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What Rights and Which Countries?: US Human Rights Policy in the Multilateral Development Banks Daniel B. Braaten Published online: 28 May 2014.

To cite this article: Daniel B. Braaten (2014) What Rights and Which Countries?: US Human Rights Policy in the Multilateral Development Banks, Journal of Human Rights, 13:2, 205-229, DOI: 10.1080/14754835.2013.824287

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What Rights and Which Countries?: US Human Rights Policy in the Multilateral Development Banks

DANIEL B. BRAATEN

What rights in particular does the United States seek to promote in the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), and what countries does the United States single out for sanction in the MDBs for their record on human rights? The present article examines these questions through an analysis of the US voting record in the MDBs. In 2004, the US Treasury Department began publishing the US voting record in the MDBs along with an explanation for why the United States votes against certain proposals. This article analyzes those votes specifically regarding human rights. Overall, the United States pursues a variety of human rights issues in the MDBs against a variety of countries with poor human rights records. More specifically, the two most prominent trends revealed in the data are the United States consistently voting against proposals from China for human rights reasons and the United States voting against proposals from countries that are alleged to be hiding war criminals.

Introduction

This article answers two specific questions about human rights and US foreign policy in the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). What rights in particular does the United States seek to promote in the MDBs, and what countries does the United States single out for sanction in the MDBs for their record on human rights? There is a substantial literature on how human rights influence the allocation of US bilateral aid (Meernik et al. 1998; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009). There is also an additional literature that examines whether human rights influence the allocation of aid by international organizations such as the World Bank and the other MDBs (Neumayer 2003a, 2003b; Lebovic and Voeten 2009). In addition, there is a literature that examines the MDBs as foreign policy tools of great powers such as the United States and Japan (Kilby 2006, 2011). The present study seeks to incorporate and build on these previous works by focusing specifically on US human rights policy in the MDBs and how it varies across countries and specific rights issues. It does so by using a unique dataset of US votes in the MDBs to answer these questions.

The United States has to vote on whether it will support or oppose every loan or grant proposal that comes before the World Bank and the rest of the MDBs.1 In 2004, the US Congress mandated that the Treasury Department make public its positions (yes,

Daniel B. Braaten is currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Lutheran Uni- versity and his research focuses on US foreign policy, human rights, and international organizations. He received a PhD in Political Science from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln in 2012. He has previously published works in the Review of International Studies and Journal of Peace Research.

Address correspondence to Daniel B. Braaten, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Political Science, and Geography, Texas Lutheran University, Langner Hall 130, 1000 W Court Street, Seguin, TX 78155, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

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no, or abstain) on each proposal that is voted on in the MDBs.2 The Treasury Department is also required to give a reason as to why it voted no or abstained from voting on each proposal it opposed. These “reason codes” primarily refer to the section of the legislation that governs the vote in question. These legislative mandates require the US Executive Directors (USEDs) in the respective MDBs to use their “voice and vote” to steer policy in the MDBs. Depending on the wording of the legislation, and subsequent directives in committee reports, the leeway of the USEDs (and, by extension, the Treasury Department and other Executive Branch agencies involved in US MDB policymaking) to vote a particular way can vary.

There are 68 reason codes that correspond to specific legislation. The reason codes range from general economic considerations to political concerns such as human rights, environmental protection, and support for international terrorism among others.3 There are 24 separate reason codes covering human rights. These codes can be broken down into three categories: general human rights code, specific human rights codes, and country-specific codes. The general human rights code category refers to the International Financial Institu- tions Act of 1977 (IFI Act). Section 701 of the IFI act instructed the USEDs in the MDBs to use their “voice and vote” to direct assistance away from countries which systematically violate individual human rights unless the assistance would directly contribute to the basic human needs of the recipient countries’ citizens (U.S Congress 1977). The specific human rights codes category refers to legislation, which prohibits assistance to countries that are charged with violating specific human rights (e.g., war crimes, workers’ rights, female genital mutilation, and religious persecution). Finally, the country-specific category refers to legislation that prohibits assistance to specific countries because of their human rights record (e.g., Burma, Cambodia, Cuba, Serbia, and Zimbabwe). The recent publication of US votes in the MDBs, along with the reason codes indicating why the United States voted the way it did, provides a rich new source of empirical content to analyze.

The rest of this article lays out the evidence from the analysis of the reason codes. It begins with a section on the US MDB policymaking process (i.e., the voting decision process). The next section describes what the specific human rights legislation referenced by the codes mandates the United States to do. The following section addresses the total amount of human rights codes that have been applied and also breaks the human rights reason codes down by year and specific code. The section also presents the number of general human rights codes, specific human rights codes, and country-specific codes applied, respectively. This section is followed by the conclusion.

US MDB Policymaking Process

The United States exerts a considerable amount of influence in the MDBs through both formal and informal means. Several studies have shown that the United States has been particularly successful in affecting MDB activities through informal channels involving staffing decisions and choice of leadership (Andersen et al. 2006; Wade 2002; Woods 2003; Babb 2009). This section will focus exclusively on the influence exerted through formal means, particularly through the voting structure of the MDBs.

The United States is represented in the MDBs in both the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors. The front line in the relationship between the United States and the MDBs, however, is in the Board of Directors. The US Executive Director (USED) represents the interests of the United States in the Board of Directors (the Treasury Secretary represents the United States in the Board of Governors) and is responsible for casting votes on behalf of the United States. The USEDs have been described as the “eyes, ears, and voices of

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the United States within those organizations [MDBs]” (Sanford 2011: 3). The president appoints the USEDs, with Senate approval, and they report to the Treasury Department. The Treasury Department has been delegated responsibility over US participation in the MDBs. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Development Policy and Debt is responsible for MDB policy and he or she serve under the general guidance of the Under Secretary for International Affairs and the Assistant Secretary for International Finance (Sanford 2011). The day-to-day management issues are handled by the Office of Multilateral Development Banking, which at one time consisted of a small staff of roughly 20 individuals and was led by a director (Upton 2000). In recent years, however, the staffing level has dropped to only five full-time and five part-time people involved with MDB issues in the Treasury Department (Office of Debt and Development, US Treasury Department, personal interview, December 28, 2010).

Although the Treasury Department has the lead in MDB operations, it is not the only Executive Branch agency with influence over MDB policy. The Treasury Department leads a weekly interagency meeting called the Working Group on Multilateral Assistance (WGMA) in which other government agencies can weigh in on MDB policy. The WGMA reviews the loan packages on which the USED will have to vote to determine if the loans are consistent with US policy and US law. The WGMA then sends its recommendations on to the Treasury Department, which in turn sends them to the USEDs. Additional agencies that participate in the policy process include the State Department, the Commerce Department the Agriculture Department, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Agencies such as the Office of Management and Budget, the Transportation Department, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Labor Department, the Federal Reserve, and the Export-Import Bank among others have responsibilities that are influenced by the MDBs but rarely participate in the policy process (Sanford 2011).

The State Department, and specifically the Office of Development Finance, reviews MDB loan proposals to determine if they are in line with current US human rights policy and law (Office of Development Finance, US State Department, personal interview, January 10, 2011). In addition to the weekly WGMA, there is also a monthly meeting with staff from the Treasury and State Departments, USAID, and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The Bank Information Center (BIC), a watchdog group that monitors the projects and policies of the World Bank and other international financial institutions, organizes the meeting. The agenda of the meetings is set by the BIC and other NGOs represented but the focus is often on the environmental and humanitarian issues associated with MDB lending. This monthly meeting allows NGOs some space to voice their concerns regarding MDB policy and lending decisions to those responsible for formulating US MDB voting decisions (Office of Development Finance, US State Department, personal interview, January 10, 2011).

Congress also plays a role in formulating US policy in the MDBs. In general, Congress sets the broad outlines for US policy while the Executive (primarily the Treasury) has responsibility for managing the details of that policy (Sanford 1982). There are two basic ways for Congress to set MDB policy: through the use of substantive legislation which attempts to control the “voice and vote” of the United States in the MDBs and appropriations legislation that uses the “power of the purse” to set the US contribution limits to the MDBs (Sanford 1988). Decisions made regarding MDB contributions are situated within the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Financial Services Committee. The use of substantive legislation creates obligations for the USEDs to vote against certain loan packages or loans to certain countries or at minimum to express reservations regarding the proposal or the county that is receiving it. Congress has used

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both substantive and appropriations legislation to address human rights issues over 16 times since the passage of the IFI Act in 1977.

One of the major limitations on the ability of Congress to use legislation, especially substantive legislation, to impact US policy toward the MDBs is oversight of the imple- mentation of that legislation. There is an inherent tension between the Executive Branch and Congress in the implementation of foreign policy, and multilateral aid policy is no exception. For example, Section 701 of the IFI Act mandating that the United States use its “voice and vote” to steer loans away from states that violate human rights was a point of contention between the Carter administration and Congress as well as the Reagan adminis- tration and Congress (Forsythe 1987). Legislation passed by Congress is implemented by the Executive Branch agencies. Congress is at an information disadvantage in relation to the Executive, and the MDBs themselves, since the USED reports directly to the Treasury Department. To rectify some of this information asymmetry, Congress has required the Treasury Department to report periodically with specific information on MDB activities and US votes.

Human Rights Legislation

General and Specific Human Rights Legislation

The human rights category is comprised of 24 reason codes that derive from 16 pieces of legislation (see Table 1). As was mentioned above, the human rights reason codes can be broken down into three categories. The first is called the general human rights category and contains only one code. This category includes only the human rights provision of Sec. 701 of the 1977 International Financial Institutions Act. This section requires the USEDs to vote against proposals going to countries that systematically violate the human rights of their citizens. More specifically, the general human rights provision of the IFI act states that the United States is to vote against loans going to countries that engage in “torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial to life, liberty, and the security of person” (US Congress 1977: 2–3).

The second category is specific human rights violations and contains nine codes. This category includes legislation that requires the USED to use its “voice and vote” to steer MDB proposals away from countries that violate specific human rights. The specific rights in question include failure to apprehend war criminals, violating worker’s rights, female gentile mutilation, religious persecution, and allowing human trafficking. With regard to apprehending war criminals, there are two pieces of legislation in question: the Foreign Appropriations Act of 2002 specifically Section 581 (a–d) (US Congress 2002) and the Foreign Appropriations Act of 2006 specifically Sections 561(a)(1) (US Congress 2006a), which deal with the harboring of war criminals and the failure to apprehend war criminals, respectively. These pieces of legislation came about in the aftermath of the wars in the Balkans. The US Congress felt that countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia were dragging their feet in cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and inactively searching for war criminals that may have been living within their borders. Both pieces of legislation require the Secretary of State to make the determination as to whether these countries have taken the necessary steps to meet their international obligations regarding apprehending war criminals and cooperation with the ICTY. In addition, the Secretary of State can waive the prohibition if the assistance is humanitarian, supports democratization or if it directly supports the implementation of the Dayton Accords (US Congress 2002, 2006a).

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Table 1 Human Rights Legislation Used in Determining US Votes in MDBs

Public Law Description

P.L. 95-118, Sec. 701 Human rights—use voice and vote to steer loans away from countries that consistently engage in “torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial to life, liberty, and the security of person” (US Congress 1977: 2–3). Unless the assistance contributes to basic human needs

P.L. 107-115, Sec. 581 (b-d) Harboring indictees for war crimes P.L. 104-208, 570(a)(2) Policy towards Burma (human rights/democratic

government) P.L. 108-447, Sec. 554(a) Government of Cambodia—assistance supports basic

human needs, assistance does not support basic human needs

P.L. 109-102, Sec. 561(a)(1) Failing to apprehend war criminal indictees—exceptions or waiver authority not applied, exceptions or waiver authority applies

P.L. 100-202, Sec. 406(1) Worker rights P.L. 104-208, Sec. 579 Female genital mutilation P.L. 105-292, Title V, Sec.

402, 405(12) and 422 Religious persecution—assistance supports basic human

needs, assistance does not support basic human needs P.L. 106-386, Sec. 110 Trafficking in persons, assistance supports one or more

specified exceptions, assistance does not qualify under any specified exception

P.L. 107-99 Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act P.L. 109-102 Zimbabwe P.L. 109-102, Sec. 563 Serbia—certified, not certified P.L. 107-245 Sudan Peace Act section 6(b)(2) (2002) P.L. 108-61 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act P.L. 111-117 Sri Lanka—assistance supports basic human needs,

assistance does not support basic human needs P.L. 109-408, Sec. 6(e) Belarus—assistance meets humanitarian needs,

assistance does not meet humanitarian needs

Another specific type of human right represented with a reason code is workers’ rights. The Foreign Appropriations Act of 1988, specifically Section 406 (1), required the USED to vote against loans to countries which violate workers’ rights by denying their ability to form independent labor unions (US Congress 1988).

The legislative prohibition on female genital mutilation stems from the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, specifically Section 579, which has two components. The USED is to use its “voice and vote” to oppose any loan going to countries where (1) female genital mutilation is common practice and the country (2) has not taken steps to imple- ment educational programs to help prevent the practice of female genital mutilation. The prohibition does not prevent the USED from voting for loans going to countries where

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female genital mutilation occurs. It only requires that the USED vote to prevent loans going to those countries where the practice occurs and the government is not actively trying to reduce it through educational programs (US Congress 1997).

An additional specific human rights legislative prohibition includes repression of reli- gious freedom. In 1998, Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), which was intended to make support for religious freedom a core component of US foreign policy (US Congress 1998a). The IRFA established various entities required to monitor re- ligious freedom around the world including the Office of International Religious Freedom. This office is charged with designating specific countries as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) if they commit “systematic, ongoing and egregious violations of religious freedom” (US Congress 1998a: 5). The IRFA gives the president a number of tools to deal with countries that are deemed to be of particular concern for their denial of religious freedom. Those tools include public condemnation, denial of public visits, and more consequential tools such as withdrawal of financial assistance. This of course includes the ability to direct the USED to use its voice and to vote to steer funds away from those countries that severely violate religious freedom. The IRFA was later amended to allow the president to waive punishment for religious freedom violators if it was believed that doing so was necessary for national security or in the interest of religious freedom.

The final specific human rights legislative prohibition is human trafficking. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA), passed in 2000, mandates that the United States will not provide assistance to countries that fail to comply with minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking or, at a minimum, are not working towards such ends. The exception to the prohibition includes assistance for humanitarian- or trade-related issues (US Congress 2000). The mechanics of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act are similar to the International Religious Freedom Act. The VTVPA requires the State Department to annually make a list of countries that are failing to meet the minimum standards for eliminating human trafficking and are also failing at working towards complying with the minimum standards. The president is then required to direct the USED to use its voice and to vote to steer funds away from those countries that violate the act. However, much like the IRFA, there are certain conditions under which the president can exercise some waiver authority in implementing the provisions of the VTVPA. For instance, the president can waive the prohibition if the assistance to the country is deemed to be in US national interest or if the country is already subject to other human rights prohibitions, thereby making the current prohibition redundant.

Country-Specific Human Rights Legislation

The third human rights reason code category is country-specific legislation. This category includes legislation requiring the USEDs to vote against loans going to Belarus, Burma, Cambodia, Zimbabwe, Serbia, Sudan, and Sri Lanka. The reason for the legislation varies depending on the country and includes general issues such as promoting democratic reforms, as well as specific measures such as apprehending war criminals. There are two separate pieces of legislation governing US policy toward Burma in the MDBs, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 specifically Section 570(a)(2), and the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act (BFDA) of 2003. The first piece of legislation prevents votes for proposals going to Burma until the country makes progress on implementing democratic reforms and improving human rights practices. The legislation requires that the USED continue to vote against proposals for Burma until the president certifies to Congress that the Burmese government has successfully moved forward in implementing democratic reforms. The

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president can also waive the prohibition if the assistance will contribute to US national security. Finally, the statute also allows for a waiver of the prohibition if the assistance is for humanitarian needs, for counternarcotic assistance, for crop substitution assistance or if it promotes human rights or democracy in Burma (US Congress 1997).

The second piece of legislation, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act (BFDA), specifically acknowledges that the United States will recognize the National League of Democracy (NLD) as the legitimate representative of the Burmese people and not the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the former ruling junta of Burma. Also, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act lays out specific measures the Burmese government must take before the United States will support loans to Burma in the MDBs. Specifi- cally, they include measureable progress on reducing the incidents of rape, violations of workers’ rights including using forced and child labor, releasing all political prisoners, allowing freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of association, freedom of religion, and transition to civilian government through democratic elections (US Congress 2003). In 2011, the State Peace and Development Council dissolved and the Union Government took its place. Although the new government is still headed by members of the former regime, it has engaged in a series of measures that have lessened its authoritarian nature. These measures include releasing some political prisoners, allowing opposition parties to participate in the political process, opening negotiations with ethnic-based resistance movements, allowing some freedom of the press, among other reforms. These steps have led the Obama administration to look at removing some of the various economic sanctions against Burma (Martin 2012). As of this writing, however, the prohibition on support- ing proposals from Burma in the MDBs is still active. However, members of Congress have stated that they will not seek an extension of the sanctions (Rowley and Ten Kate 2013).

Another country-specific legislative prohibition is found in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) of 2001. The act requires the USED to vote against proposals going to Zimbabwe until the president certifies that the rule of law has been restored in Zimbabwe, including “respect for ownership and title to property, freedom of speech and association, and an end to the lawlessness, violence, and intimidation spon- sored, condoned, or tolerated by the Government of Zimbabwe, the ruling party, and their supporters or entities” (US Congress 2001a: 2–3). The legislation also calls on Zimbabwe to conduct free and fair presidential elections along with other reforms regarding the dis- tribution of land, ending its involvement in the war in the Congo, and bringing the military under civilian control. The Foreign Appropriations Act of 2006 also contains a provision for voting against proposals from Zimbabwe. The provision contains many of the same prohibitions as the ZDERA Act but also states that the USED can support proposals if they support basic human needs or promote democracy (US Congress 2006a).

There are also legislative prohibitions preventing the USED from voting for proposals going to Cambodia. The prohibition was amended in the Consolidated Appropriations Act in 2005, specifically Section 554(a), to allow for approval only of funds that would go to local governments in Cambodia, or NGOs working in Cambodia, but not to the central government. The legislation has a basic human needs exemption and also provides for exemptions for education and basic healthcare programs, rule of law programs, counternar- cotics programs, and programs that aim to combat human trafficking (US Congress 2005). The intentions of the legislative prohibitions are multipurpose but are mainly intended to put pressure on the Cambodian government to cooperate with the hybrid tribunal prosecuting individuals for crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge era. The legislation requires that the Secretary of State provide assurances that the Cambodian judicial system is adequate

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in terms of independence and adherence to international standards of justice and fairness (Lum 2007).

There are also legislative prohibitions against voting for proposals involving the gov- ernment of Serbia. Section 563 of the Foreign Appropriations Act of 2006 requires that before the USED can support loans to Serbia the president must certify that Serbia is coop- erating with the ICTY. The certification takes place each year after May 31st. Cooperation entails access for investigators, the provision of documents, and the surrender of those under indictment or, at minimum, help in providing their apprehension. The legislation specif- ically mentions that both Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic must be apprehended.4

Additionally, the legislation says that before the president can certify Serbia the govern- ment must no longer be providing support to Bosnian Serb institutions and must have begun implementation of laws meant to protect ethnic minorities. Loans going for humanitarian needs or prodemocracy aid are not subject to the prohibition (US Congress2006a).

The prohibition preventing the USED from voting for proposals going to the Sudan stemmed from the ongoing human rights abuses committed by the Sudanese government. The Sudan Peace Act was passed in 2001 and contained a variety of provisions for the US government to undertake to pressure the Sudanese government to stem the atrocities it was committing, including genocide and slavery. The legislative language directing the USED to oppose loans to Sudan in the Sudan Peace Act is slightly different than the other pieces of legislation. The normal language employed is for the USEDs to use their “voice and vote” to deny loans to specific countries. The Sudan Peace Act however uses arguably stronger language. It states that the USED is to “continue to vote against and actively oppose any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the Government of Sudan” (US Congress 2001b: 1508). The difference is in the use of the language of “voice and vote” in the other legislation versus the “vote against and actively oppose” language of the Sudan Peace Act; the latter is arguably stronger and more forceful than the former. The Sudan Peace Act also requires the Treasury Secretary to issue semi-annual reports to the requisite Congressional committees on the steps taken by the USED in opposing a loan, credit, or guarantee to Sudan. Humanitarian assistance is exempt from the prohibition as is aid going to areas beyond the control of the Sudanese central government (US Congress 2001b).

Belarus is sometimes referred to as “Europe’s last dictatorship.” In 2004, the US Congress passed the Belarus Democracy Act, which authorized financial aid for prodemoc- racy programs in Belarus as well as included a variety of sanctions. These sanctions included a visa ban on Belarus officials and a prohibition on both bilateral and multilateral aid for the country (US Congress 2004). President Bush supported the overall thrust of the leg- islation but not any mandated sanctions, so the legislation allows the president to waive the sanctions in fulfillment of US “national interest” (Woehrel 2010). In 2006, the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act was passed by Congress and signed by the president, which reauthorized many of the provisions in the original act (US Congress 2006b).

Finally, in the case of Sri Lanka, the prohibition stems from the treatment of refugees and internally displaced people following the government’s final defeat of the Tamil Tigers in 2009. The 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act, specifically Section 7089, states that the USED must vote against any loan, agreement, or other form of financial assistance to the Sri Lankan government unless the Secretary of State affirms that the government of Sri Lanka has taken steps to account for the atrocities committed in putting down the Tamil Tigers. Specifically, the Secretary of State must certify that the government of Sri Lanka is taking steps to bring to justice members of the military who have allegedly violated international humanitarian and human rights law; that the government is respecting

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FIGURE 1. US reason codes as percentage of total votes in MDBs, 2004–2011.

international human rights law including rights of due process, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly; that it is treating internally displaced people in accordance with international standing by guaranteeing their freedom of movement, providing access to humanitarian organizations, and accounting for persons detained in the conflict; and, finally, that the government is promoting policies that are aimed at reconciliation and justice (US Congress 2010).

US Human Rights Voting Record in MDBs

Over the period from 2004–2011, the United States assigned 711 votes a human rights reason code; this is out of 13,108 votes cast. By way of comparison, 297 votes were assigned a transparency reason code, 520 were assigned an environmental reason code, and 756 proposals were assigned an economic code. These constitute just over five, two, four, and six percent of the total US votes in the MDBs, respectively (see Figure 1).

The transparency codes reference Section 576 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 and Section 572 of the Foreign Appropriations Act of 1998. These sections require the USEDs to vote against loans going to countries that do not have civilian auditing procedures in place for funds going to the armed forces and have not provided requested audit information to the MDBs (US Congress 1997, 1998b). The environmental codes refer to Section 521 of the International Development and Finance Act of 1989 and its subsequent amendments in further legislation. The original provision is known as the “Pelosi Amendment,” which was introduced by Representative Nancy Pelosi (D- CA). The Pelosi amendment requires the United States to vote “no” on proposals in the MDBs that would have significant environmental effects unless 120 days before the vote an environmental-impact assessment has been completed by the borrowing country and the specific MDB (US Congress 1989). In addition, the environmental-impact assessment must include possible alternatives to the proposed project and it must be made available to the Executive Board of the institution before the scheduled vote (United States General Accounting Office 2001). The economic reason code does not refer to a specific piece of legislation but is simply used to indicate that the United States voted “no” on a particular proposal because it feels the project is of dubious economic value. This is a right each

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member country of the Executive Board of each institution has under the Articles of Agreement for each institution. These four categories constitute well over 90 percent of the code assigned in the years under investigation. Human rights constitute the second most codes applied only behind economic reasons.

Table 2 shows the human rights reason codes broken down by year and specific reason code. From 2004 to 2011, the use of human rights reason codes has varied considerably, peaking in 2005 with 124 codes and declining steadily to only 55 codes in 2009 and finally with 86 codes in 2011. In 2004, the number of human rights codes used was 90 and, in 2006 and 2007, the number was 96. The years 2007 and 2008 represent a significant decline in the use of human rights codes with 73 and 55 codes used, respectively. The first year of the Obama administration saw a large decrease in the use of human rights reason codes from the previous years under the Bush administration. However, in the subsequent next two years the number of human rights codes used increases again to 91 in 2010 and 86 in 2011.

The variation in codes applied over the time period under investigation in this study can been seen in Figure 2. It presents the human rights codes applied as a percentage of the overall votes each year. Figure 2 shows a fairly steep decline in human rights codes as a percentage of overall votes but then the numbers increase again in 2010 and 2011. The highpoint was in 2004 and 2005 when human rights codes reached 6.5 and 7.7 percent of overall votes, respectively. In 2006 and 2007, the numbers dropped to 5.6 and 5.5 percent, respectively. In 2008, the number again dropped to 4.4 percent followed by a big drop in 2009 down to just 3.3 percent of total votes. The numbers increase again to 5.3 percent in both 2010 and 2011.

Examining the three areas of human rights codes (general human rights provision, specific human rights violations, and country-specific legislation) one can see that the general human rights provision has been utilized the most. As Table 2 shows, the general human rights code was used 412 times over the past eight years, which accounts for roughly 58 percent of the human rights codes applied. One hundred and fifty-four of the general human rights codes were human needs exemptions where the USED actually voted for the proposal since it helped support basic human needs. If the proposal was for a project that did not support basic human needs, the USED would have voted “no” based on the human

FIGURE 2. US human rights reason codes as percentage of total votes in MDBs per year, 2004–2011.

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rights record of the recipient country. In 2004, the human needs exemption of the general human rights code was only applied six times but it subsequently increased every year, reaching 32 applications in 2010. It then, however, decreases to only 15 in 2011.

Table 2 also presents the number of times the specific human rights violations codes were applied as well as the number of times the country-specific human rights codes were applied. The failure to apprehend war criminals code was the most frequently applied specific human rights violation code. It was applied 141 times over the past eight years, but it was not applied once in 2010 or 2011 and only twice in 2009. Additionally, the failure to apprehend war criminals exemption was applied 14 times.

The trafficking-in-persons code was the second most applied specific human rights violation code but it was only applied 31 times. The trafficking-in-persons exemption was also applied seven times. The only other specific human rights violations reason codes applied were religious prosecution (eight times), religious prosecution human needs exemption (once), and violating worker rights (twice).

As was mentioned above, the failure to apprehend war criminals legislation specifically instructs the USED to vote against loans that go to countries that have not taken steps to apprehend suspected war criminals and to transfer them to the ICTY. The legislation also states that the determination of whether or not a country has taken adequate steps to bring suspected war criminals to the ITCY is to be determined by the Secretary of State. Figure 3 shows the use of failure to apprehend war criminals code (including the failure to apprehend war criminals exemption) as a percentage of total human rights codes per year. As a percentage of the human rights codes used each year the failure to apprehend war criminals code (including the exemption) has increased each year from 24 percent in 2004 to 29 and 32 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively and then to a high of 41 percent in 2007. The percentage then begins to decline to 30 percent in 2008 and precipitously declines to only nine percent in 2009 with the code only applied twice in that year and zero percent in 2010 and 2011.

Examining the country-specific human rights codes, one can see that far fewer of these codes were applied compared to the previous two categories. The codes that were applied

FIGURE 3. Failure to apprehend war criminals code as percentage of total human rights codes applied by the United States in MDBs per year, 2004–2011.

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the most were the two codes that reference the legislation prohibiting US support for loans to Sri Lanka. The two codes in total were applied 35 times with the basic human needs portion of the legislation invoked 19 times. The next most frequently applied country-specific code was the one specifically requiring Serbia to cooperate with the ITCY by apprehending war criminals within its jurisdiction. As can be seen in Table 2, the Serbia code was only used 13 times over six years with 11 of them used in 2004 alone. Including the basic human needs exemption, the code for Cambodia was used 14 times over six years with all 14 of them used in 2004 and 2005. Following those two, the next most frequently applied country-specific codes were the code for Sudan (applied 12 times) and the two codes that reference Burma (six times and seven times, respectively).

Human Rights Codes by Country

The human rights codes broken down by country and specific codes are presented in the Appendix. Overall there are 27 countries (including a regional category which includes loan proposals that cover more than one country) that have had human rights reason codes applied to their loan proposal. However, 53 percent of these codes are applied to just one country: China. Two hundred and twenty-seven of these are the general human rights code, while 149 are in the general human needs exemption category. The last two codes applied to China are in reference to the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act. The reason this was applied to China is because the proposed loan under consideration involved both China and Burma, so the code applies to both countries. Therefore, the total number of human rights codes applied to China from 2004 to 2011 was 378. Unfortunately, with the general human rights provision the Treasury Department is not required to identify precisely why the code was applied (e.g., torture, degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention, etc.).

In addition to China, the other countries to which at least one general human rights code was applied (including the general human needs exemption) include the following: Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Regional, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Syria. For most of these countries, the code was only applied a few times. The second most general human rights codes applied to one country is Sudan with 12 codes, two of which were basic human needs exemptions, applied over six years. Figure 4 shows what percentage of the general human rights codes usage each country accounted for from 2004–2011. As can be seen, China accounts for over 90 percent of the general human rights codes applied over the eight-year period with the other countries only receiving negligible amounts.

The country with the second most human rights codes applied is Serbia with 101 codes. These codes deal exclusively with apprehending war criminals and complying with the ICTY. Eighty-three of the 101 codes, or 82 percent, are for failing to apprehend war criminals. Another six were for the failure to apprehend war criminals exemption. Finally, the last 12 were for the country-specific legislation that prohibits “yes” votes for loans going to Serbia until the country begins adequately complying and working with the ICTY. After China and Serbia, there is a drop off in countries with human rights codes applied by the United States. The country with the third most codes applied is Sudan. In the case of Sudan, there were multiple human rights codes applied that encompassed a variety of human rights issues. Twelve of the codes reference the general human rights provision (two general human needs exemptions). One was for failing to secure the rights of workers and another nine were for religious persecution (with one human needs exemption), four were for human trafficking (with one human needs exemptions), and 11 codes referenced the Sudan Peace Act. Sri Lanka had the next most codes applied with 36, all but one of which

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FIGURE 4. Percentage of total general human rights codes applied by the United States in MDBs per country, 2004–2011.

were the specific legislation against Sri Lanka (the exception was a general human rights code). The regional category and Bosnia both had 34 codes applied. Most of the codes applied to the regional category were for failure to apprehend war criminals (20 in all). For Bosnia, all except one of the codes applied deal with the failure to apprehend war criminals (with six exemptions). The one exception was one code for Serbia, which stems from a project in which both Serbia and Bosnia were involved: hence, the Serbia code applied to the vote.

Figure 5 displays the number of human rights codes each country received as a percent- age of its overall votes in the MDBs. When looking at the prevalence of human rights codes as a percentage of votes for each country, some interesting things stand out. For example, China and Serbia have a high percentage of their overall votes assigned human rights codes, 89 and 86 percent, respectively. Perhaps more interesting are those countries that did not have a significant number of human rights codes applied overall, but, as a percentage of the overall votes for the country, they were quite high. Examples of these countries include Bosnia with 35 percent of its proposals having a human rights code, Iran with 50 percent, and Venezuela with 40 percent. As far as total votes are concerned, Bosnia had a total of 96 while Iran had a total of eight and Venezuela had a total of 25. Also of note is the fact that for Burma and Sudan, human rights codes represent 146 and 168 percent of their total votes, respectively. The reason the number of human rights codes exceeds the total number of votes is that multiple codes can be used as a reason for voting against the proposal. Both Burma and the Sudan had relatively few votes overall with only 11 and 22, respectively.

Two things that stand out when looking at the use of the human rights codes are the number of general human rights codes applied to China and the number of times the failure to apprehend war criminals codes were used. Perhaps most interesting is the extent to which the United States has singled out China for its human rights practices in the MDBs. Over 50 percent of the human rights codes applied over the eight-year period under investigation were directed at China. There were 378 general human rights codes applied to China, which represents almost 90 percent of their total votes. This puts China far ahead as the country

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FIGURE 5. Human rights codes applied by the United States in MDBs as percentage of total votes per country in MDBs, 2004–2011.

with the most human rights codes applied. These numbers are reflective of the large volume of loans the Chinese bring forward in the MDBs but it also indicates that the United States is not squeamish about airing its displeasure with the Chinese human rights record in a multilateral setting.5

Overall, looking at US votes on proposals brought forth by China, one can see clearly that the United States contests nearly every proposal that China brings forth in the MDBs. In fact, China is an automatic basic human needs vote for the United States in the MDBs. What this means is that the United States will only support proposals for China if the proposal supports basic human needs (Office of Debt and Development, US Treasury Department, personal interview, December 28, 2010). The “no” vote position of the United States is part of a broader strategy of economic sanctions that the United States has levied on China. These sanctions include limits on US bilateral foreign assistance, bans on exports of defense- related articles and services including munitions and dual-use technology, and a ban on Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs. However, many of these restrictions can be waived or modified by the president (Rennack 2006). These prohibitions were instituted in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre and have been maintained to varying degrees since.

After Tiananmen Square, the United States was not alone in wanting to prevent MDB loans to China. There was an agreement among the G7 countries in 1990 that they would support loans to China only if they supported basic human needs. In 1990, the IBRD did not make any loans to China and the IDB made only six loans, all of which qualified as meeting basic human needs. G7 opposition to MDB loans to China quickly dissipated, however, as additional exceptions were introduced, which would allow support for MDB loans to China. The additional criteria included loans that would facilitate economic reform and loans for projects that would benefit the environment. With these extra criteria, along

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with the basic human needs criteria, it became easier for the rest of the G7 countries to support lending to China (Sanford 1997). It appears that the US position towards China in the MDBs has been maintained since 1990 even as the rest of the G7 quickly abandoned their opposition.

The focus on the apprehension of war criminals reflects the US role in trying to end the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s. The use of the codes is spread across multiple countries but is mostly focused on Serbia and to a lesser extent Bosnia. As with China, the number of codes applied to Serbia is reflective of the number of loan proposals that they bring before the Executive Boards, but, nevertheless, the signal the United States is sending is that they expect Serbia (and others) to comply with the ICTY by bringing suspected war criminals to justice. Since 2001, Congress has conditioned aid to Serbia on three factors: cooperation with the ICTY, ending support for Bosnian Serb institutions, and protecting minority rights and the rule of law. In the spring of each year, the Secretary of State must certify whether Serbia has met these requirements for the fiscal year, which means Serbian cooperation with the ICTY tends to increase as the certification deadline approaches. For example, Milosevic was arrested on April 1, 2001, and was certified the next day by Secretary of State Powell (Woehrel 2008).

The conditioning of aid (both bilateral and multilateral) is part of a carrot-and-stick approach the United States has used to get Serbian cooperation with the ICTY. Positive inducements used by the United States included the restoring of Normal Trade Relations (NTR), which had been suspended since 1993, granting of duty-free treatment of some goods produced in Serbia, and support for Serbia’s membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program (Woehrel 2008). In summation, much like with China, US “no” votes against Serbia in the MDBs were used as part of a larger foreign policy strategy aimed at inducing greater rights-respecting behavior.

Conclusion

The analysis presented in this article represents a first effort at ascertaining the current place of human rights in US foreign policy in the MDBs. The specific findings are that the United States consistently votes against, or abstains from voting on, proposals for China in the MDBs for human rights reasons. Additionally, the United States has also focused on pushing countries such as Serbia, and to a lesser extent Bosnia, to apprehend war criminals who maybe residing within their borders, although this has tapered off since 2009. Overall, the findings suggest that the United States is not afraid to vote against proposals in the MDBs for a variety of human rights reasons. Moreover, there are a variety of human rights issues that the United States pursues in the MDBs including pushing countries to apprehend war criminals within their borders, stopping human trafficking, and promoting religious freedom. This is in conjunction with more country-specific measures, which require the United States to vote against proposals for certain countries until they make improvements on certain human rights measures.

One limitation of this study is that the voting record only reflects the US position on projects that have come before the Executive Boards for formal approval. One cannot discern from the voting record the US position on projects that do not make it to the Executive Board for final approval, and there is evidence to suggest that the United States has considerable informal influence at the stages before a loan proposal makes it to the Executive Board. It has been suggested that proposals that the United States would seriously disapprove of are stopped well before they get to the Executive Board stage (Wade 2002;

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Woods 2003). In addition, several studies have shown that the United States has been particularly successful in affecting MDB activities through informal channels involving staffing decisions and choice of leadership (Andersen et al. 2006; Wade 2002; Woods 2003; Babb 2009). Finally, because of the consensus decision-making requirement, much of the politicking on decisions takes place before the Executive Boards meet, making it difficult to observe horse-trading and other political dynamics that occur in all political bodies (Woods 2003). Despite these limitations observing how the United States votes on projects that do come before the Executive Board does provide some insight into how human rights influence voting decisions.

After the passage of the IFI Act in 1977, promoting human rights in the MDBs became an explicit policy goal of the United States. With the passage of additional legislation, human rights have become more prominent in US MDB voting decisions. Voting in the MDBs is only one path through which the United States pursues its human rights policy. It is an area, however, that deserves more scholarly investigation especially since the voting records are again published for public view. The previous research on the topic during the 1970s and 1980s showed that there was a distinct Cold War bias to the promotion of human rights in the MDBs in that the recipient state’s ideology as well as its relationship with the United States appear to have been the primary reasons for the “no” votes, with human rights a secondary concern (Sanford 1982; Forsythe 1988). The present study shows that certain specific issues, such as punishing countries that are harboring war criminals, and certain countries (e.g., China, Sudan, Sri Lanka) are singled out for their human rights records. This record reflects the lack of a grand foreign policy strategy that was in place during the Cold War. However, it does show that human rights do have a place in US foreign policy, even if their promotion is more pragmatic.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank David P. Rapkin, David P. Forsythe, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Any errors or omissions are solely the responsibility of the author.

Note

1. The Multilateral Development Banks include the World Bank, The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), The Asian Development Bank (AsDB), The African Development Bank (AfDB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

2. The International Financial Institutions Act (US Congress 1977) similarly required the Treasury Department to report to Congress on a quarterly basis its votes in the MDBs. The practice was discontinued in the early 1990s as the Treasury Department claimed that it had insufficient staff to meet the requirement (Sanford 1997). The current votes can be accessed on the Treasury Department’s website: http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/developmentbanks/ Pages/data.aspx.

3. The Reason Code list can be found on the Treasury Department website: http://www.treasury.gov/ resource-center/international/development-banks/Documents/Voting%20records.pdf.

4. Both were eventually arrested, Ratko Mladic in 2011 and Radovan Karadzic in 2008. 5. China had the fourth most proposals voted on by the United States, with 412.

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WOEHREL, Steven. (2010) Belarus: Background and U.S. policy concerns. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service). [Online]. Available: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142759.pdf [20 April 2014].

WOODS, Ngaire. (2003) The United States and the international financial institutions. In US Hegemony and International Organizations, Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

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D ow

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D ow

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D ow

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229

D ow

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