Executive summary

Chapter 1 Introduction and

Conceptual Considerations When the United Nations was formed in 1945, its primary purpose was

the maintenance of international peace and security, with the Security Council as the organ primarily responsible for enforcing this task. Out of the fifty-one original signatories to the United Nations Charter, four were from Africa, these being the independent states of Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and apartheid South Africa. This number increased with time when most African countries gained independence in the second half of the twentieth century, and today fifty-four countries on the continent are members of the UN. In order to keep the peace and security which is the primary objective of the organisation, the UN Charter offered certain measures to be undertaken in the chapters 7 and 8 in case of conflicts or any threats to international security. Specifically, chapter 6 of the UN Charter deals with the pacific settlement of disputes and chapter 7 deals with action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression. These two chapters form the basis of collective security in which African states, as part of the international community, have signed on to.[1] In line with the principle of collective security, most African states adopted foreign policies that project the primary purpose of the UN in the maintenance of peace and security. Contributing to UN peace operations, as an effective collective security measure to maintain international peace and security, is one of such foreign policy goals adopted by most African countries.

According to Ernest Harsh, there has been a rise of African state participation in peace operations over the years, and the ability to participate in global efforts to resolve conflicts features in the foreign policies of African states.[2] In league with the UN, African mediators, troops, police and civil society activists are playing an increasing active and central role in trying to resolve the numerous conflicts that afflict the world.

This attempt by African nations to unite with the UN is evident when one observes the participation of African States in UN peace operations since the 1960s. Historically, African countries have contributed troops to support peace efforts in various conflict zones across the globe since the

deployment of the United Nations (UN) operations in Congo (ONUC) in 1960. The consistency and firm commitment shown by African countries since that period, to both UN and regional-led peace operations,[3] has placed Africa as a major stakeholder in the maintenance of international peace and security. In 1990, for instance, two African countries (Ghana and Nigeria) were among the top contributors to UN peace operations.[4] By 2003, four out of the ten top contributing countries were African countries—Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. As of September 2003, African states had nearly 10,000 nationals serving under UN peace operations worldwide.

While for some African nations today, contribution to peace operations has become a habit and a critical part of their foreign policy goals to contribute peacekeepers towards international peace and security irrespective of their domestic security situation, for others, contribution to peace operations has served as one of the opportunities through which they can demonstrate their role as very significant actors in world affairs and influence the outcome of international events.

As African state participation in UN peace operations reflects, African leaders place high value on such internationally authorized multilateral peace missions. Apart from the political credibility associated with African Troop Contributing Countries, their participation also brings along financial gains, in addition to material and logistical support under the UN organized peace operations. Undoubtedly, one of such committed countries among the numerous Troop-Contributing Countries (TCC) in Africa is Ghana.

The involvement of Ghana in peace operations began in 1960 when the country first deployed troops to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Ghana’s participation in that mission was driven and inspired by the Pan-Africanist views of Kwame Nkrumah, the country’s first President. In his urge to project Africans as capable of solving their own problems, Nkrumah ordered the deployment of Ghanaian troops to ONUC, even when the Ghana Armed Forces was still in its formative and nascent stages at the time.[5] Subsequently, Nkrumah’s Pan-African ideals encouraged other African countries like Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco to also contribute troops for the operation. It is instructive to note that the Congo experience is what has continued to shape Ghana’s unwavering commitment and participation in both UN and other regional peace

operations today, irrespective of the government in power and the country’s security circumstances. For more than fifty years, Ghana has earned international reputation as one of the largest and consistent TCCs especially in UN mandated peace operations in the world. Since ONUC, the country has contributed troops to international peacekeeping activities in many different parts of the world, including countries such as Lebanon, Afghanistan, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, East Timor, Cambodia, Kosovo, Sudan, Rwanda, the Balkans and Pakistan.[6] On the African continent alone, Ghana has provided personnel for nineteen major peace operations under the auspices of the UN, African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), since 1960. In June 2014, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) also ranked Ghana as the tenth largest contributor of personnel to UN peace operations worldwide.[7] This is particularly impressive considering the small size and material resources of the country’s Armed Forces as compared to other TCCs in Africa, in particular, and the world at large.

More significantly, while Ghana has long been an active contributor to peace operations, there are few or no comparative studies that systematically analyze the actual roles played by Ghanaian troops in many of the different conflict contexts where they have served. Instead, most of the existing scholarships have focused broadly on Ghana’s engagement in peace operations and accounts of individual soldiers’ experiences, with very limited exposition on the specific roles played by Ghanaian troops in the different peacekeeping contexts. This book focuses on a comparison of two peace operations undertaken by the Ghana Armed Forces in two different continents. It specifically analyzes the Ghana Armed Forces operations in Lebanon in the Middle East and Liberia in Africa, which formed part of an internationally organised operation in two different geographical locations and environments. Although the two operations share some similarities in terms of the peace processes, they differ significantly with respect to the background of the conflict, type of peace operations conducted, the composition of the peace force, the mandate of the force, the environment, the involvement of neighboring countries, the role of regional organisations in the conflicts and the peace processes. The book, therefore, makes a comparative assessment of the tasks, experiences and the challenges

encountered by the Ghana Armed Forces in the peace process in both countries. In addition, the response of the UN and ECOWAS, using the militaries of Ghana, Nigeria and other member states to broker and maintain peace in Liberia, is thoroughly discussed. This assessment is made to help policy makers avoid repeating past mistakes in designing and implementing similar interventions or peace initiatives anywhere in the world in the future. The response of the international community and the genesis of the conflict in Lebanon in the Middle East is also discussed in- depth in the book. Often, the history of the Middle East conflict has been presented from the Western and superpower perspective. The perspectives from a non-Western troop-contributing nation are equally important.

Although the study of the experience of GAF in Liberia and Lebanon is very significance for the resolution of similar conflicts within the Middle East and Africa, there is also the global relevance. The Lebanon conflict, for instance, is one of the many inter-state conflicts that are particularly important for understanding how to deal with dominant militia forces within a state that is involved in a protracted conflict against another state. The Liberian and Lebanon conflicts also illustrate the shortcomings of traditional peace operations in dealing with inter-state conflicts in complex situations and the need to develop new peace operation doctrines that can effectively deal with such types of conflicts. In Lebanon, the authority of the Lebanon government did not cover the territorial sovereignty of the state and this had series of security implications which affected the unity of the state and consequently the peace operations. The ECOWAS peace operation in Liberia also experienced similar shortcomings typical of traditional peace operations in an intra-state conflict. This was evident when Liberia relapsed into war after ECOWAS successfully conducted elections and withdrew its troops in 1997.[8] The case of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from 2003 also demonstrated the shortcomings of second generation peace operations in dealing with internal conflicts in the post–cold war era. Government authority in Liberia virtually collapsed after the emergence of new factions due to bad governance and political exclusion of the majority of the feuding groups in governance by the newly elected government.[9] Apart from this, it was in Liberia that for the very first time, the UN partnered with a regional organization for a peace operation. An understanding of the Liberia peace

process thus highlights the UN-Regional Organisation task sharing and challenges in such peacekeeping partnerships. The challenges of the GAF’s participation in the peace process in Lebanon and Liberia could spur on leaders globally to adopt mechanisms that could prevent the occurrence of such conflicts.

The book is intended to serve as a possible reference for planning and conduct of future multi-dimensional peace operations in any part of the world. It draws some valuable lessons for troop contributing countries that participate in both UN and other regional or multilateral operations. The fluidity of modern peace operations has shown that peacekeeping forces must be adequately informed of the environment and the conditions of the operational area. Troop-contributing countries must also understand the causes of conflicts to be able to plan adequately for operations in conflict areas. In addition, the troops participating in any peace operation must be adequately educated on the environment in which they are to operate, and the nature and causes of the conflict. This would prepare them mentally and psychologically before they are deployed to keep the peace in any environment. A thorough knowledge of the causes of the conflict will also enable planners for peace operations to assess the type of operations that are to be undertaken by peacekeepers in order for them to equip and train troops appropriately. An important lesson highlighted in the book is that peacekeepers must also be properly administered and equipped for peace enforcement. The roles of any peace operation may include the strategy of offensive-defense aimed at establishing and securing bases from which to launch and conduct successful operations in support of the humanitarian effort and human rights monitoring. Establishment of bases for humanitarian operations have become an integral part of multi-dimensional peace operations. Such adequacy in administration and the provision of the required logistics, among other factors, enable a peace operation mission to succeed. The book also discusses some of the experiences gained by Ghanaian peacekeepers in the area of Civil-Military Cooperation, which if transformed, would assist troop-contributing countries as part of their contribution to democracy and good governance of various states. Lastly, the most fascinating aspect of the book is that I have been an active participant in the two missions. Therefore, I did not only engage the existing literatures on the subject, but also brought to bear my own knowledge and

rich experiences in Liberia and Lebanon to enrich the discussions in the book.

This book is also intended to provide knowledge and reference material for undergraduate and graduate students in conflict, peace and security studies programmes worldwide. In order to reach these categories of readers, academic considerations such as theoretical and conceptual frameworks that guided the study are provided below.

Methodological Considerations

Comparative assessment of the GAF in peace operations continues to generate considerable challenge to researchers in the area of conflict, peace and security studies. Fuller urges peace researchers to use methodologies that are commensurate with the end-goals they seek to achieve.[10] Fuller further notes that “for peace research to be true to its professed mission, it demands a research methodology that starts from the lives of and includes in the research process, people engaged in the struggles of subordinate groups to transform structures of social stratification.”[11] To this end, the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) tool is used to assess the conflicts in Liberia and Lebanon. The value of the Strategic Conflict Assessment is that it encourages a more explicit and systematic analysis of the conflict, offers peace-building opportunities, and provides a broad framework within which a more focused mapping of the conflict and stakeholders in relation to programs can take place. The SCA process is in part descriptive (mapping out the conflict and current responses); predictive (identifying conflict trends and future scenarios); and productive (providing options). Its flexible approach allows the use of different analytical lenses to examine and develop responses. The main objective for adopting the SCA is to improve the effectiveness of development policy and programs in contribution to conflict prevention and management in Lebanon and Liberia. Stage one of the SCA involves the analysis of tructures, actors and the dynamics.

An exhaustive comparative analysis of the structural roots of conflict is essential since some recent writings on conflicts question the relevance of “root-cause analyses.” It is thus necessary to start from an adequate understanding of the structural and historical background of the conflicts.

This involves the analysis of long-term factors that make the conflicting groups vulnerable to war or factors that are likely to lead them to go to war. Complications of broad contextual analysis are carried out ranging from the background of the conflict, colonial and post-colonial policies, socio- economic policies leading to exclusion, and the State’s weakness and biased approach to conflict management and resolution. Extra information gathered from the Ghana Armed Forces, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC), and the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College Peacekeeping Library, and the transcribed interviews are mapped out and weighted in terms of relative importance and grouped into political, economic, social and security sectors.

According to Soyinka-Airewele, violent conflicts often have their roots in the pathologies of the State and such conflicts in turn lead to profound changes in the nature and capacities of the State.[12] The interests of elites in the conflicts take two main forms: the fight for emancipation and the fight to keep the status quo. Such interests come from youth associations, religious groups, ethnic groups, chiefs, politicians, businessmen and academics. In terms of State institutions and capacities, it can be said that the States of Lebanon and Liberia had a form of a democratic polity, where some underlying norms were based on personalized benefactor-politics. Governmental positions or affiliations with the government guarantee access to power and wealth, leaving out the less represented groups who lack such access. The States’ capacities to curtail the conflicts are compromised by lack of human and financial capital. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons, corrupt or poorly serviced security personnel, and unwillingness to implement findings from After-Conflict Committees jeopardized the elimination of the conflicts.

As Collier notes, wars cannot be fought just on hopes or hatreds.[13] Of central importance is the financial viability of the conflicting groups. Though proliferation of small arms is a problem in general, when groups no longer have to use local weapons but rather AK-47s and other small firearms, then one has to question the source of funding or support. Collier argues that conflicts are more likely to be started by resource wealth than resource poverty: the existence of a primary high-value resource, such as rubber, timber or diamonds, is one of the most reliable predictors of conflict.[14] This

was the case of Liberia where rubber and diamond influenced the conflict. The absence of such resource wealth might have saved the entire nation of Lebanon from full-blown civil war that emanated from the conflict in southern Lebanon, which was triggered by the Israeli invasion in 1978. The debate on whether the economy shapes conflict or not is further analyzed in chapter 5 of this book. In the case of the Liberian conflict, it is important to mention here that according to Goodhand, the economy shapes conflict.[15] As conflicts keep recurring, the consequences shape the economy because economic strategies of war first develop and then war economies grow to fuel the war machine and profiteer on the edges of the conflict. There are also social factors.

Conflict actors are aware of the importance of the emotional or affective economy, and the battle for hearts and minds is at the nexus of conflict dynamics. History plays a central role in social mythology in recreating stories to win the hearts and minds of the conflicting groups. Social exclusion (and social inclusion for some) has been blamed for being a cause of the conflict in Liberia. Apart from the direct effects of the conflicts on human capital, there is a declining faith in the State and erosion of ‘bridging’ social capital between ethnic groups, and that continuously creates tension.[16] When the Israeli military and the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon fought in the 33-day war in 2006 in Lebanon, the conflict left an enduring sense of humiliation amongst the people of Lebanon whose leaders were killed by the Israeli military action, who also took control over southern Lebanon. Religious affiliations have been used as another sense of belonging besides ethnic membership. Some researchers have classified the conflicts in Lebanon as religion-based, although this is refuted by others. Rather, the inability of the various conflicting groups to freely exhibit and socially enjoy their cultural freedom, seems to brew tensions amongst the various groups in the Lebanon conflict.

A critical factor underpinning the growing insecurity has been a decline in the State’s security apparatus. When a nation is unable to contain and resolve crises, it loses its legitimacy by failing to assure the basic security of citizens from human rights abuses, crime and physical violence.[17] Anytime the conflicts erupt, the military is dispatched to the conflict zones, thus, addressing the crisis solely as a security problem, rather than engaging with

the underlying sources of grievance, and looking into the past conflicts. For example, troops of the Armed Forces of Liberia were deployed to Nimba County to quell the National Patriotic Front of Liberia’s invasion in December 1989. The proliferation of small weapons had become a problem and the security personnel were seen to be biased—supporting their own ethnic groups, or groups they are aligned to. These causes were not initially considered. The security situation in the two focus locations is further analyzed in chapters 3 and 5.

In chapter 3 and 5, I examine the various actors in Lebanon and Liberia and discuss their incentives, interests, relations, capacities and their ulterior motives when considering a peace agenda. Using participatory community assessment, individual interviews and consultations, the study of actors pinpoints the main actors who influence or who are affected by the conflict. Unlike the structural analysis that looks at the long-term factors underlying the conflicts, the actor-oriented analysis focuses on the short-term incentives and interests that often cause latent conflicts to become open conflicts. The main pointers are the chiefs/leaders, other traditional leaders, IDPs, Youth Associations, faction leaders, warlords, security forces (police and army), local and national politicians, religious leaders, prominent civil leaders, civil organizations, NGOs, businessmen and mediators. Deeper understanding of the relationships between leaders and the led should be established.

Other theorists argue that elite antagonisms and their actions drive conflict.[18] Elites manipulate identities in their quest for power through construction of conflicts. Some social constructivists claim that elites do not merely steer the process according to existing group discussions, but shape it in view of their own material interests, to incite conflict. By the same token, the freedom of elites to foment conflict and violence is limited by their followers’ definition of the situation and what they are willing to fight over.[19]

Dynamic analysis of conflicts entails examining the main long-term trends, short-term triggers, and also identifying factors likely to increase or decrease the conflicts, including institutions or processes that can mitigate or increase tensions. Assessing the outcome of interaction between the three aforementioned factors will be crucial in determining the dynamics of

the conflicts. Other factors that will be examined include:

Lebanon and Liberia’s structural vulnerability to conflict; Opportunity to benefit from conflict by actors; and Lebanon and Liberia’s capacity to manage or contain conflict.

Based on Cliffe and Luckham’s caution, the analysis seeks to explore the

short-term and long-term triggers that might cause the conflicts to recur or change their course.[20] The analysis of the short-term triggers will reveal whether the conflicts are likely to escalate once they start, and the analysis of the long-term trends will reveal whether the tensions are increasing or decreasing. Building on the analysis of the structures and actors, the relevant precursors of the conflicts would be listed to assess the likelihood of the conflicts recurring, and if they do surface again, whether the intensity will increase, decrease or be stable. The best approach lies in examining the critical interactions between the structures, actors and the dynamics in order to assess the vulnerability, opportunity to benefit from the instability and violence by actors and other elite groups, and whether the States of Lebanon and Liberia are capable of responding to the conflict and developing strategies to manage or contain the conflicts.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

King’s “Structural Obstacles and the Intervention Strategies” best fit the study in terms of assessing the role of the UN and ECOWAS in the peace process in both Liberia and Lebanon. Two additional frameworks were adopted to complement King’s framework. They are:

1. The general theory of conflict and conflict resolution—to highlight

the nature of those two basic concepts. 2. Alagappa’s “Framework of Analysis for regional institutions and

conflict management”—to identify the dilemmas that regional bodies which intervene in internal conflicts face and the conditions for successful intervention

Structural Obstacles and Intervention Strategies

According to the “Structural Obstacles and Intervention Strategies,” civil wars are known to be prolonged to the extent that belligerents tend to continue fighting even when it is apparent that doing so is no longer in their interest.[21] Traditionally, this phenomenon has been explained accordingly in terms of irrational acts of individual combatants or the incompatible beliefs of the opposing sides.[22] King accepts that all civil wars contain elements of the two factors just mentioned but introduces an additional theoretical explanation which he calls “structural elements of war fighting in internal conflicts.”[23] He defines these structural elements as “the array of incentives to continue the conflict itself which can inhibit the willingness to abide by terms of peace settlement.” He further points out that uncovering the incentive for violent conflict (through the structural obstacle approach) reveals a better picture of the reasons for war from the perspective of the belligerents themselves. More significantly, it provides potential targets for outside mediators wishing to hasten the conclusion of a durable peace accord.[24]

King identifies five main structural obstacles to resolving internal conflicts, namely:

Leadership conundrum; Diffuse decision-making and enforcement mechanisms; Gap between military situation and political objectives; Asymmetry in commitment, status and organisation; and Security dilemma.

Each of these is briefly examined below to highlight its relevance to the

book.

Leadership Conundrum

The issue with leadership is raised partly because particular leaders may be so committed to the cause of the struggle or to retaining power such that they are incapable of contemplating some form of compromise with the enemy or opponent. Also leaders (especially the insurgent groups) may prefer fighting on and losing than returning to the status quo ante. Worse

still, as the war drags on, combatants on either side come to identify their own leadership. They struggle among themselves and refuse to accept any negotiated settlement that would diminish the status of their leadership. This was the source of President Doe’s problem that eventually led Liberia to a long civil war. Doe failed to accept various gestures to resolve the conflict with the various warring factions which emerged. On the other hand, the rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) refused to accept any negotiated settlement at the initial stages of the conflict. The NPFL feared that such a settlement would diminish the status of their leader, Charles Taylor.

Diffuse Decision-Making and Enforcement Mechanisms

Problems of decision-making and enforcement arise in all conflicts because within the same groups, belligerents may be divided over the utility of continued war. But the situation is particularly more serious in civil wars because “factionalism among warring elites is often extremely intense with belligerent parties breaking apart and reforming, while coalitions appear and dissolve and erstwhile allies become sworn enemies.”[25] In addition, the non-traditional nature of combatants in civil wars can inhibit the leaders’ ability to communicate their desire to end hostilities to their subordinates. The culture of violence makes the combatants reluctant to surrender their weapons and to return to civilian life. This is because apart from the gun guaranteeing their own safety, it becomes their source of livelihood. This situation manifested in Liberia when Prince Johnson broke away from the NPFL to form the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), due to the problem of decision-making in which Prince Johnson felt Taylor pressed for enforcement of decisions that were not openly discussed among the leadership.[26] In another dimension, the non-traditional nature of the Hezbollah action in Lebanon posed a challenge to its leadership to communicate decisions to end hostilities. Thus, during the 2006 war in Lebanon when the leadership of Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire, its combatants continued fighting after the set date for a ceasefire negotiated by their leaders.[27] This was because the leadership of Hezbollah failed to enforce the ceasefire decision taken among its widely spread fighters,

probably due to poor command and control procedures. Gap between Military Situation and Political Objectives

King argues that the assumption that parties normally accept the situation on the battlefield as a basis for peace, does not apply in the case of civil wars. The gulf which often exists between the situation on the battlefield and the negotiation table arises partly because civil wars by nature involve relatively small space for compromise between the warring factions. Leaders in both camps see anything short of total elimination of the enemy as a form of defeat, and for this reason, the military option remains foremost in their minds. More significantly, the original political objective that prompted the violence may be lost as a result of interests developed in the course of the war. Belligerents may still pay lip service to their original political goals, but the insurgent group may now have interest in the continuation of violence that would ensure that funds raised from exploitation of resources remain solidly in rebel hands. Thus, the original objectives may be transformed by the war experience itself. This point is relevant to the Lebanon and Liberia conflicts. In Lebanon, Hezbollah insisted that all Israeli occupiers must be eliminated. In Liberia the INPFL killed President Doe after his capture in 1990 due to the gap between the military situation and the political objectives.

Asymmetry in Commitment, Status and Organisation

The asymmetrical relationship which exists between contesting parties in civil wars is another disincentive to a negotiated settlement. Warring factions in civil wars have marked disparities in terms of commitment, status and organisation. This will be discussed in detail to explain the challenges that the Ghana Armed Forces faced in handling the factions in both Liberia and Lebanon. Whereas for the insurgent group commitment to the insurgency is all-consuming and a matter of life-and-death, for the incumbent group countering the rebellion is only one of the number of issues it must attend to. The latter, therefore, has to balance its commitment to fighting the rebellion with other tasks of everyday

governance. In terms of status, the incumbent party enjoys international recognition, a seat at the UN, membership of regional organisations and some degree of popular legitimacy, but the insurgents have to fight for all these. In addition, the incumbent perceives the insurgent group as illegitimate and does not recognize it as a bargaining partner, while the latter challenges the legitimacy of the incumbent. As regards organization, the incumbent group, at least initially, is better organised with professional soldiers, while the insurgent forces are composed of non-traditional combatants (e.g., child-soldiers-girl-child inclusive) concerned more about their survival than long-term strategic operations.[28] The differences in the commitment, status and organisation of the groups tend to harden their positions to the extent that neither feels capable to compromise.

Security Dilemma

The conditions of widespread violence which civil wars spawn tend to create distrust between belligerent sides and are detrimental to negotiated settlement. Because trust between warring factions is a scarce commodity, each of the opposing sides tends to reserve a residual fighting force as a deterrent, should the other renege on a negotiated settlement. The dilemma is that the reserve force presents a security threat to the opposing side and this in turn justifies each side’s unwillingness to disarm and accept a negotiated settlement. Taylor maintained a National Patriotic Front of Liberia fighting force even after he was elected as the democratic President of Liberia, even though the Armed Forces of Liberia was to serve as the only armed force in the country. This situation led to distrust among the factions that signed the peace accord which led the country into democratic elections in 1997. Eventually, the country relapsed into war and Taylor was forced to exit the political scene to give way to a new comprehensive peace agreement that eventually led to the deployment of UN forces in 2003.

The second part of King’s analysis concentrates on the extent to which third parties (individual states, external powers, regional organisation and others) may help circumvent the structural obstacles and promote durable negotiated settlement. King prescribes a number of strategies which he admits are not fool-proof, but provide useful guidelines for third party

intervention. A few such strategies would be illustrated. The first is to take advantage of leadership changes among the factions

and use the uncertain period after the departure of key leaders to press ahead with negotiations. While the mediators may benefit from the willingness of the new leadership to reassess the utility of continued conflict, there is also the possibility that the absence of a previous leader could lead to a new leader dissociating himself from the former’s commitment to negotiate. Nassrallah disassociated himself from all peace agreements negotiated by his predecessors when he assumed leadership of the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon and rather, led the movement to resume attacks on Israeli targets.

The second strategy involves the third party’s insistence on the removal of recalcitrant leaders as a prerequisite for negotiation or as a component of a final peace settlement.[29] The relevance of this point to the Liberian crisis was clearly demonstrated in 1994. After the Akosombo Accord, the Council of State ceded power to the faction leaders in accordance with the Accord. This decision, however, was not popular with the civil population in Liberia who demonstrated in protest and eventually institutionalized their protest in the formation of the Liberian National Conference of Unarmed Citizens. This second strategy looks more problematic than beneficial. It may easily boomerang and derail the peace process. Labeling particular leaders as obstacles to peace may rally the belligerents on the side of those targeted, while the other side becomes more insistent on their removal.

A third way of securing the commitment of belligerent leaders is to guarantee their safety during peace negotiation and its implementation. While providing security for the leaders ensures that they can negotiate without fearing for their survival, this strategy has the tendency of compromising ‘justice’ for ‘peace’. King succinctly illustrates this dilemma: “The prospect of war crime tribunals, the arrest of belligerent leaders, and assigning blame for atrocities committed during the war all create disincentives for . . . negotiations and generate equally strong incentives . . . to renege on commitments during the implementation of a peace agreement.”[30] Charles Taylor of the NPFL in Liberia is a typical example of a belligerent leader who gained from the guarantee for his safety during peace negotiations between 1991 and 1997. On the other hand, the leader

of the Hezbollah Movement in Lebanon, Nasrallah, refused to attend any negotiations to settle the Lebanon crisis despite the guarantee of his safety. However, the arrest of Charles Taylor and his subsequent prosecution at the War Crimes Tribunal is an example of how such a safety guarantee could be a disincentive to belligerent leaders.

King concludes that third parties can help alleviate the security concern of belligerents and generate trust in them to enable them to search for their own solution but, the extent to which they can perform this role is dependent on how the mediators are perceived by the factions as important yet powerful arbiters.[31] The foregoing provides a very useful basis for assessing the UN and ECOWAS role in the peace process in Liberia and Lebanon. The strengths of King’s framework in relation to this book are that: First, it helped in the analysis of the nature of the conflicts in Lebanon and Liberia. Second, the theory helped to determine the reasons for the continued conflict in Lebanon and Liberia from the belligerent perspective. Third, the framework assisted mediators to develop mechanism for sustainable peace in both countries. The limitations of the framework gathered from the research are the unrealistic nature of some aspects of the intervention strategy, and the failure of the theory to identify concrete solutions to the obstacles to peace.

General Theory of Conflict and Conflict Resolution

Coser defines conflict as “a struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired value but also to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals.”[32] This definition intimates the types of values over which parties in conflict struggle. They could be tangible resources like food, money, land, mineral resources and others or intangible ones like power, status and identification. But it is not always easy to draw the distinction in conflict situations because some conflicts could be a combination of these two. For instance, the Liberian crisis which began as a struggle for power increasingly became one of control and exploitation of the country’s natural resources.[33] In the same vein, the crisis in Lebanon is basically conflict with Israel over territory.

Coser’s definition also emphasizes the destructive aspect of conflict. That is, the opposing parties in their attempt to achieve their goals, try to neutralize their competitors or even to destroy them. But Stedman is of the view that conflict does not necessarily lead to violence (or the destruction of the opponent).[34] Rather, it is when peaceful mechanisms for pursuing competing interests fail that violence is used. As he puts it: “Although conflict may turn violent, violence is not an inherent aspect of conflict but rather a potential form that conflict may take.”[35] Stedman however cautions that as soon as conflict turns violent, “concerns about security and survival co-exist with the issues that caused the conflict.”[36] In such a situation, Stedman argues, conflict resolution becomes more difficult since it must deal with the two levels—the underlying causes of the conflict and resolving its violent form. Worse still, the latter takes on more of a significance and priority than the former. Stedman explains further that as violence continues, actors tend to see opponents as a threat to their very survival and any settlement short of eliminating them would be unacceptable. Conflict therefore becomes prolonged because antagonists come to fear the consequences of settlement.[37] This linkage between violence and prolonged conflict is very crucial to the analysis of the Liberian and Lebanese conflicts and the peace process for both conflicts.

Zartman also emphasizes the potentially violent nature of conflict but introduces a dilemma which governments face in dealing with demands and grievances before they turn violent.[38] “Politics,” Zartman argues, “is the process of handling demands, and demands unhandled can escalate from politics to violence.”[39] He therefore expects governments to deal with demands and grievances early. He argues further that governments are often reluctant to take on demands that challenge their programmes and authority, “often with the hope that the problem will go away” and when they do not it becomes too late to avoid violence.[40] This dilemma helps to explain why at the initial stages of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia’s (NPFL) incursion into Liberia, the Doe government tried to down play its significance.

Goodman and Bogard have opined that for negotiation to succeed in reaching a settlement there should be an element of doubt on both sides.[41] In their view, “If one side of a military conflict remains convinced that they

have the time and resources to achieve their original goals they may enter negotiations with a slate of concealed motives.” Such motives could be to test the determination of the other side to continue to fight or to allow for time to regroup their forces and prepare for a new offensive.[42]

Deng and Zartman in their analysis of the conceptual basis of conflict resolution, highlight the fact that conflicts are usually approached from the perspective of the key leaders of the conflicting factions.[43] While the role of such leaders cannot be ignored if any settlement is to succeed, it is essential to remember that often, there exist differences in the objectives of the elites, the fighting men and the populace. Usually, the faction leaders are more concerned with the struggle for power than for the lives of the ordinary citizens and the welfare of the community as a whole. There were also instances where the leaders negotiated peace while their combatants continued fighting. In Lebanon, whilst some warring factions agreed to a negotiated settlement over time, the Hezbollah Movement preferred armed action until Israel’s total withdrawal from Lebanese land.[44]

Framework of Analysis for Regional Institutions and Conflict Management

Article 52 of the United Nations Charter recognizes the importance of regionalism in the maintenance of peace and security (and implicitly as a conflict resolution mechanism) because it provides for the settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements by regional organizations. Alagappa in his framework of analysis identifies five determinants of effective conflict management by regional institutions.[45] These are

The type of institutional commitment to it; Shared interests in relation to specific conflicts; Institutional capacity; Resource availability; and Legitimacy and credibility.

In the first place, the type (purpose and scope) as well as the

commitment of member-states to the institution determines whether the

State can get involved at all in conflict management and to what extent. Usually, the roles and tasks it can perform are prescribed by the Charter based on the principles enshrined in it. Secondly, shared interests in a specific conflict by member-states and common purpose with regard to strategy and outcome are crucial to the effectiveness of regional institutions. In the absence of shared interests and commonality of purpose, even strong regional organizations would be inhibited in playing an effective role.

Institutional capacity refers to the ability of a regional institution to make decisions and use the existence of organs, rules and procedures to implement them. Closely related to this is the availability of financial and manpower resources, which together determine the role and task an organization can undertake. Lastly, to be effective, regional institutions must command the respect and authority of the parties to the dispute concerned. For this to be so, the institution must be perceived to be impartial and strong and with a good track record. Recognition and support by other regional and global institutions, as well as co-operation with them may also enhance credibility, while competitive behavior by any other institution may undermine legitimacy and credibility. Alagappa’s delineation of the determinants may seem arbitrary, but it provides a useful basis for assessing how a regional organization performs when it gets involved in conflict management. With specific reference to intra-state conflicts, Alagappa points out that they pose a dilemma for regional organizations. This is because the basic principles of sovereignty and non-interference on which governments enter into regional co-operation often preclude any formal role for such institutions to involve themselves in internal armed conflicts. [46] When domestic conflicts erupt, regional organizations often adopt, as the first option, the strategy of non-intervention by which they seek not to become involved at all. But non-intervention hardly works because internal conflicts tend to be prolonged. Again, apart from the spillover effects and the threat to regional security, a regional organization which fails to act in the face of a protracted internal conflict projects an image of ineffectiveness (if not irrelevance).

Regional organisations therefore end up intervening in the domestic conflicts of member-states, applying their collective political, economic and

military resources to either contain or terminate such conflicts. But regional intervention also carries its own limitations and dangers. The risk of being accused of interference; difficulty in forging and maintaining the neutrality of the intervening force; limited authority capability of regional institutions; lack of financial resources; and difficulty at implementing an international settlement are among the catalogue of problems which, in Alagappa’s words, limit the containment and termination roles of regionalism.”[47]

In addition, the disposition of regional and other international organisations towards the status quo, colours their role in mediating in domestic conflicts because they tend or are perceived to favor the incumbent power holders, sometimes with the result that instead of containing or terminating the conflicts, they end up prolonging and intensifying them.[48] In the light of these dilemmas and limitations, Alagappa posits that regional institutions as agents of domestic conflict management can have “only indirect impact and will be relevant only to the extent that they influence the domestic political discourse and affect the power resources of the domestic contestants”[49] The next section gives a brief overview of the book by outlining the details of the chapters.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

The book comprises seven chapters. Chapter 1, which is the introduction, highlights the experiences of Ghana as a major troop contributing country in UN peace operations. The chapter discusses the background of conflicts in general, linking it to a brief exposition of Ghana’s experience in peace operation. The conceptual framework is placed in this chapter to provide a theoretical understanding of the book. King’s structural obstacles and intervention strategies are analyzed. The chapter also identifies the main structural obstacles to resolving internal conflicts and examines the general theory of conflict resolution and conceptual basis of conflict resolution. Finally, the segment ends with Alagappa’s framework analysis of regional institutions in conflict management by identifying the dilemmas of intervention in internal conflicts.

The second chapter sets the tone for the book on an African nation in peace operations. The chapter comprises three parts. First, the theoretical and philosophical background to UN peace operations is examined. This

offers readers the opportunity to understand the background and the operations of the UN since its establishment in 1945, and lays the foundation for understanding Ghana’s participation in peace operations in Lebanon and Liberia. Second, the origin of the ECOWAS peace operations, its philosophy, goals and processes are discussed. The segment traces the culture and the core philosophy of ECOWAS peace operations linking it to the first ECOWAS peace operation in Liberia from 1990 to 1997. This again gives the foundation for discussion in the chapters on Ghana’s role in the peace process in Liberia under ECOWAS. Third, the role of a small country, Ghana, in global peace operations is discussed. This part focuses on Ghana’s contribution of formed battalions to peace operations in various theatres of conflict in the world.

Chapter 3 discusses the geo-politics of Lebanon. The Lebanon–Israeli border is the only Arab-Israeli front that has witnessed continuous violence since the late 1960s. The past four decades have seen proliferation of small disputes over territory along the demarcation line between the two countries. In other circumstances, disputes of this nature could be managed or even resolved with ease. Yet in the absence of a comprehensive peace pact between Syria and Israel, Lebanon remains both an instrument of and a potential trigger for broader regional conflict. Lebanon is not a major actor in Arab politics, but its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict has principally been as a theatre in which various actors, mainly Syria, Iran, Israel, Hezbollah and Palestinians, believe they can wage surrogate battles. Southern Lebanon in particular gained importance by becoming an ideal proxy for the larger regional conflict and military action intended by and for others. It is precisely Lebanon’s relative military insignificance that continues to make it such a volatile but crucial actor in that regional war. Despite Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, after almost three decades of occupation, little has changed in this respect. The chapter discusses the geo-politics of Lebanon in order to expose the root causes and the politics of the Lebanese conflict as a prelude to the discussion in the subsequent chapters. A discussion on the background to the invasion of Lebanon in 1978 culminating in the Camp David Accords; and the establishment of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as part of the peace process in Lebanon, is made. The segment also discusses the rise of the Hezbollah as a military and political protagonist in the Lebanon conflict, as well as the palestinization of

the conflict by Hezbollah. Finally, the chapter discusses the political and border tensions in Lebanon, leading to the 33-day war with Israel in July 2006 which led the UN to introducing a new dimension to the peace process.

Chapter 4 examines the role of the GAF under the UN in Lebanon from 1979 to September 2014. This chapter assesses the roles and activities the GAF in UNIFIL, under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 425 and 1701, adopted in 1978 and 2006, respectively. The chapter also discusses the background leading to the deployment of the UN in Lebanon, and, the political context for the establishment of UNIFIL with particular focus on the two major UN mandates and rules of engagement (UNSC Resolutions 425 and 1701) for the peace operation. This is followed by a discussion on the operations of GAF under UNIFIL from 1979 to 2006, and from 2006 till the present (December 2014). In particular, the GAF’s peace operation role in humanitarian activities, dealing with armed elements in Lebanon, reaction to violations of agreements and over flights, and the freedom of movement of troops in the area of operation are analyzed. One particular significant aspect of the chapter is the discussion on the GAF’s cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces and civil-military cooperation in the operation area. Finally, an analysis of the major difficulties marking GAF’s operations in Lebanon will be made.

The fifth chapter discusses the origins of the war in Liberia, including the profile of actors. The cause of the civil war in Liberia can be traced to that country’s unresolved ethnic and political differences. The war illustrates the events of a country that was founded on the principles of freedom and democracy, but which after almost one and a half centuries of its existence descended into destruction in which both democracy and human rights were compromised. This chapter traces the history of Liberia from its establishment to the outbreak of the war in 1989, focusing on the causes of contradictions in that long history. In particular, the geo-political profile of the Liberian State is examined, focusing on Liberia’s independence through the various political administrations the country witnessed from 1847 to 1990. The socio-political character of the warring factions is analysed and the dynamics of the conflict up to the ECOWAS intervention in August 1990 are examined. The chapter concludes with analysis in search for long lasting peace in Liberia.

Chapter 6 discusses and analyzes the role of the GAF in Liberia under both ECOMOG and the UN from August 1990 to date. As stated earlier, the GAF has continued to contribute troops globally to UN peace operations at the invitation of the UN. Consistent with this tradition, the GAF became one of the pioneers to send contingents to participate in the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 1990 and 2003 respectively. This chapter focuses on the role of the GAF in the ECOMOG and the UNMIL operations in Liberia and discusses the ECOWAS initiative covering the role of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), the ECOWAS peace plan, formation of an interim government, and the operations of ECOMOG with particular focus on the role of the GAF. Thereafter, the role of GAF under the UNMIL peace operation established in 2003 after the fresh outbreak of hostilities in Liberia is also discussed. In particular, the GAF peace building role in the areas of disarmament and reintegration, and the electoral process is analyzed. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the prospect for peace in Liberia following the GAF’s involvement in the Liberian conflict as part of both the ECOWAS and UN intervention forces.

The seventh chapter provides a comparative framework of the GAF operations in both Lebanon and Liberia. In this chapter, the GAF operations in Lebanon and Liberia are compared. The comparison which focuses on the differences and similarities of GAF’s operations is based on selected thematic areas—the background to the conflicts, peace initiatives, enforcement of mandates, the disarmament process, security sector reforms, and the difficulties encountered by GAF.

In chapter 8, which is the concluding chapter, an overall assessment of peace operations in Lebanon and Liberia is conducted. Particularly in this chapter, the similarities and differences in both operations as well as some of the defining constraints that were encountered by GAF are identified. This final chapter also summarizes the findings of the study, its conclusions and recommendations which are intended to serve as a possible template for planning by GAF in future peace operations in any part of the world.

NOTES

The author would like to thank Professor Akanmu Adebayo (Professor

of History, Kennesaw State University) for his insightful comments which greatly improved the introduction. Also the critical comments by Festus Aubyn and Fiifi Edu-Afful of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center were useful for this chapter.

1. Thompson, Kenneth “Collective Security Re-Examined,” in J. Larus (ed), 1965, From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy, New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., p. 294. 2. Harsh, Ernest “Africa Builds Its Own Peace Forces,” Africa Recovery, Vol.7 No 3, October 2003. 3. In this book, I use the term peace as an umbrella label to refer to both the traditional and contemporary multi-dimensional notion of peacekeeping. The reason basically is that many of the contemporary missions cannot adequately be captured by the term peacekeeping operations, which implies that there is a ceasefire in place that is being monitored. In that regard, to avoid any confusion with traditional ’peacekeeping,’ which has a more limited meaning, peace operation is used. 4. See United Nations website, Peacekeeping Operations, Troops and Police Contributors. 5. Ghana Armed Forces Peace Support Operation Doctrine, May 2013, p. 7. 6. Aning, K., and Aubyn, F. (2013) “Ghana” in Alex Bellamy & Paul Williams, (eds.), Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of United Nations Contributions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7. Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to United Nations Operations, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, July 2014. Indeed at one time in the history of the United Nations, Ghana was ranked the second largest Troop Contributing Country in United Nations Peace Operation. 8. Details of the Liberia conflict and the ECOMOG operations are discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 9. See Keir, M. “The Strange Survival of Nationalism” in The Geographical Magazine, July 1992, pp. 25–29. 10. Fuller. A, (2004) “Methodology for Peace Research” in Carroll, W., Critical Strategies for Social Research, Canadian Scholars Press, pp. 38–40. 11. Ibid. 12. Soyinka-Airewele,P. ‘Exploring Conflict and Conflict Resolution in

Contemporary Third World,’ Association of Third World Studies, Vol. XX11, No 1, Spring, 2005. 13. Collier, P. (2000) Natural Resources, Wealth, Conflict and Peacebuilding, New York: Institute of International Studies Press. 14. Ibid. 15. Goodhand, P. (2001) Human Rights and Intractable Conflicts, Oxford: University Press. 16. Anderson, L. (2007) Nationalism and Ethnic Conflicts, Columbia University, New York. 17. Goodhand, Op. Cit. 18. Vail, L. (1989) The Creation of Tribalism in Africa, California: Notre Dame Press. 19. Wilkinson, P. ‘Economic Ground and Ethnic Violence,’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol 47, 1997. 20. Cliffe, L., and Luckman, R., (2000) What Happens to the State in Conflict, Cambridge: University Press, p. 311. 21. King, C. (1997) Ending Civil Wars, ADELPHI Paper 308, International Institution of Strategic Studies, London: Oxford University Press, p. 29. 22. Ibid, p. 59. 23. Ibid, p.13. 24. Ibid, p. 27. 25. Ibid, p.33. 26. Author’s Field Notes as a Peacekeeper in Lebanon in 2006. 27. Author’s Field Notes as a Peacekeeper in Liberia in 1990. 28. According to King, this situation can be reversed where incumbent forces may be poorly equipped and organized relative to the insurgents with the former staggering, as in the case of Liberia, to share its position against the latter. See King. C., (1997) Ending Civil Wars, ADELPHI Paper 308, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London: Oxford University Press. 29. Ibid, p.63. 30. Ibid, p.64. 31. Ibid, pp.77–78. 32. Coser. L, (1956) The Functions of Social Conflict, New York: The Free Press. 33. The acquisition for natural resources by warlords became the new order of the struggle in Liberia. This is discussed extensively in chapter 5 of this

book. 34. Stedman. J, ‘International Institutions and Internal Wars’, World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4, July, 1997, pp. 367–389. 35. Ibid, p. 370. 36. Ibid, p. 388. 37. This security dilemma partly explains why Samuel Doe refused to resign even when his territory had shrunk to only the executive mansion and also why Charles Taylor on several occasions would refuse to disarm his troops. This dilemma also led to the emergence of several warring factions in the Liberia conflict. 38. Zartman. W, (1995) Elusive Peace: Negotiating An End to Civil Wars, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, pp. 299–319. 39. Ibid, p. 300. 40. Ibid, p. 301. 41. Goodman. A, and Bogard. S.C, (eds.), (1992) Making Peace: The United States and Conflict Resolution, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 5. 42. Ibid, p. 5. 43. Deng. F, and Zartman. W, (1997) Conflict Resolution in Africa, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, p. 6. 44. Erskine. E, (1989) Mission with UNIFIL, London: Hurst & Company, p.31. 45. Alagappa defines conflict management broadly to cover prevention, containment and resolution. See M. Alagappa ‘Regional Institutions, the UN and International Security: A Framework for Analysis’, Third World Quarterly, 1997, pp. 426–435. 46. Ibid, p. 430. 47. Ibid, p. 432. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid.