response

T h e St ru g g l e f o r   F r e e d o m f r o m   F e a r

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1

The Struggle for Freedom from Fear

C O N T E S T I N G V I O L E N C E A G A I N S T W O M E N AT

T H E F R O N T I E R S O F G L O B A L I Z AT I O N

Alison Brysk

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1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2018

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Names: Brysk, Alison, 1960– author. Title: The struggle to end violence against women : human rights and the dynamics of change / Alison Brysk. Description: New York : Oxford University Press, [2018] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017061033 (print) | LCCN 2018000963 (ebook) | ISBN 9780190901530 (Updf ) | ISBN 9780190901547 (Epub) | ISBN 9780190901523 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780190901516 (hardcover : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Women— Violence against. | Women’s rights. | Sex crimes— Prevention. | Human rights. Classification: LCC HV6250.4.W65 (ebook) | LCC HV6250.4.W65 B789 2018 (print) | DDC 362.82/ 926— dc23 LC record available at https:// lccn.loc.gov/ 2017061033

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Paperback printed by WebCom, Inc., Canada Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America

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Down- sky The sun rakes its nails—

The men sit haunched,

I quicken:

Kicked by belly- hammer down the pinball flight of menace.

The sky trundles in its merchandise—

Their eyes pressed at the pane;

The straggler, I smell blood on their breath.

Trees reduce to ground cover, I count

The cars’ eyes as witnesses; I scurry

The trail lacquered between bunkers.

Heart beat behind my ears, I gain

Sanctuary, hearing him say—

I shouldn’t be out alone so late; thinking,

Each day the sun drives its nails deeper.

— 12/ 82

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vii

Contents

List of Figures ix List of Tables xi Acknowledgments xiii

1. Violence against Women 1

2. Constructing Human Rights 30

3. Acting Globally: The International Rights Repertoire 50

4. Mobilization: Standing Up for Women’s Security 80

5. Freedom: The Struggle for Sexual Self- Determination 108

6. The Right to Life: Femicide and Intimate Partner Violence 137

7. The Right to Bodily Integrity: The Struggle to End Sexual Violence 160

8. Ending Impunity: Law and Its Limits 193

9. Expanding Rights: Gendered Public Policy 222

10. Norm Change: Pathways of Persuasion 241

11. Conclusion: The Quest for Freedom from Fear 273

B i b l i o g r a p h y   291 I n d e x   3 37

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ix

Figures

1.1 Construction of the Gender Regime 12 3.1 Dynamics of the Human Rights Regime 52 6.1 Physical Security of Women 139 10.1 The Rape Culture Hall of Shame 266

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xi

Tables

1.1 Gender Regime Clusters 13 1.2 Gender Regimes Patterns of GBV 15 1.3 Drivers of Gender Violence 22 1.4 Case Study Profiles: The Frontiers of Globalization 26 2.1 International Standards on Gender Violence 32 2.2 Pathways of Change 48 3.1 Rights Frames for Gender Violence 55 4.1 Regional Spread of Femicide Movements in Mexico 90 5.1 Human Trafficking Prevalence and Policy 124 7.1 Taxonomy of Sexual Violence 163 7.2 Patterns and Prevalence of Sexual Violence 177 11.1 Dynamics of Change at the Frontiers of Globalization 276 11.2 Reproductive Rights Access 284

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xiii

Acknowledgments

This book represents a four- year global journey that has been supported by an amazing academic and personal network, and I  am immensely grateful for the support of all the individuals and institutions listed here— and those between the lines. My re- search has been supported since 2010 by the Duncan and Suzanne Mellichamp Chair in Global Governance at the University of California Santa Barbara (UCSB). Over the past decade, Oxford University Press has provided a home for my scholarship, spanning three books. I would like to highlight the extraordinarily patient and insightful guidance my editor Angela Chnapko has offered for this project through a lengthy and complex but ultimately very fruitful revision process.

The research began during a 2013– 2014 Woodrow Wilson Fellowship, which was a much- appreciated opportunity for time, space, collegial exchange, global engagement, policy education, bibliographic enrichment, research assistance, intellectual stimulation, and friendship. This project would not have been possible without all of the directors, staff, fellows, and interns who accompanied my residence, feedback in working groups and presentations, with special support from the Latin America and the Environmental Change and Security programs. As interns, Ciro Moraes and Debbie Sutton provided expert, dedicated, and imaginative research assistance. Ciro contributed greatly to my knowledge of Brazil, international law, media mobilization, and men’s movements, while Debbie drafted comprehensive analyses of US foreign policy as well as modeling an earlier version of the regression linking inequality and urbanization to gender violence. My cohort of visiting Fellows provided inspiration, moral support, writing feedback, and

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xiv Acknowledgments

many forms of companionship— especially Donny Meertens, Erica Marat, Amal Fadlalla, Osman Can, Jessica Robbins, Sayuri Shimizu, and Maria Cristina Garcia.

At UC Santa Barbara, the project was greatly advanced by work and conversations with my co- author on “When Development Is Not Enough,” insightful development economist and stealth sociologist Aashish Mehta. I would like to recognize and appre- ciate many years of multifaceted and extremely skilled research assistance by UCSB Ph.D.  candidate Natasha Bennett, who contributed thoughtful analysis, topical exper- tise, multiple reorganizations of the structure of the text, and helpful graphics, as well as designing and administering massive information management and bibliographic sys- tems. Various aspects of the research, charts, and text editing were also ably supported by Jesilyn Faust, Yunuen Ocampo, and Amanda Pinheiro. Joint workshops with the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies and Mellichamp Chair at UCSB shaped the frameworks for human rights analysis, and I am grateful to the dozens of participants for thoughtful comments.

I have also been informed, supported, and inspired by the WomanStats Project, which has provided a research network, invaluable data source, and extremely constructive feed- back. Valerie Hudson has been a hero and role model in her own pioneering scholarship, creating the WomanStats Project and including me in numerous panels and exchanges at the International Studies Association, American Political Science Association, and else- where that have shaped my work. Valentine Moghadam has been a supportive colleague and a critical source of insight on gender regimes, global– local human rights dynamics, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Andrea van den Boer, Natalie Romeri- Lewis, Catalina Monroy, and other WomanStats co- Principal Investigators have all provided important new information and perspectives that contributed to this book.

Several other networks, institutions, and colleagues have influenced and supported the development of this research. Many thanks for the opportunity to present and re- ceive useful feedback on early versions of numerous chapters to colleagues and programs at George Washington University, Tufts University, Freedom House, Deusto University (Spain), the University of Oregon, Erasmus program at the University of Vienna, University of New Mexico, and the Gladstein Visiting Professorship in Human Rights at the University of Connecticut. I would also like to highlight the contribution of my frequent collaborator and constant friend Gershon Shafir, who read and commented on several drafts of the entire project and has enlightened me constantly with his profound knowledge, wisdom, and analysis of rights, power, citizenship, globalization, gender— and life itself.

Speaking of friends, family, and fellow travelers, I have been blessed with an extraordi- nary and beloved crew who played essential roles at various steps along the way. Friends and neighbors who have provided companionship, support, and “shelter from the storm” include the following : in DC, my hosts and neighbors Mark McElreath and Bert Kubli; in California, Lavanya Michel, Tatiana Nazarenko, Robert Bettinger, and Mark Austin Thomas; in Spain, Felipe Gomez Isa and Salvador Marti; in Mexico, Ruben Dominguez;

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Acknowledgments xv

and in the country of illness and the fortunate path beyond, Carol Wise, Sheri Cardo, my daughter Ana Brysk Freeman, and the late Susan Stone. I am touched, uplifted, and guided in all my endeavors by the love of my parents Lucy and Marcel Brysk, my daughter Miriam Brysk Freeman, her father Mark Freeman, my siblings Sarah, Seth, Josh, and Jordan and their families.

One out of three women in the world have been affected by violence— and I am one. I wrote this book in part to speak truth and knowledge to that profound distortion of power, which has touched the lives of so many of my family, friends, colleagues, and students. But I write also in a spirit of hope and solidarity with the courage and com- passion of good men and women I have learned about and witnessed all over the world, and in my own circles of collaboration and care. The journey begins and ends in our hearts, and this book is dedicated to our power to heal ourselves and build a world of safety and freedom.

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T h e St ru g g l e f o r   F r e e d o m f r o m   F e a r

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1

1

Violence against Women

In an er a of democracy, globalization, and increasing gender equity, half of the world’s women live in fear.1 Alongside men, women are the victims of human rights violations like war crimes, genocide, and forced displacement. But an estimated one out of three women in the world also suffer gender- based murder, torture, sexual violence, and assault— perpetrated and enabled by foreign armies, their own governments, social authorities, criminals and traffickers, and their own families. These threats to human security were not comprehended by the original international human rights regime, or even by pre- vious waves of mobilization for women’s civil and political rights. In 1990, Amartya Sen wrote that “100  million women are missing” from the populations of China and India due to sex- selective abortion. A generation later, we can say that one billion women— one out of three worldwide— are missing from human rights.

As David Rothkopf summarizes:

There is no genocide against any people that has produced more victims than the number of females who have lost their lives to discrimination against the birth of girl babies (in Pakistan alone, for instance, there is a culturally encouraged “shortage” of an estimated 6 million females), or who have died from the unwill- ingness of societies to provide the health care women need, or who die as a re- sult of social customs that allow fathers to kill daughters for “shaming” families, husbands to kill wives for adultery, and men to perpetrate other horrific violence

1 In a 2014 EU survey of 42,000 women, in the most democratic, secure, and prosperous region of the world, “half of all women avoid certain situations or places, at least sometimes, for fear of being physically or sexually assaulted.” These fears are justified by the same survey’s finding that 33% of women in the EU have experienced physical and/ or sexual violence in their lifetime, and an estimated 13  million women in the EU experienced physical violence just in the year prior to the survey (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, Violence against women: an EU- wide survey, 2014).

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2 Freedom from Fear

against women. That countless millions of women are also regularly raped, beaten, and abused by men only compounds these atrocities. The systematic, persistent acceptance of women’s second- class status is history’s greatest shame. And for all our self- congratulations about how far we have come, we live in a world where even in the most advanced countries, deep injustices against women remain. (Rothkopf 2013)

The purpose of this book is to show how to begin to change that. From the 1993 Vienna World Human Rights Conference onward, the global community has reframed women’s rights as human rights. Global and local women’s movement campaigns, human rights organizations, some governments— including that of the United States— and many global institutions have taken notable steps to address violence, from prosecuting rape as a war crime at the International Criminal Court to US sponsorship of a monitoring and sanctions regime for human trafficking. While there have been notable successes in some states’ policies, like Brazil’s landmark domestic violence law, the global prevalence and harms of violence against women (VAW) persist, undermining women’s rights and global human security. This book argues that human rights reform is necessary but not sufficient to address violence, and that addressing gendered abuse requires an expansion of rights frames, mechanisms, and responsibilities— from the new frame of femicide to local translation of global rights talk, from gendered public policy for urban planning to doctrines of due diligence. If we see the future of human rights as an evolving movement toward freedom, equality, and dignity in power relations, the struggle against gender vi- olence is key to constructing new rights repertoires for all.

1.1 One billion women are missing

The United Nations’ Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women defines the problem of gender- based violence as follows:

(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry- related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non- spousal violence and violence related to exploitation;

(b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution;

(c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.

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Violence against Women 3

This study will analyze the pattern, sources, and response to these direct physical threats to women’s personal security. Like human rights studies that concentrate on a specific pattern such as war crimes or racial discrimination, we will examine both the broader power relations and the specific features of this form of abuse— VAW— but not the wider range of women’s human rights or related issues of gender equity.2

We can track gender violence over time and across space. Women worldwide face special risks from the beginning to the end of the life- cycle: from female feticide to fe- male genital mutilation/ circumcision (FGM/ C) in infancy, from child abuse to honor violence and forced marriage at puberty, from sexual assault to femicide in adolescence and youth, forced labor and battering in adulthood, and targeted killing of witches and widows in old age. VAW is the most pervasive unfinished business of the international human rights regime.

In the spring of 2016, I sat in Vienna with a classroom of international master’s students from a dozen countries and asked them: how do you experience gender violence in your country? An economics student from Iran spoke of the frequency of domestic violence, and women’s lack of legal recourse and exit options. Her Austrian classmates pointed out that Austrian women do have legal protection but contingent on inconsistent police re- moval of abusers, citing cases where returning abusers have murdered their families. Her neighbor from Argentina recounted the shocking increase in femicide in that country, despite legal measures and public protest. The student from Russia reported how post- communist societies leave women extraordinarily vulnerable despite legal gender eq- uity, with high levels of employment discrimination, financial dependency, and police corruption that may also foster exploitative migration. Similarly, the Filipina student explained how employment discrimination and lack of reproductive rights at home drive Philippine women overseas despite trafficking, sexual assault, and exploitation as do- mestic workers. Students from Mexico and Turkey spoke of increasing public rape and killings in their countries, with slow government response despite public outcry, and the systematic devaluation and chronic abuse of women’s lives— especially poor and migrant women. Their classmates from Germany and Finland decried shortfalls in their coun- tries’ response to sexual assault despite greater resources and women’s empowerment in Europe. In March 2016, they told me, Germany debated amending the requirement to

2 Although gender- based violence may also affect men and is frequent against persons questioning or transitioning their gender assignment, this study will concentrate on VAW simply to render manageable an initial analysis of a core aspect of the phenomenon with an immense body of material. While this book will follow the practice of many international bodies that discuss gender violence as primarily equivalent to VAW for simplicity, we must simultaneously recognize the importance and interdependence of gendered violence against LGBTQI persons, men who defy masculine roles or gender regime rules such as marital choice, male political dissidents, men who are victimized as representatives of subordinated groups by caste or ethnicity, and male survivors of conflict rape. While Carpenter (2006) and others have begun to explicate these types of violence in their own terms, it is our hope that future research can attempt to extend the frameworks and findings of this study for the dynamics of change of VAW to the broader gamut of gender- based violence.

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4 Freedom from Fear

prove “resistance” to rape, while Finland’s penalty for a rape conviction was less than the penalty for tax evasion.

Violence against women— in households, in ethnic communities, in wartime, as a tool of repressive governments, and against migrants— kills and maims more people than any war, yet has been recognized only recently as a human rights problem (Hoeffler and Fearon 2014). The World Health Organization estimates that one- third of women in the world experience gender- based violence:  human trafficking, sexual assault, do- mestic violence, and femicide (DeVries et  al. 2013; World Health Organization 2013). The Geneva Small Arms Survey notes that more than 66,000 women and girls are killed violently every year, while the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime estimates that half of the women killed worldwide are murdered by a family member (Nowak 2012; UNODC 2013). Recent studies of the global prevalence of rape estimate that in 2010, 7.2% of women worldwide had experienced non- partner sexual violence (Abrahams et al. 2014)— over 240 million women. Around the world, at least 150 million girls under the age of 18 have been sexually assaulted in their lifetimes, and half were under 16 when the abuse occurred (Commission on Population and Development 2012). The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that over four million women are victims of forced sexual exploitation, as well as millions more who are victims of other kinds of trafficking and forced labor (International Labour Organization 2012).

Above and beyond its toll on hundreds of millions of direct victims, VAW has been linked to numerous social costs, including international conflict, crime, underdevelop- ment, disease, unsustainable population growth, and environmental destruction. After ex- tensive empirical testing of wealth, democracy, and culture as drivers of conflict, Hudson et  al. conclude:  “The very best predictor of a state’s peacefulness is its level of violence against women” (2015, 205). Gender equity and women’s security are linked to every as- pect of economic development (World Bank 2012). Within countries, gender violence raises medical costs, taxes police and legal systems, and lowers worker productivity— in a World Bank study of nine countries, 1– 2% of national income is consumed by the costs of abuse (Duvvury et al. 2013). Rape is a major threat to global public health, since beyond the direct health consequences of injury, partner, stranger, and conflict rape alike spread disease. Women beaten by their partners are much more likely to become infected with HIV/ AIDS (UN “Unite to End Violence against Women:  Fact Sheet” n.d.). Female birth suppression is systematically linked to crime as well as trafficking and sexual assault (Hudson and den Boer 2004). One 15- country study shows that women suffering abuse are more likely to have an unintended pregnancy, more than twice as likely to seek an abortion, twice as likely to have a miscarriage, and their children are almost four times as likely to manifest low birth weight (Prebble 2013).

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is increasing evidence that violence may persist despite modernization, as the United Nations’ Beijing + 20 Report shows world- wide improvements in women’s health, education, and political participation— but an epidemic level of violence (UN Women 2015). In some cases, women’s insecurity may

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Violence against Women 5

even be intensifying— although the incidence of specific forms of violence is notoriously difficult to measure, we can model the overall pattern and its social impact. Over the pe- riod 2006– 2014, in an era of rapid growth in the developing world, the Physical Security of Women Index (PSOW) collected by the WomanStats database project across 169 countries has deteriorated in more countries than it has improved. During the last decade of development and urbanization, China has fallen from 2 in 2006 to 3 in 2009 to 4 in 2014 on the PSOW scale, signifying a deterioration from occasional to widespread and tolerated violence (Hudson et  al. 2011; WomanStats Project Database n.d.). Although clearly reporting has improved in many places, if we assess VAW reports in a similar fashion to other forms of crime, the diversity of reporting sources and locations, trend of steady increase, and recorded increases in fatal forms of abuse that are more likely to gen- erate official registration combine to suggest there is some genuine underlying increase in violence— and even increased perception and fear of violence diminishes women’s empowerment.3

Deepening the contradiction of violence amid modernization, many major hot spots of VAW are globalizing, urbanizing, liberalizing middle- income states with rising women’s education, employment, and political participation. In Brazil alone, 43,700 women have been killed by their partners since 2000 (Agencia Patricia Galvao n.d.). In that country, recently headed by a female president, reports of rape increased by 168% in five years— from 15,351 in 2005 to 41,294 in 2010 (Forum Seguranca n.d.). The 2012 fatal gang rape of a student in Delhi— in the heart of a modernizing city in a rapidly growing country that has been led by a woman— was just one marker of an epidemic of VAW in India that spans the public and private sphere, from dowry deaths to female infanticide. According to the US Department of State human rights country reports for 2013, in India, “Official statistics pointed to rape as the country’s fastest growing crime” (US Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2013, “India.”). Domestic violence data on India also show an increase from 1998 to 2005 (Simister 2012, 51). South Africa— with one of Africa’s best records on women’s political empowerment and worst on so- cial inequality— reported over 66,000 rapes in 2013, up from 64,000 the previous year, and the figure has been steadily rising since the 1990s (US Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2013, “South Africa”). Human trafficking has surged in post- apartheid South Africa (Frankel 2016). This pattern continues in simi- larly situated countries beyond the emerging economy BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in other middle- income globalizers, such as Turkey and the

3 The WomanStats database, the most comprehensive and verified source of global information, measures over 300 indicators for 175 countries with extensive requirements for at least three independent sources and checks for cross- coder reliability. All dimensions of women’s security include separate information on prevalence via reported data, law and theoretical regulation, and practice including reporting taboos, social acceptance, and implementation deficits. In addition, WomanStats composite scales such as the Physical Security of Women index systematically code, incorporate, and weight reporting barriers in the algorithm.

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6 Freedom from Fear

Philippines. Following a decade of sharply rising reports of VAW and in the wake of a prominent rape and murder of an urban, educated woman that generated massive street protests in Istanbul, a social media campaign to encourage women to report violence received 800,000 posts (BBC 2015c, “Turkish women share”). At the same time, it is precisely in these hot spots of globalization and violence where we are witnessing unprec- edented reforms, mobilizations, and transnational efforts to contest it: from the femicide protests sweeping Latin America to family violence courts in India, from women’s urban safety coalitions to feminist bloggers across the global South.

The prevalence and politics of gender- based violence and resistance in this family of conflicted semi- liberal regimes highlight the contradictions of globalization across regions and cultures— and the dynamics of change for human rights. The parallel patterns of violence and pathways of response in these hot spots have special salience for the five billion people who now live in transitional middle- income countries that are generally highly unequal, rapidly urbanizing, weak and conflictual democracies, with highly contested gender roles. While these semi- liberal countries often have rising crime, they are not usually involved in major armed conflict, allowing us to differentiate chronic gender violence from more specific patterns of wartime rape suggested by recent studies (Cohen 2016). At the same time, delineating this type of struggle may also help to highlight the distinctive patterns that flow from contrasting constellations of polit- ical economy and patriarchy in what I  label semi- liberal gender regimes; just as other theorists have explored specific patterns of women’s rights for illiberal, welfare state, and resource- dependent gender regimes (Moghadam 2005; Walby 2004; Cherif 2015; Liou and Musgrave 2016).

The goal of this project is to map pathways of response, with a focus on the hot spots of rapid social change that seem to be generating both intensified gender violence and cre- ative transformation of rights repertoires. This book will show how a rights- based com- bination of international action, law, public policy, civil society mobilization, and value change is needed— and analyze the balance, potential, and limitations of these measures.

1.2 Mapping the pattern: patriarchy, profit, and power

Violence against women is a complex of interrelated and multifaceted human rights abuses based on gender, spanning the public and private sphere: femicide, enslavement, restrictions on freedom of movement, sexual assault, and battery. These “private wrongs” may be committed by a spectrum of public and nonstate actors:  foreign or domestic militaries; national police or other state officials; custodial authorities in state educa- tional, medical, and social welfare institutions; criminals such as street gangs and human traffickers; communal authorities like clerg y or tribal councils; and domestic partners or family members. Even when the perpetrators are private citizens, their abuse is frequently enabled by women’s second- class citizenship, state delegation of control over women’s

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Violence against Women 7

bodies through private law and unregulated custom, unequal access to justice for victims of gender violence, and impunity for perpetrators (Brysk 2005). Moreover, public and private forms of abuse are sociologically related. Domestic violence and human trafficking generally increase during and following state involvement in armed conflict; police in de- veloping countries may rape women who complain of domestic violence; public ethnic discrimination often includes tolerated private sexual assault by members of the domi- nant group against minority women (DeBrouwer et al. 2013; Wingate Pike 2011; Cohen 2013). Thus, one analyst of sexual assault in Peru’s armed conflict connects military rape, assault of internally displaced migrants, sexual street crime, and rape in paramilitary controlled zones, and labels this complex of social expectations and practice of targeted violence a “rape regime” (Boesten 2010).

The study of human rights— along with crime, war, and other social pathologies— has taught us that we must understand the social purpose and authority relations of different forms of violence in order to contest them. To mobilize against any syndrome of abuse, we must understand more why, how, when, and where it occurs. Social science shows that most violence has a purpose; the use of violence is costly, not natural, and readily sanctioned by most social groups under most routine conditions. Social systems usually only allow and even encourage violence by some people at some times to serve a collective need, such as maintaining social boundaries, dominance hierarchies, resources, produc- tion, or identity and associated status. The purpose of violence is sometimes openly inculcated, as in wartime, but more chronic violence is often experienced by perpetrators as a socialized intuitive response, expressing unconscious beliefs about identity, privilege, threat, and membership.

Violence is constructed and expressed at multiple levels in a nested “ecological model,” through societies, communities, households, and individuals (Morrison et  al. 2005)— and, increasingly, through world order. An individual’s decision to use vio- lence is shaped by the broader social context of conflict, resource competition, social status, authoritative institutions, and gender roles; the dynamics and reproduction of a local ethnic group, neighborhood, clan, or town; the socialization and power rela- tions within a household or family group; and the individual’s emotional and mate- rial resources, needs, beliefs, and history. Analyzing and intervening in gender violence requires attention to all of these levels, but until the current generation this form of violence has been unduly attributed to culture and individual psycholog y— to the det- riment of broader social structures and historical patterns. By contrast, a social scien- tific approach to all forms of violence- whether war, crime, or rape- suggests that most violence is allowed to operate as a long- term rational pursuit of socialized needs for dominance. In this view, widespread violence is not an aberration, but- similar to other forms of primate social interaction- persists and spreads when it is modeled, rewarded, builds social ties, and is replicated through social institutions such as law and coercive authority (Hudson and den Boer 2012).

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8 Freedom from Fear

Gender violence follows the historical logic of male bonding for control of reproduc- tion under changing social conditions. “Violence is used when it is functional and its rewards are immediate and frequent . . . sometimes the consequences solve a problem or alleviate an adversity. The selling of a child bride, for example, might protect the family from the possibility of dishonor that would come should the child become promiscuous as a teenager, or perhaps such a transaction would provide income for a starving family” (Hudson 2012, 84– 85). Smuts concludes that “male use of aggression as a tool is not in- evitable but conditional . . . under some circumstances coercive control of women pays off, whereas under other circumstances it does not.” In one development scenario, for example, the lower the share of female contribution to subsistence, the higher the level of domestic violence and rape (Hudson and den Boer 2012, 303).

Patriarchy, defined as a male gerontocratic hierarchy supported by violent control of women, can be said to be “the world’s oldest oppression.” The gender- based regime of fear reflects interlocking logics of patriarchy, profit, and power that seek to control women’s reproduction, labor, and citizenship (as we argued more specifically for sex trafficking, see Brysk and Choi- Fitzpatrick eds. 2012),. Because these logics of social organization are present throughout modern history in every society, VAW is deeply rooted, widespread, and resilient. Although the prevalence and forms of VAW are context- specific rather than generic, those contexts are patterned expressions of social logics rather than individual pathologies of particular societies. But because relations of production, reproduction, and political power are dynamic, and their relationship is configured differently in different stages and societies, the levels and types of violence vary across time and space. Moreover, the structural determinants of violence are contested and reconstructed— by many women, some men, movements, modernizing institutions, and even dominant elites persuaded by principle or social cost. As Elizabeth Wood argues about conflict rape, gender violence is “not ubiquitous or inevitable” (Cohen et al. 2013). And understanding the distinct dy- namics and evolution of different dominance regimes and syndromes of abuse is the first step towards intervention.

1.3 The development of domination

Gender dominance can be analyzed as an evolutionary strateg y for reproductive success, using violence to impose social institutions that control women’s reproduction such as polyg yny (McDermott and Cowden 2015). Historical, archeological, and comparative evidence now depict the emergence of patriarchy in certain Bronze Age societies of the Near East— systematic male dominance to ensure stratified control of female reproduc- tion, along with hardening of gender roles and suppression of women’s public partici- pation (MacGregor and Hooper 2016). Patriarchy develops as a pre- modern protection racket in centralized agricultural societies, in which elder males protect women and chil- dren from rival males and natural hazards in exchange for preferential access to female

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sexuality that ensures the reproductive success of dominant males— enforced by vio- lence.4 “Male dominance hierarchies reduce male conflict and female resistance through male bonding. Females adapt to and perpetuate patriarchy through preferences for dom- inant male protectors, female competition, and submission” (Hudson 2012, 84– 85).

In understanding violence as a social strateg y, it is important to note that patriarchy is an intersectional social system associated with other forms of hierarchy- - designed to control subordinate men as well as most women- - rather than a bad attitude of in- dividual men or a culture. Some men may be victimized for transgressing the patriar- chal order (for example, in some honor killings) and some elite women may be relative beneficiaries. Some theorists suggest a link between the logic of male dominance and the level of overall social hierarchy: “The degree to which men dominate women and control their sexuality is inextricably intertwined with the degree to which some men dominate others” (Smuts 1995, 18 quoted in Hudson 2012, 73). This presages the contemporary pattern we will note in the semi- liberal transitional countries, of intensifying violence when growth and globalization are associated with social inequality and other forms of intersectional oppression, as well as the broader worldwide association between gender violence and ethnic conflict.

As state structures and patterns of production develop over time, this historic model of reproductive dominance patriarchy morphs into a more modern patriarchal pact that serves a broader set of changing collective interests, what Rae (2002) calls the “gender- biased corporate identity of the state” (p.  16). The society’s values, beliefs, family– state relations, and the power of political elites derive from this pact of gender dominance, but it may require different relations of reproduction and production than classic his- toric patriarchy— for example, dominance to mobilize and exploit rather than suppress women’s labor force participation. Regardless of the precise form of the patriarchal pact, in each society and era this gender dominance order generates the “structural violence” of repressive gender roles and rules (parallel to Galtung’s understanding of human security, see Hudson and den Boer 2012). This background regime of fear and chronic coercion works to deny women self- determination in reproduction, labor, and public decision making— and, under changing social conditions, erupts into active violence precisely when it is challenged.

We can trace the evolving patriarchal pact and resulting violence over time and across levels of analysis from international to national to local. At the global level, with the rise

4 Hunter- gatherer, other pre- agricultural, and more diffuse or shifting agriculture may generate different forms of male dominance— or more gender- balanced power relations— but is generally not associated with a patrilocal order of commodified reproductive relations. Although the vast majority of contemporary societies are based on some modernized articulation of patriarchy with capitalism and the nation- state, it may be important to trace the persistence and disruption or modernization of these alternate forms of gender relations for some in- digenous peoples, historically isolated societies, or migrants from these zones. Evolutionary approaches debate the timing of the emergence of gender dominance; see Hudson and den Boer 2012.

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10 Freedom from Fear

of the inter- state system, women come to serve as the boundaries of their nations— so control of women’s marriage and movement may become essential to state- building and conflict (Pettman 1996; Tickner 1992). Women are positioned as symbols of the nation, mothers of soldiers and future citizens, transmitters of national culture and language, and national patrimony to be defended, usurped, or defiled to destroy group solidarity. Peterson describes the political manifestations of “gendered nationalism” in women as biological reproducers, social reproducers, signifiers of group differences, participants in identity struggles, and bearers of “heteropatriarchal family forms” (Spike Peterson 2013).

In times of war, patriarchy is mobilized across borders to pursue national security through violent control of women’s bodies and boundaries. The use of rape as a weapon of war has now been widely recognized and condemned, but there are other forms of vi- olence systematically associated with security regimes. While genocidal rape clearly seeks to appropriate biological reproduction and disrupt social reproduction, wartime rape in other kinds of conflicts may also seek to punish women as signifiers of group differences and participants in identity struggles. Moreover, soldiers in other types of civil conflicts and paramilitary groups also commit strategic sexual violence to disrupt, punish, and dehumanize— in ways that serve their cause, and must be contested as such. Sexual vio- lence serves to reinforce group bonding and violent social conditioning of soldiers. And wartime VAW is often associated with an increase in domestic abuse and partner rape at home. Women’s bodies are also victims of peace, with a frequent post- conflict increase in domestic violence and sexual abuse by brutalized, often unemployed and displaced young men, in a context of weakened social institutions and plentiful weapons (Goldstein 2001; Kaufman and Williams 2007).

In terms of political economy, patriarchy articulates with different phases of cap- italism, so that women’s labor and reproduction will be policed differently depending on their society’s level of development and international role as well as their own class location (True 2012; Enloe 2014). While agricultural or extractive economies follow a patriarchal/ patrimonial political economy that locates value in reproduction and clan networks, with the development of urban industrial capitalism, gender inequity focuses more on commodifying and controlling public- sphere women’s labor.

More recently the globalization of production, labor, and rising migration increas- ingly have become the site of VAW. As True argues, “the gendered inequalities that fuel the violence against women are rooted in structures and processes of political economy that are increasingly globalized” (True 2012, 5). While rising women’s economic empow- erment generally diminishes violence (Remenyi 2007), violence may rise in the middle stage, middle sectors, and transitional economies where women are just beginning to work and migrate, as their rising resources are seen as a threat to traditional male au- thority (Morrison et  al. 2005; Jewkes 2002; Heise and Garcia- Moreno 2002, cited in True 2012, 18)

In modernizing and globalizing societies, gender dominance is also a dimension of class conflict and ethnic violence at the national and local level. As Hill and Bilge

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explain, “economic inequality does not fall equally on everyone.  .  .  .intersectionality provides a framework for explaining how social divisions of race, gender, age, and cit- izenship status, among others, positions people differently in the world, especially in relation to global social inequality . . . ” (Hill and Bilge 2016, 15). Thus, as we will see, gender violence is an instrument of class and ethnic dominance everywhere, and persists in populations marginalized by race, class, and citizenship even when the overall gender regime improves.

Summarizing these relationships between evolving forms of patriarchy and other sys- tems of dominance, Connell (1987) develops the idea of a “gender order” as a “structural inventory” of gendered labor, power, and reproductive relations. In a parallel vein, Walby maps the “gender regime” with slightly different analytic dimensions and more emphasis on boundaries and practice (Walby 2004). The modernized gender order of any given society may mandate different levels of women’s public participation as workers and citi- zens, different levels and forms of dominance and equity— and conditions for and types of violence to enforce this gendered social contract. As Moghadam (2013, 24) summarizes, “the gender system as a cultural construct . . . constituted by social structure . . . [is] dif- ferently manifested in kinship- ordered, agrarian, developing, industrialized, and post- industrial settings . . . [and in] states that are socialist (for example, Cuba or the former German Democratic Republic), liberal democratic (the United States), social democratic (the Nordic countries), or neopatriarchal (the Islamic Republic of Iran). . . .” These gender regimes, orders, and systems are systematically associated with different forms, levels, and institutions of violence— and corresponding possibilities for resistance and change.

1.4 Gender regimes of insecurity

Gender regimes establish social expectations of gender roles and reproductive rights, incentives and discipline for performance of gender roles and functions, and systems of gender valuation and stratification— and it is these factors that directly drive violence (Figure 1.1). While all gender regimes generate some forms of insecurity, there are system- atic differences in the tendency to particular syndromes of abuse such as femicide, roughly equivalent to the way in which distinct “pathologies of power” generate particular patterns of the prevalence of diseases (Farmer 2007). There are tendencies and risk factors for abuse syndromes such as child marriage or femicide that tend to cluster in particular gender re- gime types. But particular societies may move toward or away from a modal pattern of their gender regime type over time, or may have additional specific characteristics that drive abuse, rooted in a specific history such as a major conflict.

The overall physical security of women documented by the WomanStats database is worst in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East (see Figure 6.1). But some abuses like rape are more widespread, while others like demographic suppression of women are more concentrated. Moreover, countries with parallel development and political profiles across

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12 Freedom from Fear

regions that generate parallel gender regimes tend to follow more similar patterns in their use of VAW than cultural kin or neighbors that are sociologically distinct.5

We begin with an initial rubric for gender regimes of violence that distinguishes pat- rimonial, semi- liberal, and liberal clusters. Gender regimes can be defined by the com- bination of the organizing principle of the economy, polity, and society. These gender regimes of insecurity are current constellations along a dynamic spectrum— not a static typolog y— that can be grouped for comparative analysis of the types of drivers activating abuse and the social resources and tendencies for change.

Patrimonial regimes are hierarchical and ascriptive on all dimensions with a tendency toward closure, while developed democracies are historically liberal with a movement toward social and global openness. The semi- liberal “BRICS and NICs” that now repre- sent two- thirds of the world’s population are highly globalized, consistently mixed, and represent contested forms of political economy, political regimes, and social moderniza- tion. Supporting this characterization, recent comparisons of contentious politics across the BRICS suggest a semi- liberal regime range that one study calls “the messy middle,” with surprising similarities rooted in their critical juncture development transitions of the 1980s and 1990s, even spanning most liberalized Brazil and least liberal China (Green and Luehrmann 2016). Even when patrimonial regimes globalize, they tend to reiterate ascriptive patterns, while developed democracies globalize somewhat less rapidly than the “messy middle”- and with somewhat more robust institutions to process change. The semi- liberal regimes- and those sectors of the other types that follow their pattern- are

Gender regime: roles, rules, values,

practices ->VIOLENCE

IPE: mode of production,

gender division of labor, migration

Citizenship: law, access,

mobilization, gender equity

Individual: beliefs,

perceptions, relationships

Civil society: stratification, ethnicity,

religious institutions, family structure

Figure 1 . 1 Construction of the gender regime Source: n/ a

AQ: As there are no source details available, shall we remove the word “source” from the figures 1.1, 3.1, and 10.1.

5 This approach is similar to recent research by Christine Bose disaggregating measures of gender inequity by di- mension and region, which shows that most differences in women’s overall status cluster among regions rather than North– South, and that across the developing regions, women’s physical integrity is the most significant influence on gender equity (Bose 2015).

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distinguished by exceptionally rapid change in a context of very weak institutions and high chronic social conflict (Table 1.1).

The level, form, function, and impact of gendered abuses of life, liberty, and bodily integrity differ according to these gender regime types: patrimonial political economies, developed democracies, and semi- liberal regimes. In patrimonial political economies, where patriarchal control of reproduction is a structural constituent of power relations, gender violence is pervasive, disciplinary, and widely legitimized. In more modernized semi- liberal regimes, patriarchal power relations are partially superseded by class, ethnic, and international stratification— and, accordingly, gender violence is more focalized, hi- erarchical, privatized, intersectional, and contested. The persistence of patriarchal abuses of freedom in transitional regimes tends to be concentrated in lagging sectors, but intense development conflict is often reflected in high levels of public femicide. While developed democracies certainly suffer significant gender violence, denial of self- determination to women is not generally socially functional in advanced capitalism and is therefore excep- tional. Public- sphere gender violence is present in developed democracies but more lim- ited by overall higher levels of physical integrity and growing gender equity in the public sphere. In developed democracies, both abuse and contestation center increasingly on the private sphere and sexual violence.

All gender regimes show different though interrelated patterns of prevalence, per- ception, and response to the gendered human rights abuse patterns of femicide, self- determination, and sexual violence. Systematic violations of self- determination such as child marriage are endemic in patriarchal political economies, rare in developed democracies, and lagging and localized in semi- liberal zones. Femicide, which may re- ceive public authorization or tolerance in patriarchal political economies (honor killings, witch burnings), occurs mainly in the private sphere of domestic violence in semi- liberal and developed democracies alike. But femicide is more prevalent in emerging economies with higher inequality and mobility, and may spill over to gendered public killing in poorly governed borders and shantytowns. Sexual violence is present across all gender regimes but with different levels, locations, political purpose, and public response. Although sexual violence crosses cultures, levels of development, and regime types, wide- spread sexual assault usually occurs in a context of other forms of political violence such

Table 1.1

Gender Regime Clusters Gender Regime Economy Polity Society

Patrimonial Primary Illiberal Illiberal

Semi-liberal (Neo) liberal Semi-democracy Modernizing, mixed

Developed Liberal/welfare Liberal Liberal

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14 Freedom from Fear

as war, revolution, and dictatorship, and is less prevalent and less tolerated in the most developed and democratic countries.

The cluster of countries or regions dominated by patrimonial political economies that are largely agricultural or extractive lean toward suppression of female population, movement, and self- determination, since reproduction and kinship- based territorial control are the main sources of value. Some of these countries suffer a gendered “re- source curse” in which insecure autocrats who lack middle- class or merchant alliances placate ideological or identity- motivated clerical and tribal supporters with gender- repressive policies (Liou and Musgrave 2016). Such societies are also prone to chronic political conflict and weak governance, which reinforce the resurgence of patriarchal control mechanisms— clan governance is systematically associated with insecurity (Hudson et al. 2015). Most of North Africa, rural areas of South Asia and sub- Saharan Africa, and tribal pockets elsewhere such as Central Asia follow this pattern. Patrilocality commodifies marriage as an exchange of women’s productive and repro- ductive labor, inspiring son preference and attendant female infanticide or sex- selective abortion where available. Polyg yny further disempowers women, blocks their control of property, and is associated with child marriage and domestic violence. Reproductive control is reinforced by “practices such as purdah and infibulation, which in effect lower the cost to men of protecting their female kin.” Women’s sexual autonomy and self- determination may destabilize the group— this leads to honor cultures, and rape to target male honor by stripping protection from women and/ or impregnating them (Hudson 2012, 8– 12) Since these relations of reproduction benefit the group— or are believed to benefit the group— as a whole, and privilege elders, including female elders, it is rational for some women to serve as enforcers of this kind of patriarchy. This is why we see midwives performing FGM/ C in Africa, and mothers- in- law beating and murdering young brides in India.

In more developed, industrializing, mobile but rapidly changing and unequal semi- liberal societies, the gendered struggle for control of production and the suppression of citizenship are more salient than reproduction. The war on women is a battle to repress, subvert, and exploit women’s economic and political presence in the public sphere. This results in high levels of domestic violence, trafficking, public femicide, state- sponsored rape to demobilize women in civil society, and public assault of women in urban settings. In these types of societies, the level and focus of gender violence is especially intersec- tional, highly crosscut by race, class, and ethnicity. Women’s labor and political partici- pation are threatening to many men at the grassroots and some elite interests, but some victims are more “disposable” than others, whereas some dominant forces benefit from modernization of gender roles— at least among elites. Transitional zones unfortunately combine some features of each form of chronic use of sexual violence to establish domi- nance by class, caste, ethnic, and marital rape— although with lower tolerance of official rape than patriarchies— along with widespread and sometimes increasing urban assaults on newly mobile young women circulating through public space. Most of Latin America,

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Table 1.2

Gender Regimes Patterns of Gender-Based Violence Freedom/Traditional Femicide Sexual Violence

Patriarchal Political Economy

Endemic, systematic Public, private, chronic

Disciplinary, conflict, private, hierarchical

Transitional Regimes Lagging sectors Private primary, but public surge

Private, hierarchical, public now contested

Developed Democracies Isolated, marginal populations

Private, more second-class citizens

Most private—contested

Southeast Asian modernizers like Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the BRICS countries, Turkey, and many post- communist nations fit this profile.

In the historic developed democracies, industrialization and the spread of citizenship are associated with what Walby labels a transition from domestic to public gender regime and a general shift from public violence to more privatized forms of discipline. Analysts of the European Union and United States further distinguish among liberal market, welfare state, and regulatory gender regime subtypes shaped by variance in political economy, with the mode of economic organization filtering the effect of globalization and neolib- eralism on gender roles (Walby 2004). But across all of this cluster of liberal developed democratic regimes, women’s public labor and citizenship serve essential functions, while reproduction is increasingly commodified and outsourced. Gender violence in developed democracies is thus often “privatized,” with denial of the public drivers of private- sphere abuse, and mobilization around abuse in the intermediary zone of corporate institutions such as church, workplace, and schools. In developed democracies, sexual violence is less frequent and theoretically not tolerated by public authorities in public space,but is still common and difficult to prosecute in private zones like college campuses and the mili- tary as well as intersectional communities of color. Femicide and family violence persist but are delegitimized, legally sanctioned, and increasingly concentrated in the most ec- onomically and culturally marginalized sectors, where second- class citizens or “people out of place” such as migrants are also systematically impaired in access to justice when these abuses occur. In a different mode than the semi- liberal regimes, in the most devel- oped societies gender violence is also increasingly intersectional, in the sense that law, public policy, and social mobilization begin to contest some forms of violence against some women but are less effective or may even have contradictory effects for women who are marginalized in multiple ways (Table 1.2).

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16 Freedom from Fear

The picture we see here is three overlapping zones of insecurity: increasingly gender- equitable democracies still suffering private wrongs; poor and post- conflict patrimonial regimes mired in a combination of private patriarchy and publicly sanctioned repression; and transitional liberalizing nations with a combination of persisting private violations and increasing public and transnational abuses. This picture is a snapshot of “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt 2000), and the boundaries and character of the zones neces- sarily moves over time in accordance with the social processes of gender regimes outlined above. The power relations underlying these patterns help guide our understanding of which types of responses will be most effective. For each regime type, the primary locus of power and resistance is highlighted.

The group of globalizing semi- liberal modernizers is a puzzle for understanding and action, since it appears that patriarchy is diminishing, production and power are modernizing, and social incentives and women’s autonomy should be improving. Middle- income modernizers are generally high- growth but with increasing inequality, rapid urbanization, recent or thin democracies with gaps in state capacity, high contes- tation, and rapid uneven changes in gender roles. Above all, they are at the frontiers of globalization— in repression and resistance.

1.5 Explaining gender violence: global evidence and mechanisms

Why does gender violence morph in particular patterns along with globalization? First, we can confirm the gender regime framework as we locate these patterns in a broad over- view of comparative studies before tracing the process in the case studies that follow. Next, we can track some of the potential cross- national drivers and risk factors of gender violence associated with globalization in the statistical study, “When Development Is Not Enough” (Brysk and Mehta 2017), which tests some of the mechanisms outlined in sociological and feminist literature and that will be tracked through the cases that follow.

Standard liberal views of globalization predict that gender equity should increase with economic growth, modernization of patriarchal cultures, and greater participation by women in politics and the labor force (Ingelhart and Norris 2003; Bhagwati 2004)— with the expectation that this generalized empowerment will lead to an improvement in women’s rights and physical security. As these models predict, Forsythe and Korzeniewicz et al. (2000) find that economic development improves women’s status and gender equity overall. Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz (2006) similarly find improvement in women’s legal rights and socioeconomic status with globalization— but these studies do not gener- ally consider violence. Rodrigues and Khalil (2013) establish that modernization of values toward gender equity in the World Values Survey does influence attitudes toward toler- ance of VAW, but they find that shifting attitudes have different effects at different levels of development.

Only a few prior studies have attempted to empirically assess the impact of develop- ment that shapes gender regimes on the practice of VAW cross- nationally, and they are

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usually limited to the phenomenon of domestic violence. Testing a wide array of variables that proxy for women’s empowerment, cultural modernization, and globalization— but on a sample of only 40 countries— Kaya and Cook (2010) find the modernizing factors of rising GDP, female labor force participation, and secondary education along with de- clining fertility rate are strongly linked to reduction in physical intimate partner vio- lence. In a broader cross- national study of 150 countries, Arthur and Clark (2009) test the impact of a similar range of modernization, cultural, and globalization variables on domestic violence— but with more mixed results. Cho begins to advance the usefulness of this approach when by distinguishing the opposite effects of two dimensions of glob- alization on the single but representative problem of human trafficking. Cho finds that economic liberalization worsens the problem, while social globalization such as informa- tion exchange reduces the prevalence of trafficking (Cho 2013). This seems to parallel the mixture of rising violence and resistance in the semi- liberal globalizing gender regimes.

The limits of this globalization literature for explaining gender violence directs us to examine more closely the political economy and sociological components of the gender regime and try to assess mechanisms and pathways from global social change to violence- and resistance. Approaching gender violence as a function of social conflict rather than modernization of gender roles suggests a different understanding of the impact of glob- alization on gender regimes of insecurity. Sociological critics of development point out that liberalization and modernization of political economy are often accompanied by structural change associated with many forms of social conflict, including redistribution of resources, rural– urban migration, changes in employment patterns, and a breakdown in traditional social structures (Rahnema and Bawtree eds. 1997; Davis 2006). In parallel, the human rights literature shows that the prevalence of state- sponsored political terror is linked to these types of development problems— such as economic inequality, polit- ical conflict, and governance gaps— which may contradict the liberalizing modernization variables such as increasing national income (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe, Tate, & Keith 1999; Davenport 2000; Carey and Poe 2004).

With more specific relevance to the semi- liberal frontiers of globalization, a long- standing human rights and development literature shows a curvilinear or threshold re- lationship between development, democratization, and violence— popularly dubbed the “more murder in the middle” effect (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Fein 1995). At a system level, borderline semi- authoritarian regimes and transitional or unconsolidated democracies are more likely to experience higher levels of both crime and political violence than either less developed and democratic or more fully liberalized countries, because liberalization generates rising economic and political demands and competition at the same time that historic structures of authority, distribution, and coercion are fragmented and uncertain (Regan and Henderson 2002). Supporting this pattern, rising crime de- spite economic development is strongly associated with social inequality and lagging human development that signals sociological problems (UNODC 2011, 10). In the tran- sitional zone of liberalization, mobilizing citizens, workers, and ethnic constituencies are caught between newly accessible national institutions that cannot deliver their needs,

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18 Freedom from Fear

lingering authoritarian enclaves that seek to repress them, and a governance shift to inac- cessible global and subnational authority that undermines state response to sociological problems. These rising social conflicts generate gender violence both directly and indi- rectly, as we will see below.

We can project from this analysis of human rights contradictions of development to patterns of VAW, first because overall human rights conditions are highly associated with the level of gender violence. Worldwide, the highest overall levels of lethal criminal vio- lence are associated with more femicide, the gender- based killing of women. Similarly, the level of gun violence correlates positively with corruption— and with gender inequality. A survey of dozens of countries confirms that both crime and VAW are associated with a similar pattern of slum crowding, alcohol use, and heat (Florida 2014; Simister 2012).

Tracing more specific social dynamics, why and how does the dark side of globali- zation generate gender violence along with crime and human rights abuse? Feminist critics outline how unequal development and structural change may produce gendered insecurity through the mechanisms of structural vulnerability such as unemployment (Rubio- Marin and Estrada- Tanck 2013), governance gaps as economy and polity become more informal sector (Spike Peterson 2013), and a corresponding cultural crisis in “bread- winner masculinities” (True 2012, Ch. 3). These dynamics play out in a nested “ecolog- ical model” that translates contested globalization through the gender regime to drive patterns of violence at the state, community, household, and individual levels.

We will track the globalized generation of gender violence through each of these levels. At the state level, a feminist perspective traces the gendered effect of globalization and neoliberalism as a driver of violence due to informalization of the economy and state institutions (Spike Peterson 2013). This feminist literature echoes human rights and gov- ernance literature on social conflict effects of failed states and corruption. Focusing on sexual violence in war, Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell (2007) link corruption and low level of control of public officials to a higher incidence of sexual assault. They find that “the level of financial corruption in a political system is robustly associated with the exten- siveness of sexual violence committed by policemen and soldiers. . . .” (Butler et al. 2007, 680). Weak democracies, corruption, and male- biased institutions lead to a deficit of le- gitimate security forces to offer social order and protection from domestic and street vi- olence for women in poorly governed urban areas, while cultural and class bias in poorly trained and monitored police and legal institutions produces a propensity for impunity for private perpetrators (UN Women “Global Database on Violence Against Women” n.d.). Poor governance and corruption also increase private abuse by state agents and diminish their accountability, through police collaboration with gangs and traffickers, abuse of police power to perpetrate and excuse domestic violence and sexual assault, post- conflict incorporation of abusive members of militaries and rebel groups into police, and weak state delegation of police authority to abusive paramilitaries and local ethnic or religious forces. This pattern has been recently documented extensively in Colombia (ABColombia, Corporación Sisma Mujer, and US Office on Colombia 2013).

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Violence against Women 19

In another dimension of the impact of global political economy on gender conflict at the national level, contested development may interact with political conflict to increase state- sponsored sexual violence. As political and economic openings permit the mobiliza- tion of challengers and rivals for state power, security forces may respond with increasing violence, including sexual violence, to terrorize dissidents and insurgents (Pettman 1996, 102– 103). This kind of peacetime “conflict rape” has been recently practiced in Eg ypt (Amnesty International 2013a; FIDH 2014). Sexual assault often rises in the aftermath of highly contested elections in transitional regimes— as seen in the post- election violence highlighted in the ICC’s Kenya case (Bosire and Lynch 2014). In a parallel driver, as the state’s coercive pact unravels with political liberalization and economic globalization, ethnic conflict often increases (Chua 2003). This creates incentives for side- payments of state- tolerated sexual violence that maintain communal cohesion and hierarchies to ethnic rivals, religious and tribal authorities, and complicit criminal networks— reported widely in India (Bhattacharjee 2008; Rajesh 2010).

At the community level, development dynamics of modernization and mobility do not bring safety for women— and rapid uncontrolled urbanization may increase women’s structural vulnerability to gender violence. Contrary to modernizing assumptions, ur- banization does not necessarily improve women’s status; there is little statistical correla- tion between urbanization, per capita gross national income, and gender equality (Chant 2013; Chant and Datu 2011). According to UN Women, “Women in urban areas are twice as likely as men to experience violence, particularly in developing countries” (UN Habitat 2012/ 13). Indeed, urban density has additional gendered effects, increasing women’s spatial vulnerability to domestic violence in crowded households, sexual assault and femicide in gang- laden streets, and insecure transport while migrating to and from slums (McIlwaine 2013). In rapidly growing cities, newly mobile young women are vulnerable as they migrate from villages or shantytowns to employment in Mexican maquiladoras, Indian call centers, African city centers, and domestic work in distant neighborhoods or towns. Throughout the emerging economies, “gender- blind transport planning” ignores women’s work and migration patterns, and women report security risks specific to urban transport (Fernando and Porter 2002). In Mexico and Central America, thousands of young women migrating to cities to enter the labor force in border zones disappear each year and are murdered, raped, and tortured— a pattern labeled “femicide” to highlight the targeted assassination of women who leave traditional roles and compete with men for scarce jobs (Equipo Regional 2013; US Department of State 2013).

At the household level, rising female labor force participation can lead to more vi- olence in the home due to contradictions in gender roles and threats to “breadwinner masculinities,” and can increase gendered spatial vulnerability in urban areas. There is ample evidence that increases in women’s education and labor force participation can introduce role conflict, leading to domestic violence, and that these effects vary with levels of development. Looking across dozens of countries, more education for both men and women is associated with a lower incidence of gender- based violence in

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20 Freedom from Fear

the long run— but sometimes with a threshold of 6– 9  years of schooling before vio- lence decreases, or even a curvilinear trend where violence increases before it declines (Simister 2012). Similarly, a Pan- American Health Organization/ CDC study of do- mestic violence in the Americas concludes that although women’s education is generally associated with a decrease in violence, some places show a curvilinear pattern with less violence against the least and most educated but “more murder in the middle” (Guedes, Garcia- Moreno, and Bott 2014).

At the micro level, The World Development Report 2012 shows that women’s asset ownership lowers the risk of domestic violence in Colombia, India, South Africa, and Uganda in the medium term— but there is sometimes a short- term increase in vio- lence when women’s incomes rise. Supporting the sociocultural problem of threatened “breadwinner masculinities,” the report also notes a positive association between male economic stress and increased violence in Brazil, Chile, Croatia, and India (World Bank 2012). Similarly, recent research in India reinforces findings from the United States, Taiwan, Ecuador, and Bangladesh of a nonlinear effect of women’s earnings on domestic violence— before women’s income can rise to the level to create greater bargaining power in an abusive relationship, women’s greater resources create “gender role deviance” that results in a compensatory increase in violence by threatened male partners. In the largest sample to date of over 60,000 Indian women with the most reliable data from health surveys (rather than crime reports), employed women with unemployed spouses are 45% more likely to be abused than the reverse traditional labor formation— and have signifi- cantly higher odds of experiencing more frequent and more severe violence (Weitzman 2014, 65). A study of modernizing Bangladesh concludes that employment and increased decision making increase the vulnerability of younger and poorer women to domestic violence: “Promoting women[’s] empowerment in the household without men’s support may put women at more risk of IPV [intimate partner violence]” (Rahman et al. 2011). In a World Bank study of 20 countries, an Indian man from a focus group observes the links between domestic violence and women’s increased earnings at the grassroots level, reporting that in his village: “The women are not physically abused as frequently as they used to be. Of course, around 40% are still being abused physically. The reasons are mainly related to earnings” (Munoz Boudet et al. 2013, 73; my emphasis).

At the individual level, development crisis in masculine roles— urban poverty, un- employment, and crime— also increases targeted sexual violence in the public sphere by displaced males. A  recent multi- country study of over 10,000 men in Asia shows that male perpetrators of non- partner sexual assault were at least twice as likely to report development- related problems: food insecurity, involvement in gangs, and transactional sex— as well as linked personal pathologies of alcohol problems and childhood physical abuse ( Jewkes et al. 2013). Along the same lines, in South Africa, with one of the highest levels of rape in the world, male youth unemployment is estimated at 48% by the World Bank. Economic displacement and frustration is linked to sexual predation by delayed marriage and diminished female dependence, filtered through patriarchal doctrines of a

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Violence against Women 21

male right to sexual access (cited by perpetrators in interview studies, Jewkes et al. 2011). We can trace the influence of social conflict via crisis masculinities in statements like that of a South African taxi driver cruising with friends to gang rape upwardly mobile– looking young women circulating in public space, who told a television reporter that “cheeky” women “force us to rape them” (Moffett 2009, 166). Meanwhile, research in South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico shows how urban gangs (and associated prison complexes) provide new forms of male bonding and spatial control for displaced and marginal male youth, with corresponding new forms of VAW- especially rape- as a mech- anism of recruiting gang members, establishing dominance hierarchies, and creating a political economy of prostitution (Wood 2005).

Brysk and Mehta (2017) have evaluated this series of potential driving mechanisms as correlates of gender violence statistically in a cross- national comparison based on WomanStats PSOW index. Consistent with the analysis above, we show that holding other modernizing factors constant, the development conflict factors of income ine- quality, structural change proxied by urban crowding, and poor governance each affect the physical security of women (Table 1.3). Women are significantly more secure in more democratic societies, less corrupt polities, and in countries in which they are better represented in parliament, consistent with standard human rights explanations. But so- ciological contradictions of development are also important. Income inequality is asso- ciated with more VAW, and rising incomes must be well- distributed to reduce violence. Gender violence is linked to urban crowding. As our narratives of gender role conflict suggest the curvilinear impact of women’s work, there are diminishing returns to female labor force participation beyond the middle range, as social conflict effects begin to cancel out empowerment. This statistical analysis confirms that to put an end to VAW we must confront traditional patriarchy, development conflict, and governance gaps alike.

1.6 Research plan

This book aims to show how it is productive to frame VAW as a gendered form of human rights abuse— and how we must extend our understanding of human rights further to fully address it. In turn, the study of gender violence can expand our understanding of the broader repertoire of human rights reform pathways and the broader requisites of rights interdependence. Through tracking the pattern of struggles against VAW in dis- tinct gender regimes and among different syndromes of violation types, we will see how different forms of resistance and reform can be tailored to address the structural and cul- tural drivers of violence.

In order to elucidate the patterns of the problem and pathways of response, this study will concentrate on comparative case studies of the globalizing semi- liberal gender regimes. This set of middle- income modernizers are “most likely” cases for the emergence of VAW as they display precisely the syndrome of drivers of violence suggested by the feminist, human rights, and critical development literature:  rapid growth, inequality,

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.9 68

]* *

− 7.

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[1 .6

30 ]*

**

G ro

w th

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ve 8.

48 3

[2 .6

18 ]*

** 8.

04 9

[3 .2

87 ]*

* 7.

24 2

[4 .12

6] *

9. 31

3 [2

.12 0]

** *

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n U

rb an

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. B

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− 11

.3 95

[4 .2

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]* *

− 9.

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[6 .16

0] −

11 .9

86 [3

.12 7]

** *

D en

si ty

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w th

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ve 3.

36 6

[2 .4

90 ]

5. 02

7 [3

.13 8]

3. 4

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.53 9]

4 .7

90 [1

.8 95

]* *

Fi gu

re s i

n pa

ra th

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a re

ro bu

st st

an da

rd e

rr or

s. *s

ig ni

fic an

t a t 1

0% ; *

*s ig

ni fic

an t a

t 5 %

; * **

si gn

ifi ca

nt a

t 1 %

. R eg

re ss

io ns

in c

ol um

ns (5

) a nd

(6 ) i

nc lu

de si

x re

gi on

al d

um m

y va

ri ab

le s.

So ur

ce : B

ry sk

a nd

M eh

ta , “

W he

n de

ve lo

pm en

t i s n

ot e

no ug

h” (2

01 7)

.

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Apr 18 2018, NEWGEN

oso-9780190901523.indd 23 18-Apr-18 11:53:21 AM

24 Freedom from Fear

neoliberal political economy, weak democracy and limited citizenship, diminished state capacity, and contested gender roles. As a social science strateg y, they also represent “most different cases” for region and culture that hold relatively constant the sociological structures under consideration (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). In the tradition of his- torical sociolog y, this case study strateg y permits what Eckstein calls “parallel demonstra- tion of causality” that can generate configurations and identify pathways- rather than fully test hypotheses- regarding reform responses (Eckstein 1975; George and Bennett 2005). This set of cases are especially valuable for process- tracing of the dynamics of change, be- cause they present a wide range of frequent and intense responses to violence such as legal reform, protest, cultural innovation, and adaptation of the international regime— despite shortfalls in resources and citizenship compared to the developed democracies.

The focus on one class of gender regime should help reveal gendered aspects of glob- alization and citizenship that have both shaped and altered the operation of the interna- tional human rights regime in this set of countries, and thus contribute to analysis of the scope conditions for human rights reform worldwide. At the same time, Chapters  5– 7 each include a few brief treatments of neighboring gender regime types for contrast and comparison of overlapping problems with distinct response repertoires (shadow cases) (Table 1.4). Overall, we will find that citizenship is the critical factor that moves both gender regime types and response repertoires up or down the spectrum, consonant with general human rights trends.

This chapter has outlined the global problem, prevalence, causes, and consequences of VAW. We have seen that gender violence is a violation of human rights with special characteristics and logics, and a growing contradiction of development and globalization. The major cross- national risk factors for physical insecurity of women include shortfalls in democracy, social inequality, urbanization, and gender role disparity— all associated with globalization.

Accordingly, global action to end VAW must begin with human rights promotion— and go beyond. In Chapter  2 we will review the lessons learned from a generation of human rights scholarship. Then we will analyze why VAW requires additional forms of action that flow from literature on expanding rights, private wrongs, rights interde- pendence, intersectionality, and distinct patterns of response to different syndromes of violation.

Chapter  3 chronicles the international regime that has grown to respond to gender violence. We will trace the growth, rationale, and mechanisms of the global response rep- ertoire. We will see how global action against gender violence has evolved from humani- tarian protection to “women’s rights as human rights” to broad connections with multiple facets of human security and development. This chapter will track global institutions, foreign policy, and transnational advocacy— and plant the need for local response.

Chapter 4 argues that social mobilization is an essential response to VAW that catalyzes and complements global rights repertoires and changes in law. The chapter treats the parallel and overlapping pathways of mobilization:  voice, advocacy, transnationalism,

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Apr 18 2018, NEWGEN

oso-9780190901523.indd 24 18-Apr-18 11:53:21 AM

Violence against Women 25

translation, and information politics. Echoing the general patterns of human rights campaigns, we will see resonant symbolic voices against femicide in Pakistan and Brazil, alongside more programmatic public protest and lobbying for reform over all types of gender violence in the Philippines, Argentina, and Algeria. Spanning the multiple levels of global rights dynamics, transnational mobilization contesting gender violence in Mexico and Nigeria contrast with vernacular translation of international norms to the local level by grassroots movements in India and West Africa. Meanwhile, online campaigns create new repertoires and vocabularies to contest cultures of harassment, rape, and honor violence in Pakistan, Eg ypt, India, and Brazil.

Chapters  5– 7 analyze the three predominant genres of gendered violation of li- berty, life and bodily integrity:  threats to self- determination, femicide, and sexual vio- lence. In each of these presentations of a gendered human rights problem, we will map the incidence, analyze the causal dynamics, illustrate patterns of abuse, and expose the dilemmas for rights reform. Chapter 5 considers threats to sexual and reproductive self- determination through case studies of FGM/ C in Eg ypt, trafficking in the Philippines, and child marriage in India (with shadow case in Yemen). In each case, we will trace responses in the international regime, law, and human rights campaigns.

Gender- based denial of the right to life is treated in Chapter 6. The chapter follows the threats to women’s security through the life- cycle, beginning with cases of “gendercide” (sex- selective abortion and infanticide) in India, then moving to honor killings in Turkey and Pakistan. We examine public femicide in Mexico and Central America— with com- parison to the disappearance of indigenous women in Canada as “second- class citizens” in a developed democracy. The panorama of private- sphere domestic violence continues in China, Russia, Brazil, and the Philippines, along with a range of responses in law, public policy, advocacy, and protest.

In Chapter  7 we profile the global pattern of sexual violence. Because this form of violence is the most widespread and varied in its political purposes, the chapter will in- clude brief treatments and analysis of a number of different genres, gender regimes, and cases. For the pattern of conflict rape, we examine the counter- insurgency violence and transitional justice response in Peru and Colombia. We consider the plight of women dis- placed by conflict from Syria and Central America- and limited international policy re- sponse. State- sponsored sexual violence and resistance will be chronicled in Eg ypt as well as Mexico, and popular resistance via reclaiming public space. Among the globalizing middle- income transitional regimes, we will track intensifying public sexual assault amid social crisis in Turkey and South Africa, which has been met by a wide range of public protest, legal reform, and policy change. In India, we consider the full spectrum of a semi- liberal rape regime combining syndromes of sexual assault for counterinsurgency, policing, communitarian and ethnic conflict, social crisis, and family abuse. The Indian experience also displays a full repertoire of legal, state, and social response. Finally, for a contrasting experience of the privatization of sexual assault in developed democracies, we trace campus, workplace, and military rape in the United States.

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Apr 18 2018, NEWGEN

oso-9780190901523.indd 25 18-Apr-18 11:53:21 AM

Ta bl

e  1.

4

C as

e St

ud y

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le s:

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tie rs

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liz at

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na Eg

yp t

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ex ic

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e M

ul tiv

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ca le

# 1

is P

ro fe

ss or

M ar

y C

ap ri

ol i’s

( U

ni ve

rs it

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01 4

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ud e

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io le

nc e,

R ap

e an

d Se

xu al

A ss

au lt,

M ar

it al

R ap

e, a

nd M

ur de

r.

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Apr 18 2018, NEWGEN

oso-9780190901523.indd 26 18-Apr-18 11:53:22 AM

Ta bl

e  1.

4

C as

e St

ud y

Pr ofi

le s:

 Th e

Fr on

tie rs

o f G

lo ba

liz at

io n

B ra

zi l

C hi

na Eg

yp t

In di

a M

ex ic

o Pa

ki st

an Ph

ili pp

in es

R us

si a

So ut

h A

fr ic

a Tu

rk ey

So ur

ce

Po pu

la tio

n 20

7, 8

1,4 b

i 91

,5 1,3

b i

12 7,

0 18

8, 9

10 0,

6 14

4 ,0

55 ,0

78 ,6

W or

ld B

an k

(2 01

5) 1

G D

P Va

lu e/

R an

k (P

PP )

$2 1 t

ri /1

st $3

tr i/

7t h

$1 tr

i/ 22

nd $9

tr i/

3r d

$2 tr

i/ 12

nd $1

tr i/

24 th

$8 07

b i/

28 th

$3 tr

i/ 6t

h $7

40 b

i/ 29

th $2

tr i/

13 th

W or

ld B

an k

(2 01

6) 2

G IN

I In

eq ua

lit y 

51 .5

4 2

n/ a

35 48

31 43

4 2

63 40

H um

an D

ev el

op m

en t

R ep

or t (

20 16

)3

U rb

an iz

at io

n (%

 o f t

ot al

po

pu la

tio n;

%

an nu

al c

ha ng

e)

86 %

; 1 %

56 %

; 3 %

43 %

; 2 %

33 %

; 2 %

80 %

; 1 .5%

39 %

; 3 %

44 %

; 1 %

74 %

; n /a

65 %

; 1 .5%

73 %

; 2 %

W or

ld B

an k/

C IA

W

or ld

F ac

tb oo

k (2

01 5)

4

C or

ru pt

io n

In de

x 38

37 36

38 35

30 35

29 44

4 2

Tr an

sp ar

en cy

In

te rn

at io

na l (

20 15

)5

G en

de r

In eq

ua lit

y (G

II )

0. 4

0. 1

n/ a

0. 5

0. 4

0. 5

0. 4

0. 2

0. 3

0. 3

U ni

te d

N at

io ns

D

ev el

op m

en t

Pr og

ra m

m e

(2 01

6) 6

D em

oc ra

cy –

Po lit

y 8

-7 -4

9 8

7 8

4 9

3 Po

lit y

IV  –

R eg

im e

Tr en

ds 7

G lo

ba liz

at io

n In

de x 

60 60

62 51

61 51

57 69

65 69

K O

F In

de x

(2 01

3) 8

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ba liz

at io

n–

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om ic

52 52

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53 52

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F In

de x

(2 01

4) 9

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ba liz

at io

n–

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al 45

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In de

x (2

01 4)

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W G

en de

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cu ri

ty 4

2 4

4 4

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3 4

3 W

om an

St at

s.O rg

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ul tiv

ar ia

te 1

(2 01

4) 11

1 Th e

W or

ld B

an k—

20 15

P op

ul at

io n

To ta

l D at

ab as

e. A

cc es

se d

on Ju

ne 2

6, 2

01 7.

2 Th e

W or

ld B

an k,

W or

ld B

an k—

20 16

W or

ld D

ev el

op m

en t I

nd ic

at or

s— G

D P/

PP P.

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at ed

o n

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1, 2

01 7.

A cc

es se

d on

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4 , 2

01 7.

3 U ni

te d

N at

io ns

D ev

el op

m en

t P ro

gr am

m e

(U N

D P)

— 20

16 H

um an

D ev

el op

m en

t R ep

or t/

G IN

I I nd

ex . A

cc es

se d

on Ju

ne 2

6, 2

01 7.

4 P er

ce nt

ag e

of th

e 20

15 to

ta l p

op ul

at io

n; p

er ce

nt ag

e of

th e

an nu

al c

ha ng

e be

tw ee

n 20

10 –2

01 5.

Th e

W or

ld F

ac tb

oo k—

U rb

an iz

at io

n In

de x—

U S

C en

tr al

In te

lli ge

nc e

A ge

nc y

(C IA

). A

cc es

se d

on Ju

ne 2

7, 2

01 7.

5 2 01

5 Tr

an sp

ar en

cy In

te rn

at io

na l’s

C or

ru pt

io n

Pe rc

ep tio

ns In

de x.

A cc

es se

d on

Ju ne

2 7,

2 01

7. 6 U

ni te

d N

at io

ns D

ev el

op m

en t P

ro gr

am m

e (U

N D

P) —

G en

de r I

ne qu

al it

y In

de x

(G II

) 2 01

6. A

cc es

se d

on Ju

ne 2

7, 2

01 7.

7 S ys

te m

ic P

ea ce

— Po

lit y

IV In

di vi

du al

C ou

nt ry

R eg

im e

Tr en

ds , 1

94 6–

20 13

. A cc

es se

d on

Ju ne

6 , 2

01 7.

8 Th e

K O

F Sw

is s E

co no

m ic

In st

it ut

e’s G

lo ba

liz at

io n

In de

x (2

01 4)

m ea

su re

s g lo

ba liz

at io

n th

ro ug

h th

e th

re e

m ai

n di

m en

si on

s:  e

co no

m ic

, s oc

ia l,

an d

po lit

ic al

. A cc

es se

d on

Ju ne

2 8,

2 01

7. 9 Th

e K

O F

Sw is

s E co

no m

ic In

st it

ut e’s

E co

no m

ic G

lo ba

liz at

io n

In de

x (2

01 4)

. A cc

es se

d on

Ju ne

2 9,

2 01

7. 10

Th e

K O

F Sw

is s E

co no

m ic

In st

it ut

e’s S

oc ia

l G lo

ba liz

at io

n In

de x

(2 01

4) . A

cc es

se d

on Ju

ne 2

9, 2

01 7.

11 Th

e M

ul tiv

ar ia

te S

ca le

# 1

is P

ro fe

ss or

M ar

y C

ap ri

ol i’s

( U

ni ve

rs it

y of

M in

ne so

ta D

ul ut

h) 2

01 4

Ph ys

ic al

S ec

ur it

y of

W om

en S

ca le

( PS

O W

) re

po rt

ed b

y W

om an

St at

s.o rg

. V ar

ia bl

es e

xa m

in ed

in cl

ud e

D om

es tic

V

io le

nc e,

R ap

e an

d Se

xu al

A ss

au lt,

M ar

it al

R ap

e, a

nd M

ur de

r.

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Apr 18 2018, NEWGEN

oso-9780190901523.indd 27 18-Apr-18 11:53:22 AM

28 Freedom from Fear

The remaining chapters turn to analyzing specific dynamics and efficacy of the pathways of response:  law, policy, and norm change. Chapter  8 tracks the uses and shortfalls of law as a path to ending impunity, in international law on sexual violence, national treatment of private abuse, and legal pluralism incorporating multiple local codes. Our study of law shows how critical vectors of architecture, access, and account- ability influence the power and limitations of legal response to gender violence. While the preceding chapters tracked legal efforts and barriers to justice for key cases- from trafficking in the Philippines to domestic violence in India and sexual violence in South Africa- Chapter 8 adds conceptual analysis of legal dynamics with further illus- tration of additional cases. Thus, Chapter  8 demonstrates parallel problems of legal pluralism for coping with domestic violence in the disparate but similarly situated cases of Argentina, Nigeria, and Lebanon. The chapter also tracks architecture and access barriers through emerging debates on marital rape in Kenya and Malawi. Finally, Chapter 8 highlights the challenges and pathways to accountability present in all the prior cases, especially South Africa and the Philippines, with a deeper discussion of impunity in Mexico and India.

Chapter  9 turns to the impact of global models and diffusion of gendered public policy on urban planning, transportation, sanitation, and social services. Global and na- tional programs and transnational coalitions for urban safety, sanitation, and transporta- tion respond to the sexual violence tracked above in India, South Africa, and Mexico— as well as similar problems in slum areas in Kenya. New models of policing and social serv- ices are a pathway of reform to address family violence depicted in Chapter 6 in Turkey, Brazil, South Africa— with an additional example of a model program in El Salvador. The chapter highlights the growing awareness but lingering disconnect of global devel- opment, security, and rights repertoires.

In Chapter 10, we analyze the requisites and results of campaigns for norm change in women’s agency, masculine identities, and sexual self- determination, once again tracking response in most of the hot spots and attempting to interrogate more deeply the dy- namics of persuasion. Building from the information campaigns profiled as spontaneous mobilizations in Chapter  4, this chapter will investigate conscious communication campaigns that aim to reshape community consciousness of gender regimes in South Africa, India, and Brazil. To analyze the dialectic over the norm of women’s agency, we will examine global programs adopted by local movements to promote women’s empow- erment to resist violence in India and Pakistan. In a complementary dynamic of norm change, both global programs and transnational coalitions work to engage men and transform violent masculinities in India, South Africa, and Brazil. Finally, we will trace a variety of civil society cultural initiatives that directly confront gender regime norms by asserting sexual self- determination against rape culture in Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, and China.

The concluding chapter assesses the record of action against gender violence in the cases visited, the promise and pitfalls of the pathways for reform, and the implications for

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Violence against Women 29

women’s human rights campaigns. At the frontiers of the next wave of contestation, we will trace critical struggles for reproductive rights in global institutions, Ireland, Mexico, and a migrant family. Finally, this section will explore how the lessons learned from the worldwide campaign to end VAW can enhance all struggles for human dignity.

1.7 Implications

The analysis of VAW as a human rights problem shaped by gender regimes and global- ization suggests that the policies we need to end VAW start with human rights reform conceived broadly- and expand those rights across multiple domains. With the globaliza- tion of human rights threats and responses, global governance of gender violence must ex- tend within, across, and between borders. Good governance— democracy, representation of women, and control of corruption— contributes to both human rights and women’s physical security. Fundamental freedoms for all are the foundation of freedom from fear for women— but as the history of human rights reform shows, law must be matched with civic mobilization, public policy, and multilevel implementation. The development dynamics shaping gender violence also show that social rights and equity for all are in- extricably tied to women’s security. Socioeconomic hierarchies and discrimination are equally important drivers of violent gender regimes, and barriers to reform pathways such as access to law, public space, and evolving gender roles. As in other identity- based regimes of fear, carrots and sticks must be matched with hearts and minds and a poli- tics of persuasion- including transformation of masculine, women’s, and interactive sexual and reproductive roles.

The contradictions of globalization and interdependence of rights experienced most intensely in the semi- liberal middle- income modernizers drive stagnation or even worsening of some forms of gender violence, and at the same time generate new responses that expand the human rights repertoire. New frames, networks, development models, state responsibilities, and multiple modernities are being generated by the struggle at the frontiers of globalization— from the femicide frame to due diligence doctrine, from san- itation as a human right to viral social media campaigns.

However, we will see how lagging reproductive rights continue to undermine women’s security despite the progress of some of these struggles— and thus direct reform in gender regimes is necessary to stop violence. A focus on women’s empowerment must be matched by transformation of men— who are both collateral and direct victims of vio- lence as well as perpetrators— and the transformation of at- risk communities. Finally, as cultural norms help construct the political power of violence and the dehumanization of victims, the struggle for women’s human rights must confront rape culture with a coun- tervailing ethos of sexual and reproductive self- determination.

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30

2

Constructing Human Rights

We h ave seen that violence against women is a massive, pervasive, and costly problem that is the biggest gap in the international human rights regime. Contemporary understandings of the drivers and risk factors for this form of abuse suggest that gender violence is related much more to sociological factors and power relations than to indi- vidual psycholog y or culture— although it is transmitted through mentalities of gender regimes that organize ideologies and practice of gender roles and dominance. Just as human rights scholarship has yielded greater insight into how to contest other forms of violent oppression, we will now examine what the history, logic, and ethos of human rights can tell us about how to contest VAW as a global problem. We will examine the turn to human rights for gender domination, the lessons of a generation of human rights scholarship on the dynamics of social change, feminist analysis of the limits and fur- ther development of the human rights model, and a new wave of human rights analysis delineating pathways for expansion.

2.1 Changing the subject: Women’s rights as human rights

After decades of denial, punctuated by occasional humanitarian efforts, in the past gen- eration the massive abuse of women’s physical integrity has been met with the growth of the notion and norms of “women’s rights as human rights.” From the 1993 Vienna World Human Rights Conference onward, the global community has reframed women’s rights as human rights, moving from protection of a vulnerable population to a quest for gender justice. In the analysis that inspired the movement, activist Charlotte Bunch pointed out the extent of violence and its threat to life and fundamental freedoms, questioned the dis- tinction between public and private violence, and showed that gender violence is a struc- tural result of male dominance— a deeply political issue (Bunch 1990).Global activists who were present during the founding international conferences report that this phrase

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Constructing Human Rights 31

actually originated with Filipina women’s rights activists, belying objections that women’s human rights are an elite Western imposition (Hudson 2015, 336).This has produced the emergence of new institutions such as the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, increased the presence of women’s movements and feminist agendas in global governance, and enhanced activities and resources of both the human rights and women’s rights regimes. Moreover, different forms of VAW have been framed and linked to health, development, and human security agendas (Peters and Wolper 1995).

Women’s human rights include the right to life, freedom, physical integrity, po- litical participation, access to justice, health, education, reproductive rights, and nondiscrimination in access to and exercise of all the rights of any society or community. So women’s human rights are both universal and gendered; a woman may be persecuted or attacked for her political opinions or ethnic identity just like a man, and/ or she may be abused on the basis of her identity as a woman or challenge of an assigned reproductive role. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms a universal right for both men and women to free marriage and to “found and form a family,” while the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) asserts women’s equal rights to freedom of movement, civil status, political participation, and free and fair labor conditions. The World Health Organization defines reproductive rights as the right to choose sex, pregnancy, and the number and spacing of children; sexual health including safe pregnancy; and freedom from sexual violence. Therefore, VAW may violate the rights to life, freedom, physical integrity, nondiscrimination, and reproductive rights (Table 2.1).

As with all human rights, these rights are interdependent and indivisible, but some of them can be analyzed as enabling rights for the pursuit of other outcomes. In this regard, the right to safety plays a special role, in that personal security is both a rights outcome and a precursor to the exercise of other rights such as political participation and educa- tion. Safety is an enabling right for the pursuit of public participation and for gender equity in the private sphere, but it is also a distinct dimension of women’s empowerment that does not automatically flow from the attainment of civil liberties or even access to health and education.

2.2 Human rights and the dynamics of change

If violence against women is fundamentally an abuse of power rather than a psychological problem or cultural atavism, the same political tools we use to contest all forms of human rights abuse have the potential to change VAW:  consciousness- raising, mobilization, global governance, and policy reform. A generation of research on the politics of human rights shows that critical factors for challenging all forms of human rights violations include naming and framing abuse, bringing transnational pressure “from above and below,” using information politics, empowering vulnerable groups, and institutionalizing

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Ta bl

e  2.

1

In te

rn at

io na

l S ta

nd ar

ds o

n  G

en de

r V io

le nc

e Ph

ys ic

al S

ec ur

it y

Pa rt

ic ip

at io

n R

ig ht

s R

ep ro

du ct

iv e

R ig

ht s

C E

D AW

(1 97

9) 1

Su pp

re ss

a ll

fo rm

s o f t

ra ffi

ck in

g, A

rt icl

e 6 Eq

ua lit

y of

m en

a nd

w om

en b

ef or

e th

e la

w , A

rt icl

e 2 El

im in

at e

di sc

ri m

in at

io n

in

he al

th ca

re

D EV

AW (1

99 3)

2 Th

e ri

gh t t

o lif

e, li

be rt

y an

d se

cu ri

ty , A

rt icl

e 3 Eq

ua lit

y, eq

ua l p

ro te

ct io

n un

de r t

he la

w , f

re ed

om fr

om

di sc

ri m

in at

io n,

A rt

icl e 3

Is ta

nb ul

C

on ve

nt io

n (2

01 1)

3

St al

ki ng

c ri

m in

al iz

ed , A

rt icl

e 3 4

Fo rc

ed a

bo rt

io n

an d

st er

ili za

tio n

cr im

in al

iz ed

, A

rt icl

e 3 9

Pr ov

id e

se rv

ic es

fo r v

ic tim

s of

d om

es tic

v io

le nc

e, A

rt icl

es

20 —

26 V

ic tim

’s ri

gh t t

o cl

ai m

co

m pe

ns at

io n,

A rt

icl e 3

0 Fo

rc ed

m ar

ra ge

in va

lid ,

A rt

icl e 3

2 Fo

rc ed

m ar

ri ag

e cr

im in

al iz

ed ,

A rt

icl e 3

7

Ph ys

ic al

v io

le nc

e cr

im in

al iz

ed , A

rt icl

e 3 5

A ll

no nc

on se

ns ua

l s ex

ua l a

ct s c

ri m

in al

iz ed

, A

rt icl

e 3 6

Fe m

al e

ge ni

ta l m

ut ila

tio n

cr im

in al

iz ed

, A

rt icl

e 3 8

Se xu

al h

ar as

sm en

t c ri

m in

al iz

ed , A

rt icl

e 4 0

Th e

ri gh

t t o

ac ce

ss em

er ge

nc y

ba rr

in g

or de

rs ,

re st

ra in

in g,

o r p

ro te

ct io

n or

de rs

, A rt

icl e 5

2  &

53

R ec

og ni

tio n

of g

en de

r- ba

se d

vi ol

en ce

a s a

ba

si s f

or a

sy lu

m c

la im

s, A

rt icl

e 6 0

H on

or k

ill in

gs a

nd c

ul tu

ra l j

us tifi

ca tio

ns

un ac

ce pt

ab le

fo r c

ri m

es o

f v io

le nc

e ag

ai ns

t w

om en

, A rt

icl e 4

2

C on

ve nt

io n

of

B el

ém d

o Pa

rá

(1 99

4) 4

A ll

w om

en h

av e

fu ll

ac ce

ss to

h um

an ri

gh ts

, A

rt icl

e 4 Ex

er ci

se o

f a nd

fu ll

pr ot

ec tio

n of

a ll

ri gh

ts in

cl ud

in g

ci vi

l an

d po

lit ic

al , A

rt icl

e 5 R

ig ht

to b

e fr

ee fr

om a

ll fo

rm s o

f d is

cr im

in at

io n,

A rt

icl e 6

Es ta

bl is

h pr

oc ed

ur es

to c

ri m

in al

iz e,

p ro

se cu

te , a

nd p

un is

h vi

ol en

ce a

ga in

st w

om en

th ro

ug h

fa ir

a nd

e ffe

ct iv

e le

ga l

pr oc

ed ur

es , A

rt icl

e 7

Pa le

rm o

Pr ot

oc ol

5 Pr

ev en

t t ra

ffi ck

in g

an d

pr ot

ec t v

ic tim

s o f

tr affi

ck in

g; p

ro vi

de v

ic tim

s w ith

fu ll

se rv

ic es

U N

R es

ol ut

io ns

6 Pr

ev en

t s ex

ua l a

nd g

en de

r- ba

se d

vi ol

en ce

in

a rm

ed c

on fli

ct . I

nc or

po ra

te g

en de

r pe

rs pe

ct iv

e in

to p

ea ce

ke ep

in g

op er

at io

ns U

N

R es

13 25

; El

im in

at io

n of

d om

es tic

v io

le nc

e ag

ai ns

t w

om en

, G en

er al

A sse

m bl

y R

es 18

/1 47

; P re

ve nt

an

d pr

os ec

ut e

tr affi

ck in

g in

w om

en a

nd g

ir ls

, U

N R

es 6

1/ 14

4

In cr

ea se

p ro

te ct

io n,

fu nd

in g,

a nd

in vo

lv em

en t o

f w om

en

at a

ll le

ve ls

o f g

ov er

nm en

t, U

N R

es 2

24 2,

13 25

, 1 82

0, 18

88 ,

18 89

, 1 96

0, 2

10 6,

2 12

2

H ea

lth a

nd re

pr od

uc tiv

e se

rv ic

es fo

r f em

al e

vi ct

im s o

f se

xu al

v io

le nc

e du

ri ng

a rm

ed

co nfl

ic t,

U N

R es

2 10

6

1 C on

ve nt

io n

on th

e El

im in

at io

n of

A ll

Fo rm

s o f D

is cr

im in

at io

n ag

ai ns

t W om

en (C

E D

AW )—

19 79

2 D ec

la ra

tio n

on th

e El

im in

at io

n of

V io

le nc

e ag

ai ns

t W om

en (D

EV AW

)— 19

94 3 C

ou nc

il of

E ur

op e

C on

ve nt

io n

on P

re ve

nt in

g an

d C

om ba

tin g

V io

le nc

e A

ga in

st W

om en

a nd

D om

es tic

V io

le nc

e (I

st an

bu l C

on ve

nt io

n) —

20 11

4 I nt

er -A

m er

ic an

C on

ve nt

io n

on th

e Pr

ev en

tio n,

P un

is hm

en t,

an d

Er ad

ic at

io n

of V

io le

nc e

ag ai

ns t W

om en

(C on

ve nt

io n

of B

el ém

d o

Pa rá

)— 19

94 5 P

ro to

co l t

o Pr

ev en

t, Su

pp re

ss a

nd P

un is

h Tr

affi ck

in g

in P

er so

ns E

sp ec

ia lly

W om

en a

nd C

hi ld

re n,

su pp

le m

en tin

g th

e U

ni te

d N

at io

ns C

on ve

nt io

n ag

ai ns

t T ra

ns na

tio na

l O rg

an iz

ed C

ri m

e (P

al er

m o

Pr ot

oc ol

)— 20

00 6 T

o re

ad th

e U

ni te

d N

at io

ns re

so lu

tio ns

, s ea

rc h

by th

ei r s

ym bo

l a t U

N D

oc um

en t D

oc um

en ts

.

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Apr 18 2018, NEWGEN

oso-9780190901523.indd 32 18-Apr-18 11:53:22 AM

Ta bl

e  2.

1

In te

rn at

io na

l S ta

nd ar

ds o

n  G

en de

r V io

le nc

e Ph

ys ic

al S

ec ur

it y

Pa rt

ic ip

at io

n R

ig ht

s R

ep ro

du ct

iv e

R ig

ht s

C E

D AW

(1 97

9) 1

Su pp

re ss

a ll

fo rm

s o f t

ra ffi

ck in

g, A

rt icl

e 6 Eq

ua lit

y of

m en

a nd

w om

en b

ef or

e th

e la

w , A

rt icl

e 2 El

im in

at e

di sc

ri m

in at

io n

in

he al

th ca

re

D EV

AW (1

99 3)

2 Th

e ri

gh t t

o lif

e, li

be rt

y an

d se

cu ri

ty , A

rt icl

e 3 Eq

ua lit

y, eq

ua l p

ro te

ct io

n un

de r t

he la

w , f

re ed

om fr

om

di sc

ri m

in at

io n,

A rt

icl e 3

Is ta

nb ul

C

on ve

nt io

n (2

01 1)

3

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ki ng

c ri

m in

al iz

ed , A

rt icl

e 3 4

Fo rc

ed a

bo rt

io n

an d

st er

ili za

tio n

cr im

in al

iz ed

, A

rt icl

e 3 9

Pr ov

id e

se rv

ic es

fo r v

ic tim

s of

d om

es tic

v io

le nc

e, A

rt icl

es

20 —

26 V

ic tim

’s ri

gh t t

o cl

ai m

co

m pe

ns at

io n,

A rt

icl e 3

0 Fo

rc ed

m ar

ra ge

in va

lid ,

A rt

icl e 3

2 Fo

rc ed

m ar

ri ag

e cr

im in

al iz

ed ,

A rt

icl e 3

7

Ph ys

ic al

v io

le nc

e cr

im in

al iz

ed , A

rt icl

e 3 5

A ll

no nc

on se

ns ua

l s ex

ua l a

ct s c

ri m

in al

iz ed

, A

rt icl

e 3 6

Fe m

al e

ge ni

ta l m

ut ila

tio n

cr im

in al

iz ed

, A

rt icl

e 3 8

Se xu

al h

ar as

sm en

t c ri

m in

al iz

ed , A

rt icl

e 4 0

Th e

ri gh

t t o

ac ce

ss em

er ge

nc y

ba rr

in g

or de

rs ,

re st

ra in

in g,

o r p

ro te

ct io

n or

de rs

, A rt

icl e 5

2  &

53

R ec

og ni

tio n

of g

en de

r- ba

se d

vi ol

en ce

a s a

ba

si s f

or a

sy lu

m c

la im

s, A

rt icl

e 6 0

H on

or k

ill in

gs a

nd c

ul tu

ra l j

us tifi

ca tio

ns

un ac

ce pt

ab le

fo r c

ri m

es o

f v io

le nc

e ag

ai ns

t w

om en

, A rt

icl e 4

2

C on

ve nt

io n

of

B el

ém d

o Pa

rá

(1 99

4) 4

A ll

w om

en h

av e

fu ll

ac ce

ss to

h um

an ri

gh ts

, A

rt icl

e 4 Ex

er ci

se o

f a nd

fu ll

pr ot

ec tio

n of

a ll

ri gh

ts in

cl ud

in g

ci vi

l an

d po

lit ic

al , A

rt icl

e 5 R

ig ht

to b

e fr

ee fr

om a

ll fo

rm s o

f d is

cr im

in at

io n,

A rt

icl e 6

Es ta

bl is

h pr

oc ed

ur es

to c

ri m

in al

iz e,

p ro

se cu

te , a

nd p

un is

h vi

ol en

ce a

ga in

st w

om en

th ro

ug h

fa ir

a nd

e ffe

ct iv

e le

ga l

pr oc

ed ur

es , A

rt icl

e 7

Pa le

rm o

Pr ot

oc ol

5 Pr

ev en

t t ra

ffi ck

in g

an d

pr ot

ec t v

ic tim

s o f

tr affi

ck in

g; p

ro vi

de v

ic tim

s w ith

fu ll

se rv

ic es

U N

R es

ol ut

io ns

6 Pr

ev en

t s ex

ua l a

nd g

en de

r- ba

se d

vi ol

en ce

in

a rm

ed c

on fli

ct . I

nc or

po ra

te g

en de

r pe

rs pe

ct iv

e in

to p

ea ce

ke ep

in g

op er

at io

ns U

N

R es

13 25

; El

im in

at io

n of

d om

es tic

v io

le nc

e ag

ai ns

t w

om en

, G en

er al

A sse

m bl

y R

es 18

/1 47

; P re

ve nt

an

d pr

os ec

ut e

tr affi

ck in

g in

w om

en a

nd g

ir ls

, U

N R

es 6

1/ 14

4

In cr

ea se

p ro

te ct

io n,

fu nd

in g,

a nd

in vo

lv em

en t o

f w om

en

at a

ll le

ve ls

o f g

ov er

nm en

t, U

N R

es 2

24 2,

13 25

, 1 82

0, 18

88 ,

18 89

, 1 96

0, 2

10 6,

2 12

2

H ea

lth a

nd re

pr od

uc tiv

e se

rv ic

es fo

r f em

al e

vi ct

im s o

f se

xu al

v io

le nc

e du

ri ng

a rm

ed

co nfl

ic t,

U N

R es

2 10

6

1 C on

ve nt

io n

on th

e El

im in

at io

n of

A ll

Fo rm

s o f D

is cr

im in

at io

n ag

ai ns

t W om

en (C

E D

AW )—

19 79

2 D ec

la ra

tio n

on th

e El

im in

at io

n of

V io

le nc

e ag

ai ns

t W om

en (D

EV AW

)— 19

94 3 C

ou nc

il of

E ur

op e

C on

ve nt

io n

on P

re ve

nt in

g an

d C

om ba

tin g

V io

le nc

e A

ga in

st W

om en

a nd

D om

es tic

V io

le nc

e (I

st an

bu l C

on ve

nt io

n) —

20 11

4 I nt

er -A

m er

ic an

C on

ve nt

io n

on th

e Pr

ev en

tio n,

P un

is hm

en t,

an d

Er ad

ic at

io n

of V

io le

nc e

ag ai

ns t W

om en

(C on

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34 Freedom from Fear

change through law (Keck and Sikkink 1998). This parallels the policy repertoire and recommendations of more specific studies of VAW: empowering women, engaging men, and ending impunity (Hudson et al. 2015). Beyond the established human rights model, for “private wrongs” committed by nonstate actors, rights campaigns must work to make the personal political by identifying new rights standards for previously ungoverned so- cial behavior, find new leverage mechanisms beyond the legal regime, and establish new responsibilities for states and global governance (Brysk 2005).

But acting globally to end VAW also requires an expansion of human rights frames, claims, and mechanisms (Brysk and Stohl eds. 2017). Gender- based killing is newly framed as “femicide,” revealing new patterns and inspiring waves of legislation and mobi- lization. Political mobilization and litigation have helped to establish the state’s “due dil- igence” obligation to protect citizens from private harm, as well as to demonstrate state sponsorship, delegation, or criminal negligence of abuses that appear to be committed by private parties. Global models of implementation move from capacity building to gen- dered urban planning, resource rights, and refugee protection. Hierarchical and inter- sectional patterns of gender violence reveal deeper interdependence between women’s human rights and lagging socioeconomic, cultural, and reproductive rights. These new initiatives in turn expand the human rights regime.

Transnational mobilization for human rights achieves leverage “from above and below,” in phases over time (Brysk 1995). The international human rights regime provides a repertoire of norms, claims, resources, mechanisms, and processes for addressing VAW. The main channels of international regime influence at the national and local level, for all kinds of human rights campaigns, are the diffusion of law and policy models, capacity building for challengers and willing states, and transnational advocacy network pressure. In the “spiral model” of evolving state response, states adopt policies on VAW most readily when they face both global and civil society pressure, and responsiveness evolves over time from denial to acknowledgment to commitment to compliance. Rapidly modernizing states that are materially dependent on global approbation are the most likely to do so— but even norms injected from above can and do become internalized and institutionalized over time with continuing contestation from below (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013). As Avdeyeva (2007) argues for 25 post- communist states ratifying CEDAW and policy compliance on VAW, treaty adherence is often driven by top- down signaling and logic of appropriateness— yet it can gain unexpected traction by subjecting states to monitoring bodies and empowering information politics in civil society, which will be most effective for the most internationally enmeshed countries (like Kosovo, the Czech Republic, and Poland) (Avdeyeva 2007).

In the revised spiral model that goes beyond the basic transnational pressure model and contemplates nonstate perpetrators and backlash reversals, human rights reform also depends on the power relations of abuse: notably, the concentration of authority for the violation as well as state capacity for reform, which will generally take a different form for private wrongs (Brysk in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013). Montoya further outlines

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three pathways to reform leverage specific to transnational advocacy combating VAW, in the “most likely” case of the European Union:  transnational coalitions connecting local and global pressures on the state in the “boomerang” model as above (Keck and Sikkink 1998), but also domestically driven reform with strong local advocates and state responsiveness, and a third possibility of top- down internationally driven diffusion. The domestic pathway seems to flow most often from modernizing or transitional state identities, while receptivity to top- down diffusion is conditioned by the state’s linkages to global governance (Montoya 2013). These elaborations of international regime dy- namics suggest that transitional semi- liberalizing regimes are likely to show a strong dia- lectical relationship between global, state, and grassroots human rights reform. Indeed, Simmons argues that the general pattern for human rights reform is that “international civil rights treaties will have their greatest effect where stakeholders— local citizens— have the motive and the means to demand treaty compliance. This is most likely to be the case not in stable autocracies, where such demands are likely to be crushed, nor in stable democracies, where the motive to mobilize is attenuated due to rights saturation, but in transitional countries where the expected value of mobilization is maximized” (Simmons 2009a).

On the other hand, the double- edged impact of acculturation is especially visible in rapidly changing developing democracies, where gendered violence, like ethnic con- flict, will be a common scapegoating mechanism by losers of globalization and reactive nationalists. The rise of modernized “rape cultures” and repertoires of gang rape and urban sexual violence in emerging countries like India, South Africa, Eg ypt, and Mexico illustrate this phenomenon and generate both local reform demand and resistance. Yet emerging democracies that seek a stronger regional or global role, like Turkey, Brazil, and India, have strong incentives to incorporate global norms and participate in global institutions— providing a potential necessary condition for effective mobilization. For example, Turkey hosted the 2011 drafting of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Violence Against Women and was the first country to ratify it; Brazil has been a re- gional leader on domestic violence and the Inter- American Convention; while Mexico pioneered landmark femicide legislation to counter international criticism of border zone serial killings of women. These global linkages and aspirations may result in leg- islation and institutions that provide new opportunities for social movements, but are extremely dependent on ongoing empowerment and social transformation. In this sense, the modernizing emerging nations have both “more murder in the middle” and more movement in the middle.

For all forms of social change, there is “power in movement,” and transnational action networks are a complementary aspect of the international regime (Tarrow 1994). Transnational campaigns involve mobilizing structures such as networks, norm entrepreneurs, solidarity alliances, and experts (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). The global movement to end VAW was marked by typical phases of transnational mobiliza- tion:  problem definition with movement consciousness- raising and bonding, solution

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36 Freedom from Fear

framing by experts, and politicization to pressure states and build alliances from above and below ( Joachim 2003). Impact is visible at the comparative national level: a study of policies against VAW in 70 countries over four decades shows that “feminist mobilization in civil society . . . accounts for variation in policy development” (Htun and Weldon 2012).

Cutting across these levels of analysis, human rights scholarship identifies the soft power of information politics in global civil society as a key determinant of the success of human rights campaigns confronting a range of abuses and power relations (Castells 2009). Like historic human rights campaigns, efforts to raise consciousness regarding VAW depend on the ability to locate globally resonant and emblematic “innocent victims” (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Similarly, VAW is challenged most successfully when it can be linked to a preexisting and powerful frame, as in “sex slavery” for human trafficking or “health rights” for FGM/ C. Communication power operates through introducing new and effective voices, frames, and performances of human rights claims that resonate with an audience due to bridging narratives, cause célèbres, and media campaigns (Brysk 2013). Symbolic events can catalyze access, including UN conferences (Friedman et al. 2005). In the area of women’s rights, “NGOs attempt to influence states’ interests by framing problems, solutions, and justifications for political action” ( Joachim 2003, 247).

An important facet of rights reform is institutionalizing change through law, and law represents the foundation and origin of the international rights regime. Despite debates on the sincerity and impact of treaty ratification, Simmons ( 2009b) finds that ratification of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Convention Against Torture (CAT), and Convention on the Rights of The Child (CRC) are positively as- sociated with improvements in human rights protections— but only when coupled with civil society activism, judicial enforcement, and transnational socialization. Other scholars find the strongest international norm effects from regional treaties, and specifi- cally note the domestic impact of the first and strongest Inter- American Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. Activists interact with legal and institu- tional change as they raise awareness of treaties and norms, train governments, and lobby legislatures (Weldon and Htun 2012).

In all of these transnational human rights reform processes, the state level plays a crit- ical role in filtering the international regime, enacting citizenship rights and autonomous women’s rights reform, and empowering or repressing human rights movement mobi- lization. Human rights theorists analyze the dynamics of the state’s role in reform by considering the influence of national regime type, legal structure, institutional networks, freedoms, and social mobilization (Cardenas 2007). An overwhelming body of research identifies some level of democracy as critical to human rights (Davenport 2000), while analysts such as Foweraker and Landman (1997) focus on the importance of citizenship rights seen in fundamental freedoms and social empowerment. Brysk and Shafir (eds. 2004)  condition the impact of globalization to improve human rights on the “citizen- ship gap” in the membership and legal status of affected groups. In a parallel analysis

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of indigenous peoples’ rights in Latin America, Deborah Yashar shows how the contra- diction between neoliberalizing political economy and liberalizing citizenship regimes drives a process of contested reform (Yashar 2005)— very similar to the dynamic of tran- sitional gender regimes in the semi- liberal BRICS and beyond.

Given the “patriarchal pact” of state and society discussed in the last chapter relative to gender regimes, Savery argues more systematically that the diffusion of gender equity norms will need to combine international construction and interaction with domestic power relations— including domestic feminist activism and the state (Savery 2007). Similarly, Sonia Alvarez (1990) and Jane Jaquette (2006) chronicle the relationship be- tween rights, democracy, and social mobilization for women’s rights issues in general. Similarly, Mala Htun (2003) shows how state institutions and issue- networks shape women’s reproductive rights— above and beyond culture and even regime type. Just as Donnelly (2007), Hertel and Minkler (2007), and others emphasize the interdepend- ence of economic and social rights with civil rights and security, Cherif (2015) finds that women’s rights in the Mideast depend more on core education and labor rights than on development, religion, or even international standards. In sum, citizenship matters— and we should expect it to interact systematically with international human rights regime dy- namics for change in VAW.

Finally, a factor that emerges from the human rights literature but has not been systemat- ically modeled is the influence of issue type on the dynamics of change within the spectrum of human rights abuse. Separate subsets of human rights studies have developed to discuss classes of violations governed by separate treaties, following different patterns of prevalence, and generating different mobilization and global responses— such as torture and genocide. I  will argue that the systematic differences in the dynamics of change for these distinct genres of abuse can be projected to the parallel gendered form of violence: slavery, genocide, and torture are analogous to trafficking, femicide, and rape. This interacts with the gender regime, in that gender regimes have characteristic prevalence, perpetrator, intersectional, and geographic profiles of these syndromes of violence— and we can transfer lessons from the parallel form of human rights abuse to the form of intervention for VAW.

Why have some forms of violence been more easily recognized and contested than others? Why do parallel and at times overlapping forms of abuse receive different response at some times and in some places? Although issues like human trafficking have inspired global treaties, regional initiatives, US aid, and extensive advocacy, other forms of VAW are more difficult to recognize and/ or resistant to governance. Slavery, like trafficking, was recognized first and benefited from its border- crossing resonance and shifting political economy; genocide, like femicide, was rapidly stigmatized but founders on sovereignty and power relations; and torture, like sexual violence, remains the most resilient, func- tional, and potentially privatized abuse. These differences in response can be traced to different power structures of each form of abuse, different leverage points and state ca- pacity for change, different framing and representation of different forms of violence by advocates, and strategic alignments with broader national and international interests.

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38 Freedom from Fear

Among the panoply of forms of violence, trafficking is a “best case scenario”: a border- crossing threat to the security of strong states, with dispersed and marginal beneficiaries, which is framed as slavery and evokes an unusual coalition of feminist, religious, law en- forcement, and children’s advocates in a lowest- common- denominator humanitarian rubric. While early attention garnered a strong intervention, the politics of mobiliza- tion also distorted response and generated subsequent struggles and reorientation to a more rights- based versus protectionist frame. Issues that are “most likely to succeed” can also easily become ghettoized from the broader understanding and response to abuse, requiring a bridging strateg y. For example, while trafficking as a chronic form of transna- tional criminal exploitation is well established in popular imagination and international policy, advocates struggle to link the increasing incidence of trafficking among refugees and displaced populations (Brysk and Choi- Fitzpatrick 2012). Moreover, trafficking is inextricably intertwined with issues of border security and crime that increase leading host- state incentives and responsiveness in both international and national law, but exert constant pressure for more prosecutorial and governance approaches rather than rights and victim- centered models (Lloyd and Simmons 2014).

By contrast, the response to localized violence to deprive women of reproductive free- doms, such as child marriage and honor killings endemic in the MENA region and South Asia, has lagged significantly in effective mobilization. Far along the spectrum of non- state, delegated, and naturalized perpetrators such as families, in relatively weak states that delegate universal and constitutional rights to legal pluralism, such issues have only recently found local voice to contest cultural counter- frames through resonant figures like Malala Yousafzai. “Rights talk” and even state- generated legal reform has been rel- atively unavailing, and efforts like the Tostan campaign against FGM/ C have achieved traction largely through close attention to vernacularization, collective socialization, and alliances with international health regimes.

The issue politics of gender- based killing are more mixed and delayed:  public rec- ognition of violence is easier than other forms of abuse, as it results in homicide, but mobilization is more difficult and response even more limited. The emerging frame of “femicide” brings together a range of tactics to suppress female population, like sex- selective abortion and female infanticide in India and China (“gendercide”), with an epidemic of rape- torture- mutilation murders of women along the US– Mexico border and throughout Central America (“feminicide”). The tens of thousands of women killed annually by domestic violence in Russia, Brazil, and other rapidly developing nations is now also approached as a gender- based hate crime. In more traditional societies, gender- based targeted killings may take the form of assassination of hundreds of alleged witches in parts of Africa, South Asia, and Papua New Guinea— highlighted in recent United Nations reports. These abuses are truly private wrongs by nonstate perpetrators that often occur in ungoverned spaces against women who are multiply disadvantaged as migrants, peasants, ethnic minorities, illiterate, or simply poor. The key to information politics for mobilization is pattern recognition through documentation, from the killings in Ciudad

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Juarez to Amartya Sen’s “100 Million Women Are Missing.” The recent femicide frame has evoked mobilization and episodic policy response. Women’s movements and global development alliances have helped push policy responses in the Americas and some aspi- rational developing countries such as Turkey, but legal response to gendercide in India has been largely unavailing, and domestic violence is just emerging on the political agenda in both Russia and China— and even suffering backlash.

Sexual violence is a multifaceted form of torture, terror, and crime, enacted along the full spectrum from state sponsorship to “private wrong.” Global campaigns against sexual violence have emerged the most recently, and have traveled from war crimes to criminal public assault by private parties, with slow but increasing recognition of state- sponsored rape in national conflicts and authoritarian regimes, and lagging acknowledgment of state- delegated and domestic sexual violence. The privatization and naturalization of rape as illicit sex rather than abuse of power has undercut both mobilization and policy response worldwide, compounded by widespread cultural norms of shame around sexual violation that compound the trauma and disabling impact, discouraging voice (even among male victims). The conflict frame of “rape as a weapon of war” has the poten- tial to overcome patriarchal notions of consent and legitimate victims as representatives of the aggrieved national or ethnic community, turning shame to martyrdom. Like the wider human rights regime, violence in the interstate public sphere is privileged over na- tional and private violence but, unlike the human rights campaign transition from war crimes to state terror, domestic legal response to sexual assault is muddied by patriarchal criminal codes, family law, and delegated legal pluralism. Concern with sexual violence has been mainstreamed in international human rights campaigns against dictatorships and counter- insurgencies, but response to state negligence of chronic rape regimes in democracies has emerged only when highly symbolic, shocking cases, like the 2012 Delhi rape, combined with high levels of both global concern and local protest. Even well- designed legal reforms have foundered on problems of enforcement, political will, and popular socialization in India and South Africa, and current international approaches are moving toward urban policy (UN Habitat, Global Safe Cities), gender- based violence ed- ucation (Promundo), and technological empowerment of women at risk (Harass Map).

This broader understanding of the dynamics of rights- based change articulates well with the inductive analysis of a major international promoter of gender equity, Britain’s Department for International Development (DFID), based on surveying decades of interventions by major UN agencies, foreign aid providers, and transnational NGOs for both men and women. Their principles for a theory of change flow from an ecological model of the cause, and echo the dynamics outlined above:

1. Context is critical: successful interventions are those that are tailored and based on rigorous analysis of the particular factors affecting violence against women and girls in a specific context, including setting, form of violence, and population af- fected by the violence.

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40 Freedom from Fear

2. The state has primary responsibility for action on violence against women and girls: national governments hold the ultimate responsibility for implementing laws, policies, and services around violence against women and girls and can achieve change on violence against women and girls.

3. Holistic and multi- sectoral approaches are more likely to have impact: coordi- nated interventions operating at multiple levels, across sectors, and over multiple time frames are more likely to address the various aspects of, and therefore have greater impact on, tackling violence against women and girls.

4. Social change makes the difference:  sustained reduction in violence against women and girls will only occur through processes of significant social change, in- cluding in social norms, at all levels.

5. Backlash is inevitable but manageable: resistance to tackling violence against women and girls, which may include increased risk of further violence against women and girls, is inevitable where root causes are being addressed but can, and should be, managed.

6. Women’s rights organizations (WROs) create and sustain change: supporting WROs, especially those working to tackle violence against women and girls, to make changes, and build strong and inclusive social movements, is the most effective mechanism for ensuring sustainable change in the lives of women and girls.

7. Empowering women is both the means and the end:  focusing on the rights of, and being accountable to, women and girls is the most effective way of tackling gender inequality as the root cause of violence against women and girls (Alexander- Scott 2012).

2.3 Freedom from fear: Why is this right different from all other rights?

While rights- based campaigns and lessons drawn from the historic repertoire are nec- essary to address VAW, they are not sufficient. There are some systematic differences between gendered insecurity and the state violations of civil and political rights that established the international human rights regime. The incidence, addressees, norms, mechanisms, and interdependence of VAW pose additional challenges for rights- based reform, and ultimately push for an expansion of human rights itself. At the same time, the study of semi- liberal gender regimes at the frontiers of globalization can yield particular insights into these incomplete areas of the human rights regime: the security dilemma, privatization, contradictions of modernity, politics of law, and complex intersectional interdependence.

First of all, aside from the gendered nature of VAW, there is a broken link between personal security and the broader corpus of civil and political rights that is heightened at the frontiers of globalization. Early struggles for the four freedoms and democrati- zation assumed a positive interdependence in which democracy checks impunity, civil

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liberties provide transparency and voice, and citizenship grants accountability for the abuse of power by the state. International law was presumed to provide a safety net for border- crossing war crimes, refugees, and slavery. While there is negative interdepend- ence as totalitarian regimes inevitably violate life and bodily integrity in order to crush freedom, the assumed positive linkage has proven elusive; elected governments and civil liberties do not necessarily insure respect for personal security— for men and women alike. Journalists and human rights defenders are especially at risk of assault, torture, and assassination from a murky combination of paramilitaries, police, and criminals that instills a regime of fear that undermines their formal freedoms— just like the rape regime and honor attacks undermine women’s freedom of movement and political participa- tion in deadly democracies (Haschke 2014). This is why political empowerment is not enough to insure women’s security, especially in semi- liberal and post- conflict regimes. The “triangles of empowerment” deemed sufficient to foster women’s rights in a stable, sovereign democratic polity— political leadership, bureaucracy, and civic movements (Vargas and Wieringa 1998)— must add a fourth and fifth element: fundamental security in the home and the street.

The gendered conceptual challenge for women’s rights as human rights is that “private wrongs”— human rights violations by nonstate actors— shape the requisites of mobili- zation and policy in distinctive ways (Brysk 2005). VAW has different patterns of cau- sality and consequently leverage than government suppression of dissidents, as it often emanates from decentralized nonstate perpetrators like families (Brysk in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013). Sometimes the addressee of women’s rights is the state, ranging from state- sponsored sexual assault to women’s suffrage to equal access to property rights to family planning. But often the source of the denial of women’s rights is a private actor: an exploitative employer, sex trafficker, abusive family, tribal council, or religious institution. And states and international institutions may be sponsors, regulators, isolated from, or powerless over private actors, domains, or zones. Gendered violence is often governed across borders or below the state through institutions like family law, complicating en- forcement. Cross- border forms of VAW like trafficking and conflict rape are usually generated by a combination of distortions in global power relations and shortfalls in the sovereignty of the very state that is failing to protect its female citizens (Tickner 2001; Enloe 2014; Pettman 1996).

Moreover, while VAW is perpetrated by a spectrum of state and nonstate actors, part of its repressive power comes from the naturalization of structural violence and the pri- vatization of state complicity that evades accountability to citizens and universal norms. The most disabling violence is that which cannot be named, framed as a violation of a universal social standard, or attributed to an actor for accountability— when VAW is deeply internalized as an inevitable background condition of war, marriage, migra- tion, or regime control. One consequence and illustration of this dynamic is a systematic difference in the relative treatment of public and private sexual violence by liberal and authoritarian states with different governance logics of privatization. Liberal states are

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42 Freedom from Fear

quicker to tackle public assault, which is a threat to the rule of law and women’s public citizenship, but often lag on acknowledging and sanctioning private- domain violence, whether marital rape or campus assault. By contrast, modernizing authoritarian states like China or Iran will initially target domestic violence as a private deviation from public norms, but usually deny and delay confronting public assault that undermines the state’s claim to provide order— or may involve the negligence or even participation of state agents.

The content and dissemination of the norms of gender equity are also a particular challenge for universalist models of human rights reform. Different kinds of rights have a different historical association with the power relations of modernity and create different stakeholders on the ground, and gender equity is fragile on both counts. While some analysts promote and applaud the diffusion of beliefs about women’s empowerment as global common sense (Sen 1990; King and Mason 2001), others decry the adoption of a prestigious “modern” norm promulgated by dominant powers as a “mark of civili- zation” to raise their international status (Towns 2010). In constructivist terms, this is a “logic of appropriateness” where roles outweigh principled beliefs; it is also a global version of Appiah’s (2010) notion of a collective “honor code” that inspires expansion of rights and citizenship. For example, arguments for the introduction of women’s suffrage in Kuwait in 2005 repeatedly cited global embarrassment rather than rights, beliefs, or local stakeholders (cited in Hudson 2012, 174). Overall, norms associated with central contradictions of modernity tend to provide greater leverage for adoption but place a greater burden on social mobilization for implementation by an ambivalent state— and women’s rights is a prime example that is intensified at the frontiers of globalization where modernity is extremely contested. The CEDAW women’s rights regime and asso- ciated monitoring mechanisms foster complex learning and contestation among global institutions, transnational networks, and the gendered state. This negotiated and dy- namic process of change produces an unpredictable combination of socialization, back- lash, and transnational redefinition of norms at the same time, at both the global and state levels (Zwingel 2012).

Women’s rights also have a different relationship to law, since the ambit and consti- tutive function of law is distinct from historic civil and political rights. Classic human rights issues began with war crimes and the border- crossing violation of the slave trade in international humanitarian law during the 19th century, then entered interna- tional human rights law via key international covenants following the Holocaust (the International Covenants on Civil- Political and Economic and Social Rights (ICCPR and ICECSR), along with the Genocide and Refugee Conventions). A generation later, the international agenda of human rights issues expanded to domestic civil liberties and rule of law, along with the campaign against torture, which were long proposed in es- tablished constitutional democracies but have been activated in new ways by transna- tional social movements, and became central features of campaigns against authoritarian

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regimes during the 1980s and 1990s as dozens of states transitioned to democracy. A key channel of implementation is the enactment of domestic law that incorporates interna- tional standards and the diffusion of legal codes, law enforcement repertoires, and ca- pacity building for human rights monitoring, resources, and national institutions (Brysk ed. 2013).

By contrast, VAW is more recently governed by congeries of family law, religious and tribal law, international private law, public law, constitutional norms, the human rights covenants, revised war crimes standards and jurisprudence, issue- specific treaties such as trafficking , and actor- specific treaties like CEDAW. Some of these bodies of law are not rights based, and all are gendered in construction and impact. The sequence of rights recognition and jurisdiction is different for VAW, as law on trafficking arises along with slavery during the 19th century, but war crimes against women are not addressed until the 1990s. Moreover, gendered forms of violence like domestic vio- lence and marital rape are still not addressed in the national laws in dozens of states— in March 2013, women’s groups marched in Lebanon to support a proposed law to criminalize domestic violence, against parliamentary opposition. And even when there are clear laws sanctioning VAW that are properly located in a universal criminal code, there are well- documented systematic barriers to legal monitoring and enforcement for VAW, especially sexual violence. At the frontiers of globalization, even as the architec- ture of law begins to universalize, generic lack of access to justice and accountability intensify the barriers to gender justice.

Finally, women’s rights and security are extraordinarily interdependent with their ec- onomic and social, collective, and reproductive rights, with tremendous implications for the intersectional struggle for rights by populations systematically disadvantaged in these other dimensions of rights. While all human rights are doctrinally indivisible, their degree of empirical interdependence varies greatly— and once again, these linkages are acute in the semi- liberal regimes with intense levels of social inequality and clashing conceptions of reproductive rights. Women who are poor, from marginalized identity groups, in less developed countries, forcibly displaced, or politically repressed are often disadvantaged at multiple levels within their community, in the wider polity, and glob- ally. Such women therefore are both especially vulnerable to abuse and doubly lack the se- curity, freedom, and resources to contest it (Ackerley 2008). For example, a Guatemalan indigenous woman may be beaten in her home, raped by paramilitaries or police for her ethnicity or political activism, assaulted in a refugee camp (perhaps even by international personnel), trafficked for sexual exploitation, attacked by urban gangs in her shantytown, sexually harassed as a domestic worker, or assassinated migrating to a global factory— and this woman might lack permission from her family to report the abuse, access to medical treatment, command of the national language, knowledge of her rights, bus fare to the office or court, birth registration or citizenship papers, permission from her employer for time off, childcare, and protection from retaliation.

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Thus, Intersectional feminist analysis supplements human rights interdependence to show how

Violence can be analyzed both via how it traverses intersecting systems of power as well as by how it is organized across domains of power. Across varying social contexts, the use or threat of violence has been central to power relations that pro- duce social inequalities.  .  .  . An intersectional analysis reveals how violence is not only understood and practiced within discrete systems of power, but also how it constitutes a common thread that connects racist, colonialism, patriarchy, and na- tionalism, for example.” (Hill et al. 2016, 55)

Another axis of rights interdependence that vexes campaigns for women’s human rights is the insecurity that results from denial and denigration of women’s reproductive roles and rights, since the logic of many forms of violence is control of women’s reproductive lives. Reproductive rights are the most recent, contingent, and contested rights in both international and domestic law. Rights to marital and reproductive self- determination garner the most reservations in the widely subscribed CEDAW treaty. Many states do not recognize marital rape or a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy, and displaced or migrant women often lack access to reproductive health services and legal protection from sexual abuse. Sex workers almost everywhere are more vulnerable to violence, are systematically denied protection, and are often abused by police. In many countries, pros- ecution of sexual assault or trafficking for sexual exploitation demands proof of failure to consent— in contrast to response to parallel forms of nonsexual violence like robbery or debt bondage. Moreover, the characteristic form of abuse of women’s bodily integ- rity is sexual violence, and its harms often include potentially fatal sexually transmitted disease, forced pregnancy, and/ or damage to reproductive capacity. Gendered lack of re- productive rights and health rights may compound the consequences of the violation, and discriminatory and even abusive treatment of victims by police and legal institutions has been labeled a “second assault.” Women’s reproductive roles increase vulnerability to violence, while sexual self- determination lags behind women’s rights as workers, citizens, and victims of war and disaster, and appears to be the dimension of rights most prone to backlash even in developed democracies. Emerging research based on the WomanStats database, tracking dozens of indicators for 176 countries for over a decade, demonstrates that indicators of patriarchal social organization such as polyg yny and marriage exchange value are robustly associated with women’s physical insecurity as well as other forms of conflict and violence (Hudson et al. 2017).

2.4 Expanding rights: Strategies and pathways

As in other areas of emerging rights, the special challenges of acting globally to end VAW may lead to creative expansion of human rights actors, frames, mechanisms, and

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responsibilities (Brysk and Stohl eds. 2017). The successful campaign to frame rape as a war crime installs a formerly privatized wrong in the international human rights re- gime. The globalized commodification of human trafficking gains attention when it is described as a form of pre- modern slavery, bridging frames. Child marriage is reframed as a rights problem rather than a cultural gap, and linked to domestic violence, health rights, and education. Reframing FGM/ C as a health rights claim facilitates coalition- building on global public health (Baer and Brysk 2008), with similar patterns on do- mestic violence. Campaigns craft new frames: gender- based killing worldwide is framed as “femicide” by activists and a series of UN conferences, revealing new patterns of abuse and responsibility and inspiring waves of legislation and mobilization in the Americas and South Asia.

From the global governance side, the new rights claims of women’s human rights campaigns are accepted and extended, creating a new political opportunity structure for the next round of transnational mobilization. The World Bank, as the largest de- velopment institution on the planet, has bridged gender equity and women’s security to improvement in nutrition, education, child development, and overall productivity (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank 2012). In a 20- country study On Norms and Agency (p. 4), the World Bank affirms and helps extend the norm, stating that the Bank takes gender equality as both a right that is an end in itself as well as a capacity necessary for development. The Bank, which is a hegemonic global institution in both the political and Gramscian conceptual sense, defines women’s agency in terms that acknowledge the interdependence of rights and security as freedom of movement, free choice regarding fertility, freedom from violence, and voice in society.

Expanding rights for private wrongs also involves mobilizing new actors and new types of campaigns. Alongside the transnational networks that established women’s rights as human rights and the national women’s movements that lobbied for law and protested in the public sphere, new layers of local and virtual activism add new claims, repertoires, and reach to the movement. At the local level, grassroots movements like India’s Gulabi Gang struggle against interlocking abuses of poverty, corruption, caste, domestic violence, and child marriage with a highly vernacular repertoire of direct action and occupying sites of local power. Millions of young women worldwide have closed the digital divide to launch viral campaigns to shame harassers in India, protest rape culture in Brazil, or chronicle domestic violence in China. Online movements often stress sexual self- determination and link women’s autonomy to safety. In the second generation of women’s rights as human rights, male feminists seek to transform their own relationship to violence and create a more peaceful and just world.

For freedom from fear, the state may be both the target of mobilization and the mech- anism for fulfillment. As Hudson reminds us, the state can be both an oppressor and protector of women’s rights, with leverage points in the policy areas of rights monitoring, protection for human rights defenders, education, reproductive health services, incentives like scholarships for girls, political quotas for gender representation, women’s

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46 Freedom from Fear

participation in peace negotiations, women in local civil structures, women in police, employment discrimination, paid maternity leave, and foreign policy for gender equity, alongside gendered legal frameworks like the status of religious rulings vis- a- vis state law, minimum age for marriage, equal right to divorce, equal property rights, femicide laws, and asylum laws (Hudson 2013, 129). Global models of implementation and campaign goals have moved from fostering legal compliance to broader state capacity building, gen- dered urban planning, resource rights, refugee protection, and public policy for transpor- tation, sanitation, and education.

Implementation can also be expanded through grounding new norms in local alterna- tive mechanisms that go beyond the standard legal model. Merry (2006) argues that “in order for human rights ideas to be effective. . . they need to be translated into local terms and situated within local contexts of power and meaning. In other words, to be remade in the vernacular” (p. 1). For example, she shows how local activists in Delhi helped set up women’s (informal) courts during the 1990s to help women access meaningful and ap- propriate redress for domestic violence. We will extend this insight on expanding rights to policy domains beyond the legal and translation to local vernacular norms and social processes to struggles against VAW worldwide.

To combat private wrongs also means expanding responsibilities. In issues from VAW to corporate social responsibility, political mobilization and litigation have helped to es- tablish the state’s “due diligence” obligation to protect citizens from private harm, as well as to demonstrate state sponsorship, delegation, or criminal negligence of abuses that appear to be committed by private parties (Marshall 2008). As an early leader at a na- tional level, Brazil’s democratizing 1988 constitution in paragraph 8, article 226 expresses the duty of the state to create mechanisms to avoid violence in the family. As we will see below, international doctrine on due diligence developed in tandem, especially in the European and Inter- American systems.

Another facet of expanding human rights and responsibilities for women’s security is norm change that bridges rights talk and collective gender regime norms, with the poten- tial to socialize a broader range of actors. A systemic analysis may yield insight on how to change the incentives of both men and women who benefit from or depend upon patriar- chal structures, such as mothers whose daughters’ marriageability and economic survival depends on female genital cutting as long as it is a group norm— that can be transformed by grassroots campaigns. Correspondingly, unpacking patriarchal power relations allows appeals to modernizing gender equity norms to seek allies for relatively powerless victims in other sectors who benefit from change, like aspiring young men who may benefit from the education of women in their household or community. However, the critical norm expansion of reproductive rights often confronts resurgent counter- frames of nation- alism, religious ideolog y, and honor/ shame culture.

The privatization of gender violence, contested modernity, complex rights intersectionality, and limitations of the modal human rights mechanism of law also re- quire an expansion of implementation mechanisms and responsibilities. At the national

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level, this analysis will show how a rights- based combination of law, public policy, civil society mobilization, and value change is needed to fully address gender violence— and which elements will be most critical for which abuses and gender regime types. For ex- ample, public policy has particular influence in transitional regimes with high levels of urban poverty. Law is unlikely to affect structural gender violence in patriarchal political economies without significant value change and mobilization to reconstruct interests. Conversely, in transitional regimes, gendered vulnerability to public violence depends less on relatively established legal rights and modernizing gender norms and more on public policy, state capacity, and mobilization to pressure distorted democracies. Across all types of gender regimes, sexual violence is more legitimized and privatized, requiring much more norm change and information politics relative to other types of abuse.

We will also trace the inherent potential and limitations within each pathway of re- sponse to illustrate the salient features that enhance, distort, or block the impact of women’s human rights struggles for law, public policy, mobilization, and norm change. Different aspects of each pathway are challenged by the structural parameters of the gender regime in which the struggle occurs. For example, within the strateg y of law, the architecture of law is generally a limiting feature— contrasted with the expansive poten- tial of vernacular translation within the strateg y of social movement mobilization. More generally, the impact of law on gender violence depends on factors related to legal archi- tecture, access, and accountability that present differently for gender regimes and abuse syndromes. For traditional abuses and patriarchal regimes, violence may be authorized by the structure of the law itself, whereas for public crimes in semi- liberal regimes, the gap is enforcement and impunity.

Similarly, different aspects of the mobilization pathway are critical for different gender regimes and genres of violence. While campaigns in more traditional societies require mobilization of voice and translation of global norms to local vocabularies, more modernized and institutionalized transitional regimes respond to advocacy, public protest, and lobbying.

As for value change, for issues of self- determination characteristic of patriarchal gender regimes, the essential missing norm is women’s agency as subjects of rights. But in semi- liberal regimes with established women’s citizenship and rising gender equity that gen- erate expectations of women’s empowerment, beliefs about masculinity and violence are a greater normative challenge. Across all types and locations of sexual violence, various articulations of rape culture are a counter- norm to reproductive rights and a barrier to sexual self- determination (Table 2.2).

Putting all of this together, we can now outline some expectations and scope conditions for the dynamics of change for gender violence derived from an expanded human rights model. As the basic human rights model suggests, change must come from above and below, in a shifting interaction between the international regime, transnational, and grassroots mobilization that fosters increased state responsibility and responsiveness over time. Countries and sectors at the frontiers of globalization are both most vulnerable to

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48 Freedom from Fear

abuse and most amenable to influence. Citizenship status and democratic political par- ticipation are critical filters for contesting human rights, but can often be broadened by introducing new actors as claimants and new mechanisms as channels of response. The ultimate impact of human rights campaigns depends upon a strategic combination of information politics and institutionalization through law and policy, and we can map characteristics of framing, architecture and access to law, and state capacity that shape the move from commitment to compliance. Conversely, shortfalls and regressions in gaining accountability for VAW are usually traceable to the absence, decline, or contradictions among these characteristics: international regime, mobilization, citizenship, democracy, information politics, state capacity, and institutionalization.

But there are additional characteristics and parameters of women’s rights as human rights suggested by feminist theory and a constructivist approach that can help us analyze and tailor responses to VAW: the interaction of gender regimes and violation types, the dynamics of “private wrongs,” and human rights interdependence/ intersectionality. The underlying power relations and political economy of different types of gender regimes both predisposes them to particular syndromes of violence and suggests what kinds of response will be most useful to intervene in those forms of repression. For example,

Table 2 .2

Pathways of Change Pathways of Response to Violence Against Women

Freedom Femicide Sexual Violence

Patriarchal Political Economy

*Norms–agency *Law-architecture *Mobilization–voice *Policy–education, health

*Norms–honor *Law enforcement *Public policy *Mobilization–vernacular

*Norms–rights *Law–access *Policy–sanitation *Global diffusion

Transitional Regimes

*Law-enforcement *State capacity and responsibility

*Norms–masculinity *Public policy–urban, transport *Law–access *Mobilization–advocacy

*Norms–rape culture *Public policy–urban, migration *Law–access, enforcement *Mobilization– solidarity,3.0

Privatized Developed

*Law–architecture *Mobilization– Information

*Norms–masculinity *Law–access, enforcement *Mobilization–services *Policy–programs

*Norms–rape culture *Mobilization-3.0 *Law–enforcement *Policy–migration

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norm change will be most effective for historic syndromes of abuse that are no longer functional for the gender regime, while globalizing sectors of semi- liberal regimes that benefit from democratic rights and modernity may be natural coalition partners of women’s movements across gender lines. International promotion focused on legal re- form state compliance will be more effective for public than domestic femicide and sexual violence— though interdependent reforms of family law and property rights will usu- ally trickle down into private settings. For all forms of violence in all gender regimes, but especially in semi- liberal regimes that are the most unequal, the citizenship filter is highly intersectional: women who are marginalized by cross- cutting characteristics like race and class are also most impeded in membership and access to justice. These addi- tional factors can further guide our understanding of the relationship among the factors listed in the standard model, such as the relationship between local and global action that requires most “vernacularization” in patrimonial gender regimes, or the balance between norm change and formal policy that is most critical for sexual violence. In the material that follows, we will trace the operation of these dynamics and affirm the directions of impact— as well as stagnation or backlash— predicted by these analyses.

2.5 Getting to gender justice

What are the lessons of “women’s rights as human rights” for constructing political will for gender justice? First, it is productive and important to reframe VAW as a gendered form of human rights abuse. Second, it is a critical task for campaigns to resist the priva- tization of abuse, revealing state complicity and demanding state accountability for the full spectrum of violations.

The dynamics of change operate through a dialectical interaction between the inter- national regime, state, and grassroots level— following patterns of influence that can be analyzed relative to the power relations of abuse and gender regime types. Although the modal human rights response is law, for VAW, changes in law are necessary but not suf- ficient. Similarly, a narrow focus on women’s empowerment must be matched by trans- formation of men and at- risk communities, guns and butter as well as hearts and minds. We now turn to analyzing the global repertoire of response, mobilizing dynamics of change, and situated pathways for contesting specific syndromes of VAW at the frontiers of globalization.

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3

Acting Globally

T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R I G H T S R E P E R T O I R E

Global attention to VAW has grown in tandem with the international human rights regime, but with some special features. The international cluster of institutions, networks, and resources dedicated to gender violence has shaped response in impor- tant ways. Global standards and programs, regional organizations, foreign aid and di- plomacy, and cross- cutting development and health linkages have raised consciousness, empowered advocacy, diffused law, fostered policy, and built capacity to contest violence. In a typical pattern for human rights promotion “from above and below,” international initiatives interact with the patterns of transnational and grassroots mobilization de- tailed in the next chapter. As we will see in discussion of the genres of gender violence, in some cases global attention may precede national action, while in others, the interna- tional system sets a template or network for independent local mobilization. Mapping the international rights repertoire available for women’s right to physical security is thus the foundation for understanding and improving response to VAW worldwide.

3.1 International regime influence

International relations scholars identify the clusters of global organizations, states, and transnational bodies that habitually interact to shape the norms, resources, and policies surrounding a complex issue as “international regimes.” While international regimes lack formal authority, the networks, knowledge, linkage, and expectations they generate do seem to guide behavior— from trade negotiations to arms races to disaster relief. The international human rights regime increasingly shapes incentives and constraints for both state action and transnational coordination in areas like election observation, tran- sitional justice, and response to human trafficking, although it commands less leverage

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and weaker ties than corresponding governance systems in security, political economy, and even adjacent environmental and health issues with clear global commons public goods (or public bads). Information politics is usually a key resource and force multiplier for international regimes- in the absence of authoritative control- and has been the cur- rency of human rights regimes. In human rights regimes, civil society actors and transna- tional networks often advocate, design, legitimate, populate, inform, and administer the regime’s standards and policies (Krasner 1984; Haas 1992; Rittberger, Volker, and Meyer 1993; Donnelly 1986; Friedman et al. 2005).

By the late 20th century, global governance networks, transnational mobilization, and policy diffusion on gendered abuse increased dramatically by two distinct logics. The par- adigm of “women’s rights as human rights,” generated by the 1993 Vienna human rights conference and deepened at the Beijing World Conference on Women of 1995, offered a principled extension of the gathering human rights regime. But VAW was also framed as a broader human security issue with negative spillovers, and as a barrier to global devel- opment, health, and environmental goals— and even national security. This fits with the finding that issue linkage is often more important than persuasion in building a regime (Charnysh, Lloyd, and Simmons 2014). This dual movement is especially appropriate for women’s rights issues, because both analysts and advocates split on the salience and effi- cacy of fostering dedicated mechanisms to remedy gender- based discrimination versus “mainstreaming” gender issues in broader regimes for development and security (Everett et al. 2013). In practice, both have occurred.

The emergence of global governance for VAW was inspired by a new combination of rights framing , issue linkage, and transnational mobilization. While VAW is a per- ennial and poorly measured problem, a resurgence of border- crossing abuse made it a more visible and visibly global problem in the 1990s in the forms of genocidal rape in Bosnia and Rwanda, sex trafficking from Eastern Europe, and the “femicide” murders of female migrant workers at the US– Mexico border. Negative spillovers to the global AIDS crisis were documented from rape, domestic violence, and forced prostitution. State interests in conflict resolution, development of emerging economies, and even governance of failing states was increasingly understood to be intertwined with gender inequity and violence (Hudson 2010). For human trafficking , the move from victim to human rights to crime frame securitizes the issue and empowers states to police their borders (Lloyd and Simmons 2014). In addition, there were sources of norm en- trepreneurship and advocacy at every level of the international system, from a United Nations Decade for Women (1975– 1985) to worldwide mobilization of grassroots and transnational women’s movements. Notable gatekeepers included the flagship human rights organization Amnesty International and the leadership of Hillary Clinton as US Secretary of State.

At the same time, there were different dynamics within this general pattern of growth for global mobilization on VAW by sector, region, and venue. The balance of regime- generating forces was distinctive for particular genres of violence: trafficking corresponds

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52 Freedom from Fear

most to state interests, domestic violence to women’s movements advocacy and health spillovers, and sexual violence to a combination of transnational mobilization, gov- ernance gap, conflict management, and principled argumentation. As in other areas of rights, international action was strongest in the regions with the most institutional den- sity and organizational capacity: Europe and the Americas. States were most attentive to conflict and migration issues, while global institutions were most sensitive to threats to health and development (Figure 3.1).

3.2 Pathways of response

How does the response repertoire work? The current generation of human rights schol- arship outlines dynamics of international regime influence via interdependence, diffusion, legalization, and communicative action ( framing and shaming ). This is a rough expansion upon the Keck and Sikkink (1998) model for transnational action networks:  symbolic politics, information politics, leverage, and institutionalization. Improving effective- ness requires analyzing the potential, barriers, and changes in these pathways. While international institutions may be central to all of these pathways, global civil society is also critical for diffusion and communicative action. Moreover, the impact of interna- tional initiatives is cumulative and interactive with the local level. In particular, various studies suggest joint effects of international law, domestic judicial institutions, and social

International human rights regime:

norms, resources, mechanisms, governance

+ transnational networks

State: identity, law, citizenship

access, public policy

Gender regime: rules, roles,

norms, practices

Figure 3 . 1 Dynamics of the human rights regime Source: n/ a

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mobilization (Dancy 2013; Simmons 2013, Krommendijk 2015; Sandholtz and Stiles 2009; Hillebrecht 2014).

First, states— and transnational actors like corporations— may respond to human rights claims because they are enmeshed in international accountability through relationships of “moral and material” interdependence that renders them vulnerable to pressure (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013). Material leverage includes economic sanctions and aid, while moral interdependence might operate through the power of reputation, such as valuing the status of membership in international society and organizations (Brysk 2009). We will see these dynamics emerge most strongly for violations of self- determination such as trafficking (Chapter 5) and public policy responses like policing (Chapter 9). However, some forms of material influence are weaker for women’s rights issues— and rights sanctions and conditionality are weakening across the board.

Second, international norms, institutions, and practices may circulate and diffuse to the local level with powerful effects. This can occur through structural emulation, norm cascades, regional convergence, network effects, and even sub- national circula- tion (Sikkink 2011; Greenhill 2016; O’Brien 2015). Sociological institutionalist models suggest that establishing globally mandated institutional structures shifts local agendas and empowers civil society, while specific studies of women’s rights offices confirm this effect (Frank and Phillips 2013; True 2001; Kardam 2001). Recent research on the power of membership in international institutions shows that sheer membership in global or- ganizations tends to reshape state interests toward greater compliance with human rights norms— even if the institutions do not have a human rights mandate— albeit with an averaging effect that does not always improve performance. This type of cosmopolitan acculturation seems to outweigh either material influence or even persuasion to specific values, and to have greater influence on more enmeshed rich and democratic states— contrary to the hegemonic and dependency critiques examined in Chapter 2. Within the process of diffusion, modeling and aspiration overlap with the ranking dynamic discussed by Towns (2010)— it pays to be “modern” as defined by dominant societies. Specifically, “richer or more democratic states have greater influence over the transmission of women’s rights” (Towns 2010, 133; Greenhill 2016). This pathway of international influence suggests why the frontiers of globalization are especially amenable to reform, as they are experiencing intense diffusion, democratic and developed enough to be regime- takers, and generally aspire to modernizing middle- power status and/ or regional leadership.

Moreover, some institutions serve as a complementary source of knowledge transmis- sion; as Greenhill (2016, 43)  puts it, the OECD and World Bank are a veritable “in- tergovernmental think tank.” In a different but complementary mode, the creation of benchmarks and information protocols may have powerful diffusion effects. For example, as Cambodia prepared its first national survey of VAW, complete with policy analysis, they cited the Millennium Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)’s inclusion of VAW as a benchmark, and the World Health Organization (WHO) model for data collection as “the gold standard” for interrogating gender violence (WHO 2014).

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54 Freedom from Fear

Another avenue of influence is legalization— the spread and increase in legal regula- tion and institutional repertoires for social problems. The globalization of legal archi- tecture and practices— of all kinds— generally fosters greater compliance with rights norms, but only under certain conditions (Brysk 2013b). The presence and strength of an independent judiciary improves the efficacy of human rights treaty adherence and serves as a multiplier for social movement mobilization, and there are increasing findings of interactions between international norm commitment, grassroots pressure, and do- mestic institutions (Simmons 2009; Sandholtz 2017; Stobb 2015). We will see the power of legalization across our cases, especially when laws are generated by mobilization— but legalization is often an incomplete response to gender violence issues. We will explore the limits of law in Chapter 8.

For the information- politics channel of influence, communicative action in global institutions introduces new and effective voices, frames, expertise, and performances of human rights claims (Brysk 2013a). Frame contests and the creation of “new rights” influence the power of human rights; frames generate different international au- thority and opportunity structures via distinct treaty mechanisms and human rights organization brands and resources. Distinct frames like genocide legitimate inter- vention, while frames like discrimination carry dedicated resources from the inter- national community or tap into the foreign policy of particular promoter states. A concrete illustration of frame extension is the history of intersectional organizing by women’s groups in race and discrimination- oriented global institutions and events (Falcón 2016).

Different rights frames both evoke and are constructed by mobilization, which influences state response directly and shapes new regime repertoires— such as Special Rapporteurs for designated forms of abuse. At the same time, crafting new frames like “femicide” can generate further mobilization, legislation, and diffusion— framing is a highly interactive pathway. The success of struggles for rights is conditioned by the search for established frames that fit patterns of abuse, frames that bridge to related problems, frames that shift from rights to other rubrics, or— less commonly— frames that innovate a new mobilizing label (Brysk 2017) (Table 3.1). We will see these dynamics played out for the genres of abuse sketched out in Chapters 5– 7.

Finally, historically the information politics of the international regime generates re- sponse to rights problems via naming and shaming— the oldest and most widespread activity of human rights advocates and even international bodies. While there is some evidence of a country- specific impact of rights shaming (Ausderan 2014), recent trends of shame deflation and backlash, especially on gender issues, may perversely reinforce nationalist resistance and the salience of counter- norms that undermine the legitimacy of rights and even of cosmopolitan connection (Terman 2016). At the local level, close study of grassroots negotiation between global and local norms in campaigns against FGM/ C shows competing effects:

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Table 3.1

Rights Frames for Gender Violence International Rights Frames for Gender Violence

Fit Bridge Shift Craft Missing

VAW Discrimination: CEDAW, intersectional

physical integrity

health, development, security

sexual violence

reproductive rights

Child marriage Freedom

Trafficking slavery security sex workers

FGM health

Domestic violence

development femicide marital rape

Son preference infanticide gendercide

Rape war crime torture discrimination harassment marital rape, conflict abortion

Source: Brysk, Expanding Rights (Elgar, 2017).

An international norm’s salience at the international level impacts the level of funding that is available to sustain activists’ efforts, and thus the overall level of activism to promote the norm worldwide. At the same time, a local norm’s salience in its particular local context impacts the willingness of local actors to take up the transnational campaign, since they must live among the people whose behavior they are trying to change. As a result, the local norm’s salience also impacts the level of activism to promote the international norm. The respective saliences of the international and local norms work against one another, such that high sali- ence for the international norm drives activism up [by reordering the priorities of organizations], while high salience for the local norm drives activism down” as po- tential activists attempt to avoid alienating their community.” (Cloward 2016, 154)

This suggests that a different model of dialectic “naming and claiming” may be more sustainable (Risse 2000). For human rights in general, international reporting alone appears to contribute to state socialization, building bureaucratic capacity, and circula- tion of information to domestic challengers (Creamer and Simmons 2016). In the area of women’s rights, Baldez shows the power of CEDAW to subtly but systematically im- prove state behavior through a dialectic among independent experts, data generation and reporting by states, and consultations and shadow reporting by NGOs, which often leads

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56 Freedom from Fear

to proactive incorporation of recommendations by states seeking global recognition— even those with reservations (Baldez 2014).

Despite all of these potential contributions, we must also examine criticism of the potential distortions of global governance. Analysts of historic efforts and Northern interventions on behalf of self- determination decry protectionist logics that may under- mine women’s autonomy and substitute humanitarian rescue for rights (Nayak 2015). Some feminists fear that linkage to other regimes may bring “instrumentalization” of women’s rights as a means to an end such as development— with the danger that women may be sacrificed if there are trade- offs instead of complementarities. More specifically, critical analysis fears “securitization” of gender violence as a false protectionist mandate for hegemonic interventions and global governmentality (Hudson 2010). Requisites of the global regime may lead to internal goal distortion even within advocacy networks, as strategic decisions to emphasize consensus cross- border issues like trafficking and con- flict rape may silence peacetime, national, and routine violence— and structural violence (True 2012 6). In terms of governance distortion, global regime pressure for domestic policy change that is not matched by the development of national and local women’s movements may substitute unsustainable symbolic signaling for structural reform, espe- cially in post- conflict and aid- dependent countries (Bush 2011). We will interrogate these potential negative and unintended consequences, beginning with our examination of mobilization in the next chapter and through our focus on the frontiers of globalization, where protectionism is less prominent and chronic violence is now receiving attention that circulates back to the global level.

3.3 Historical roots

Global attention to VAW began as an outgrowth of humanitarian protection for cross- border flows during the 19th century under the rubrics of human trafficking and wartime relief, which do not address abuse within or by nation- states, communities, or households. Early instruments against human trafficking included the ILO Forced Labor Convention (1930) and the UN’s Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949). International humanitarian law such as the Geneva Conventions classed women as civilians and/ or refugees, and wartime rape as an offense against honor.

Gender violence is recognized as a systematic feature of humanitarian protection be- ginning in the 1980s, in response to the visibility of the widespread rape of Vietnamese “boat people” refugees and the advocacy of women’s groups at the 1985 Nairobi women’s conference. This recognition led to the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) adoption of a 1989 Coordinated Reference on Women, 1991 Guidelines on Protection of Refugee Women, and 1995 Guidelines on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Violence. However, these standards and their implementation over the following decades

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is often critiqued as protective rather than rights- based. The refugee regime’s treatment of gendered violence is based on vulnerability, lumps together women and children, and sometimes reinforces women’s susceptibility to assault and exploitation through lack of representation in planning refugee camps, and dependency in distribution of relief to an assumed male “head of household” and/ or elders (Freedman 2010).

Meanwhile, the confluence of transnational activism, new spaces in the United Nations such as conferences and programs, and human rights movement expansion converged to construct the regime for “women’s rights as human rights.” From the late 1970s and early 1980s, women’s movements mobilized against gender- based violence (GBV) worldwide. The United Nations Decade for Women (1975– 1985) fostered bridges between women’s groups. The 1975 Mexico City UN World Conference on Women sparked a 1976 Brussels International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women attended by over 2,000 women from 40 countries, inspired by Bertrand Russell’s International War Crimes Tribunal, that greatly increased the visibility and framing of VAW. The 1985 Nairobi conference that closed the Decade for Women highlighted VAW as a “major obstacle to the achieve- ment of peace” and mandated member states to establish national mechanisms to combat gender violence. The Nairobi conference also facilitated women’s movement networks to development, equality, and peace campaigns ( Joachim 2003).

Building global civil society, the International Women’s Rights Action Watch that parallels the broader Helsinki Watch movement was established in 1985 after the UN Nairobi Conference, and the Center for Women’s Global Leadership formed in 1989, with violence as a core focus. These organizations came to play a key role in the first 16 Days of Action Against Gender Violence. From the late 1980s, the emerging women’s human rights movement was supported by the mainstream human rights movement— due to a combination of principled argumentation and activist circulation. Amnesty International convened a working group for women’s rights in 1989, and Human Rights Watch also dedicated special staff, analysis, and eventually programs. In 1991, these global civil society actors successfully petitioned the United Nations to make the upcoming World Human Rights Conference “comprehensively address women’s rights at every level of its proceedings.” As a result, the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights declared that “women’s rights are human rights,” and discussed gender violence as a global problem, including female genital cutting, female infanticide, and sex trafficking (Friedman 1995).

The following year, the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, 1994, made VAW a central issue. The Beijing Conference on Women prioritized violence as one of the “critical areas of concern” and explicitly stated that gender violence “constitutes a vi- olation of basic human rights and is an obstacle to the achievement of the objectives of equality, development, and peace.” Parallel NGO events such as the Global Tribunal on Violations of Women’s Human Rights shined a spotlight on family abuse, war crimes, sexual violence, and political persecution. Shortly thereafter, an Office on Violence Against Women was created by the US Department of State (UN Women 1995).

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During the same post– Cold War era, parallel developments in related spheres of global governance fostered recognition and responsibility for gender violence that articu- lated with new frames and mechanisms, prominently the human security agenda, rights- based development, and health rights. In 1989, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) formed a Women’s Refugee Commission and began devoting resources specifi- cally to GBV among refugees. Amnesty International expanded its mandate to anti- VAW campaigns in the 1990s, naming gender violence as one of its 12 critical areas of concern in 1995. In the wake of the Beijing conference, the UN Population Fund (UNPFA) es- tablished programs for gender empowerment and the impact of violence on reproductive health. After millennia of denial, by the 1990s concern with the most widespread human rights violation offered something to everyone: protecting women from violence prom- ised to produce healthy mothers, peaceful citizens, productive economies, and secure borders— and, incidentally, safeguard the lives and freedom of half the planet.

3.4 Global institutions

At the global level, the United Nations has set the agenda, established norms and instruments, mobilized resources, and empowered global civil society to combat VAW. The potential mechanisms of impact include monitoring states and global trends, programs that provide direct services, soft law that shapes state incentives, assistance and capacity building to member states, model legislation and practices, and direct support for local organizations. As in all areas of human rights, global institutions also generate international standards that some states must incorporate by domestic rules or bilateral conditionality, protection for national and grassroots advocates, and potential global venues for accountability.

The norms of the UN regime comprise applications of the CEDAW Convention, the powerful but nonbinding Declaration on Violence Against Women, and half a dozen Security Council resolutions on “women, peace, and security.” While originally the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women that came into force in 1981 did not address violence explicitly, by the 1990s CEDAW monitoring reports and recommendations 12 and 19 had concluded that gender violence is a form of discrimina- tion. CEDAW has ruled on state responsibility for domestic violence under the Optional Protocol mechanism adopted in 2000. Accordingly, in 1993, the United Nations issued a Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women that was adopted by con- sensus. The declaration provides a comprehensive global standard defining both public and private forms of violence in Article 2:  physical and sexual violence in the family, community, and state, including battering, rape, harmful traditional practices, exploi- tation, harassment, and trafficking. As the United Nations declared November 25th the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the 16- day span until the December 10th celebration of International Human Rights Day has been des- ignated an annual 16 Days of Activism Against Gender- Based Violence, a focal point for

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worldwide events. The declaration also led to the creation of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women.

The UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council adopt biannual and annual resolutions respectively on women’s rights and gender violence. These resolutions cover the spectrum of issues outlined in the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, with particular emphasis on human trafficking and conflict violence. In 2000, the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security acknowledged the gendered impact of war on women, urged special measures to protect them— especially from sexual violence— and mandated increased participation by women in all global institutions and conflict- resolution processes. This resolution has been widely cited, studied, and generative of reforms and programs within the UN peace- keeping and human security apparatus. Although UN 1325 remains underfunded and has not systematically improved gender equity in conflict management, it has sensitized program personnel and created new rubrics for resources and reforms. These measures do appear to have improved some specific UN interventions, despite the limitations of global impact— for example, mandating greater participation by women’s groups and post- conflict gender programs in Afghanistan (Neuwirth 2002; Willett 2010).

The “women, peace, and security” norms developed further through a series of resolutions in 2000– 2012, as follows:  Resolution 1380 on accountability for con- flict violence, Resolution 1820 on rape as a war crime and training for peacekeepers, Resolution1888 creating a Special Representative on Violence Against Women in Conflict and reporting system, Resolution 1889 on obstacles to women’s participation in peace processes, and Resolution 1960, which strengthens monitoring and accounta- bility for sexual violence. Hillary Clinton’s trip to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to meet victims of violence helped catalyze US support for Resolution 1888 and the creation of Special Envoy Zaina Bangura. In 2013, Resolution 2106— adopted under the UK leadership of the Security Council— deepens global commitment:

This resolution, which adds greater operational detail to previous resolutions on this topic, reiterates that all actors, including not only the Security Council and parties to armed conflict, but all Member States and United Nations entities, must do more to implement previous mandates and combat impunity for these crimes.

UN Women is particularly encouraged that Resolution 2106, co- sponsored and supported by several dozen countries, affirms the centrality of gender equality and women’s political, social, and economic empowerment to efforts to prevent sexual violence in armed conflict and post- conflict situations. (Lakshmi 2013)

As a capstone to these efforts, in 2013 the United Kingdom introduced a special UN Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, which was quickly subscribed by 137 countries. The declaration has generated an International Protocol for Documentation, helps to shape domestic legislation to prosecute sexual violence as a war

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crime, and mandates changes in military training of international and national forces, which has already been incorporated in NATO. The declaration specifically calls for the exclusion of rape from post- conflict amnesties.

Working under these rubrics, there are at least 36 UN entities with specific mandates or programs to address VAW, most prominently UN Women, the UNPFA, UN Development Program (UNDP), UNHCR, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the WHO, ILO, UNAIDS, and UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The Inter- Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANGWE) Task Force on Violence against Women established in 2007 includes representatives from 25 UN agencies. Thirteen agencies combine to implement the UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict (Stop Rape Now Campaign). A  different cluster of nine agencies comprise the Inter- Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Sub- working Group on Gender and Humanitarian Action, which coordinates guidelines across the United Nations for GBV interventions in humanitarian emergencies.

Several UN entities specialize in monitoring and reporting , which generates rec- ognition, data, state investigation, shadow reporting by NGOs, and dialogue be- tween UN bodies and state representatives— which has been shown to improve compliance with global human rights standards. The CEDAW treaty reporting mech- anism established in 1982 is the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW ). As with other UN rights regimes, a broader and older but nonbinding Economic and Social Council forum parallels the treaty body :  the UN Commission on the Status of Women, which devoted its 2013 session to VAW. The UN Commission on the Status of Women has an NGO committee comprising over 100 organizations that monitor UN proceedings and sponsor NGO events. This commission has also hosted parallel NGO forums around important conferences— most recently, the 2015 Beijing + 20 event incorporated hun- dreds of organizations and thousands of participants over 12  days of sessions, with around one- third focused on various forms of violence. Finally, in 2006 the UN Secretary- General commissioned a special study on VAW, and in 2008 established a database devoted to national reporting.

The lead UN operational agency for policy implementation is UN Women, made up of 41 rotating member states, which was established in 2010 to merge the former entities UN Division for the Advancement of Women, United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW). UN Women now holds over $300  million in assets and coordinates VAW initiatives in 85 countries. Notable initiatives include a Handbook for National Action Plans on Violence against Women, Handbook for Legislation on Violence against Women, and Global Safe Cities Free of Violence Against Women and Girls Program. Some recent examples of impact at the country level on gender violence policy by UN Women and its predecessor UNIFEM include the adoption of laws against domestic and sexual violence in Colombia, Sierra

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Leone, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe, as well as police training and women’s participation in Rwanda, Liberia, Cambodia, and Bosnia (discussed in Chapter 9).

UN Women also administers the separate UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women, which is supported by contributions from rights- promoting states. By the mid- 2010s, the UN Trust Fund had distributed $103 million to 393 initiatives in 136 countries and territories, and supported 86 programs annually with a value of over $55  million. A  Congressional Research Service study reports that one- third of these grants go to women’s organizations and one- fourth to UN country teams, and in 2010, 29% went to Africa and 26% to the Asia- Pacific region (CRS). The Fund’s projects have improved access to justice for survivors of violence in five African countries, lobbied for legislative change in Tonga and Cambodia, and funded the men’s engagement NGO Promundo in Brazil, Chile, and Rwanda. In 2014, the states that contributed to the Fund and could be tagged as norm promoters included Australia, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (www. unwomen.org ; Blanchfield et al. 2011).

In 2007, the UN Secretary- General established the ongoing campaign called “UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, Stop Rape Now” that unites the work of 13 UN entities with the goal of ending sexual violence in conflict (DPA, DPKO, OCHA, OHCHR- High Commission for Human Rights, PBSO, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN WOMEN, UNODC, WHO). The Nobel Women’s Initiative, established in 2006 by Jody Williams (United States), Shirin Ebadi (Iran), Mairead Maguire (Ireland), Wangari Maathai (Kenya), Rigoberta Menchu (Guatemala), Betty Williams (Ireland), Leymah Gbowee (Liberia), Tawakkol Karman (Yemen), and Aung San Suu Kyi (Burma) also strongly influenced the International Campaign to Stop Rape and Gender Violence in Conflict. It is supported by a trust fund with top contributors Sweden, Finland, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates. Along with extensive media efforts, the campaign has improved data and policy design with a gender- based violence information management system. In specific conflict coun- tries, the campaign has fostered a Declaration of Principles (Central African Republic), National Strateg y on Sexual and Gender- Based Violence (Congo / DRC), conference on justice and rehabilitation for victims (Bosnia), Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict (Libya), and Comprehensive Strateg y to Combat Conflict- Related Sexual Violence (Cote d’Ivoire).

The following year, the Secretary- General sponsored the more comprehensive cam- paign UNiTE to End Violence Against Women, covering all forms of violence and incorporating both UN Action and UN Women— but also the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNHCR, UNDP, UNFPA, WHO, and UNICEF. Their efforts com- bine promotion of awareness, advocacy for national laws and action plans, grassroots mo- bilization, and some direct programs. Secretary- General Ban Ki Moon made numerous statements and expanded the scope of the campaign, as well as establishing a network of male leaders for public statements. UNiTE sponsored a global T- shirt competition for

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young men, social media events with celebrities pledging to end violence, and Goodwill Ambassador Nicole Kidman.

Another core element of the regime is the UN Office of the High Commission on Human Rights (OHCHR) Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women (originally Rashida Manjoo). This office is empowered to inspect country conditions, file country reports, and make recommendations that may provide leverage to multilateral and bi- lateral relations. In a typical year, 2012, Manjoo visited Jordan, Somalia, and Papua New Guinea, each notable for a particular pattern of violence. She also requested visits in Bosnia, Croatia, India, Venezuela, Bangladesh, Nepal, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe (UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women:  2012 report, A/ HRC/ 20/ 16).

Notable agencies with distinct primary mandates that dedicate significant resources or lead key initiatives on VAW include the UNDP, which lists gender equality activi- ties for over two- thirds of its key metric country outcomes. UNDP also hosts a Gender Thematic Trust Fund, and is the lead sponsor of Partners for Prevention: Working with Boys and Men to Prevent Gender- based Violence (an initiative of UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women, and UN Volunteers in Asia and the Pacific). The UNPFA has completely in- tegrated gender violence and reproductive rights into its campaigns and programs for family planning. Thus, UNPFA provided violence- prevention funding to the Ministry of Gender of Liberia, helped establish Women and Children Protection police units in Congo DRC, and advocated for a law on the prevention of sexual violence and legal en- forcement in Colombia.

Similarly, the UNODC has grown from its initial concern with transnational sex trafficking to systematic attention to domestic and sexual violence as global issues. The UNODC provides model strategies for criminal justice worldwide and a Handbook on Effective Police Responses to Violence against Women (UN General Assembly, 2010). At the country level, the UNODC has assisted South Africa to establish One- Stop Centers, a Victim Empowerment Programme, and police training for domestic violence. In Kenya they trained prosecutors, in the Southern Cone sponsored victim support programs, and in Vietnam provided capacity building to help that country implement a 2008 law on domestic violence.

The UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations has received and required spe- cial attention, as both a first responder- and a sometime perpetrator- of wartime abuse. Thus, that body has sometimes cited Resolution 1325 as a norm, and accordingly de- veloped training and Gender Advisors for peacekeepers post- conflict, especially in the Congo DRC, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Timor- Leste (Hudson 2010, 56, table 3.1). UN Peacekeeping has also partnered with UNDP and UN Women to foster security- sector reform and post- conflict governance that checks state- generated sexual violence and improves new security forces’ response to domestic violence. In similar fashion, the former UNIFEM (now UN Women) worked with NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo to train police and raise community awareness and participation on domestic

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violence and trafficking. Following mid- 2000s scandals of peacekeeper exploitation of refugees, the UN formed a Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse incorporating 30 UN entities and NGOs to monitor and prevent abuse by UN personnel. The UN also issued a Statement of Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and policy doctrine— “To Serve with Pride: Zero Tolerance for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.”

Last but not least, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first global legal en- tity with a specific mandate to prosecute VAW as a war crime and a gross human rights violation. The ICC is historic in its statute, procedures, and concrete resources dedicated to gender violence. According to the ICC web site:

• The Statute recognizes rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced preg- nancy, forced sterilizations, gender- based persecutions, trafficking of persons particularly of women and children, and sexual violence as crimes under its jurisdiction.

• The Statute and Rules also establish a Victims and Witnesses Unit to provide protection, security, counseling, and other assistance. The Statute requires that the ICC prosecutor appoint advisers with legal expertise on sexual and gender violence and that the Victims and Witnesses Unit, to be housed within the ICC registry, include staff with experience in trauma related to sex crimes.

• The Court cannot admit evidence of a victim or witness’s prior or subsequent sexual conduct or require corroboration of testimony concerning sexual vio- lence. The Rules outline principles to guide the Court in handling sexual vio- lence cases, making clear that a victim’s consent cannot be inferred where the perpetrator took advantage ; of a coercive environment (such as a detention center), and requiring special procedures for presenting evidence of consent to acts of sexual violence.

More concretely, the ICC has established a Victims’ Trust Fund to provide reparations and rehabilitation to victims of gender violence, mostly sexual violence in conflict. The Trust Fund has reached over 100,000 victims since 2008, with notable programs in the Congo DRC (International Criminal Court, https:// www.icc- cpi.int/ ). https:// www. icc- cpi.int/ iccdocs/ otp/ otp- policy- paper- on- sexual- and- gender- based- crimes- - june- 2014.pdf )

3.5 Regional organizations

The intermediary layer of regional institutions can strengthen norms and implementa- tion within their zones, and even inspire further global initiatives through the familiar logics of diffusion, legalization, and communicative action. Like the overall human rights

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regime, Europe and the Americas have been the leading regions. The 1994 OAS Inter- American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women is remarkable in that it precedes UN norms and is a legally binding instru- ment for states parties, not merely a declaration. The Inter- American Convention argues that VAW “constitutes a violation of their human rights and fundamental freedoms,” but also states that gender violence “is a manifestation of the historically unequal power rela- tions between women and men.” The OAS instrument, known as the Belém Convention, requires monitoring reports to the Inter- American Commission on Women, adoption of enabling legislation by states, and creates a channel for complaints to the Inter- American Human Rights Commission and Inter- American Court, which have the capability to issue sanctions. It explicitly holds states responsible for guaranteeing women’s safety in the private sphere. The Belém Convention was quickly ratified by 32 of the 35 member states of the OAS and entered into force in 1995 (like CEDAW, the United States has not yet ratified this treaty) (http:// www.un.org/ womenwatch/ daw/ cedaw/ ).

A generation after adopting this landmark instrument, the OAS deepened attention to gender violence. Because implementation has been slow due to overall resource constraints in the OAS human rights bodies, in 2004 the states parties created a special review commission to study state compliance with the Belém Convention and improve access, the Mechanism for Follow Up of Implementation (MESECVI). The Mechanism operates through review of state reports, independent investigations of regional trends, and advisory reports by an unusually participatory conference of states parties, committee of experts, and a civil society body that provides shadow reports for committee review. It has issued two comprehensive reviews in 2010 and 2012. MESECVI reviews show that the Belém Convention has catalyzed vast improvements in data collection by many parties and the adoption of comprehensive legislation by half a dozen Latin American states. Nine countries in the region have developed National Action Plans mandating programs and offices on VAW. Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay reported that they made use of the Convention of Belém in court sentencing (Organization of American States and Council of Europe 2014).

In Europe, there were scattered initiatives throughout the 1980s and 1990s, such as a 1986 European Parliament resolution and 1993 Council of Europe Declaration. A  hor- rific serial murder- torture of numerous young girls in Belgium discovered in 1996 sparked a massive national protest movement that demanded EU attention to child abuse and sexual violence, and helped shape a 1997 resolution on VAW and a year- long campaign. The 1999 European Year Against Violence built important information such as an NGO report— Unveiling the Hidden Data on Domestic Violence in the EU— and laid the founda- tion for transnational networks, as well as establishing extensive benchmarks for national policy. The following year saw a governance- oriented 2000 resolution against trafficking, and a multi- year anti- trafficking coordination program called STOP, influenced by the surge in exploitative migration from Eastern Europe. By 2003, the European Union turned to more specific private- sphere issues with a resolution on domestic violence,

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followed by a 2004 resolution on honor crimes. Finally, in 2005 the EU passed a binding Convention on Action against Trafficking (no.  197), then a 2007 Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation (no. 201). In that year the Treaty of Lisbon, the third and most developed constitutive basis of European Union, made an explicit goal of the transnational body to combat domestic violence as part of the long- standing mandate to promote gender equality. Waves of growing attention to VAW were associated with the growth and influence of European women’s NGOs in the European architecture, the 1994 accession of Sweden and associated circulation of a Swedish femi- nist leader to become a European Commissioner, and later the Spanish presidency of the Council in 2010 (Montoya 2013).

The capstone of the European regime is the 2011 Istanbul Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating VAW and domestic violence. The European Convention became the second legally binding regional instrument on VAW and girls but, “unlike other regional agreements, it can be signed and ratified by any State” (“Global Norms and Standards” n.d.). This norm recognizes “the structural nature of violence against women as gender- based violence. . . . whether occurring in public or in private life” and lists do- mestic violence, sexual harassment, rape, forced marriage, honor crimes, FGM/ C, and armed conflicts. It requires states parties to pass legislative measures, ensure compliance by state actors, and use “due diligence” to prevent, investigate, punish, and provide repa- ration for acts perpetrated by nonstate actors in their territory, by one of their nationals (with transnational reach), or by a person habitually residing in their territory (which has special relevance for migrant women). Moreover, the treaty specifies states’ obligation to provide legal aid for victims, GBV asylum, and participate in a monitoring mechanism (a Group of Experts elected by a Committee of Parties).

Since almost all of the EU states already had comprehensive legislation on domestic violence, sexual assault, and trafficking before the Convention, the regional instrument has had less influence on country norms than on regional programs, domestic implemen- tation schemes, and foreign policy promotion. The Daphne program is the signature EU capacity- building and grassroots funding initiative for implementation, initiated in 1997, and by 2013 supporting almost 600 projects with a five- year budget over 100  million Euros. But even this significant initiative was originally justified under the EU’s public health mandate, and combines violence against women and children. For EU candidate states, accession conditionality including attention to gender equality has also been an important though indirect strateg y, mainly operating through citations of patterns of gender violence in European monitoring reports that appear to create an incentive for the creation of legislation, programs, and opening to women’s movements by aspiring states to signal their commitment to European community norms1 (Montoya 2013).

1 European critiques of trafficking and domestic violence in candidate states and specific recommendations for legislative reform have increased for the past decade, although scrutiny for women’s rights seems linked more to candidate states’ political stability and economic performance than their level of gender inequity. Critics cite

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3.6 Foreign policy: “Gender Good Samaritans” promoter states

Bilateral foreign policy has provided critical resources, governance, and promotion for national and global action on VAW. Around a dozen states have been proactive promoters of norms, mechanisms, and resources to combat gender violence world- wide. In general, they consist of the classic human rights promoters— “global Good Samaritans” (Brysk 2009)  such as Sweden and Canada, but also coincide strongly with the participants in the Human Security Network such as Finland, Norway, Japan, Austria, and Thailand. Beyond this, the United Kingdom has taken a spe- cial leading role on VAW, coordinated but distinct from its traditional American and European partners. These states sometimes add material leverage to the mix of diffusion, standard- setting , and policy support.

As noted above, this cluster of states has introduced the UN Declarations and Resolutions, provided the bulk of funding for the UN Trust Funds, and drafted standards within the EU. These states generally pursue VAW issues such as trafficking in their bilateral relations, and dedicate a significant proportion of their foreign aid to women’s rights and combating GBV. Sweden’s Foreign Minister Margot Wallstrom has called for a “feminist foreign policy,” sought to defend threatened women’s rights advocates, and controversially critiqued Swedish trade partner Saudi Arabia for its treatment of women. Canada introduced and has helped disseminate the tool of gender- based asylum for victims of violence (Alfredson 2009). The promoter states have also provided hosting and support for influential global conferences, seminars, and research networks on gender violence. Canada’s IRDC funds the largest international academic network on sexual violence. A  2014 Femicide seminar in Austria with participants from dozens of countries gathered critical information and empowered efforts on sex- selective abortion, domestic violence, and disappearances; it was sponsored by Austria, Argentina, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. The Austrian representative to the UN who opened the conference stated, “For Austria, women’s rights and the fight against violence and discrimination against women is a corner- stone of our foreign policy.” Thailand’s representative was its former UN Ambassador, who gains domestic traction as a granddaughter of the king ; she stated “The National Campaign to Stop Violence Against Women, which I  personally support, has been running for five consecutive years and has been very successful” (ACUNS 2013. Great Britain illustrates a mid- level promoter that has been more active and influential on gender violence than its overall profile.

uneasy tensions between established European states’ historic commitment to gender equality, denial of do- mestic violence within their borders, and distorted concentration on forms of gender violence associated with immigrant populations and candidate states such as FGM/ C and honor killing. (Montoya 2013).

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3 .6.1 For eign p olic y: Uni ted Kingdom

Britain shared the post– Cold War European exposure to genocidal rape in Bosnia and trafficking from Eastern Europe, and began the millennium with growing socialization in the emerging UN regime. Beyond this base, the United Kingdom’s special sensitivity to gender violence was planted during the 2000s by increasing problems with FGM/ C, honor killings, and forced marriage among its large Middle Eastern, African, and South Asian immigrant populations. The UK Foreign and Home Offices began to collaborate on these transnational threats to citizens’ rights. They established a Forced Marriage Unit that by 2011 advised 1,468 cases. The infamous 2003 honor killing of Shafilea Ahmed in the United Kingdom shocked the nation and galvanized the legal system, and was finally prosecuted in 2010, when the victim’s surviving sister agreed to testify against her parents.

The UK ambassador to the 2014 Femicide seminar traces an expansion in that country’s special role on overseas gender violence to the heightened consciousness of the lead for- eign policy official, stating :  “Foreign Secretary William Hague’s meetings with female victims of sexual violence were the catalyst for the PSVC [Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict] initiative.” The Initiative was launched in 2012, initially concentrating on improving international and transitional justice and providing specialist teams of UK experts on crime and trauma to conflict zones. The United Kingdom also provided £1  million of core funding to the UN Secretary- General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence. After the United Kingdom spearheaded the UN Declaration on Sexual Violence in Conflict in 2013, in 2014 they sponsored a Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, co- chaired by UK Foreign Secretary William Hague and Angelina Jolie, Special Envoy for the UNHCR.

When Great Britain assumed the Presidency of the G8 in 2013, they launched a cog- nate initiative for refugees vulnerable to abuse. The UK development agency DFID pledged £21.6 million to protect women in emergencies. Almost half of this was assigned to a joint program with the IRC in Pakistan, the Congo DRC, and Ethiopia— most of the rest went to protection projects in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. As UK International Development Secretary Justine Greening explained, the United Kingdom hoped to lead donor response to ensure that relief and resettlement prioritized women’s safety, citing specific measures such as lockable toilets, safe access to firewood, and adequate lighting (Kirby 2015).

3 .6.2 For eign p olic y: Uni ted States

The United States has played an extremely prominent role on this issue, despite a ge- neral decline in human rights policy during the post- 9/ 11 period, and is noteworthy as the liberal hegemon for the post– Cold War period. Like many bilateral humanitarian policies such as foreign aid and democracy promotion, US action on violence against women combines human rights, development, and security logics. As is typical for

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state- based initiatives, these overlapping mandates result in disparate levels of attention and resources to specific forms of violence that coincide with these agendas, with the US pattern privileging trafficking, rule of law, and health- related programs. Unfortunately, it is also typical that state promotion by hegemonic powers is rarely consistent and sustainable— bilateral foreign policy can only be “part of the solution” for women’s rights during favorable conjunctures (Hudson in Brysk 2017). It is also important to note that American foreign policy has been highly contradictory for human rights in general (Forsythe 2000)— often creating human rights problems with one hand while engaging in humanitarian initiatives with the other.

Like other areas of human rights foreign policy by powerful states, US promotion was ultimately based on a combination of leadership, ideolog y, and civil society influence that harmonized human rights with traditional considerations of national interests (Brysk 2009). Gender violence unites an unusual coalition across the US political spectrum of feminists, human rights activists, development advocates, religious humanitarians, lib- eral interventionists, proponents of “smart” security and law enforcement strategies, and even some sectors of global business seeking wider markets. At the same time, we know that greater gender equity at home is associated with stronger human rights for- eign policy (Brysk and Mehta 2014), and the United States improved domestic women’s empowerment in the generation following the Beijing conference. A series of US leaders who promoted key programs and legislation were both principled liberal feminists and beneficiaries of women’s electoral support, including Presidents Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama; Secretaries of State Condoleeza Rice and Hillary Clinton; and Senators Diane Feinstein, Joe Biden, and Harry Reid. While this bipartisan, cross- cutting consensus on liberal self- determination rights for women tends to endure despite domestic regression under the Trump administration, reproductive rights and sexual vio- lence are more fragile commitments that are challenging to sustain in an era of nationalist parochialism and renewed fundamentalist influence.

US support for initiatives against VAW began with generic human rights approaches during the Carter years that included signing CEDAW (which the United States later failed to ratify), supporting the UN conferences and Women’s Decade, including women’s rights issues in the annual State Department human rights reports, and establishing a Women in Development Office under USAID. US representatives to the UN helped to draft the CEDAW Convention. After retrenchment under Reagan, progress con- tinued during the Clinton administration, with the combination of post– Cold War commitment to global issues and institutions, leadership by First Lady Hillary Clinton, and the growing influence of US women’s organizations through the 1990s. One marker of the evolution of US civil society is that when the Taliban took over Afghanistan, prior to the 9/ 11 security shift, the State Department reported that in 1999– 2000 it “had re- ceived more mail from Americans on restoring women’s rights in Afghanistan than on any other foreign policy issue” (Hudson 2015, 27). At home, in 1994 the US Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act, and the Justice Department established an Office

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on Violence Against Women. President Clinton established the Office of International Women’s Issues in the State Department, and US representatives to the UN helped to construct the pathbreaking 2000 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. Clinton- era Ambassador Swanee Hunt founded an innovative and influential forum for global women’s leadership, the Vital Voices initiative, which later partnered with anti- violence and girl- power initiatives. The Clinton White House also catalyzed attention, and the President’s Interagency Council on Women drafted recommendations for the first US anti- trafficking legislation, the landmark Trafficking Victims Protection Act passed by Congress in 2000 (Hudson 2015, 29).

Under the Bush administration, despite an era of distrust of global institutions and regression on reproductive rights, the United States actively promoted some kinds of women’s rights in some places— because of the strategic argumentation that sex trafficking endangered US immigration control, women’s abuse in Africa impeded the struggle against AIDS, and repression of women in Afghanistan undermined US efforts at sta- bilization and democracy promotion. These efforts were more protectionist than rights- based, and quickly became entangled with US military campaigns and nation- building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet they did attend to real needs and did achieve some real progress. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice also raised the profile of global women’s issues in both bilateral and some global settings, supporting the UN Security Council Resolution 1820 on sexual violence in conflict and renaming the Office of International Women’s Issues the Office of Women’s Empowerment. Bush’s reconfiguration of US for- eign assistance, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, has a gender policy and senior gender advisor staff that carry increased funding. The administration criminalized sex tourism by US citizens abroad under the PROTECT Act (Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act), and instituted zero tol- erance for the purchase of commercial sex by both federal contractors and US military personnel (Hudson 2015, 45).

Once the Democrats returned to power, Secretary of State Hilllary Clinton, who had previously called for “women’s rights as human rights” at the 1994 Beijing con- ference, promulgated the broadest and most explicit linkage to security. In the widely cited 2010 “Hillary Doctrine” she said, “The subjugation of women is a threat to the common security of our world and to the national security of our country.” Subsequently, the following US Secretary of State John Kerry summarized the comple- mentary rationale in an Op- Ed he penned that was featured on the State Department web site: “No country can get ahead if it leaves half of its people behind. This is why the United States believes gender equality is critical to our shared goals of prosperity, stability, and peace, and why investing in women and girls worldwide is critical to advancing US foreign policy” (Hudson 2015; US Department of State “Office of Global Women’s Issues” n.d.).

Concretely, President Obama drafted a 2011 National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, followed by a 2013 National Strateg y that has reshaped every foreign policy

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agency of the US government, from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice to USAID. The new mandate includes a 2012 Executive Order on Preventing Gender- Based Violence Globally. The Obama administration elevated the Office of Global Women’s Issues and increased its budget by a factor of ten (Hudson 2015, 51). In 2013, Obama led the reauthorization and expansion of two key pieces of legislation: the Violence Against Women Act, which expands immigration status coverage and battered spouse asylum, and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which increases T visas and recourse for girls subject to FGM/ C.

As Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton introduced the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review of US foreign policy, which formally and systematically incorpo- rated women’s human rights as a US national interest and requires gender analysis and reporting throughout US agencies and programs. Clinton established a State Department International Fund for Women and Girls, as well as new strategies and policy directives on counter- trafficking, women’s empowerment, gender violence, and child marriage. She championed international attention to sexual violence after her visit to Congo DRC, and implemented a “women’s track” in bilateral diplomatic meetings with India, Pakistan, China, and Indonesia that incorporated the Office of Global Women’s Issues and requested a partner country counterpart. The Department of State introduced impor- tant diplomatic markers of recognition, such as the Swanee Hunt Award for Advancing Women’s Role within the bureau, an Ambassador- at- Large for Global Women’s Issues, and an International Woman of Courage Award (which was presented by President Obama in Saudi Arabia to a domestic violence advocate who was unable to travel after his 2014 visit). Clinton also included the United States in the annual Trafficking in Persons report (Hudson 2015).

An indicator of the breadth and mainstreaming of US policy is the creation of intera- gency working groups led by the national security staff (International Violence Against Women Working Group), USAID (Interagency Gender Working Group), PEPFAR (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief ) (interagency Gender Technical Working Group on HIV/ AIDS and Gender), and the President’s Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking (PITF). As a consequence of this type of coordination, PEPFAR programs for AIDS relief now coordinate a gender analysis of refugees at risk with UNAIDS, the CDC, State Department Refugee Office PRM, and the UNHCR. Within USAID alone, there are significant programs on VAW by the Office of Women in Development; Senior Gender Advisor in the Bureau of Policy, Planning, and Learning ; Gender Coordinator in the Office of the Deputy Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance; and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office of Transition Initiatives. At the same time, within this panorama, the State Department’s commitment to implement the 2013 National Action Plan explicitly emphasizes different issues in different regions: peace processes in Africa, trafficking in East Asia, post- conflict reconstruction in Eurasia, women’s empowerment in the Middle

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East, gender violence as a development barrier in South Asia, and femicide and domestic violence in the Western Hemisphere.2

The mechanisms available for women’s human rights now include the full foreign policy repertoire of monitoring, carrots and sticks, and global citizenship. The US State Department Human Rights reports, US Trafficking in Persons reports, and USAID evaluations and country studies provide systematic monitoring. CDC and USAID dem- ographic and health surveys are now mandated to include attempts to measure domestic violence. There are potential sanctions for human trafficking, and incentives for attention to gender violence in rule of law, development, and security funds. In 2013, it is estimated that State Department and USAID funds dedicated to GBV totaled over $147 million. Although the US contribution is still significant, unfortunately there has been a decrease in funds under the current administration; the 2018 fiscal year USAID budget request includes approximately $102.5 million dedicated to GBV. In terms of leverage, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2006 requires training on GBV in bilateral and military assistance. US global commitment on gender violence is also significant, as the United States advocates attention to VAW in UN peacekeeping mandates, provides funding and a team of experts to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary- General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and training on protection of civilians and prevention of gender violence to 62 partner countries and dozens of multilateral missions through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (https:// www.state.gov/ t/ pm/ rls/ fs/ 2017/ 266854.htm).

To gain a sense of the spectrum and significance of US policies, it is helpful to survey across agencies along the goals of protection, prosecution, and prevention— which some- times includes empowerment. Protection efforts run the gamut from refugees to trafficking, conflict rape, and domestic violence. The State Department Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration, between 2000– 2009, provided over $60  million for GBV programs among Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Rohing ya in Bangladesh, and displaced women in Colombia, while the humanitarian disaster relief bureau Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) dedicated $7.5  million for 14 GBV protection programs in eight countries. As of 2016, the total budget for the Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration amounted to approximately $3.1 billion. The proposed budget for 2018 reflects a slight decrease at about $2.7 billion. The Global Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (State Department) spent $85.3 million on anti- trafficking assistance in 2010, and under the annual Trafficking in Persons report placed 23 countries in Tier 3, making them eligible for sanctions. At the same time, the United States granted over 18,000 T and U visas for trafficking victims and their family members. In 2014 the

2 The information in this section was extracted from the USAID National Strateg y on Gender Violence and the US National Action Plan, and documents relatively typical programs profiled from 2008 to 2012.

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trend remained steady; the United States approved 1,401 T visas and 18,520 U visas. In 2016, the number of U visas for victims and their family members remains consistent at 17,937. Recent notable bilateral efforts include US advocacy for anti- trafficking legisla- tion in Timor, assistance with legal response in Sierra Leone, and an expert exchange with Serbia (U.S. Department of State 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report).

American attention to overseas sexual violence was sparked by a 2008 US congres- sional hearing that also gained world attention— “Rape as a weapon of war:  account- ability for sexual violence in conflict”— with testimony and submissions by DRC advocate Dr. Denis Mukwege, the Open Society Foundation, feminist author Eve Ensler, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the anti- genocide Enough Project (U.S. Congress 2008). The United States has provided over $30  million for assistance to the DRC, serving an estimated 20,000 survivors. In addition, the US Department of Defense gave $3 million for DRC civilian police, including women, and helped to build police stations and provide equipment in remote areas.

On domestic violence, the US Global Health Initiative and USAID have commissioned numerous studies and interventions on intimate partner violence and its impact on maternal health and access to family planning. As part of the three- year Gender- Based Violence Initative (GBVI), PEPFAR AIDS fund provided $55 million in 2011 to combat GBV, with scale- up extension of successful interventions in Mozambique, Tanzania, and the DRC (Casto and Messner 2016). In addition, USAID partners with national governments throughout the Americas to fund police, shelters, health services, and holistic family violence social service units in the Americas. The US program in El Salvador established four Domestic Violence Justice Centers, the community planning and support campaign Ciudad Mujer, and training for judges and prosecutors.

Programs for prosecution are more concentrated on trafficking and domestic vi- olence. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) received $292  million dedicated for GBV in 2012. As in Salvador, in Guatemala the United States established coordinated programs for domestic abuse with an even stronger legal emphasis: a Model Police Precinct program, network of Femicide Courts, and the “Guatability Project” that pairs Guatemalan government agencies and attorneys with US counterparts. US Congressional resolutions in 2007– 2008 are closely associ- ated with Guatemala’s passage of a femicide law in 2008, while USAID funded path- breaking prosecutor Claudia Paz y Paz (who later lost her post). In Afghanistan, the U.S trained prosecutors in VAW units of the Attorney General in Kabul and established three new provincial units; since 2010 these units have produced more than 750 cases and 26 convictions. Similarly, in Cambodia USAID GBV law trainings are credited with raising the case clearance rate from 16% to 32% in one year. In the related area of war crimes, Department of Defense trainings under Disaster Management and the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies trained 1,500 personnel in Congo FARDC (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo [in French]) by January 2010 (Blanchfield et al. 2011).

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Prevention programs are also extensive over a broad range of issues and regions. For refugee protection, USAID DCHA has worked in Liberia and Darfur to provide lighting, cook stoves, camp security, and cell phones. In 2013 the United States donated $10  million for the “Safe From The Start” program of UNHCR/ ICRC (international Committee of the Red Cross) protection planning. For chronic, peacetime sexual assault of girls, USAID funds a Safe Schools program— originating in Ghana and Malawi, then spreading to the Dominican Republic, Senegal, Yemen, Tajikistan, and Congo DRC— which provides victim support, teacher training, curriculum, and a national code of teacher ethics. The Department of State and US Embassies also support FGM/ C preven- tion programs in Ethiopia, Eg ypt, Kenya, and Guinea.

Smaller but widespread US programs explicitly promote women’s rights and em- powerment. A  Women’s Legal Rights Initiative (USAID) builds capacity in Albania, Guatemala, Kenya, Benin, South Africa, and Rwanda, with a $7.3 million budget in 2010. In 2011, a USAID $14  million grant aimed to increase women’s involvement in peace processes. A  Department of State “democracy and rights” education program worked with 450 imams in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to promote women’s and human rights within Islamic curriculum, with a documented influence on child marriage and family attitudes toward girls’ education. The Office of Global Women’s Issues Fund for Women and Girls hosts 116 active grants to support grassroots groups in 57 countries. Since its start in 1987, it has given $24.5  million to support over 2,000 groups in 160 countries (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 2002).

While multi- purpose foreign policy programs often serve to protect women as well as promote US national interest in development, peace, and global health, there may be tensions between human rights and “securitization” of gender violence programs. These conflicts have been especially critiqued in distortions of US anti- trafficking efforts that prioritized law enforcement over women’s rights, although some anti- trafficking programs have been reformed in response to a more rights- based model since 2010 (Brysk and Choi- Fitzpatrick 2012). Contradictory effects of US women’s rights advocacy in con- flict zones and security trade- offs with US allies have the potential to sacrifice women’s empowerment and at times even endanger them. A chilling example is a program by the US Embassy in Pakistan that produced documentaries on women’s role in preventing terrorism called, “Think Twice Pakistan,” along with a project in tribal areas to “gather data on the role of mothers in the process of radicalization.” Hudson notes US willing- ness to trade off women’s rights concerns in security allies like Saudi Arabia— as well as systematic shortfalls in implementation through relationships with contractors and na- tional implementing agencies (Hudson 2015).

The decimation of US diplomacy and especially human rights policy from the 2017 installation of the Trump administration marks the most severe challenge to the sus- tainability of US policy. It has already resulted in significant retreat from Obama- era commitments to overseas funding for women’s reproductive rights and protection from domestic violence. By mid- 2017, Trump’s punitive immigration policy had already

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deepened the securitization of trafficking to justify increased detentions of minors and deportation of families (Friedmann 2017). Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has openly stated that human rights conditions will no longer be a condition for US aid, and Trump has met with a series of rights- regressive authoritarian allies— including avowed aspiring rapist Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte.

However, there are promising counter- trends. As the Georgetown Women’s Institute reports:

Senator Shaheen (D- NH) authored an amendment to the State Department Reauthorization Bill for FY2018 to preserve the Ambassador- at- Large for Global Women’s Issues. The amendment was adopted. The Administration had proposed a 32% cut to State Department and USAID budget. In its action, the committee instead agreed to a level that is only 1.7% below current levels (not counting extra plus- ups to counter ISIS and famine in Fiscal Year 2017). (U.S. Department of State “Congressional Budget” 2017).

US civil society has shown remarkable resilience in defending women’s rights at home with the January 2017 Women’s Marches that were the largest demonstration in US his- tory. Nevertheless, front- line defense of domestic civil liberties, healthcare, and refugees has thus far consumed the resistance, as overseas solidarity has largely fallen below the radar. Yet it is a remarkable testament to the robustness of the international regime that several historic “gender Good Samaritan” states— including the Netherlands and Canada— have pledged to replace US aid cuts for women’s rights and global women’s health programs (Reuters Staff 2017; Zilio 2017).

While some of the pitfalls of foreign policy are tied to the contradictions of any state- based promotion of human rights, related tensions between mandates may be inherent in strategic linkage across regimes at other levels. Thus, we now turn to a parallel exam- ination of the expansion of campaigns against gender violence from the human rights agenda to broader human security concerns in global institutions and transnational networks. How far can linkage carry us— and where does it falter?

3.7 Guns, germs, and girl- power

By the turn of the millennium, the global regime for VAW reached an inflection point of increasing linkage to global security, development, health, and environment. These linkages evolved dialectically from the 1990s foundational era, when women’s rights advocates often appealed strategically to more powerful and less controversial institutions, particularly peace and public health.3 But within a decade, proponents of other global

3 For a parallel phenomenon with indigenous rights see Brysk (1996).

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issues came to promote and sponsor initiatives on gender violence, due to a combina- tion of principled beliefs of linkage between VAW and their core values and a converse strategic advantage, as global action on gender violence became a source of visibility, le- gitimacy, and even resources. Issue linkage between women’s rights, violence, and cross- cutting global concerns is consciously promoted by key actors on both sides. Michelle Bachelet, the former president of Chile who later became Director of UN Women, said: “We must convince all political actors— including ministers of finance and trade as well as health and education— that we are not only talking about rights, we are talking about social vitality, political stability, and economic growth” (Hudson 2012, 204). Conversely, at the Davos World Economic Forum treatment of the Nike Foundation’s Girl Effect, the managing director of the World Bank told the Forum:  “Investing in women is smart economics  .  .  .  investing in girls will have tremendous impacts on the Millennium Development goals and will help resolve poverty, population, family welfare and climate change issues” (Modesti 2009).

Diffusion of the VAW agenda is prominent in central institutions of the peace, rights, development, and health regimes. The US Institute for Peace, an independent congressionally funded research and funding entity, has established a Center for Gender and Peace- building and sponsored major conferences on conflict- related sexual violence. In a report titled “Lessons from Women’s Programs in Afghanistan and Iraq” they argue that “Advancing women’s empowerment is an essential priority for transitions in conflict countries, as it can contribute directly to sustainable stability” (Kuehnast et  al. 2012). Attending to VAW is now seen as an integral part of refugee crises. Thus UN, US, and UK efforts in crisis and conflict zones are complemented by the leading NGO, the IRC, which has over 400 staff dedicated to gender violence and directs almost $5 million per year to the Women’s Refugee Commission. The IRC provides prevention education to millions per year, direct support for tens of thousands of survivors of sexual violence, ec- onomic and family empowerment programs for women refugees at high risk of abuse and exploitation, and safety centers for domestic violence near conflict zones.

Health and population programs at all levels have thoroughly adopted a rights- based approach and sponsor numerous interventions on GBV. A  former US Undersecretary of State who is now a member of the Aspen Institute’s Global Leaders Council for Reproductive Health argues, “Reproductive rights, health rights, women’s rights and human rights should be woven together into one seamless fabric of US diplomatic efforts and international policy as the basis upon which we make the case for inclu- sive democracies” (Sosenshine n.d.). WHO, USAID, Pathfinder International, and the Population Council sponsor dozens of studies and interventions on the linkages between domestic violence and women’s health, children’s well- being, access to contraception, and vulnerability to HIV. Suzanne Ehlers, the president of Population Action International, recalls her witness of women’s abuse as a Peace Corps volunteer in the Central African Republic in 1996, and asserts that “promoting women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights is one of the best bets in development. Every dollar invested in family planning

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returns up to nine dollars in better health, higher income and overall social stability and well- being” (Ehlers n.d.). The UN Population Fund has launched a four- year Programme of Essential Services for Women and Girls Subject to Violence. The executive director of UNPFA, a Nigerian physician who was his country’s former director of the national AIDS agency and then Minister of Health, states that his career in global public health has shaped his orientation to gender issues:

I have made it my mission to help create a world where no girl or woman is ever subjected to violence, where every pregnancy is wanted, every childbirth is safe and every young person’s potential is fulfilled. And I  have come to see that universal access to reproductive health care is an essential first step. (Osotimehin n.d.)

There is an emerging crossover between environmental campaigns and efforts to pro- mote gender equity and end violence. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature, a coalition of over 1,200 governmental and NGO environmental entities, has established a Global Gender Office, and its 2012 conference focused on linkages with women’s empowerment and conservation and featured “population, health, environ- ment” projects. In 2013, Conservation International announced support for new empow- erment programs for women in Africa and Latin America, saying gender equality is key to conservation goals. The president of the Natural Resources Defense Council explains why her organization is pressing for strong financial commitments from the world’s deci- sion makers to invest in women:

Saving the planet depends on women achieving full human rights, and that begins with reproductive rights. Two groundbreaking studies, one from the US National Center for Atmospheric Research and one from the Futures Group, found that simply meeting the current need of 222  million women worldwide for access to voluntary family planning , we could reduce carbon emissions by 8 to 15%. That is equal to stopping all deforestation this very day .  .  .  . women are at the center of water security, energ y security and food security at the household level (Beinecke n.d.).

These trends come together in an emerging archipelago of girl- power initiatives. The Girl Effect is a global movement based on both principled and strategic norms:

The unique potential of adolescent girls to end poverty for themselves and the world . . . when you take a holistic approach to improving a girl’s life through edu- cation, health, safety and opportunity, these changes have a positive ripple effect. As an educated mother, an active, productive citizen and a prepared employee, she is the most influential force in her community to break the cycle of poverty. (Modesti 2009)

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The movement and its promotion and mobilization activities has led to an implementa- tion scheme established in 2010 between the United Kingdom’s DFID aid agency and Nike in Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Nigeria. One focus area is media, including a radio net- work in Ethiopia that has reached 7 million people, and a girls’ magazine in Rwanda.

The turn from women’s rights to girl- power is similarly marked by a key initiative of the United Nations Foundation called “Girl Up.” Parallel to the civic partnership model of Women for Women, Girl Up mobilizes American girls to raise awareness and funds for at- risk adolescent girls worldwide. They focus on education, health, leadership, and safety projects. Girl Up safety projects highlight femicide in Guatemala, child marriage in Malawi, Somali refugees’ access to light in refugee camps in Ethiopia, post- conflict programs in Liberia, and chronic abuse in Rajasthan, India.

There are several multisectoral transnational coalitions centered specifically on girls’ rights that cluster dozens of global and local organizations crossing women’s rights, children’s rights, development, and population sectors. The Coalition for Adolescent Girls, supported by the Nike Foundation, coordinates more than 40 international or- ganizations that design, implement, and evaluate programs for girls’ rights and education throughout the developing world. The coalition exchanges information and resources, as well as engaging in joint advocacy in global settings. It includes key actors profiled above such as UN Women, the IRC, and Equality Now, along with CARE, Save the Children, and a triumvirate of population organizations— the Population Council, Population Reference Bureau, and Population Services International.

Private sponsors have also become strong promoters and even program designers for transnational campaigns against violence. Beyond the historic funders of development and human rights such as the Ford Foundation, several corporate foundations associated with women’s issues have assumed a prominent role in transnational outreach. The Avon Foundation has been involved in efforts against domestic violence worldwide, through a Speak Out Against Domestic Violence initiative for awareness and education as well as the Global Believe Fund, which also improves prevention efforts and funds direct serv- ices such as women’s shelters. Avon has provided over $38 million for these issues, with especially prominent presence in Brazil. From 2010, the Avon Foundation for Women collaborated with the women’s leadership NGO Vital Voices and the US Department of State to create The Global Partnership to End Violence Against Women. Since that time, Avon has sponsored a series of Justice Institute training collaborations on combating do- mestic violence for judges, prosecutors, law enforcement, and NGO representatives in Brazil, India, Mexico, Nepal, the Philippines, South Africa, and in Colombia (https:// www.avonfoundation.org/ category/ press/ domestic- violence/ ).

Another less- known source of funding support is the NoVo Foundation. The NoVo Foundation was established in 2006 by the Buffet family with a stock endowment then valued at over $1 billion, doubled in 2012, and a primary commitment to the empow- erment of women and girls around the world. NoVo has gone on to support numerous regime- building NGOs as well as grassroots women’s groups. In 2008, NoVo joined the

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Nike Girl Effect campaign, contributing over $116  million to a collaboration with the Nike Foundation, United Nations Foundation, and Coalition for Adolescent Girls. They have special initiatives against trafficking, with a partner organization for women’s em- powerment in India, and post- conflict gender violence (https:// novofoundation.org ; https:// novofoundation.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2012/ 09/ Ms.- Report- on- Gender- Based- Violence- Funding.pdf ).

Communication technolog y companies, programs, and foundations have played a special role in building resources for women and movements. Vodafone introduced a Women Launch Free Dial *724# to report domestic violence in high- prevalence Fiji, with the Vodafone ATH Fiji Foundation and Fiji Goodwill Ambassador for Women. Vodafone also designed a prize- winning app for women to report domestic violence in Turkey (http:// fortune.com/ 2015/ 07/ 14/ domestic- violence- app- turkey/ ). Ukraine worked with communication companies to create the SMS Heartbeat check- in app to track workers abroad and fight trafficking (http:// iom.org.ua/ en/ home- page/ news/ iom- and- mtv- exit- warning- ukrainian- youth- about- dangers- of- trafficking. html). In tandem, the World Bank has tried to foster more development of tech- nolog y by and for youth; in 2013, they sponsored a Hackathon Against Domestic Violence in seven countries with 300 developers, resulting in 40 apps including chat sites to promote healthy relationships in Nicaragua (“Chat Salud”), Costa Rica (“Amor Joven”), and El Salvador (“Matiti”) (http:// blogs.worldbank.org/ latinamerica/ apps- against- domestic- violence- 21st- century- solutions- to- an- old- problem- 0).

3.8 The power and pitfalls of the VAW regime

We have seen that the worldwide plight of women’s abuse has inspired unprecedented and remarkable efforts at all levels of the global system, in a single generation. Campaigns against gender violence have rapidly evolved from humanitarian protection to a form of women’s human rights to a broader vision of empowerment that underlies a wide spectrum of global goals. The resources and activities of this regime have been consequential; they have generated worldwide awareness, vastly increased monitoring and understanding, policy change in dozens of countries and international organizations, significant flows of direct assistance to victims and survivors— and perhaps most important, catalyzed and supported multitudes of transnational networks and grassroots movements.

The turn to “girl- power” may represent a regression to protectionism, but empowered global networks for gender equity have been mainstreamed worldwide— especially at the frontiers of globalization. Despite some distortions, linkages between gender violence and goals such as health and development have often transformed the other regimes to be more rights- based and inclusive. Securitization is an ongoing feature of foreign policy, especially on trafficking, but has often reformed under pressure from transnational networks. Strategic emphasis on some forms of abuse may have distracted attention from

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routine violence in some settings, but in others has served as a “wedge issue” that opens discussion and awareness of broader patterns, as we shall see in the chapters that follow.

We turn now to the horizontal and grassroots panorama of movements and campaigns contesting VAW that sometimes complement, sometimes combine with, and sometimes challenge the international regime. Like most human rights issues, progress comes “from above and below” and in waves. Mapping the dynamics of this movement is the first step to understanding how to increase its power.

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4

Mobilization

S TA N D I N G U P F O R   W O M E N ’ S S E C U R I T Y

Social mobilization has been the catalyst, guarantor, and pathway for fulfillment of human rights worldwide. Social movements and rights campaigns perform a wide variety of roles. Movements represent marginalized populations, raise consciousness of new issues, establish or bridge compelling frames for social problems, foster transnational networks, translate international norms into locally appropriate vocabularies, advocate, occupy public and forbidden space, mobilize culture change, and persuade decision makers, elites, and mass publics. They operate through a combination of symbolic and information poli- tics, leverage, and institutionalization (Brysk 1995, 2013a; Keck and Sikkink 1998). In this chapter we will map these modes of mobilization by the level and pathway of impact, with illustrations from the core cases of semi-liberal regimes profiled throughout the book— Mexico, the Philippines, India, Brazil, Turkey, Egypt—alongside some noteworthy com- parative cases that are influential or unexpected in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Algeria.

Humanitarian global feminism and some local movements have focused on protecting women from violence as a vulnerable population. Meanwhile, liberal rights-based global campaigns and modernizing national movements have emphasized women’s empower- ment, and the impact of violence as a barrier to women’s equal citizenship and participa- tion in public life. The “women’s rights as human rights” optic has also contributed to the rise of feminist campaigns and alliances that often campaign against a particular genre or incident of abuse such as trafficking or rape. More recently, a third strand of 21st-century feminism, often involving youth and cultural politics via social media, challenges patriar- chal ideolog y and demands sexual self-determination.

Worldwide, there are thousands of organizations involved in anti-violence campaigns, spanning almost every country in the world. The fully transnational organizations are constituents of the international regime, but national, local, and virtual mobilizations

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also participate in transnational networks and forums. For example, the International Civil Society Action Network For Women’s Rights, Peace and Security brings together dozens of local leaders from over a dozen post-conflict countries for annual workshops, joint publications on thematic challenges (Anderlini 2010), and training exchanges. Virtual mobilizations may originate from local grievances and actors and go viral—such as the sarcastic Indian video “It’s Your Fault” that went global in the aftermath of the Delhi rape—or, conversely, global actors may take up a local concern, as illustrated in the Chibok kidnappings #bringbackourgirls campaign. Despite tremendous debates about the globalization of women’s movements and their relationship with local actors, upon examination the functional level of movements is usually a question of degree, not kind (Moghadam 2005). Most movements are not purely local or global, but instead a blend that varies over time and for different types of activities and relationships. Even the char- acter of diffusion from global to grassroots may differ and is probably more accurately described as circulation, with strategic framing at multiple levels by transnational action networks for simultaneous localization and civic globalization (Roggeband 2010).

The composition of campaigns ranges along a spectrum from directly affected victims and survivors to more principled or identity-based advocates to solidarity coalitions from other sectors. Unlike the more typical rights movement “boomerang” pattern (Keck and Sikkink 1999)  where the directly affected on the ground reach outward for help, campaigns may develop up, down, or across. In India, Brazil, and Turkey alike, decades of campaigns against gender violence were launched by national women’s movements in tandem with the growth of the international regime, but received important and ongoing support from national rule of law, development, and ethnic advocates, inter- mittently clustering around survivors and incorporating local organizations (Weldon 2006). Femicide campaigns in Mexico started with locally affected families but reached out for transnational support and then regional diffusion—but movements like Femen were “born transnational.” Tostan began with an international health campaign but localized effectively and then spread regionally, while the Gulabi Gang started local and became national—but with little transnational influence. Movements in the Philippines anchored by women affected or at risk participate upward in some national and transna- tional feminist networks, but have nevertheless had an important horizontal coalition relationship to national labor and migrant rights movements—which also have transna- tional components.

Women’s movements have successfully lobbied for change in domestic and sexual vio- lence legislation in India, Turkey, South Africa, Lebanon, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and the Philippines, among others. In India, waves of protest since the late 1970s through the present have led to a series of reforms in rape law and judicial treatment. In that country, women’s groups also helped to design a new domestic violence law, and now provide a significant proportion of legal aid, shelters, and even reporting to implement the law. In South Africa, women’s groups weighed in strongly on the 2007 rape law reform— although their model was not fully adopted—and have subsequently helped to staff

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sexual violence courts as well as rape crisis centers (Britton 2006). In Turkey, women’s groups working with transnational human rights networks pushed successfully for legal reforms on honor killing, domestic violence, and rape, in the wake of recent cause célèbres. A series of Lebanese protests, spearheaded by a local movement called KAFA— “enough”—helped to generate a new family violence law in 2014, as well as improvement in anti-trafficking measures and the rights of domestic workers. Protests against femicide have swept Latin America for the past decade, resulting in Brazil’s 2006 Maria da Penha Law, Mexico’s 2007 femicide legislation, and legal changes in a dozen other countries in the region, including Colombia and Argentina.

4.1 How it works

As with the international regime, we must delineate the pathways of influence for so- cial mobilization to track and improve its impact on contesting violence. In this case, we can discern a pattern in which different modes of mobilization operate differently for different kinds of abuses and gender regime types, as profiled in Chapter  1. For the cluster of abuses of freedom we will examine in Chapter 5, the dynamic of international norm cascades are the foundation for contesting violations of self-determination. The mobilization of self-determination movements usually begins as modernizing humani- tarian efforts that later develop community-based campaigns for norm change and gain traction as they “vernacularize.” Examples include the African women’s movement Tostan mobilized against FGM/C, the Mukhtar Mai women’s organization in Pakistan against honor killing, and the coalition of civil society groups against child marriage Girls Not Brides—with over 300 member groups in 58 countries. In the communicative action realm, voice works to show women’s agency and represent hidden subjects.

For the threats to life treated in Chapter  6, diffusion of framing and networks are key dynamics for mobilizing against femicide. The issue of partner violence travels back and forth from global health initiatives and human rights treaties to local and national women’s empowerment campaigns. Mobilization against domestic violence is some- times rooted in national feminist movements with a legal and lobbying orientation, as in Brazil and most of the Americas, or sometimes arises from grassroots development groups like India’s Gulabi Gang and similar campaigns in other parts of South Asia. Campaigns against domestic abuse are generally better connected to state institutions than more challenging mobilizations against sexual violence or traditional practices, since mobilizations against battering are operating within an accepted mandate—al- though they may clash with governments over implementation. These movements are often catalyzed by cause célèbres that are important to individualize victims and reveal hidden violence.

Campaigns against gendered forms of violent labor exploitation such as sex traffick - ing were initiated as an international humanitarian effort but increasingly adopt a

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rights-based and survivor-focused lens at the global level (Brysk and Choi-Fitzpatrick 2012). While some local campaigns like Ukraine’s Femen and the Philippines’ GABRIELA (General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action) explicitly contest trafficking , there are fewer local initiatives against gendered trafficking and labor exploitation, and even rights-based activism has remained more at the global level. Growing concern with migrant domestic workers may represent the beginning of more grassroots attention in some countries such as the Philippines, backstopped by the recent poorly subscribed but symbolically impor- tant ILO Treaty on Domestic Workers. Because policy response to labor exploitation of women migrants is both international and national, and trafficking source states are by definition weak and/or corrupt, the focus of movement lobbying and leverage is diffused.

Sexual violence was historically more difficult to politicize, but contemporary campaigns against rape span the gamut from protests for protection to movements for equal rights to sexual self-determination campaigns to take back public space. In many cases, issue- specific anti-rape movements are both outsider rights-based advocates for women vis the state and insider NGO providers of health, psychological, and legal services (as in South Africa, see Britton et al. 2009). Multisectoral street protest for state protection and law enforcement has emerged in developing democracies that are hot spots of sexual vi- olence, such as South Africa, Brazil, and India, especially in the wake of cause célèbres. Such movements were critical to the passage of new legislation on sexual violence in South Africa in 2007, and to pressing a series of initiatives for various forms of sexual abuse in India from the 1980s through 2013, discussed in Chapter 7. Information politics is espe- cially salient for demolishing the denial of rape—both documentation of the incidence and impact, and symbolic affirmation of individual “innocent victims.” An overlapping set of recent initiatives to protest sexual assault asserts the rights to sexual autonomy and self-determination through testimonial theater, public protest, and social media—from transgressive videos to “SlutWalks.” In “feminism 3.0,” women move from hidden shame to public affirmation-and from blaming the victim to shaming the perpetrator.

Looking across the mobilization requisites of different types of gender regimes, pa- triarchal political economies demand the highest level of vernacular translation by local movements. At the next level, semi-liberal gender regimes with established norms and open institutions but lagging law and policy are especially amenable to protest and movement advocacy for political will and enforcement. Protest politics are present but less possible in less developed polities, and are needed more intermittently in the most developed and democratic countries. In contrast, in developed democracies with lower public violence and higher rule of law, social movements play a stronger role in monitoring established reforms and fomenting culture change. The surge in awareness and experience of gender violence in rapidly urbanizing societies also raises the relevance of occupying public space, in developed democracies and semi-liberal regimes alike. In both of these locations, movement campaigns work to cross the public–private divide on

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femicide and sexual violence. Moreover, in both types of liberal and liberalizing regimes that increasingly host underdeveloped or shrinking social service sectors, reforming states rely on civil society monitoring and fulfillment of policies against gender violence.

4.2 Transnational civil society

At the global level, social movements are at the same time members of the interna- tional regime, vehicles of norm diffusion, advocates for new international norms and mechanisms, and transnational transmission networks for protest and policy repertoires to the national level. Global advocacy movements have played a critical role in shaping the international regime on VAW (Friedman et  al. 2005). Transnational NGOs and campaigns promote and advocate women’s rights and security in global institutions and promoter states, as well as providing direct resources to national and grassroots women’s organizations.

Equality Now is a core advocacy organization, established in 1992. It has rights-based programs to document, mobilize international action, and support grassroots activists with a strateg y of legal advocacy and strategic litigation. The organization has been a key actor at the United Nations and has over 200 partner groups globally. The group’s focus issues are discrimination in law, sexual violence, female genital mutilation, and trafficking. Over a generation, it has been involved in campaigns to change over 50 key legal frameworks around the world. For example, Equality Now secured a prohibition on sex tourism in the US Military Code of Justice, removal of a marriage exemption for child rape in Ethiopia, gender-based asylum for FGM victims in theUnited States, legalization of abortion in Nepal, reform of the law on honor crimes in Jordan, and reform of the na- tionality law in Lebanon (https://www.equalitynow.org/).

The most well-known civil society organization for conflict-related gender violence is Women for Women International, which operates a people-to-people sponsorship plan for survivors and their communities. This NGO has distributed over $110 million since its founding in 1993. Women for Women International has served more than 400,000 women in eight conflict-affected countries, from Bosnia to Afghanistan, Congo, Sudan, and Iraq. Their core rehabilitation program for survivors of sexual violence, which has reached over 80,000 of these women, provides a 12-month training for women in ec- onomics, health, empowerment, and safety. Signature initiatives include a Women’s Opportunity Center in Rwanda and a Men’s Leadership Program in Congo DRC (http://www.womenforwomen.org/what-we-do).

Global Rights for Women, established in Minnesota from that university’s world- renowned human rights program, is dedicated to securing legal justice for VAW world- wide. This organization provides draft legislation, training, and monitoring for legal reform, effective prosecution, and local advocacy. They are active in UN conferences and provide expert consultation to UN Women and the Special Rapporteur on Violence

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Against Women. Global Rights for Women currently operates programs with partners in Armenia, Morocco, Lithuania, Georgia, Colombia, Moldova, Serbia, and Turkey (http://globalrightsforwomen.org/).

The Center for Reproductive Rights is a global legal advocacy movement for repro- ductive rights and sexual health rights. They work on abortion, contraception, safe preg- nancy, funding for reproductive health, HIV/AIDS, censorship, and youth rights in the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia. They have hosted a regional South Asian Reproductive Justice and Accountability Initiative litigating on child marriage, abortion access, and con- traception since 2012. They have brought numerous cases before the UN treaty bodies, and advocate vigorously in the United States for reproductive rights at home and for for- eign assistance for family planning (https://www.reproductiverights.org/).

The most long-standing and dedicated funding group is the Global Fund for Women. Since 1987, the Global Fund has granted over $100 million to more than 4,500 women’s groups in 174 countries. Across a broad spectrum of women’s empowerment issues, the Fund has invested significantly in efforts to combat all forms of VAW. They have been particularly influential in promoting alternatives to FGM/C worldwide, and a women’s movement against sexual violence in the Congo DRC. The Fund has catalyzed and partnered with larger foundations on broader campaigns, notably the Nike Foundation’s Grassroots Girls Initiative. Among their current initiatives, AmplifyChange campaigns for reproductive rights with the African Women’s Development Fund, FLOW (Funding Leadership and Opportunities for Women) builds women’s leadership in the Asia Pacific region, and Roots Lab fosters social innovation by feminist youth world- wide, in partnership with Oxfam, the Young Feminist Fund, and others (https://www. globalfundforwomen.org/).

Some transnational actors seek to consciously construct solidarity and directly em- power local movements. The Oxfam “Raising Her Voice” program is a systematic capacity-building program for advocacy against gender violence in 17 countries, funded by the British cooperation agency DFID. The program seeks to build state protection for combating gender-based violence overall and for the security of women’s rights defenders and political leaders, who are systematically at risk in partner countries. In Bolivia, Oxfam partner organizations lobbied for a political violence Law to protect women candidates, while in Mozambique, women’s groups organized to audit government ministries’ com- pliance with the country’s 2009 domestic violence law. In Nigeria, Oxfam-supported civic groups coordinated a Legislative Advocacy Coalition on Violence Against Women (Green 2015).

4.3 Transnational solidarity

Mobilization of transnational networks is another potential mode of empowering women’s movements against gender violence. Transnational support can build capacity

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for advocacy, build pressure on governments from above and below, craft new frames to activate the international regime, and make local issues globally visible. Women Living Under Muslim Law has heightened the visibility, resources, and consciousness of a wide array of movements facing challenging regimes and, often, physical threat. Yet each of these roles carries tensions between local and global, rights and representation, universal claims and local realities. These tensions are most visible in the #BringBackOurGirls campaign, with a relatively strong differential in power between front-line activists and global supporters. Yet more balanced processes are possible, especially among peer-level regime types. As Roggeband shows for European activists against sexual harassment, “actors jointly recreate frames and strategically adapt them to make them resonate with opportunity structures at different levels”—translating American notions, seeking common ground and traction in European institutions, and at the same time adapting campaigns to national contexts (Roggeband 2010, 33). This is more parallel to the dy- namic of Mexican femicide protests in a semi-liberal gender regime, which travel from local to binational to national and regional Latin American repertoires over time—with some tensions but relative effectiveness.

4.3 .1 Women Li v ing Under Muslim L aw

Women Living Under Muslim Law (WLUML) is a transnational solidarity network of women’s associations in over 70 countries—including Sharia law countries, women in Muslim minority populations with state-recognized religious and family codes, non- Muslim women living in Muslim states, and women in conflict zones with fundamen- talist forces. WLUML was established in 1984 by nine women resisting the imposition of religious law to the detriment of women’s rights in crisis situations in Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Iran, Mauritius, Tanzania, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. WLUML defines VAW as the cross-cutting theme of their focus areas of fundamentalism, militarism, and sexu- ality. With international coordination from London and regional offices in Pakistan and Senegal, the organization provides information and networking—sponsoring periodic seminars and publications—solidarity for legal actions, and training for member organi- zations. Since 2007, they have sponsored a global campaign fomenting reinterpretations of Islamic law and practice called “Violence is not our culture,” coordinated with the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. WLUML has re- cently campaigned for threatened or imprisoned women’s rights defenders in Iran, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. They regularly participate in UN treaty bodies and committees on women’s legal status and human rights. Their publications adopt an in- tersectional approach to women’s struggles as migrants, minorities, and second-class citi- zens in different environments—and a critical approach to legal claims made in the name of Islam’s multiple and evolving traditions (Women Living Under Muslim Laws 2011; http://www.wluml.org/).

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4.3 .2 Me xico : Cr ossing b or der s

In Mexico, the experience of a generation of the disappearance and murder of hundreds of young women along the United States–Mexico border sparked a multilevel movement with local, national, binational, and regional modalities. The murders and sexual vio- lence in the epicenter of Juarez became a worldwide symbol of attacks on young female workers migrating to global factories—a phenomenon later echoed throughout the re- gion. Mexico’s movement helped to craft the international frame of “femicide” to charac- terize these violations, which achieved global resonance for a range of problems discussed in Chapter 6, and circulated back to Mexico to fortify state response.

The rise of a movement against femicide was intertwined with global conscious- ness-raising, which helped bring government response, albeit at some cost to local sol- idarity. Local groups campaigned through the 1990s, slowly gaining media attention in The Nation, LA Times, New York Times, Washington Post, and “60 Minutes.” By the turn of the millennium, cultural coverage and academic consideration of the murders had increased tremendously. Gaspar de Alba 2010 chronicles songs by Tori Amos, Lila Downs, Los Tigres del Norte, and Los Jaguares; an Amnesty International exposé, 2001 docu- mentary, two Hollywood films and one Mexican film; a mystery novel, two journalistic books, academic monographs; and panels at the American Studies Association, MLA, and National Association for Chicano Studies. A 2003 UCLA conference, attended by over 1,500 participants, generated resolutions for a binational commission to investigate the murders, later adopted by Mexico under US pressure, and a “Ni Una Más” petition. The “Ni una más” rubric spread throughout the Americas (Gaspar de Alba 2010). The year 2004 also saw a V-Day march in Juarez with feminist leaders Eve Ensler, Jane Fonda, and Sally Field offering international solidarity and celebrity status for the issue.

Over a generation of protest from the 1990s to the present, local campaigns bridged, evolved, and competed over differences in class base, rights versus maternal appeals, level of collaboration with the Mexican state, and relationship with transnational networks. The original scattered, but persistent and symbolic, protests of grieving families, mostly working class, were transformed in 1993 by the entry of feminist journalist Esther Chavez and human rights activist Judith Galarza. These middle-class activists challenged the Mayor of Juarez to respond to the larger social problems and created an umbrella group for femicide protest, domestic violence organizations, and some development groups: Coordinadora de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales en Pro de la Mujer. These broader campaigns increased media and government attention, but some claimed they diluted the femicide issue and diverted resources to broader social programs, at times benefiting middle-class professionals rather than direct victims. Later on, some of these advocates took government posts, which they claimed as a victory for their access to re- form but more grassroots activists saw as cooptation by the Mexican state. For example, Victoria Caraveo, who established the organization Mujeres por Juarez, was later ap- pointed director of the government regional women’s office, Instituto Chihuahuense

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88 Freedom from Fear

de la Mujer. In a different phase of reform and legal proceedings, the Mexican govern- ment began to give some victims’ families “assistance”—which also split some previous grassroots efforts and legal champions.

When the government intermittently claimed that the victims were prostitutes or runaways, family activists responded by increasing personalization, locally resonant sym- bolic protest, and depicting the disappeared as daughters. In March 2002, a few months after the shocking discovery of a mass grave in a cotton field across from a multinational facility, family groups staged an Éxodo por la Vida, trekking 370 kilometers across the desert dressed in mourning, with clear linkages to regional Catholic repertoires of pil- grimage. Similarly, Las Mujeres de Negro erected crosses on the international bridge be- tween Juarez and El Paso, combining local symbolism and transnational outreach. By the 21st century, two new groups had formed—the internationally oriented Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa and the more legally focused Justicia para Nuestras Hijas. In par- allel fashion to neighboring Latin American feminist and human rights movements, the family-based, legal, and service-provider wings of the movement split over participa- tion in government reforms and international efforts (for the original model based on Argentina’s Mothers of the Disappeared, see Brysk 1994). Thus, during the famous 2004 V-Day protests that marked the zenith of public protest, the Ciudad Juarez mothers’ group refused to march with the feminist international protest, and rallied elsewhere (Wright 2010). Moreover, some observers note an inherent tension between the trans- national resonance of the feminicide frame and local limitations on articulation with the state (Garcia-del Moral 2015).

The 2004 transnational protests reflected a complex and relatively effective interna- tional pressure campaign. The cross-border Coalition Against Violence emerged, along with independent unions and other binational social movement organizing. The coali- tion mobilized 2002 cross-border International Women’s Day events, and crafted a black cross on pink symbol. They pressed successfully for a binational investigation commission, lobbied Texas officials for greater law enforcement collaboration, and their efforts led to the Chihuahua governor’s appointment of Vicky Caraveo to the Instituto Chihuahua de la Mujer. Coalition testimony at US congressional hearings in 2003 helped foster a con- gressional resolution that put further pressure on Mexico, even as the coalition reported to the 2003 UN Commission on Status of Women. US representative Hilda Solis (from Los Angeles, with many Juarez constituents) was a key transnational bridging figure, who led delegations to the border, helped sponsor the congressional resolution, and organized the US Congressional Hispanic caucus to push then-President Vicente Fox for Mexican federal involvement to overcome local government resistance—which Fox eventu- ally provided. The transnational movement mounted protests at Mexican consulates worldwide, including Tokyo, Belgrade, Madrid, and contributed to a 2003 Amnesty International report for global naming and shaming. Finally, for V-Day in 2004, 5,000– 8,000 marchers crossed from El Paso to Juarez, and performed the Vagina Monologues in solidarity (Staudt and Coronado 2010). As we will discuss in Chapter 6, throughout

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this decade the Mexican government responded with commissions, investigations, and a 2007 femicide law.

During the 2010s, the local to binational femicide rubric planted in Juarez deepened and circulated in two different directions, disseminating horizontally across the nation and transnationally across the region. First, there was a new wave of organization in Juarez itself—the 2011 organization Comité de Madres y Familiares con Hijas Desaparecidas (Committee of Mothers and Relatives with Disappeared Daughters), which sponsored a 2013  “Walk for Justice” (Caminata por la Justica) across the region seeking swifter investigations (Barrios 2013; Coria 2013). As waves of femicide and consciousness of the interconnections in murder, rape, and harassment spread, Mexicans began to protest across regional capitals. In the spring of 2016, the “Primavera Violeta” coordinated street protests of thousands in 50 Mexican cities, including the capital, using the color purple associated with feminism and echoing the demand for safe streets and accountability for missing and murdered women (Goche 2016). In this era, protests have demanded better enforcement of the measures adopted from the femicide law and commissions, investi- gation of specific cases, and the declaration of “gender alerts” in different localities—a mechanism introduced by Mexico to warrant “state of emergency” concentration of re- sources on localized surges in gender violence (Table 4.1).

At the same time, anti-femicide movements spread throughout Latin America. The demand for “#Niunamenos” (Notonemore) became the source of massive protest and legal reforms in Argentina from 2012–2015, peaking with a protest march of 300,000 in Buenos Aires. In Peru, which is deemed the second leading country in sexual assault in the Americas, local feminist mobilizations joined the regional campaign by 2016. Peru’s Niunamenos movement inspired a testimonial campaign with thousands of postings of street harassment and domestic violence, mass marches in Lima, and demands for im- plementation of the national action plan secured by a previous wave of protest. As a Peruvian journalist participating concluded, “Has #NiUnaMenos changed something ? Yes, all of it” (Wiener 2016).

4.3 .3 Br ing Back Our Gir l s

In a contrasting case in Nigeria, the transnational social media campaign on behalf of the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko Haram illustrates the power and limits of global “hacktivism” to bring attention to a self-determination abuse in a besieged regime. Like the Taliban attack on Malala Yousafzai in Afghanistan, the April 2014 abduction of 276 girls by the Islamist rebel group Boko Haram was merely one peak of a tide of terror that has devastated northern Nigeria and claimed an estimated 20,000 lives over six years. Amid this toll, human rights groups have registered around 2,000 kidnappings of schoolchildren, and hundreds of thousands have been displaced. Like ISIS and the Taliban, the group opposes Western education for girls—and, like Joseph Kony’s Ugandan rebel cult, they attack schools to terrorize civilians and capture child slaves as soldiers and

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brides. Just as all of these groups are fueled in part by a drive for ethno-religious domi- nance of a contested region in a conflicted country, rape, murder, and forced marriage of enemy women is a strateg y of political violence akin to the genocidal wartime rape in Bosnia or Rwanda. As rising young Christian or secular secondary students, the Chibok girls represented the specter of female empowerment anathema to the extremists. Yet the pillage of northern Nigeria received limited and ineffective attention from the interna- tional community, or even the Nigerian government, until the stunning mass capture catalyzed a global movement, #BringBackOurGirls (Chandler 2015).

Like the femicide campaign in Mexico, Bring Back Our Girls began with a local movement by family members of the victims, frustrated by government inaction, that quickly became a transnational effort. Then-President Goodluck Jonathan made little specific effort to find the girls, and when his wife Patience met with one of the mothers of the missing girls weeks later, the First Lady was criticized for her patronizing approach. Goodluck’s inattention to the cause célèbre came to symbolize the failure of security in Nigeria and was later seen as an important factor in his loss of the following year’s Nigerian election. The Nigerian military’s regional campaign in pursuit of the rebels was chronically plagued by insufficient resources, poor coordination, and poor relations with beleaguered communities. Thus, families’ local protests soon turned toward marches on Nigeria’s capital cities, directed by three Nigerian activists, and their social media appeals leapfrogged to a global audience (Shearlaw 2015). Although English is widely used in Nigeria, it is notable that local advocates signs and slogans were presented in the interna- tional language from the beginning.

The Chibok girls’ personable images, family ties, and aspirations put a human face on the faraway and alien violence—and like the rape victims in India and Turkey, they filled the role of emblematic daughters of the community, emphasized beyond the fates of equally affected victims. Local protests and global media featured the girls’ names, faces, ambitions, and hobbies. The tag to Bring Back Our Girls emphasized their role as universal daughters. The hashtag was famously adopted by First Lady Michelle Obama, Secretary of State and presidential candidate Hilary Clinton, Representative Fredrica Wilson, celebrities like Ellen Degeneres, Katy Perry, and Emma Watson, and by CNN and UNICEF. Malala, as a survivor of a parallel attack on girls’ education, offered strong support and further bridged to a universal frame. The campaign surpassed one million tweets, and although it waned within months it was renewed on each anniversary of the attack. While global social media campaigns like #Kony2012 have been criticized for lack of concrete policy goals and manipulation by privileged outsiders, Bring Back Our Girls was truly transnational in origin and did have a plausible and legitimate focus, although it inevitably simplified a complex conflict and did not address root causes (Dewey 2014).

The widely cited figure of detainees was 219 during the peak of the campaign; a few dozen girls escaped during or in the wake of the attack, and a few families learned of the deaths of some girls from escapees. A  May 2014 video released by the rebels to press for a prisoner swap showed around 100 girls alive. On Christmas 2015 in the

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midst of negotiations with the government, the rebels released a new video showing 15 girls claimed as brides to rebel fighters, pleading with the government to negotiate concessions with Boko Haram to secure their release. Later, a fugitive girl who broke away from a rebel forest camp confirmed this pattern, reappearing with a baby from a forced marriage. During the second year of captivity, evidence began to emerge that some of the Chibok girls might be among the dozens of young women forced into su- icide bombings in markets and towns in Nigeria and Cameroon. Other girls who have escaped from various Boko Haram abductions have returned to their communities, but face reintegration problems similar to those of child soldiers and “war brides” from other African civil conflicts, including lingering trauma, brainwashing and forced conversion, forced participation in abuses, unwanted pregnancies, and, in some cases, rejection by their families (Leithead 2016).

The Bring Back Our Girls campaign did galvanize offers of military support from the United States, United Kingdom, and France to the overwhelmed Nigerian gov- ernment, which did appear to aid the Nigerian counterinsurgency effort, though still failing to assist brutalized and displaced civilians and the spillover rebel attacks in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. Once attention turned to a more thorough regional campaign, the new Buhari government retook a large swath of rebel territory and freed many captives from other operations but was not able to locate the Chibok girls themselves. President Buhari restructured Nigeria’s military command in July 2015, and ordered a renewed in- vestigation of the Chibok kidnappings in January 2016. Meeting with the parents as he faced continuing international pressure from the campaign, the president told them, “I assure you that I go to bed and I wake up every day with the Chibok girls on my mind” (Kaplan 2016). Similarly, after the April 2016 release of the CNN video with 15 Chibok girls, the Nigerian Senate demanded a report from security agencies and greater scrutiny of military efforts. The second-anniversary video sparked a new wave of international concern, with the resonant image of a bereft mother recognizing her missing daughter on the video and renewed outrage in Nigeria and abroad (Elbagir et  al. 2016). One of the girls’ fathers, an anguished gray-haired man, was shown carrying a sign of universal outreach: “If you keep quiet about our #Chibokgirls, it is only a matter of time, same may happen to you” (Chandler 2015). In the spring of 2017, an additional 82 Chibok girls were released under government auspices and became a rallying point for national pride, as the Nigerian military made further progress in the armed struggle against Boko Haram.

4.4 Power in movement: voice, advocacy, dialectic

At the national and local level, mobilization directly empowers participants, lobbies for institutional change and representation, builds social capital, and monitors and enforces reforms. Social movement campaigns interact with the other channels of change: they de- mand, draft, and monitor laws; advocate and implement policy as service providers; and

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introduce new frames, images, and knowledge in public information campaigns. Htun and Weldon (2012) demonstrate that the presence of women’s movements is an impor- tant and independent factor in the adoption of national reform to stop VAW. Women’s leadership may—or may not—produce gender violence reform, but is more likely to do so when associated with a women’s movement, as when President Ellen Sirleaf Johnson introduced a Gender Audit in Sierra Leone.

Major modes of mobilization for women’s movements include symbolic politics, pro- test and legal advocacy, and translation of global norms into local contexts and processes. In the widely disparate transitional regimes of India and Turkey, emblematic martyred rape victims broke through shame cultures and mobilized mass protest of sexual vio- lence and legal reform. In both the 2012 Delhi and 2015 Ozgecan Aslan rape cases, rising middle-class women in their early 20s were savagely attacked on mini-buses, resonating with widespread experience of urban crime and inadequate state protection. Moving from martyrs to heroes, across Brazil and China symbolically empowered and “respect- able” survivors of domestic violence revealed hidden abuse and demanded legal account- ability. Maria da Penha and Kim Lee were both educated, relatively elite women whose chronic assault had been ignored by states with documented massive abuse and lagging legislation (Kim Lee is profiled in Chapter 6). Their singular presence focused attention on an amorphous private problem perceived to affect mostly less esteemed and less networked citizens.

Advocacy movements to stop VAW successfully employ the classic tactics of human rights social movements and networks-monitoring, publicizing abuse, mounting street protests and online campaigns to pressure government, helping to design legal and policy changes, and sometimes acting as para-state service providers of legal aid, domestic vi- olence shelters and hotlines, and rape crisis counseling. These roles are notably strong in the more democratic transitional regimes where states are willing or ambivalent but weak, information politics are widely available, women’s political participation is rising, and both international regimes and civil society have some mandated traction on state response.

4.4.1 S ymb ol s of suffer ing : m a rt y r ed daugh ter s

4.4.1.1 India

The Delhi rape victim of 2012 was referred to as “India’s daughter” in press coverage, protest, and later an influential documentary. This positioning generated both peer soli- darity by extensive student protests and protectionist pleas by outraged parents and pa- ternal figures, in addition to the expected mobilization of women’s groups. Young Indian women protesting the attack identified as fellow daughters of India and adopted versions of the slogan, “Don’t tell your daughter not to go out—tell your son to behave.” A prom- inent yoga guru and a former general each led protests for protecting India’s women, and

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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh began his response:  “As a father of three daughters, I feel as strongly about this incident as all of you.” Since Indian law forbids publicizing the name of rape victims, the press initially gave the student victim the name “Nirbhaya,” which means “fearless” in Hindi—another discursive move of resistance. But, several years later, her name was revealed by her mother to personify her identity and reverse shame. There were waves of nationwide and even regional protests—using candles, black clothing, and symbols of mourning—upon news of the incident, when the victim died of her injuries, at the sentencing of the attackers, and upon the release of the one juve- nile. The norm power of this case is shown by India’s unprecedented prosecution of the death penalty for the rapists, overcoming a general national prohibition. In addition to legal changes, the Indian government established a Nirbhaya Fund for women victims of violence. The BBC documentary film on the incident was called “India’s Daughter” (Walia 2014).

4.4.1.2 Turkey

In Turkey, university student Ozcegan Aslan was also seen as an “innocent victim” rep- resentative of the vulnerability of the daughters of the urban middle-class to violence. Her image was carried on protest posters by thousands of Turks, including pillars of society like the Turkish Bar Association. On social media, her name became a hashtag marking resistance to violence. When the Islamist government’s condemnation of the murder included a statement linking women students’ vulnerability to Western dress, young Turkish men marched in mini-skirts and posted men-in-miniskirt photos online to contest victim-blaming. Thousands of Turkish women posted photos of themselves in black to mourn the murder, while some women marchers donned fake wounds echoing the attack in solidarity (Hurriyet Daily News 2015a).

4.4.2 Sher oes : Voice a nd agenc y

4.4.2.1 Malala

In Pakistan, Malala Yousafzai’s leadership and near-martyrdom personified attacks on girls’ freedom and globalized resistance to the gendered terror of fundamentalists. After surviving a 2012 assassination attempt, locally reminiscent of the murder of Pakistan’s first female leader Benazir Bhutto, Malala went on to worldwide fame and a Nobel Prize. In her best-selling autobiography, she notes that “Whenever my grandmother saw me speaking on television, or leaving the house, she would pray, ‘Please God make Malala like Benazir Bhutto but do not give her Benazir’s short life’ (Yousafzai and Lamb 2012, 162)  Far from a rebel against patriarchy in her own family, Malala is the daughter of a modernizing father who is a progressive nationalist educator, a man who was sent by his Indian-educated father to government rather than religious schools, and was active in student politics under Benazir Bhutto. She legitimizes her struggle for gender equity

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with the philosophy of the founding father of Pakistan, Islamic nationalist Muhammad Ali Jinnah: “No struggle can ever succeed without women participating side by side with men. There are two powers in the world; one is the sword and the other is the pen. There is a third power stronger than both, that of women” (Yousafzai and Lamb 2012, 31).

Malala and her father consciously crafted a communication strateg y for her as a rep- resentative of local values with global resonance as a universal figure of girl-power. Years prior to the Taliban attack, when Malala was an education activist living under local terror in the Swat Valley conflict, she gave a series of anonymous interviews to the BBC Urdu about girls’ struggle for education and school violence—using the pseudonym of Gul Makai, a Pashtun folk heroine who uses the Koran to discourage her elders from war. The BBC radio journalist was a friend of her father who conceived a weekly schoolgirl diary about life under the Taliban to humanize the conflict; “He told me about Anne Frank. . . .” (Yousafzai and Lamb 2012, 155) Malala’s communication presence developed further through a January 2009 New York Times web site documentary, “Class Dismissed in Swat Valley”—which gained her family support from a Pakistani Stanford student when they became internally displaced. Her campaign became an emblem that brought attention to a wider hidden problem: hundreds of schools had been destroyed, and girls were being threatened and attacked throughout the region. The Swat Valley had suffered chronic poverty and Gulf State migration, natural disasters, Taliban attacks, abusive mil- itary occupation, drone strikes—and women’s rights and security were diminished by each of these problems, which intensified Pashtun patriarchy.

Prior to her global renown, Malala was a long-standing recognized activist and practi- tioner of information politics in Pakistan extending to transnational networks. Through 2010, she had been elected speaker of a District Child Assembly in Swat (supported by UNICEF and the local Khpal Kor Foundation). She attended journalism workshops from the British organization Open Minds Pakistan, of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting—workshops on “how to tell our stories so people outside would know what was going on in our valley and help us” (Yousafzai and Lamb 2012, 194). In October 2011, she was nominated by Desmond Tutu for a KidsRights international peace prize (Amsterdam), and won Pakistan’s first National Peace Prize. With the prize money, she had started a girls’ education foundation in Pakistan, and in January 2012 a Karachi school had been named in her honor. When she was severely wounded by the Taliban shooting ten months later, this recognition created pressure for her transfer for treatment to the United Kingdom—that probably saved her life. The President of Pakistan paid for her treatment and gave her father diplomatic status so the family could accompany her abroad.

In the wake of her recovery from the attack, Malala notes that “I realized what the Taliban had done was make my campaign global” (Yousafzai and Lamb 2012, 288–289). A  Pakistani schoolgirl activist received messages from heads of state and thousands of people worldwide, recognition by celebrities including a song by Madonna, a US appearance on the “Daily Show,” and a UN petition, day, and special position to promote

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girls’ rights to a safe education. For her 16th birthday address to the United Nations, Malala symbolically wore Benazir Bhutto’s shawl, spoke of a culturally rooted Islamic right to education, and coined the movement mantra: “One child, one teacher, one book and one pen can change the world.” A year later, in 2014, she became the youngest recip- ient of the Nobel Peace Prize. Underlining her move from martyr to hero, in her autobi- ography this remarkable young woman refers to the 32 million girls worldwide who do not attend school—5 million in Pakistan—and emphasizes: “I don’t want to be thought of as the ‘girl who was shot by the Taliban’ but the ‘girl who fought for education’ ” (Yousafzai and Lamb 2012, 309) To celebrate her 18th birthday, she opened a school for Syrian refugees at the border with Lebanon.

4.4.2.2 Maria da Penha

Maria da Penha, an activist survivor of domestic violence, spearheaded long-standing efforts by Brazil’s women’s movement to strengthen legal response. In May 1983, after decades of abuse and unavailing complaints, the middle-aged pharmacist was shot while asleep by her husband, injuring her spinal cord, and two weeks later when she returned from the hospital he tried to electrocute her in the shower. She became par- aplegic from her injuries, and prosecuted her assailant. She later wrote a book called “I survived so I can tell” that was entered into evidence. Seven years later her husband was finally sentenced, but the sentence was overturned on appeal, and eventually she took her case to the Inter-American Human Rights Court, arguing that victims of domestic abuse were systematically ignored by the Brazilian justice system—and the international body agreed. The articulate survivor traveled Brazil in her wheelchair to seek support for greater action, embodying the toll of domestic violence and telling her story. In 2002, da Penha’s aggressor was finally imprisoned. In August 2006, Brazil passed the landmark Maria da Penha Act. She currently heads an organization of relatives and survivors of do- mestic violence in Brazil, campaigning for improved enforcement of the bill she helped to draft (UN Women 2011b).

4.4.3 A dvocac y: ta king i t to the str eets—a nd courts

4.4.3.1 Algeria

Even in a gender regime on the cusp between patriarchy and liberalization, women in post-revolutionary Algeria have reshaped law through public protest. Building on their role in anti-colonial resistance, Algerian women have mobilized repeatedly for legal eq- uity and protection from violence. After the post-independence generation of socialist nationalist rule devolved toward Islamism, women mobilized throughout the 1980s against a Sharia-based Family Code with matrimonial guardians, husbands’ permission to work, and limited divorce rights. An autonomous self-help organization, SOS Women In Distress, was established to assist victims of domestic violence. When Islamists were

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blocked from assuming full governmental control in 1992, they launched a bloody rebel- lion that killed tens of thousands, replete with vicious attacks on women in the public sphere: “lists of women to be killed were pinned up at the entrance to mosques, women who worked in government offices were threatened and killed . . . . women teachers were beheaded in front of their pupils” and, in rebel-held areas, women were kidnapped and held as sex slaves (Salhi 2010, 120). Throughout the 1990s civil war, Algerian women protested, testified as survivors of rape and violence, founded assistance organizations for sexual abuse, and maintained international ties, including regional Maghreb groups seeking legal reform. After resolution of the conflict around the turn of the millennium, in 2004 some provisions of the Family Code were revised (Salhi 2010). Following an additional decade of civil society mobilization and international networking, in 2015 Algeria passed landmark legislation on VAW, assuming a leading role in the Mideast in tandem with neighboring Morocco (Issaoun 2015).

4.4.3.2 Argentina

With hundreds of femicides each year, Argentina passed a strong domestic violence law in 1994. But reports of battering and trafficking have risen with economic crisis, and several horrific cases have shocked the nation: for example, a kindergarten teacher who was murdered by her husband in front of her class. In June 2015, an estimated 200,000 Argentine citizens—male and female—rallied to protest continuing VAW and demand greater enforcement. The following year, the #Niunamenos movement against femicide organized a one-hour walkout national strike on “Black Wednesday” after the savage rape and murder of 16-year-old Lucia Perez (BBC 2016a, “Argentine women strike”). The leading role of such women’s movement pressure in the adoption, strength and effec- tiveness of domestic violence laws is confirmed by a scholarly analysis across Argentina’s provinces, also comparing Argentina with its neighbors (Smulovitz 2015).

4.4.3.3 Philippines

The Philippines’ panoply of social movements has influenced law and policy on a variety of gender violence issues. Despite significant gender inequity in the Philippines, vibrant women’s organizations have developed to advocate on family violence, sex worker rights, and domestic workers. The largest group, GABRIELA, is an amalgam of over 250 local women’s organizations named for a female rebel commander who fought against Spanish rule. The women’s coalition was founded in 1984 to advocate against the Marcos dicta- torship for women’s and popular sector needs such as landlessness and workers’ rights. From its earliest days, the program of GABRIELA and its sister groups have also in- cluded cross-border women’s issues such as trafficking, foreign domestic workers, pros- titution, abuse by American servicemen, and mail-order brides. During the drafting of the Philippines 1986–1987 first democratic constitution, GABRIELA organized a na- tionwide project of women sewing their demands on tapestries that were collected and

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delivered to the Constitutional Commission in a mass demonstration (Friesen 1989). However, women’s reproductive rights were not included in the constitution—the Philippines remains the only country in which divorce is illegal (Hundley and Santos 2015). In 2003 the movement formed a women’s political party, which gained one seat in Parliament that year and two since 2007. The first item in their platform is, “Women have the right to a society where all forms of discrimination and violence against women have been banished” Gabriela Women’s Party n.d.).

At the same time, a rich array of grassroots organizations formed issue-specific coalitions such as the women’s rights and health campaign SIBOL (Sama-samang Inisyatiba Para sa Pagbabago ng Batas at Lipunan). From the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s, the Philippines passed a series of laws against sexual harassment, rape, trafficking, and do- mestic violence:  the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, the Anti-Rape Act of 1997, the Rape Victims Assistance Act, An Act Declaring Unlawful the Matching of Filipino Mail Order Brides to Foreigners, Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, and Anti- Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Echoing various accounts of persistent social movement pressure on a decade of VAW reforms, UN Expert Rowena Guanzon affirms that “The role of women’s rights organizations was notable in the passage of Republic Act No. 8353 [the Anti-Rape Act] and other laws addressing VAW that followed.” Regarding the rape law, she cites lobbying, protest, and implementation roles of the Women’s Crisis Center and the SIBOL multisector coalition. Guanzon goes on to say that “The Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the “Anti-VAWC Act”) is the result of a decade of advocacy of victim-survivors, women’s human rights advocates and organizations, women legislators, government agencies and the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women” (Guanzon 2008).

Anti-trafficking legislation also reflected a particularly strong role for a different though sometimes overlapping cluster of social movements, including transna- tional, feminist, and church-based organizations. Influential organizations included the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) Asia Pacific, the Third World Movement Against the Exploitation of Women (TW-MAE-W), and the Development Action for Women Network (DAWN). DAWN assists Filipinas who migrated to Japan as “entertainers” and were often exploited there, rejected by Philippine society upon their return, and/or bore Japanese-Filipino children who were often abandoned by their fa- thers and Philippine policies. TW-MAE-W was founded by a Catholic activist to shelter and advocate for prostitutes, especially those exploited by sex tourism. CATW is a re- gional transnational network headquartered in Manila that was established in 1993 in tandem with that year’s UN World Conference on Human Rights. These groups pushed collectively for trafficking legislation to incorporate the controversial UN standards that trafficked persons are victims not criminals, consent does not excuse exploitation, and clients and pimps should be prosecuted while prostitutes should be protected. As Roces explains the lobbying role of CATW:

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. . . the final bill that was passed into law was drafted by CATW-AP [author inter- view with Enriquez 2003]. Senator Loi Estrada who was responsible for taking the bill to the Senate, was advised by CATW-AP [author interviews with Enriquez, 2003 and de Dios,  2003] Considering that the majority of the senators were not empathetic to this issue, and the notion of “consent” was controversial, the passage of this Act was a huge triumph for the women’s movements. This victory could be attributed to the vigorous campaign of CATW-AP and its allies. In their cam- paign CATW-AP and its allies used several strategies including networking with politicians and legislators and demonstrations outside the legislative buildings (Roces 2009, 276).

Mobilization was also a key to gaining state advocacy and protection for overseas Philippine domestic workers, including women’s, labor, and migrant rights organizations. Migrante International and the Philippines Migrants Rights Watch represented a range of migrant interests and pushed for more and better Philippine government overseas labor offices and greater regulation of labor recruitment agencies. Informed by this his- tory of Philippine civil society mobilization, overseas workers also formed host-country self-help organizations that lobbied their home government for protection. A  third strand of the movement was a Philippine national domestic workers group SUMAPI (Samahan ng mga Manggagawang Pantahanan sa Pilipinas, or Association and Linkage of Domestic Workers in the Philippines) that engaged in advocacy and monitoring at home, including documenting the linkage between local domestic workers substituting for absent migrants.

Several waves of national protest around the deaths or legal prosecution of Filipina domestic workers in the Mideast demanded government intervention with the host governments. After a Filipina maid in Kuwait was sentenced to death in 2007 for murdering her abusive employer, transnational protests during her sentencing by Migrante and other advocates in Australia, Canada, Japan, the United States, Hong Kong, Europe, and the Philippines pressed then-President Arroyo to appeal for com- mutation to life in prison. In September 2013 a Kuwait-based Filipino rights group, Mga Oragon sa Kuwait, presented a petition with 10,000 signatures to the Philippine consul asking for an immediate moratorium on deployment. In addition, GABRIELA mounted a nationwide “Purple Rose” campaign to publicize and advocate for the rights of overseas women workers and against trafficking.

Meanwhile, representatives of the estimated thousands of Philippine women forced into sex slavery during Japan’s World War II occupation of the Philippines have lobbied their government to negotiate an apolog y and reparations with Japan, with support from GABRIELA and their own organizations, Lila Pilipina and Malaya Lola. The few dozen elderly survivors have mounted highly resonant symbolic street protests at the Japanese Embassy and during visits of Japanese officials, often deploying shaming im- agery. GABRIELA party representatives have pressed the Philippine Foreign Ministry to

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publicize the terms of a claimed closed-door reparations arrangement with Japan for the handful of survivors, mentioned by the government in response to 2015 and 2016 protests. Several Philippine administrations have offered assurances to the women’s groups, even as the Philippines pursues a close alliance with Japan and is generally less vocal than their Korean counterparts regarding historical accountability for war crimes.

4.4.4 Tr a nsl ation a nd tr a nsfor m ation

Translation begins with and goes beyond the well-known “vernacularization” that adapts international rights to local repertoires and realities (Merry 2006). In its most successful form, translation is part of a dialectical transformation similar to the socialization and persuasion pathway discussed in Chapter 3 for the international regime, and consciously advanced by campaigns described in Chapter 10. It is a translation of women’s rights as human rights, freedom from fear as human security, and bridging frames across cultures. As the founder of Senegal’s Tostan movement explains the organization’s unexpected, growing, and unprecedented impact on FGM/C:  “I have learned many lessons during the decades I’ve been doing this work . . . but none as important as this: if you want to help empower people to positively transform their communities and their lives, human rights education is key” (Molloy 2013, xi).

4.4.4.1 Tostan

The pan-African Tostan movement is considered a global model for vernacularization and scaling up grassroots solidarity. After decades of local–global disconnect on FGM/C, the breakthrough effort came from a village-level campaign crossing health and human rights that evolved to national and then regional levels, innovating a new model of collective norm transformation. Tostan began as an American former Peace Corps worker’s reorganization of a UNICEF education program to become more situated in local culture-after she had lived in Senegal for over twenty years, participated in Wolof-language outreach programs, and crafted integrative rural literacy classes while living in a village. The name she chose for the repurposed program in concert with local intellectuals—Tostan—means “the hatching of an egg” in Wolof. The new organization provided holistic education and empowered local women to form community groups that adopt collective initiatives to promote women’s rights and well-being ; notably, village-wide resolutions to abandon female genital cutting. During years of classes, reproductive health education is integrated with literacy, primary health care, income generation—and discussion of universal human dignity. Circulating from the local back to the global level, Tostan’s rights-based community-centered approach to women’s health and autonomy has been adopted by programs of the World Health Organization, UNICEF, USAID, and several African governments.

The Tostan program begins by bringing together village women to imagine a vision for their future, and teaches them the international human rights treaties that Senegal has

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signed. Classes and village outreach by class members make extensive use of testimonial and theater. A woman leader of one of the first villages to publicly abandon FGM/C, in 1996, explained that key elements were the realization that most women in the world do not practice it, an understanding and visibility of their bodies, and a new understanding of their rights. “It was this knowledge that made us confident in our right to choose for ourselves what happens to our bodies . . . ” (Molloy 2013, 19). An older woman who had defended the practice announced the village decision to stop FGM/C to the press, “Where we once had fear we now have courage, because we have been given knowledge. We know our rights and the rights of all women. We have the right to dignity and the confidence to change customs if they do not bring us that dignity” (Molloy 2013, 20).

Although Tostan was founded by an American resident in Senegal, the staff are all African. Formally established in 1990 as a women’s health and empowerment program, by 1994 the program operated in 350 villages with over 15,000 participants. In that year, Tostan received a grant from the American Jewish World Service to expand the children’s health component, and in the preparatory field research discovered a vast gap in reproductive knowledge and rights, even in women who had already benefited from the literacy and income-generating trainings. Chronic violence and lack of health rights to seek and receive appropriate and responsive medical care were contributing greatly to Senegal’s elevated maternal mortality rate. Three of Tostan’s African staff, who had been cut and approached by numerous women concerned about health consequences, asked to include a health module on women’s human rights in 1995. After the new module was introduced, some village women’s groups confronted men about domestic violence—and some contested “the tradition” that had previously been taboo even to name:  genital cutting. Even women whose inherited livelihood was cutting came to question the tradition when given the knowledge to make sense of the suffering they witnessed, and the empowerment to think critically and make choices. In 1997, the President of Senegal endorsed the campaign at a speech to the International Federation for Human Rights in Dakar. And in 1999, Senegal passed a law banning female genital cutting (Molloy 2013).

While individual villages accepted the campaign, their interdependencies with other places where the tradition was still practiced, media misrepresentation, and concern with feared and historic Western imposition stalled the work of Tostan for a period. But a few key male village elders and imams came to see the health problems, and traveled among extended networks to promote the new critical consciousness. After months of visits and community dialogues, one elder persuaded fourteen related villages to abandon FGM/C, now known as the Diagougou Declaration. Later in 1998, another 18 villages joined. Hilary Clinton learned of the movement and later that year, when President Clinton was visiting Senegal, represent- atives of Tostan were invited to a human rights roundtable and gained national recognition.

As the program spread in the most conservative Islamic region of Senegal, Tostan’s program was threatened by local elites and religious figures who opposed human rights education itself, beyond debates on FGM/C. But local women who heard of the health

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agenda pushed for inclusion, and even went on a ceremony boycott. By 2007, over 2,500 villages had made public declarations of abandonment of FGM/C (Molloy 2013).

The human rights education program quickly expanded to a national dialogue and local interventions on child marriage, domestic violence, and rape. In 2004, after Tostan extended a local campaign to child marriage, a Canadian journalist witnessed a ten- year-old taken from a village school for an arranged marriage rescued by her classmates, who marched to the principal and called the media, resulting in the president sending gendarmes to her village (Armstrong 2014, 100–101). Tostan’s program was extended to Guinea in 2002, Somalia in 2005, and later Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali. It has now reached over 10 million people.

4.4.4.2 India’s Gulabi Gang

Another grassroots culturally rooted movement that translates global norms but remains nationally based is India’s Gulabi Gang. Their rights-based mobilization constantly makes the personal political, and humanizes marginalized women who are excluded from political voice and participation by poverty, caste, and patriarchal authority. The movement began when Sampat Lal, a former village social worker in rural India, founded a grassroots women’s group in 2006 to rescue women and the rural poor from violence and to pressure corrupt local officials. By 2008, she had enrolled an estimated 20,000 poor, mostly lower-caste women in the “Gulabi Gang”—known for their symbolic pink saris and bamboo sticks. One of her first actions gathered a group of village women to forcibly restrain a neighbor chronically beating his child bride. Hundreds of actions later, in the famous 2011 case chronicled in the book Pink Sari Revolution, the Gulabi Gang confronted a powerful Brahmin local legislator accused of raping and then jailing for theft a Dalit teenage runaway he had “rescued” at her father’s request. They secured her release and his resignation and indictment (Fontanella-Khan 2013).

Sampat and her dozens of “district commanders” investigate reports of mistreat- ment, mediate with families and village officials, accompany injured women for med- ical treatment, advocate with police, organize local protests, and mobilize the media. This often involves massing in pink saris for a traditional Indian militant repertoire of confrontation with police and local officials; these mob actions are often supported by local men, but the women take the lead for symbolic and strategic reasons. They advo- cate for their members’ broader livelihood and economic rights and essential govern- ment services in one of India’s poorest and most corrupt regions: access to roads, pension cards, and subsidized food supplies. For example, the Gulabi Gang several times raided trucks and shop owners suspected of pilfering government grain. They even support and witness “love marriages” and assist threatened couples to escape family threats, focusing on February 14th as “Pink Gang Day” for weddings.

The Gulabi Gang is a paragon of information politics. Sampat Lal is a charismatic leader who mobilizes village women with colorful speeches and emotive songs. She recounts her

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personal struggles as a child bride, demands from her mother-in-law, raising five children while organizing her movement, and negotiating an unusually independent household and career with her husband. Sampat came from a poor farming family; she was the only person in her village who taught herself to sew, which became her first means of support. Sampat has only a basic education, and was trained by a small local NGO in basic skills and consciousness-raising when already a working mother in her twenties. She con- stantly advocates unity through the parable of the strength of the closed fist. The Gulabi Gang’s leader writes movement folk songs with lyrics like, “We will solve problems on our own, We will make our lives better. The time has come to wake up, we will educate both girls and boys together.” She works actively to establish relationships with sympa- thetic journalists and manage the movement’s media presence. The Hindustan Times has provided constant coverage, and Sahara Samay TV helped launch the movement by promising protest coverage for “cases” they or the Gang uncovered—because, in contrast to most of her community, Sampat was good at speaking (Fontanella-Khan 2013, 197). Protest performances include marches, sit-ins, shaming protests like mass spitting on po- lice stations, a prayer service for the sanity of a police official, and even a “dog march,” herding stray dogs to corrupt officials to replace them.

The Gulabi Gang is an authentic and accountable civic movement, but it is not a classic NGO nor a Western-style advocacy group. The movement began when Sampat and her male colleague were working as paid community organizers for a government development program, the Tribal Women Upliftment and Empowerment of Women Organisation, and politicized their resistance to local patriarchal bottlenecks to commu- nity empowerment. Since the government self-help groups were required to meet monthly for lessons on personal finance and entrepreneurship, the organizers “customized their meetings to suit their own mission: equality and justice for women, the lower castes, and the poor” (Fontanella-Khan 2013, 18). Far exceeding their government brief, they came to specialize in recruiting women marginalized by cultural practices: widows, girls seeking to escape arranged marriages, and battered wives. Because the Gulabi Gang were battling local mafias and landlords allied with regional parties in Uttar Pradesh—with almost half the regional party’s candidates under indictment—Sampat’s movement even re- ceived intermittent support from the national Indian Congress Party. Sampat later ran as an independent candidate for the state legislature, to block the campaign of the mother of a notorious bandit who had been nominated to satisfy affirmative action policies. She organized her followers to monitor corrupt campaigning and break the isolation of terrorized villages, though her own candidacy was defeated. Mounting a sophisti- cated analysis of these struggles for accountable democracy in India against the so-called Goonda Raj (mafia rule), Sampat concluded, “There is no joy in being an independent country so far” (Fontanella-Khan 2013, 57).

Grassroots mobilization in a local idiom for universal values of self-determination has transformed the consciousness and agency of its members, communities, and even the nation. One of the Gulabi Gang followers, a stigmatized impoverished widow, was asked

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how she finally mobilized to challenge a lifetime of abuse: “Lungi Dai, one of the elderly women, put it this way: ‘Hope is a very big thing. Sampat gave it to us every time she came to the village’ ” (Fontanella-Khan 2013, 22). A younger “district commander” who joined in the wake of a beleaguered “love marriage” explained, “It feels good to fight other’s fights and to stand up against injustice. To fight with the police is a good thing because the police do all the wrong things” (Fontanella-Khan 2013, 130). Explaining her leadership role and per- sonal risk-taking, Sampat says, “In this world, at least one person has to fight. All over the world, someone comes forward who has courage.” (Fontanella-Khan 2013, 167). The Gulabi Gang now claims 400,000 adherents throughout North Central India (Desai 2014).

4.5 Feminism 3.0

Feminism 3.0 adds new media and repertoires to historic campaigns for women’s safety. While many of the mobilizations profiled above use social media to disseminate or co- ordinate, there is another genre of online campaigns that are exclusively or primarily dedicated to viral resistance. This genre of social media activists argue in the court of public opinion for women’s self-determination, often using militant or transgressive im- agery—and ironic humor. These are generally spontaneous responses rather than formal movements, dedicated to contesting a political decision, cause célèbre, or a controversial statement by an authority figure. Their purposive orientation also distinguishes these on- line campaigns from ongoing cultural action critiques by groups such as Pussy Riot or Hooligan Sparrow, which will be discussed in Chapter 10. These feminist appeals are usu- ally launched within a national context, although they may travel regionally or globally; rather than sustained transnational networks or vernacular adaptation, these campaigns are viral bursts of horizontal outrage. In an unexpected way, they are popular across all gender regime types, and online activism sometimes represents a way to overcome the risks of public collective action in socially modernizing but politically patriarchal regimes, characteristic of the MENA region and parts of South Asia.

4.5 .1 Ir a n

In Iran, women resist state-mandated limitations on their dress and mobility with on- line postings, as well as GPS apps that permit evasion of Morality Police checkpoints. Activists at home and in the diaspora further assert self-determination by posting unveiled photos of women moving in public space with the hashtag #mystealthyfreedom (http:// mystealthyfreedom.net/en/). Recently, a complementary campaign for self-determina- tion signals support for women’s rights by wearing white on Wednesdays, which opens a potential legal public means to display support within Iran. The use of white for women’s rights echoes the trans-Atlantic suffragettes who campaigned for women’s right to vote in the United States and Britain. The campaign has received hundreds of posts and received

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over half a million views—although the exiled organizer has been threatened with death by the Iranian government (BBC 2017h, “Why Iranian women”).

4.5 .2 Pa kista n

Weighing in against legitimation of domestic violence, women in Pakistan posted a militant campaign after Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideolog y criticized a government attempt to enhance legal protection against domestic abuse with the claim that Islamic law permits men to “beat their wives lightly.” Angry young women posted photos of re- sistance with the hashtag, #trybeatingmelightly (Dackevych 2016). Pakistani photogra- pher Fahhad Rajper started the series with a dozen portraits of strong young professional women protesting. One social media manager posted:  “Try beating me lightly—you won’t live to see the morning.” In the context of ongoing clerical resistance in Pakistan to legislative reform on partner violence, honor killings, and rape, and the Islamic Council’s mandated role, the women’s widely endorsed protest played a powerful role in signaling social opposition.

4.5 .3 Egy p t

In Eg ypt, one mode of resistance to sexual harassment is online appeals. The Twitter hashtag #EndSH has achieved significant local traction across Eg yptian civil society be- yond the women’s movement, with top influencers including leading Eg yptian journalist AlMasry AlYoum, news outlet Elwatan News, and noted satirist Dr.  BassemYoussef. A 2014 video of a blonde Cairo University student in Western dress being hounded by mobs of men led to public condemnation, initial justification by university officials, and subsequent public criticism of their victim-blaming that ultimately advanced the conver- sation in that country (Al Arabiya 2014). An Eg yptian woman filmmaker aimed to raise consciousness online about the experience and impact of harassment by filming on her cellphone her walk across a symbolic bridge on the Nile, similar to the New York woman who recorded a day of being catcalled and threatened in that city. She and her foreign col- laborator mixed the video with a popular song, “Flirting yes, harassment no,” and posted the result as “Creepers on the Bridge,” which has gone viral (Berger 2014). In a more militant intervention online, a series of Eg yptian women document their empowered response to different forms of oppression. The most controversial and widely circulated shows a woman reenacting her confrontation with a street harasser at a supermarket in which she humorously reversed shame and challenged his manhood: “You say you want to f*ck me, then show me your cucumber—I have the right to pick,” and tells women that disrespectful men are like street dogs that will go away if you shout at them. The filmmaker Sharine Atif links her “A Way Out” series to the Uprising of Women in the Arab World movement: “Eg ypt was going through a revolution [and] the real revolution for me was the radical self expression people started to display” (Eg yptian Streets 2016).

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4.5 .4 Indi a

In India, a series of online interventions has focused on reversing shame for sexual vio- lence. In the aftermath of the Delhi rape, the sardonic video “It’s Your Fault” depicted women with varying styles of dress being randomly attacked, and mocked cultural myths blaming the victim. The product of a group of young Indian social satirists, it was viewed over five million times, and achieved some prominence in Brazil. “It’s Your Fault” system- atically invokes a series of statements about rape made by prominent Indian politicians and social authorities:  blaming victims for provocative clothing, using cell phones, walking unaccompanied—or eating chow mein that was alleged to cause hormonal imbalance.

A subsequent intervention contesting sexual harassment also gained tremendous au- dience in India. As Indian newspapers reported, “A cellphone video of an Indian girl berating a man who tried to harass her on an Indigo Airlines’ flight to Bhubaneswar from Mumbai, went viral on the internet on Tuesday.” The young woman explained she felt the law would do nothing against the older, wealthy man, and that her aim was to mobilize public shame. In the video she shouts in a mix of English and Hindi that he may think he has the right to touch her any time—but he doesn’t. She also states that she is not ashamed—he should be ashamed (Cohen 2015).

4.5 .5 Br a zil

Brazilian women have mobilized online repeatedly to protest rape culture in that country. After over a quarter of 3,810 respondents in 212 cities said that if Brazilian women knew how to be behave, there would be fewer rapes, activists responded with a media cam- paign:  “Nobody deserves to be raped.” It involved tweeted photos, some nude, with posters and the hashtag #ninguemMereceSerEstuprada. Brazil’s first female President Dilma Roussef tweeted criticism of the survey results and support for the journalist who started the campaign, after the activist was herself threatened online (McCoy 2014).

After the May 2016 posting by the perpetrators of a video of a mass rape shocked Brazil, women again responded with a blend of street protest, symbolic action, and on- line militancy—including a struggle for the soul of the Internet. Many posted online under the hashtag #EstuproNuncaMais, echoing human rights movement “never again” slogans, and #EstuproNaoECulpadaVitima (“rape is not the victim’s fault”). Because the victim was a teenage slum-dweller who had social ties to gang members and a history of drug use, some of the press and police had initially minimized the assault or questioned the victim’s innocence. As one Twitter post put it: “Short clothes do not rape. Hours do not rape. Places do not rape. Drinks do not rape. Rapists rape.” A popular YouTube video showed a series of women discussing rape as torture, and the impact on survivors.

Online protest in this case was complemented by mass marches—an estimated 5,000 in Sao Paolo—and symbolic actions in public space. Postings and protest slogans

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included, “We are all bloodied” and “Ser mulher sem temer” [“to be a woman without fear”—also a pun on the surname of the current male President Temer who has not supported women’s rights]. A group called Rio de Paz staged a symbolic action to dram- atize the scale and impact of sexual violence on Rio’s main Copacabana beach. Dozens of two-meter square posters of women’s faces marred by a giant bloody handprint were erected in rows on the beach, and in front of them, 420 pairs of bloodied underwear— the number of sexual assaults reported every three days in Brazil. In response to this case and the outpouring of social repudiation online, in the streets, and abroad, half a dozen suspects were arrested—and the Brazilian Senate passed a bill increasing the penalties for gang rape and rape recordings (Robinson 2016; “Brazilian Senate Approves Increased Penalties for Gang Rape” 2016).

4.6 Expanding rights

Rights expand through the introduction of new actors, claims, mechanisms, and responsibilities-and movements, networks, and campaigns play a critical role. Mobilization empowers new voices of women who have been hidden, disenfranchised, or stigmatized by their own communities, from survivors of domestic violence to de- fenseless migrants, from village to slum. Mobilization makes new claims for women’s safety: we have an equal right to education, work, public space, justice, and sexual self-de- termination. Mobilization is a force multiplier for reforming law and public policy and provides complementary channels for implementation. Last but not least, mobilization reshapes public consciousness around women’s worth and dignity, the human costs of violence, male responsibility, and the state’s duty to protect the lives of all of its citizens.

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5

Freedom

T H E S T R U G G L E F O R S E X U A L S E L F - D E T E R M I N AT I O N

Violations of freedom are a symptom, source, and outcome of violence. These harmful practices of coercive control of women’s bodies, movement and reproductive choices in the private sphere undermine the realization of public freedoms and rights to health, education, livelihood, and security. The dynamics of sexual slavery- whether trafficking or forced marriage- are often interconnected with other forms of violence.

As a 14- year- old Tanzanian girl seeking refuge at a church- run shelter recounts the in- teractive syndrome of FGM/ C, child marriage, and domestic violence and its effect on her rights:

My parents said I should be cut because I’d finished primary education and reached maturity. They wanted me to marry. I told them I didn’t want to. That infuriated my dad. . . . My father started beating me, and that’s when I decided to run away. He said I should have FGM/ C so I’d get a bigger dowry. Those five cows would be sold to pay for my younger brother’s boarding school. I said, “You should allow me to go to secondary school first, then I might be successful and help the rest of the family.” My mother intervened between my father and I, and that made him so angry he lashed out at her with kicks and blows. I was terrified. (Pressley 2015)

In another illustration of the interacting and intersectional syndrome of contemporary forms of slavery, in the distinct environment of India:

“Sumangali schemes” affected an estimated 120,000 young women. These plans, named after the Tamil word for “happily married woman,” are a form of bonded labor in which young women or girls work to earn money for a dowry to be able

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to marry. The promised lump- sum compensation, often ranging from 50,000 to 70,000 rupees ($750 to $1,050), is withheld until the end of three to five years of employment. Compensation, however, sometimes went partially or entirely un- paid. While in bonded labor, employers reportedly subjected women to serious workplace abuses, severe restrictions on freedom of movement and communica- tion, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, sex trafficking, and death. The majority of sumangali- bonded laborers came from the SCs [scheduled castes, mainly Dalits]. (US Department of State 2015)

A recent report by the International Labor Organization and International Organization for Migration with NGO partners estimates that 40 million people world- wide are affected by forced labor and forced marriage— 71% female and 25% children. Of the 25 million in forced labor, 24% are domestic workers and around 3.8 million are sex workers. But 15  million are in forced marriage- and 37% of these are children. All of these practices are most prevalent in Africa, followed by Asia. (Global Estimates of Modern Slavery 2017) This chapter considers a representative range of threats to sexual self- determination through case studies of FGM/ C in Eg ypt, trafficking and forced labor in the Philippines, and child marriage in India.

5.1 Violations of sexual self- determination: Causes and responses

Systematic violations of self- determination such as child marriage are endemic in patriar- chal political economies, rare in developed democracies, and persisting but more localized in semi- liberal transitional zones. In patriarchal regimes, they are often intertwined with femicide and sexual violence, such as honor killings. But in semi- liberal transi- tional countries, violations of freedom tend to be concentrated in marginal populations, where they do overlap with domestic violence and rape but are not necessarily present in broader patterns of urban middle- income gender violence. Persisting patterns of chronic abuses of self- determination result from state complicity with local patriarchal elites, honor cultures, and suppression of women’s agency. These are most characteristic of patriarchal states, but often lagging in sectors of emerging economies. Violations of self- determination may also resurface in all types of gender regimes when the society or community experiences a severe crisis such as war, radical regime change, forced migra- tion, natural disaster, or economic collapse.

The driver of gendered denial of freedoms is a struggle to control the relations of reproduction— direct access to women’s bodies, distribution of land, loyalty, and care labor through marriage— and commodification of women’s sexual and domestic labor. The process of modernization is largely a transition from reproduction to production as a source of value, and from patriarchy to state authority as a form of social control. These transitions generally privilege individual freedoms and liberate women from

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family control and unpaid labor for public- sphere work and citizenship (albeit usually unequal). But modern states may also rely on women’s reproductive labor to supplement distorted development, or they may lack effective authority over local elites who do. While globalization stimulates modernization of gender roles through education, migra- tion, and markets, it may also create contradictions of gender role conflict and backlash that inspire a modernization of traditional abuses by resurgent defensive local forces. The countervailing force to these contradictions of the liberation of women is the moderni- zation of men, when transitions succeed in shifting the interests of younger males toward family freedoms, dual- income households, universal citizenship, and sexual expression unfettered by reproductive requisites. Crisis conditions often undermine this process and produce a regression to patriarchal practices, as families and communities that cannot control their production, citizenship, residence, or even safety shift back to trying to con- trol reproductive relations.

The rights response to VAW combines legal norms, transnational action, linkage to public policy, and value change. Violations of self- determination are often associated with women’s lack of legal standing or access due to citizenship gaps, discriminatory religious and family codes, and lagging reproductive and marital rights. Contesting such abuses in patriarchal regimes requires both dissemination and vernacularization of rights norms, while in semi- liberal societies with established women’s rights in theory, information pol- itics and mobilization are more salient to claiming rights in practice. Campaigns against child marriage and FGM/ C also draw on appealing local voice and universal symbols of innocent victims. Across all types of regimes, struggles for self- determination prosper more in access to public- sphere goods and participation rights like education than reg- ulation of private practices like FGM/ C. In part for this reason, self- determination campaigns have a preferential relationship with the international health regime that crosses boundaries and appeals to universal norms, and often benefit from health sector public policies. Bridging frames— to labor rights for trafficking and health for FGM/ C— offers new mechanisms and a supplement to the weak domain of reproductive rights.

We will examine a series of representative security barriers to self- determination as they occur over the life- cycle of a woman. In childhood, she may face genital cutting. Moving toward adolescence, there are dangers of child marriage and attacks on schools. From youth through adulthood, women are at risk of trafficking and forced or exploitative labor.

5.2 Female genital mutilation/ cutting

Female genital mutilation/ cutting (FGM/ C) describes the partial or complete removal of the female external genitalia for cultural, religious, or other non- medical purposes.1 The

1 There are three types of FGM/ C. Type 1:  clitoridectomy, where part or all of the clitoris is removed. Type 2:  excision, which involves complete clitoridectomy and removal of part or all of the labia minora. Type

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United Nations now estimates that around 200 million women and girls have undergone some form of the procedure, while an additional 3  million girls are at risk each year. FGM/ C is practiced primarily in several dozen sub- Saharan and North African countries and migrants from these areas, but is also seen widely in Indonesia. Frequent short- term consequences are extreme pain, shock, bleeding, tetanus or sepsis, and infections— including transmission of HIV by instruments. Long- term complications may include scarring, chronic urinary infections, infertility, and infant and maternal mortality during childbirth.

UNICEF reports that high- prevalence regions for genital cutting correspond mostly to ancient empires, and cites an origin theory that extreme resource inequality led to hyper- polyg yny and patriarchal control of paternity via FGM/ C, which then diffused re- gionally and across social strata (UNICEF 2016). FGM/ C carries a stronger ethnic than religious association— for example, it is not practiced in Islamic model Saudi Arabia but is enacted by Christians in Tanzania from an ethnic group historically associated with the practice. Confusion about Islamic origins comes because the practice has spread as a marker of privileged ethnic group status associated with Arab trade and political influ- ence from the Mideast southward through Africa. From the colonial era to the late 20th century, in certain countries such as Kenya, FGM/ C was promoted by political elites as a symbol of national resistance to Western influence, although FGM/ C nationalism slowly faded with the rise of health frames and African women’s campaigns over the past generation (Boyle 2002).

Although contemporary parents cite a variety of motives for cutting their daughters, including tradition and a spurious basis in Islam, the majority states that they believe it is necessary for social acceptance rather than intrinsically valuable or required by reli- gion. Confronted by social workers, the father of the 14- year- old from Tanzania whose story opened this chapter says, “It’s only pressure from the wider family, and our cul- ture,” promising to relent (Pressly 2015). While some traditional and local religious elites still promote FGM/ C as a perceived means to control female sexuality and stabilize re- productive relationships, grassroots continuation of the practice despite known health dangers depends more on collective norms and linkage to self- defined community iden- tity (Mackie 1996). Even amid modernization and migration that diminish community peer pressure, gender role distance perpetuates the decision distortion of “pluralistic ig- norance”: Sara Johnsdotter’s (2015) research with Somalis in Sweden shows that isolated women think men want infibulation even when ordinary men oppose the practice.

By the 1970s, there was broad consensus within the international rights community that FGM/ C violated a number of core human rights: the right of women to be free from discrimination on the basis of gender, the right to life and physical integrity including

3: infibulation, the most severe form of FGM/ C where the clitoris and labia minora are removed, and the labia majora are cut and sewn together, leaving only a very small opening for urination and menstruation.

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freedom from violence, the rights of the child, and the right to health (Toubia and Rahman 2000; Skaine, 2005). In 1990, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) adopted General Recommendation No. 14, which expressed the committee’s concern over the continued practice of FGM/ C and urged governments to support efforts to eradicate the custom (CEDAW “General Recommendation” 1990). A  1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women explicitly in- cluded FGM/ C within the category of VAW (UN General Assembly, 1993). The 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna called for the elimination of VAW including traditional practices that take place in the private sphere (UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 1993). The International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994 also highlighted the interconnections between women’s health and human rights regarding FGM/ C. In 2002 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution against FGM/ C, and from 2007– 2010 the UN Commission on the Status of Women issued an annual resolution. Harmful traditional practices are condemned in the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, as well as the 2005 Bamako Declaration of the Inter- African Committee. The World Health Organization’s 2008 norm standard, launching a global program with the UN Population Fund and UNICEF, calls FGM/ C a practice with “no known health benefits” that reflects “deep- rooted inequality between the sexes” and is an “extreme form of discrimination against women” (World Health Organization 2008). The 2012 UN General Assembly Resolution, “Intensifying global efforts for the elimination of FGM/ C,” urges “States to pursue a comprehensive, culturally sensitive, systematic approach that incorporates a social perspective and is based on human rights and gender- equality principles.”

As a result, 26 African countries prohibit FGM/ C, and there are laws concerning its practice in 33 others (mostly relating to immigrant children).2 By the 2000s, FGM/ C had been banned in the highest prevalence countries: Eg ypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and fi- nally in Somalia in 2012. Over the following years, there were occasional arrests in Eg ypt, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. In 2011, Kenya added an extraterritorial clause; in 2006, Sweden sentenced a Somali- born Swedish citizen to four years for taking his daughter to Somalia for FGM/ C.

International programs, local activists, and even African governments began to cam- paign against FGM/ C. The WHO combined with UNFPA and UNICEF in 2008 to work with government agencies, health professionals, and religious figures in Burkina Faso, Eg ypt, Kenya, and Senegal. The Somalian fashion icon and FGM/ C survivor Waris Dirie wrote an autobiography, established a foundation, made a consciousness- raising

2 Laws against FGM/ C have been adopted in the prevalence countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, and Eg ypt; as well as the immigration host countries of Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United States.

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film (Hormann 2009), and was appointed a UN special ambassador, featuring a 2010 international ad campaign. In Sudan, civic and religious campaigns tried to promote a counter- image of uncut girls as healthy and “whole,” which translates in Arabic to a popular girls’ name: Saleema. In West Africa, the grassroots women’s Tostan movement persuaded over 5,000 villages in Senegal and hundreds of communities in neighboring countries to collectively abandon FGM/ C through a comprehensive program of health education and women’s empowerment (see Chapter 4). A recent anthropological study comparing three communities in Kenya reports the presence of a wide range of preven- tion programs through workshops, theater, and education, including Tostan and local grassroots efforts such as the German- run Fulda- Mosocho Project (among Kisii ethnic group), Njuri Nchke Supreme Council of Ameru Elders, Pokot Council of Elders, and the Il Chamus Council of Elders (Cloward 2016, 107) In response to FGM/ C in immigrant communities, the major host countries of the European Union, United States, Canada, and Australia have banned FGM and instituted some level of protective regime for girls at risk. In the United States, the first legal prosecution was brought in 2017 in Michigan against two doctors from an Indian Muslim sect— the Dawoodi Bohra— who are alleged to have cut as many as 100 girls over a decade. In 2015, three members of the group had been convicted in Australia, inspiring the sect’s leaders in India to order members to obey national laws regarding the practice in their countries of residence (Belluck 2017).

By 2012, we can see international diffusion in a representative willing state, as the gov- ernment of Niger’s representative from the Ministry for Population, the Promotion of Women and Child Protection proudly reported to the UN:

  .  .  .  the State and its partners were able to decrease the numbers of FGM/ C carried out from 5% in 1998 to 2,2% in 2006, notably through pleading, reinforced capacities and community action. More than 130 female circumcisers decided to lay down their knives and benefited from micro- credits to undertake other commer- cial activities; 200 traditional and religious authorities support the fight against FGM/ C; 219 neighborhood task forces were created; and awareness raising activi- ties for relevant actors took place.” (ACUNS 2013)

Yet, a UNICEF report on current prevalence reports that FGM/ C is still practiced in 30 countries and is estimated to affect 200 million women, with an average of 3.6 million cut each year (UNICEF 2016). The highest prevalence (over 80%) occurs in Somalia, Guinea, Djibouti, Eg ypt, Eritrea, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Sudan— but the highest number of women affected is in Eg ypt (27.2 million). More than half of all the women affected live in Eg ypt, Indonesia, and Ethiopia; only one of these is Islamic and Middle Eastern.

While there have been big declines in Kenya, Burkina Fasso, Ethiopia [all lower preva- lence with strong campaigns] and Yemen, in half of countries pressure campaigns appear to have driven the practice underground, as girls are now cut before age 5, in part to avoid

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prosecution. Even within high- prevalence countries, severity is declining ; infibulation is now in the majority only in Somalia. Moreover, there are cohort declines almost every- where between generations. For example, in Ethiopia prevalence has dropped from 80% of adult women down to only 60% of current adolescents. The severity is also dropping markedly by generation— in Djibouti, infibulation is down from 83% of adults to 42% of adolescents (UNICEF 2013a). However, the most recent data suggests that high popula- tion growth rates in high- prevalence countries and those with slower declines will mean that more absolute numbers of women will be affected for at least a generation more (UNICEF 2013b).

5 .2.1 FGM/ C in Egy p t

According to a 2014 Eg yptian government demographic and health survey, 92% of ever- married women between 15 and 49  years old had undergone FGM/ C in that country. (https:// dhsprogram.com/ pubs/ pdf/ FR302/ FR302.pdf ) While international norms, national programs, social campaigns, and modernizing attitudes seem to be making some progress on this abuse, millions of girls each year in dozens of countries are still subjected to forced mutilation and permanent disability. Why do millions of families cling to a practice that provides no discernible benefit and is known to damage mothers and chil- dren? And why does Eg ypt— the most developed, urban, educated high- prevalence country— host the highest number of women affected, the least attitude change, higher belief in a religious basis, and more male support than its less developed neighbors? For this genre of abuse, Eg ypt represents a lower– middle income, semi- liberal regime in which traditional violations persist— and also morph into new social functions as a reac- tion to protracted social crisis, as well as transitions that do not deliver on the promises of development and democracy.

Although Eg ypt is more developed than its peers, that country has experienced decades of profound economic decline, growing inequality, urban dysfunction, and two bloody episodes of regime change in the recent years. In this context of uncertainty, traditional reproductive relations are also in crisis, as significant numbers of unemployed young men cannot afford to marry and suffer constant challenges to their ability to fulfill traditional masculine roles. While women circulate freely in the public sphere, the vast majority of Eg yptian women report sexual harassment— the highest recorded in the world, signaling extreme tensions in gender relations. Endemic sexual assault by state agents including police, surrogate paramilitaries, and street mobs has undermined women’s civic partici- pation and ability to defend their rights.

From the waning years of the corrupt Western- backed Mubarak dictatorship through the Islamic populist Morsi regime to the current Al- Sisi military crackdown, Islamist movements have been the most sustainable and representative social bases of solidarity, resistance, and identity. But Islamism in Eg ypt carries a program of reinscribing tradi- tional gender roles and demobilizing women. By contrast, modernization of gender

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relations is associated with the despised Mubarak regime, as First Lady Suzanne Mubarak was the key promoter of women’s rights movements and international population campaigns. Patriarchy has been modernized as a defense of local identity and commu- nity in the face of negative transformations. Thus, in contemporary Eg ypt, FGM/ C has been maintained as a marker of social control but medicalized to reduce the health consequences; an estimated three- fourths of women are cut by a medical professional.

Although FGM/ C appears to be an ancient local practice that predates Islam in Eg ypt, it is associated with religious rather than cultural identity. Yet modernizing op- position spans the 20th century and was also associated with Arab nationalism. As early as the 1920s FGM/ C was opposed by the Eg yptian Society of Physicians, and by 1957– 1958 women’s magazine articles aimed at the urban elite campaigned against it and stated that Islam does not support the practice (UNICEF 2013a). Accordingly, in 1959 the nationalist Nasser government forbade performing FGM/ C in government health facilities. Interestingly, over a generation later, debate renewed over shifting state spon- sorship of FGM/ C:  a renewed 1994 Ministry of Health ban was reversed in 1995, but this was followed by a 1996 government decree extending the ban to all hospitals, which was opposed and repealed, culminating in a legal appeal to the High Court— which ul- timately upheld the state policy banning FGM/ C in state facilities. By 2006, the gov- ernment had expanded its decree to ban everyone from performing the surgery, and at the same time the Islamic Grand Mufti issued a fatwa against FGM/ C. But in 2007, Eg yptians were shocked to learn of the death of an 11- year- old cut at a private clinic; thus in 2008, the Eg yptian parliament finally criminalized FGM/ C in law. In 2012 under the short- lived Morsi regime, hardline Islamist factions made some legislative attempts to reverse the law but were successfully opposed by the National Council on Population, a range of human rights and women’s groups, and Eg yptian medical associations.

For the past generation, the Eg yptian government and international institutions have also engaged in social outreach and information campaigns, with mixed response. Throughout the 1990s, First Lady Suzanne Mubarak advocated for women’s rights and established a national hotline for FGM/ C; the Ministry of Religious Affairs declared that FGM/ C was not part of Islam; and state media stressed that FGM/ C was illegal and harmful. Following the 1994 International Conference on Population, Eg ypt estab- lished a national task force with 60 grassroots groups. The international spotlight and socialization of that conference are credited with fortifying national efforts (El- Gibaly et al. 2002). Overall, women’s education and urbanization were associated with declining FGM/ C from the generation following the 1990s into the 21st century— echoing the ge- neral trend (Cloward 2016, 247, citing Yount 2002).

A decade later, Eg ypt hosted the 2003 Cairo Conference of legal experts and a resulting Declaration against FGM/ C, while Eg ypt’s National Council for Childhood and Motherhood adopted the FGM/ C- Free Village model that was beginning to gain traction in West Africa with Tostan. Moushira Khattab, Eg ypt’s former Minister of Family and Population and Vice Chair of the UN Committee on the Rights of

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the Child, served as an advocate and fostered complementary measures that prohib- ited child marriage (Child Law 126 in 2008), established over a thousand girl- friendly schools, and sponsored sessions at the 2009 Organization of Islamic States conference on Islamic Sharia and the Rights of the Child. From 2008– 2012, a UNICEF/ EU program for collective norm change persuaded 17,000 families to commit to abandon FGM/ C. As a result, in Eg ypt, attitudes acknowledging that FGM/ C can cause death doubled to 44%; belief among women that husbands prefer the practice dropped from 74% to 55%; and prevalence declined from 96% for middle- aged women to 70% for adolescents (UNICEF 2013a).

But government commitment and social attitudes eroded through the tumult of the Arab Spring, Islamist initiatives of the Morsi regime, and the current military dictatorship’s continued prosecution of women’s rights advocates. Attention to FGM/ C in Eg ypt was renewed with another focus case: the death of a 13- year- old victim of FGM/ C in 2013. In January 2015, an Eg yptian court sentenced the doctor and the girl’s father to prison— although the doctor remained at large for almost a year thereafter— and the National Population Council launched a new “Enough with FGM/ C” campaign. They released new government figures that suggest adolescent prevalence has dropped, and government experts claim that legal sanction has sharply diminished practice motivated solely by tradition, which was believed to comprise about a third of supporters. The gov- ernment aims to reduce this rate further by 15% over the next five years (Hussein 2015). Eg ypt’s new national FGM/ C abandonment strateg y includes the Ministries of Justice, Health, and Education, Public Prosecutor, the renowned Al- Azhar Islamic academy, and Eg yptian Coptic Church officials. Social outreach activities include physician training and an extensive media campaign. According to the 2014 Eg ypt Demographic and Health Survey, published during the year by the Ministry of Health, the percentage of girls between 15 and 17 years old who had undergone FGM/ C decreased to 60%, from 74% in 2008. The survey showed that 56% of mothers supported FGM/ C, a decrease from 75% in 2000 (Ministry of Health and Population et al. 2015)

Eg yptian advocates differed sharply over the approach and likely success of the new government campaign that reflect the patterns discussed above, as reported by The Guardian:

“Now we have the political support we need,” said Vivian Fouad, an official with the National Population Council, which is spearheading the anti- FGM/ C campaign.

On the other hand, Dalia Abd El- Hameed, head of the gender programme at the Eg yptian Initiative for Personal Rights, said the campaign represented “a top- down approach to dealing with the issue of circumcision, which is extremely problematic That’s emphasising laws over change in perceptions, and in the changing of per- ception, prioritising religion over other aspects, like gender stereotypes,” she said. “There is no rights- based approach in this strateg y, which is very disappointing. There is no emphasis on women’s rights to bodily integrity, to be free from violence,

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to sexual pleasure.” Soraya Bahgat, a women’s rights advocate, said the plan did not do enough to involve nongovernmental and grassroots groups (Malsin 2015).

5.3 Child marriage

Child marriage has long been recognized internationally as a violation of self- determination. The right to free and full consent to marriage by adults is treated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages; and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

UNICEF estimates that 12 million girls per year are affected by child marriage, with 650  million women who were married as children living with the consequences of foreshortened education, greater risks pregnancy, and greater vulnerability to domestic violence. However, the number has declined over the past decade- from around 25% to 1 in 5 women worldwide. (UNICEF 2017; https:// www.unicef.org/ protection/ 57929_ 58008.html) Child brides are concentrated in South Asia and sub- Saharan Africa, with the highest prevalence rates in half a dozen of the poorest African states— Chad, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Mozambique, Niger, and Eritrea— as well as India and Bangladesh (see Girls Not Brides for most current figures, (http:// www.girlsnotbrides. org/ ).. But the largest numbers affected are in South Asia, due to higher populations. According to UNICEF, “South Asia is home to almost half (42%) of all child brides worldwide; India alone accounts for one- third of the global total. . . . In South Asia, the decline has been especially marked for marriages involving girls under age 15, dropping from 32% to 17%; the marriage of girls under age 18, however, is still commonplace” (UNICEF 2014).

Early and forced marriage is also prevalent in lagging sectors of semi- liberal transitional regimes, including rural enclaves as well as ethnic and religious minority communities. Central Asian republics and Caucasus areas of Russia have high rates of bride kidnapping of girls as young as 12, often enforced by rape and battering. The nongovernmental legal advocacy group Stichting Russia Justice Initiative has documented honor killings, bride kidnapping, forced marriage, and child marriage in the region— especially Chechnya and Dagestan— and brought complaints to the CEDAW Committee and the European Court of Human Rights. According to their investigation, in Dagestan “statistics show that 181 women were kidnapped for marriage between 2001 and 2006 and 190 in 2013 alone” (Russia Justice Institute 2015, p.  6) Meanwhile, in Bopkhoyeva v Russia the European Court is hearing a 2014 case of a kidnapped bride who was assaulted so badly she was returned to her mother’s home in a vegetative state, which has not been signifi- cantly addressed by Russian authorities (Russia Justice Institute 2015).

Like FGM/ C, immigrant populations may carry this abuse into host countries. Britain reported approximately 1,500 forced marriage cases in 2011- half involved girls under the

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age of 18, a majority of whom were immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Similarly, “a 2011 survey by the U.S.- based Tahirih Justice Center, an organization that serves immigrant women, uncovered as many as three thousand known or suspected forced marriages in the United States” (Vogelstein 2013). The United Kingdom now has a system of protection orders for FGM and child marriage, with monitoring by teachers and health professionals and a combination of family counseling and restraints such as removing passports from parents whose daughters are at risk of being taken abroad against their will. Hundreds of protection orders have been issued for forced marriage and dozens for FGM/ C (BBC 2016, “The woman saved”).

The purposes of child marriage are to cope with chronic poverty, crisis conditions, and collective honor cultures. Child marriage is concentrated in the poorest countries, and girls in the poorest 20% are more than twice as likely to marry in childhood than those in the wealthiest 20% (UNICEF 2014). In situations of acute poverty, feeding girl chil- dren who will not contribute to the family income is a burden; reducing the size of the household and obtaining support from a wealthier older male is a survival strateg y for the family and even the girl herself— in the short term. In African bride- wealth coun- tries, younger girls fetch a higher price, while in South Asian dowry systems, families of younger girls pay less, since the girls will contribute more labor and fertility for a longer period to the husband’s family. Most of the highest prevalence countries are also fragile states, conflict zones, and/ or sites of serious natural disaster. In crisis situations, including forced displacement, families are pressured to marry their daughters off earlier due to diminished resources and to attempt to protect them from sexual violence (Global Partnership to End Child Marriage 2016).

Honor cultures that restrict girls’ movement and education also increase incentives for child marriage before or at puberty to safeguard loss of community status— and deny girls the knowledge and capacity to resist. For example, 25%– 30% of urban girls report harassment in Yemen and Morocco— high zones of child marriage— so that girls’ school attendance is restricted for safety (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2012), and they then become vulnerable to early marriage. Research shows that education is the most critical factor in forestalling premature marriage. In Turkey, for instance, the extension of compulsory education to age 14 reduced the proportion of girls married at age 16 by 45% (Vogelstein 2013, 17).

Child marriage is a symptom, site, and cause of gender inequity. Women married at younger ages are more likely to experience domestic violence, sexual abuse, and depres- sion, and have higher rates of suicide. Child brides are vulnerable youth isolated under the authority of an older male and unrelated family with a mandate to perform heavy labor, as well as sexual service and reproduction before physical maturity (International Center for Research on Women n.d., “Child Marriage Facts”; International Center for Research on Women 2013; Arango 2012). Married girls are usually forced to end their ed- ucation, compounding their powerlessness, and studies demonstrate that early marriage reduces the rate of literacy (International Center for Research on Women 2006). While

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child marriage may solve a family’s short- term economic crisis, in the long run it carries tremendous costs for their society in unsustainable population growth, national educa- tion rates, lowered female labor and productivity, a statistically significant correlation with intimate partner violence, and health consequences (Wodon et  al. 2017). Thus, ending child marriage is now one of the United Nations’ sustainable development goals.

The premature sexual activity and reproduction early marriage forces on adolescents are dangerous, disabling, and even fatal. As Reviews in Obstetrics reports on a range of consequences, summarizing country health data, UN surveys, and global medical studies:

Complications from pregnancy and childbirth are the leading cause of death for girls aged fifteen to nineteen in the developing world. . . . Girls between the ages of 10 and 14 years are 5 to 7 times more likely to die in childbirth; girls between the ages of 15 and 19 years are twice as likely. High death rates are secondary to eclampsia, postpartum hemorrhage, sepsis, HIV infection, malaria, and obstructed labor.

Prolonged or obstructed labor is common for adolescent mothers and can lead to debilitating conditions, such as obstetric fistula, a hole in the birth canal that causes incontinence and results in shame and social ostracization. . . .Vesico Virginal Fistula (VVF) is said to affect around 150,000 women, with 80%– 90% of these child wives divorced by their husbands. Globally, obstetric fistula affects estimated 50,000– 100,000 women each year. . . . Girls aged 10 to 15 years have small pelvises and are not ready for childbearing. Their risk for obstetric fistula is 88%.

Marriage by the age of 20  years is a risk factor for HIV infection in girls.  .  .  . Pregnant girls in malaria regions were found to be at higher risk for infection. Of the 10.5 million girls and women who become infected with malaria, 50% die. Their highest risk is during their first pregnancy. Pregnancy not only increases the risk of acquiring malaria, but pregnant girls under the age of 19 have a significantly higher malaria density (Nour 2009, 54)

Several high- prevalence states, including Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Gambia, and Equatorial Guinea have no law forbidding child marriage. Many African and some Middle Eastern states also make exceptions for the minimum age of marriage under customary or religious law (Vogelstein 2013). In other cases, features of the law compound the problem— as in Morocco, where the penal code allowed a rapist of an underage girl to escape prosecu- tion by marrying his victim to restore honor. This law was finally amended by Morocco’s parliament in 2014, following international condemnation and public protest over the 2012 suicide of a 16- year- old forced to marry her rapist (Alami 2014). In countries with adequate legislation but poor enforcement, child marriage may also be prosecuted when it comes to police attention through other crimes or social conflicts. For example, in Nigeria, a 14- year- old child bride was revealed when she poisoned her abusive 35- year- old husband; now her father will be charged for forcing her into the marriage (BBC 2014e, “Nigeria Child Bride”).

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There have been significant international responses to child marriage, beginning with concerted campaigns by UNICEF and the UN Population Fund. USAID has long- standing and well- regarded programs with partner NGOs. The 2009 Safe Age of Marriage program in Yemen reached 29,000 people and targeted local religious leaders. The CHUNAUTI program in Nepal trained over 1,000 community educators, set up hundreds of local Child Marriage Eradication committees and Child Clubs, and granted hundreds of scholarships for girls to finish school (US Agency for International Development 2012, “United States Strateg y”). Reducing child marriage has been adopted as a key component of US human rights promotion; the March 2013 Violence Against Women Act includes a provision on child marriage requiring the Secretary of State to develop a US strateg y.

At the level of transnational civil society, the humanitarian leadership group Council of Elders of Nobel Laureates launched “Girls Not Brides” in 2011, which partners with more than 700 NGOs in Bangladesh, Ghana, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Nepal, Uganda, the United Kingdom and the United States, along with coalitions in Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Their global “champions” consist of South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Mozambican Minister and UN leader Graca Michel, and Afghan refugee rapper Sonita Aliyadeh. Girls Not Brides provides resources, advocacy, and legal, education, com- munity empowerment, and health reform models (http:// www.girlsnotbrides.org/ ).

At the local level, resistance ranges from village- level health campaigners to modernizing religious figures. In Indonesia, a pioneering conference of female Islamic clerics has issued a rare fatwa (religious prohibition) against child marriage. With an estimated one- fourth of girls married before adulthood in the world’s largest Muslim country, the Indonesian KUPI Women’s Ulema Conference has urged the government to raise and enforce the legal marriage age from 16 to 18 (BBC 2017b, “Female Islamic Clerics”). In one region of Kenya, teacher, paralegal, and FGM/ child marriage survivor Nuria Gollo heads the Marsabit Development Advocacy organization that has intervened in child marriages, FGM, and domestic violence since 2003. The effort was initially supported by Dutch Development and ActionAid and has led to numerous prosecutions as well as informal community mediations (O’Grady 2017).

5 .3 .1 Child m a r r i age in Indi a

As with FGM/ C in Eg ypt, it is initially puzzling that the most developed and modernizing country of the high- prevalence group contains the largest number affected by an abusive traditional practice, and has proven more resistant to change than some of its peers. Like Eg ypt, India remains an extremely hierarchical society with social control and production highly dependent on reproduction of the family and women’s unpaid labor. Similarly, decades of nationalist modernization have not created an effective public sphere, and corruption undercuts essential services and infrastructure. Like Eg ypt, concentration of land holdings drives haphazard urbanization that provides only fitful and highly unequal

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development. India is distinctive for its pluralism and democracy, which have allowed some opportunities for reform through the rule of law and a vigorous civil society. But cultural and religious pluralism, filtered through the legacy of colonialism, threaten so- cial boundaries and spill over into chronic low- level violence punctuated by episodes of bloodletting. Gender relations are also unstable and contested. While women’s education, work opportunities, and political participation have notably improved, the suppression of female population through sex- selective abortion is worsening and associated with the fastest developing regions, and women’s labor force participation is fiercely resisted by patriarchal feudal elites in some zones (Yardley 2011).

India hosts around one- third of the world’s child brides, and in several Indian states, one- fifth of girls are married before age 15. There are frequent public child marriages in rural areas, and enforcement of the legal minimum marriage age in effect since 1978 has been rare (Vogelstein 2013). High rates of child marriage persist, as 47% of women who were 20– 24  years old in 2014 state they were married before age 18 (UNICEF 2014). Although average ages are increasing in most places, they are stagnant or sometimes even worsening in some areas and social sectors.

India follows all the patterns above regarding drivers and consequences of child marriage. The median age at first marriage is 19.7  years for women in the richest quin- tile compared to 15.4 for the poorest women (UNICEF 2014). Child marriage in India is concentrated in rural areas, the half- dozen poorest states, lower castes, and among both traditional Hindus and Muslims (rather than Christians, Sikhs, or other religious minorities). In addition, early marriage is more common in areas with high migration and/ or frequent flooding associated with crisis and instability (Nirantar Trust 2015). Conversely, child marriage is reduced by proximity to roads, schools, and cities, even within high- prevalence West Bengal (Ghosh 2011).

However, local- level research suggests that early marriage is driven by an interaction between historic poverty and crisis with persisting communal norms that may not re- spond to change in underlying conditions (Ghosh 2011). Many families cite community pressures overwhelming their preferences and knowledge of the law, including their daughters’ marriageability and the family’s honor. A  unique and intersecting factor for India is the dearth of girls due to skewed sex ratios that puts extra pressure on the marriage market (see Chapter  6), leading families to search for increasingly younger brides for their sons, and families with unmarried sons to create package deals trading a boy’s younger sisters to secure his bride. Socially determined exorbitant wedding costs may also pressure struggling families to marry off several daughters at the same time, regardless of age, to economize on ceremonial debt. A  study conducted by ICRW in two states in India found that girls who were married before 18 were twice as likely to re- port being beaten, slapped, or threatened by their husbands than girls who married later (International Center for Research on Women n.d., “Child Marriage Facts”).

To facilitate enforcement, in 2000 the government theoretically enhanced requirements for registration of marriage to include evidence of age and consent. In 2006, India added

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an improved Prohibition of Child Marriage Act increasing penalties and court interven- tion options. A children’s rights campaigner in that region began to seek court annulments of child marriages to rescue girls trapped in local arrangements, testing a provision of the 2006 law, and has secured 27 dissolutions in family courts since 2012. The 2012 pilot case, where a 16- year- old girl refused to join her husbands’ family after another girl in the family committed suicide citing chronic abuse, has now been publicized in school textbooks and encourages girls’ awareness of alternatives (Guardian and Mukhar 2016). But in 2015, a legally delegated village council in Rajasthan demanded $25,000 compen- sation to the husband’s family from a young woman seeking to refuse a marriage that had been contracted when she was an infant— she became aware of the marriage when she was summoned at age 16 to move to her prospective in- laws’ household (Bhalla 2015).

Moving beyond legal regulation to broader public policy, state- level governments in India and international NGOs have established programs to safeguard women’s security by rewarding families for the birth, education, and delayed marriage of girls. For example, in 1994 the Haryana state government established a program of savings accounts set up upon the birth of a daughter that can be claimed if the girl remains unmarried at age 18— meant to defray the cost of dowry. The program, which also offers cash compensation for the birth of girls to reduce incentives for female infanticide, is called Our Daughter, Our Wealth (Vogelstein 2013)— and there are similar programs in several states. Some local NGOs in high- stress areas have started girls’ boarding schools to keep village girls from being married off— or, in some cases, merely delay their transfer to the husband’s house- hold to age 15 or 16 while they stay in school (Aizenman and Valentine 2015).

But as for FGM/ C in Eg ypt, local feminists complain that state- sponsored and development- oriented programs concentrate on controlling anti- modern local communities without understanding the social roots of the problem, and overlook the rights and empowerment of the girls themselves. Moreover, an assessment of dozens of organizations working on the issue found they did not address girls’ vulnerability to violence— but only the health and educational consequences of early marriage (Nirantar Trust 2015). Local campaigns also generally do not confront patriarchal norms that “marriage is essential for girls” and that self- determination is harmful to the community— norms that fieldwork suggests drive the persistence of child marriage equally along with poverty and illiteracy. Village- level focus groups suggest that vocational opportunities and dowry relief are more important supports for marital choice than legal action, with daughters additionally requesting more, better, and closer schools as the key to their lib- eration. Local- level authorities and village councils are perceived as notably unconcerned and ineffective— despite the mandated participation of women through quotas (Ghosh 2011). In one illustrative recent response, a modernizing local official who presides over mass marriages designed to ease wedding costs demonstrated his concern with his area’s high rate of early marriage and domestic violence by gifting young brides with wooden bats traditionally used for laundry to defend themselves against abusive husbands (BBC 2017c, “Indian brides”).

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The Gulabi Gang social movement in Northern India (profiled in Chapter  4) targets child marriage as a core concern and has forestalled many. But the constant cost of local opposition is highlighted by the case of Bhanwari Devi, a government family planning and women’s rights campaigner in Rajasthan who was gang- raped by higher- caste neighbors in 1992 in retaliation for her intervention in an illegal child marriage. After courageously reporting the assault in an even less responsive era, Devi’s own campaign for justice mobilized media and national protest, resulting in India’s first post- colonial sexual violence legislation (see Chapter 7). However, her own court case was delayed, botched, with five changes of judges, and eventually resulted in lim- ited convictions of only some of her assailants on lesser charges, resulting in a nine- month prison sentence. For over two decades, Devi has continued to appeal her own judgment in the Indian courts, and has continued to work in her home village against child marriage, dowry, and infanticide— globally lauded but locally shunned and ha- rassed (Pandey 2017).

5.4 Human trafficking and contemporary slavery

Gendered forms of forced and exploitative labor also persist and shift shape with mo- dernity and globalization. Trafficking and other forms of contemporary slavery have been recognized internationally as violations of self- determination since the inception of the rights regime. Forced labor, physical abuse, and imprisonment by employers as well as governments violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Anti- Slavery Convention, and International Covenants on Civil- Political and Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights. Human trafficking additionally contravenes the Palermo Protocol to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, numerous accords of the International Labor Organization, a dedicated Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking and Latin American norms.

Gender- based human trafficking generally results from a commodification of tradi- tional forms of gender exploitation, projected across borders by global power structures and inequities. Countries at the frontiers of globalization are especially prone to trafficking as gender roles and global inequities change- - and are especially conflicted in response (Table 5.1). Even within Europe, the leading source country for human trafficking is the lagging transitional regime of Moldova. Moldova is the poorest country in Europe, with a long history of foreign invasion and exploitation, that has never recovered from the collapse of the Soviet Union— and also has one of the highest estimated rates of domestic violence in the region. The country’s own statistics show 25,000 trafficked each year. Traditional gender relations are highly repressive, and a majority of trafficking victims report some form of prior family abuse (Ferrell 2016; Brinzeneau 2014). At a global level, due to transnational racial hierarchies, Moldovan women fetch a high price in the Middle East. State weakness and corruption in the aftermath of a failed transition from

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ot re

po rt

w ha

t s er

vi ce

s, if

an y,

it p

ro vi

de d

to th

e m

aj or

it y

of th

e vi

ct im

s i t i

de nt

ifi ed

• D

ev el

op ed

g ui

da nc

e on

v ic

tim id

en tifi

ca tio

n an

d re

fe rr

al p

ro ce

du re

s, bu

t d id

n ot

b eg

in to

im pl

em en

t s uc

h pr

oc ed

ur es

.

In di

a 2

• In

cr ea

se d

th e

nu m

be r o

f v ic

tim s i

de nt

ifi ed

, i nv

es tig

at io

ns c

om pl

et ed

, a nd

tr affi

ck er

s c on

vi ct

ed , a

s w el

l a s i

ts b

ud ge

t f or

sh

el te

r p ro

gr am

s f or

fe m

al e

an d

ch ild

tr affi

ck in

g vi

ct im

s. •

Id en

tifi ca

tio n

an d

pr ot

ec tio

n re

m ai

ne d

in ad

eq ua

te a

nd in

co ns

is te

nt , a

nd th

e go

ve rn

m en

t s om

et im

es p

en al

iz ed

v ic

tim s

th ro

ug h

ar re

st s f

or c

ri m

es c

om m

it te

d as

a re

su lt

of b

ei ng

su bj

ec te

d to

h um

an tr

affi ck

in g.

• C

on vi

ct io

n ra

te a

nd th

e nu

m be

r o f i

nv es

tig at

io ns

, p ro

se cu

tio ns

, a nd

c on

vi ct

io ns

w er

e di

sp ro

po rt

io na

te ly

lo w

re la

tiv e

to

th e

sc al

e of

tr affi

ck in

g in

In di

a.

M ex

ic o

2 •

C on

vi ct

ed m

or e

tr affi

ck er

s t ha

n in

2 01

5 an

d en

ga ge

d in

n ew

a nt

i-t ra

ffi ck

in g

pr ev

en tio

n eff

or ts

in th

e tr

av el

a nd

to ur

ism

se ct

or .

• O

ffi ci

al c

om pl

ic it

y co

nt in

ue d

to b

e a

se ri

ou s a

nd la

rg el

y un

ad dr

es se

d pr

ob le

m .

• Sh

el te

rs re

m ai

ne d

in ad

eq ua

te , a

nd v

ic tim

se rv

ic es

w er

e un

av ai

la bl

e in

m uc

h of

th e

co un

tr y,

le av

in g

m an

y re

po rt

ed v

ic tim

s vu

ln er

ab le

to re

-t ra

ffi ck

in g.

P ak

is ta

n 2 W

at ch

L is

t •

D em

on st

ra te

d si

gn ifi

ca nt

e ffo

rt s b

y in

cr ea

si ng

in ve

st ig

at io

ns , p

ro se

cu tio

ns , a

nd c

on vi

ct io

ns o

f s ex

tr affi

ck in

g. •

La w

e nf

or ce

m en

t e ffo

rt s o

n la

bo r t

ra ffi

ck in

g re

m ai

ne d

in ad

eq ua

te .

• O

ffi ci

al c

om pl

ic it

y in

tr affi

ck in

g cr

im es

re m

ai ne

d a

se ri

ou s p

ro bl

em , y

et th

e go

ve rn

m en

t r ep

or te

d no

p ro

se cu

tio ns

o r

co nv

ic tio

ns o

f c om

pl ic

it o

ffi ci

al s.

G ov

er nm

en t p

ro te

ct io

n eff

or ts

w er

e w

ea k.

P hi

lip pi

ne s

1 •

Fu lly

m ee

ts th

e m

in im

um st

an da

rd s f

or th

e el

im in

at io

n of

tr affi

ck in

g; •

D em

on st

ra te

d se

ri ou

s a nd

su st

ai ne

d eff

or ts

b y

co nv

ic tin

g an

d pu

ni sh

in g

m or

e tr

affi ck

er s,

id en

tif yi

ng m

or e

vi ct

im s

th ro

ug h

pr oa

ct iv

e sc

re en

in g

pr oc

ed ur

es , a

nd e

xp an

di ng

it s e

ffo rt

s t o

pr ev

en t t

ra ffi

ck in

g of

F ili

pi no

m ig

ra nt

w or

ke rs

. •

D id

n ot

e xp

an d

th e

av ai

la bi

lit y

an d

qu al

it y

of p

ro te

ct io

n an

d as

si st

an ce

se rv

ic es

fo r t

ra ffi

ck in

g vi

ct im

s, pa

rt ic

ul ar

ly

m en

ta l h

ea lth

c ar

e an

d se

rv ic

es fo

r m al

e vi

ct im

s.

R us

si a

3 •

D oe

s n ot

fu lly

m ee

t t he

m in

im um

st an

da rd

s f or

th e

el im

in at

io n

of tr

affi ck

in g

an d

is no

t m ak

in g

sig ni

fic an

t e ffo

rt s t

o do

so .

• A

ut ho

ri tie

s r ou

tin el

y de

ta in

ed a

nd d

ep or

te d

po te

nt ia

l f or

ce d

la bo

r v ic

tim s w

ith ou

t s cr

ee ni

ng fo

r s ig

ns o

f e xp

lo it

at io

n,

an d

po se

cu te

d vi

ct im

s f or

ce d

in to

p ro

st it

ut io

n fo

r p ro

st it

ut io

n off

en se

s. •

O ffe

re d

no fu

nd in

g or

p ro

gr am

s f or

tr affi

ck in

g vi

ct im

s’ re

ha bi

lit at

io n,

w hi

le se

ve ra

l p ri

va te

ly ru

n sh

el te

rs re

m ai

ne d

cl os

ed

du e

to la

ck o

f f un

di ng

a nd

th e

go ve

rn m

en t’s

c ra

ck do

w n

on c

iv il

so ci

et y.

So ut

h A

fr ic

a 2

• D

em on

st ra

te d

in cr

ea si

ng e

ffo rt

s b y

id en

tif yi

ng m

or e

th an

d ou

bl e

th e

nu m

be r o

f t ra

ffi ck

in g

vi ct

im s a

nd re

fe rr

in g

al l

id en

tifi ed

v ic

tim s t

o ca

re .

• G

ov er

nm en

t s ev

er el

y un

de r-

bu dg

et ed

th e

fu nd

s r eq

ui re

d to

im pl

em en

t t he

a nt

i-t ra

ffi ck

in g

la w

a nd

c on

se qu

en tly

c ou

ld

no t f

ul ly

im pl

em en

t t he

la w

. •

D id

n ot

c om

pr eh

en si

ve ly

m on

it or

o r i

nv es

tig at

e fo

rc ed

c hi

ld la

bo r

• D

id n

ot p

ro se

cu te

o r c

on vi

ct a

ny o

ffi ci

al s a

lle ge

dl y

co m

pl ic

it in

tr affi

ck in

g off

en se

s, de

sp it

e al

le ga

tio ns

o f c

om pl

ic it

y in

vo lv

in g

im m

ig ra

tio n

an d

la w

e nf

or ce

m en

t o ffi

ci al

s.

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Apr 18 2018, NEWGEN

oso-9780190901523.indd 124 18-Apr-18 11:53:34 AM

Ta bl

e  5.

1

H um

an T

ra ffi

ck in

g Pr

ev al

en ce

a nd

P ol

ic y

C ou

nt ry

T ie

r Tr

affi ck

in g

Pr ofi

le

B ra

zi l

2 •

C om

pr eh

en si

ve a

nt i-t

ra ffi

ck in

g la

w .

• B

el ow

m in

im um

st an

da rd

s i n

se ve

ra l k

ey a

re as

. •

D id

n ot

p ro

vi de

sp ec

ia liz

ed sh

el te

rs fo

r v ic

tim s o

f t ra

ffi ck

in g

or a

de qu

at e

lo ng

-t er

m c

ar e.

C hi

na 3

• D

oe s n

ot fu

lly m

ee t t

he m

in im

um st

an da

rd s f

or th

e el

im in

at io

n of

tr affi

ck in

g an

d is

no t m

ak in

g sig

ni fic

an t e

ffo rt

s t o

do so

. •

Pr ov

id es

la w

e nf

or ce

m en

t d at

a an

d re

po rt

ed c

on vi

ct in

g nu

m er

ou s.

tr affi

ck er

s

E gy

pt 2

• D

em on

st ra

te d

in cr

ea si

ng e

ffo rt

s t o

el im

in at

e tr

affi ck

in g.

• D

id n

ot re

po rt

w ha

t s er

vi ce

s, if

an y,

it p

ro vi

de d

to th

e m

aj or

it y

of th

e vi

ct im

s i t i

de nt

ifi ed

• D

ev el

op ed

g ui

da nc

e on

v ic

tim id

en tifi

ca tio

n an

d re

fe rr

al p

ro ce

du re

s, bu

t d id

n ot

b eg

in to

im pl

em en

t s uc

h pr

oc ed

ur es

.

In di

a 2

• In

cr ea

se d

th e

nu m

be r o

f v ic

tim s i

de nt

ifi ed

, i nv

es tig

at io

ns c

om pl

et ed

, a nd

tr affi

ck er

s c on

vi ct

ed , a

s w el

l a s i

ts b

ud ge

t f or

sh

el te

r p ro

gr am

s f or

fe m

al e

an d

ch ild

tr affi

ck in

g vi

ct im

s. •

Id en

tifi ca

tio n

an d

pr ot

ec tio

n re

m ai

ne d

in ad

eq ua

te a

nd in

co ns

is te

nt , a

nd th

e go

ve rn

m en

t s om

et im

es p

en al

iz ed

v ic

tim s

th ro

ug h

ar re

st s f

or c

ri m

es c

om m

it te

d as

a re

su lt

of b

ei ng

su bj

ec te

d to

h um

an tr

affi ck

in g.

• C

on vi

ct io

n ra

te a

nd th

e nu

m be

r o f i

nv es

tig at

io ns

, p ro

se cu

tio ns

, a nd

c on

vi ct

io ns

w er

e di

sp ro

po rt

io na

te ly

lo w

re la

tiv e

to

th e

sc al

e of

tr affi

ck in

g in

In di

a.

M ex

ic o

2 •

C on

vi ct

ed m

or e

tr affi

ck er

s t ha

n in

2 01

5 an

d en

ga ge

d in

n ew

a nt

i-t ra

ffi ck

in g

pr ev

en tio

n eff

or ts

in th

e tr

av el

a nd

to ur

ism

se ct

or .

• O

ffi ci

al c

om pl

ic it

y co

nt in

ue d

to b

e a

se ri

ou s a

nd la

rg el

y un

ad dr

es se

d pr

ob le

m .

• Sh

el te

rs re

m ai

ne d

in ad

eq ua

te , a

nd v

ic tim

se rv

ic es

w er

e un

av ai

la bl

e in

m uc

h of

th e

co un

tr y,

le av

in g

m an

y re

po rt

ed v

ic tim

s vu

ln er

ab le

to re

-t ra

ffi ck

in g.

P ak

is ta

n 2 W

at ch

L is

t •

D em

on st

ra te

d si

gn ifi

ca nt

e ffo

rt s b

y in

cr ea

si ng

in ve

st ig

at io

ns , p

ro se

cu tio

ns , a

nd c

on vi

ct io

ns o

f s ex

tr affi

ck in

g. •

La w

e nf

or ce

m en

t e ffo

rt s o

n la

bo r t

ra ffi

ck in

g re

m ai

ne d

in ad

eq ua

te .

• O

ffi ci

al c

om pl

ic it

y in

tr affi

ck in

g cr

im es

re m

ai ne

d a

se ri

ou s p

ro bl

em , y

et th

e go

ve rn

m en

t r ep

or te

d no

p ro

se cu

tio ns

o r

co nv

ic tio

ns o

f c om

pl ic

it o

ffi ci

al s.

G ov

er nm

en t p

ro te

ct io

n eff

or ts

w er

e w

ea k.

P hi

lip pi

ne s

1 •

Fu lly

m ee

ts th

e m

in im

um st

an da

rd s f

or th

e el

im in

at io

n of

tr affi

ck in

g; •

D em

on st

ra te

d se

ri ou

s a nd

su st

ai ne

d eff

or ts

b y

co nv

ic tin

g an

d pu

ni sh

in g

m or

e tr

affi ck

er s,

id en

tif yi

ng m

or e

vi ct

im s

th ro

ug h

pr oa

ct iv

e sc

re en

in g

pr oc

ed ur

es , a

nd e

xp an

di ng

it s e

ffo rt

s t o

pr ev

en t t

ra ffi

ck in

g of

F ili

pi no

m ig

ra nt

w or

ke rs

. •

D id

n ot

e xp

an d

th e

av ai

la bi

lit y

an d

qu al

it y

of p

ro te

ct io

n an

d as

si st

an ce

se rv

ic es

fo r t

ra ffi

ck in

g vi

ct im

s, pa

rt ic

ul ar

ly

m en

ta l h

ea lth

c ar

e an

d se

rv ic

es fo

r m al

e vi

ct im

s.

R us

si a

3 •

D oe

s n ot

fu lly

m ee

t t he

m in

im um

st an

da rd

s f or

th e

el im

in at

io n

of tr

affi ck

in g

an d

is no

t m ak

in g

sig ni

fic an

t e ffo

rt s t

o do

so .

• A

ut ho

ri tie

s r ou

tin el

y de

ta in

ed a

nd d

ep or

te d

po te

nt ia

l f or

ce d

la bo

r v ic

tim s w

ith ou

t s cr

ee ni

ng fo

r s ig

ns o

f e xp

lo it

at io

n,

an d

po se

cu te

d vi

ct im

s f or

ce d

in to

p ro

st it

ut io

n fo

r p ro

st it

ut io

n off

en se

s. •

O ffe

re d

no fu

nd in

g or

p ro

gr am

s f or

tr affi

ck in

g vi

ct im

s’ re

ha bi

lit at

io n,

w hi

le se

ve ra

l p ri

va te

ly ru

n sh

el te

rs re

m ai

ne d

cl os

ed

du e

to la

ck o

f f un

di ng

a nd

th e

go ve

rn m

en t’s

c ra

ck do

w n

on c

iv il

so ci

et y.

So ut

h A

fr ic

a 2

• D

em on

st ra

te d

in cr

ea si

ng e

ffo rt

s b y

id en

tif yi

ng m

or e

th an

d ou

bl e

th e

nu m

be r o

f t ra

ffi ck

in g

vi ct

im s a

nd re

fe rr

in g

al l

id en

tifi ed

v ic

tim s t

o ca

re .

• G

ov er

nm en

t s ev

er el

y un

de r-

bu dg

et ed

th e

fu nd

s r eq

ui re

d to

im pl

em en

t t he

a nt

i-t ra

ffi ck

in g

la w

a nd

c on

se qu

en tly

c ou

ld

no t f

ul ly

im pl

em en

t t he

la w

. •

D id

n ot

c om

pr eh

en si

ve ly

m on

it or

o r i

nv es

tig at

e fo

rc ed

c hi

ld la

bo r

• D

id n

ot p

ro se

cu te

o r c

on vi

ct a

ny o

ffi ci

al s a

lle ge

dl y

co m

pl ic

it in

tr affi

ck in

g off

en se

s, de

sp it

e al

le ga

tio ns

o f c

om pl

ic it

y in

vo lv

in g

im m

ig ra

tio n

an d

la w

e nf

or ce

m en

t o ffi

ci al

s.

(c on

tin ue

d)

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Apr 18 2018, NEWGEN

oso-9780190901523.indd 125 18-Apr-18 11:53:34 AM

C ou

nt ry

T ie

r Tr

affi ck

in g

Pr ofi

le

T ur

ke y

2 •

D em

on st

ra te

d in

cr ea

si ng

e ffo

rt s b

y ad

op tin

g a

na tio

na l a

ct io

n pl

an , i

de nt

if yi

ng m

or e

tr affi

ck in

g vi

ct im

s, tr

ai ni

ng

go ve

rn m

en t a

nd se

cu ri

ty p

er so

nn el

o n

tr affi

ck in

g is

su es

, a nd

c re

at in

g a

sp ec

ia liz

ed a

nt i-t

ra ffi

ck in

g un

it .

• C

on tin

ue d

pr os

ec ut

in g

tr affi

ck er

s, an

d op

en ed

tw o

sp ec

ia liz

ed sh

el te

rs fo

r f em

al e

se x

tr affi

ck in

g vi

ct im

s. •

In te

ra ge

nc y

co op

er at

io n

re m

ai ne

d w

ea k,

le ad

in g

to o

bs ta

cl es

in v

ic tim

id en

tifi ca

tio n.

E ffo

rt s t

o id

en tif

y Tu

rk is

h vi

ct im

s an

d pr

ot ec

t t he

g ro

w in

g an

d hi

gh ly

v ul

ne ra

bl e

re fu

ge e

an d

m ig

ra nt

c om

m un

iti es

in th

e co

un tr

y co

nt in

ue d

to n

ee d

im pr

ov em

en t.

So ur

ce : Th

e U

ni te

d St

at es

D ep

ar tm

en t o

f S ta

te —

Tr affi

ck in

g in

P er

so ns

R ep

or t (

Ju ne

2 01

7, h

tt ps

:/ /w

w w

.st at

e. go

v/ do

cu m

en ts

/o rg

an iz

at io

n/ 27

13 39

.p df

).

N ot

es : T

ie r 1

— C

ou nt

ri es

w ho

se g

ov er

nm en

ts fu

lly m

ee t t

he T

ra ffi

ck in

g V

ic tim

s P ro

te ct

io n

A ct

’s (T

V PA

) m in

im um

st an

da rd

s.

T ie

r 2 —

C ou

nt ri

es w

ho se

g ov

er nm

en ts

d o

no t f

ul ly

m ee

t t he

T V

PA ’s

m in

im um

st an

da rd

s, bu

t a re

m ak

in g

si gn

ifi ca

nt e

ffo rt

s t o

br in

g th

em se

lv es

in to

c om

pl ia

nc e

w ith

th os

e st

an da

rd s;

T ie

r 2 W

at ch

L

is t—

Th e

go ve

rn m

en t o

f c ou

nt ri

es th

at d

o no

t f ul

ly m

ee t t

he T

V PA

’s m

in im

um st

an da

rd s,

bu t a

re m

ak in

g si

gn ifi

ca nt

e ffo

rt s t

o br

in g

th em

se lv

es in

to c

om pl

ia nc

e w

ith th

os e

st an

da rd

s, an

d fo

r w hi

ch :

a) th

e ab

so lu

te n

um be

r o f v

ic tim

s o f s

ev er

e fo

rm s o

f t ra

ffi ck

in g

is v

er y

si gn

ifi ca

nt o

r i s s

ig ni

fic an

tly in

cr ea

si ng

;

b) th

er e

is a

fa ilu

re to

p ro

vi de

e vi

de nc

e of

in cr

ea si

ng e

ffo rt

s t o

co m

ba t s

ev er

e fo

rm s o

f t ra

ffi ck

in g

in p

er so

ns fr

om th

e pr

ev io

us y

ea r,

in cl

ud in

g in

cr ea

se d

in ve

st ig

at io

ns , p

ro se

cu tio

n, a

nd c

on vi

ct io

ns o

f tr

affi ck

in g

cr im

es ; i

nc re

as ed

a ss

is ta

nc e

to v

ic tim

s; a

nd d

ec re

as in

g ev

id en

ce o

f c om

pl ic

it y

in se

ve re

fo rm

s o f t

ra ffi

ck in

g by

g ov

er nm

en t o

ffi ci

al s;

o r

c) th

e de

te rm

in at

io n

th at

a c

ou nt

ry is

m ak

in g

si gn

ifi ca

nt e

ffo rt

s t o

br in

g it

se lf

in to

c om

pl ia

nc e

w ith

m in

im um

st an

da rd

s w as

b as

ed o

n co

m m

itm en

ts b

y th

e co

un tr

y to

ta ke

a dd

iti on

al st

ep s o

ve r t

he

ne xt

y ea

r.

T ie

r 3 —

Th e

go ve

rn m

en ts

o f c

ou nt

ri es

th at

d o

no t f

ul ly

m ee

t t he

T V

PA ’s

m in

im um

st an

da rd

s a nd

a re

n ot

m ak

in g

si gn

ifi ca

nt e

ffo rt

s t o

do so

.

Ta bl

e  5.

1

C on

tin ue

d

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