Week 3 Discussion

THOMAS AQUINAS

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (c. 1225–74), the greatest theologian of the medieval, and perhaps of any, era. His efforts to reconcile Christian and Aristotelian understandings of humanity’s place in the world yielded a powerful synthesis that continues to inspire moral and political theorizing. Aquinas rejects the view, powerfully articulated by Augustine in antiquity and reiterated in modern times by Luther, that human nature is inherently corrupt. Like Aristotle, he regards human beings as capable of self-control and self-government. One of the tasks of theology, then, is to articulate principles to guide human conduct. Because these moral principles apply in every sphere of life, their authority extends even to war.

From Summa Theologiae

II–II, Question 40, Of War First Article: Is it Always Sinful to Wage War?

We proceed thus to the First Article: Objection 1. It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war, because

punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now, those who wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Mt. 26: 52: “All that take up the sword shall perish by the sword.” Therefore, all wars are unlawful.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is contrary to a divine precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a divine precept, for it is written: “But I say to you not to resist evil,” and “Do not defend yourselves, my dearly beloved, but yield to [God’s] wrath.” Therefore, war is always sinful.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing except sin is contrary to an act of virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore, war is always a sin.

Obj. 4. Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as is evident in scientific exercises. But the warlike exercises which take place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore, it seems that war is a sin in itself.

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the servant of the centurion, “If Christian discipline forbad war altogether, those who sought salutary counsel in the

Gospel would have been advised to cast aside their arms and to give up soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: “Do violence to no man, … and be content with your pay.’ If He commanded them to be content with their pay, He did not forbid soldiering.”

I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the ruler, by whose command the war is to be waged; it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Similarly, it is not the business of a private individual to summon together the people, something which has to be done in wars. But since the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom, or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle: “He bears not the sword without cause, for he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that does evil,” so too it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority: “Rescue the poor and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner,” and for this reason Augustine says, “The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority.”

Secondly, a just cause is required, namely, that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. Wherefore, Augustine says, “A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects or to restore what it has seized unjustly.”

Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says, “True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement or cruelty but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.” For it may happen that, even if war be declared by legitimate authority and for a just cause, it is nonetheless rendered unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says, “The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst to vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war.”

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says, “To take up the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of someone without the command or permission of superior or

lawful authority.” On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by the authority of the ruler or judge or (as a public person) through zeal for justice and by the authority, so to speak, of God, is not to “take up the sword” but to use it as commissioned by another; wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain by the sword, yet they always perish by their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.

Reply Obj. 2. Such like precepts, as Augustine observes, should always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be ready to obey them and, if necessary, to refrain from resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless, it is necessary sometimes for a man to act otherwise for the common good or for the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says, “Those whom we have to punish with a kindly severity it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will. For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity and an evil will, like an internal enemy.”

Reply Obj. 3. Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace which Our Lord “came not to send upon earth.” Hence Augustine says, “We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against and bring them to the prosperity of peace.”

Reply Obj. 4. Not all exercises by men in warlike feats of arms are forbidden but those which are inordinate and perilous and end in slaying or plundering. In older times, warlike exercises presented no such danger, and hence they were called “exercises of arms” or “bloodless wars,” as Jerome states in an epistle.

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II–II, Question 64, Of Killing Sixth Article: Is it Ever Lawful to Kill the Innocent?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: Obj. 1. It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill the innocent. The

fear of God is never manifested by sin, since, on the contrary, “the fear of the Lord drives out sin.” Now, Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was willing to slay his innocent son. Therefore, one may without sin kill an innocent person.

Obj. 2. Further, among those sins that are committed against one’s neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now, to be killed is a greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life to the glory of heaven. Since, then, it is lawful in certain cases to kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a righteous person.

Obj. 3. Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is not a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of justice, to slay an innocent person, for instance, when a judge, who is bound to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man whom he knows to be innocent, but who is convicted by false witnesses, and likewise the executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to death the man who has been unjustly sentenced.

On the contrary, It is written: “The innocent and just person you shall not put to death.”

I answer that An individual man may be considered in two ways: first, in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in every man, though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has made and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated above, the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. On the other hand, the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common good, since they are the chief part of the community. Therefore, it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent.

Reply Obj. 1. God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both the sinful and the righteous die. Hence, he who at Gods command kills an innocent man does not sin, as neither does God, at Whose behest he executes; indeed, his obedience to God’s commands is a proof that he fears God.

Reply Obj. 2. In weighing the gravity of a sin, we must consider the essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore, he who kills a just man sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he injures one whom he should love more and so acts more in opposition to charity; secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less deserving of one and so acts more in opposition to justice; thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater good; fourthly, because he despises God more, according to Luke 10: 16, “He that despises you despises Me.” On the other hand, it is accidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be received by God into glory.

Reply Obj. 3. If the judge knows that a man who has been convicted by false witnesses is innocent, he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, so as to find an occasion for acquitting the innocent. But if he cannot do this, he

should remit him for judgment by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent man to death but they who stated him to be guilty. He who is assigned to carry out the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an intolerable error, should not obey, else they would be excused who executed the martyrs. If, however, it contain no manifest injustice, he does not sin by carrying out the sentence, because he has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior, nor is it he who slays the innocent man but the judge whose minister he is.

Seventh Article, Is it Lawful to Kill a Man in Self-Defense?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: Obj. 1. It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in self-defense. For

Augustine says to Publicola, “I do not agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him, unless one be a soldier or hold a public office, so that one does it not for oneself but for others, having the legitimate power to do so, provided it be fitted to the person.” Now, he who kills a man in self-defense kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore, this would seem to be unlawful.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says, “How are they free from sin in sight of divine Providence who are guilty of taking a man’s life for the sake of these contemptible things?” Now, among contemptible things he reckons “those which men can lose unwillingly,” as appears from the context, and the chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore, it is unlawful for any man to take another’s life for the sake of the life of his own body.

Obj. 3. Further, Pope Nicolas says, and we have in the Decretum, “Concerning the clerics about whom you have consulted us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in self-defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they may return to their former state or rise to a higher degree, know that in no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any circumstances whatever.” Now, clerics and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral precepts. Therefore, neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in self-defense.

Obj. 4. Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or adultery. Now, nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or adultery or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life, since the spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore, no man may lawfully take another’s life in self-defense in order to save his own life.

Obj. 5. Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to Mt. 7: 17. Now, self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according to Rom. 12:19: “Do not defend

yourselves, my dearly beloved.” Therefore, its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written: “If a thief be found breaking into a house or undermining it and be wounded so as to die, he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood.” Now, it is much more lawful to defend one’s life than ones house. Therefore, neither is a man guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.

I answer that Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now, moral acts take their species according to what is intended and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental, as explained above. Accordingly, the act of self- defense may have two effects: one, the saving of one’s life; the other, the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore, this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in being as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore, if a man in self- defense uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful, whereas, if he repel force with moderation, his defense will be lawful, because according to the jurists, “It is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense.” Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit an act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one’s own life than of another’s. But as it is unlawful to take a man’s life, except by public authority acting for the common good, as stated above, it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except by such as have public authority, who, while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe or a judge’s servant struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.

Reply Obj. 1. The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when one man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The passage quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the same sense. Hence he says pointedly, “for the sake of these things,” whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3. Irregularity results from the act, though sinless, of taking a man’s life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly condemns a man to death. For this reason, a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him but to defend himself.

Reply Obj. 4. The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of one’s own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking of a man’s life.

Reply Obj. 5. The defense forbidden in this passage is that which is maliciously vengeful. Hence a gloss says, “Do not defend yourselves, that is, do not strike your enemy in return.”

Eighth Article, Is One Guilty of Murder through Killing Someone by Chance?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: Obj. 1. It would seem that one is guilty of murder through killing someone by

chance. For we read that Lamech slew a man in mistake for a wild beast, and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore, one incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written: “If … one strike a woman with child, and causes a miscarriage … if her death ensue thereupon, he shall render life for life.” Yet this may happen without any intention of causing her death. Therefore, one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance.

Obj. 3. Further, the Decretum contains several canons prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now, penalty is not due save for guilt. Therefore, he who kills a man by chance incurs the guilt of murder.

On the contrary, Augustine says to Publicola, “When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us.” Now, it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore, the person who did it is not accounted guilty.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher, “chance is a cause that acts beside ones intention.” Hence chance happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary. And, since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine, it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.

Nevertheless, it happens that what is not actually and directly voluntary and intended is accidentally voluntary and intended, and so that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental cause. Wherefore, he who does not remove something whence homicide results, whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first, when a man causes another’s death through occupying himself with unlawful things which he ought to avoid; secondly, when he does not take sufficient care. Hence, according to jurists,

if a man pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is not guilty of that person’s death, whereas, if he be occupied with something unlawful or even with something lawful but without due care, he does not escape being guilty of murder if his action results in someone’s death.

Reply Obj. 1. Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a man’s life, and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide.

Reply Obj. 2. He that strikes a woman with child does something unlawful; wherefore, if there results the death either of the woman or of the ensouled fetus, he will not be excused from murder, especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.

Reply Obj. 3. According to the canons, a penalty is inflicted on those who cause death unintentionally through doing something unlawful or failing to take sufficient care.