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CHAPTER 1 -What Is Terrorism? Ter•ror•ism. Noun. The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an orgoniied group agoinsl people or propeny wit h the intention oi in1imidotin9 or coercing societies or gove rnments, often for

ideologica l or political reasons. -American Heritag e Di cti o nary

On December 27, 2007, Benazir Bhutto, the former prime minister of Paki- stan, was assassinated. Bhutto, who was running for president as an opposi- tion candidate, was killed two weeks before scheduled January 2008 elections. Although differing accounts exist to how she died, the likely cause was a sui- cide bomb, which also killed twenty-four others. Just two months earlier, Bhutto survived a suicide bomb assassination attempt that killed 13 6 people.

1

Assassination is one of the earliest forms of terrorism, according to writ- ten records dating back to the Zealot sect, one of the first groups to practice systematic terror in first-century Palestine. In the year 66, the Zealots assassi- nated several religious and political figures, often using daggers to cut their victims' throats in the midst of a crowd. Like the assassination of Bhutto and many others, the Zealots wanted to "foment a sense of vulnerability within the population at large, a classic tactic of terrorists today . [They] could act wherever and whenever they wanted. That was their strength. "

2

Even better known and better documented than the Zealots is the terror- ism practiced by the group known as the Assassins between the eleventh and thirteenth centuri es . As Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin note in their defini - tive work, The History of Terrorism, from Antiquity to Al Qaeda, w hile the Assassins were known for more than their assassination s, their assassination of Nizam

. . f f 1 T k' h Sel1·uq sultans . "was al-Mulk, the Persian grand vizier o the power u ur 1s · .. .

fall . ., 3 Ch }'and and Blin vvrite , HS

one of th e greatest terrorist attacks o nme. a 1

l f the assassination of the contemporary impact was at least as great as tut

O .

f S b r 11 200 1 in their own

Archduke Franz Ferdinand or th e attacks O eptem e ' ' . ld f

. al d reput e in the Muslim wor era s ... . Nizam al-Mulk was a figure o unn v e d b 11 . . 1 . h ' ' had already been ensure y a of Lh t ele ve nth ce ntury. Hi s pace m iStar)

T errorisrn and the Pc~

14 ., ·me In death. h e w1wittingly 0 ed in 111s 1i1en . ... Pen ed r d ccocnplish h. ·tor)' of terrorism . Jn, ,4 he ha a in the 1' dice

d 51 "e chapters d to describe many He re m thing s by the ea erm use I I . 01•n1 TerrorisIO 1s a

1 . . ts historian s. psyc 10 og 1sts, sociolog · di! r • al sc1enus • 1s1.s , 1 """Pie · Po iuc _ id terrorism sc h o lars have Written · ctin-.. ,cren ,,. . . . cienusts. a1 . e:x.te11si

1 gists. cn1htar) 5 f d diffi culty in d efinmg th e term. D . 'tit

no o . r1ance o an . r. Anei lL on both tl1e nnPo r Political Vi olence at Tel Aviv Uni ve rsit , .. "I.

f 1 Center ,or ·d I ) , 5.1\ s • ,ri head o 1 ,e . y of achi eving a w1 e Y accep ted defini·t· · A · . ce in the "a _ . ton of

major hindran t"ve emoti o nal connotallon of th e term 'T Po- . 111 is th e neg a 1 · erron-• Jitic.l 1errons I er derogatory w o rd, rather than a desc . ·-... ,e mere!)' anot , nptor of

has becon _ _ . Usuall)' people u se th e te rm as a disappro . • . e of acunt). · v1ng l<ht!

specific 1)-P f phenomena that they d o not li ke, wi thout both . r a whole range o . b h . ., 1 enng lo ,or . el . ,1 1 constitutes te rrorisuc e av1or. dfiepreas) " 1a . e m _ f I dds that wh en the term 1s syno n ym o u s Wi th "depl Meran uruer a .. . .. . ara ble'

el . .ts usefulnes s is m propaganda and n o t m research • B , ,10Ien1 b iaVJor , . . - . e,ore b . 10 understand the relanon sh1p b e twee n m edia and terroris h one can egm . . rn. e

h I firs t have a clear workin g de fimt10n o f the term, must try 1 or s e mus o un. dersiand the causes of te rrorism, and m u st b etter under stand how terrorism has eYO!red since the Zealots and th e fir st century o f the co mmon era .

Defining Terrorism Russian leader Vladimir Lenin, responsi ble fo r th e Red Terro r o f 19 J 7-192 1 once said. "the purpose of terrorism is to p ro du ce terro r." Mos t scholars and most "·orking definitions of te rrorism ackn owledg e th e simple idea that ter- rorists produce ( or try 10 produce) terror and fe ar am o n g opponents. The word terror ori ginates in Latin fr om the wo rd terrere, w hi ch means "10 frighten ." Its first use in the English language w as r ecord e d in l 528, but be- fo re that it eme red imo Western vocabularies duri n g th e fo urt eenth cemury throu gh the French language and was later giv en m ode rn political meaning dunng the French Re\"olution at the end of the eigh teenth cen tury . '

Dunng ilie 19 80s, two Dutch research e rs at the Unive rsit y of Leiden took a socta! sc ience appro I d . . - Tl -ac 1 to etermmmg h o ,v to b es t d e fin e terrorism. ie) collected mo re than h d

one un red acad emi c and o ffi cial d e fin ition s of terror· ism and analrzed rhem d - h th I to ete rmme the main comp o n e nt s . Th ey found t

31 e t ernem of iiolenc e a d . - . I I·

appeared - ppeare 111 83.S p e rce nt o f d e finitions ; po huca goa, tn65percentof d f · · . . . d ' 51

percem of d f e tnitions; mn1 ct111g fear and terror app eare 111 t 1111 ll ons; arbitr · . . . . din

anne ss and md1scnminate targ e ung app eare

W)lal Is Terrorism? 15

21 percent of th e definiuo ns: and the vicum1u11on of civ1h ans . noncombat - ants . neut rals. or o utsiders appeared in 17 . percent o f the de.fuuuons.'

Meran found that three common elements eXlst in the legal defimuons o f terro nsm of the United States. Germany. and Britain : " ( I ) the US<: of ,·,ohince.: ( Z) pc hti cal objectives: and ( 3) the intention of sowmg fear 111 a tuget popu - Iano n ... He adds that most academic definitio ns o f terronsm contam th ~ same three co rnerstones. Despite the co mm on,litie.s. Me.ran argues that these three cornerstone cha ra cteri stics do not "suffice to ma.lc.e a useful deflmuon" because they're too broad to be useful. He suggests "the main problem 1s that the)' do not provide the ground to distingui sh between terro n sm and other forms of violent co nfli ct. such as guerilla o r even conventi o nal wu ."' Menn writes that if a definition of terrorism is equally appli cable to all forms o f war. including nuclear war. the te rm loses any useful meaning because n be.comes a syn onym for "vio lent intimidatio n in a political co ntext and 1s thus redu ced to an unflattering term. describing an ugly aspect o f violent co nflicts o f ,II sizes and shapes . conducted through ou t human hi story by a.II kinds of re - gimes." 10 This is one of th e criticisms lobbied against many media in their coverage o f terrorism - a lack of definiti o nal precision, and a politidZlflg o f th e term (whi ch will be highlighted thro ugh o ut the book). Merari, for prac- tical purposes, u ses the U.S. State Department definition of the term. which holds that terrorism is "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpe - trated against n o n combatant targets by su bnational groups or clandestine state agents. usually intended to influence an audience." 1

O th er scholars define terrorism similarly and ag ree \vith Merari that a good definition must no t lose its o riginal meaning because the term has Ube- come part of the rh eto ri c of insults exc hanged between political oppo nents . .. ' Scholar s who contributed to the International Encyclopedia of Tmorism all define ter- ror ism similarly. as "the selective o r indiscriminate use o f violence in order to bring abo ut political chang e by inducing fear. " 1'

One of the additional challe n ges in defining terrorism lies in considering th e different disciplines that use the term. as w ell as the context in which ter- rorism is studi ed. One of the m ost widely used definitions of terro n sm m criminal justice and militar y scien ces comes from Brian Jenkins. a noted coun- ten errori sm securit y specialist, who calls terrorism the "use o r threa tened use o f force d esigned to bring about p o litical change."' Walter Laqueur. a crimi- nal justice sc h olar at Geo rg etown, offers a similar defmition-"the illegitimate u se o f force to achieve a political objec tive by targeting innocent people."

Te rrorism and 11

__

•ie Prf!lt 16 11 •t)' of the defmition, but argu the simp c1 es lh.t i

_..._0 ,,.1~ges 1 definitions becau se th e terrn terro"- t 11 ~r ,....,, d s1mp e t•fi l l '"'Ill ts Uq 0 ,·e 1>eyon d "ni ti on e.xemp 1 1es t 1e c 1allenge

1 11, useless 10 Ill . 0 " 11 en n deflJli

al. 1,1queur s al components that complicate the stUd n, COntrO'~rst dd1ng mor . k .. ·11 . . .. y of ,_ lhout • . ··t)' words h e t egn1mate and "· -« 1errn "

1 . bjecu, 1 • 1nno..-. the BeC•use of th eir su" .. n crafted by scholars like Merari . ·-,q• ronsrn d ·n a de,in1uo

···'d 01 be foun 1

1,.1umacy, and Power: Th e Conscq umccs of PoU wow n . raronsm. -• h . . b<tJ v.._ S - she ~tt 1 e a·ted Manha Crens aw s 1mpor"-t ID•• . cholars ,av . ""' Work

•- ~ tn 1983. man) s 3 Crenshaw noted that te rro n sm cannot bed fi ..,.. . n In 198 , d I .b ''llld liac,l 1erron

51 · . elf the target, an t 1e poss1 ili ty of succ po d •n the act tts , . ess. Slit

",thout const en g bout the impo rtan ce of defmmg terrorisrn by un,L U)' wnuen a 1 T · · ''""1-b,s cons1stcn . 1 . 1 terrorism occurs. n errornm 1n Cont ex t she ext 10 WU C l . . . n°'-'1

stinding the cont · al ms in poli tics , because po ht1cal language affects ,c · . neutr ter cc '"'

"There ,re e\\ . and audi ences , and such eu ect acquires a gr . f rotagornsts . . e,ter pcrcepaons

O P of te rrorism. Similarly, th e m earungs of Ule te

urgency in the drama . .. " nns fi changing cont ext.

ch.nge to It a B ce Hoffman writes that th e most compelling re"" Terrorism expe n ru , . -..vn . difficult to defin e is that the term s m earun g has frequently th t terronsm ts so t

a th I two hundred years. He al so argues that today, Panli• shifted dunng e pas . d media "most people have a vague idea or impression beause of the mo ern ·

. · but lack a more precise , co ncrete and trul y explanatorv of what terronsm ts ., . . f h rd [V]irtually any especially ab horrent act of violence deftmuon o t e wo . . . . . . . '"

perceired as directed against society ... 1s oft en labeled terronsm by the media.· As Hoffman observes, the media are relevant to any contemporary discussion of terrorism and how it is defin ed , so m uch so that some scholars ha,·e crafted new definitions of terro ri sm that account for the impact of the media on public understanding and awaren ess , often elevating the press role substanually. Political scie nti st Brigitte Nacos recently craft ed her own defini- non of a fo nn of terrorism she call s "mass m ediated terrorism, " which she defmes as "poli tical violence against noncombata nt s o r symbolic targets which ts designed 10 communicate a messag e to a broader au di ence ." "

\\'hat can one make of these variable defi niti o n s7 Ho ffman suggests that "todai mere is no one widely accep ted o r ag reed- up o n d efiniti on fo r terror· ism:· and adds that when one looks at U.S. governm ental ag ency definiti ons of terronsm re .g., the U.S. State De partm en t, th e U.S. Fed eral Bur eau oflnves· ugauon.

th e U.S. Deparunent of Homeland Sec ur it y , and the U .S. Department

of Defe J • fl I e dtf. n s e ·

11 5 not surprisi ng that thei r definiti o nal varia tio ns re eel t i

Whal Is T em>rism? 17

ferent pnonues of each agency . The work of other scholars comes to• sum - d uston-that at a minimum. o ne must sta.rt to cl.rnfy what tl!TTOnsm ts l.r con

b)· at le~t de.firung what terrorism is not.

Classifying Political Violence

As previous!)" noted. terrorism loses its me.arung when it becomes • catch -ill for e,·eq form o f political vio lence. Scholars agree that sepa raung terronsm as • mateg) for political change from other forms of political violence 1s useful Merari" s thorou gh classifica ti on of fo rm s of pohucal ,10\ence begms by broad!)' catego rizing viole nce in four ways · ~late ve rsus state. stat e versus Cltl - zen. citizen versus stat e, and ci uzen versus citizen . Typia\ly, su.te ve rsus state violence takes th e form of co nventional war, but can Include assass1nauon . com mando raids, and so o n. In all cases o f state versus st,te violence, "these am are o rganized and planned and reflect the capability of a luge bureauc- racy."· On the flip side is ciuzen versus citizen v10lence. whtch most com- monly occu rs in Lhe form of individual crime that is not typically pohttc.Uy motivated.

Terrorism as a stra tegy generally falls under the remaining two atcgo- ries--s tate ve rsus citizen and citizen ve rsus state. Sometimes these rwo catego- ri es are called top-down and bottom-up. Co ntemporary terro rism IS predominant! )' botto m -up. but historically lop-down terrorism has been far more preval ent and has claimed substantially more victims ." In top-down, o r state versus citize n , two subcategories exist. One is the legal process a state uses to enforce its laws. This is not cons idered terro rism. However. the other subcategory, which is defined as the " illegal violence used by a government to terrori ze and intimidate, usually with the intention of preventing opposiuon to a regime, " is considered a form of terrorism ."

Th e most famous and extreme historical examples of this form of state ve rsus citize n political violence were recorded in Nazi Germany and in the Stali nist Sovie t Un ion. A co ntemporary example is seen in some Latin Amen- can countries' use of death squads that are usually maru1ed by a gove rnment's sec urit y forces. An offshoot of state versus citizen violence is state sponsored or state terro rism that broadens the forms of ,iolence a state can perpetrate against citizens to instill fear . Chaliand and Blin write that "until very recently, no o ne spoke of 'state terro rism.' State terrorism, as it is understood toda}. applies above all to the support provided by ce rtain governme ntS (Ltbya or Iran. fo r ins tance) to terrorist groups, but it takes man) other forms "· Those

18 - T errorisrn a~ - '"'lhe' ·siem,u c terro r as a Looi empl o i cd b) 10,_, d u51ng S) d "'-'ll•n~ _.,,,, 1ndu e di uonal 1dca), an som eumes IL 1~ •t r.,, ... he more rra ound

mrs t1h1> 11 1 , anned force, . Chahan d an d Blin cons d 1n '-, g1 e of, sl'te , I er lb, nnlll>l'J d0t11111 b .. a> developed i n 1he We s1 in th e 1930 I}, .. ,c born mg .. . s iS mn• of slr>leg I dou nne wa, based en1 1rely o n th e I ill~ t,tcrn,e 1 1e error in,,._ , ,rnple of 1h1>. f ci \'ihan popula tions to co mpel governrn e ·-.q

bombing O . . 11 1.\ to 1 h) 1ht nuss d 81 suggest 1ha1 it wa, 1h1s doctnne tha1 res 1 \I/.

" (h,h,nd rn m . " u led in lb render I H · hnna and Nagasaki. Some wo uld argu e ti . t hombing o 1'°' . Hs 11 1 ,ionm ed conl'enuonal warfare and 1s no t a fo rm of st Qq

!0imque us in . a1e lerror one l 1 1 rs poilll out that th e Imes berween top -down d Re ,idles,, man)' sc to a an bo1.

g -nsm are ofien blurred: IOOl• UP ICu v

od • terroris t become wmorrow 's head of state, with whom Wr b.1, r 1.11 s.tt:n l al) go\ . ,11 h lo deal ,u the diploma.tic level. Menachem Begi n exemplifies ti r:mmcnu " .1,-e. . . . . 11!1

h , we~tern rradioon considers v10lence legnunate onli• wht n ,coll m~11morp OSb. . . n it -P rtd b the siate Such a hmned definiu on takes no account of lht terror pra c~

u pucu ) ·h h,,- no other means of redressin g a situation they de e. 111 10

1.. . urtd b) tho:>e \\ o .. . . . . . ut Th leg m ma C)' of a terrorist act hes m Lhe ob1ecu ves of tts age.ms: oppress.!\~ ('

State terrorism may be one of th e hardes t cat ego rie s for peopl e in democ- rauc soaeues to understand pro perl y becau se o f th e gen erally accep1ed noti on that the end justifies the means. In de moc ratic societi es (more so than in other fo rms of go,·ernment), people generall y embrace the cause rather than the mode of action, supponing the just war doctrine that legitimates state ,1olem acnon tf the cause. sucb as the liberatio n of an oppressed peopl e, is considered to be good. Chahand and Blin sugges t that th ere is a "dangerou s confusion between the moral interpreiaci on of a politi cal act, and th e ac t it self clouds our undemanding of the te rrori s1 pheno menon." ''

Although terrorism clear!)' occ urs in th e top- dow n , stat e ve rsus citizen ca1egori. 1t is mos1 often observ ed today as a ci tize n ve rsus stat e or bottom-up phenomeno n. When it is organi zed and its aim is to ove rth row the gol'ern- mtnt. CJUZen l'iolence against th e stat e fa ll s und er th e cat egory of insurgent)'. Ttrrornm is one form of insurge ncr . Other fo r ms includ e co ups, guerilla war , rnoluuon. and nots . .-\. co up is defined as a pl anned insurge ncy ihat take, place at h,gh- hel rank, wi1hm the stat e and usuall y only in volve s a fe" peo- ple and rtlau1d) sr a.I] . . f · d of time

n amotuns of violence ove r a ve ry bne pe n o Unlike a coup wh, h . .. I ange of

.. · c ls a strategy, revo lution t ypica ll y invo lves a c 1 lbt 1\ itcm Bu1 a ~I . , f •oluuon, rt, 1 ' s · tran notes , ' u nd er th e Lenin ist m odel o re,

. uu, n dot, co n ome--Il Bott a sirategi· rathe r than a soc ial o r po li ti ca l outc

Whal ts Terronsm? 19

"<h,r•cterued as •n 1n,urgcnq lro m ~ow 1nvolV1ng num,rou, pwpl,. lh, nod of prep.ir•uon 15 v,ri· lo ng . but 1h, dirtct '10lent confroni•uo n ls ex

::.tcd to bncf.. Rl ot5 u, d11l",11t fro m •II 01her lo rm5 o l pol1uul , 10 I,nce beous, th,) u, unpl•nn,d Rlo ung un r,cur. but even an the'le ,nstvice< 1t" not co n51dered • "pl•nn,d. o rga nl«d . protra ct,d ,ir•1cgy ."'

of the v•riang fo rms o f insurg ency. the one rno,t co mmonly co nfused ",th terromm 1s gu,nlla warfare . One o f the mos t tnflu enu•I " rronsm hand- t,ooks tad•)'. th, M1mmonuol of th, Urban Gucnllu. to mes from the wnungs of C.r- los Manghella. the BraL1l1an guerdla revo luti o nary ktUed by pohce In 1969 . In Spanish, guenlla ,s a d1m 1nu11 ve m,a nang ",mall war." Guerilla warfare 1s one of the oldes1 fo rms of war. eve n older than co nvenuo nal notlon5 Gue rllla wars are diffuse, fought in relativel y small fo rmauons agaJnsL stronger en, - mi es. and as a strategy of insurgency It avo id, dueo. dec1s1ve battles . lns1ead. guerillas prefer lo ng . drawn -o ut strug gles. with the idea in so me guenlla doc - irines that victor)' co mes by wearing o ut the enemy. As Manghella wrote more than forty years ago, "the primary ta sk of ch e urban guerilla is to d.,s- tra ct, lO wear down. to demorali ze th e military regime and its repres5tve fo rces, and also lO attack and destroy 1he wealth and prope rty of I.he fo rei gn

,. 19 man agers. Some scholars have sugges ted that guerilla wars ar e simpl)· an imerim

phase that allows insurgents to build up a regular army that might have a chance of winning a conventional war. But , typically guerilla warfare involves the use of "hit-and-run operations" with its principle goal o f catching the en- emy off guard and preventing it from employing its full might against the gue rillas. One of th e most important differences between te rro rism and guer - illa warfare is th al unlike terrorism, guerilla warfare as a strategy seeks Lo es- tabli sh physical control of a terri1ory. Merari explains I.hat

>l on.,·1lhstanding the fact tb.a.t terronst.s try to lffiJX>Sf: t..heu will on the gene.nl popul..J.. uon and channel its behavior by so,qng feo1r, this influence~ no geograph.tcil dt- ma.rcauon Ime s. Terron sm as a ~trategy does not rel )· on -hbe.rated zonts .. a.> ~ging areas for consohda.trng the struggle and carrrmg n further As a stnteg}. u:rronYn remams m the domain of psychological mfluence- and lacks the ma.t e.n.i.l clement.<, 0 1 gue rilla warfa re

So , what are th e fundamen1al characlerisncs of terrorism as a d.tscinLI strategy of insurgencr' As previouslr noted, no agreed upon definmon for the term 1erro rism exists, but despi te the defininonal challeng e, . scholars and terro ri sm ex perts do agree that terrorism as a strateg) has co mm on elements .

1

- T erronsm and the Prei.

20 for th e fac t that terronsm 15 "• Co , 11 11 allow , er rn~

on ,lcnicnt.S .. 1., sho ws up In d u, erent forms With dilt Thot co1run 1otnenon l l ,1 tr u1u , •n•tc phei ns o l the w o rld .

,nd ni ,, ,n differcn• P-' 11 units compared to o ther fo rms of . 1 obiC\u, , ery snia ' . 111sii,_ en ml> opcr••e " ' fro,n the sing le assassin o r th e indlvidui)

T<rr<l can range b . SU,. Th<ll number., , lly five or six . u t someu m es more~

gen() , ,eam , (1) pica . el b 'ttn 1,omher to brgcr cks as well as m som e a o rate kidnap .

ad• 1 I ,erron s1 a11a .. . h Ping the s,p1tmher carr)' out a h!J ac km g . W e n e n gaged in butl

,n hostages or ·11 . cs, l !') th•t capture ro rists th an gu en a warri o rs , th ey are Usu,,u

po' . lcs> common for ter l' " 'h1 ch b

f r ·er 1han ,en . all · · d d · group> o ,e\\ ri sts iyp ic y u se improv ise ev1ces such f weapans. ,erro . , as In ,enns O bo b o r ba ro m e tri c press ure-op erat ed d ev ices d

bo 1bs car m s, e-homemade 11

• • 1 The)' also u se h andgun s, gr e nades, and assau) lode on a,rp anes. . t signed to exp O mil itary wea p ons or artill e ry . Because terronsu 1 . ba,·e access t nllcs bu• rare l . . 1 b . s like gu erillas. they typicall y wor k to blend into , h Ye te.rrnona a:,e -r- n T . don I a . d all)' don ' t w ear um ,orms . e rro n st targets are . il pulauons an usu m ,an po 1. . 1 pponents an d th e public at larg e. Richardson ob. mbols Po ,uca o , siat

e S) • n element is that te rrorist gro u p s are alw ays signifi-es that a.nm.her comma sen h h . opponents and "ar e prepared d elib e rately to murder cantl) weaker t an t elf . . . .

. f therance of their obiecn ves. Th e adopno n o f terron sm as noncom batants m ur . . ,. H a tactic 10 effeci political change is, the refo r e , a d elib e rate chmce. Mos, agree that terrorism is a stra tegy of last resort , based o n the fa ct that terrorist groups are "ery small and because of thi s o ft e n lack th e ab1ltty to emplo)' other strategies. Finally, terrori sm is not recogm ze d a s a le gal act , either mter- nationallr or domesticall y. Both conventio nal w ar and guer ill a w ar are recog- nized as internationally legal if co nducted under sp ecifie d rule s .

Causes of Terrorism

In Th, Roo~ of Tmonsm, a book that grew o u t o f the 2 005 Interna tio nal Summit on Democracy , Terrorism. and Secur ity in Mad r id , Spa in , sch o la rs from a "

1de range of disciplines trie d to identify the roo t ca u ses o f te rr o ri sm . They agtted that no si ngle cause ex ists and that te r ro r ism is a co mp lex problem that r,qwres soph,sticated res ponses."

P'._)chologist Jerrold Post noted th at at an ind ivid u al le ve l , p syc hologiStS ha,e long argued th I · h 1 e

at t lere IS no partic ular te rrori s t p e r so n alit )' a nd t at l l nouon of terronsts as c d c . . . f I .

al . raze ,a naucs 1s no t co n sis te nt wi th th e plentt u em pine evidence aYatlabl " l t. He notes th at i n th e fi e ld o f p sych o logy . scho ars

Wf13l1s Tf!(TOOS~~m~? _________________ _ .:..:.--

21

Se 05 us o n the ,du that "group. o rgama.uon.tl, and <ocul me to con .__ h h•'' co d ndiV1dua.l psycholo g y" offer the best lens tLU oug h logr-•n not l pslc

O d he psychologicoll dynamics of te rro n s m . Pos t ugues that the h h to SIU y l d .

" ,c f .. Uective ide ntity and the processes of fo rm111g an trans -rt._nce o co h ,rnp<> II t ve ,dent111es canno t be O\er,;tat ed. Thi s. Ill turn. emp as1Les c nmg co ec t 11 ,on ul I co nt ext whic h de1 ern1111 es th e balance between co ecuve soaOC tura. . th

• d al d ntity Te rro n sts s ubordinate th ei r individual ldenllly to the nd ,nd1v1 u ' e . le. f • dent1t)' so that what serves th e group, o rgamzau o n o r nct,~or 1s o collecuve 1 " n

,mary importance. pr Man)' terrorism sc ho lars s tudy the co llective Identity o f a te rron.st thr o ugh ,h e stated goals o r m o tivati o ns o f • terronst group. As Meran has obse rved . most terro n st g roups descri be them se lves at nauonal Libera.n o n m o vements o r people who ar e fighting agains t so me form of op press io n, be 1t soo al. re li - gious, i m pe rialist, economic, o r so me co mbmauo n o f t~~se . Much, has been made, b y bo th the p ress a n d by acade mics o f the quote. One man s terronst is an o th e r ma.n 's fr eedom figh ter ." It's difficult to trace the o ngm o f this q uo te becau se it is co mm only used wi thout citation. but it likel y too lt root as an id ea in th e I 940s . w h e n M enachem Begi n , the forme r prime minister of Israel. arrived in Pal estin e and be came o n e of the leade rs o f the militant Zion- ist group Ir gun Zvai Le um i. In th e 19 4 0s the lr gun fo u ght a gainst Briush rule in Palestine , b ecause th e Ir gun wanted to creat e an ind ependent j e,~ish state . ' Som e called Irgun 's r evolt against the Bri ti sh terrorism . Others c alled the lrgun freedo m fig h te rs. Be g in himself spo ke about h ow he saw the differences be - tween a terro r ist and a free d om fig h te r i n a speech that was la ter r eprinted in Internati onal Terrorism: Challenge and Response. Begin sa ys the difference lies in evalu- at ing the aim s an d m e thods o f the tw o. H e arg u es that the lrgun was n o t a terro ri st gro up b ec ause it took gre at p a.in s to not h a.rm civilians. 1n the fam ous Irgun bo mbing of th e King David H o te l in Jerusalem in 19 4 6, ninety-o n e peo p le di ed . T h e attac k w a s aim e d a t the British military . which w as using the h otel as a mi li ta ry h eadqu arters. Be gin says that the Irgun forewarned the Bnt- ish of the attac k in o rde r to spare lives. He w rites. " we g a ve that warning fo r half an h o ur becau se thi s is th e diffe r ence between a fighter fo r freedom a.nd a ter ro rist. A terro ri st kill s civili ans. A fig ht er for freedo m saves lives a.nd fights on at th e ri sk o f h is o w n life u ntil li be rty win s the day." Others, h o w e,e r , still w rite ab o ut th e l r gun as a te rro rist group , n o ting that it fit m ost deftm- ti o n s o f te rroris m an d e m p loyed th e methods u sed b)' terro n sts. despne the fac t th at it made so m e co nscio u s effort to limn noncombatant casualues. In

=

22 Ued freedo m h ght ers and tcrron,t,,, the 1 •--,n" <> I - rgun

d non 10 "'" • 111., rnd re, o uu o nan c,. id , u , o l guer , i,,,n,1ll~1gro I c 1ircs<dc nt Geo rge H.'N . Bru;h mtroduc"'

' 8 then \l l .. l\J i lJ In lq ~ · d uni ent called Terro n st Gro up Pro f,! .. S r.

Defense Ol e, bi l'1runcni ol I ' '" ee n ,crronm and freedo m f1gh1er i1 "It,.. d,!Tercn,e ' ' is sc, ·, ih'1 "Thr Id ) one man' , fr eed om fighter b anoth e "'

. 111 e wou ~a ·n· r lll,1n 's doud~ The ph,loso phi cal d, ere nce, are stark d lt11,~ ,,1 I rtJ<'<-' ,1u1 nouon. an fun,

1.11 ·· 1 "one man\ terro ri st is an o lh er man' !!. fr e d Th nonon ' ,a, . e oin r. ~-- e I discussions of ,erro n sm, even within the g..,,, "' popu ar n1edJa b h, e> on l'or ex ampl e, in co rrespondence with Hon ' u, u

h 1111snomer. est Repo nu\ e' d r of BBC World Update, wrote: "I t is the style f lllng, )o,nni Mills, e ,10 . o the s,, al l no one a 1errons1, aware as we are that one in , "- World Sernce ID C " . an s lerro

I e's freedo m fighter. Meran arg ues that presentin 1·

"' ,s ano• ,er on . . . l . g the two I "as mutually exclus,ve IS 111 gen era a logical fallac)' .. ,, <enns toge! ier .. fi .. . · He sar

.. ,errorist" and fr eedom 1gh ter descnb e two differ s that ihe 1erms en1 asi'<cts beh r ior because one is a method and th e o ther is a cause-of hu man a -

The causes of groups tha1 have adopted terrorism as a mode of struggle are as divt-rse a> the mte-re~b a.ud aspirauons o.f mankind ... Some terrorist groups undoubted!} fight for self.delenmnauon or nauonal _liberation . On the o_ther hand. not all na uona.] hberauon mo\'e tn e.Jlts re.son 10 terrorism to advan ce theu cause . In Other words some insurgent groups are bo th terrorists and freedom fighters, some are either on~ or the other, an d so me are neithe r •

Of course , much of the difficulty in tryi ng to sort ou t the causes and prin- ciples behind reso rting to terrori sm as a strategy to effect poli tical change comes back 10 1he idea that the term "terrorism" is so poli tically loaded . Using Merari' s disrin cti on of method and cause , the me thod is determined and named based on the percei ved leg itimacy o f th e ca u se . This is also true wh en one exami nes much of the media cove rag e o f terro rism becau se the media often adop t th e state, polit ical, and /o r th e cu ltural no tions of what 1erronsm is As noted earlier. one of the challeng es in di sc ussi ng and studying terronsm 11 tliat terrorism has become so broadly applied to all forms of political vio- lence tha< many \\'Ould argue it mu st be uncatego ri call y cond emned as astral- tg) for political change .

An exampl e of this kind of absolute co nd emna tio n is see n in th e ,rnting, of Ben1anun i':etan yahu, decades before h e becam e the prim e mini ster ol b- rad. In 1979 , he llltrodu ced th e Jeru sal em Co nfe rence o n lnt ernaiional Ter-

i't1lalis Teironsm? 23

",nun ,nd. m ch•ll•ngmg wh•t hr t•llrd th•oo••'l mor•I «l•uvism " ol tbr ido ,h,u on, m.in·~ ttrro nq I,;, ,mother rnt1n·~ frttdom fig h1,r . Qld it ".t "- 1m r"rt•nt tor the cont,renc, "tu •st•bh <h •t th• out<tt th r fau th,i • d,u drti nmon•I tr.un•"orJ.. """· reg•rdlrs< of pohuul \Jew T,rromm - ,h, drhbrraie •nd S) st,mrnc k,lhng ot uv1h•m '° ._ to '"'P"• feu- " •< ,ho" 11 P'"""'''el) w be. be)ond •II nu.u1ee •nd qu ,hble, a moral ,vii, lllfrctlllg nm onl ) tho,, who comm,, ,u,h rnmrs. hut tho" wh o, out of m•h ce, 1gno- r.inle, o r strnpl, r,fu~l to think, lo um enam:.~ Lhcm ...

De.)p 1te Netanrahu', a.s~e ru o n th,u terro n,m is .i m o r~l ,.., tl , h1st onilns t1nd othe r sc holar, su ggest that a " rno rah <llc approach" to terro rism " dcxu mented. The "hero " o f the mo ral,suc approach" Ru ss ian lv,n K•ly,)ev, who al the turn of th e twe nti eth ce ntury was a me m be r o f the "tomb.1t o rg.i n1z.i • tio n" of ,h e Soual Revo luuo n Pani . Tim group used the "'"''"nation of gov ernme m officials as its primary strategy agalllst th e cz•nst regime . On February 2, 1905, Kalyayev was supposed to assassinat• Grand Duke Se rg« but he did nm fo llow through becau;e Se rg ei arri ved at the proposed m e of the assassina<ion with his two yo ung nephews and h,s wife lnste•d. Kal)a yev assassi nated the Grand Duk e se veral days later when he was alo ne so as not 10 ham1 his innocent family :

Another way to co nsider the moral 1mplicauons of terronsm co mes from political philosopher Michael Walzer who writes "m ,ts modem mamfesu - <ions, terror is the to talitarian fo rm of war and poliu cs. It shatters th e war convention and political code . It b realcs across moral hmits beyo nd which no further limitatio n seems possible, fo r within the catego n es of ci,iha.n and au- zen , there isn't any smaller group fo r which immunity might be dwned Terrorists anyway make no such claim: they kill anybody ."" But the ,dea thac ,errorism could be mo ral o r immoral is, acco rding to Merari, meanrngless. He acknowledges "terrorists wage war by th eir own standards, not b) those ol th eir enemi es, " and that

Terrorists usually dism1~ Ult: la\\ alto gether. wahout e,·en pretendrng to .btdl:' b) it. whe.reas states pay tnbute to law and no m1s and breach them onl) undc.r cxtrtn1c ar cumsta.n ces ; but It ~ho uld bt: noted that the relan\·1.t) o i mor.ilit) h.15 been .l.bo e).. pres~ed m tl1 e cha.ngmg rules o f co mb.anng terromm If law!> reflect !.he pre\rullli moral standards m a g1wn !>OCJet), ont: nu) fmd mtere,t Ul the fact th..t all ~u.tt:,, when faced with the threat o f msurgenC), ha," enac.ted -~ual IJ.w!> or emergenq reg ulano ns pt:rmHnng th e secunt) forct'lo to act m nunner::. Wt would lllmnllh he CO l1!>1der1::d unmoral ··

,

24 ,utuung repressive laws or •llou, .. ,,,,, into m .. •ng

1 Prorok1ng s tate secun 1 }' forces was a goal o f Peo 1

111 b nuh tar} or ' P e hle '

pr,,ue<' l . that when states turn ed to repressive 4:,. 11 "ho kne" . . rtspo....._ wnghe •· e ublic at J,rg e and not JU" 10 in su rg ents th,u Pubhc...,. ll.

,pphed 10 th pf the state. Tlus can occu r in states with v,1ry · ,,

,ould ,!uh''"} rom tng foin. 11 government · h · I · I . d f 1,ohucal con tex t w ll rn w 11 c 1 mainy poliu 1 11 " ,Jus kin o . Cil SCte

cs of terrorism. ex pl onng, among o th er things °'Illa stud the root cau, . , CO rrcJ. } usauon be t ween terro rism and the type of poJ · , ,ad somenmes ca . IUQJ

I Cl ,errorism takes place. Ignac io Sanchez-Cuenc,1 st ct· ronment Ill w 11 1 . . u led •ements in 1wenty-one countri es during the I 9lOs 1"'o. Iuuonar} mo1 and fo

groups emerged in stat es that had experi enced past 1 . 1111d that tmonst po llic.J .

b I . I ad powerful soci al move me nts a decade earli er, and had . . in. st, I 11). l . . lflSUtultd l·re policies. He argues that to understand the condi uons und repress er which

,errorism exiSIS scholars should disaggrega te the broader concep t oft ' . . . erronsm

and stud)' particular t}'pes of terro nst groups. Thi s 1s particularly im . . . " portant tn understanding internauonal terro nsm , he argues.

From a sociologKal perspective, some scholars have argued that rapid SO- c,oeconomic change ,s a ri sk facto r that may help terrorism exist 1-0 . . . . . certain places because 11 produces mstab1ht }' and often tim es dislocates popu] .

. . au ons. Imeresnngl}', when rehg1ous scholars offer perspectives on the causes ofter- ronsm, ther note that socioeconomic and poli tical factors rem ,;n .

pri mary causes of rehgious and ex tremi st terrorism, but these ca uses are obscured by the extreme rehg, ous language that so me terrorists use. Sc holar Mark Jue,. gensmeyer has looked broad] }' at all religi ons and the ir relati ons hips to terror. ism _and concluded tha1 it is economi c and political grievances and not religion that are the initial problems. "Th ese sec ular conce rn s are now being expressed .'.h roug h rebelhous reli gio us ideolog ies, w hich makes them more mtractab]e he sa)•s "Th • .

· ese gri evances ... are bemg arti culated in religious terms, and are being seen ti I 1 · . . b . . iroug 1 re 1g1ous images , and are being organized ) reL g1ous leaders thro ugl 1 . . . . . . . 1 re 1g1ous msutuuons. Rehg1on th en brings new aspects to the conflict. ,,.,

Rehg,ous schola r Karen Ar of the relatio h· b mstrong ec hos Juerge nsmeyer' s understanding

ns 'P et ween relig · d mg on the s b· 100 an terrori sm in so me of her recent wnl · u 1ec1:

\\' t 1-Id). if ne r, called the IRA bom .. "

tnough to re.hSt th 1 1 bin gs Catholi c terro rism bccau st: W t: kil t\~ a ! Its wcs not f5St 11 ntra r a relig1ou') campaign lndet:d , hli: th t

v,'1131 Is Terrorism?

u,.\h ~puhfo, .. .an nlO~rncnl, nw.n) fund.um.nt•lm moviell\it.n~ Y. ()f'klv.idt: \.lfflpl) D~""' 1 J fffiS oi n.iuon.al1.stn lfl i highly unorthodo, rthg,ous gw\t Thh l\ ob'10Uily tht u~ ",th l..loni,t tun<UITW:ntil.lum ln b.ud .rnd t.bie fiervtntl) p.imoU< Chrlsu;m right ln tht US •

25

Olten, people t•lk about rehg,o us dtmens,on< of terrorism a< • modem 0 but actually terrorim, wuh • rehg,ou < underpinning d•t~ b.lck henomeno ,

p d 1s • recumng histoncal ph enomenon Whil e rel 1g1 ous terromm , crnt unes an ,rucularl) the ph eno menon of radical mtltt•nt Islam, 1s on the nse, terron<m

p em 1o ag ree that "phadm terronsm cannot prrv•tl , bcc•usc unhk e experts se .... Islamism, 11 has no genuine pohu c•l vision

The Importance of History While terrorism dates back to the first century , co ntcmporar, ideas •bou t ter • rori sm are usually traced back to the f' rench Revo luti on o f th e eighteenth cen - tury. Historians say this is not exactly accurate and su ggest that the Zealots,,md the Assassins had quite a bit in co mmon wuh modem terrorists , and that ter- rorism is no t a recent pheno menon ."•'

Th e earliest terrorists were the fir st-ce ntury jewtsh Zeal oL,, also called the sica ri i, the Latin plural of th e word sicarius, wlucb means dagger . Tlus " mur • derous sect" helped incite an uprising against the Roman occupation of Judea in 70 C.E. that resulted in the destructi on o f the seco nd templ e in Jerusalem. The Zealots assassinated man ) impo rtant religi ous and political figures, us1Dg daggers 10 cut their victims' throats in th e midst of cro wded public places. Like modern terrorists, historians have suggested that the •ctions of the Zeal - ots was intended to send a message to a wider audien ce. m thLS case to Roman imperial official s and pro- Roman Jews .

Anothe r reli gious terrorist sect conside red with the Zealots a; o ne of the ea rliest documented terrorism groups was the Assassins, who were an Islamic correlate that for two centuries (tbe eleventh through the thirtee nth ) made its name through the assassination of Muslim dignitari es. The AssasslllS were not the first "secre t socier}'°' to turn to assassination and terror , but the) were the best organized and longest -lived "terronst" group operatin g m that context. eve n th ough the}' were never able to attain central power. The mategy of the Assassins was indirect, based on threats and persuasion and their skill at sue cessfully assassinating:

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26 Terrorisni - ariat • .

whJC h m.idc .1 !ilunnm g (.in ne~ d in th ..... ""'-- 1"1... indiJ't'C1 nrittg), . ' twen,

1 ,. 1~ 1 on .a n ,,m. rel ies on other t.h.u1 nuh t.iry th , 1 of rt'''O uu , , rnein, 1 tb"r I rurucul,1.rl)' well In ,1 comcxt m whi ch \) n f1i , t'111) It funcnon ,·- . . ncrg) Ii.,

' " 1 1 end\ , nd \ tr.tt c g 1, rrso urcc, The ten-or tJ 1 '"""

t,<-1wttn Po mu. . . . Uit touJ(j l: 'l dNdl} J\\,rnlh wa , , muall ) unl11n11 ed, gh•,n th I~ 11, • !lht ~~~\Im, ,1 ,tn) 11111e E,·cn In Europe, ,ome heads of ct n \\•h C.J:~• "2 t.achng ,an)'OO • St.1.t t \I., ho t.

h Cru"d" fwcd for their 11,·e, wlthtn the sheltc f h.id 1. • ,-ot,rd mt ( r O their ""'1:111 ii. d d Fr.i, nct 111ert 1s no e,•1dcncc to suggest that th e "' O\i\11 ~'-I-Englin .m t"\S~~IO\ "'t:I '"

., l but 11 ,~ the 1m.uonal fe,u ll1.1.1 terron sts inspire tver ~ha..._ "" ~uu1 ,ut.1.( ), , o u1 of ill . ..,rr-Jl~ iht.ir U\le GlpiO Uh 10 hmn. tha t cons tit utes d1c1r Mrength • PrrJfll,ttir~

Chahan d md Blin note that Chri stian sects did not u , se terror

"'-c as the Zealots and th e Assass ms, but that th e Tabori·t to the..,_ eu , , es of Bah fift eenth centur) 1s an example of a Chri stian sect that ernta 1n,,.

, , , engaged i "" Wl\i ues. They wru e th at all of the early relig ious te rror n terrn,,_ sects wer ....

moremems u1 a1 beli eved that th e world woul d be transfor e rn es5%c f I . " " tn ed b)· a .. marking the end o ustory, n e,•em

.'Is with all ou1 er aspects of the study of terrorism th e 1

. , · us tory of mrolves a mul mu de of terror groups that have functi oned , tenori szn

. . . 1n a va • hti cal contexts wtt h different auns and mo ti vati ons-s nety of po.

0 me reli i social rerolut ionary, so me ethni c, some nationa li st Mo g ous, sozne . st con cern

cuss1ons about terrori sm ign ore the Zealo ts and the A , porar)' dis. , , ss ass ms and th

different forms of terronsm that exis ted around the w Id , e rnan y or pn or to th · ecnth century , It is the Fren ch Revo luti on of the eight h e etght-

. . eent century th , smnng pmm for most co111 emp orar)' anal yses of t , at ts the

erron sm beca h . where the term terro rism and its modern fo rm d , usec at ts d . . emerge , While th . enpng the stgni ficance of the French Revolution to modern-da . ere is no

mgs of terrorism. several other moments in histor and s ) understand, ta mes that e\'olved during the rim , d b Y ome specific terro r French Rel'olution are wonh notin e Tteno etween th e Assassins and lhe complexiti es of d g.. ey may also help ex plain some of the

mo ern sta te terron sm as ' 11 h crafung a si ngle prac ti cal d f , . · \' e as t e gen eral difficult y in

\\'luie the ; e 1111u on of what terrorism is. ealo ts and th e Assass in ·1 · d . .

rchg1ous fi gures b . . s uu ize assass111 auon of political and as a as1c tacuc (and .· .· . ,

unponan1 weapo . · ass ass ma uon today 1s still considered an n tn a terrori sts strat , stde of ttrronsm N all , , egtc ars enal) . assassina ti on can exist om-

~! h · ot poh11cal ass · , · uc of the rt asoni , assma uons are defined as terrori st acts. al ng or this evolves f I

c perspectil'es on t)' , . ra m t 1e Greek and Roman ph ilosophi- terr ranmc,de. Whil

on,111. Chahand and 81. e to man y tyrannicid e is not linked to in argu e that · · 1· . .. . II ts mked by !11story. noting the dt·

\.'/!131 ls T e,rorism? 27

rt<' ,nd ,nd1r~1 inOumc, um 1h, d, f, nde~ of 1yr. nn1ad, h.i ,-, wi,l<kd 0 ,-,r grou~ eng•ged m pohuc;al ••5• « in• t1on h;is bttn CC>n<1dcr•blc O\Cr the cm 1unes

T) r.nmc1d, 15 the k1lhng of• I) ra.nc o r • de<pot In Gr" k culture. the per , ,n "ho killed• 1yr.rn1 w•s • hero Ans 1otle did no1 a«oc1•" t) ra.n111c1de wuh .,mple cnme because he bdieved the person wh<, loll td • I) ra.nt wos •cru all) ,u,nhed in bis , won Acco rding 10 Chal,and • nd Bl in . the "1ustific.11on of c)ronmode. suppo rted by 1h, des ire IO brin g 1h e ac t 11110 co nfo rm1t) with the I•" •nd io associate ll wilh ce rt•m mo ral rul e;, 1s •k m 10 th e doctnnc of the ust war . whe rebr the use ot violence ts 1u<t1fied 111 ,nst•nces that , ma y be, I . '" h f ope n to 1n1erpretauon, T e acce ptance o 1yran111c1de w•s •n important cle ment of an cieni pohu cal cul cure and of the culture, tha 1 rnbsequ entl ) arose 111 Eu rope and in the Arab world . The Romans were also "fascmattd " by the con ce pi of ty rannicide . Ci ce ro had asserted 1ha1 wh ile a,sass1nat1o n was "the most hei nous of all crimes," tyran ni cide was "1he mos t noble ot •cuons. dchve nn g humanit y as it does from 't he crn elty of a sa vage beas t ...

Others justifi ed tyran nicide in la1er ce ntu ries-John of S•h, bury tn the 1welfth ce ntury, Saint Thomas Aqu in as m 1he thmee nth ce ntury. and v.inous Catholic and Protestant philosophers in the fifteenth and sixteenth cenrunes . By 1he sixt eenth century. Jean -Jacques Ro usseau' s co nce pt of the po puw w1U entered into political philoso ph y and tyranni cide shifted fro m bemg an mciJ. vidual act by a hero. and instead became an act req uired by the peo ple them- selves. It is popular wiU that motivated people and ga ve them th e nght to nse up against a tyrant En glis h soldi er Edwa rd Saxby . who m the seventeenth cen - tury plotted to assass inate Oli ve r Cromwell , wrote 111 bis pamphlet Killtng No Murder that the assassinati on of a tyrant should be undertaken "tn the name of the public honor, sec urit y and well -being ." He argued that tyrannicide is a dut y that people must accept on be half of humanity , and \\,th God's bless-,, mg .

Saxby's thoughts abou t tyran nicide existed more than a decade .rter the end of th e Th irt y Years' War in Europe. The signing of the Peace of Wes1- phalia in 1648 he lped usher in poli tical realism m Europe , in which another fundam ental principle emerged-the noninterfe rence 111 the affam of other states because a stat e is responsible fo r its own political managemen t no nw - ter what th e nature of the st at e may be, mcluding t)'TanD)' , This wa) ol think- ing dominated politics w1til the la te twentieth cemury. But , dunng the

T erronsm ano .... -- •"'Prill

28 . unu ed, becommg more th.n JU.St n111 cide con I I d •"''>I< h cen1ur), t)r• I According to C ia ,an and Bhn,

"'"'"""' ,nd free peOP e . .attt)r.anD

d11r11n i ""., ,)n,holi< .. hec.iu'lr It o1~ m::d th e'"'") lo " punfiu.u,,_ TM '-' ' t4,.'\Lt111!l ~ii the I) r.i: 1hr ch.an Lt' tor " ne" lx gmmng . wh.h the go.ii not cmlt r;f ,1\ tht p,.lhul.Al ')y,,1 rn1 "" un e hut al')O of trin'>formmg soc..1ety nw~ Ile\\ lnlerprtU ti1ngmg 1hr r 1ht1l"I rtg ,o 111.i.rk th '-' entire mnetccnth centlir) for m.n)· rtvc,IIJ

l t t}T.1.nn1l 1dr ".a' n\u.non') ltodar]. trranmc1de h • l e) elemtn1 -r oon ° d 1, rromt org.i o nonlf\ group~ "" their ph1l~ ph)

eii t of tyranni ci de , the idea of terror in . o the co ne ".r-

Jn add1uon t ries leadin g up to th e French Revolution Th d ,he centu . 1 f,re emerged unng . Kl an and his successor Tamerlan e, used te rror

der Genglus .1 h d c as• Mongols . un c qu est in the th in eent an ,ouneenth centu .

I d strategy ,or con I nes. !,,sic 100 an .1. , victo r)' was not enoug 1 and that thei• had . ·ed that a 1111 11ar) . to The) behe1 d sh his will to res ist. Tam erlane spared peopl . h e.ne.Ill)' an cru e: 1n e]11mnate ' en . 1 . bu t when he enco untered resistance , he p I d'd not resist um, un-aues t iat 1. 1 h the massacre of civilian s and by raising pyra mids ed I t reS<s<ance t u oug 1Sh 1" f d pitated beads to persuad e others not to resist. "

I r l ,housands O eca . ' bm t ran d ing war in Western Europe didn t emerge until the

The use of terror ur , ,1. 1 occurred between 1618 and 1648 . Most of this wu Tlu rt) )'ears War, ,, uc 1 . . , but it involved most ma1or European powers. The

was fough t lll German), . li . conflict be tween Protes tants and Cat holics but gradu-war started as a re g1ous . . .

d . era! war and also fuse d wnh a cm ! war ra ging in Ger-all) erolre mto a gen . . I Thirt)' Years' War started as a rehg1ous war , it involved man}·· Because t 1e .. . .,

mshan populations, and despite the fac t th at th e 1ust war precepts estab- lished br tbe Church prohibi,ed it, noncom batants becam e fa vored targe~ . Al the outset , the war was only one in a series of reli gio us confli cts, but it even- tual!) became a much larger event, with massive armi es from across Europe descending on Germany. "As a result of the combin ation of uninhibited vio- lence and mditary mass ," Chaliand and Bli n say, "civi li ans fo und themselws rn the duck of f,ghung of whi ch the y were the pr ima ry victi ms ."'' Germany's populauon dropped by S0 -6 0 percent during the decades of th e Thirt)' Years' War. and afrer decades of fighting, many weary gene rals hoped to bring ,he ''"" <o a close b) terrorizing the enemy. Mall)' gruesome exampl es of lltm terrormng ex1':tt, rncludi ng th e French exec uLi o n of eve ry survivmg soldier foll0111 ng a baule 111 <h t <011·11 of Chatillon -ur -Saone. After th e soldirn were <'tcu<ed , <hrn bod1e1 were hanged from the trees in a nearby fo rest and were kit " • runmder, partly beLause th e FrenLh be lieved it "woul d make ,he

,'11131tST~? 29

,ff.ct ,,en monger and sprtad tht n,w, l"5ttr •nd lanhtr · Although , hod I h Thlrt) Yran' War did not tnd all "'arbrr tn Europt. the Puce hrendot• 1 h 1 d d put a total end to wars of rrhg,on and the ter ror camp,ugns I We5tP • ta ' 9 " d omp;uued th em unu l the Fre nch Revoluuon ~gan tn I 7 8 bat h• , cc , 1 Th• Reign of Terro r du nng the Frentl1 Revolu uon w,, • turning point m

f odern tcrronsm parucularly a, u ,1 rdat<d tc, the ,w e The ,he ht stor) o m , h

be wnh the rxecuuon of deposed Kmg Louis XVI and th, u, ,nng enod gan p f 1 ule of the Revo lu uo nar) Government 111 1793 It waJ the narrow ,n o t ie r c f h N I

f I 793- 1794 when the Comm n1 ee of Publi c 5.1.,cty o t • mon• Penod o . h · n led by Max11rn hen Robesp<erre, was charged wit uncovwng Conve nu o , .. .. and foiling conspiracies that th e 1< rm reign of terror was born. The co m-

. orde red the execution of tho usands of people, m•n ) believed to be m1uee · ,nnoce nt, and officially adopted terro r as a revolu u onary policy The terror reached its high po int when the government exec uted an yone ll con"de red an enemy of th e people and treat ed those who 101ned co unterrevoluuon•f} movements as members of a fomgn enemy state. Htstonans esurnate that li many as thi rty thousand peop le dt ed as a resu lt of the terro r, "1th roughly ,wo thousand six hundred executed in Pam , nearly seventeen thou.sand u,- cuted across France, and the "colonnes mfemales" (mfernal columns ) lalling tens of thousands of people considered instigators of the Vendee R,belhon, which incl uded priests, prisone rs o f war, women, children, and residents of ent ire villages associa ted \\~th the rebellio n."

Historians n01e that the "'French Terror se rved both as the founding act of modern state terror and as the model defining and dehneatrng the strategic use of violence by a state apparat us . .. The French Terror prefigUied • system to be found in all of the great revoluuons, especially the Bolshevik Revolution ... the exploitation of id eological fanaticism, the mantpulauon of soaal ten - sions, and extermination campaigns against rebellio us sectors." ·

The founding act of mode m terro rism m the French Revolution led 10 the bi rth of co ntempo rary terrori sm in Russ ia 111 the late nmeteenth and earl) twemieth centuries. Th e se ries of eco nomic and social uphe.-·als m Russia that led to the eve ntual ove rth row of the tsarist autoc raq and the subsequent so- cialis t Provi sio na l Govern ment also evemually led to the Bobhenks gamrng power and establi shing th e Soviet Unton.

It was also in th e nin etee nth ce ntuq that the concept of "propaganda b) deed" emerg ed , a practice that was favored b) anarclusts, parucularl) m Ru, - sia, Ital)', Spain, and France. Contemporanl), "p ropaganda b) deed " b wider-

- -

=

Terrorism ano the Pr~

f acis of violence to gain publicity and enable a terr stood as the use O d of its insurrec ti on and expand it s base. Me .

0 ~

ad th e wor ran noti; group to spre ely succeed ed because terro rists rarely attra that tlm doctrine has ct pubi_

I nd support. l sympat 1y a .. nda by deed" had t 1e m ost success (albei t 1 Histori call y, propaga d ti 11 tmnec . ·I ere anarc hi st terro ri sts use 1e strate gy we mto the twentie to

in Spatll, " 1 . 01

. . Hubac-Occh.ipinti writes that th e Spanish a . t ' Historian iv1er . . . narchit

cenn l') · . -"ke th e Russian acts dunng thi s um e, were desig d - of terrorism. u1w . ne to

act> ·t1 " the doctrine in whose nam e n had been co mm· link the violence " ~ 1 . . f llled,

. . . t , to ackn owledge the m tensn y o the rage and sentim thus obhg ing socte } . . . en~

I ti h d moti va ted it." '' The Spamsh anarclusts also targ eted peo l

ofrevot iat a . p e . . . ocial clas s. "The goal here was to k.ill anyone who collabo

wnlun a ce.rtalll s • rated " ~th the bosses or the state or even merely _worked within the system. From tl1at standpoin t, all members o f the bourge01s1e were_e_ne~_;,es deserving of death. even if th ey were assign ed no parncular respon s1b1hty.

In Russia. "pro paganda by deed" grew o ut of th e principle of volumeer- is m, which held t11at within eve ryo ne is a dormant, revolutionary, popular energ )' that could be "unleashed by propaganda or by terror ." " Because of their unsuccessful efforts to stir the masses to revoluti on through pamphlets and other fo rms of propaganda, th e most rad.ical o f the anarchists adopted the name Narodnaya Volya (meaning Th e Peo ple's Will) and began to plot the executio n of Czar Alexander II. Th e Naro dnaya Vol ya becam e th e fir st terrorist group in Russian histo ry. Aft er multipl e failed att e mpts , th ey finall y killed Alexander II wi th a bomb in 1881, but th e power of th e act did not produce the des ired resul t of up ri sing. Pu bli c o pinion co nd emn ed th e k.illing and after several arrests of ke y lead ers of th e group, influ e nc e o f tl1e anarchis ts fell un• der Alexander Ulyan ov, broth er o f Vladimir Lenin ." Le nin would eventually gain po\\'er and lead th e Bolshevik gov ernm ent' s institution o f th e Red Terror, modeled after "Th e Terror" o f th e Fre nc h Revo luti o n . Th e Bolsheviks used terror between 191 7 and 192 1 to cru sh th eir o ppon e nt s and co nt rol their own people. Their terro r too k th e fo rm of co nce ntrati o n camps . execu tions wttb- out tnals and taking hostage s.

Conclusion

Poln,ca] sue nu st Br , . d" concept

1 ,_gwe Nacos ha, widely app li ed th e "p ro pagan da b)' dee

Ill lt r wm rngs ab . . 1· ponance of

I o ut te rr o ri sm, 111 which sh e also high.lights the 111

t ie tned,a to 1 - · . . . · rl erronsm as II ts prac ti ce d today . 'vVbil e her " 0

Wtiat ls Terrorism? :.:.:---

31

l s- n th e history and c.au<e< o utlin ed tn th1< ch•pte r. N•cos •lso ton-ude~

bu•=o hcau ons o f modern te rro ri s m som e,vhat d iffe ren tly h, •ddmg me,d1• th e ,mp 10

th e mix tn a ce ntral way int erest 1n the relatl onsh1p between th e m~ •nd terro rism has exploded si nce Se ptembe r I I , but pno r to mis, onl, • sm•ll

tage o f th e sc ho larl y wnung about the histo ry , the ddunt,ons o r the perce n causes o f 1err o n sm 111cludes the m edi a a~ more than 1ust an asid e Geneull,

, .. ng the m edia emerg ed as a re levant part o f the stud, o f te rro n s m m the speaiu , 196

0, . Na cos is o ne o f me leading polmcal sc1enusts who has explored the si nificance of the m ed.ia to unde rstanding how mode m te rro n s m 1s pr;ic ti!ed. In explaining he r creation o f the term "mass mediated te rro nsm" she

writes:

lhe 1dea he.re is chat most u:rron~ts ulcub.tc the co nsequences of their de~. the h..kc hhood of ga.uung media attcn uo n. wd most unporu.nc , the hk.thhood of w mnuig en- uance--thro ugh the media- to ,,_,, .. h.u 1 call Tht Tnangk oi PohUCl.l UlmmumCllllOO ln cn.u5 sodeties in which duect cont.1. ct and commuma.uon betv,·tto the go v~rnon uid the governed are no lo nge r poss1bli::. the m edt .1 provide the lines of commuruauon br - rween pubhc o ffi ces and Lhe gene r~ public..

Nacos writes that m ode rn terro rists have four "media-dep=dent" goili that include cap turing the atte ntio n o f audiences both inside and o uts1de theu "target" societies , seek.ing reco gnitio n fo r their m otives, seeking "the r~t and sy mpath y o f those in whose interest they da.im to act," and seelung "quasi-legi timate" status so that they receive the same degree o f media attfil - tion as legitimate po litical acto rs."

As sugg ested by Hoffman, the med.ia are ilio critically important to the ge nera l public ' s understand.ing of what constitutes terronsm. He has su g - ge sted that "most peo pl e have a vagu e idea o r impress.ion o f what u~rronsm ts but la ck a more precise, concret e and truly explanatory d efiniuon o f the w o rd" because they learn about te rrorism fr o m the m ed.ia. Yet, the way th e m ed.ia d efin e and repo rt abo ut terrorism varies " ~d ely. · Understanding the definitio nal co mplexi ti es and th e lo ng histo ry o f terrorism is tmponam to any anal ys is of media co verage of terrorism . The next chapter explo res the wa )S m wh ich th e m ed.i a crea te th e ir o wn d eftn.i ti ons o f terro rism as w ell as ho w ter - rorism is generally repo rt ed by the ne w s med.ia .

CHAPTER 3 The News Media and the Government

/ Fonnrr CBS Nf\\1 Ancborj Dan Rothtr "'US riut a th«rkudtr lur powrr, o lhtt rlwJrr lo r tM (Bl.Uh/ ad mmst ruu on frm 00\\ , \, hm lie goo, to rNam hi msdf MHb lht pllturn of Abu Ghnub pnlllfl, hr \lb .Jn the stor) for mo ,,«-kl Nobo.l ) ·s called him on 1hts B«oUS( lhc ct\curmoo ol 1ht Join, Ch1rh of Stt1H at.ltd him 10 ) II on 1hr stol)

1 And 1hm ht SG ) ~. t1:1a1 11 0Uy, ·w, only brokr Ulr uo, y bn.uusr Mc hod tu We

didn', brrok tht stor) btcouSt nc should, or btcoust JI n 1hr n9h1 thing to do for thr Amtncon people or !o, the 1,orld . We broke thr story b«oust somebody dSt na.s gomg 10 bmii If II \\ <U going to cumr 001 on the /nrcmct · rh1 s is 1us1 unrrcm, ardJCc on h1s pan

-John MacAn..hur . Harper Mag.tLl ne pre,1de-m and pubh.shcr

The formal study of th e press and its relati onship to go ve rnm em date, back to th e emergen ce of th e academic field of co mmunication . Studi es in th e 19-¼0s foc us ed on the impa ct mas s communication had o n vo ter; ' cho ices dunng political elections , and research ers concluded that lml e evide nce exmed to sh ow that the media chang ed people 's o pini ons, even th o ugh th ey did find evidence that pe opl e were inform ed by th e mass media :

As chapter 2 showed, a vari ety of mass co mmunicau o n theo n es su gge st that the media do help set the publi c agenda and can mflu ence ho w peo ple perceive informati o n depending o n ho w it is framed and ho w familiar and relevant an iss ue is. Two ways that American scholars o ften co nsider th e rela- tionship between th e press and th e gove rnment is m th e co ntext o f how much infl uence government wi eld s o n the n ews m edia's agenda (a.nd Yi ce Yersa ) , and in a First Amendment context, specifically the guarantee of press freed om and access 10 in fo rmation. Th e relationship between th e press and the goY- ,. t,m em is relevant 10 the srudy o f ho w th e press repo rts about terrori sm .. -\s chapter I highli g ht ed, m os t agree that o n some leYel terro rism is a strateg} aimed at fo rci n g po liti cal change. If m edia are a primary conduit for news and info rmati o n about po litics , and if m edia th eories are correct in as, ening that th e media ca n influen ce pu blic o pini o n, b0 1h terro ri sts and co untert erro nsm effu n s by th e gove rnm ent need th e n ew s m edia 10 reach a mass audience .. -\., Brig it te Naco, explaiu ed 111 Muss -Mediat ed Terrorism. the media are on e u npo rtant piece o f what she call s th e "Tri,rngle of Pol itical Cu mmum cau o u," Ill " lu ch three it em s for m a triangl e with arro w s !lo wing bo th " ay, . Th e three corners o f Nacos ' triangle are th e ma » medi.1, the ge neral pubh< int ere,t groups, and gorc.:rnrnenr 0 ffi cia\ s/ dl'ci~1 o n mak er:-i . NaL o :,., .ugut''I d1Jt tt' rro n, t:,, \\ lll en

54 Terrorism alld

. :..: coren-d the ffll)t] Gulf Wu, beimmg llS signal Into foreign a.11 d d,fi

o,., th rid o,ck Cheney, then secretary of defen se in th , °"" ni,,,._ ill 0 ,'tr e \\ O e Il~ t P. ... , tnt'\ r. duo wledged 1ha1 he got more umcly, rdevam inf. "'Ill.II ~ nun.1.>traoon. 011 en a Orl'IJ.i.tion & (.'.;l\' thin he did fro m u S d1plomau. S~ n old and new networks, SJ)i\\ the ,gt of ne iv iechnolog}. fo llowed CNN s example of pro,·1dmg continuoUs lltd 1n

e of dnn~ uc eren~. ill homt' and abroad . Though it was still ca lled the CNN~ .g ded rt lh m 1ust CNN co,,erage-n meant tha t the world WiS tfft-a. 11 111 cl u mo., .. ,ou.s coveng e, and that the coverage affec ted even·on now Wired. open 10 ins1,111i .. , - , e ind t tlung, mduding world Je ,1.den and their tacti cs and sm.teg y. 'ts),

Jou mal1S<S Dann)' Schechter and Ali za Di cht er \\Tit e that ··there is no

ONN'S enormous impact on world events and the global ne ~. . . . --Ma.nr go,•emments and news orgamza uons ha ve tts electronic face on l>llJti four hou rs a day:·" In th e context of terronsm coverage and war, CNN work e.xecutires ha"e acknowledged that people "seek to use us as a P~); tn much the sam e way the Jmh N,ws of the 199Os was aware of the, groups like the IRA wanted to "use" them to sp read IRA-related paramfu: propaganda.

In a recent study. poli tical scienti st Robin Brown explored the "wu ~, conunuauon of politics " thinking in the context of th e rela tionship bel\lltl th, mtlttar) and tlie media. He notes that "while ini tial disc ussion wis Ctr, c,rned \\1th the rm pact of CNN as a diplomatic tool, by the mid-1990,tb tbcussron erolred to ask whether television was actuall y shaping U.S. fornl' pohC) I! was argued that th e impact of televisio n pictu res 'forced' po1,ri maken. mto taking acuon whether it was to in tervene in humani tarian ~ or to pull ou t once rn terventio n had actuaU)' occurred. As with the e1rlier to1> flr ct, an acadenuc literature derelo ped di sputing the initial claim s. This Utm turc ha, demonstrated that it is diffirnlt to find eviden ce for clatms abomtl, po11,r of the medra orer poliq :·

In hr, ' "-'nt hook abou t medi a frami ng and public poli cy. RobertEnlltlll sugge,ls that II hen poltucal communrcatt on scholars examine the "go,,,,_ ment media nnu, rn Ioretgn poltq " ther use one of two nia1or apprOlrn<I h,gcm. 'll\ or ind XI H h . .. .o , c. ng egemonr t eo n st~ beli e, e that go, ernment [Iii

I L rnauon a,a1 able to the public " "thi n such narro11 1"" 1 'i"'1 bou nd"''' that demouauc dd1berauon and mfl uerJCc are ill I,; unp J\\l~!t-.. J,, uth d h 1

.. t' r wor ~. t e governmem doesn't allo,, "1de .. r dt bate Ir ,m a II d f , , t c range o perspecu,es: ra th<r. tt keeps the pu, ..

d, J~t, \tr, ~imp! l . .J. -d c an, constram,d lnde.,rng suggests that the m""' • ,, , r ,l,-,cl1 idb.t db d d " ate about pohq issues am ong d1te, . an °

The News Media and the Government - 65 foster or report abou t debat e il5 tt occurs among rtgul.u- lltl,co, Boch hegrm any and inde.'(Jng suggest that the rnedli, coverage of foreagn policy rtfltru rn ostl r the gove rnm ent's 1deil5 111 very nmo" terms. and that this kmd of co\'erage se verely limits the pu bltc's mfo rma uon and access to a wtd, range of poiuts of view . The impact of this rs that the press '"docs not offer cnual analysis of Whit e House policy demrons unless actors ms1de the government (most often in Congress) have done so first. This mems the media m . u • vehicle fo r government officials to cnucrze each other. Th us the media mu, no independent contnbution (exce pt at the m.u-gms) to foreign pohC) de-

bate From a hegemony perspecuve, wtul e elites may someumes confuct. thw

general agreement on basic prinaples crea tes a ··hmnon) that impedes the fl ow of independent information and consistentl1 ( although not llleviubli ) produces pro-government propaganda-and public conse nt or acqwescence to White House decisions ."" The concept of hegemony ts explored tn greater detail in chapter 7. The sig1ti fi cance of propaganda to the media corenge of the U.S. "war on terrorism" is discussed below.

Propaganda The term propaganda originates with the Catholic Church dunng the Refor- mation. The Church established the Coogt,gouo dr prol"'ganda fide (Congregauon for the Propagation of Faith) in 1622 to manage Its struggle aga.inst the grow- ing use of science to better understand the world. A pn nnple figure caught lD the struggle was Galileo. who argued that the Earth rernlved around the Sun. based on his sc ientific obse rvati ons thro ugh a telescope. The Inquisition tned and con\'icted Galileo of heresy in 1633, and he was forced to renounce lus v1ew: 1 Mass co mmuni cation scholars 'Nemer Se\'enn and Jam es Trnkard suggest that the term propaganda mar ha,·e picked up some of ii> negau,·e connotations of being untru thful from the Galileo inadent m which the Church Wil5 forced to argue a posi uon that was SCJenuficall) false .

Curre nt defm iuons of propaganda m the field of mass commurucauon trace back to Ha rold Lasswelr s clas,ic book Propaganda To:hruqucs 1JJ th< World War. pu blished in 1927 · Lasswell defi ned propaganda a, "the control of opinion b) ,rg mficant symbols, or. to speak more concmel) and less accurate!). b)' stones, rumo rs. repo rt!i, p1uurcs and other forms o f socul commurucauon." ·• Ten ) '"' later. Lasswell alt ered the defU1Juon sLlghtl) and suggested, "propa - ganda 111 the broadest sense i, the technique of mfluenang human action bi·

>

-

66 ________ T:...:e::.m:.::o:'..'.rism afld ..._

~Pr-. 0

of represe.ntanon s. Th ese represe ntau ons may ~ke Lh< man1pulauo ,u · ical fo rm . " Lasswell' s definitio ns 'P<,,.

icwn .11 or n We.re b "-,,11en. P d d ·ernsing and o th e r forms o f co mmu n ication th <ll,

h mdu ea ' it x, ,noug to so ,ubseq u e nt e ffo n s to refine th e te nn ' d llJ-

Jd ll per,ua,1on, s efuu " ou ca h propaga nda fro m o th er fo rm s o f co mmun icati o1 ~,_.

ed to disungms .. . . l. A lll<Jd ITT d -" es p ro paganda as the spread m g o f id eas , in for .

d uonaf) eun matton em ic ose o f he lping or inj u ring an in s ti t uti o n, a cause ·"' rumor for the purp . or a pc,

.. d , ct· o r allegation s spread d e h b e ra te.ly to fu rth er on , ron" ind t ea~. ,a !I • • . e s CiUSt Pposm g ca use; also: a p ubli c ac u o n having su ch an effi • or to damage an o . . ec1.

od man) ""o uld argu e th at de te r mmmg w h e the r sometL, Still, f\CD I a). • . •ung " d 01 lies in the eyes of a m essag e s re ce ive r as w ell as in th . propagan a or n e m.

,enuons of the sender. Most discusswn and analysis of p ropaganda as it r e la tes to the media and

go,·emme.nt co mes from wartime . In I 9 2 7, Lassw e ll n oted fo ur main obitt- a,·es of warame propag anda-to m ob ilize hatred agai n st th e e nemy, to de- moralue the enemy , to preserve all y fri e ndsh ip s , and to gain th e cooperation

01 neutral parti es.· Some scholars have n o ted th a t th e con ce p t of wamm, propaganda dates as far back as Th e Art of Wa r, vai tt e n by Su n Tsu before the begmrung of the Common Era. In the United Sta tes , m o s t disc ussion about propaganda begins in co nnec tio n " ~th W o rld War s I a n d II . Th e U.S. govern- ment', h.ighl)· effecme use of pro paganda during W o rl d War I led many to argue fo r propaganda educa ti o n at th e o n se t o f W o rl d Wa r II . Duri ng th, '<m leadrng up to the U.S. invo lve m en t in W o rld War II , Am e ricans wortied atx,ut the success of Ado lf Hitle r and hi s p ropaganda mi ni ste r Jose ph Goebbeh m German).· In 1939, th e newly fo rmed In sti tut e fo r Propaganda Analyst; publJ,hed the now famous boo k The Fine Art of Propaganda, whi c h explai ned to readers the \t\ en commo n de,ices o f propaga nda . T h ese d evices could be Used I idenuf, propaganda and to educ a te p ubli c sc h oo l stude nts about the dangers of propaganda. Th e SC\ en d evices came fr o m th e sp eec hes of Father Charle, E C Juohlm I . • , a popu ar Ca tholic p r ies t w h o b roa d cas t hi s messag ~\tr a tL>:-1} 'c\t'fl radio sl ation netwo rk in t.he la te I 93 0 s. Th e Insti tu te feared C;gWa1 cnuld bt:co ., . ed "t ,. . mt an .\ m en can Hid e r " becau se h is sh ows present l

hCht pfi1los,Jph) and t J1 TI "' magazrn e mirrored Naz i propaga n da.

1t St'\t'll pr 1:•an d d ., t tr ,f ~an a e \ Kb a rt name-cal ling, gli u ering genecc1.1i )·

an t',. lnttm >Illa. I lam I ll , th r p-,, ,eitr I , . · P O ' · Lard stacking, a n d ba n d w agon . For 3 a1.:,adt'\ 1nan, I . " ror .~t· ,h ,1 t ' · pc-up e ha,e co n sid e red th e u~e o f th e te r l11 t...-r

,rm<,! pr<,J'Jvand. . . k nd1c <:> 1st1L name-tal hng . So n1 e o f t h b t raL e:, ba( t

67 The N~ Me<fia and the Gove!Tlffi0nl

. o nst ts ano ther rn.in'• fr eedom hght~r .. "'' .\ltred .. ne m•n s te rr f p --.1,

,..l,n g o El be h Sn.int Lee defin e " rn Th< Fin< Nt o rol"'l!"'- · d Lee and

12• ' f ML ung .. .d • a bad la b<,!" and t< used to e nc o ur•g• f'<'OP e ff ,g ts g1nng an t e " A

name -c a u d h e ide• withou t e x.am1run g Lhc evidence " .. ect and co n en1 n t • d d'

to re f d Tankard p o mt out . "whether a per,on t< ~ail ed .in un erg rou n Se\"ertn an fl h . o r is called a ' te rro rm .. depe nds o n ,h e Vlew

d . r ' freedom tg ter, h ,of ,e r o th e label o r th e side th e person a,,igm ng t e f ,h e p e rson ass1gmng . • d

po ltlt o Ofi n the aw v, ues of a n 'unde rg round" so ld1 e r o r tree o m I bel suppo rts. te f l " D a . d I o f a ' te rro ris t' are ,denucaf-only th e lab, Lu nge,. r figlner an t 1ose U

• h d o f th e Cente r fo r Po hu cal V10lence at T e.I Av tv mver>ll). Ariel Me ran . ea f

d that m u c h o f the diffi c ult y m d efining te rro n s rn grows out o has sug ges te f 11 . k. d f u sage of the te r m as a general descnpto r o r labd o a negauve

this ·m O b ,·io lent b e h av ior . M era ri says tha t when th is kind o! g e n e rahzat10n occ urs. t e wo rd terro ri st is reduced to a form of propaganda .

Des pi te atte mpts to create a dis tinct and separate ca te go r y o f commuruca - ti on call ed p ropaganda, in m ost o f the se ve n devi ces , peo ple see ~.nkages_ to adverti sin g and to p o litical communication. Lee a.n d Le e de~ne glmenn~ gene ralit y" as a w ay to associ at e a concept o r an id ea with a \;nue ,,·o rd. som eth ing tha t will e n courage people to acce pt and appro ve o f the co n cep t or idea w itho ut e xamining the e,~dence ." ·· T ransfer" w o rks thro ugh a process o f asso ciation-th e go al is to connect an id ea o r a cause \'•ith some th.ing that peop le lik e o r fi nd fa , ·ora b le . ""Tes ti m o nial" involves ha ,ing a highl)" respected pe rso n-o r a n1uc h d espised perso n----disc uss , praj se. o r den o unce an ide a to im p ac t p eo p le's pe rcep ti ons." "Plain fo lks" w o rks when speakers connnce aud ie n ce s tha t th ey a r e o n e of them. just o ne o f tb e crowd. ··card stac k.mg" involves th e se lec ti o n of arg un1ents and evidence that s uppo rt a position ,vb1le ig n o rin g co ntrar y a rg u me nt s and evidence. And, "band wago n " w o rks b) co n vinc ing p eo pl e to fo llo w the cro wd. 10 e mb race an ·· e Yerybodr thinks o r does th is " n1e ntaht y. H

In ad d iti o n to na m e-call in g . card stacking and band " ·agon are th e rwo pro pagand a d evices n1 os t used by th e g overnn 1en t to co n1bat terro n srn . A N(l, York Times inves ti ga ti o n p ubli sh ed in April 2008 sh o wed thaL the Geo rg e \ \' Bu sh adJ11inis trati o n ' s co mn1u ni ca tio n s a n n at th e Pe ntag o n ca.rdull} orch es.- tra ted co n1ment a r }' o n t h e Iraq War. te rro ri sn1. and treatn1 en t of pn!)o ners at Gua ntanam o Bay b y a gro up o f retired n1ilir a r y o ffic e rs , vho w ere' w o rking fo r seve ral m ed ia o u tl e ts ,1~ Jnal ysts. Th e T1111 e) articl e no ted that