Law - Criminal Short assignment

284

A Conceptual Model of Crime Prevention

PAUL J. BRANTINGHAM Associate Professor, School of Criminology, Florida State University

FREDERIC L. FAUST

Associate Professor, School of Criminology, Florida State University

Crime prevention is the professed mission o f every agency found within the American criminal justice system. In prac- tice, the term "prevention" seems to be applied confusingly to a wide array of contradictory activities. This confusion can be avoided through the use of a conceptual model that defines three levels of prevention: (1) primary prevention, directed at modification of criminogenic conditions in the physical and social environment at large; (2) secondary prevention, directed at early identification and intervention in the lives of individuals or groups in criminogenic circumstances; and (3) tertiary prevention, directed at prevention of recidivism. The use of such a conceptual model helps to clarify current crime prevention efforts, suggests fruitful directions for future research by identifying current lacunae in practice and in the research literature, and may ultimately prove helpful in ad- dressing the seemingly endless debate between advocates of "punishment

"

and advocates of "treatment."

pREVENTION, probably the most

overworked and least understood

concept in contemporary criminol- ogy, might be defined simply as any activity, by an individual or a group, public or private, that precludes the incidence of one or more criminal acts. But caution is warranted here, for the simplicity is deceptive. Can crime prevention be logically con- ceived to encompass such divergent actions as long-term incarceration and pretrial diversion from the jus- tice system? Solitary confinement and remedial reading instruction? The improvement of automotive antitheft devices and the develop- ment of neighborhood recreation centers? Or psychosurgeiy and the levying of fines? Considering the

goal definition of crime prevention, the answer might well be &dquo;yes.&dquo; But where means are concerned, the matter is heavily clouded by definitional ambiguity and theo- retical contradiction. The purpose of the following dis-

cussion, then, is threefold: (1) to examine briefly the philosophical roots and related definitional issues of crime prevention; (2) to outline a conceptual framework that will

provide a more useful understand-

ing of crime prevention; and (3) to specify the most fruitful direction for the development of theory, re- search, and programing in crime

prevention. Considering the present state of competing and contradic- tory views on the prevention of

285

criminal behavior, we judge this to he a timely endeavor.

Punishment, Treatment, and Crime Prevention

Punishment is a persistent prob- lem for social theorists: its definition is elusive and its justification is debat~ible.1 Nevertheless, a defini- tion of the standard case of punish- ment, roughly acceptable to utili-

tarians, seems to have evolved from the work of Antony Flew.’ Under this definition, punishment is (1) a painful or unpleasant consequence (2) intentionally imposed by other persons (3) upon an offender (4) for his offense against legal rules (5) under authority of the legal system against which the offense was com- mitted.3 The paramount utilitarian justification for the imposition of punishment has been that it will

prevent crime.’

Recent scholarship has shown, however, that the ethical issues in- volved in the application of painful or unpleasant consequences to in- dividual men by agents of legal systems cannot properly be circum- scribed by the concept of punish- ment. Troublesome children, re-

tarded people, madmen, and drug abusers are all currently subject to treatment through legal process at the hands of what Kittrie has called the &dquo;therapeutic state. &dquo;S The actual consequences accruing to people being treated differ very little from the consequences accruing to people being punished. Herbert Packer has observed that

punishment and treatment can be distinguished primarily by the put- pose for which the consequence is

imposed: crime prevention or retri- bution, or both, in the case of

punishment; social protection or in- dividual betterment, or both, in the case of treatment.6 But that distinc- tion blurs when social protection is equated with prevention of social harms (including crimes) in the more aggressive literature of deter- ministic cr iminology.’ This blurring of a weak distinction increases in

many legislative formulations. &dquo;Pre- vention of harm to self or others,&dquo; for instance, is the seventh most

frequently mandated ground for ex- ercise of juvenile court jurisdiction

1. Recent collections which probe the debate between utilitarians and retributionists include

Jeffrie G. Murphy, Punishment and Responsibil- ity (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1973): Ru-

dolph J. Gerber and Patrick D. McAnany, Con- temporary Punishment (South Bend, Ind.: Uni- versity of Notre Dame Press, 1972); Stanley E. Grupp, Theories of Punishment (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1971).

2. Antony Flew, "The Justification of Punish- ment," Philosophy, October 1954, pp. 291 et seq. Those who have adopted Flew’s position in- clude H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsi- bility (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), and Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968).

3. Packer attempted to make the definition workable for both utilitarians and retributionists

by adding a sixth condition to the standard case adduced by Flew: "That it be imposed for the dominant purpose of preventing offenses against legal rules or of exacting retribution from of- fenders, or both." Packer, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 31.

4. Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punish- ments, Henry Paolucci, trans. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp. 42, 93-94; Jeremy

Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Haffner, 1948); Packer, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 31. 5. Nicholas N. Kittrie, The Right to Be Dif-

ferent : Deviance and Enforced Therapy (Balti- more, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).

6. Packer, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 25-30. 7. Barbara A. Wootton, Crime and the Crim-

inal Law (London: Stevens, 1963); Marc Ancel, Social Defence (New York: Schocken, 1966); Karl Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (New York: Viking’1968).

286

in American juvenile court legisla- tion.&dquo; The British N’lental Health Act of 1959 provides for compul- sory hospital commitment of the retarded, psychopathic, or mentally ill person in the interest of his health or safety, or for the protec- tion of others.9 9

Though punishment and treat-

ment t are generally regarded as

closely related concepts, one com- mon conceptual tie has not been

developed. Both the general justifi- cation of punishment and treatment and the specific justification of

particular forms of punishment and treatment, as well as hybrid peno- therapeutic practices such as proba- tion and halfway house confine- ment, are considered to be crime

prevention. We suggest that analysis of this common conceptual goal- crime prevention-may be the key to a better understanding of the definitional and ethical distinctions between punishment and treatment. One of the more striking features

of the Anglo-American system of criminal justice is a divergence be- tween systemic activity and systemic ideology. The system lOin action deals in post hoc assessment, of f culpability and assignment of pun- ishment. Police arrest offenders after the offense occurs; courts

adjudicate offenders after the of- fense occurs; prisons punish offend-

ers after the offense occurs.11 I Yet each major element of the criminal justice system professes a special calling to prevent crime. Thus, says the American Bar Association, &dquo;Police administrators...character- ize prevention as their primary 1

goal. &dquo;1 z The President’s Crime Commission pointed out that &dquo;It is

generally assumed that police have a pr eventive...role as well. &dquo;’ 3 And the recent report by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals defined the primary goal of police as crime prevention According to the American Law

Institute, the prime purpose of a

penal code is &dquo;to forbid and pre- vent&dquo; crimes, and the principal purpose of sentencing and treat-

ment t of offenders is &dquo;to prevent the commission of offenses.&dquo;1 S

8. From a list of thirty-four such grounds compiled in Frederick B. Sussman and Frederic S. Baum, Law of Juvenile Delinquency, 3rd. ed. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1968), p. 12.

9. Mental Health Act 1959 § 26; cf. § § 60, 61, permitting commitment of retarded, psycho- pathic, or mentally ill convicts to the same men- tal hospitals in lieu of sentence.

10. It is a "system" in the formal sense—a set of elements which interact in some significant way. We do not imply that the interaction is

necessarily smooth or efficient. The criminal

justice system is amazingly inefficient.

11. The juvenile justice system, compulsory narcotics addict commitment schemes, eugenic sterilization laws, and sexual psychopath laws have all tried to deal with potential offenders before any offense has been committed. All have been under serious attack of late as distri-

butively unjust. 12. American Bar Association Project on

Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relat- ing to the Urban Police Function, approved draft (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1973), p. 56. The standards also point out that the first commissioner of the London Metropol- itan Police set crime prevention as the first priority for the new police—ahead of apprehen- sion and prosecution of offenders. Id., pp. 55- 56. The standards themselves, however, reverse that order, giving apprehension first priority and prevention second priority out of a ranked list of eleven priorities. Id., § 2.2.

13. President’s Commission on Law Enforce- ment and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D. C.: U. S.

Govt. Printing Office, 1967), p. 13. 14. National Advisory Commission on Crim-

inal Justice Standards and Goals, A National Strategy to Reduce Crime (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1973), pp. 103-05.

15. American Law Institute, Model Penal

Code, Proposed Official Draft (Philadelphia: American Law Intitute), § § 1.02, pp. 2-3.

287

Since courts necessarily make con- tact with suspected actual offenders and convicted offenders rather than

potential offenders, prevention takes two forms: general deterrence through exemplary sentencing and special deterrence through selective sentencing involving combinations of punishment and treatment. The goal of sentencing courts is crime

prevention.16 6 The preventive purpose of correc-

tional agencies is less directly ex-

pressed than that of police or courts but appears strongly in the Ameri- can Correctional Association’s equa- tion of modern penology with &dquo;rehabilitation&dquo;-the reform or con- trol of offenders so that they will not commit new crimes when re-

lcascd from custody or super- B-Ision.&dquo; Of course, the historical

penitentiary was designed to

serve general and special deterrence purposes. The goal of the correc-

tional subsystem, then, is to pre- vent recidivism. Outside of the criminal justice

system, many community organiza- tions and agencies engage in activ- ities of which crime prevention is at least one of the major purposes. These include such diverse programs as parent education, mental health services, recreational activities, voca- tional education and employment counseling, drug abuse treatment

services, remedial academic classes, public information programs on

protection of self and property, crisis intervention telephone ser-

vices, school programs on youth and the law, and so forth. Every public reference to crime preven- tion is coupled with a proposal for some form of further community involvement in reducing the op- portunity for, deterring, or treating criminality.

Clearly, with each of the major crimina justice subsystems as well as several noncriminal justice sys- tems being committed to crime

prevention, the concept must have wide temporal and behavioral scope -so wide, in fact, that it is of dubious value without definitional refinement.

A Paradigm for Analysis of Crime Prevention

A legitimate argument may be made that each of the subsystems referred to above poaches on the crime prevention functions of the others-business organizations en-

gage in security and law enforce- ment activities, community agencies provide services to probationers and parolees, police engage in adjudica- tion and correctional activities

through informal probation and

cautioning schemes, prosecutors and probation officers become in- volved in detective work, and cor- rectional officers investigate and

adjudicate rule violations by in-

custody offenders. Most of the time, however, the preventive activities of noncriminal justice programs, po- lice, courts, and correction are sub- stantially different. The points of distinction may be identified most

clearly by the level or stage in the development of crimina behavior at which intervening activity is

implemented. Since it is similarly conceived as intervention at dif-

16. R. M. Jackson, Enforcing the Law, rev.

ed. (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1971), pp.311-30. 17. American Correctional Association, Man-

ual of Correctional Standards, 3rd ed. (College Park, Md.: American Correctional Association, 1966), pp. 6-12. See also the ACA’s statement on objectives of the correctional system: "Sim- ply stated, the basic goal of a correctional sys- tem is to provide public protection by aiding in the prevention of crime." Id., p. 1.

288

ferent developmental levels, the

public heath model of disease pre- vention is analogous and useful.’ 8 The public health model posits

three levels of activity.’9 9 Primacy prevention identifies disease-creat-

ing general conditions of the en-

vironment and seeks to abate those conditions (e.g., sewage treatment, mosquito extermination, small-pox vaccination, job-safety engineering, personal hygiene education). Sec-

ondar~~ prevention identifies groups or individuals who have a high risk of developing disease or who have incipient cases of disease and inter- venes in their lives with special treatments designed to prevent the risk from materializing or the incip- ient case from growing worse (e.g., chest x-rays in poor neighborhoods, special diets for overweight execu- tives, rubella vaccinations for pro- spective but not-yet-expectant mothers, dental examinations). 7~r- trary prevention identifies individ- uals with advanced cases of disease and intervenes with treatment to

prevent death or permanent disabil- ity (e.g., stomach pumping for

poisoning, open-heart surgery for defective heart valves, radiation

therapy for some forms of cancer), provides rehabilitation services for

those persons who must live under the constraints of permanent dis-

ability (e.g., Braille training for the blind, prosthetic limbs for ampu- tees), and provides a measure of f relief from pain and suffering for individuals with incurable diseases (e.g., opiate therapy for terminal cancer patients, leper colonies ).20 Tertiary prevention, then, aims at three forms of prevention: (1) pre- vention of death or disability; (2) prevention of a decline to a less

adequate level of social, economic, and physical activity; (3) preven- tion of more physical and social

pain than necessary in an inevitable demise. Crime prevention can be con-

ceptualized as operating at these same three levels.2’ (See Figure 1).

18. We recognize the risk inherent in borrow- ing a conceptual model from medicine. Crimi- nology is only just beginning to recover from the damage done by the Positivist School’s use of the medical analogy of crime as disease. In

borrowing from public health concepts here, we have modified the public health model to fit the criminological situation rather than vice versa.

19. Hugh R. Leavell and E. Gurney Clark, Preventive Medicine for the Doctor in His Com- munity : An Epidemiological Approach, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 19-28. We are indebted to Jack Wright, of the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-

vices, for bringing the public health paradigm to our attention.

20. We have modified the groups of activity within the primary, secondary, and tertiary classifications described above to facilitate their use for criminological purposes. See Leavell and Clark, op. cit. supra note 19, pp. 20-21. For an argument that an unmodified public health mo- del is not useful to criminological thinking, even in the drug abuse area, see Richard Brot- man and Frederic Suffet, "The Concept of Pre- vention and Its Limitations," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social

Science, January 1975, pp. 55-56. 21. Lejins has developed a tripartite classifi-

cation of crime prevention which cuts orthogon- ally across our model. Thus, he describes (1) punitive prevention (a primary and tertiary form), (2) corrective prevention (a primary and secondary form), and (3) mechanical preven- tion (a primary and tertiary form). Peter Lejins, "The Field of Prevention," Delinquency Preven- tion : Theory and Practice, William Amos and Charles Wellford, eds. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 1-21. Wolfgang’s tri-

partite categorization of prevention appears to be a breakdown of secondary and tertiary forms of prevention. Marvin E. Wolfgang, "Urban

Crime," The Metropolitan Enigma, James Q. Wilson, ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), p. 299. The Florida State Bureau of Criminal

Justice Planning has developed a typology of crime prevention programs which also cuts a-

cross our model. It defines programs of preven- tion aimed at (1) the initiating conditions of

289

290

Primary crime prevention identifies conditions of the physical and social environment that provide oppor- tunities for or precipitate criminal acts. Here the objective of interven- tion is to alter those conditions so that crimes cannot occur. Secoll- dary crime prevention engages in

early identification of potential of- fenders and seeks to intervene in their lives in such a way that they never commit criminal violation. Tertiary crime prevention deals with actual offenders and involves intervention in their lives in such a fashion that they will not commit further offenses. With this classifi- cation in view, let us examine the

relationship of these levels of crime prevention to contemporary issues in criminal justice. For the purpose of analysis, we will consider the three levels of crime prevention in reverse order.

Application of the Nlodel The correctional subsystem with-

in the criminal justice system is

charged with tertiary prevention. The optimistic-perhaps heroic-

assumption is made that, through effective intervention, the offender will be fully restored to a perma- nent, functional level of socially acceptable behavior. For those of- fenders whose behavior is not amen- able to modification through known forms of punishment or

treatment, tertiary prevention aims to provide such control of the of- fender’s behavior as is necessary to protect society and elicit the high- est and most sustained level of con-

forming behavior possible.22 2 The

preventive aspect of intervention at this level may be found in the no- tion that such intervention keeps society from being placed at in- creased risk, keeps the offender from being placed at greater risk for his own harmful behavior and from the excessive retaliation of others,2 3 and keeps conditions from occur-

ring which offer no opportunity and encouragement for whatever higher level of conforming behavior the offender might be capable of

achieving at some future time. For offenders whose criminal be-

havior is not amenable to correction

through known forms of punish- ment and treatment and who are

seen as potentially dangerous to

society, the traditional societal re-

action has been incapacitation-the imposition of lifetime or long-term confinement t in a secure setting. This confinement has been justified as societal protection.24 4 Theoreti-

cally, it is assumed that the behavior of offenders in this category might improve to some degree but not

crime (primary prevention) and (2) the sustain- ing conditions of crime (secondary prevention). Florida Bureau of Criminal Justice Planning and Assistance, The Florida Annual Action Plan for 1974 (Tallahassee, Fla., 1974), pp. 1-21.

22. Capital punishment does not fall within this conceptual model without straining the an- alogy considerably since the legal and ethical tenets of public health medicine do not include the intentional infliction of death, regardless of the patient’s medical threat to the health of others. If we do strain the analogy, however, the death penalty might be viewed as the most extreme form of tertiary prevention, with gen- eral deterrence feedback to the primary preven- tion level.

23. Canadian Committee on Correction, The Basic Principles and Purposes of Criminal Justice (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969).

24. Capital punishment is excluded from con- sideration here and is not treated seriously with- in the general model of crime prevention, since the principal justification for imposition of the death penalty is retribution rather than any utilitarian judgment that the offender is not amenable to reform or rehabilitation and is too dangerous for less final methods of incapa- citation.

291

sufficiently to warrant their release from custody in the near future. But still, any behavioral improve- ment is desirable. Toward this end, the President’s Crime Commission recommended that offenders of this type be transferred to special institutions that would &dquo;encourage the development of more imagina- tive programs for long-term pris- oners-special industries, perhaps greater independence and self-suf-

ficiency within the confines of a

secure institution. &dquo;2 S For those offenders who are not seen as

potentially serious threats to so-

ciety, the correctional system com- bines rehabilitation and reform to elicit more conforming behavior. The hope is that the behavioral im- provements for these prisoners will be sufficient to inhibit further illegal activities.

Effective tertiary prevention is the primary goal of the correctional subsystem. It is also one of the

goals of the courts and the proba- tion and parole service as these sub- systems interact and interlink with correction. Effective tertiary pre- vention is, and always has been, more idea than actual. But the

justification of particular forms of both punishment and treatment is

grounded on their efficacy in

achieving this level of prevention. As a result, corporal punishment has been generally abolished be- cause it fails to prevent recidivism rather than because it is inhumane, even though a case can be made for it on retributive grounds. Other forms of punishment such as im-

prisonment and other forms of

treatment such as castration of sex- ual offenders are currently under attack because they fail to reduce recidivism below the levels attained

by cheaper and less drastic methods. On the other hand, forms of punish- ment such as fines and forms of treatment such as psychosurgery, which promise improved tertiary prevention, are currently fashion- able even though retributive and humanitarian problems are raised.26 6 Secondary prevention is the level

at which crime prevention is most

fervently pursued in research and

program funding. Courts, probation and parole services, general social

services, educational institutions, planners, private citizens, and police all engage in secondary prevention. It is argued that poverty, low edu- cational level, lack of vocational skills, minority status, and poor physical and mental health are all associated with criminal activity. The assumption is that these social and physical problems are causally related to crime, although most cur- rent research rejects the causal link. Without question, the great bulk

of intervention activities labeled &dquo;crime prevention&dquo; must be catego- rized as secondary prcvention-i.e., early identification of potential of- fenders, followed by action de-

signed to reduce the risk of future involvement in more serious forms of antisocial behavior, particularly

25. President’s Commission on Law Enforce- ment and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1967), p. 58. (Our italics.)

26. See generally, Alan R. Mabe, ed., New Techniques and Strategies for Social Control: Ethical and Practical Limits, a special issue of American Behavioral Scientist, May-June 1975, for a group of articles probing state-of-the-art issues in behavioral control. Note that the ethi- cal and legal issues surrounding such modes of behavioral control make them politically vulner- able as secondary and tertiary prevention tech- niques. See, e. g., "Clockwork Orange Projects Banned," Crime & Delinquency, July 1974, pp. 314-15.

292

criminal behavior. For example, during the 1960’s, massive federal, state, and local programs wcrc

mounted to identify and deal with problems nl’ school drop-outs, voca- tionally untrained and economical- ly disadvantaged youth, physically and mentally handicapped individu- als, minority group members, etc., with the assumption that such inter- vention would curb and reverse the

incrcasing crime rates. 2 7 While these endeavors have been launched toward laudable objectives, they have frequently rested on thc false

assumption that they were striking at the root &dquo;cause&dquo; of crime and

delinquency whcn, instead, they werc dealing only with observable symptoms.28 R Primary prevention-identifica-

tion of those conditions of the

physical and social environment that provide opportunities for or

precipitate criminal behavior and the alteration of those conditions so that no crimes occur-is clearly the ideal objective. In fact this is the objective that is posited as the justification for most secondary prevention activities, but obviously the identification of incipient cases implies that the opportunity for

primary prevention (in those in- stances at least) has already passed. With a few notable exceptions, there has been little systematic study of primary prevention of criminal behavior.29 9 The work ac-

complished at this level has been

largely pursued along one of three lines: (1) psychological immuniza- tion from certain types of be- havioral icl7dencies, (2) prcclusion of criminal activity by 1’CdCSlgll of the physical environment, and (3) general &dquo;dCtel’1’C17CC&dquo; of criminal

activity by exemplary sentences

and the presence of correctional facilities. The first two directions of inquiry have raised serious ethical and lcgal questions, to say nothing of the problem of resource alloca- tion for implementation on a scale large enough to affect crime rates

significantly.

Directions for Crime Prevention

Using the three-part model we can classify criminal justice system activities and noncriminal justice system activities designed to prevent t crime. As can be seen by examining Figures 2 and 3, most crime preven- tion activity has occurred in secon- dary and tertiary prevention. Less effort has becn spent on primary prevention. Tertiary prevention, currently,

consists mostly of efforts to &dquo;treat&dquo; offenders, but this &dquo;treatment&dquo; is

given in the absence of knowledge and competence to permanently &dquo;reform&dquo; tendencies toward illegal behavior. Most of what is done in the name of &dquo;treatment&dquo; is, in reality, little morc than an effort to help offenders cope and to control them through externally imposed pressures. If this fact were more

widely recognized in contemporary correction and the widespread myth of available effective treat-

ment were dispelled until human behavior is more fully understood, then resources could be more

appropriately allocated between

27. Peter Marris and Martin Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Aldine, 1973); Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding (New York: Free Press, 1968). 28. C. Ray Jeffery, Crime Prevention through

Environmental Design (Beverly Hills, Calif.:

Sage, 1971 ). 29. Ibid.; Oscar Newman, Defensible Space

(New York: Macmillan, 1972).

293

control activities and much I7ccdcd hehavioral research. For example, probation and parole officers recog- nise that their job has dimensions of both control and treatment-i.e., on the one hand, surveillance and serving as a source of information and, on the other, some type of therapeutic counseling. The type of training that probation and parole personnel generally receive, how- ever, places great emphasis on the treatment function and virtually ignores control technology. As a

result, these persons frequently spcnd the largcst share of their time and effort attempting to accom-

plish an unrealistic therapeutic task and resist the performance of less interesting and soften routine control activities which could produce more effective results. Further, the control relationship between cor-

rcctional personnel generally and offenders and their families might t be considerably strengthened if the delusion of effective treatment, and the subsequent disillusionment of failure, were removed. This leads to the conclusion, then,

that the rhetoric of effective treat- ment should be dropped, except for those few activities where the con-

sequences of therapeutic interven- tion have been rigorously tested and the outcome can be predicted with confidence (e.g., the con-

trolled use of chemotherapy in certain cases of aggressive behavior, or brain surgery where tumors are determined to be the cause of acts of violence). Such a narrowing of the operational definition of treat- ment is quite consistent with legal arguments and recent court de- cisions relating to the &dquo;right to

treatment&dquo; and would help to put the justification for coerced loss of liberty into proper perspective.3 0

Clearly differentiating between re-

habilitative control and treatment in tertiary prevention may spare many offenders imprisonment for nonexistent therapy, in favor of more humane and economical re-

habilitative programing. Research is also needed in the other forms of

tertiary prevention; e.g., special deterrence, postadjudicative diver- sion, and the deterrent effect of arrest and prosecution. At the level of secondary pre-

vention, there is certainly a need for continued research that will lead to the development of more accurate diagnostic lnSt1-L1I11eI1tS for the early identification of potential offenders and more effective inter- vention approaches. At present, however, the inadequate state of

knowledge precludes such diagnosis and intervention, except in rather rare instances, and suggests that

premature and inappropriate assign- ment of the &dquo;potential offender&dquo; label contributes to the crime prob- lein.~ ~ Thus, as with tertiary pre- vention, effective intervention at

the secondary level will have to

await the scientific achievement of a more complete understanding of human behavior in general and criminal behavior in particular and careful evaluation of existing secon- dary prevention schemes. On the basis of the foregoing dis-

cussion, it should come as no sur-

prise that primary prevention is viewed as the most fruitful direc- tion for the future development of 30. Kittrie, op. cit. supra note 5; Beverly G.

Toomey, Clifford E. Simonsen, and Harry E.

Allen, "Right to Treatment: Issues and Pros-

pects," Proceedings of the 20th Annual South- ern Conference on Corrections (Tallahassee, Fla.: Florida State University, 1975). 31. Frederic L. Faust, "Delinquency Label-

ing—Its Consequences and Implications," Crime & Delinquency, January 1973, pp. 41-48.

294

295

296

theory, research, and programing insofar as preventing criminal be- havior is concerned. Perhaps the most cogent argument in support of this position is that presented by C. Ray Jeffery in his Crimo Prevrn i ion t Izrollglz Environ mental l Design. 3 2 The logic that crime can most effec- tively be curbed by altering con- ditions that precipitate or provide opportunities for criminal behavior can hardly be challenged. The prob- lems of implementation, however, are staggering-not just problems of f required resources and legal and ethical considerations (these have

always been major challenges to the advancement of science), but more significantly the necessary shift in

public policy from almost total commitment to crisis intervention to an equally strong commitment to long-range behavioral research. Such a shift is by no means im-

possible, but under the most ad-

vantagcous conditions it would be

ponderously slow in taking place and the question of how to deal with the crime problem in the interim is legitimately raised. The answer, of course, is that we

cannot turn our backs on the prob- lem while we work to influence

public policy toward basic be- havioral research and wait for the

products of that research. Rather, we can place greater emphasis on more effective rehabilitative control, on the one hand, and basic research in primary prevention (involving limited pilot and demonstration

projects), on the other, using a

significant share of the resources

currently being expended on in- effective secondary and tertiary prevention programs. We entertain no illusions about the problems to be confronted in this endeavor. It is certainly an ambitious goal, but it holds promise for ultimately pre- venting much, if not most, criminal behavior before rather than after it has occurred.32. Jeffery, op. cit. supra note 28.