Wk 5 Discussion (Corruption in a Global Economy) - Post 1
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records in preparation for an IRS audit. The hotel bookkeeper graciously faxed the “guest” a
copy of the King hotel bill.
On the bill, King had listed her occupation as a travel agent, giving her business address as
the local office of Spicewood Travel. To receive a 50 percent discount on her room rate—a
savings worth $412—she furnished the manager with her business card and an Airline
Reporting Corporation number, a code issued by an international clearinghouse to identify
every travel-booking agency. Though Reed suspected King might have gone on other
company-subsidized trips, “Antigua was the only one we flushed out. We only needed one.”
Further analysis of King’s credit statements showed that she charged three other airline
tickets over a seven-month period and received three corresponding credits that canceled
out the price of the trips, saving her $834.
The fraud examiners clearly proved that King had breached her duty to act in the
company’s best interests in connection with her role as the company’s purchasing agent.
And she had also derived some benefit from a vendor—another violation of corporate
policy. ElectroCity’s personnel handbook addresses both issues: “Employees must disclose
any outside financial interest that might influence their corporate decisions or actions. If
the company believes that such activities are in conflict with the company’s welfare, the
employee will be expected to terminate such interests. Such interests include but are not
limited to personal or family ownership or interest in a business deemed a customer,
supplier, or competitor.”
King broke other rules listed in the personnel handbook as well: “Employees may not use
corporate assets for their personal use or gain. Employees and their families must never
accept any form of under-the-table payments, kickbacks, or rebates, whether in cash or
goods, from suppliers.” Contrary to company policy, King had set up an off-site mini-agency
using the company’s phone, accepted travel discounts from a vendor for continued and
increased business, and received an estimated 10 percent of the agency’s billings in
kickbacks.
Based on their findings, the examiners also determined that King violated the state’s
commercial bribery statute and could be liable for civil damages if the company decided to
press charges. While Reed said that her transgressions warranted immediate termination,
the ex-cop recommended against pursuing criminal action, given King’s age and the ill
health of her unemployed husband. “When you take someone to court, the only options you
have are fines or prison.”
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He takes full responsibility for the decision not to prosecute King. Like police officers,
security professionals must make appropriate assessments based on the circumstances,
Reed said. “The bad ones always follow the book, regardless of what’s best for the
community.”
“We made the case, corrected the system within the company, and damaged her
professionally,” Reed said. Electro-City now requires all vendors to sign agreements
acknowledging prohibitive behavior and gifts to all its employees, who now number 3,200.
The errant employee was not required to make restitution.
Reed next brought the results of their fraud examination to the president of Spicewood
Travel, who reacted with total silence and stunned disbelief. “The documentation was there.
They knew they were going to lose business.” The company also made verbal legal threats
against the agency in the beginning. They held prolonged negotiations to recover $20,000,
an estimate of two years of overcharges, “but another VP dropped that ball,” said Reed.
The corporation’s director of investigations conducted a corporate interview with King to
make a final determination of the nature and extent of her relationship with Spicewood and
to elicit evidence of any other kickback arrangements that might have adversely affected
the company. Reed suggested that King be asked to furnish investigators with a full written
disclosure of her interests and activities in connection with Spicewood and any other
suppliers.
During the interview, King composed her thoughts in a handwritten letter to the president
of ElectroCity:
Dear Mr. Smith:
I must say that I am sorry. It never dawned on me that what I did was in conflict of my
trusted position here at ElectroCity. I truly screwed up; there is no explanation other than
that. There was no consideration on my part that a reduced price was anything other than
that. I never even thought about it. I am truly sorry, especially because I feel I have broken a
trust that we have built over the years. Please understand that I meant nothing against
ElectroCity or anyone. Additionally, I didn’t even see that special rate as a benefit from a
supplier, only as a manner by which I could save some dollars personally.
Respectfully,
Rita Mae King
King had misused her authority as a purchasing agent and had violated her duty to
ElectroCity. “She was remorseful in the sense that she was now going to have to bite the
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bullet,” said Reed. “I think she probably kicked herself because she didn’t get more out of
the scam. She felt that she was a woman who worked very hard at a very difficult job, was
unappreciated, and was not compensated properly by a male-dominated class system in
corporate America.”
Several names and details have been changed to preserve anonymity.2
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Purchasing Schemes
The majority of conflict schemes in our studies were purchasing schemes, and the most
common of these was the overbilling scheme, the kind of fraud Rita Mae King committed in
the preceding case study. We have already briefly discussed conflict schemes that involved
false billings (see Case 1132, above). Because these frauds are very similar to the billing
schemes discussed in Chapter 4 of this book, it will be helpful to discuss the distinction we
have drawn between traditional billing schemes and purchasing schemes that are classified
as conflicts of interest.
Though it is true that any time an employee assists in the overbilling of her company there
is probably some conflict of interest (the employee causes harm to her employer because of
a hidden financial interest in the transaction), this does not necessarily mean that every
instance of false billing will be categorized as a conflict scheme. In order for the scheme to
be classified as a conflict of interest, the employee (or a friend or relative of the employee)
must have some kind of ownership or employment interest in the vendor that submits the
invoice. This distinction is easy to understand if we look at the nature of the fraud. Why
does the fraudster overbill her employer? If she engages in the scheme only for the cash, the
scheme is a fraudulent disbursement billing scheme. If, on the other hand, she seeks to
better the financial condition of her business at the expense of her employer, this is a
conflict of interest. In other words, the fraudster’s interests lie with a company other than
her employer. When an employee falsifies the invoices of a third-party vendor to whom she
has no relation, this is not a conflict of interest scheme, because the employee has no
interest in that vendor. The sole purpose of the scheme is to generate a fraudulent
disbursement.
One might wonder, then, why shell company schemes are classified as fraudulent
disbursements rather than conflicts of interest. After all, the fraudster in a shell company
scheme owns the fictitious company and therefore must have an interest in it. Remember,
though, that shell companies are created for the sole purpose of defrauding the employer.
The company is not so much an entity in the mind of the fraudster as it is a tool. In fact, a
shell company is usually little more than a post office box and a bank account. The fraudster
has no interest in the shell company that causes a division of loyalty; he simply uses the
shell company to bilk his employer. Shell company schemes are therefore classified as false
billing schemes.
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A short rule of thumb can be used to distinguish between overbilling schemes that are
classified as asset misappropriations and those that are conflicts of interest: If the bill
originates from a real company in which the fraudster has an economic or personal
interest, and if the fraudster’s interest in the company is undisclosed to the victim company,
then the scheme is a conflict of interest.
Now that we know what kinds of purchasing schemes are classified as conflicts of interest,
the question is: How do these schemes work? After our lengthy discussion about
distinguishing between conflicts and fraudulent disbursements, the answer is somewhat
anticlimactic. The schemes work the same either way. The distinction between the two
kinds of fraud is useful only to distinguish the status and purpose of the fraudster. The
mechanics of the billing scheme, whether conflict or fraudulent disbursement, do not
change (see Exhibit 10-7). In Case 464, for instance, a purchasing superintendent defrauded
his employer by purchasing items on behalf of his employer at inflated prices from a certain
vendor. The vendor in this case was owned by the purchasing superintendent but
established in his wife’s name and run by his brother. The perpetrator’s interest in the
company was undisclosed. The vendor would buy items on the open market, then inflate
the prices and resell the items to the victim company. The purchasing
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superintendent used his influence to ensure that his employer continued doing business
with the vendor and paying the exorbitant prices. (A more detailed analysis of overbilling
frauds is found in Chapter 4.)
EXHIBIT 10-7: Conflicts of Interest
Fraudsters also engage in bid-rigging on behalf of their own companies. The methods used
to rig bids were discussed in detail earlier in this chapter. Briefly stated, an employee of the
purchasing company is in a perfect position to rig bids, because he has access to the bids of
his competitors. Since the fraudster can find out the amounts of the bids of other vendors,
he can easily tailor his own company’s bid to win the contract. Bid waivers are also
sometimes used by fraudsters to avoid competitive bidding outright. In Case 1473, for
instance, a manager processed several unsubstantiated bid waivers in order to direct
purchases to a vendor in which one of his employees had an interest. The conflict was
undisclosed, and the scheme cost the victim company over $150,000.
In other cases a fraudster might ignore his employer’s purchasing rotation and direct an
inordinate number of purchases or contracts to his own company. Any way by which a
fraudster exerts his influence to divert business to a company in which he has a hidden
interest is a conflict of interest.
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But not all conflict schemes occur in the traditional vendor–buyer relationship. Several of
the cases in our survey involved employees’ negotiating for the purchase of some unique,
typically large asset such as land or a building in which the employee had an undisclosed
interest. It is in the process of these negotiations that the fraudster violates his duty of
loyalty to his employer. Because he stands to profit from the sale of the asset, the employee
does not negotiate in good faith on behalf of his employer; he does not attempt to get the
best price possible. After all, the fraudster will reap a greater financial benefit if the
purchase price is high.
An example of this type of scheme was found in Case 2421, in which a senior vice president
of a utility company was in charge of negotiating and approving mineral leases on behalf of
his company. Unknown to his employer, the vice president also owned the property on
which the leases were made. The potential harm in this type of relationship is obvious—
there was no financial motive for the vice president to negotiate a favorable lease for his
employer.
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Turnaround Sales
A special kind of purchasing scheme that we have encountered in the ACFE studies is called
the turnaround sale, or flip. In this type of scheme an employee knows his employer is
seeking to purchase a certain asset, and takes advantage of the situation by purchasing the
asset himself (usually in the name of an accomplice or shell company). The fraudster then
turns around and resells the item to his employer at an inflated price. We have already seen
one example of this kind of scheme in Case 464 discussed above, in which a purchasing
supervisor set up a company in his wife’s name to resell merchandise to his employer.
Another interesting example of the turnaround method occurred in Case 1379, in which the
CEO of a company, conspiring with a former employee, sold an office building to the CEO’s
company. What made the transaction suspicious was that the former employee had
purchased the building on the same day that it was resold to the victim company, and for
$1.2 million less than the price charged to the CEO’s company.
Sales Schemes
The ACFE studies identified two principal types of conflict schemes associated with the
victim company’s sales. The first and most harmful is the underselling of goods or services.
Just as a corrupt employee can cause his employer to overpay for goods or services sold by a
company in which he has a hidden interest, so, too, can he cause the employer to undersell
to a company in which he maintains a hidden interest (see Exhibit 10-7).
Underbillings
In an underbilling scheme, the perpetrator sells goods or services below fair market value
to a vendor in which he has a hidden interest. This results in a diminished profit margin, or
even a loss on the sale, depending on the size of the discount. Two employees who sold their
employer’s inventory to their own company at off-spec prices, causing a loss of
approximately $100,000, used this method in Case 2427. Another example was found in Case
2684, when an employee disposed of his employer’s real estate by selling it below fair
market value to a company in which he had a hidden interest, causing a loss of
approximately $500,000.
Writing Off Sales
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The other type of sales scheme involves tampering with the books of the victim company to
decrease or write off the amount owed by an employee’s business. For instance, after an
employee’s company purchases goods or services from the victim company, credit memos
may be issued against the sale, causing it to be written off to contra accounts such as
Discounts and Allowances. A plant manager in Case 2197 used this method; this fraudster
assisted favored clients by delaying billing on their purchases for up to sixty days. When the
receivable on these clients’ accounts became delinquent, the perpetrator issued credit
memos against the sales to delete them.
A large number of reversing entries to sales may be a sign that fraud is occurring in an
organization. The fraudster in Case 2197 avoided the problem of too many write-offs by
issuing new invoices on the sales after the “old” receivables were taken off the books. In this
way, the receivables could be carried indefinitely on the books without ever becoming past
due.
In other cases, the perpetrator might not write off the scheme, but simply delay billing. This
is sometimes done as a favor to a friendly client, not as outright avoidance of the bill but
rather as a dilatory tactic. The victim company eventually gets paid, but loses time value on
the payment that arrives later than it should.
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Other Conflict of Interest Schemes
Business Diversions
In Case 1258, an employee started his own business to compete directly with his employer.
While still employed by the victim company, this employee began siphoning off clients for
his own business. This activity clearly violated the employee’s duty of loyalty to his
employer. There is nothing unscrupulous about free competition, but when a person acts as
a representative of his employer it is certainly improper to try to undercut the employer
and take clients. Similarly, the fraudster in Case 2161 steered potential clients away from his
employer and toward his own business. There is nothing unethical about pursuing an
independent venture (in the absence of restrictive employment covenants such as
noncompete agreements), but if the employee fails to act in the best interests of his
employer while carrying out his duties, then this employee is violating the standards of
business ethics.
Resource Diversions
Finally, some employees divert the funds and other resources of their employers to the
development of their own business. In Case 209, for example, a vice president of a company
authorized large expenditures to develop a unique type of new equipment used by a certain
contractor. Another firm subsequently took over the contractor, as well as the new
equipment. Shortly after that, the vice president retired and went to work for the firm that
had bought out the contractor. The fraudster had managed to use his employer’s money to
fund a company in which he eventually developed an interest. This scheme involves
elements of bribery, conflicts of interest, and fraudulent disbursements. In this particular
case, if the vice president had financed the equipment in return for the promise of a job, his
actions might have been properly classified as a bribery scheme. Case 209 nevertheless
illustrates a potential conflict problem. The fraudster could just as easily have authorized
the fraudulent expenditures for a company in which he secretly held an ownership interest.
While these schemes are clearly corruption schemes, the funds are diverted through the use
of a fraudulent disbursement. The money could be drained from the victim company
through a check tampering scheme, a billing scheme, a payroll scheme, or an expense
reimbursement scheme. (For a discussion of the methods used to generate fraudulent
disbursements, please refer to Chapters 4–8.)
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Financial Disclosures
Management has an obligation to disclose to the shareholders significant fraud committed
by officers, executives, and others in positions of trust. Management does not have the
responsibility of disclosing uncharged criminal conduct of its officers and executives.
However, if and when officers, executives, or other persons in trusted positions become
subjects of a criminal indictment, disclosure is required.
The inadequate disclosure of conflicts of interest is among the most serious of frauds.
Inadequate disclosure of related-party transactions is not limited to any specific industry; it
transcends all business types and relationships.
Preventing and Detecting Conflicts of Interest
Conflict of interest schemes are violations of the rule that a fiduciary, agent, or employee
must act in good faith, with full disclosure, in the best interest of the principal or employer.
Most schemes are a violation of the maxim that a person “cannot serve two masters.” Some
of the more common schemes involve an employee’s, manager’s, or executive’s interest in a
customer or supplier and receipt of gifts. Often, the employee, manager, or executive is
compensated for her interest in the form of “consulting fees.”
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The prevention of conflicts of interest can be difficult. The primary resource for heading off
this complex act is a company ethics policy that specifically addresses the problems and
illegalities associated with conflicts of interest and related offenses. The purpose of the
policy is to make the position of the company absolutely clear, to define what constitutes a
conflict or an improper relationship, and to express in no uncertain terms that conflicts are
not appropriate and will not be tolerated. The absence of a clear policy leaves an
opportunity for a perpetrator to rationalize his behavior or to claim ignorance of any
wrongdoing.
A policy requiring employees to complete an annual disclosure statement is also an
excellent proactive approach to preventing conflicts of interest. Comparing the disclosed
names and addresses with the vendor list may reveal real conflicts of interest and the
appearance of such. Communication with employees regarding their other business
interests is also advisable.
In order to detect conflicts of interest, organizations should concentrate on establishing an
anonymous reporting mechanism to receive tips and complaints; this is how most conflict of
interest cases are detected. Complaints typically come from employees who are aware of a
coworker’s self-dealing, or from vendors who have knowledge that a competing vendor who
has ties to an employee of the organization is being favored.
Another detection method that can be helpful is to periodically run comparisons between
vendor and employee addresses and phone numbers. Obviously, if a vendor is owned or run
by an employee of the organization without that fact having been disclosed, this would
constitute a conflict of interest.
PROACTIVE COMPUTER AUDIT TESTS FOR DETECTING CORRUPTION
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Title Category Description Data file(s)
Stratify vendor payments by approval limits, especially directly under (e.g., 5%) the approval limit.
All A high incidence of invoice payments directly below an approval limit may be an attempt to circumvent a management review.
• Paid invoice
Stratify inventory actual to standard price.
All Inventory prices may be agreed to that are higher than normal as part of the fraud schemes. This stratification will direct audit efforts on those parts exceeding the standard price.
• On-hand inventory
Identify trends in obsolete inventory over two or more periods.
All Inventory that has been overpurchased will generally result in obsolescence, which should be identified through trend analysis.
• On-hand inventory
Age inventory by the date of last part issuance.
All Inventory that has been overpurchased will generally result in obsolescence, which should be identified through trend analysis.
• On-hand inventory
Calculate number of months of inventory that is on hand (on a part-by- part basis) and extract those with a high number of months.
All Inventory that has been overpurchased will generally result in obsolescence, which should be identified through trend analysis.
• On-hand inventory
• Shipment log
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Title Category Description Data file(s)
Extract all parts greater than zero in cost that have had no usage in the current year.
All Inventory that has been overpurchased will generally result in obsolescence, which should be identified through trend analysis.
• On-hand inventory
• Shipment log
Identify inventory price greater than retail price (if inventory is for sale).
All Inventory prices may be agreed to that are higher than normal as part of the fraud schemes.
• On-hand inventory
Identify inventory receipts per inventory item that exceed the economic order quantity or maximum for that item.
All Inventory quantities may be agreed to that are higher than normal as part of the fraud schemes.
• Receiving log
• Inventory master file
Identify duplicate payments based on various means that would be made with intent by the employee and accepted with intent by the vendor.
All Duplicate payment tests can be enacted on the vendor, invoice number, amount. More complicated tests can look where the same invoice and amount are paid yet the payment is made to two different vendors. Another advanced test would be to search for same vendor and invoice when a different amount is paid.
• Paid invoice
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Title Category Description Data file(s)
Calculate the ratio of the largest purchase to next- largest purchase by vendor.
All By identifying the largest purchase to a vendor and the next-largest purchase, any large ratio difference may identify a fraudulently issued “largest” purchase.
• Paid invoice
Calculate the annualized unit price changes in purchase orders for the same product in the same year.
All Assesses price changes in purchases for potential fraudulent company purchases and employee payments.
• Purchase order
List all vendors who had multiple invoices immediately below an approval limit (e.g., many $999 payments to a vendor when there is a $1,000 approval limit), highlighting a circumvention of the established control.
All Multiple invoices below an approval limit may be an attempt to circumvent a management review.
• Paid invoice
Extract round- dollar payments and summarize by vendor.
All Payments made in round dollars have a higher incidence of being fraudulent and should be scrutinized closely.
• Paid invoice
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Title Category Description Data file(s)
Review payments with little or no sequence between invoice numbers.
All Vendors issuing phony invoices many times will invoice the company with no gaps in invoice sequence.
• Paid invoice
List payments to any vendor that exceed the twelve- month average payments to that vendor by a specified percentage (e.g., 200%).
All Large payments are unusual and should be scrutinized as potentially being fraudulent.
• Paid invoice
List payments to any vendor that exceed the twelve- month average payments to any vendor within the purchase category (e.g., supplies, fixtures) by a specified percentage (e.g., 200%).
All Large payments are unusual and should be scrutinized as potentially being fraudulent, especially when analyzed in relation to other vendors of similar products.
• Paid invoice
Summarize invoice payment general ledger activity by type of purchase, and identify areas with less than three vendors.
All By summarizing general ledger activity, the vendors by type of purchase (e.g., fixtures, transportation) can be identified. Types with less than three vendors could identify an area where few vendors are being used, reducing competitive influence, and providing the opportunity for fraudulent activity.
• Paid invoice
• General ledger distribution
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Title Category Description Data file(s)
Calculate the average payment by general ledger activity type and review for payments made that exceed that average by a large percentage (e.g., 100%).
All By summarizing general ledger activity by type of purchase (e.g., fixtures, transportation) high value payments may be identified to fraudulent vendors.
• Paid invoice
• General ledger distribution
Summarize by vendor the number of inferior goods based on number of returns.
All Inferior quality may be reduced to companies with employees receiving fraudulent payments.
• Receiving log
Identify delivery of inventory to employee address by joining employee address to shipment address file.
All Inventory may be shipped directly to an employee address to act as consideration to the employee for fraudulent activity.
• Shipment register
• Employee address
Identify delivery of inventory to addresses not designated as business addresses.
All Inventory may be shipped to an employee address that is entered into the system to appear as a regular business address. Such a shipment would act as consideration to the employee for fraudulent activity. The identification of whether an address is legitimately a business one can be done via software databases such as Select Phone Pro.
• Shipment register
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Title Category Description Data file(s)
Match the vendor master file to the employee master file on various key fields.
All Compare telephone number, address, tax ID numbers, numbers in the address, PO Boxes, and ZIP code in vendor file to information in employee files, especially for employees working in the accounts payable department.
• Vendor master file
• Employee master file
Identify vendor addresses not designated as business addresses.
All The identification of whether an address is legitimately a business one can be done using software databases such as Select Phone Pro.
• Vendor master file
Review Internet resources, online newspaper archives, background check, and commercial credit databases for related parties of employees.
All Review of Internet resources such as AuditNet.org, online newspapers such as newyorktimes.com and wsj.com, and other online background databases may identify employee related parties.
• N/A
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SUMMARY
As we learned in Chapter 1, occupational fraud can be divided into three major categories:
asset misappropriations, corruption, and fraudulent statements. Corruption occurs when an
employee of an organization wrongfully uses his influence in a transaction to procure some
benefit for himself or another person, contrary to the employee’s duty to the organization
for which he works. Corruption schemes are broken down into four categories: bribery,
illegal gratuities, economic extortion, and conflicts of interest.
Bribery is the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting any thing of value to influence an
official act or business decision. Bribery schemes generally fall into two categories:
kickbacks and bid-rigging schemes. Kickbacks involve collusion between employees and
vendors and almost always strike the purchasing function of the target company. Kickbacks
typically involve the overbilling of the victim organization, though in some schemes the goal
is only to divert extra business to a particular vendor. Bid-rigging schemes can be
categorized based on the stage of bidding at which the perpetrator exerts his influence. This
type of scheme may take place in the presolicitation phase, the solicitation phase, or the
submission phase of the bidding process.
Although illegal gratuities are similar to bribery schemes, they differ in that an illegal
gratuity is paid as a reward for a decision that has already been made, rather than in an
attempt to influence an impending decision. Illegal gratuity schemes can, and do, develop
into bribery schemes when an understanding results that future business decisions
benefiting the person or company that gave the illegal gratuity will be rewarded.
The third category of corruption is economic extortion, which occurs when one person
demands a payment from another in order to make a decision that will either benefit the
payer or prevent the occurrence of economic harm, such as loss of business.
Conflicts of interest are the fourth category of corruption. They occur when an employee,
manager, or executive has an undisclosed economic or personal interest in a transaction
that adversely affects the perpetrator’s employer. Most conflict of interest schemes fit into
one of two main categories: purchasing schemes and sales schemes. Purchasing schemes
generally involve a perpetrator who has a hidden interest in a vendor and who helps that
vendor overbill his employer. Turnaround sales are another type of purchasing scheme that
takes place when an employee knows his company is about to purchase an asset (such as
land), acquires it, and then sells it to the company at an inflated price.
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In sales schemes, the perpetrator typically causes her employer to sell goods or services at
below fair market value to a vendor in which she has a hidden interest. Another form of
sales scheme occurs when an employee writes off sales to a vendor in which she has a
secret interest, or generates fraudulent discounts on behalf of that vendor.
Other conflict of interest schemes include business diversions, in which the perpetrator
steals customers from his employer, and resource diversions, in which the perpetrator uses
his employer’s cash or property for the benefit of a company he secretly owns.
ESSENTIAL TERMS
Bid-pooling
A process by which several bidders conspire to split contracts, thereby ensuring that
each gets a certain amount of work.
Bid-rigging
A process by which an employee assists a vendor to fraudulently win a contract
through the competitive bidding process.
Bid-splitting
A fraudulent scheme in which a large project is split into several component projects
so that each sectional contract falls below the mandatory bidding level, thereby
avoiding the competitive bidding process.
Bribery
The offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of something of value for the purpose of
influencing an official act.
Business diversions
A scheme that typically involves a favor done for a friendly client. Business diversions
can include situations in which an employee starts his own company and, while still
employed by the victim, steers existing or potential clients away from the victim and
toward his own new company.
Collusion
A secret agreement between two or more people for a fraudulent, illegal, or deceitful
purpose, such as overcoming the internal controls of their employer.
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Commercial bribery
The offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of something of value for the purpose of
influencing a business decision without the knowledge or consent of the principal.
Conflict of interest
A situation in which an employee, manager, or executive has an undisclosed economic
or personal interest in a transaction that adversely affects the company as a result.
Economic extortion
The obtaining of property from another when the other party’s “consent” has been
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force or fear.
Illegal gratuities
The offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of something of value for, or because of, an
official act.
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Kickbacks
Schemes in which a vendor pays back a portion of the purchase price to an employee
of the buyer in order to influence the buyer’s decision.
Need recognition scheme
A presolicitation-phase bid-rigging conspiracy between the buyer and contractor
whereby an employee of the buyer receives something of value to convince his
company that it has a “need” for a particular product or service.
Official act
The decisions or actions of government agents or employees. Traditionally, bribery
statutes proscribed only payments made to influence public officials.
Purchasing scheme
A conflict of interest scheme in which a victim company unwittingly buys something
at a high price from a company in which one of its employees has a hidden interest.
Resource diversions
The diversion of assets from the victim company.
Sales scheme
A conflict of interest scheme in which a victim company unwittingly sells something at
a low price to a company in which one of its employees has a hidden interest.
Slush fund
A noncompany account into which company money has been fraudulently diverted
and from which bribes can be paid.
Specifications scheme
A presolicitation bid-rigging conspiracy between the buyer and vendor wherein an
employee of the buyer receives something of value to set the specifications of the
contract to accommodate that vendor’s capabilities.
Turnaround sales
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10-1
10-2
10-3
10-4
10-5
10-6
10-7
10-8
10-9
10-10
10-11
10-12
10-1
A purchasing scheme wherein an employee knows that his company plans to purchase
a certain asset, takes advantage of the situation by purchasing the asset himself, and
then sells the asset to his employer at an inflated price.
Underbilling
A sales scheme that occurs when an employee underbills a vendor in which she has a
hidden interest. As a result, the company ends up selling its goods or services at less
than fair market value, which creates a diminished profit margin or loss on the sale.
REVIEW QUESTIONS
(Learning objective 10-2) What are the four categories of corruption?
(Learning objective 10-4) How are bribery, extortion, and illegal gratuities different?
(Learning objective 10-5) What are the two classifications of bribery schemes?
(Learning objective 10-6) What are some of the different types of kickback schemes?
(Learning objective 10-7) What is a bid-rigging scheme?
(Learning objective 10-7) How are bid-rigging schemes categorized?
(Learning objective 10-8) How might competition be eliminated in the solicitation phase
of a bid-rigging scheme?
(Learning objective 10-8) What types of abuses may be found in the submission phase of
a bid-rigging scheme?
(Learning objective 10-11) What is a conflict of interest?
(Learning objective 10-12) What is meant by the term turnaround sale?
(Learning objective 10-12) How are underbillings usually accomplished?
(Learning objective 10-12) What is the difference between business diversions and
resource diversions?
DISCUSSION ISSUES
(Learning objective 10-3) Offering a payment can constitute a bribe, even if the illegal
payment is never actually made. Why?
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10-2
10-3
10-4
10-5
10-6
10-7
(Learning objective 10-1) What is the common ingredient shared by the four
classifications of corruption?
(Learning objective 10-3) What is the difference between official bribery and
commercial bribery?
(Learning objectives 10-6 and 10-9) If you suspected someone of being involved in a
kickback scheme, what would you look for?
(Learning objective 10-6) An employee can implement a kickback scheme regardless of
whether she has approval authority over the purchasing function. How might this be
accomplished?
(Learning objectives 10-7, 10-8, and 10-9) What are some clues that might alert you to
possible fraudulent activity at the different stages of a bid-rigging scheme?
(Learning objective 10-11) How do conflicts of interest differ from bribery?
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