Module 7 paper

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Democr acy, Publ i c Admi ni st r at or s, and Publ i c Pol i cy Dale Krane

Democracy as a form of government rests on procedures and rules by which citizens can exercise significant influence on the shape of public policy. At the same time, democracy itself is a policy choice and depends greatly on the use of public power. Governments by their very nature embody the use of authority and power to facilitate the attainment of collective goals. Public policy refers to a purposive course of action established by public officials that is binding on the residents of a community or nation. Simply put, public policy is what governments choose to do or choose not to do (Dye, 1976). But who makes these policy choices, how these choices are made, and for what ends or objectives are key questions at the heart of any discussion of democracy. Institutions that encourage the expression of popular consent and give citizens tools to ensure public officials respond to public preferences undergird the practices and quality of representative democracy. This connection between democracy as a form of government and as a product of government activity makes the character of a nation’s policy-making process critical to the maintenance of popular sovereignty. In effect, the composition and operation of the policy process goes a long way toward determining whether there is “rule by the people.”

The Rel at i onshi p bet ween Democr acy and Publ i c Pol i cy

As noted in the Introduction to this volume, debates over the abstract definition of democracy have been long running and carry over to the important issue of which attributes or features of government and the policy process foster “rule by the people.” How might one decide that the community or nation one lived in was democratic, while another was less so? The most common and simplest answer to the question of how people exercise popular sovereignty, according to Sartori (1965, p. 73) is “easy—during elections.” With the emergence of nation-states, rapid population growth, and urbanization, the Athenian ideal of direct communal democracy became increasingly unworkable, and democracy was redefined as the choice of one’s rulers. Instead of the whole adult community actively engaged in making policies, some citizens would be selected to constitute a governing body and these “representatives” would be granted the authority to make choices binding on the whole community.

But elections are only one attribute of democratic government. As Jefferson argued so eloquently, if citizens were to be sovereign, then “certain unalienable rights” had to protected from arbitrary actions by the government. That is, public policy should not abridge an individual’s exercise of rights such as those of assembly, belief, representation, speech, and worship. Scholars of democracy have offered numerous lists of fundamental features that must be present for a political system to be considered “democratic.” Typically included on these lists are requirements such as: (a) free, fair, and frequent election of public officials; (b) freedom of expression; (c) access to alternative sources of information; (d) associational autonomy (i.e., the right to form groups independent of government control); and (e) inclusive citizenship (Dahl, 1982, pp. 83–99). Other attributes held to be necessary for a functioning democracy include the rule of law, public accessibility to government institutions and officials, equal opportunity, and personal security (Hartmann, 2004; Wayne, 2004). What these various lists imply is democratic government requires more than competitive elections. The ideals of democracy must be “translated and transformed into governing institutions that resolve societal problems and produce policy decisions that reflect the consent of the governed” (Krane & Marshall, 2003, p. 3).

Different societies have organized authority and political power in a variety of ways with the result that several different models of democratic institutions exist. The American diffusion of powers model (i.e.,

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 7 . R o u t l e d g e .

A l l r i g h t s r e s e r v e d . M a y n o t b e r e p r o d u c e d i n a n y f o r m w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n f r o m t h e p u b l i s h e r , e x c e p t f a i r u s e s p e r m i t t e d u n d e r U . S . o r a p p l i c a b l e c o p y r i g h t l a w .

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separate institutions of government with powers diffused across these institutions) functions differently from the parliamentary model (fusion of executive and legislative power and concentrated executive power) common in many other nations. Because each model differs institutionally, the process of formulating and implementing public policy also differs, but each model possesses democratic features. Similarly, local government in the United States also exhibits different institutional forms that shape the policy process; for example, municipal government, whether it is mayor-council or manager-council, functions with a unified executive, while many county governments operate with a multiheaded executive (i.e., the board of county supervisors) and diffused executive authority (i.e., multiple elected officials such as sheriff, tax assessor, clerk). It is important to note that the choice of governing institutions is itself a policy choice, albeit one that occurs infrequently in more stable political systems.

Governments, whether democratic or not, exist to achieve certain purposes, among which are social order, conflict resolution, and defense against external attacks. One can find the purposes proclaimed for a nation’s government by reading the nation’s constitution; for example, think of the goals expressed in the preamble to the U.S. Constitution. Again, as with the lack of agreement on a definition of democracy, there is little consensus on the purposes democratic governments ought to pursue. Perhaps the most widely accepted purpose is the protection of individual rights, defined as freedom from government control. Locke, who held this view, argued that since every exercise of government came at the expense of individual liberty, less public policy was better than more. However, others such as Rousseau argued that government could act positively to increase individual rights, for example to eliminate child labor or protect spouses from abuse. Crucial to democratic purposes are public policies that limit the actions of those in official positions and prevent the emergence of a permanent set of rulers. Turning this idea around, public policy in a democracy strives to open the political process to all citizens and to create opportunities for citizens to participate in the formulation and implementation of public policy.

A second large purpose of public policy in a democracy is the development of the individual to the fullest capabilities possible. The protection of individual rights has long been intertwined with the pursuit of equality. The revolutionary notion that all citizens have “certain unalienable” rights rests on the idea that all persons possess inherent dignity and worth. After all, without equality for all citizens, government by consent of the governed cannot be sustained. Democratic equality refers to more than basic political participation (e.g., equal franchise), it also means equal treatment, for example, one’s place in line at the motor vehicle bureau does not depend on one’s income or social rank. Equal treatment also entails equality of opportunity— the public provision of basic education, food, health care, and shelter so that all individuals can contribute to their own development as well as participate in the larger community. Jefferson, for example, made the case for free public education because without literate citizens, popular control of the government was impossible. Hungry and ill children cannot learn effectively, so public policy today offers school lunch programs and health care for children from low income families. Increasingly, “the bulk of public policy in a modern democratic nation aims to ensure a minimal quality of life for all and to facilitate, in the words of modern psychology, each person’s ‘self-actualization’” (Krane & Marshall, 2003, p. 5).

For too many persons, competitive elections serve as defining characteristic of democracy, but thisthe solely procedural view is myopic because it ignores the substantive side of public policy and its effects on the conduct and legitimacy of any democratic government. Certainly, procedural policies are necessary to ensure that contests for public office remain open to a broad expanse of individuals and not become the domain of a political class. But legitimacy also depends on the outcomes of public policy. Without policies that protect the security of individuals and their property, a functioning economy is difficult to sustain. Without policies to ensure the “general welfare,” individuals may not be able to function as citizens. Most fundamentally in a democracy, public policy “ ” (Hartman, 2004,responds to the needs and wants of ordinary, everyday citizens p. 16), or government becomes something other than a democracy—it no longer is “We the People.”

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Democr acy and Bur eaucr acy

In his defense of the House of Representatives, as proposed in the yet to be ratified constitution, Madison in states that “The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republicanFederalist 57

government” (Cooke, 1961, p. 384). By a “republican government” Madison meant a government that derived its powers from the great body of the people and in which policy was made by the legislative branch. While it was important for there to be “energy in the executive,” as Hamilton argued in (Cooke,Federalist 70 1961, p. 471), executive “magistrates” were to serve under the authority and direction of Congress. But, since 1787 Congress has delegated substantial policy-making authority to the executive branch, so much so that most observers of government agree with Carl Friedrich (1950, p. 37) that “bureaucracy is the core of modern government.” Yates (1982, p. 1) observes that “democratic decisionmaking takes place more and more in bureaucratic settings,” and that American government “has increasingly become a ‘bureaucratic democracy.’” The classical position articulated by Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, and other “founders” of American public administration held that “administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions” (Wilson, 1887, p. 210). Many have taken this view to mean administrators were not supposed to engage in politics, and hence there was a sharp line between the politics of policy adoption and the apolitical and technical world of policy administration. It should be noted that the Wilsonian interpretation of politics did not mean that decisions, whether over policy design or implementation, would not lead to “winners and losers”; rather Wilson meant “partisan” politics, as in Democrats versus Republicans (Shafritz & Russell, 2005, p. 33).

More importantly, the argument for viewing administration as an apolitical activity could not stand against the reality of life in public agencies. The congressional-presidential struggles for power over the policy-making process through the first half of the twentieth century undercut the prevailing orthodoxy of separation as did the rapid expansion of national government agencies during the Depression and the two World Wars. Public administration scholars soon determined the politics-administration dichotomy was a fallacy. For example, in 1936 Marshall Dimock noted that “going too far in the formal separation between politics and administration” would be “dangerous” (Dimock, 1936, p. 3). Norton Long (1949, p. 257) declared that the “lifeblood of administration is power,” and Paul Appleby (1949, p. 170) stated that “Public administration is policy-making.”

But if unelected officials in the bureaucracy make public policy, then the principles of “republican government” are at risk, and the question of effective control over the bureaucracy becomes an issue critical to the maintenance of a democratic government. Debates over how best to constrain the actions of administrative agencies and their staffs have led to a continuing stream of legislation that has imposed control after control on public agencies at all levels of government (Light, 1997). But too many controls can hamstring administrative action and reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of public administrators. The public’s demand for cost-effective but responsive government creates a tension over the appropriate role of bureaucrats in a democracy: should public administrators be servants of the people who operate under close legislative supervision or should they be expert professionals who operate with some degree of autonomy? Further compounding this question of the role of bureaucrats in the policy process is the expectation that those who administer particular policies should advocate for those policy areas as well as negotiate with others about the course of public action.

Stillman (1996) has explained in detail that these different value positions on the place of administrators in American democracy can be traced back to viewpoints articulated by Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison. Since Stillman’s exposition is well known, there is no need to repeat it here, but two of his conclusions are important to note. First, the three value traditions remain alive and well, and the “persistent rivalry” between the three value traditions continues to reappear in the constant stream of new controls (under the guise of reform) imposed on agencies. Second, the pursuit of any one of these three values results in a trade-off of benefits and costs with the other two. As a consequence, it is unlikely that the bureaucratic genie will be put back into the “republican” bottle.

Modern governments require large organizations to produce and deliver the diverse array of goods and

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services demanded by the public. While the necessity and reality of bureaucratic policy making may offend many whose image of democracy is the ballot box, John Markoff (1996, p. 118) pointedly notes that “electoral processes are central to democratic legitimation, but in no state is political life limited to elections.” The proper role of bureaucrats in a democracy is an important issue, but it is equally important to understand the various contributions bureaucrats make to the policy process.

Pol i cy For mul at i on

Decisions to adopt public policies almost always result from a series of actions and decisions made by a number of different individuals who occupy different positions within the larger processes of policy formulation and adoption. That is, prior to the exercise of formal authority by a legislative body, by an executive, or by a court, several phases or types of activity by public and private individuals shape the emergence and development of policy decisions. Different authors have proposed different models of policy formation, but in general all of these models include in the “pre-decision” phase of the policy process the following activities: problem identification, agendasetting, and policy design. The roles public administrators play and their interaction with citizens in each of these three policy formation activities determine whether civil servants support or undermine popular sovereignty.

Problem Identification

Demands for public action commonly arise from the harmful effects or losses caused by some condition or situation in private life. For example, inclement weather, air pollution, and traffic congestion can be irritants, but they also can become sufficiently severe as to impose costs of time and money on individuals and even lead to injuries and death. Other situations, such as financial machinations by corporate executives, drug trafficking, or sex slavery, may be less visible but more insidious in their effects. Whether a societal condition or shift prompts public action depends on the situation being defined as a problem that government ought to solve. That is, some person or group must make the case that a problem exists and that public action is appropriate and necessary to remedy the situation.

The First Amendment grants citizens the rights of free expression, petition, and assembly. These three guarantees provide the foundation for citizens, either individually or in groups, to call to the attention of public officials conditions or situations affecting citizens. A dedicated and tenacious person may succeed in attracting the attention of officials to a harmful economic or social condition—one can think of a Rosa Parks or a Ralph Nader. More typically, interest groups function as the primary means for the identification and articulation of problems to public officials.

Interest groups represent the policy preferences of an extremely varied collection of professional associations, for-profit enterprises, nonprofit organizations, government jurisdictions, ethnic groups, religious denominations, research organizations, and advocacy groups. Because interest groups seek to gain policy benefits for their members at the expense of the larger public, their activity can undermine rule by the majority. However, they play an important democratic role by transmitting the shared concerns of many citizens to public officials. Despite the negative reputation of interest groups, many individuals would not have an impact on policy formulation if their views were not represented by interest groups.

Public administrators also play important roles in problem identification. Associations of professionals who work in the public sector—e.g., firefighters, educators, civil engineers—monitor and report on conditions within their areas of responsibility. These professional associations also establish standards of quality that become benchmarks for the identification of unacceptable situations. The very existence and purpose of some government agencies, particularly at the national level, is to monitor and analyze societal conditions, issue reports on trends, including whether conditions are improving or worsening, make recommendations for action to other parts of the government, and in some cases, take appropriate action. To name a few, one can think of the Federal Reserve Board, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (Department of Homeland Security).

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The technical expertise of the personnel in “monitoring” agencies gives them a degree of legitimacy in describing the nature and severity of problems and in declaring the public’s interest in the problem. Many situations that become identified as problems necessitating public action are often “invisible,” in that a condition such as homelessness may not be well understood or may be ignored by most citizens (Anderson, 2006, p. 85). Other situations, may be viewed as “private,” such as domestic violence, or as the cost of doing business—for example, air pollution. While it often requires a crisis for many citizens to discover a long-standing condition really constitutes a serious problem, the tracking, analysis, and reporting of societal conditions by public agencies not only can educate citizens about the nature and extent of a given situation, but more importantly agencies can also inform citizens as how a situation affects them and the larger public interest.

Agenda-Setting

Typically, a problem gains the attention of public officials when some person or group demands government action to address the problem. The demand can be as simple as a single individual’s telephone call asking the local animal control officer to enforce “leash laws,” or the demand may be as complex as the public outrage in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks over the lax security of America’s borders. In many cases, the problem is a routine one (e.g., garbage collection) in that an agency or a jurisdiction has the authority and responsibility to handle the situation. But in other cases, there may be disagreement as to whether the public sector ought to step into the situation (e.g., Internet pornography or real estate commissions), or if it does decide to act, there may be disagreement over the proper type(s) of action. Long ago Schattschneider (1960) observed that conflict over an issue functions as a key factor in whether public officials recognize and act on a societal problem. Persons or groups demanding public action may well encounter opposition from those who benefit from the current situation (e.g., letting one’s dog run free or firms that employ illegal aliens) or from those ideologically opposed to public action (e.g., advocates of an absolute position on free expression). In many cases, this political struggle determines whether the problem gets placed on the agenda of a governmental body or whether government officials ignore the issue or deliberately deny the issue a place on their agenda. It is important to remember that just because some person or group calls for a public remedy of a problem or situation, it should not be expected that public officials will respond positively. After all, what some perceive as a “problem” may be a desirable situation for others, and those who benefit from the status quo can be expected to defend the current situation by lobbying public officials not to adopt new policy.

Numerous organizations exist to press for government action in many areas of life; in fact, whole “communities” of specialists work to convince policy makers to enact new or different public policy. The residents of these “policy communities” may work for interest groups, legal firms that lobby, media and public relations companies, professional associations, corporations, nonprofit organizations, universities, private research organizations, and government agencies. To become a member of a given policy community (e.g., economic development) one must develop a reasonable level of knowledge and understanding about the particular area of policy; that is, unless a person or a group possesses a grasp of the problems and issues in a policy area, they are not likely to gain much influence within a given policy community. Members of a policy community do not necessarily agree with each other over ends or means, but they do share the common attribute of extensive specialized knowledge. Mass public opinion can push an issue onto the policy makers’ agenda either by raising a chorus of complaints about a current public program or by expressing widespread enthusiasm for some proposed course of public action (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, pp. 86–90). Although waves of public opinion definitely can prompt policy makers to change public policy, usually “private problems need to be linked to public causes in order to demand governmental attention” (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 27). One of the critical functions performed by policy communities is the conduct of debate over whether a private problem has a public cause or is amenable to a public solution. Large-scale policy change generally will not occur if members of a policy community are sharply divided on the nature and/or causes of a problem (Hayes, 1992, p. 141).

Public administrators participate actively in policy communities. As previously noted, many bureaucrats monitor, interpret, and report on changes in society. Other civil servants work on the front lines of social and economic problems and acquire “street-level” knowledge of local circumstances. Furthermore, through their

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interaction with citizens from all sectors of society, public administrators receive feedback from citizens about the current state of affairs. Citizen complaints and compliments offer agency personnel important information about the performance of public programs, and while some bureaucrats may not transmit complaints to their political superiors, many other bureaucrats use feedback to make the case for improvements in public programs.

Agenda-setting entails more than the demand for public action to remedy societal problems; it also includes the search for and supply of feasible solutions to the problems on the government’s agenda (Kingdon, 2003, p. 178). Public administrators play an especially important role in the supply of feasible solutions to the public’s problems. Because of their professional training, their detailed knowledge of current public programs and policies, and their interaction with the public, agency personnel constitute a major source of policy alternatives. Although many in the public perceive bureaucrats as merely managers of public programs, elected officials fill government agencies with professional and technical experts precisely for the purpose of developing and evaluating possible solutions to policy problems. In some cases, elected officials submit unaltered policy proposals developed by civil servants as bills to be considered by the legislative body. Where policy proposals emanate from interest groups, think tanks, or citizens, elected officials rely on agency personnel to analyze the technical aspects of a proposal, which include adequacy, affordability, effectiveness, implementability, and legality. Obviously, the more complex the societal problem, the more likely any solution will exhibit complex facets that require technical analysis based on specialized knowledge. While elected representatives decide whether to act to solve a public problem, much of the content of how they choose to solve the problem emerges out of the debates among the members of relevant policy communities, and within policy communities, public administrators are critical gatekeepers as to the technical feasibility of alternative proposals.

Policy Design

The creation of a public program usually occurs, as Kingdon (2003, p. 178) observes, when three key processes converge to place the issue on the : the problem at issue is sufficiently compellingdecision agenda to call for public action, an acceptable solution is found or present, and support by a majority of policy makers exists. While the presence of these three conditions increases the likelihood that a “window of opportunity” to enact the policy is open, the three conditions do not explain the elements that go into the design of a public program. First, a new policy or program’s goals and objectives must be specified; for example, the Women’s Business Ownership Assistance (WBOA) program (Small Business Act, Sec. 29, 15 U.S.C. 631(h) and 656) proclaims two complementary goals: “to fund private, nonprofit organizations to assist through training and counseling, small business concerns owned and controlled by women, and to remove, in so far as possible, the discriminatory barriers that are encountered by women in accessing capital and promoting their businesses.” Second, policy makers must agree on a given instrument of public action, or “policy tool,” by which to achieve program goals—in this case, the expenditure of funds via a project grant. Third, the program design will establish an authorized level of annual outlays for the program, if enacted. Fourth, a program’s intended beneficiaries or persons eligible for the program’s benefits must be specified, or “targeted.” The WBOA program identifies certain types of organizations as eligible to apply for the funds, which must be expended to benefit “women entrepreneurs starting their own business or expanding their existing business.” Fifth, a program’s design typically includes various requirements to be met by eligible organizations or persons, such as details to be reported annually by the nonprofits that receive WBOA grants. Sixth, the design of a program will also identify the agency responsible for administration of the program (Office of Women’s Business Ownership, Small Business Administration), delineate the agency’s authority, and set out various obligations, such as annual reports. Other program elements may also be included in a program’s design.

The ultimate design of a program emerges out of “mark up” sessions in which members of subcommittees and committees in each congressional chamber negotiate over the final language of a bill. While the representatives and senators are the official “architects” of legislation, much of an act’s details are produced by various “draftsmen,” including congressional staff, administrative agency specialists, interest groups, think tanks, and individual policy entrepreneurs. Each party to the legislative process brings its own

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preferences and values, and senior managers of administrative agencies will work to advance the interests of their agency (Held, 1991, p. 226). Because lawmakers desire to solve problems and thereby claim credit so as to boost their chances for reelection, they rely on the expertise and information possessed by bureaucrats to assist congressional staff draft an initial design. Agency proposals may not become the final enacted legislation, but they often provide core programmatic elements around which the contending parties bargain. Furthermore, since agency managers participate in a program’s design, the legislative drafting process offers an opportunity for agency managers to pursue the interests of the agency. One of the three sides of the well-known triangular “subgovernment model” of policy formulation describes this legislative-administrative interaction as an exchange of expertise and information from the agency in return for additional resources (i.e., appropriations, personnel, tasks) from congressional committees. Consequently, a policy’s design will often include elements beneficial to the agency responsible for the policy’s implementation. Whether the program’s design is beneficial to the program’s intended targets depends both on the quality of the design as well as the effectiveness of the program’s implementation.

Pol i cy I mpl ement at i on

The classical model of public administration, as noted earlier in this chapter, holds that administrative matters are not political, but rather technical. According to this view, policy implementation requires the establishment of an appropriate set of routine activities that will bring about the result intended by the choice made in the policy decision. The classic presumption is that partisan and political-interest jockeying ends once a law is enacted or a judicial ruling decreed. However, this orthodox position ignores the reality that the achievement of a program’s objectives (or a court order) entails a “process of assembling numerous and diverse program elements” (Bardach, 1977, p. 36), many of which are dispersed across levels of government or held by persons or organizations in the private sector. Converting a law or court ruling into action is not automatic, because the implementation of policy in the American federal union occurs within a matrix of multiple governments and power relationships characterized by fragmented authority and contending political interests. Because many of the government officials and private citizens who must be marshaled to implement a policy are independent of each other and these diverse actors possess their own preferences on a given policy (e.g., favor or oppose), bargaining is required to elicit their cooperation. Choices made by agency managers and staff will often reflect more than their professional judgment about how best to achieve the legislature’s or court’s intent; their decisions will also reflect compromises or trade-offs among contending interests and values. Consequently, implementation combines the technical tasks of administration with the resolution of political issues.

Citizens are supposed to be sovereign in a constitutional democracy, and democratic theory holds that policy choices made by the people’s elected representatives are the authoritative expression of public purposes (Appleby, 1962; Mayo, 1960). Madison, in , argued that the proposedThe Federalist Papers constitution would place the executive branch under the control and direction of Congress. For Madison this meant the litmus test of accountability in a republican system of legislative supremacy was the adherence by administrators to legislative intent. That is, to the degree policy implementation diverges from the policy enacted by a legislature, then the people’s purposes are undercut. However, the ability of administrators to effect the legislature’s intent is a function of: (1) the design of the policy itself; (2) the resources provided to and the constraints imposed on administrative agencies; (3) the choices made by agency personnel; and (4) the larger political context surrounding the policy initiative (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983, pp. 20–33). These same factors also affect the relationship between bureaucrats and citizens as well as the quality of service to citizens.

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Policy Design and Implementation

Successful achievement of a policy’s goals depends on the quality of its design as well as its implementation. No matter how well implemented, a poorly crafted or targeted policy will not be effective. Ideally, legislators would possess a clear understanding of what actions will remedy a pressing problem. This situation occurs when the causes of the societal problem are known and consensus exists not just about the causes, but also about the most effective means for ameliorating the problem. However, when the cause(s) of a problem is unclear or little consensus as to a problem’s cause(s) prevails, it becomes more difficult to design an effective policy. Similarly, when debate over solutions does not yield consensus, policy is difficult to design. Simply put, if legislators produce poor program designs or choose to sketch policy in generalized terms, these choices affect the actions of administrators as well as the attainment of successful policy performance.

For example, the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act contained a new prescription drug benefit for senior citizens (Medicare Part D). Unfortunately, the implementation of this new policy has revealed several design flaws, such as confusion among seniors caused by the multiplicity of available plans (leading to the low rate at which seniors have signed up for the new benefit), failure to cover low-income seniors whose medications were paid for previously by Medicaid, and confusion between national and state governments as to what prescription drugs are to be included on the formulary of approved medicines (Krane & Koenig, 2005, pp. 17–19; Meyerson, 2006; Weisberg, 2006). The evolution of environmental protection laws is a good example of lawmakers using administrative agencies as problem identifiers and solvers. In this case, legislative policy makers acknowledged they had a poor understanding of a problem and so they enacted a general policy creating a new administrative agency (the Environmental Protection Agency) to investigate the sources of the problem and to propose policy solutions. Another example of how design choices may affect implementation can be seen in the history of the Community Development Block Grant program. Drawing on the experiences with the Model Cities program and responding to the 1960s and 1970s “new politics” demands for citizen participation in policy making and implementation, Congress converted several urban development grant programs into a block grant with two parts: a formula grant to larger cities, and state-administered grants for smaller communities. In both cases, Congress mandated that municipalities must hold public hearings over the content of the plans cities were required to submit as a condition for receipt of funds. Here one can see that it is possible to design policy features that enhance opportunities for citizen participation in program implementation. The recent trend toward the use of tax expenditures (i.e., tax credits, deductions, exemptions) as a policy tool demonstrates that it is possible to design a policy that does not depend on creating a specialized agency to provide the goods or services—the tax break only requires a change in the tax code (Howard, 2002, p. 413).

Resources for and Constraints on Policy Implementation

In addition to a policy’s design, the resources provided to and the constraints imposed on an administrative agency directly shape implementation. While many candidates and many in the general public rail against “throwing money” at problems, most understand that without adequate funding public purposes will not be achieved. The large amounts of funds to purchase school desegregation compared to the lack of monies to ensure and protect the franchise for minorities is striking (Krane, 1985). Similarly, the number, diversity, and quality of an agency’s personnel (e.g., trained professionals versus patronage appointments) as well as its facilities and equipment (e.g., up-to-date computers) can affect agency performance.

Because public administrators may act only under legal authority granted to their agency, the nature and extent of authority provided by a policy’s design is at once a resource and a constraint on performance. The ability of the Internal Revenue Service to collect taxes rests on the extensive investigative authority possessed by the agency as well as the substantial penalties it may levy for noncompliance. Policy decisions on the content of sex education programs (“abstinence only” versus contraceptive information) determine whether public health agencies gain or lose ground against the spread of sexually transmitted diseases (McFarlane & Meier, 2001).

It is important to note briefly that all administrative agencies function under three general sets of rules.

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First, national and state administrative agencies must follow the procedures established in their respective administrative procedures acts (APAs). These APAs set standards for agency operation, lay out steps to be followed for various agency activities, and establish boundaries over access and information to agency proceedings. Despite the widespread view that the writing of regulations by administrative agencies is a closed process, the federal APA has long permitted substantial public participation, and more recently, Congress has enhanced participation through the adoption of a negotiated rulemaking process. Second, administrators not only must follow “due process” but they also must provide “equal treatment.” That is, the work of administrative agencies must abide by the framework of national and state civil rights laws. Third, national and state statutes dictate a long list of management and control requirements that affect agency implementation. These requirements include directives on budgeting and auditing, contracts and procurement, human resources and work conditions, and codes of conduct and ethics (Cooper et al., 1998, pp. 63–66). These three general policy frameworks inject democratic practices and values into the bureaucratic world.

Choices Made by Agency Personnel

Many citizens have little understanding of the chains of implementation activities that extend from Washington, DC, and state capitals to their community, but they do care greatly about the choices made by public servants in their localities and neighborhoods because those choices directly influence their everyday lives. Although bureaucrats function under a considerable set of rules, they do possess varying degrees of discretion. Some civil servants work at highly routine jobs that permit little discretion, while others carry out tasks that require considerable judgment. Obviously, the more discretion the policy or program grants to agency personnel, the more critical for citizens these individualistic decisions become. Police officers at a traffic stop can give you a warning, issue a ticket, or arrest you; a public school teacher may assign “easy” or challenging homework; and a street repair crew may decide the pothole in front of your house is not yet deep enough to fill. In effect, policies do not become “real” for citizens until they encounter bureaucrats at work.

Furthermore, the discretionary choices made by agency personnel can enhance or hinder attainment of the policy’s purposes. Ball, Krane, and Lauth (1982, p. 197) explain:

Administrative discretion is, at once, a virtue and a vice. Through the possession of discretion, a government agency can “fine tune” its implementation activities to specific situations and circumstances. On the other side of the implementation coin, freedom to translate legislative mandates into administrative action can lead to a wide range of interpretations from minor modifications to goal distortion and displacement.

Whether a regulatory agency, for example, adopts a general rule by which to decide whether violations have occurred or adopts a case-by-case approach has significant consequences for how the agency conducts its work as well as for the outcomes of the agency’s decisions. Use of a general principle will produce more consistent and uniform decisions compared to a case-by-case approach; on the other hand, a general principle as a decision criterion is less sensitive to individual variation in cases. Here one can see the dilemma discretion poses for public administrators: which of several important democratic values should be served?

Political Context and Implementation

Scholars of policy implementation have long observed the importance of economic, political, cultural, and social change on the success or failure of a public policy (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Certainly, economic, cultural, and social trends impact not just the demand and design of public policy, but also make it easier or harder to achieve a policy’s goals. A program to assist displaced workers by retraining them as computer programmers may well fail to achieve its purpose of reducing unemployment because employers decide to “outsource” jobs for basic computer programmers to overseas locations. The unexpected arrival of non-English-speaking refugees may overwhelm an agency’s ability to assist other indigent persons in the locality and may prompt the agency to hire interpreters. Police officers may arrest a parent for what appears to be a case of child abuse when, in fact, the spots on the child’s back are the result of warm stones, a folk medicine practice common in some cultures.

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Political conditions constitute the most immediate and important parameter on policy implementation. Changes in the partisan affiliation of elected executives may lead to new and different orders to career administrators that direct them to enforce the law more or less vigorously. The emergence of a new interest group or social movement (e.g., consumer protection) may alter an agency’s established relationship with other interest groups (e.g., manufacturers) such that the agency is caught between contending parties. As a consequence, agency managers may be forced to seek compromises that alter the agency’s practices.

Changes in the political context of a policy may also occur because of shifts in public opinion. When the change in public opinion is large and coalesces around a relatively clear position, as noted earlier in this chapter, elected policy makers are likely to respond. However, it is less certain that bureaucrats respond to shifts in public opinion. Stillman (1996, p. 100) claims that “generally public opinion is too transitory and amorphous to have much influence on the typical public agency.” But Stillman also says that he is not suggesting that public opinion never influences administrative actions. Agencies may be sensitive to general public opinion because a poor public image can affect the agency’s standing with elected officials. Over time, agencies may alter their practices to increase their support from the general public, as the Army Corps of Engineers did in transforming itself from an agency perceived as a detriment to the environment to an agency with a substantial commitment to environmental protection (Mazmanian & Nienaber, 1979). Studies of variation in the political cultures of American states also indicate that citizens in different parts of the country hold different ideological orientations toward government and politics including the roles of public administrators (Flentje, 2000). These different cultural expectations establish parameters of what constitutes acceptable styles of state and local administration. On balance, public opinion does have some effect on policy implementation, and civil servants do not necessarily behave in accordance with the Kafkaesque image some have of bureaucrats.

Pol i cy Desi gn, Bur eaucr acy, and Democr acy

Surprising to some, many democratic theorists do not discuss or go into much detail about the place and role of bureaucracy. Concern over bureaucracy, when the topic is broached, focuses on the question of whether bureaucratic officials will faithfully follow the policy directives of legislatures and elected executives. That administrators will use their resources to alter public policy and thus weaken popular sovereignty is the principal democratic fear. This concern of course, is an important one in public administration. The debates over how best to ensure the accountability of bureaucrats have a long and distinguished history, and numerous means have been proposed by which to control civil servants (Gormley & Balla, 2004, pp. 10–11).

But another question about the use of bureaucracy as an instrument of popular sovereignty also bears on the place and role of bureaucracy in a democratic government—in what ways does the public expect and empower public administrators to act? To be sure, the public does not and will not support a “rogue” bureaucracy, but the public does expect administrative agencies to act and to act in ways preferred by the public, for example, respond to a disaster in an expeditious and effective manner. Considine (2005, pp. 191–192) argues that “policy-making always involves a dual structure.” By this he means every policy design has an “instrumental dimension” of decisions, programs, and outcomes as well as a “developmental dimension” of norms and relationships. That is, policy choices not only seek to achieve particular goals and objectives, but the goals and objectives contained in policy decisions communicate expectations about the future condition of the community or nation (e.g., less crime). As Schneider and Ingram instruct (1997, pp. 140–141): “Policy teaches lessons about what groups people belong to, the characteristics of groups with which people identify, what they deserve from government, and what is expected from them . . . whether the problems of the target population are legitimate ones for government attention, what kind of game politics is (public-spirited or the pursuit of private interests), and who usually wins.” The developmental dimension of policy design also includes expectations about the behavior of bureaucrats and their relationships with the policy’s targets and the general public—for example, the IRS is expected to collect taxes and apprehend tax cheaters, but to do so in a way that is not burdensome or overly intrusive to ordinary citizens.

Smith and Ingram (2002, p. 566) decry the “blind spot” policy studies have for the relationship between policy tool choices and the condition of democracy. But policy design also includes more than just the

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“instrument of action” by which the policy goal is to be achieved; policy design creates an official role for administrators and among these many and diverse roles are: agent, expert, guardian, leader, mediator, partner, servant, and steward. It is important to understand that the role assigned to administrators establishes more than just a function to be performed, it also includes norms about the interaction between citizens and administrators. The interaction of tool choice with role expectation affects agency performance and policy outcome, and crucially defines the standards of accountability to which the policy and its administrators are held (Posner, 2002). Rule the people can be protected from “unfaithful” actions by imposing controls onby unelected officials, but it is important to understand that rule the people can be expanded through the rolesfor and relationships embodied in a policy’s design.

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