Module 6: Group Discussion

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3. Negotiation within collaborative networks Elise Boruvka and Lisa Blomgren Amsler

INTRODUCTION

Collaborative governance requires that actors enter into collaborative relationships and exer- cise conflict management skills to solve societal problems. Within collaborative governance, networks form from multiple actors with shared and differing interests. These actors work together to achieve goals no single actor can achieve. A single actor may be a principal, an agent, or both simultaneously. An agent acts as a representative of a principal. Networks consist of a complex web of interactions between principals and agents. The performance of the network depends on network actors’ abilities to successfully negotiate disputes (O’Leary & Bingham, 2007).1 For network conflict management, interest-based negotiation is more effective than distributive or competitive bargaining, because it builds on open communication of interests rather than locking members into positions which may render negotiation ineffec- tive (Kenis & Provan, 2009). In a network, parties share interests in continued relations and resolving disputes quickly and effectively.

In addition to negotiating internal conflict, networks should consider the public’s role in decision-making. For networks with government members, public participation may be necessary and could take the form of dialogue or deliberation. Network actors engage the public most often during upstream legislative and quasi-legislative processes (Bingham, 2011; Amsler, 2016). Depending on the network’s purpose and members, public involvement may not be a necessary or even possible step.

The following sections describe the environment and potential for conflict, different nego- tiation strategies, alignment between interest-based negotiation and networks, the role of prin- cipals and agents, and the process for establishing governance mechanisms within a network.

NETWORKS FOR COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

Governance is a complex process involving multiple actors across sectors seeking compre- hensively to manage or resolve multifaceted issues. Governance takes place across the policy continuum, from legislative to judicial processes (Amsler, 2016). To address issues in society and provide services for the public, governments may need to collaborate with individuals, organizations in the public, private, and/or nonprofit sectors, and other stakeholders to have the resources, relationships, and ideas necessary (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). These actors (individuals or organizations) combine to collaborate and form a network.

Scholars have defined a network as:

1 Many of the ideas in this chapter were first developed in O’Leary and Bingham (2007). The authors cite it generally and recommend readers use it as a practice guide for how to manage conflict in networks.

Handbook of Collaborative Public Management, edited by Jack W. Meek, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cudenver/detail.action?docID=6481961. Created from cudenver on 2022-11-19 01:10:56.

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Negotiation within collaborative networks 51

(1) “structures of interdependence” moving beyond hierarchical structures (O’Toole, 1997, p. 45);

(2) “structures involving multiple nodes – agencies and organizations – with multiple link- ages” (McGuire, 2003, p. 4);

(3) “formal and informal structures, composed of representatives from governmental and nongovernmental agencies working interdependently” (Agranoff, 2004, p. 63; Milward & Provan, 2006) with concerted action and joint production (Alter & Hage, 1993); and,

(4) a “series of interactions occur[ring] around policy and other issues” (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000, p. 139).

The multi-actor, non-hierarchical, collaborative nature of networks allows for members jointly to solve problems facing the public, providing services and activities on a scale larger than any single entity, and benefits like shared resources and political interests, or other integrative factors (Fleischman, 2009; Gray & Purdy, 2018).

Networks tend to form in policy arenas entailing complex or ambiguous issues (Waugh, 2004; Agranoff & McGuire, 2004), such as the environment (see O’Leary & Bingham, 2003; Robins, Bates, & Pattison, 2011), disaster management (see Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010; Koliba, Mills, & Zia, 2011), sustainability (see MacDonald, Clarke, & Huang, 2019), defense, health (see Provan & Milward, 1995), education (see Ball, 2009), legal, and social services (see Edelman, Leachman, & McAdam, 2010). They address problems that span sector or jurisdictional boundaries with impacts on the public, like how to reduce carbon emissions. To make cities more sustainable, managers must work together and are accountable both within-network and to the public.

Milward and Provan (2006) identify five essential tasks network managers must address: the management of accountability, legitimacy, conflict, design, and commitment. At the outset, network actors must negotiate the governance structure. Networks use multiple decision-making forums, are both interorganizational and interpersonal, and can use a variety of governance structures, decision-making protocols, and rules. As network actors negotiate the governance structure and plan network actions, conflict may arise.

Conflict among Actors of a Network

Connelly, Zhang and Faerman (2014) describe how a web of paradoxes generates network con- flict. Network managers working autonomously and interdependently must handle common and diverse goals; operate in both small and larger, diverse groups; and exhibit participative and authoritative characteristics. They envision details while also maintaining perspective of a larger picture; they balance advocacy and inquiry. Task and relationship conflict arise within and among groups (Medina, Munduate, Dorado, Martínez, & Guerra, 2005). Task conflict includes issues relating to the distribution of resources, interpretation of facts, procedures, and policies (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). Relationship conflict includes political preferences, values, culture, and interpersonal style. Relationship conflict negatively correlates with group effectiveness and satisfaction; both relationship and task conflict mean group performance will likely decline.

O’Leary and Bingham (2007) apply Carpenter and Kennedy’s (2001, 1988) spiral of unmanaged conflict to networks. It follows eight stages: (1) problem emerges, (2) players form sides, (3) positions harden, (4) communication halts, (5) disputants commit resources, (6) the

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conflict goes outside the community, (7) conflict distorts perceptions, and (8) disputants sense crisis. Conflict raises questions of network effectiveness and performance (Lewis, 2010). Skillful managers must handle emerging disputes and prevent a full crisis. Time-sensitive issues of a public, political, or grave nature can strain within-network relations, putting man- agers under pressure to act under more scrutiny.

Conflict is more likely to arise when dealing with “hot-button issues,” when there is a large membership, and when there is a long history of conflict (Lubell, Mewhirter, & Berardo, 2020). Within public administration research, the idea of polycentricity has been present since the 1960s (Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). More recently, particularly when studying networks, scholars have begun to study conflict that arises when actors must work together to make decisions dependently, forming a system of policy forums (Lubell, Mewhirter, & Berardo, 2020). Elinor Ostrom (2010) discusses the concept of action arenas or action situa- tions in which networks form. These action situations are where decision-making processes and negotiations take place. Within an action situation, interactions take place to impact outcomes as well as resource systems, resource units, governance systems, and users. Ostrom (2010) identifies contextual variables related to the social-ecological system impact the action situation. When working within or studying an action arena, the role of conflict and how actors negotiate such conflicts shape the outcomes of the network and the surrounding systems, units, and users. Conflict becomes a function of individual, forum, and system-level variables (Lubell, Mewhirter, & Berardo, 2020).

When studying conflict within networks, the unit of analysis becomes important. Is the unit of analysis the agency or organizational member (i.e., the principal)? Or, is the unit of analysis the individual human representative that the organization sends as its agent to the network meetings?

Conflict with the Public

Just as it does within collaborative public management (Agranoff, 2006), conflict has the potential to arise between the public and the networks. Public-facing networks have respon- sibilities like public organizations, including transparency, public engagement, and account- ability. Public engagement can enhance public perceptions of effectiveness, legitimacy, and social justice (Fung, 2015). Collaborative public management can include participatory gov- ernance, which actively involves citizens in government decision-making (O’Leary, Gerard, & Bingham, 2006). Network managers must determine how and when to engage the public, ensuring relevance and effective design that encourages citizen deliberation, dialogue, and shared decision-making. Failure to do so may engender disputes.

During the Cleveland Air Toxics Pilot, the Environmental Protection Agency funded an initiative to reduce air toxins in a neighborhood in Cleveland, Ohio. The stakeholders involved in the project included government agencies, environmental groups, neighborhood associ- ations, citizen representatives and representatives of mobile, stationary, and indoor sources (Cleveland Air Toxics Project, 2002). Initially, participants played a passive role. It was not until participants reframed their role in the pilot project that they saw themselves as actors with responsibilities and the abilities to change the air pollution in their city (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006). Once participants felt they had the power to act, they became active partici- pants in the project’s network.

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Negotiation within collaborative networks 53

Although networks are not legal entities (Provan & Kenis, 2008), when addressing public issues, they must consider the role of the public. Examples in which networks involve citizens in decision-making include citizen juries, face-to-face dialogue, large-scale meetings, and deliberative polling. Carson and Hartz-Karp (2005) identify three criteria for determining the quality of such processes – influence, deliberativeness, and inclusiveness. Another key component is whether public participation is appropriate. Scholars most often see participation taking place upstream and midstream in the policy process, when participants are making and implementing policies (Amsler, 2016). In participatory budgeting, citizens participate in collective decisions while also improving short-term service delivery (Russon Gilman, 2012). However, public participation is not suitable for all network actions. While suitable in advance planning for a hurricane, it may not be appropriate during emergency response when the hur- ricane makes landfall. Network managers must decide which public participation approaches are best given the timing, influence, and network goals and priorities.

Negotiation in Collaborative Governance Frameworks

Negotiation is a central piece in common collaborative governance frameworks or any collaborative arrangement. Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012) introduce an integrative framework for collaborative governance that incorporates interactive collaboration dynam- ics that include principled engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for joint action. These collaboration dynamics rest within the collaborative governance regime in which actors, decision-making processes, and feedback loops exist between actions and dynamics. Negotiation resides between the actors in a collaborative governance regime as the actors negotiate their governing practices and handle collaboration dynamics. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) discuss the negotiations that took place between the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture to assess and provide resources for the federal borders. Through ongoing negotiations among the network actors, these departments established an institutional framework that led to greater cooperation and coordination between agencies regarding protection, communication, and land management strategies.

Ansell and Gash (2008) discuss negotiation in terms of the collaborative process such as face-to-face dialogue, trust-building, commitment to process, shared understanding, and inter- mediate outcomes. Ansell and Gash do not, however, include negotiation in the institutional design, such as setting the ground rules and participative processes for the collaboration. From this perspective, Ansell and Gash see negotiation as taking place once network actors form and begin their collaborative operations. The collaborative process that Ansell and Gash outline incorporates many of the desired outcomes of interest-based negotiation discussed next.

Negotiation in networks is fluid and ongoing. Ansell and Gash (2018) state that “collab- orative governance can be fragile, time consuming, and risky and can lead to least common denominator outcomes; when it fails, it can accentuate skepticism and conflict, and when it succeeds, it is often due to contextual factors such as inspired leadership or conditions that promote voice over exit” (p. 17). Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012) discuss principled engagement as including the process of deliberation or “candid and reasoned communication” (p. 12). Negotiation takes place within deliberation as actors express and listen to one anoth- er’s needs, interests, and ideas. Within the collaborative regimes framework, this is an iterative process that is ongoing throughout a network’s existence. By discussing negotiation explicitly,

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one can break apart the processes of negotiation and identify the necessary skills for reducing conflicts within networks.

NEGOTIATION PERSPECTIVES AND STRATEGIES

Public managers have relied on negotiating and bargaining to implement programs across many settings facing a range of conflicts for the majority of U.S. history (Agranoff & McGuire, 2004). O’Leary, Durant, Fiorino, and Weiland (1999) suggest most environmental disputes form from differences in values and worldviews, conflicting interests, and technical uncertainty (pp. 196‒197). Network managers’ ability to negotiate effectively depends on skills including negotiation analysis, using different styles of negotiation (integrative and distributive), considering others’ interests and perspectives, identifying resources available to parties, brainstorming and problem-solving new solutions throughout the negotiation processes. Two approaches to negotiation include distributive (also known as positional, adversarial, confrontational, or competitive) and integrative (also known as interest-based, principled, collaborative, or win–win).

Distributive versus Integrative Negotiation

Scholarly views on negotiation styles shifted from distributive to integrative or interest-based negotiation over the 20th century (Follett, 1940; Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011). Distributive bargaining emphasizes fixed positions of participants. A car dealer and a potential buyer enter their negotiation with set boundaries (reservation prices) on what each is willing to accept or give up for the car. Neither is willing to share all information for fear of giving up bargaining power. Instead, the seller avoids sharing the lowest price they are willing to accept, hoping the buyer will pay more; the buyer will not share the highest price they are willing to pay. Parties experience give-and-take, with neither likely completely achieving what they want.

In distributive bargaining, parties advocate for positions (Lax & Sebenius, 1986) and engage in salesmanship, manipulation, and sometimes lying in an effort to impose their position (Allen-Meyer & Katz, 2000). Fisher, Ury, and Patton (2011) state that positional bargaining creates unwise outcomes, is inefficient, and endangers ongoing relationships (pp. 4‒7). “Winning” comes when one party concedes or yields to the other, usually resulting in win–lose, lose–win, lose–lose, or compromise outcomes (Allen-Meyer & Katz, 2000). In such instances, participants rarely feel fully satisfied with the results of the negotiation. Schneider (2002) conducted a study of the effectiveness of U.S. lawyers and found that partic- ipants viewed those practicing adversarial or positional bargaining as less effective than those using interest-based negotiation techniques.

In contrast to positional bargaining, integrative bargaining considers goals, objectives, values, and ethics of the parties (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011). Also called interest-based nego- tiation, it emphasizes the parties coming together to ask and understand the other’s interests. An interest is the main reason behind one’s actions, decisions, or stated purpose and may entail security, economic wellbeing, belonging, recognition, or autonomy. O’Leary and Bingham (2007) suggest that integrative negotiation aligns with collaborative processes, values, and purposes of networks focused on governance issues, because actors already have a shared interest in seeing the network succeed. It encourages network actors to co-create solutions.

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Skillful negotiation requires negotiation analysis, understanding the differences between posi- tional bargaining and interest-based negotiation, and identifying bad faith bargaining.

Interest-based negotiation emphasizes the zones or boundaries of participants’ goals, values, and interests. Fisher, Ury, and Patton (2011) identify four essential steps to the process: separating people from the problem, focusing on interests as opposed to positions, inventing options for mutual gain, and using objective criteria (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011, p. 13). This process allows parties to work together to creatively solve complex disagreements, as seen in ending Apartheid in South Africa, preventing strikes and boycotts, and negotiating Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt (Katz & Pattarini, 2008).

Katz and Pattarini (2008) state that the interest-based negotiation process “identif[ies] and prioritize[s] interests, develop[s] options that might meet those interests, agree[s] on fair standards for evaluating options, and explor[es] both alternatives and proposals to a negotiated agreement” (p. 88). Parties share their interests or the motivations behind a stated position. A principled negotiator will ask the other party about actual needs and interests. To succeed, each party must view the other as a negotiating partner, with shared interests in resolving the conflict. All parties must honestly disclose their interests and be willing to revise their position (Allen-Meyer & Katz, 2000). In seeking to resolve disputes, the parties create value through collaboration (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006).

Finally, interest-based negotiation provides an opportunity to resolve conflict in a manner that builds trust and understanding between parties. By parties collaborating to find a solu- tion, they address the three components that lead to satisfaction of each party – interests in fair process, fair outcome or substance, and psychological/relationship needs. This increases the likelihood of continued interactions, creating a very useful solution for conflict within networks.

In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, command systems failed because they did not build common cognition of the situation among the network of emergency respond- ers (Comfort, 2007). Within emergency management literature, centralized, hierarchical management of disaster responses is ineffective, particularly when response organizations need the ability to adapt to changing situations and coordinate communication and actions among the network of responders (Yates & Paquette, 2011). A guiding document for the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency identifies the following components as essential for effective emergency management: all hazards, all phases, all impacts, and all stakeholders (Blanchard et al., 2007). This perspective of emergency management inherently requires net- works of stakeholders, including the private sector, the government, and the public, to come together to address disasters collectively and collaboratively. Not only is this the definition of collaborative governance, but it also requires the negotiation of rules and conflict within the emergency networks that form.

When considering the reasons for engaging in integrative negotiation rather than distribu- tive negotiation, power plays an influential role. When there are multiple parties and power between parties is not skewed toward one party, then distributive bargaining is difficult. As actors enter into negotiations, they must be aware of others’ power in the negotiation. Power tends to inspire different strategies of actors. For example, parties with lower positional power in a network will more likely employ a coalition-building strategy (Volkema, Bergmann, & Farquhar, 1997). Coalition-building consists of gathering other parties for support around a common interest. Changes in policies can be a result of coalitions’ abilities to negotiate and

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coordinate (Fischer, 2014). The role of power and who has larger, equal, or smaller quantities within a network may shape the interactions of parties as well as their negotiation preferences.

Negotiation Analysis

Negotiation scholarship has undergone significant changes over the past century. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, game theory provided a prescriptive approach with assumptions and the quest to predict equilibrium outcomes (Sebenius, 1992). Game theory gave scholars an understanding of competitive dynamics, opening opportunities for analyzing and under- standing “fairness” principles (Sebenius, 1992). In the 1960s and 1970s, social psychology undertook the study of individual differences among negotiators and situational characteristics (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000). Social psychology introduced a contextual understanding of the negotiation environment. In the 1980s and 1990s, negotiation research incorporated concepts and methods from cognitive psychology research (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000). Cognitive psychology assumed rational behavior among opponents. It sought strategies for negotiators to maximize their gains from a negotiation. In particular, cognitive psychology introduced a concern for fairness and continuing relationships between participants.

Cognitive psychology introduced the negotiation analytic approach, which emphasizes decision analysis. Four features common to negotiation analysis include:

● an asymmetrical prescriptive or descriptive orientation ● a subjective perspective ● consideration for “value left on the table” ● emphasis on “zones of possible agreement” (Sebenius, 1992, p. 20).

Scholars view negotiation as capable of creating value through participants’ interactions and forming creative solutions. Scholars and negotiators study how the formation of rules, conduct, and decision-making processes are opportunities for procedural fairness. When participants have a voice in establishing key processes of the negotiation, they gain a sense of ownership and fairness. Negotiation analysis now includes not only the study of negotiation processes, such as opportunities for gains and losses, but also incorporates the perceptions of participants regarding procedural fairness and value creation.

Negotiation analysis requires a network manager to identify (1) the subject and scope of negotiation, (2) who has the authority to bargain, (3) the culture and context for negotiation, (4) each party’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), (5) reservation prices, the settlement range or bargaining zone, and the cooperative or exchange surplus, and (6) possible psychological or cognitive biases for people on both sides of the table (Amsler, 2015). The reservation price is the most a buyer will pay or the least the seller will accept in exchange of goods or services. The settlement range or bargaining zone is defined by the reservation prices. If the buyer is willing to pay enough for the seller to accept, there is a positive bar- gaining zone (Lewicki, Barry & Saunders, 2020) defined by the two reservation prices. The parties have created value by their willingness to enter into this exchange. The cooperative or exchange surplus is the amount that represents the difference between the reservation prices at either end of the bargaining zone.

Managers can readily apply this analysis to a negotiation involving two actors. However, it is problematic within a network. It might provide helpful information for the relative positions

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of any two parties, but the many network actors create degrees of freedom, coalitions, and complexity. Nevertheless, the network may reach consensus on a joint negotiation with a party external to the network. With that external party, the negotiation may effectively entail two actors if the network reaches consensus on authority to delegate to its agent.

Bad Faith Bargaining Tactics

Whether network actors use distributive or integrative negotiation, it is important they identify bad faith bargaining tactics that may derail negotiation and damage future communication and relationships. Conflict between unions and management led to the National Labor Relations Act, creating standards and requiring participants to “conduct negotiations in ‘good faith’” (Meizlish, 1985, p. 721). Bad faith bargaining (also known as surface bargaining) tactics include going through the motions with no intention of resolving the conflict, being fraudu- lent in one’s representations during mediation, being ambiguous about whether one has full authority, increasing the stress of a situation through the physical environment of negotiation, verbal and nonverbal attacks, the good-guy/bad-guy routine, and explicit and implicit threats (Mnookin, Peppet, & Tulumello, 2000; Ury, 1991). The purpose of these inhibitive behaviors in negotiation is to make another participant uncomfortable. When a negotiator recognizes bad faith bargaining by another party, Ury (1991) recommends explicitly naming it, and stating that it appears the other party is hampering the negotiation and asking why. Bad faith bargain- ing tactics can impair settlement and leave parties dissatisfied with negotiation outcomes.

Integrative negotiation allows flexibility if all actors come with the authority and will- ingness to negotiate. The following section considers the alignment between interest-based negotiation and the governance of networks.

INTEGRATIVE OR INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATION AND NETWORKS

Integrative negotiation provides opportunities for parties to express their concerns, encourages continued relations and deliberation, focuses on the underlying interests of all parties, and gives parties control through voice in negotiation and its outcomes. It strives for transparency in the decision-making process and sees those negotiating as partners or collaborators, not opponents or competitors. Emerson, Orr, Keyes, and McKnight (2009) identify the following variables as impacting outcomes of an agreement, a resulting high-quality agreement, and improved working relationships: deemed appropriate for the resolution; appropriate parties engaged; parties have time, skills, and resources to engage; appropriate mediator skills and practices add value; and, relevant, high-quality trusted information integrated. When parties have more control over both process and outcome in negotiation, they report higher satisfac- tion with the final resolution (Wall, Stark, & Standifer, 2001).

As actors form networks to pursue common goals, they must often negotiate. Networks serving the public incorporate public values into their purpose. Public values include partic- ipation by the public, reception and consideration of input from the public, as well as trans- parency and accountability (Fung, 2015; Nabatchi, 2012). When conflict forms in networks, interest-based negotiation puts into practice public values.

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Networks serving the public face certain challenges and characteristics that make negotia- tion essential for the network actors. As a network forms, its members must decide the gov- ernance structure of the network, which incorporates its rules and decision-making policies. Different structures lead to different behaviors and outcomes (Lubell, Scholz, Berardo, & Robins, 2012). Accountability to fellow network members, constituencies, and the public also influence the power parties have to negotiate and contribute resources for network purposes. The institutional and socio-economic contexts impact the variables and actors participating in a network (Ostrom, 2010; Lubell, Scholz, Berardo, & Robins, 2012). Finally, the network becomes its own identity, separate from the individual actors who make it up. Communication and transparency of the network as a whole becomes an influential factor as network members must negotiate the message from the network, not the individual.

The Interest-based Negotiation Process

The process of interest-based negotiation requires all parties to come together intending to resolve potential issues or disputes, listen and speak with one another, complete the negotiation process, and follow through with the solution (Amsler, 2015). O’Leary and Bingham (2007) provide a summary of eight steps involved in interest-based negotiation that are well-suited for rationally resolving issues among network members. Further expanding on these steps, Amsler (2015) provides insights into the individual network manager’s actions to prepare and then enter the negotiation process.

1. Individually prepare for the negotiation Failing to prepare through negotiation analysis may create challenges. For example,

identifying cultural context is helpful when networks incorporate diverse members. Cultures vary in members’ tendencies to share information, which is an essential element to interest-based negotiation. Adair, Brett, Lempereur, Okumura, Shikhirev, Tinsley, & Lytle (2004) find that “power strategies may help or hurt joint gains, depending on a culture’s values and norms for power and whether or not power-based influence is used in conjunction with sufficient information exchange … Understanding the other party’s cultural characteristics and strategies can help negotiators plan how to focus on informa- tion exchange and deal with unusual power strategies that they may encounter” (p. 87). Without awareness and understanding of how other parties in the negotiation perceive and value power, one may under or overestimate how other parties view risk and are willing to negotiate (Dűr & Mateo, 2010; Metcalf, Bird, Peterson, Shankarmahesh, & Lituchy, 2007).

When preparing for negotiation, members must identify other members’ BATNAs. This involves identifying three elements – time, power, and information (Cohen, 1991). By understanding time, power, and information for each participant, one enters into the negotiation with an idea of the boundaries for possible settlement options. The preparation process allows parties to generate better questions and strategies for entering into the network, wherein emotions or other distractions may impede one’s ability to negotiate (Barthel & Fortson-Harwell, 2016). Qualities of questions that are likely to lead to more open and transparent interactions include asking from a point of curiosity and asking ques- tions that are trustworthy, emotionally intelligent, balanced and open, incorporating dif-

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ferent learning styles, creative, future focused, and unifying (Barthel & Fortson-Harwell, 2016).

Overall, as network managers prepare for negotiating with fellow network members, nego- tiation analysis will help managers understand their interests but also the framework in which the other managers are working. Each of the six elements becomes important once the negotiation begins. Even when engaged in the complexity of multiparty negotiation, understanding each actor’s reservation price or bottom line will define the scope of dif- ference between one network actor and another. Often, networks make decisions through consensus. Negotiation analysis identifies where consensus might form.

2. Set the ground rules or protocols The next step is deciding how the negotiation will take place (e.g., meeting times and

locations, no press releases, mutual deadlines for raising substantive issues, and binding tentative agreements) (Amsler, 2015). As the parties go about setting the ground rules, they are simultaneously establishing a relationship and standards for communication. This interaction builds the foundation for the negotiation process. It sets the tone and establishes behavior norms (Lewicki & Hiam, 2006), while giving equal opportunities for participa- tion among all parties.

3. Frame the problem Before talking about interests, all parties should come together to jointly frame the

problem. Within collaborative networks, all members are essentially working together to solve problems. Interest-based negotiation encourages members to see other members as collaborators who share the same challenge and can work together. “Every time two negotiators define a problem or issue … they have enacted frames that may make resolu- tion easier or more difficult. And when a negotiator shifts his own or the other person’s frame, negotiations may move forward or may deadlock and stalemate” (Lewicki & Hiam, 2006, pp. 224‒225). Without this shared understanding of the problems under negotiation, parties will be operating in misalignment.

4. Disclose and listen to interests After jointly defining the problem, each party takes turns sharing their interests. This is not

a time for providing solutions but rather for understanding other members’ interests and expressing one’s own interests. Asking questions is crucial for all parties to gather as much information as possible. This establishes a foundation for the future steps.

5. Look for ways to create value (before claiming value) Disputes in networks often arise due to different resource, time, or power constraints.

In distributive bargaining, constraints may act as boundaries limiting solutions, while integrative negotiation seeks to understand members’ shared resources. It uses members’ interests and differences to create value through new possibilities and solutions. Members may break issues into smaller challenges that are easier to resolve. By working together to understand all network resources and constraints, they may collaboratively find solutions that would not exist if members focused only on their unique positions.

6. Create multiple settlement options Network managers need to brainstorm possible options that appeal to or meet the interests

of all parties to approach a challenge or resolve an issue. Fisher, Ury, and Patton (2011) refer to this process as “inventing options for the mutual gain” (p. 58). Brainstorming means generating ideas without judging or discussing them, without ownership or attribu- tion to any party, and in an effort to exhaust the possibilities. Parties do not yet weigh or

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evaluate the options. Exploring all possible solutions empowers each party to express their ideas.

7. Evaluate the options After brainstorming, various methods allow members to prioritize options, including dot

voting on a small number (e.g., top 3) or consensus on which options to discuss further. Members evaluate their options by creating standards. These may operate to prevent par- ticipants from eliminating suggestions other than their own (O’Leary & Bingham, 2007).

8. Select and/or modify options To meet the interests of most members, negotiators may need to combine components of

different ideas to create one comprehensive solution. When present, a mediator may act as a collection point for all parties to share which solutions or pieces of solutions best fit their interests and needs.

9. Resolve impasses through objective criteria and consensus-building Fisher, Ury, and Patton (2011) suggest using objective criteria when unable to find an

initial solution. Objective standards help members avoid using coercion, will, or power to overcome the impasse. These may include law, tradition, professional standards, values, costs, or efficiency as deciding factors. In a network, the governance document may provide a method to reach a final decision, for example, by consensus (“Can you live with this?”) or by voting (simple or supermajority) or with help from a third party (mediator or factfinder).

10. Develop a plan for implementation and monitoring The final stage of agreement within negotiation is to create a plan for implementation and

monitoring. At this time, members decide who will evaluate the implementation, how they will identify progress, and when monitoring actions will take place. Again, the emphasis remains on all members in the negotiation collaboratively suggesting and mutually agree- ing to follow through with the negotiation resolution.

By members of a network working through the process of interest-based negotiation to resolve issues within networks, they slowly gain trust and understanding of one another. Building trust then encourages continued interactions. Meanwhile, in governing the network, members practice the tools and skills necessary to resolve disputes. Ideally, they actively collaborate, find ways to create value, communicate, and view network members as partners.

Important Skills for Managers

Summarizing the network literature, Klijn, Steijn, and Jurian (2010) state that “without adequate network management strategies, it is very difficult, or even impossible, to achieve interesting outcomes in these complex interaction processes” (p. 1064). These strategies include skills to negotiate effectively within a network and between the network and external stakeholders. Skilled managers can decide when to negotiate, communicate clearly, articulate the overall purpose of negotiation, and build relationships with other members (Amsler, 2015). Any principal must consider the context and actors to decide when or whether to negotiate. Law or government may mandate entering a network, and with it, mandate negotiation. Managers should attempt to identify obstacles, which include interpersonal dynamics (bad feelings among members). If these seem insurmountable, managers should identify when or what it is not fruitful to negotiate. If unresolved, conflict may spiral to the outside community.

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Communication skills are essential for network operations. Asking constructive questions to understand others’ interests and reflective listening builds a sense of mutual understanding. Leading questions may provoke defensive responses. More useful responses come from asking open-ended questions (who, what, where, when, how, why, and why not) and listening to answers without interruption. Body language is also critical. The goal is to encourage com- munication to better understand each party’s interests. Reflective or active listening includes respectfully listening to another without interruption, then acknowledging what is heard by paraphrasing back. Using strong communication skills, members establish the basis for con- tinued interactions.

When comparing network versus traditional organizational settings for negotiation, Silvia and McGuire (2010) conclude that public sector network leaders are more likely to focus on people-oriented behaviors rather than task-oriented behaviors. This approach may occur because of the likely longer-term nature of most networks, the need for trust among actors, and the shared leadership roles within networks (Silvia & McGuire, 2010). Other possible distinc- tions may be the context of different cultures in which networks arise; however, the individual skills necessary for negotiations in networks and negotiations in organizational settings likely remain the same given the need to understand parties’ interests, BATNAs, and the context of the negotiation.

NEGOTIATION NETWORK GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

The skills for negotiating principal–agent relationships are similar to those for negotiating in a network. O’Leary and Bingham (2007) provide a model for how network managers can establish a network governance structure while incorporating values reflected in integrative negotiation. Networks need a system to address issues and handle conflict; negotiating this provides a foundation for future interactions. Integrative negotiation helps networks structure and agree on a governance system by addressing these issues:

1. Identify network members whose agreement is necessary Networks comprise multiple actors, but not all have power or authority to make decisions.

As O’Leary and Bingham (2007) state, “the goal is to insure that those with the capacity to implement the agreement of the network on a task are at the table and have consented to the form of its governance” (p. 31). Key players include those who have power or authority, understand the issues in dispute, are acceptable to other parties, and are willing to bargain in good faith (Moore, 1996, p. 144).

2. Identify the network’s scope and jurisdiction The network must identify the extent of its work, including what issues it will address,

its authority to operate, actors suitable to participate in the network, and its overall goals. When network actors agree on scope, they identify boundaries for which actions and goals fall within the network’s capacity and responsibility.

3. Address issues of the network’s legitimacy O’Leary and Bingham (2007) identify multiple sources of legitimacy: legal policies,

authoritative convener, membership, effectiveness and quality of work completed, trans- parency, and accountability to the public. The importance of understanding a network’s

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legitimacy is that it allows the network to identify when it needs to fill in gaps, whether procedural or in membership.

4. Negotiate the ground rules The ground rules in a network provide standards of behavior for network members.

Ground rules may include expectations for meetings, how to go about reaching interim agreements, or how to talk to the press. The negotiation of ground rules allows all members to understand and agree on the network’s shared standards of behavior.

5. Negotiate processes on exchanging views Networks operate by sharing resources and views among members, so members must have

access to appropriate agreed tools and a system for managers to monitor information-sharing. Tools include technology and resources like video-conferencing equipment, rooms with space for open collaboration, or minutes from meetings for members to read later.

6. Discuss administration and allocating responsibilities Networks have day-to-day administrative tasks. Negotiation determines meeting times,

spaces, budgets, meeting notices, and other administrative details. With multiple actors often in multiple locations, a negotiated governance document must address designated administrative responsibilities.

7. Negotiate decision rules for closure on an issue Members must negotiate how networks make decisions. Without rules for making final

decisions, disputes arise over what is final versus tentative suggestions. Many networks follow traditional aggregative decision rules such as majority or supermajority voting or secret ballots. Another method is consensus-building (Susskind & Cruikshank, 2006).

8. Identify a system for resolving impasse in decision-making or disputes When a network requires consensus in decisions, impasse or deadlocks may occur that

greatly hinder network action. Similarly, ambiguities may exist in network policies giving rise to disputes. To break an impasse or resolve a dispute, network members may negotiate additional procedures, like bringing in an impartial third party, facilitator, or mediator to assist the network. Having clear policies and governance mechanisms allow all members to understand expectations for behavior and provide avenues to resolve disagreements.

9. Identify a decision process for ending the network Exit plans for networks provide a shared understanding of when the network has accom-

plished its goals or is no longer effective. By discussing the end of the network initially, members have a clear perspective on the elements necessary to terminate the network arrangement or consider a new arrangement (O’Leary & Bingham, 2007).

CONCLUSION

Network actors are frequently agents representing principals. Principals often incentivize agents to operate on the principals’ behalf, particularly when the agents may have conflicting interests. Interest-based negotiation skills apply within the network and between principals and agents. To address conflicting interests and disputes between principals and agents and among network actors, integrative negotiation provides an effective process. Networks often operate through continual interactions to achieve common goals, despite often conflicting interests. Network actors must resolve disputes before these negatively impact on network per-

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formance. Integrative negotiation provides a constructive process for network actors to resolve disputes by considering each other’s interests. It allows network actors to build understanding with one another and encourages repeated interactions.

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