Week 5 discussion INR

Global Civil Society and the International Human Rights Movement: Citizen Participation in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations Author(s): Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Christine Min Wotipka Source: Social Forces, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Dec., 2004), pp. 587-620 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598341 . Accessed: 10/08/2013 09:30

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Global Civil Society and the International Human Rights Movement: Citizen Participation in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organi7ations*

KIYOTERU TSUTSUI, State University of New York, Stony Brook CHRISTINE MIN WOTIPKA, Stanford University

Abstract

We examine patterns of citizen participation in the global human rights movement

through memberships in human rights international nongovernmental organizations (HRINGOs). After showing enormous growth in the number ofHRINGOs in recent decades, we investigate country level characteristics leading to greater participation in the international human rights movement. Drawing on the social movement literature and world society theory, we employ multivariate regression analyses to

explain HRINGO memberships in 1978, 1988 and 1998. To understand changes over time, we also use panel analyses for 1978-88 and 1988-98. The strongest predictors of memberships in HRINGOs are found to be embeddedness in global civil society and internationalflows of human resources. The effects of these internationalfactors grew stronger over time while domesticfactors became less important.

Nongovernmental factors have been the engine of global expansion of human rights in the post World War II era (Lauren 1998; Weiss & Gordenker 1996; Wiseberg 1992). Among them are international nongovernmental groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which have played key roles in the formative years of global human rights by promoting international human rights instruments and publicizing gross human rights violations.' The contributions of

* The authors contributed equally to this research. We wish to thank John W Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, David John Frank and Jackie Smith for especially helpful advice, as well as the members of the Stanford Comparative Workshop for suggestions related to this project. We also thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. We gratefully acknowledgefinancial supportfrom the National Science Foundation (NSF/SES-0214168. 2002), and the Bechtel Initiative on Global Growth and Change and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law of the Stanford Institutefor International Studies (Francisco O. Ramirez and John W Meyer, principal investigators). Direct all correspondence to Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794-4356. E-mail: [email protected]. ? The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces, December 2004, 83(2):587-620

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588 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

human rights international nongovernmental organizations (HRINGOs) have become even more critical in the contemporary international human rights regime; their unsparing reports of local human rights practice all over the world have been essential in proceedings of United Nations (U.N.) human rights instruments such as the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee. Many HRINGOs have gained official consultative status in the U.N., and have been actively promoting their visions of human rights standards into the new century.

Correspondingly, the existing literature has paid much attention to the activities of such organizations in the international political arena (Lauren 1998; Smith,

Pagnucco & Lopez 1998; Weiss & Gordenker 1996; Wiseberg 1992). What the literature often downplays, however, are the individual activities of local constituencies, who find ways to connect with these organizations. Without their

support, HRINGOs cannot carry out their key activities such as detailed reporting on local human rights practice and active promotion of global human rights models to local populations. Notwithstanding the importance of local constituencies, few studies have systematically examined cross-national variations in citizen

participation in HRINGO activities. Why do certain countries have large numbers of citizens joining HRINGOs? Do they engage in international human rights activities because their governments' commitment to global human rights ideas

encourages the citizens to follow suit, or is it the strength of local civil societies and their linkages to global civil society that lead individuals to get involved in HRINGOs?2 Do individuals in advanced democracies join HRINGOs to promote their ideals in the world, or is it individuals under oppressive governments who

join HRINGOs to gain leverage vis-a-vis local governments and to solicit help from external actors? This research addresses these questions by investigating the patterns of citizen participation in HRINGOs. Toward that end, we combine tools in two theoretical perspectives: the social movement literature and the world society approach.

In recognition of HRINGOs' contribution to the promotion of human

rights and consequent social changes, we view involvement in HRINGOs as

participation in the international human rights movement. Thus, theoretical tools in social movement studies should provide significant analytical purchase for our study. Indeed, the global movement for advancement of human rights has fueled many domestic social movements and spawned various social movements at the international level. HRINGOs have initiated and carried forward

many of these activities. Thus, examination of the local-global dynamics within HRINGOs is critical to understanding the global human rights movement. Drawing on the social movement literature, we investigate how configuration of political opportunities, resources for mobilization, and cognitive frames at both domestic and international levels shape the patterns of citizen participation in HRINGOs.

We also engage the studies on globalization, particularly those from the world

society approach (Meyer et al. 1997). We seek to examine if and how linkages to

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Global Civil Society/ 589

world society might influence individuals' participation in HRINGOs. In doing so, we employ new measures of international linkages, which enable us to link the social movement literature and the world society approach effectively. Furthermore, we attempt to sort out the different roles of inter-governmental and nongovernmental organizations in global political processes. Global human rights ideas pose a threat to governmental actors because they tend to constrain state behavior in domestic political affairs. Nongovernmental actors, on the other hand, are less concerned about state sovereignty. Therefore, we expect linkages to global civil society to have a stronger impact on citizen participation in the international human rights movement than intergovernmental linkages.

We also expect that global factors have become more important predictors of citizen participation in HRINGOs over time relative to that of domestic factors. In

early stages of the global human rights movement, individuals in developed countries led the process, but as human rights become institutionalized in global politics, participation by citizens of developing countries has grown. By employing social movement theories and the world society approach in one analysis, our study explicates the actual processes of"norm cascade," in which a norm emerges in global society, achieves a taken-for-granted status, and influences activities of individuals and organizations across the globe (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999; Sunstein 1997). Our core argument is that endogenous factors had some explanatory power early on, but that external factors have become increasingly important over time

(e.g., Tolbert & Zucker 1983), corresponding with the growth of international human rights norms. As global civil society increasingly promotes human rights ideas, countries with citizen engagement in global civil society become more likely to have citizens who are members in many HRINGOs. Thus, we see global civil society as a breeding ground for progressive ideas, such as human rights norms. Our research clarifies the processes through which an international movement

develops into a force in international politics and points to the importance of global civil society as an important arena for political changes in the contemporary world. Theoretically, it contributes both to world society theory, by explicating the processes of norm diffusion, and to social movement theories, by illustrating how international social movements evolve and what countries lead these movements.

After briefly describing the history of global human rights and HRINGOs' roles in it, we present descriptive statistics on the growth of the number of HRINGOs over the last two centuries and citizen memberships in the organizations over the past thirty years. We then highlight the two theoretical perspectives described above and present our main hypotheses. Finally, we examine patterns of citizen participation in HRINGOs using a multivariate regression analysis for three time points - 1978, 1988, and 1998 - as well as changes over two ten-year time periods. We seek to contribute to the literature with longitudinal data on HRINGOs collected for this research.

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590 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

Expansion of Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Post-World War II World

HISTORICAL FACTORS

Research on the history of human rights reports contributions by different actors in the global expansion of human rights (Buergenthal 1995; Claude &Weston 1992; Donnelly 1998; Lauren 1998). After World War II, spurred on by many nongov- ernmental activists (Korey 1998), political leaders of the Allies sought to establish human rights as a foundation of the new world order (Lauren 1998).3 Their vi- sions are reflected in the U.N. Charter (1945) and in the U.N. Declaration of Hu- man Rights (1948), the two documents that laid the foundation for human rights instruments that followed. Soon thereafter, however, a power struggle between the two superpowers, oppression in the colonies, and racism within the powerful na- tions began to impede efforts to promote human rights further in the international political arena.

When the enthusiasm of powerful governments dwindled, nongovernmental activists and Third World countries became the central actors in international human rights activities. Their efforts resulted in the adoptions of several key U.N. human rights treaties since the 1960s and their ratifications by an increasing number of states (Wotipka & Tsutsui 2001). Third World countries were motivated by their anticolonialist fervor and by their aspiration to establish racial equality in the postcolonial world order. The conviction of these countries is reflected in the fact that the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) was the first major U.N. human rights treaty to be adopted. When their domestic human rights practices became targets of international criticism in the 1970s, however, their enthusiasm gradually waned. Thus, governments from both the developed and developing world turned from proponents of the global human rights regime to its doubters and even critics.

As Third World countries diminished their human rights activities in the 1970s, nongovernmental human rights activists became increasingly instrumental in moving the global human rights movement forward. Numerous HRINGOs were established in this period and worked fearlessly to criticize rights-violating governments. In contrast to HRINGOs, national governments tend to be averse to criticizing other governments' domestic practices for fear that this would undermine state sovereignty in general and justify criticism from other governments regarding their own domestic violations. In addition, other political factors are taken into consideration such as trade relations with rights-violating countries and possible retaliation in other arenas that may result from criticism regarding human rights issues. In some cases, governmental actors may not be concerned with human rights and may even work to actively undermine international progress in human rights as was witnessed by some military governments in Latin America (Lutz &

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Global Civil Society/ 591

Sikkink 2000). HRINGOs, on the other hand, do not share these concerns. Motivated by their principles and powered by their flexible and committed constituencies, these organizations document and publicize human rights violations in virtually all corners of the world. The work of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, among other HRINGOs, is widely recognized by now; their publications have become authoritative sources of information on human rights practices. These organizations continue to constitute a powerful lobby in contemporary global politics.

DESCRIPTIVE CHANGES

While much research has recognized the importance of HRINGOs in global human

rights politics, few studies have systematically examined them in a cross-national

analysis.4 Using the data we collected on HRINGOs from the 1970s to the 1990s, we first outline the universe of HRINGOs along a few key dimensions, and then

analyze patterns of memberships in HRINGOs. Our focus is on the two most

important dimensions in understanding global expansion of HRINGOs founding year and countries from which members come.5

These variables provide us with insights on how the world of HRINGOs has evolved over time as well as the characteristics of the types of countries whose citizens led the evolution. To begin, we provide a brief description of the coding scheme used to collect the data on HRINGOs.

The data used in our analysis are culled from the Yearbook of International

Organizations, published by the Union of International Associations.6 We define human rights international nongovernmental organizations as those international nongovernmental organizations that are concerned with the

promotion and protection of human rights in the long term. Human rights here refer to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of living human

beings. Nongovernmental status requires that the organizations are composed largely of independent citizens and are free of direct government influence. To be considered international, an organization must have members from two or more countries. By specifying the long-term focus of organizations, we exclude organizations that offer tentative solutions to social problems but do not aim for any long-term social changes.7 The coding was done taking advantage of the categorizations employed in the Yearbook for three time

points - 1978, 1988, and 1998. As more categories and specifications emerge over time, identifying organizations that qualify as HRINGOs becomes increasingly easier. For 1998, most of the relevant organizations are coded from the category labeled human rights organizations. In earlier periods, this category did not exist. Thus, for 1988, we had to expand the scope and code organizations in several different categories including rights, justice, equality, discrimination, and humanity. For 1978, we first coded organizations under two English subject headings -

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592 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

human and rights. Then, we coded organizations under classified subject headings - social welfare, women, trade union, and religion, ethics, morals.8 In the following analyses, we used only organizations that work explicitly to promote and protect internationally recognized human rights in the long term.9 The data include 96 HRINGOs in 1978, 170 in 1988, and 499 in 1998, indicating a dramatic increase in HRINGO activities over the thirty years.

Figures 1 and 2 show graphically the dramatic growth of HRINGOs over time

using information on HRINGOs from the 1998 data file. Figure 1 summarizes the founding years of HRINGOs, which range from 1839 to 1998. According to this data set, among 412 HRINGOs for which the founding year is known and that were still in existence in 1998, 30 of them emerged prior to 1945. In the following 30 years (up to 1975), 77 organizations emerged. In the next 24 years (1975-98), 305 organizations were founded. The growth is particularly dramatic from the mid- 1980s to the early 1990s, as the number of foundings consistently registered over 14.10 Figure 2 captures the cumulative count of HRINGOs and shows even more

dramatically the growth of HRINGOs in this period. The number of countries with citizen membership in HRINGOs ranges from

2 to 170, and averages about 32 countries per organization with a standard deviation of 33 for the data in 1998.11

Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics on HRINGOs at three time points including a list of the top ten and bottom ten countries in terms of the number of

memberships in HRINGOs.12 These data on citizen membership confirm the global expansion of HRINGOs, as the mean number of countries that have citizens involved in HRINGOs increased from about 12 in 1978 to almost 46 in 1998. The list of top and bottom ten countries exhibits an interesting pattern. Developed Western countries consistently occupy the top ten spots, while peripheral developing countries are at the bottom.13 One might speculate that it is a general pattern that

developed countries have more citizens engaged in HRINGOs. Citizens in the countries on the low end of memberships may be unable to mobilize due to their lack of opportunities and resources. More important, however, is the fact that growth in citizen participation in HRINGOs is not limited to developed countries alone.

Although countries with little citizen engagement tend to be peripheral countries, their citizens' participation is increasing nonetheless. We explore these issues in the next section.

International Linkages and Global Dimensions of Social Movements

Two lines of research guide our analysis of the patterns of participation in HRINGOs; we explore the literature on social movements and globalization to investigate global and national level factors that circumscribe participation in HRINGOs. We seek to contribute to (1) the social movement literature by exploring the interplay between domestic and global political opportunity

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Global Civil Society / 593

Founding Years of Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations

I I

I

I U

0I

1839 1919 1929 1945 1954 1963 1971 1979 1987 1995

1892 1923 1940 1949 1958 1967 1975 1983 1991

Founding Year

structures, resource configuration, and framing of the movement; and (2) the literature on globalization by investigating the impact of linkages to world society, by sorting out the different roles of international governmental and

nongovernmental actors in global politics and by examining the process of norm diffusion over time.

Since the international human rights movement is a type of social movement, theories on social movements ought to be useful in studying patterns of local actors' participation in this movement. Three approaches have

figured prominently in the recent growth of the literature on social movements:

political opportunity structures, resource mobilization, and cognitive framing (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1996). Using these approaches, social movement research has produced many insights into how social movements emerge and

develop. However, as McCarthy (1997) and McAdam (1998) point out, its traditional emphasis on domestic politics has been a serious limitation in the field, preventing examination of important factors that lie outside national borders.

In response to this concern, some important contributions on international dimensions of social movements have emerged over the last few years. They have examined international political opportunity structures (Imig & Tarrow 1999; Marks & McAdam 1996; McAdam 1998), transnational flows of human and material resources for movements (Keck & Sikkink 1998a; Smith, Chatfield & Pagnucco 1997), and new patterns of framing that reflect sensitivity to global

FIGURE 1:

201

10

C o

u n t

Ul -

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594 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics of Country Memberships in International Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations, 1978, 1988, and 1998

Descriptives

Minimum Maximum

Mean Standard Deviation

N

Top 10 Countries

1988

Country

France U.K. West Germany Netherlands USA

Belgium Switzerland

Italy Canada Sweden

Number

80 77 74 73 73 71 70 67 64 61

1998

Country Number

France U.K. U.S.A.

Germany Belgium Italy Netherlands Switzerland Canada

Spain

158 153 146 142 138 132 131 127 119 117

Bottom 10 Countries

1978

Country Number

Cape-Verde Brunei

Eq-Guinea Maldives Qatar Andorra Vatican Nauru Solomon Is

Tonga Vanuatu

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1988

Country Number

Nauru Albania Cambodia St. Kitts

Afghanistan Bhutan North Korea

Mongolia Brunei Maldives Qatar Andorra Sao Tome Laos

0 0 1

2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3

1998

Country Number

Nauru Qatar Laos Brunei Maldives Liechtenstein Sao Tome Oman North Korea Monaco

1 3 4 5 5 6 7 7 8 8

Notes: Source: UIA

1978

0 45

12.1 11.0

166

1988

0 80

22.0 18.7

169

1998

1 158

45.9 34.2

167

1978

Country

UK West Germany France Sweden Netherlands

Italy U.S.A. Denmark

Belgium Switzerland Austria Canada

Number

45 43 42 41 40 40 40 36 36 35 35 35

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Global Civil Society/ 595

audiences (Klandermans et al. 1999). Correspondingly, a few incipient attempts to theorize global dynamics of contentious politics have appeared (Keck & Sikkink 1998b; McCarthy 1997; Tarrow 1998). Drawing on this emerging literature, we

develop our hypotheses along the three key dimensions of social movement studies. First, studies have documented that political opportunities available in a polity

shape the form and timing of social movements. Such opportunities include openness of the institutionalized political system, potential for activists to influence elites, and perceived probability of forceful repression by the government (McAdam 1996). This line of reasoning predicts that domestic political opportunities are prerequisites for participation in global social movements. Correspondingly, on the evolution of the global human rights movement, much literature alludes to the leading role of individuals in countries with more opportunities for political activism (Gaer 1995; Wiseberg 1992).

Another line of human rights research documents a world-level process in which oppressed citizens use international channels to publicize human rights violations and pressure their governments and multinational corporations (Keck & Sikkink 1998a; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999). This "boomerang effect" has become an effective way for oppressed populations to rectify wrongs done to them. As this process has become fairly common, it might be the case that these groups are in greater need of developing a connection with global actors and are joining HRINGOs, whereas citizens who enjoy political freedom are able to establish domestic organizations to voice their complaints. This perspective privileges international political opportunities over domestic ones, while the other hypothesis proposes a spill-over effect of local political opportunities. In our

analysis, we consider both possibilities. Hypothesis la: Citizens in countries with greater domestic political opportunities participate in more HRINGOs, all else being equal.

Hypothesis 1 b: Citizens in countries with fewer domestic political opportunities participate in more HRINGOs, all else being equal. At the international level, political opportunities open up for local populations

when their governments join intergovernmental human rights organizations via international human rights treaties. By ratifying these treaties, governments ex-

press their willingness to be judged by a series of benchmarks and to be held ac- countable for failing to live up to their promises. Commitment to these organiza- tions renders the governments more vulnerable to criticism from abroad about their domestic human rights practices, thus providing local populations with in- ternational level opportunities to pressure their governments. Some organizations also have authority to examine individual complaints; local populations can file

complaints to the organizations and ask for investigations into possible human

rights violations.14 We hypothesize that citizens in these countries are more likely to perceive political opportunities at the global level, which they can use to influ-

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596 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

ence local or global human rights politics, and therefore are more likely to join HRINGOs.

Hypothesis Ic: Citizens in countries with greater global political opportunities (more memberships in intergovernmental human rights organizations) participate in more HRINGO memberships, all else being equal.

By testing these hypotheses, we delineate the interplay between local and

global political opportunity structures. We also make inferences about the in- teraction between global and local civil societies and about the directionality (unidirectional or bi-directional) of the influences; we explore whether global civil

society encourages local populations to join the international human rights move- ment, or local civil societies mobilize to create and sustain such movements.

Second, research on resource mobilization has found that flows of resources for mobilization and the strength of preexisting organizational structures and social networks circumscribe the potential for social movements. On the domestic level, resources that are available for citizens often shape the possibility of social movements for human rights. Populations with more resources are more likely to engage in postmaterialist movements, which prioritize noneconomic factors such as a sense of belonging and aesthetic concerns as their goals (Inglehart 1977, 1990). In other words, once basic human needs have been met, citizens can turn their attention to other needs. The human rights movement is often considered an example of such postmaterialist movements.

On the international level, inflows of resources across borders, both material and human, facilitate a country's connection to the international human rights movement. Citizens in such countries not only have the advantage of having more mobilizational resources for social movements, but also have human networks through which they link with global civil society and join the human

rights movement. These arguments lead to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a: Citizens in more developed countries participate in more HRINGOs, all else being equal.

Hypothesis 2b: Citizens in countries with greater international inflows of human and material resources participate in more HRINGOs, all else being equal. Third, the literature on framing points to the importance of the cognitive

dimensions in mobilizing individuals for social movements. Movement leaders need to choose effective ways of framing that would facilitate understanding of the issues at stake and convince individuals to participate in the movement

(Brysk 2000; Clark 2001). Domestically, the level of education of a country's population influences the level of cognitive understanding of human rights issues. Citizens who are better educated may possess the cultural capital needed to be aware of their rights, to recognize when those rights have not been met, and to

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Global Civil Society/ 597

possess the tools needed to articulate demands and to organize for change (Tarrow 1987). This argument leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Citizens in countries with higher levels of education participate in more HRINGOs, all else being equal. On the international level, we argue that linkages to global civil society facilitate

a cognitive understanding of human rights issues. Here, we make use of world society theory to advance the argument. The world society theoretical perspective explains globalization processes by arguing that world models for state and society, organization, and relations have expanded over time, especially since the end of World War II (Meyer et al. 1997). Such models are available to all countries

regardless of their economic, social, or political characteristics. By meeting world standards of nation-statehood, countries are able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of other nations. The result has been increasing isomorphism among national

governments over time in their structures, behavior and policies. We argue that the globalization of the human rights regime reflects the triumph

of world models of progress and justice within which the individual person is

assigned a central role. As reflected in the models, nation-states are expected to

pursue progress and justice and to do so by enhancing the capacities of individuals and protecting their rights (Ramirez 2001; Ramirez & Meyer 1998). One example of this is the changing nature of the discourse surrounding the rights of women over the past two centuries (Berkovitch 1999).

The international human rights regime has impacted the formal policies and structures of many nation-states (Jacobson 1996; McNeely 1995). In order to be

part of the international human rights regime, countries are expected to fit a certain human rights profile, which includes participating in human rights organizations and conferences, signing international and regional human rights treaties and conventions, and developing domestic human rights law and policy (Ramirez et al. 2002).

The expansion and intensification of networks linking countries, organizations, and people to one another facilitate the development and dissemination of these world models. This is especially the case with human

rights. International organizations (IOs), including both governmental and

nongovernmental ones, serve as a key networking mechanism for the diffusion of world models. Through involvement with IOs, citizens get exposed to models

concerning progress and justice, and eventually regard attention to human rights to be the norm. As a result, they would be more likely to engage in activities specific to human rights, such as participation in HRINGOs. Thus, the more connections a country has with international society, the more likely its citizens are to participate in many HRINGOs. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4a: Citizens in countries having greater connections to international

society participate in more HRINGOs, all else being equal.

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598 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

FIGURE 2: Cumulative Count of Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations

500

400

300'

200'

100-

0

1839 1919 1929 1945 1954 1963 1971 1979 1987 1995

1892 1923 1940 1949 1958 1967 1975 1983 1991

Year

However, the influence of these international connections may differ depending on the type of connections. Recent scholarship on globalization has suggested that international governmental and nongovernmental arenas may be two separate spheres operating by different principles and logic (Boli & Thomas 1997; Jang & Luo 2000). This distinction is particularly striking in a field such as human rights (Tsutsui 2004). As discussed above, governmental agents and nongovernmental organizations have been taking turns leading the efforts to establish human rights as a major global political agenda. Since the 1970s, however, it has been

nongovernmental actors that are more aggressive in promoting human rights ideas and publicizing human rights violations. Governmental agencies tend to be more averse to commit to human rights causes because they are concerned about

undermining state sovereignty, which global human rights almost inevitably do.

Nongovernmental actors, on the other hand, are less concerned about state

C u

m u 1 a t i v e

F r e q u e n c

y

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Global Civil Society/ 599

sovereignty and therefore are more active and flexible in human rights activities. Given the appreciatively more active role global civil society has played in the promotion of human rights, linkage to it should have a greater impact on citizen engagement in HRINGOs. Thus the second part of this hypothesis reads as follows:

Hypothesis 4b: Linkage to global civil society has a stronger effect than linkage to the intergovernmental world on citizen participation in HRINGOs, all else being equal.

Finally, we expect the effects of global civil society to be stronger in more re- cent periods. While in earlier periods domestic factors might have determined whether a country's citizens were represented in HRINGOs, international factors ought to have become more important in recent years as globalization connects more local actors and as human rights becomes more institutionalized in global society.'5 As the literature on norm cascade specifies, once a norm attains a taken-

for-granted status, its influence on local political actors grows dramatically, lead- ing to isomorphic political structure and practice across the globe. Since human rights ideas are considered to have reached the taken-for-granted status in the mid- 1980s (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999), the impact of linkages to global civil society ought to have increased since then.

Data and Measures

The descriptive analysis above suggests that developed Western countries tend to have more citizens engaged in human rights international nongovernmental organizations. Over time, however, individuals in developing countries have increased their participation in HRINGOs. In this section, we build on the descriptive analysis to provide explanations for those national characteristics that lead to a greater number of memberships in HRINGOs. In order to test the

hypotheses we have laid out earlier, we employ ordinary least-squares regression analyses to explain HRINGO memberships in 1978, 1988 and 1998. To understand changes over time, we also use panel analyses for 1978-88 and 1988-98.16 All of the analyses use a constant set of 77 countries, which are listed in the Appendix.

Our dependent variable is the number of HRINGOs in which each country's citizens participate as described in a previous section. It is measured in 1978, 1988, and 1998, as are the independent variables, unless otherwise stated. To correct for the skewed distribution of HRINGOs, we tested several transfor- mations of the variable. The square root transformation approximated the normal distribution the best, and results using this measure yielded stronger model fits than those with other transformation, such as natural log.

We use the following independent variables to test the hypotheses presented earlier. To measure the availability of domestic political opportunities, we use in- dicators of the level of civil and political rights granted to local populations. We

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600 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

combine the measures of civil liberties and political rights from Freedom House (2001) to create a composite index of domestic political opportunities. The indi- ces each measure degrees of political rights and civil liberties on 1-7 range scales. We flipped the original index so that high scores coincide with high degrees of lib- erties and rights (e.g., Costa Rica and Norway) whereas low scores are given to countries with fewer civil liberties and political rights (e.g., Myanmar and Soma- lia). Thus, our measure of civil and political rights ranges from 2 to 14, with a score of 14 representing a country with the greatest protection of civil and political rights.17

As for political opportunity structures at the international level, we use

memberships in human rights intergovernmental organizations (HRIGOs) as the measure. The variable quantifies national memberships in international

governmental organizations that are human rights-related in each of the three time points. Similar to the dependent variable, this measure comes from the Union of International Associations (Various years).

To measure the size of national resources, we use gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP) in current international dollars (World Bank 2001). We took the natural log transformation to correct for the skewed distribution. To measure international flows of resources, we use two variables. The first is the number of people entering the country in the short term, which is a proxy for inflows of human resources. This measure

captures the openness of national borders to people from abroad, which facilitates activists to come in and work on human rights issues in the country. The second variable is import of goods and services as a percentage of the GDP, which measures inflows of material resources. It represents the openness of a country to material resources coming from abroad.'8 Both of these variables come from World Development Indicators (2001) and are logged.19

Our arguments concerning cognitive dimensions lead to two types of measures, one for domestic and the other for global level measures. The first is education. We use tertiary enrollment ratios for the age cohort likely to be enrolled in that level of education (20-24 year-olds).20 The variable is available from the World Bank (2001) and is transformed (natural log) to correct for skewed distributions.21 The second set of variables measure the level of a country's involvement in international society. We follow the convention in world society research, and use memberships in international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and memberships in international governmental organizations (IGOs). We corrected for the skewed distribution by first adding one to all cases and then performing a natural log transformation for both variables. In order to ensure independence from HRIGOs and HRINGOs variables, we subtracted the numbers of HRIGO and HRINGO memberships from each country's memberships in overall IGOs and INGOs, respectively. Both IGO and INGO measures come from the Union of International Associations (Various years). Table 2 summarizes the definitions and descriptive statistics of these variables.

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Global Civil Society / 601

We ran three cross sections using variables measured in 1978, 1988, and 1998,

respectively. In the two panel analyses (1978-88 and 1988-98), we included the

lagged dependent variable as well as explanatory variables, which are lagged ten

years.

Results

CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSES

In this section, we present the results for three cross-sectional analyses using the number of memberships in HRINGOs in 1978, 1988 and 1998. Results are summarized in Tables 3, 4, and 5. For all three time points, model 1 tests the effects of domestic factors on the number of memberships in HRINGOs, while in models 2 and 3 we add measures of international factors. We begin by reporting the results for 1978.

Model 1 reports the effects of domestic political opportunities and cognitive understanding, measured by the civil and political rights index and education,

respectively. We initially attempted an analysis with the measure of resource

availability at the domestic level, gross domestic product per capita (logged). However, since the variable was very highly correlated with education (over .85), and did not have a significant effect, we are not presenting the results with the GDP variable. In model 1, the effects of education are positive and significant. The effects of civil and political rights are also significant, although at a lower level.

In model 2, we added the following international factors: HRIGO memberships, which measures international political opportunities, international inflows of human and material resources, and memberships in IGOs. The openness of a

country to people outside has a positive significant effect, while the openness of a

country to foreign goods and services has a negative and significant effect. These results suggest that international flows of human resources have a positive impact on citizen participation in the international human rights movement, while flows of material resources have the opposite impact. The former finding is consistent with our hypothesis, but the latter is opposite to our hypothesis and calls for more discussion. Memberships in IGOs has a positive significant effect. The effect loses

significance in model 3, however, with inclusion of linkage to global civil society measured as memberships in INGOs.22 Thus, our hypothesis that international

linkages, particularly those to global civil society, have positive effects on HRINGO memberships finds support. With the addition of these linkage variables, other variables gradually lose significance. In model 3, all the other variables lose

significance as we introduce memberships in INGOs.23 The overall model fit increases quite a bit as well. These findings indicate a strong impact of linkage to

global civil society on citizen participation in the international human rights movement.

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602 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

Table 4 shows the results of the same analyses for the next time point, 1988. The results for 1988 are different from those for 1978 in some interesting ways. The positive effect of domestic political opportunity structures measured as civil and political rights becomes stronger in this period; it is significant in all three models. The effect of HRIGOs becomes significant in model 2. These results suggest stronger effects of both domestic and international political opportunity structures in this period. In model 2, international flows of human resources continue to have a positive impact whilst flows of material resources have a negative one. IGOs continue to exert a positive and significant effect in this model. In the final model, INGO linkage has the strongest effect and eliminates the effects of HRIGOs, flows of material resources, and IGOs, but the rights variable continues to be positive and significant in 1988.

Finally, Table 5 summarizes the results for 1998. The results are very similar to those for 1988 except that the level of significance changes for some variables. This suggests that the patterns of participation in HRINGOs have remained largely the same in this period. Citizens in countries with greater domestic opportunities, more inflows of human resources, and stronger linkage to global civil society are more likely to participate in the international human rights movement. In all three years, the adjusted R-squares are the highest in model 3, which includes INGO memberships. However, the overall amount of variation that is accounted for by the model goes down slightly over time (.869, .838, and .786 in 1978, 1988, and 1998, respectively). This suggests that, over time, participation in HRINGOs becomes increasingly institutionalized and therefore more difficult to capture.

Panel Analyses

To examine what factors predict changes in citizen participation in HRINGOs, we carried out panel analyses with a ten-year lag for two time points, 1978-88 and 1988-98. The explanatory variables used in the analyses are the same as those used in the cross-sections except that we add the lagged dependent variable. The risk involved in such an analysis is that the lagged variable accounts for all of the variation in the later time period. Indeed, this is what we find in the models we ran

using the same dependent variable as was used in the cross-sections, that is, total

memberships in HRINGOs.24 For the panels presented here, we make use of a

slightly different dependent variable. It measures the change in HRINGO

memberships between the later time period (e.g., 1988) and the earlier one

(e.g., 1978).25 We do this for both 1978-88 and 1988-98. Results for the first panel are reported in Table 6.

The findings suggest that the strongest predictor of change in citizen

memberships in HRINGOs between 1978-88 is the degree of civil and political rights ten years prior. In all three models, holding other variables constant, this variable consistently registers a strong positive significant effect (p < .001),

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Global Civil Society / 603

suggesting that domestic political opportunities increase the level of participation in the international human rights movement. The lagged dependent variable has a

weakly significant (p < .05) and positive effect in only the first model. In all models, the effects of education, HRIGO memberships, and international flows of human and material resources are insignificant. Memberships in IGOs, as seen in model 2, have a strongly significant and positive effect on HRINGO memberships, but the effect is wiped out in model 3 when we add INGO memberships, which has a weakly significant effect. This last model explains the greatest amount of variation (adjusted R2 = .584). Thus, domestic political opportunities and linkage to global civil society predict the growth in HRINGO memberships from 1978 to 1988, with the former having a much stronger effect.

The picture changes in the analysis of the 1988-98 period. The results in Table 7 show that the lagged dependent variable, international human inflows, and linkage to global civil society have positive significant effects on the dependent variable. The level of domestic political opportunities, which had a strong positive significant effect in all models in the earlier period, is negative and significant in the first model and insignificant in the rest.26 No other variables show significant effects in any models. These findings suggest that citizens in countries that had joined the international human rights movement by 1988 continue to grow in their memberships to HRINGOs in the following ten years, and that individuals in countries with greater inflows of human resources and stronger linkage to global civil society also expand their participation in the movement. In other words, global factors predict increase in citizen participation in the international human rights movement better than domestic factors controlling for the lagged dependent variable. In addition, a greater amount of the variance is accounted for in this analysis than in the analysis of the 1978-88 period.

Further Specifications

We tried several additional variables in analyses not reported in the models presented above.27

Our account of the historical process leading to the expansion of HRINGOs around the world indicated that both developed and developing countries

played the lead role in establishing human rights issues as a legitimate global political concern. On one hand, most countries that can boast of large numbers of citizens who are members of HRINGOs and HRINGO headquarters are located in Western Europe and in the U.S. and Canada. However, as we have reiterated throughout this article, human rights is not to be viewed as a venture limited to core countries.28 To explore potential regional diversity, we used regional dummy variables, which produced somewhat inconsistent results. In some models of the cross-sections and the panel analyses, the dummy variable for Middle East/North

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604 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

TABLE 2: Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis

Definition Mean Std. Dev.

HRINGO

memberships

Change in HRINGOs

National resources

Education

Rights' index

Measured by memberships in human rights international nongovernmental organizations at national level, 1978 (square root).

Measured by memberships in human rights international nongovernmental organizations at national level, 1988 (square root).

Measured by memberships in human rights international nongovernmental organizations at national level, 1998 (square root).

Measured by subtracting human rights international

nongovernmental organizations in 1978 from human

rights international nongovernmental organizations in 1988 (square root).

Measured by subtracting human rights international

nongovernmental organizations in 1988 from human

rights international nongovernmental organizations in 1998 (square root).

Measured by gross domestic product per capita, 1978 (log).

Measured by gross domestic product per capita, 1988 (log).

Measured by gross domestic product per capita, 1998 (log).

Measured by tertiary enrollment/age cohort, 1975 (log).

Measured by tertiary enrollment/age cohort, 1988 (log).

Measured by tertiary enrollment/age cohort, 1995 (log).

Measured on a 14-point scale (14 = most rights; 2 = least rights), 1978.

Measured on a 14-point scale (14 = most rights; 2 = least rights), 1988.

Measured on a 14-point scale (14 = most rights; 2 = least rights), 1998.

3.80 1.43

5.34 1.65

2.06 7.58

3.65 1.21

5.21 1.52

7.49 1.08

8.20 1.12

8.45 1.20

1.48 1.47

2.12 1.27

2.38 1.33

4.30 1.84

4.36 2.01

4.83 1.60

Africa was weakly negative and significant.29 The other regions failed to exert

significant results. In testing the effects of domestic political opportunity structures (or a lack

thereof), we tried an additional measure, the degree of state terror in a country.

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Global Civil Society/ 605

TABLE 2: Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis (Continued)

Definition Mean Std. Dev.

HRIGO Measured by nation-state memberships in

memberships human rights intergovernmental organizations, 1978. 4.14 1.33

Measured by nation-state memberships in human rights intergovernmental organizations, 1988. 7.06 2.55

Measured by nation-state memberships in human rights intergovernmental organizations, 1998. 10.30 2.50

Human inflows Measured by short-term visits, 1980 (log). 5.65 .86 Measured by short-term visits, 1988 (log). 5.82 .85 Measured by short-term visits, 1998 (log). 6.02 .90

Imports of goods Measured by imports of goods & services and services as a percentage of gross domestic product, 1978 (log). 3.37 .62

Measured by imports of goods & services as a percentage of gross domestic product, 1988 (log). 3.36 .54

Measured by imports of goods & services as a percentage of gross domestic product, 1998 (log). 3.55 .50

IGO memberships Measured by nation-state memberships in

intergovernmental organizations, 1978 (add one, log). 3.76 .35

Measured by nation-state memberships in

intergovernmental organizations, 1988 (add one, log). 3.80 .30

Measured by nation-state memberships in

intergovernmental organizations, 1998 (add one, log). 3.75 .28

INGO memberships Measured by memberships in international non-

governmental organizations at national level, 1978 (add one, log). 5.57 .98

Measured by memberships in international non-

governmental organizations at national level, 1988 (add one, log). 6.29 .81

Measured by memberships in international non-

governmental organizations at national level, 1998 (add one, log). 6.60 .83

We used indices of the degree of human rights abuses in countries culled from

Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department's annual reports. Scores

ranged from 1-5 with low scores indicating low levels of human rights abuses (Ball 2000; Poe & Tate 1994). The results for these measures failed to produce any significant results.

We also consider other factors that may be influencing the rise of international

nongovernmental organizations. It has been argued that starting in the mid 1970s, official development assistance (ODA) from the U.S. was frequently provided to

lesser-developed countries via international nongovernmental organizations. Given

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606 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

TABLE 3: Cross-sectional Analysis of Memberships in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations (HRINGOs), 1978

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Education .68*** .33** .07 (.09) (.09) (.08)

Rights index .05t .04 .01 (.03) (.03) (.02)

HRIGO memberships .07 .08 (.07) (.06)

Human inflows .25t (.13)

Imports of goods and services -.31 * -.13 (.13) (.12)

IGO memberships 1.5*** -19 (.31) (.36)

INGO memberships 1.22*** (.18)

Constant 2.32*** -3.33* -2.36* (.24) (1.36) (.98)

Adjusted R2 .640 .794 .869

(N= 77)

Note: Unstandardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses. Variables mea- sured in c. 1978.

t p <.10 * p <.05 p < .01 p < .001 (two-tailedtests)

that much ODA addresses basic human needs, it is possible that the rise of HRINGO

memberships in these countries is driven by ODA and the organizations stemming from them. To test this possibility, we used a measure of official development assistance and official aid (in current $US) in the analyses for lesser-developed countries (i.e., those receiving aid for those years). The results for the cross-sections were not stable over time. The variable was positive and significant for 1988 and 1998 but did not exert a significant effect for any year when the INGO variable was added to the models. In each of the panel analyses, the variable failed to reach

significance. Lastly, we also considered the issue of multicollinearity. Correlations among

variables were not extremely high. Among all independent variables, tertiary education enrollment and the development measure (GDP) were the most highly correlated, and therefore, we excluded the development measure in our tables. Furthermore, the stability of coefficients and standard errors across most models

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Global Civil Society / 607

TABLE 4: Cross-sectional Analysis of Memberships in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations (HRINGOs), 1988

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Education .51*** .12 -.08 (.14) (.14) (.11)

Rights index .18*** .16*** .09* (.04) (.04) (.04)

HRIGO memberships .11* .03 (.05) (.05)

Human inflows .42* (.17)

Imports of goods & services -.36t -.09 (.19) (.16)

IGO memberships 1.19** -.15 (.38) (.38)

INGO memberships 1.58*** (.24)

Constant 2.61*** -2.91 -4.61** (.28) (1.81) (1.45)

Adjusted R2 .615 .754 .838

(N = 77)

Note: Unstandardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses. Variables mea- sured inc. 1988.

tp<.10 *p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

provides some confidence that multicollinearity was not a problem. Although the results tended to change with the inclusion of the INGO variable, this owes more to the strength of its effect than multicollinearity.

Discussion

The foregoing analyses reveal a striking finding: international factors explain country level variation in citizen participation in the international human

rights movement better than domestic factors with the exception of domestic

political opportunities. Considering the effects found in the panel analyses, we see that endogenous variables, namely rights, had a strong positive impact in the earlier

period. In the later era, exogenous variables, particularly memberships in INGOs and international human inflows, have a strong and positive impact on citizen

memberships in HRINGOs. When human rights are less institutionalized, internal

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608 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

TABLE 5: Cross-sectional Analysis of Memberships in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations (HRINGOs), 1998

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Education

Rights index

HRIGO memberships

Human inflows

Imports of goods and services

IGO memberships

INGO memberships

Constant

Adjusted R2

(N= 77)

Note: Unstandardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses. Variables mea- sured in c. 1998.

tp<.10 *p <.05 ** p <.01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

conditions (local political opportunities) are more consequential, and when human

rights are more institutionalized worldwide, linkages to the world matter more. Furthermore, both memberships in INGOs and international human inflows are

processes at the global civil society level and not at the intergovernmental level. We discuss these international factors first.

The effects of linkages to international society, both in terms of memberships in IGOs (in models 2) and INGOs (in models 3), are strong in all but one

analysis. The positive effects for both variables support the idea that linkages to world models concerning human rights encourage participation in the international human rights movement. The effects of IGO memberships disappear, however, when we add INGO memberships in all the analyses. As we discussed earlier, nongovernmental actors have played key roles in the global expansion of

.81** (.16)

.12* (.06)

.02 (.17)

.19***

(.05)

.08 (.07)

.85**

(.24)

-.71* (.28)

2.13** (.59)

-.25 (.15)

.09* (.04)

.003 (.06)

-.28 (.25)

.14 (.61)

2.22*** (.34)

-7.00** (2.28)

.786

4.44*** (.53)

.431

-5.73 (2.70)

.705

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Global Civil Society/ 609

TABLE 6: Panel Analysis of Change in Memberships in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations (HRINGOs), 1978-88

Lagged DV HRINGOs, 1978

Independent variables Education

Rights index

HRIGO memberships

Human inflows

Imports of goods and services

IGO memberships

INGO memberships

Constant

Adjusted R2

(N= 77)

.003 (.11)

.15*** (.03)

.03 (.09)

.26 (.17)

-.10 (.16)

1.41** (.43)

1.30*** (.35)

.519

-.06 (.12)

.15"** (.03)

.04 (.09)

-.09 (.16)

.86 (.55)

.60+ (.35)

-3.77* (1.72)

.581

-.07 (.12)

.14*** (.03)

-3.04t (1.54)

.584

Note: Unstandardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses. Variables mea- sured inc. 1978.

t p < .10 * p <.05 ** p <.01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

human rights; they have a greater commitment to human rights issues and are less concerned about eroding state sovereignty. Thus, citizens in those countries that are well connected to global civil society - where human rights activism has been

intensifying - will become more aware of human rights issues, and are more likely to get involved in the international human rights movement. This finding provides support for the argument in world society research that international governmental and nongovernmental arenas need separate analytical treatment.

International inflows of human and material resources show divergent effects. Inflows of human resources measured as people entering the country in the short

Model 1

.29* (.11)

Model 2

-.07 (.15)

Model 3

-.22 (.18)

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610 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

term exert a positive significant effect on citizen memberships in HRINGOs in all analyses except the first panel (1978-88). On the other hand, inflows of material resources measured as imports of goods and services are negatively associated with the dependent variable, although the effect is significant only in cross-sectional models without the INGO variable. The effect of human resources provides partial support for our argument, but the negative effect of imports is rather puzzling. The effect of human inflows indicates that openness of national borders to people from outside facilitates local actors to gain mobilizational resources, including ideas about human rights and connections to human rights activists outside, thus encouraging them to join the international human rights movement. Thus, this indicator can be deemed as a measure of linkage to global civil society; it therefore provides further support for the world society argument.30 The negative effect of imports suggests a need for a better measurement of inflows of material resources for social movements. Because the vast majority of imported goods have no bearing on potential for social movements, the variable may be simply measuring international economic exchange, or even dependence on foreign goods. Thus, the negative effect may be showing that citizens in a dependent economy are less likely to have the capacity to participate in the international human rights movement.

On the other hand, few of the domestic factors influence HRINGO memberships. Among them, political opportunity structure is the only variable that has a significant effect even when international factors are included in the analysis. Most of the analyses show that domestic political opportunities increase citizen participation in HRINGOs. This provides support for the argument about a spillover effect of domestic political opportunities as opposed to the argument about a boomerang effect. It is worth noting that the effect of this variable becomes negative (and significant in the first model) in the second panel. Thus, while advanced democracies with many political opportunities may have led the international human rights movement in the earlier period, countries with lower levels of civil and political rights account for the expansion of citizen memberships in HRINGOs in the second period. This suggests a process of "catching-up" to memberships more in line with those of their democratic equivalents. The second panel captures the expansion of HRINGOs in the period since human rights have gained taken-for-granted status in the international political arena. Thus, the "catching-up" process may be deemed as a "norm cascade," in which accepted norms of human rights impact local actors across the globe (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999). Linkages to international civil society were important factors in this "catching-up" process; countries with more inflows of human resources and greater memberships in INGOs were more likely to increase citizen participation in HRINGOs.

In sum, the analyses indicate that while the developed democracies may have contributed to the expansion of HRINGOs in earlier periods, countries with greater linkages to global civil society, many of them with a weak economy and an

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Global Civil Society / 611

TABLE 7: Panel Analysis of Change in Memberships in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations (HRINGOs), 1988-1998

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Lagged DV HRINGOs, 1988

Independent variables Education

Rights index

HRIGO memberships

Human inflows

Imports of goods and services

IGO memberships

INGO memberships

Constant

Adjusted R2

(N = 77)

Note: Unstandardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses. Variables mea- sured in c. 1988.

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

undemocratic polity, have been the driving force for the expansion in recent

periods. The panel analyses demonstrate the shift in the effects of independent variables dramatically. The first panel (1978-88) shows that domestic political opportunities have a stronger effect on growth in citizen memberships in HRINGOs than linkages to global civil society. In the period from 1988 to 1998, however, domestic opportunities are no longer relevant and the effects of linkages to global civil society and human inflows become the most important factors, underscoring the norm cascade that was taking place. This finding suggests a

parallel to the process in which local social capital nurtures democracy in a country

.44* (.17)

-.23 (.16)

-.07 (.05)

.64***

(.13)

-.25 (.16)

-.04 (.05)

-.07 (.06)

.88***

(.11)

.02 (.15)

-.11* (.05)

-.06 (.06)

.71**

(.20)

-.28 (.22)

.48 (.46)

-.18 (.22)

-.31 (.53)

1.35** (.42)

1.47*** (.40)

-1.87 (2.07)

.640 .577

-2.23 (2.18)

.629

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612 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

(Paxton 2002); just as vibrant civil society and vigorous associational life are beneficial for the establishment of a democratic political system in a country, linkage to global civil society works as what might be called "global social capital" and encourages advancement of human rights in international society.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to provide a macro-sociological understanding of the expansion of the international human rights movement with empirical data on HRINGOs.

On the global level, the data show that the overall number of HRINGOs and citizen memberships increased dramatically, especially within the past twenty years, corroborating the expansion of the international human rights movement. At the national level, we find that many countries have increased their participation in the international human rights movement in the last few decades. While wealthy Western countries tend to have the most citizens who are membersof HRINGOs, the least wealthy or peripheral countries consistently register the lowest level of citizen participation. However, our statistical analyses of the factors that affect citizen participation in HRINGOs suggest that rich democratic countries are not driving the expansion alone. Indeed, citizens in less industrialized and less democratic countries are increasing their involvement in international human rights activities. Our analyses show that linkage to global civil society is a key factor in drawing citizens into human rights activism.

This article makes unique contributions to the study of social movements, as it presents the first statistical analyses that explore the dynamics between global and local factors affecting social movements. An emerging literature in social movement studies has speculated on the international factors in contemporary social movements, but few scholars have attempted to test these effects in empirical quantitative analyses. Our analyses show that global factors, particularly linkage to global civil society, have strong effects on participation in the international human rights movement controlling for domestic factors. This is especially the case in the more recent era when human rights were more institutionalized the world over. Considering the active roles nongovernmental actors play in other types of social movements, such as environmental activism and peace movements, and their increasing level of transnational coalition, one might argue that global civil society is an important factor in contemporary social movements in general. Another variable that can also be considered a measure of linkage to global civil society, human resource flows, showed a strong impact on involvement in global human rights activism. Thus, future research on contemporary social movements, whether transnational or domestic, might need to examine the role of global civil society as well as global-level political opportunities and international resource flows.

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Global Civil Society/ 613

This research also provides new insights in the globalization literature. First, we use new measures of international linkages that not only enable testing the impact of global factors in social movements, but also add new dimensions to the study of global politics. Research in the world society approach has emphasized the effects of linkages to global society on local politics, but has used memberships in international organizations almost exclusively. This often invited criticisms about the underspecification of the effects of linkages. Our linkage variables specify what effects different types of linkages exert, as we operationalize them along the three key dimensions in social movement theories. Thus, we combine the two literatures, social movement theories and globalization literature, and create a set of analytical tools that expand our understanding of contemporary social movements and global-local dynamics in them.

Our analysis also confirms the process of norm cascade and clarifies the mechanisms by which global norms impact local politics. In earlier periods, when human rights ideas had not become globally accepted norms, endogenous factors shaped individuals' participation in HRINGOs. With the consolidation of global human rights norms since the mid-1980s, however, global factors have become the most powerful predictors of participation in the global human rights movement. These findings also contribute to the world society literature, as they specify changes in the impact of global models over time.

Finally, our analyses sort out different effects of international governmental and nongovernmental actors. Research on global politics has suggested the different roles for the two sectors, as do studies on international human rights. Our findings confirm the argument that nongovernmental actors have been playing the leading role in the expansion of global human rights in the last few decades. Because of their flexibility and lack of concern for state sovereignty, they have been able to

aggressively push the international human rights movement forward. We suspect that this is the case in other global issues such as environmentalism and global inequality. Thus, understanding of the evolution of the international human rights movement would provide insights into how other international progressive social movements might evolve. While these movements tend to originate in advanced democracies, as they diffuse throughout the world, participation by citizens in

developing countries increases and pushes the movement forward to impact global and local politics. Global civil society plays a key role in this evolutionary process, as it sustains political life outside governmental networks and enhances progressive movements that governments tend to abhor. With increasing participation of activists in developing countries as well as those in developed countries in global civil society, the potential for more global progressive social movements is growing, as is the potential for real social change in important issue areas such as global inequality and environmentalism. By focusing on one of the most prominent international social movements, the human rights movement, this study offers an important first step to understanding these global trends.

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614 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

Notes

1. We also note that some human rights nongovernmental organizations are domestic in their scope (Ball 2000). Although studies of human rights nongovernmental organizations that operate at the national level contribute to the working of local human rights politics, they do not directly address an important aspect of human rights politics, namely, the interaction between global and local human rights movements. Our research examines international human rights nongovernmental organizations, and hence enables us to explore the connection between global and local human rights processes and the interplay between international governmental networks and global civil society.

2. We use the term global civil society to refer to the realm of international collective life in which nongovernmental actors form networks, advance claims and establish solidarity (Wapner 2002).

3. Recent scholarship has pointed out the contributions by small countries as well (Waltz 2001).

4. See for an exception, Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco (1997).

5. We note that our membership data only measure the breadth of country participation, not the depth of participation. To examine the depth of participation, we need data on how many people from each country has joined HRINGOs. Future research should consider whether the breadth and depth of participation are correlated.

6. See Boli and Thomas (1997) for more on the Yearbook and on data quality and coding issues.

7. Some of these organizations make great contributions to human rights protection, but to the extent they are focused on short-term relief regardless of who the victims are and do not aim for structural changes, we see them as not interested in promoting human rights in the long term.

8. For all years, we examined all organizations in the relevant categories, and coded only those that fit our definition of international human rights organizations.

9. Part of the process both authors took in rating the organizations was to give each organization a score on a four-point scale (0-3) with 3 meaning "definitely a HRINGO" to 0, "not a HRINGO." Using these scores, we compared ratings using reliability analyses. Average measure intraclass correlations were over .92 for all three years, leading us to believe that our codings were accurate and consistent. In the following analyses we include only those organizations that have a score of 3.

10. The apparent drop-off since the mid-1990s has more to do with the reporting process, which delays entry into the Yearbook by several years, than with an actual decline in founding.

11. The total number of countries with citizen members (aggregate number of countries listed as having membership in HRINGOs) is 1,847 for 1978, 3,443 for 1988, and 7,132 for 1998.

12. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics on HRINGOs at three time points including a list of the top ten and bottom ten countries in terms of the number of

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memberships in HRINGOs."1 According to the UIA, representatives from each

organization were asked the following question to ascertain organizational and/or individual memberships: "Please indicate the countries in which your organization has [members]. Also, please indicate any international organizational members."

13. Note also that quite a few of the countries included in this table do not make it into our analyses due to missing data on our independent variables. This is especially true of small, developing countries.

14. The processes by which individuals can file complaints are exemplified in the procedure in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights established by Resolution 1503 in 1970, and the first optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force in 1976), which is monitored by the Human Rights Committee.

15. This argument is parallel to that of Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan (1997): they found that endogenous factors circumscribed the patterns of female enfranchisement in earlier periods but that exogenous factors became more important over time, corresponding to the increasing institutionalization of the female enfranchisement at the international level.

16. We also ran the panel analysis for 1978-98. The results are largely similar to those for 1988-98.

17. Recognizing differences in civil liberties and political rights, we first ran the models using the two indices separately and found very similar results to the ones presented in the following sections. This, combined with their high degree of collinearity, is the reason we decided to combine the two measures into the rights index reported in this paper. The analyses were also run using a measure of democracy from the Polity IV Project. As the data were less complete than those used here, we report just the results for the rights index. The results were very similar and are available from the authors upon request.

18. We note that this variable includes some nonmaterial resources: "services" inevitably include resources that do not necessarily take the materialized form. Nevertheless, the vast majority of "goods and services" measured by this variable can be distinguished from human inflows and therefore, we deem this variable to measure inflows of material resources.

19. Direct measures of flows of international human rights activists and funding would be ideal for testing the argument that inflows of mobilizational resources encourage participation in the international human rights movement. However, such data are not readily available for a large number of countries. In addition, our measures have the advantage of capturing flows of resources objectively and generally, thus enabling us to take into account the spillover effects of inflows of resources. See Keck and Sikkink (1998a) for a description of U.S. foundation grants for international human rights work from 1977-91.

20. We also tried a secondary enrollment ratio variable in place of the tertiary enrollment ratio variable. The results for secondary and tertiary enrollment were nearly identical. Because human rights education is primarily done at higher education levels and citizens with higher education are more likely to join HRINGOs, we report just the results with this variable. The other results are available from the authors.

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616 / Social Forces 83:2, December 2004

21. Data for 1975 provided the most complete data for the 1978 time point, as did 1995 for the 1998 time point, while data for 1988 were complete.

22. In model 3, we did not include the measure of international inflows of human resources as it was highly correlated with INGOs.

23. Because of this, our arguments about earlier models have to be taken with caution. Yet, we find the results of model 1 to be important since they allow us to compare the impact of domestic and international factors over time.

24. These results are available from the authors by request.

25. This compares with yet another possibility, that is, the percent growth (time minus time over time1). As the time measure is close to zero for several countries in the analysis, we decided to use the method described here.

26. In order to further specify the effects of the Rights index, we broke the countries into two groups, one with just the less-rights countries (1-7 on Rights variable) and the other with just the more-rights countries (8-14 on Rights variable), and ran the same panel analyses as presented in Tables 6 and 7. For more-rights countries, there is no effect for rights in the earlier period; in the more recent period, the effect is negative. For less-rights countries, the effect of rights is positive in the earlier period; in the more recent period, there is no effect. This suggests that in the earlier period, citizens in relatively democratic countries among the less-rights countries were more likely to participate in HRINGOs while individuals in more-rights countries were equally likely to participate in HRINGOs. In the recent period, citizens in the most democratic countries are not increasing their participation in HRINGOs any longer, while those in less-rights countries are participating in HRINGOs across the board. We also ran the panels with a dummy variable for MORE and LESS rights [1= more rights (8-14) and 0 = less rights (1-7)] in place of the rights index. The results were virtually identical to those presented here for both panels. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting we run this analysis.

27. Results described in this section are available from the authors upon request.

28. Boli and Thomas (1997) argue that by "promoting human rights ideology and critiquing world inequality, many international nongovernmental organizations resist the interests of the core" (fn. 2).

29. According to Crystal (1994), few Middle East human rights organizations are regional in character. Those organizations that were able to emerge in the 1980s tend to be national in their scope and membership. This may explain why citizens in this region are less likely to join HRINGOs.

30. This is an important point as this finding undermines a potential criticism that participation in HRINGOs is simply an extension of participation in INGOs in general.

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Countries Included in the Analysis of Nation-State Memberships in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations, 1978-1998

Algeria Australia Austria

Bangladesh Barbados

Belgium Benin Bolivia Botswana Brazil Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Canada Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia

Congo Costa Rica

Cyprus Ecuador

Egypt El Salvador

Fiji Finland France Ghana Greece Guyana Honduras

Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kenya

Korea, Republic of

Lesotho

Madagascar Malawi

Mali

Malta

Mauritius

Mexico

Morocco

Nepal Netherlands

Niger Norway Pakistan

Paraguay Peru

Philippines, The

Saudi Arabia

Senegal Sierra Leone

Spain Sri Lanka

Swaziland

Sweden

Switzerland

Syria Thailand

Togo Trinidad & Tobago Tunisia

Turkey United States of America

Uruguay Venezuela Zambia

(N= 77)

APPENDIX:

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