Eyewitness Memory

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Eyewitness Identification

Article  in  Current Directions in Psychological Science · February 2011

DOI: 10.1177/0963721410389169

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2011 20: 24Current Directions in Psychological Science Neil Brewer and Gary L. Wells Eyewitness Identification

   

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Eyewitness Identification

Neil Brewer1 and Gary L. Wells2

1 Flinders University and 2 Iowa State University

Abstract Eyewitness identifications play an important role in many police investigations and courtroom decisions. Identification decision accuracy is shaped not only by the quality of a witness’s memory but also by social-influence variables. Some variables can be categor- ized as general impairments, whereas others produce biases against a specific suspect. We review some of the key variables in each category and consider postidentification indicators of identification accuracy. Finally, we highlight what we think are some of the major directions for future research. These include addressing some of the significant limitations of past research, examining variables that are not directly related to memory or social influence, and developing some radical new directions for identification tests.

Keywords eyewitness identification, eyewitness memory, confidence

Witnesses to crimes are sometimes asked to view a police

lineup to see if they can identify the culprit. Using experimen-

tally created events, psychological researchers have long

warned that eyewitness identification evidence is less reliable

than people seem to believe. Corroborating the concerns of

psychologists, since the advent of forensic DNA testing in

the 1990s, 258 people convicted by juries in the United States

have been freed based on exculpatory DNA tests, and 200 of

these were cases of mistaken eyewitness identification (Inno-

cence Project, 2010). Examination of the reasons for these

mistaken identifications has provided rich avenues of investi-

gation guided by cognitive and social perspectives. Here we

focus on (a) variables that produce general impairments of

identification accuracy, (b) postidentification indicators of

identification accuracy, and (c) variables that result in biases

against the suspect.

General Impairments of Identification Performance

Numerous variables have been shown to shape (a) whether

witnesses make positive or negative lineup decisions (i.e.,

choices or rejections) and (b) the accuracy of those decisions.

Not surprisingly, witnesses are likely to assume that the culprit

is in the lineup; when explicitly warned that the lineup may or

may not contain the culprit, witnesses are less likely to make a

selection (Brewer & Wells, 2006). Identification accuracy is

impaired under encoding conditions likely to undermine mem-

ory strength, such as divided attention, short exposure duration,

and long viewing distance (e.g., Lindsay, Semmler, Weber,

Brewer, & Lindsay, 2008; Palmer, Brewer, McKinnon, &

Weber, 2010). Some conditions, such as identifying a culprit

of a different race or one who was wearing a disguise (e.g.,

Meissner & Brigham, 2001), undermine encoding and/or

lineup discrimination performance. Other conditions such as

lengthy retention intervals are associated with diminished

memory strength (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, McGorty, & Pen-

rod, 2008).

Indicators of Identification Accuracy

Because an identification decision is often the key evidence

against a suspect, characteristics of identification decisions that

might discriminate accurate from inaccurate decisions have

been explored. Decision confidence (Brewer & Wells, 2006),

latency (Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004) and

phenomenological reports (Palmer et al., 2010) have all been

found to discriminate for positive decisions but not for lineup

rejections. Highly confident decisions, rapid decisions, and

decisions accompanied by relevant recollection (i.e., recall of

contextual information relevant to discriminating the culprit)

are more likely to be accurate than are decisions made with low

confidence, slowly, or without relevant recollection.

Although we cannot specify absolute latencies or amounts

of relevant recollection associated with accurate decisions,

Corresponding Author:

Neil Brewer, School of Psychology, Flinders University, GPO Box 2100,

Adelaide, S. Aust 5001, Australia

E-mail: [email protected]

Current Directions in Psychological Science 20(1) 24-27 ª The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0963721410389169 http://cdps.sagepub.com

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eyewitness confidence can provide a valuable pointer to the

accuracy of an individual identification decision. It is not

uncommon for psychologists to express the view that there is

no meaningful relation between confidence and accuracy for

identifications, a position based on the usually modest (at best)

confidence–accuracy (CA) correlations that have been

reported. However, recent research has shown that the CA cor-

relation does not provide a comprehensive picture of the CA

relation. Researchers who have used a calibration approach

(which involves charting the proportion of accurate responses

for each confidence level) to assess the CA relation across a

variety of stimuli, exposure and attention conditions, and reten-

tion intervals, have shown that, when measured immediately

after an identification, confidence does provide a meaningful

guide as to the likely accuracy of decisions made by adult (but

not child) witnesses (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Keast, Brewer, &

Wells, 2007; Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010)—a find-

ing that is at odds with oft-stated positions in the literature.

These research outcomes signal that police investigators should

attend carefully to witness confidence when evaluating

whether an identified suspect warrants continued investigation

or whether they should perhaps target other possible suspects.

Confidence is not, however, an infallible index of accuracy.

The calibration research summarized above indicates that,

under many conditions, very high levels of confidence may

exceed the probability of an accurate identification, with confi-

dence levels of 90% to 100% often associated with lower accu-

racy rates around 75% to 90%. Further, as we discuss later,

confidence breaks down as a marker of accuracy under certain

conditions.

Variables Known to Produce Specific Suspect Biases

Eyewitness researchers have found it useful to distinguish

between variables that impact general performance (as in the

previous section) and variables that create a specific bias

against the suspect (Wells & Loftus, 2003). Poor lighting con-

ditions or cross-racial identification situations, for example,

impair eyewitness identification performance, but no more so

for one member of a lineup (e.g., one of the fillers) than for

another (e.g., the suspect). Of course, the suspect might or

might not be the perpetrator, so any factors that bias witness

responses toward the suspect are of great concern. Psycholo-

gists have long called for double-blind lineups to prevent the

lineup administrator from inadvertently cueing the witness

toward the suspect (Wells, 1988), but only recently have

experiments more carefully teased apart these cueing dynamics

(Clark, Marshall, & Rosenthal, 2009; Greathouse & Kovera,

2009). A powerful suspect-bias influence can also occur after

the witness makes an identification if the witness receives con-

firming feedback (e.g., ‘‘Good, you identified the suspect’’).

Confirming postidentification feedback dramatically inflates

witnesses’ reports of their certainty, view, attention, and other

variables (Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004; Wells, Olson, &

Charman, 2003). Of course, an innocent suspect can stand out

in a lineup for a variety of reasons, including the presence of

fillers who do not fit the description of the culprit. But there are

other variables that create bias against a suspect, such as mis-

attributed familiarity. Misattributed familiarity can occur

because of repeated identification procedures such as having

seen the person in a mugshot search prior to a lineup or confus-

ing a bystander with the perpetrator.

Understanding suspect-bias variables is an important direc-

tion in eyewitness identification research. In virtually every

trial involving contested eyewitness identification, the to-be-

explained issue is not merely why the witness has a weak mem-

ory or whether witnesses are unreliable. Instead, the question

is, ‘‘Why did the witness choose the suspect, rather than one

of the fillers, from the lineup?’’ General impairment variables

play an important role, but only suspect-bias variables answer

that question. Research examining this latter category of vari-

ables has yielded many practical guidelines for lineup conduct

(Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006).

Some Major Directions

We identify four main research directions that we believe can

advance this field. The first is not at all exciting, as it will

involve researchers going back over some old ground. There

is a tendency in this field to speak with certainty about the vari-

ables that explain the variations in identification performance.

Yet we are not convinced that the knowledge base is as robust

as is sometimes assumed. Traditionally, eyewitness identifica-

tion experiments yield one data point per subject from either a

culprit-present or a culprit-absent condition. Even with what

may appear to be large sample sizes for psychology experi-

ments, statistical power is a major, and often underestimated,

issue, as has been clearly demonstrated by Brewer, Weber, and

Semmler (2005). Additionally, the levels sampled for the inde-

pendent variables are necessarily restricted, as is the range of

stimuli sampled. Meta-analyses can address some of these

issues, but when studies that have employed a same–different

face recognition paradigm (to provide stimulus variability and

more data points) are set aside, there are very few identification

test studies examining specific variables (e.g., exposure dura-

tion). These limitations mean that we do not have detailed

knowledge about the influence of individual variables or the

likely complex interactions between variables, a point illu-

strated by Lindsay et al.’s (2008) field study, using multiple sti-

muli, of the effects of viewing distance (and other variables) on

identification performance. One impediment to the sorts of

studies we are calling for might appear to be the capacity to

access sufficiently large participant samples. Several recent

field studies (e.g., Lindsay et al., 2008; Sauer et al., 2010)

reveal some effective and relatively inexpensive solutions to

this problem.

Second, there is a relative dearth of work examining the

interactions between general-impairment variables and

suspect-bias variables. An emerging theoretical view is that

suspect-bias variables have a more powerful influence when

general-impairment variables are present (Charman & Wells,

Eyewitness Identification 25

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2006). In recent years, computational modeling has been

applied to lineup identification behaviors, and this has been

useful in fleshing out the assumptions behind some of the

‘‘mini-theories’’ that have been used to explain eyewitness

identification errors (Clark, 2008). With a better data base of

how general impairment variables and suspect-bias variables

interact, these computational models could become more

sophisticated and lead to better theories.

Third, there is an emerging type of research that is very

important to eyewitness identification evidence in the real

world that is not directly related to memory or to social influ-

ence yet is being conducted by psychologists. One example

of such research concerns the influence of the base rate for

which the actual culprit is in the lineup (e.g., does the culprit

appear in 90% of lineups or 50% of lineups?). Psychologists

have drawn attention to the fact that this base rate is an

important factor in the chances of mistaken identification.

Two other examples of important nonmemory variables rele-

vant to mistaken identification have also been identified

recently. One is the problem of estimating likelihoods of guilt

based on the consistent and inconsistent behaviors of multiple

witnesses to the same event. Clark and Wells (2008) used

data from a wide variety of experiments to estimate how

probabilities of guilt rise and fall as a function of agreement

and disagreement among witnesses in their lineup identifica-

tions. More work needs to be done to take account of nonin-

dependence among witnesses. Another example is the

‘‘pleading effect,’’ which results in vastly different chances

of mistaken identifications to be expected at the lineup versus

in the courtroom. Wells et al. (2006) noted that 85% of guilty

suspects in the United States plead guilty. Therefore, suppose

95% of suspects who are identified from lineups are guilty

and 5% are innocent. The pleading effect means that 85% of the 95% guilty will not go to trial whereas almost 100% of the 5% innocent will go to trial rather than plead guilty.

Hence, the proportion of identified suspects going to trial

who are innocent would be greater than 33%. These are not

memory variables, but they are important to study because

they have a great impact on our understanding of how to cal-

culate the chances of mistaken identifications surfacing at

various junctures in the justice system.

Fourth, with the exception of the development of sequential

lineup (in which the witness views one lineup member at a

time; Lindsay & Wells, 1985), the eyewitness identification

research paradigm has seldom departed from the traditional

simultaneous lineup (i.e., all lineup members appear together)

used by police in criminal investigations. The extant lineup

paradigm demands that witnesses either choose from among

the members of the lineup or reject them, a decision that is

influenced by an array of social and metacognitive variables

independent of the witness’ memory strength and the degree

of match between their memory and the lineup members.

Although research has identified a number of procedural vari-

ables that can reduce error in the traditional lineup, experimen-

tal psychologists should be able to develop alternative

procedures that provide a more sensitive index of the likelihood

that the suspect is indeed the culprit. One example of such a

procedure is Sauer, Brewer, and Weber’s (2008) use of patterns

of witnesses’ confidence judgments to indicate the lineup

member who most resembles the culprit and whether that per-

son is the offender. Classification algorithms exploiting the

confidence judgments assigned to each lineup member were

used to identify a confidence criterion that optimized the clas-

sification of witnesses’ responses as accurate or inaccurate.

This approach produced culprit-present and culprit-absent

accuracy rates that exceeded the accuracy of the traditional bin-

ary identification test decision.

A likely reaction to such radical approaches is that police

and the courts would never accept a form of identification evi-

dence that doesn’t actually involve the witness picking, or

rejecting, the suspect. Our response is that any procedure that

reduces the likelihood that culprits go free and innocent people

are convicted warrants serious attention from a research per-

spective and from the perspective of giving away psychological

science.

Recommended Reading

Brewer, N., & Weber, N. (2008). Eyewitness confidence and latency:

Indices of memory processes not just markers of accuracy. Applied

Cognitive Psychology, 22, 827–840. A position paper arguing for a

focus on eyewitness decision confidence and latency in theory

development about eyewitness memory.

Brewer, N., Weber, N., & Semmler, C. (2005). (See References).

A chapter that reviews the eyewitness identification literature and

highlights some key methodological issues.

Brewer, N., & Wells, G.L. (2006). (See References). An article apply-

ing the confidence–accuracy calibration approach to eyewitness

identification.

Sauer, J.D., Brewer, N., & Weber, N. (2008). (See References). An

article examining a radical alternative to the traditional eyewitness

identification task.

Wells, G.L., & Quinlivan, D.S. (2009). Suggestive eyewitness identi-

fication procedures and the Supreme Court’s reliability test in light

of eyewitness science: 30 years later. Law and Human Behavior,

33, 1–24. An extensive review of suggestive influences on eyewit-

ness identification and how the findings call into question the U.S.

Supreme Court’s 33-year-old law on how courts should evaluate

eyewitness identification evidence.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect

to their authorship or the publication of this article.

Funding

This research was supported by Australian Research Council Grants

DP0556876 and DP1093210 to the first author and National Science

Foundation Grant SES0850401 to the second author.

References

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tion. In N. Brewer & K.D. Williams (Eds.), Psychology and law:

An empirical perspective (pp. 177–221). New York, NY: Guilford.

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