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Bureaucratic Structure and Personality Author(s): Robert K. Merton Source: Social Forces, Vol. 18, No. 4 (May, 1940), pp. 560-568 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2570634 Accessed: 16-05-2019 01:56 UTC

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GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP

a Contributions to this Department will include matcrial of thrce kindsi (I) original discussion, suggcstion, plans, programs .

and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE AND PERSONALITY

ROBERT K. MERTON

Tulane University

A FORMAL, rationally organized social structure involves clearly

defined patterns of activity in which, ideally, every series of actions is

functionally related to the purposes of the

organization.' In such an organization

there is integrated a series of offices, of hierarchized statuses, in which inhere a number of obligations and privileges

closely defined by limited and specific rules. Each of these offices contains an

area of imputed competence and responsi-

bility. Authority, the power of control which derives from an acknowledged

status, inheres in the office and not in the

particular person who performs the official role. Official action ordinarily occurs

within the framework of preexisting rules of the organization. The system of

prescribed relations between the various offices involves a considerable degree of formality and clearly defined social dis- tance between the occupants of these

positions. Formality is manifested by means of a more or less complicated social

ritual which symbolizes and supports the

''pecking order" of the various offices. Such formality, which is integrated with

the distribution of authority within the

system, serves to minimize friction by

largely restricting (official) contact to

modes which are previously defined by the

rules of the organization. Ready cal-

culability of others' behavior and a stable

set of mutual expectations is thus built up. Moreover, formality facilitates the inter-

action of the occupants of offices despite their (possibly hostile) private attitudes toward one another. In this way, the

subordinate is protected from the arbitrary action of his superior, since the actions

of both are constrained by a mutually recognized set of rules. Specific pro- cedural devices foster objectivity and restrain the "quick passage of impulse into action."'2

The ideal type of such formal organiza- tion is bureaucracy and, in many respects,

the. classical analysis of bureaucracy is that by Max Weber.' As Weber indi-

1 For a development of the concept of "rational organization," see Karl Mannheim, Mensch und

Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus (Leiden: A. W.

Sijthoff, I935), esp. pp. 28 ff.

2 H. D. Lasswell, Politics (New York: McGraw- Hill, I936), pp. i2o-2i.

3 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tuib-

ingen:J. C. B. Mohr, i9)2), Pt. III, chap. 6, pp. 65o- 678. For a brief summary of Weber's discussion,

see Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action

(New York: McGraw-Hill, I937), esp. pp. 5o6 ff. For a description, which is not a caricature, of the

bureaucrat as a personality type, see C. Rabany, "Les types sociaux: le fonctionnaire," Revue g6ne'ralc

d'administration, LXXXVIII (I907), 5-z8.

56o

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GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP 56I

cates, bureaucracy involves a clear-cut

division of integrated activities which are regarded as duties inherent in the

office. A system of differentiated con-

trols and sanctions are stated in the

regulations. The assignment of roles

occurs on the basis of technical qualifica- tions which are ascertained through

formalized, impersonal procedures (e.g.

examinations). Within the structure of hierarchically arranged authority, the

activities of "trained and salaried experts"

are governed by general, abstract, clearly defined rules which preclude the necessity

for the issuance of specific instructions for each specific case. The generality of the rules requires the constant use of

categoriZation, whereby individual prob- lems and cases are classified on the basis

of designated criteria and are treated accordingly. The pure type of bureau- cratic official is appointed, either by a superior or through the exercise of

impersonal competition; he is not elected. A measure of flexibility in the bureaucracy

is attained by electing higher functionaries

who presumably express the will of the electorate (e.g. a body of citizens or a

board of directors). The election of higher officials is designed to affect the purposes of the organization, but the technical procedures for attaining these

ends are performed by a continuous bureau-

cratic personnel.4 The bulk of bureaucratic offices involve

the expectation of life-long tenure, in the absence of disturbing factors which may decrease the size of the organization. Bureaucracy maximizes vocational secu-

rity.5 The function of security of tenure,

pensions, incremental salaries and regu- larized procedures for promotion is to ensure the devoted performance of official duties, without regard for extraneous pressures.6 The chief merit of bureau- cracy is its technical efficiency, with a premium placed on precision, speed, expert control, continuity, discretion, and optimal returns on input. The structure is one which approaches the complete

elimination of personalized relationships and of nonrational considerations (hostil- ity, anxiety, affectual involvements, etc.).

Bureaucratization is accompanied by

the centralization of means of production, as in modern capitalistic enterprise, or as in the case of the post-feudal army,

complete separation from the means of

destruction. Even the bureaucratically organized scientific laboratory is char- acterized by the separation of the scientist from his technical equipment.

Bureaucracy is administration which

almost completely avoids public discussion of its techniques, although there may occur public discussion of its policies.7 This "bureaucratic secrecy" is held to be necessary in order to keep valuable in-

formation from economic competitors or from foreign and potentially hostile political groups.

In these bold outlines, the positive attainments and functions of bureau-

cratic organization are emphasized and the internal stresses and strains of such structures are almost wholly neglected. The community at large, however, evi-

dently emphasizes the imperfections of

4 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, I936), pp. i8n., I05 if. See also Ramsay Muir, Peers and Bureaucrats (London: Con-

stable, I9IO), pp. I2-I3. 5 E. G. Cahen-Salvador suggests that the person-

nel of bureaucracies is largely constituted of those

who value security above all else. See his "La

situation materielle et morale des fonctionnaires,"

Revue politique et parlementaire (I926), p. 3I9.

6 H. J. Laski, "Bureaucracy," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. This article is written primarily

from the standpoint of the political scientist rather

than that of the sociologist.

7 Weber, op. cit., p. 67I.

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562 SOCIAL FORCES

bureaucracy, as is suggested by the fact that the "horrid hybrid," bureaucrat,

has become a Schimpfwort. The transition to a study of the negative aspects of

bureaucracy is afforded by the application of Veblen's concept of "trained incapac- ity," Dewey's notion of "occupational

psychosis" or Warnotte's view of "pro-

fessional deformation." Trained incapac- ity refers to that state of affairs in which

one's abilities function as inadequacies or blind spots. Actions based upon

training and skills which have been

successfully applied in the past may result in inappropriate responses under changed conditions. An inadequate flexibility in the application of skills will, in a chang- ing milieu, result in more or less serious

maladjustments.8 Thus, to adopt a barn- yard illustration used in this connection

by Burke, chickens may be readily con- ditioned to interpret the sound of a bell as a signal for food. The same bell may now be used to summon the "trained

chickens" to their doom as they are assembled to suffer decapitation. In gen- eral, one adopts measures in keeping with his past training and, under new condi- tions which are not recognized as sig-

nificantly different, the very soundness of this training may lead to the adoption of the wrong procedures. Again, in Burke's almost echolalic phrase, "people may be unfitted by being fit in an unfit fitness"; their training may become an incapacity.

Dewey's concept of occupational psy-

chosis rests upon much the same observa- tions. As a result of their day to day

routines, people develop special prefer-

ences, antipathies, discriminations and

emphases.9 (The term psychosis is used by Dewey to denote a "pronounced char- acter of the mind.") These psychoses

develop through demands put upon the individual by the particular organization of his occupational role.

The concepts of both Veblen and Dewey refer to a fundamental ambivalence. Any action can be considered in terms of what

it attains or what it fails to attain.

"A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing-a focus upon object A involves

a neglect of object B."'0 In his discus- sion, Weber is almost exclusively

concerned with what the bureaucratic structure attains: precision, reliability,

efficiency. This same structure may be

examined from another perspective pro- vided by the ambivalence. What are the limitations of the organization designed to attain these goals?

For reasons which we have already

noted, the bureaucratic structure exerts a

constant pressure upon the official to be

"'methodical, prudent, disciplined." If the bureaucracy is to operate successfully,

it must attain a high degree of reliability

of behavior, an unusual degree of con-

formity with prescribed patterns of action. Hence, the fundamental importance of discipline which may be as highly devel- oped in a religious or economic bureau- cracy as in the army. Discipline can be

effective only if the ideal patterns are buttressed by strong sentiments which

entail devotion to one's duties, a keen sense of the limitation of one's authority

and competence, and methodical per- formance of routine activities. The

efficacy of social structure depends ulti- mately upon infusing group participants with appropriate attitudes and sentiments. As we shall see, there are definite arrange-

8 For a stimulating discussion and application of these concepts, see Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change (New York: New Republic, I935), pp. 50 if.; Daniel Warnotte, "Bureaucratic et Fonctionnar-

isme," Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie, XVII (I937), 2.45.

I9bid., pp. 58-59. 10 Ibid., p. 70.

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GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP 563

ments in the bureaucracy for inculcating and reinforcing these sentiments.

At the moment, it suffices to observe that in order to ensure discipline (the

necessary reliability of response), these sentiments are often more intense than is technically necessary. There is a margin of safety, so to speak, in the pressure

exerted by these sentiments upon the

bureaucrat to conform to his patterned obligations, in much the same sense that added allowances (precautionary over-

estimations) are made by the engineer in

designing the supports for a bridge. But this very emphasis leads to a transference of the sentiments from the aims of the organization onto the particular details of behavior required by the rules. Adher- ence to the rules, originally conceived as a

means, becomes transformed into an end- in-itself; there occurs the familiar process of displacement of goals whereby "an instrumental value becomes a terminal

value. ""' Discipline, readily interpreted

as conformance with regulations, what-

ever the situation, is seen not as a measure

designed for specific purposes but becomes an immediate value in the life-organiza-

tion of the bureaucrat. This emphasis, resulting from the displacement of the original goals, develops into rigidities and an inability to adjust readily. For-

malism, even ritualism, ensues with an

unchallenged insistence upon punctilious

adherence to formalized procedures .12 This may be exaggerated to the point

where primary concern with conformity to the rules interferes with the achieve-

ment of the purposes of the organization, in which case we have the familiar

phenomenon of the technicism or red tape of the official. An extreme product of this process of displacement of goals is

the bureaucratic virtuoso, who never

forgets a single rule binding his action

and hence is unable to assist many of his clients-.3 A case in point, where strict recognition of the limits of authority and

literal adherence to rules produced this

result, is the pathetic plight of Bernt

Balchen, Admiral Byrd's pilot in the

flight over the South Pole.

11 This process has often been observed in

various connections. Wundt's heterogony of ends is a

case in point; Max Weber's Paradoxie der Folgen is

another. See also Maclver's observations on the

transformation of civilization into culture and Lass- well's remark that "the human animal distinguishes himself by his infinite capacity for making ends of his means." See R. K. Merton, "The Unanticipated

Consequences of Purposive Social Action," American Sociological Review, I (I936), 894-904). In terms of the psychological mechanisms involved, this process has been analyzed most fully by Gordon W. Allport,

in his discussion of what he calls "the functional autonomy of motives." Allport emends the earlier formulations of Woodworth, Tolman, and William

Stern, and arrives at a statement of the process from the standpoint of individual motivation. He does not consider those phases of the social structure which conduce toward the "transformation of mo- tives." The formulation adopted in this paper is thus complementary to Allport's analysis; the one

stressing the psychological mechanisms involved, the other considering the constraints of the social structure. The convergence of psychology and sociology toward this central concept suggests that it may well constitute one of the conceptual bridges

According to a ruling of the department of labor Bernt Balchen . . . cannot receive his citizenship

papers. Balchen, a native of Norway, declared his

intention in I927. It is held that he has failed to meet the condition of five years' continuous residence

in the United States. The Byrd antarctic voyage

took him out of the country, although he was on a

ship flying the American flag, was an invaluable

member of an American expedition, and in a region

between the two disciplines. See Gordon W. All- port, Personality (New York: Henry Holt & Co., I937), chap. 7.

12 See E. C. Hughes, "Institutional Office and the

Person," American Journal of Sociology, XLIII (937), 404-4I3; R. K. Merton, "Social Structure and Ano-

mie," American Sociological Review, III (I938), 67X-68X; E. T. Hiller, "Social Structure in Relation to the

Person," Social Forces, XVI (937), 34-44. 13 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. io6.

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564 SOCIAL FORCES

to which there is an Amnerican claim because of the exploration and occupation of it by Americans, this

region being Little America.

The bureau of naturalization explains that it

cannot proceed on the assumption that Little America

is American soil. That would be trespass on inter-

national questions where it has no sanction. So far

as the bureau is concerned, Balchen was out of the

country and technically has not complied with the

law of naturalization.'4

Such inadequacies in orientation which involve trained incapacity clearly derive

from structural sources. The process may

be briefly recapitulated. (i) An effective bureaucracy demands reliability of re-

sponse and strict devotion to regulations. (z) Such devotion to the rules leads to their transformation into absolutes; they

are no longer conceived as relative to a

given set of purposes. (3) This inter- feres with ready adaptation under special conditions not clearly envisaged by those who drew up the general rules.

(4) Thus, the very eletnents which con- duce toward efficiency in general produce inefficiency in specific instances. Full realization of the inadequacy is seldom

attained by mnembers of the group who have not divorced themnselves fromn the "'meanings" which the rules have for them. These rules in time become sym-

bolic in cast, rather than strictly utilitarian.

Thus far, we have treated the ingrained sentiments making for rigorous discipline simply as data, as given. However, definite features of the bureaucratic struc-

ture may be seen to conduce to these sentiments. The bureaucrat's official life is planned for him in terms of a graded career, through the organizational devices of promotion by seniority, pensions, incremental salaries, etc., all of which

are designed to provide incentives for

disciplined action and conformity to the official regulations.'5 The official is

tacitly expected to and largely does adapt

his thoughts, feelings, and actions to the prospect of this career. But these very

devices which increase the probability of

conformance also lead to an over-concern

with strict adherence to regulations which induces timidity, conservatism, and tech- nicism. Displacement of sentiments from

goals onto means is fostered by the tremendous symbolic significance of the

means (rules). Another feature of the bureaucratic

structure tends to produce much the same result. Functionaries have the sense of a

common destiny for all those who work together. They share the same interests,

especially since there is relatively little competition insofar as promotion is in terms of seniority. In-group aggression is thus mninimized and this arrangement is therefore conceived to be positively

functional for the bureaucracy. How-

ever, the esprit de corps and informal social organization which typically de-

velops in such situations often leads the personnel to defend their entrenched interests rather than to assist their

clientele and elected higher officials. As President Lowell reports, if the bureau- crats believe that their status is not adequately recognized by an incoming elected official, detailed information will be withheld from him, leading him to errors for which he is held responsible. Or, if he seeks to dominate fully, and thus violates the sentiment of self-integ- rity of the bureaucrats, he may have

documents brought to him in such num- bers that he cannot manage to sign them

14 Quoted from the Chicago Tribune (June 2.4, I93I, p. io) by Thurman Arnold, The Symbols of Government

(New Haven: Yale University Press, I935), pp. 2OI-2.. (My italics.)

15 Mannheim, Mensch und Gesellschaft, pp. 32X-33.

Mannheim stresses the importance of the "Lebens-

plan" and the "Amtskarriere." See the comments

by Hughes, op. Cit., 4I3.

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GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP 565

all, let alone read them.16 This illustrates the defensive informal organization which

tends to arise whenever there is an appar-

ent threat to the integrity of the group."7 It would be much too facile and partly

erroneous to attribute such resistance by

bureaucrats simply to vested interests. Vested interests oppose any new order

which either eliminates or at least makes uncertain their differential advantage de- riving from the current arrangements.

This is undoubtedly involved in part in

bureaucratic resistance to change but another process is perhaps more signifi- cant. As we have seen, bureaucratic officials affectively identify themselves with their way of life. They have a pride of craft which leads them to resist change in established routines; at least, those

changes which are felt to be imposed by persons outside the inner circle of co- workers. This nonlogical pride of craft is a familiar pattern found even, to judge from Sutherland's Professional Thief, among

pickpockets who, despite the risk, delight in mastering the prestige-bearing feat of

"beating a left breech" (picking the left front trousers pocket).

In a stimulating paper, Hughes has applied the concepts of "secular" and

"sacred" to various types of division of labor; "the sacredness" of caste and Stiinde prerogatives contrasts sharply with the increasing secularism of occupa- tional differentiation in our mobile so- ciety.'8 However, as our discussion

suggests, there may ensue, in particular

vocations and in particular types of

organization, the process of soanctification (viewed as the counterpart of the process

of secularization). This is to say that through sentiment-formation, emotional dependence- upon bureaucratic symbols and status, and affective involvement in spheres of competence and authority, there develop prerogatives involving atti-

tudes of moral legitimacy which are

established as values in their own right, and are no longer viewed as merely technical means for expediting adminis- tration. One may note a tendency for certain bureaucratic norms, originally introduced for technical reasons, to be-

come rigidified and sacred, although, as Durkheim would say, they are laique en apparence.19 Durkheim has touched on this general process in his description of the attitudes and values which persist in the organic solidarity of a highly differentiated society.

Another feature of the bureaucratic

structure, the stress on depersonalization

of relationships, also plays its part in the bureaucrat's trained incapacity. The per- sonality pattern of the bureaucrat is nucleated about this norm of imperson-

ality. Both this and the categorizing tendency, which develops from the dom-

16 A. L. Lowell, The Government of England (New York, 1908), I, I89 if.

17 For an instructive description of the develop- ment of such a defensive organization in a group of

workers, see F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, Management and the Worker (Boston: Harvard School

of Business Administration, 1934). 18 E. C. Hughes, "Personality Types and the Divi-

sion of Labor," American Journal of Sociology, XXXIII

(19X8), 754-768. Much the same distinction is drawn by Leopold von Wiese and Howard Becker,

Systematic Sociology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1932), pp- 2-22-5 et passim.

19 Hughes recognizes one phase of this process of sanctificationi when he writes that professional train- ing "carries with it as a by-product assimilation of

the candidate to a set of professional attitudes and

controls, a professional conscience and solidarity. The profession claims and aims to become a moral unit. "

Hughes, op. cit., p. 76z, (italics inserted). In this same connection, Sumner's concept of pathos, as the halo of sentiment which protects a social value from

criticism, is particularly relevant, inasmuch as it affords a clue to the mechanisms involved in the process of sanctification. See his Folkways (Boston: Ginn & Co., I906), pp. i8o-i8i.

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566 SOCIAL FORCES

inant role of general, abstract rules, tend

to produce conflict in the bureaucrat's

contacts with the public or clientele.

Since functionaries minimize personal rela-

tions and resort to categorization, the

peculiarities of individual cases are often ignored. But the client who, quite un-

derstandably, is convinced of the "special features" of his own problem often ob- jects to such categorical treatment.

Stereotyped behavior is not adapted to

the exigencies of individual problems. The impersonal treatment of affairs which are at times of great personal significance to the client gives rise to the charge of

"arrogance" and "haughtiness" of the

bureaucrat. Thus, at the Greenwich Em- ployment Exchange, the unemnployed

worker who is securing his insurance payment resents what he deems to be "the impersonality and, at times, the apparent abruptness and even harshness of his treatment by the clerks. . . . Some men complain of the superior attitude

which the clerks have."20

Still another source of conflict with the

public derives from the bureaucratic

structure. The bureaucrat, in part ir-

respective of his position within the hierarchy, acts as a representative of the

power and prestige of the entire structure. In his official role he is vested with

definite authority. This often leads to an actual or apparent domineering atti-

tude, which may only be exaggerated by a discrepancy between his position within the hierarchy and his position with

reference to the public.2' Protest and recourse to other officials on the part of the client are often ineffective or largely precluded by the previously mentioned

esprit de corps which joins the officials into a more or less solidary in-group. This source of conflict may be minimized in private enterprise since the client can

register an effective protest by trans-

ferring his trade to another organization within the competitive system. But with the monopolistic nature of the public

organization, no such alternative is pos- sible. Moreover, in this case, tension is

increased because of a discrepancy be- 20" 'They treat you like a lump of dirt they do. I see a navvy reach across the counter and shake one of

them by the collar the other day. The rest of us felt like cheering. Of course he lost his benefit

over it. . . . But the clerk deserved it for his sassy

way.' " (E. W. Bakke, The Unemployed Man, New York: Dutton, 1934, pp. 79-80). Note that the

domineering attitude was imputed by the unemployed

client who is in a state of tension due to his loss of status and self-esteem in a society where the ideology is still current that an "able man" can always find a job. That the imputation of arrogance stems

largely from the client's state of mind is seen from Bakke's own observation that "the clerks were

rushed, and had no time for pleasantries, but there was little sign of harshness or a superiority feeling in their treatment of the men." Insofar as there is an objective basis for the imputation of arrogant

behavior to bureaucrats, it may possibly be explained by the following juxtaposed statements. "Auch

der moderne, sei es 6ffentliche, sei es private, Beamte

erstrebt immer und geniesst meist den Beherrschten gegenuiber eine spezifisch gehobene, 'standische'

soziale SchAtzung." (Weber, op. cit., 65z.) "In

persons in whom the craving for prestige is upper- most, hostility usually takes the form of a desire to

humiliate others." (K. Horney, The Neurotic Per-

sonality of Our Time, New York: Norton, I937, pp.

I78-79.) 21 In this connection, note the relevance of Koffka's

comments on certain features of the pecking-order of

birds. "If one compares the behavior of the bird at the top of the pecking list, the despot, with that of one very far down, the second or third from the last,

then one finds the latter much more cruel to the few others over whom he lords it than the former in his

treatment of all members. As soon as one removes from the group all members above the penultimate,

his behavior becomes milder and may even become very friendly. . It is not difficult to find analogies

to this in human societies, and therefore one side of

such behavior must be primarily the effects of the social groupings, and not of individual characteris-

tics." K. Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935), pp. 668-9.

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GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP 567

tween ideology and fact: the govern-

mental personnel are held to be "servants

of the people," but in fact they are usually superordinate, and release of tension can seldom be afforded by turning to other

agencies for the necessary service.22 This tension is in part attributable to the con-

fusion of status of bureaucrat and client; the client may consider himself socially

superior to the official who is at the mno- ment dominant.23

Thus, with respect to the relations be- tween officials and clientele, one struc-

tural source of conflict is the pressure for formnal and impersonal treatment when individual, personalized consideration is

desired by the client. The conflict mnay be viewed, then, as deriving from the introduction of inappropriate attitudes and relationships. Conflict within the

bureaucratic structure arises from the converse situation, namely, when person- alized relationships are substituted for the structurally required impersonal rela-

tionships. This type of conflict may be characterized as follows.

The bureaucracy, as we have seen, is

organized as a secondary, formnal group. The normnal responses involved in this

organized network of social expectations

are supported by affective attitudes of members of the group. Since the group

is oriented toward secondary norms of

impersonality, any failure to conform to

these norms will arouse antagonism from

those whb have identified themselves with

the legitimacy of these rules. Hence, the

substitution of personal for impersonal

treatment within the structure is met

with widespread disapproval and is char- acterized by such epithets as graft, favor-

itism, nepotism, apple-polishing, etc.

These epithets are clearly manifestations

of injured sentiments.24 The function of such "automatic resentment" can be

clearly seen in terms of the requirements of

bureaucratic structure. Bureaucracy is a secondary group mech-

anism designed to carry on certain ac-

tivities which cannot be satisfactorily

performed on the basis of primary group criteria.25 Hence behavior which runs counter to these formalized norms becomes the object of emotionalized disapproval.

This constitutes a functionally significant defence set up against tendencies which jeopardize the performance of socially necessary activities. To be sure, these reactions are not rationally determined practices explicitly designed for the ful-

filment of this function. Rather, viewed in terms of the individual's interpretation

of the situation, such resentment is simply an immediate response opposing the

"dishonesty" of those who violate the

22 At this point the political machine often be-

comes functionally significant. As Steffens and

others have shown, highly personalized relations and the abrogation of formal rules (red tape) by the machine often satisfy the needs of individual "cli-

ents" more fully than the formalized mechanism of governmental bureaucracy.

23 As one of the unemployed men remarked about

the clerks at the Greenwich Employment Exchange:

" 'And the bloody blokes wouldn't have their jobs

if it wasn't for us men out of a job either. That's what gets me about their holding their noses up.'

Bakke, op. cit., p. 8o.

24 The diagnostic significance of such linguistic

indices as epithets has scarcely been explored by the

sociologist. Sumner properly observes that epithets

produce "summary criticisms" and definitions of

social situations. Dollard also notes that "epithets

frequently define the central issues in a society,"

and Sapir has rightly emphasized the importance of

context of situations in appraising the significance of epithets. Of equal relevance is Linton's observa-

tion that "in case histories the way in which the

community felt about a particular episode is, if any-

thing, more important to our study than the actual

behavior...." A sociological study of "vocabu- laries of encomium and opprobrium" should lead to

valuable findings.

25 Cf. Ellsworth Faris, The Nature of Human Nature

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), pp. 41 ff.

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568 SOCIAL FORCES

rules of the game. However, this sub-

jective frame of reference notwithstanding, these reactions serve the function of main-

taining the essential structural elements of

bureaucracy by reaffirming the necessity for formalized, secondary relations and

by helping to prevent the disintegration of the bureaucratic structure which would occur should these be supplanted by personalized relations. This type of con-

flict may be generically described as the

intrusion of primary group attitudes when

secondary group attitudes are institu-

tionally demanded, just as the bureau-

crat-client conflict often derives from

interaction on impersonal terms when

personal treatment is individually de-

manded.26

The trend toward increasing bureau-

cratization in Western society, which

Weber had long since foreseen, is not the

sole reason for sociologists to turn their

attention to this field. Empirical studies

of the interaction of bureaucracy and

personality should especially increase our

understanding of social structure. A

large number of specific questions invite

our attention. To what extent are par-

ticular personality types selected and modi-

fled by the various bureaucracies (private

enterprise, public service, the quasi-legal

political machine, religious orders)? Inas- much as ascendancy and submission are

held to be traits of personality, despite

their variability in different stimulus-

situations, do bureaucracies select person-

alities of particularly submissive or as- cendant tendencies? And since various

studies have shown that these traits can

be modified, does participation in bureau- cratic office tend to increase ascendant tendencies? Do various systems of re-

cruitment (e.g. patronage, open competi-

tion involving specialized knowledge or "general mental capacity," practical ex- perience) select different personality types? Does promotion through seniority lessen

competitive anxieties and enchance ad- ministrative efficiency? A detailed ex- amination of mechanisms for imbuing the

bureaucratic codes with affect would be instructive both sociologically and psy-

chologically. Does the general anon-

ymity of civil service decisions tend to

restrict the area of prestige-symbols to a narrowly defined inner circle? Is there a tendency for differential association to be

especially marked among bureaucrats? The range of theoretically significant

and practically important questions would

seem to be limited only by the accessi- bility of the concrete data. Studies of religious, educational, military, eco- nomic, and political bureaucracies dealing

with the interdependence of social organ- ization and personality formation should

constitute an avenue for fruitful research.

On that avenue, the functional analysis

of concrete structures may yet build a Solomon's House for sociologists.

26 Community disapproval of many forms of be- havior may be analyzed in terms of one or the other of these patterns of substitution of culturally in- appropriate types of relationship. Thus, prostitu- tion constitutes a type-case where coitus, a form of intimacy which is institutionally defined as symbolic

of the most "sacred" primary group relationship, is placed within a contractual context, symbolized by the exchange of that most impersonal of all symbols, money. See Kingsley Davis, "The Sociology of Prostitution," American Sociological Review, II (937),

744-55-

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