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78 JFQ / issue 57, 2 d quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu

BIOTERROR in the

AGE of BIOTECHNOLOGY

T his powerful statement from the

most recent Commission on the

Prevention of Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) Prolifera-

tion and Terrorism serves as ample warning

of the dire threats faced by the United States

and indeed the world from a bioweapon

successfully deployed by a determined and

knowledgeable terrorist. In thinking about

the potential for such a bioterror attack,

several important questions serve to frame

the discussion. Do terrorists have the desire

to employ WMD, and in particular biological

weapons? Under what conditions might bio-

logical weapons be an attractive choice for use

by terrorists? Would they have the requisite

knowledge, equipment, and organizational

capacity to mount a biological warfare (BW)

attack? Would they be successful in such an

By D A N I E L M . G E R S T E I N

Dr. Daniel M. Gerstein is a Strategist and Policy Expert with significant operational experience. He has

written extensively about national security. This article is based on his most recent book, Bioterror in the 21st

Century: Emerging Threats in a New Global Environment (Naval Institute Press, 2009).

The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and

with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction

will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.

The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able

to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. The Commission

believes that the U.S. government needs to move more aggressively to limit the

proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack.1

U.S. Army M190 chemical warhead section

containing demonstration Sarin bomblets, 1943

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GERSTEIN

attack? What could we do to mitigate the

effects of a bioterror attack?

This article provides a framework for

understanding the potential for a BW attack

now and in the future by a terrorist or terrorist

organization. In developing this framework,

the findings hinge less on the technical capa-

bilities than on the intentions of the potential

perpetrator. State use of biological weapons

in either large-scale strategic scenarios or as

tools of assassination is not examined directly,

although the framework could have equal

application to a state BW program.

The Potential Perpetrator Terrorism is a term that evokes strong

emotions. Events of 9/11 brought terrorism to

the forefront of the national security debate in

the United States and arguably throughout the

rest of the world. Despite this increased atten-

tion during the intervening period, the debate

has seen little increased clarity.

No agreed definition of terrorist has been

developed, and the word has been used seem-

ingly interchangeably with other terms such

as insurgent, illegal combatant, and freedom

fighter. The result is a politicization of the term

that hinders global cooperation and confuses

the issue. This can be seen in a discussion of

the rationality of the terrorist. Many believe

that terrorists are pathologically damaged,

violent sociopaths who employ violence for

their own perverted outcomes. Others believe

that terrorists are calculating and highly

rational actors with real or perceived griev-

ances, employing a range of strategies from

political actions to violence in order to achieve

desired outcomes. Some have gone as far as to

suggest that it is possible to reach a negotiated

settlement with terrorists, in the same way that

one might reach a postconflict settlement fol-

lowing a state-to-state conflict.2

Regardless of the exact definition

or the rationality of the terrorist, several

important trends serve as the foundation for

this analysis. First, terrorism is not a new

phenomenon and has a long historical pre-

cedence. The direct origin of the term can be

traced to the time of the French Revolution,

although the period beginning in the 1970s

is of the most interest for our discussion. It

is during this period—with emphasis on the

post-9/11 period—where we see the conf lu-

ence of the use of high violence strategies, the

rise of global terrorist organizations fueled

by globalization, and increasing religious

radicalization.3

Second, terrorists are continually

searching for new means to facilitate increas-

ingly violent and spectacular attacks that will

gain visibility for and further their causes.

Attacks have become more frequent and

more violent. Prior to the Embassy bombings

in Kenya and Tanzania in the late 1990s,

for instance, global casualties from terrorist

attacks were fewer than 500 per year.4 The

Embassy bombings caused casualties in

the thousands, and then the attacks of 9/11

caused over 3,000 deaths with many more

injured. In compiling terrorism trends for

2008, the National Counterterrorism Center

(NCTC) identified 11,770 attacks that killed

15,765 (see figure 1).5 A note of caution is

in order for the reader who might want to

directly compare the casualty figures. The

different counting rules and definitions

certainly contribute to some of the disparities

noted. Additionally, the NCTC data include

attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, which

some might consider related to an insur-

gency rather than terrorist action. Still, the

increases in violence and number of attacks

are worth considering. A statement by noted

terrorism expert Brian Jenkins summarizes

the trends in terrorism:

Over the past three decades, terrorists have

multiplied the number of their victims by an

order of magnitude every 15 years. In the 1970s,

the bloodiest incidents involved tens of fatali-

ties. By the 1990s, hundreds were killed and

the incidents increased. In 2001, the number

reached the thousands, and today we fear sce-

narios in which tens of thousands might die.6

Third, general agreement now exists that

terrorists are “rational” actors. Their actions

may not be understood by their victims or the

governments and law enforcement agencies

that attempt to deal with these threats, but

they are far from random irrational acts. One

noted expert identifies alienation, humilia-

tion, demographics, history, and territory as

grievances that motivate terrorists.7

Fourth, and related to their rational

actor status, terrorists have constituencies

they must satisfy. High violence strategies that

indiscriminately kill and maim large numbers

of people are not desirable as a long-term

tactic. Likewise, failure to adequately gain vis-

ibility and promote a cause will likely be seen

as ineffective by these constituencies. This

2 ,9

8 7

71 8

76 2

2 9

2

77 4

5, 52

8

4 ,5

9 4

5, 8

2 6

4 ,3

54

3 70

3 52

9 78

Dead: 15,765 Number of attacks: 11,770

Africa East Asia and Pacific

Europe and Eurasia

Near East South Asia Western Hemisphere

Figure 1. Terrorism Statistics (2008), National Counterterrorism Center

no agreed definition of terrorist has been developed, and the word has been used seemingly interchangeably with other terms such as

insurgent, illegal combatant, and freedom fighter

80 JFQ / issue 57, 2 d quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu

FEATURES | Bioterror in the Age of Biotechnology

will serve as both a motivating influence and

a moderating factor that will feature promi-

nently into the bioterror question.

Fifth, the question of whether a terrorist

will employ a unique means such as biologi-

cal weapons is directly related to the ability

to develop the capabilities, intentions, and

knowledge necessary for perpetrating a bio-

terror attack. Some terrorist groups will likely

find it outside of their operational envelope

to employ such a technique. Others may find

development of these capabilities too techni-

cally challenging. Still others may determine

that use of these weapons may present an

existential threat to the terrorist should the

attacked nation employ a massive retaliatory

effort (assuming, of course, that the perpetra-

tors can be identified).

Finally, terrorism today does not repre-

sent an existential threat to the United States

or our friends and allies. However, this could

change should terrorists develop or acquire

the capability for conducting a WMD attack

using either nuclear or biological weapons.

In a harbinger of what the future might hold,

Bruce Hoffman noted ominously that “many

of the constraints (both self-imposed and

technical) which previously limited terrorist

use of WMD are eroding.”8

What Is Biological Warfare? Biological warfare is the intentional

use of microbes to cause disease in a target

population. Microbes are inherent in all life

forms and include bacteria, viruses, protozoa,

algae, and fungi. While some microbes are

responsible for causing disease, many others

serve vital functions for supporting all forms

of plant and animal life. In BW, the attempt is

to effectively and efficiently deploy weapons

composed of biological material to attack a

target and achieve a desired objective.

The use of biological weapons is not

a new tactic and in fact predates the under-

standing of disease. The history of biological

warfare can be traced back to medieval

times including the siege of Caffa on the

Crimean Peninsula, the use of blood-laced

arrows against enemies, and the catapulting

of human and animal carcasses into enemy

encampments and fortifications during the

Crusades.

The modern history of biological

weapons includes programs by some 20

states beginning in the 1940s to the present.

Often-cited efforts include the Japanese use of

BW against China and captured prisoners in

the World War II period; the massive Soviet

program that continued through the end of

the Cold War; and the programs and coopera-

tion among Canada, the United Kingdom,

and the United States that began in the 1940s

and continued until the United States uni-

laterally denounced biological weapons and

toxins in 1969. The modern history of BW

also includes the Biological Weapons Conven-

tion (BWC), which was the first arms control

treaty that banned the use of an entire class of

weapons for offensive purposes. Also part of

whether a terrorist will employ a unique means such

as biological weapons is directly related to the ability to develop the capabilities, intentions, and knowledge

necessary for perpetrating a bioterror attack

9/11 brought terrorism to forefront of national

security debate

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GERSTEIN

this history is the limited success the BWC has

had with regard to halting the development

of offensive BW capabilities by some of the

convention’s signatory nations.

The history of bioterror incidents is also

instructive. One study concluded that from

1900 to 2003, there were only 77 total inci-

dents. The data do not encompass state-spon-

sored BW or hoaxes.9 The hoaxes in particular

would include a large number of “incidents”

as they tend to outnumber actual events by

as much as 100 to 1.10 The small number of

incidents and the uniqueness of each limit the

ability to draw definitive conclusions from the

data. Instead, each requires analysis to deter-

mine the key parameters and outcomes that

defined it and ultimately the success or failure

of the attack. An important note is that during

combat operations in Afghanistan in 2001,

documents were seized indicating al Qaeda’s

interest in developing a BW capability; few

details have emerged concerning the intended

purpose of the weapons or how far their devel-

opmental effort have progressed.

In understanding BW, several factors

contribute directly to the ability to develop

and employ an effective biological weapon,

including the agent or pathogen, deployment

method, formulation, manufacturing process,

and meteorological and terrain conditions.11

It is instructive in understanding the

potential for a bioterror attack to appreci-

ate the choices that must be made. Will the

agent be a bacteria, virus, or toxin? Should

a contagious or noncontagious pathogen be

selected? Should a lethal or an incapacitating

agent be used? These initial decisions begin to

determine the type of attack that will be pos-

sible and even the manner in which it should

be conducted.

In examining the deployment method,

will the agent be delivered by aerosol, vector,

food, or water? Will the pathogen be deliv-

ered using an explosive device or a spray

nozzle? The formulation of the pathogen is

also important. Will a wet or dry agent be

used? Will the material be stabilized to make

it more efficient and able to remain airborne

for a longer period? What is the manufactur-

ing process? How and in what quantities will

the material be grown to mount an attack

against the envisioned target? Will the mate-

rial be dried and milled? What size are the

particles? Do they support efficient respira-

tory infection or are they too large to be

inhaled and remain deeply embedded in the

alveoli within the lungs?

Even once the initial agent, deployment

method, formulation, and manufacturing

process have been determined, success in the

attack ultimately depends on the meteorologi-

cal conditions when the weapon is deployed.

What is the wind speed? Will the weapon

be deployed in a city or open terrain? What

time of day? Is there an inversion that would

keep the agent on the ground and therefore be

more effective against the intended target?

These questions relate to the poten-

tial effectiveness of the biological weapon;

however, another set of considerations is

directly related to the effectiveness of the

attack. They include the concentration, dose,

stability, and target susceptibility. In consider-

ing these factors, the goal of the bioweapon-

eer is to have the highest concentration of

organisms per milliliter or gram (depending

on whether a liquid or dry formulation is

used) of material. Another consideration is

the lethal dose (LD) or infective dose (ID),

which is normally measured in LD 50

and ID 50

,

respectively, and relates to the dose required

to cause mortality or infection in 50 percent

of the people exposed. This becomes a major

factor in considering the agent for weaponiza-

tion. Consider that for the disease tularemia,

the LD 50

is approximately 50 organisms, while

for anthrax it is approximately 8,000 spores.

However, there are always tradeoffs to be

made. Francisella tularensis, the organism

responsible for tularemia, is highly susceptible

to the environment and experiences biological

decay at a rate of 2.5 to 5 percent per minute

(depending on meteorological conditions and

the weaponization of the pathogen), while

Bacillus anthracis, the anthrax organism, is

a hearty spore that experiences virtually no

biological decay.

The final consideration of target

susceptibility is another important factor.

Ultimately, the success of an attack will be

determined by whether the deployed BW

weapon will infect the target population in

the appropriate manner to cause disease. If

the target population has been vaccinated or

is not susceptible to the weapon or if protec-

tive measures have been taken, the attack will

fail. For example, if an anthrax attack against

troops is initiated, but the soldiers all have

personal protective equipment and have been

vaccinated against the pathogen, the attack

most likely will not be successful.

An important note is in order at this

point. When terms such as LD 50

and ID 50

are

used, they normally are based on what the

medical and public health community knows

about the effect of the naturally occurring

strains of the bacteria and viruses. But what

if the biological material has been altered

such that fewer particles cause disease or the

virulence of the material reduces the incuba-

tion time? This would be the likely goal of a

bioweaponeer.

once the initial agent, deployment method,

formulation, and manufacturing process have been determined, success in

the attack ultimately depends on the meteorological

conditions when the weapon is deployed

Photomicrograph of Bacillus anthracis bacteria

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FEATURES | Bioterror in the Age of Biotechnology

This previous set of questions contains

a mix of operational and technical issues that

the bioterrorist would need to master for a

successful attack. It also serves as fodder for

those who claim that developing a BW capac-

ity is a nontrivial task too difficult for a terror-

ist to master. But what are the facts?

Dual-use Technologies Central to the question of the potential

for a bioterror attack is the ability of the

terrorist to develop a viable BW capability,

implying mastery of the biology, the technol-

ogy for dispersing the pathogen, and the

development of a scenario aligned with the

objectives sought.

Some believe that the technology is too

sophisticated for mastery by a terrorist and

that specialized capabilities are required.

Advocates of this position state that other

terrorists such as Aum Shinrikyo and the

Rajneeshee cult failed to acquire, process,

weaponize, and successfully deploy a biologi-

cal weapon. In another example, a postdoc-

toral student was given a year to develop

this scenario using the pathogen Francisella

tularensis. At the end of that period, when the

results were briefed, the student had made

three fatal errors that would have doomed the

effort and prevented a successful attack.12 In

yet another anecdote that alludes to the dif-

ficulties of developing a biological weapons

capability, Jerzy Mierzejewski, the retired

director of the Polish biological defense labo-

ratories who spent his career working with

Clostridium botulinum, lamented that “one

culture cycle would produce toxin that was

lethal and a few months later the next would

not, and so on over the years.”13

Others argue that the development

of biological weapons is almost trivial. One

author wrote that producing biological

weapons was “about as complicated as manu-

facturing beer and less dangerous than refining

heroin.” In seminar presentations a few years

ago, former Central Intelligence Agency Direc-

tor James Woolsey claimed that “a B-plus high

school chemistry student” could produce bio-

logical agents, and at a January 2000 meeting

he described producing biological agents as

being “about as difficult as producing beer.” In

her book The Ultimate Terrorist, Jessica Stern

quotes Kathleen Bailey who, after interviewing

professors, graduate students, and pharma-

ceutical manufacturers, concluded that several

biologists with only $10,000 worth of equip-

ment could produce a significant quantity of

biological agent.14 In fact, the U.S. Government

conducted an experiment in which a small

team of experts was tasked with determin-

ing the feasibility of developing an “anthrax”

weapon using readily available capabilities and

equipment. The initiative—Project Bacchus—

was sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduc-

tion Agency (DTRA) and demonstrated that

the development of these capabilities is not

particularly complex or costly.15

Does this important issue really come

down to a question of whom one believes?

Other insights can be gleaned from examining

the trends in biotechnology that are placing

ever increasing knowledge and capabilities in

the hands of more people around the globe,

undoubtedly including some who would use

the technology for other than noble purposes.

one study concluded that capabilities in several key technologies are experiencing a doubling every 6 months—a

400 percent increase per year

Members of Georgia National Guard CBRNE

response force conduct search, extraction,

and decontamination drills

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In fact, many believe that we have

entered the Age of Biotechnology. On the face

of it, such a statement means little without

further examining the likely impact for key

technologies that could be used for the benefit

of humankind or just as readily turned into

deadly weapons of mass destruction.

One study conducted by the Department

of Defense (DOD) concluded that capabilities

in several key technologies are experiencing

a doubling every 6 months—a 400 percent

increase per year. Areas experiencing such

increases include cell growth chambers and

fermenters, encapsulization and stabilization,

the human genome, pathogen efficacy, DNA

engineering, sensors, vaccines and antibiotics,

and nucleic acid synthesis.16

By way of an example, the rate of vaccine

development doubled every 5 years from 1940

to 1970. From 1970 to 1980, the rate increased

fivefold such that the time to double the capa-

bilities in the field of vaccines was 1 year. Over

the next 20-year period from 1980 to 2000,

the time to double in capability decreased to

6 months. Another field, DNA engineering,

not even in existence until 1982, has doubled

in capacity every 6 months since. This area is

critically important to a variety of biotechni-

cal advances including gene therapy, vaccine

development, and sensors, as well as the poten-

tial of ominously increasing the virulence of a

pathogen. The same is true for encapsulization

and stabilization, which have potential for

enhancing personal protection and therapeu-

tics as well as making BW weapons more effec-

tive and stable in the environment.17

As an example of what the future might

hold, a recent article discusses the develop-

ment of an artificial polio virus synthesized

with nonliving components combined using

specialized equipment and chemicals.18 While

this early work provides a proof of concept,

genetic engineering and combinatorial

chemistry in the future will allow for large-

scale, rapid synthesizing of peptides, poly-

nucleotides, and other low weight molecular

material, allowing for manipulation of the

very building blocks of life. The polio virus,

with its relatively simple structure and 8,000

base pairs in its genomic sequence, provides

a glimpse into the possibilities as well as

highlighting the potential for the develop-

ment of, for instance, the smallpox virus in

this manner. Artificial development of the

smallpox virus, with 200,000 base pairs and

a considerably more complex structure, in

this manner remains out of reach for the

moment, but the Age of Biotechnology will

likely make this development possible in the

future. Couple this with the ready availability

of the genomic sequences from a wide variety

of disease-causing pathogens and organisms,

and one can easily predict the potential for

artificially developing pathogens, manipulat-

ing current pathogens to make them more

virulent, or perhaps developing antibiotic-/

antiviral-resistant pathogens.

Attempts to control or limit advances in

biotechnology seem fruitless with an industry

that has such potential for improving the

quality of life and that comprises such a large

part of the U.S. and global economies. Addi-

tionally, the dual-use nature of biotechnol-

ogy—that is, the very capabilities that allow

for developing prophylaxes and treatments

and can be employed just as effectively for

developing biological weapons—results in a

conundrum that we cannot fail to recognize.

Framework for Analysis Successful employment of a bioterror

weapon implies that a lone terrorist or ter-

rorist organization has mastered five steps:

acquire, process, and weaponize a pathogen,

and plan the attack and deploy the weapon

so as to cause disease in a target population.

However successful, employment of a bioterror

weapon should not be considered in isolation,

but rather should be thought of as a two-sided

proposition where our capabilities in prepared-

ness and response as articulated in the Depart-

ment of Homeland Security’s doctrine of

prevent, protect, respond, and recovery interact

to either facilitate or hinder the terrorists’

capabilities in varying degrees across each of

the five steps. This framework forms a matrix

that allows us to consider this two-sided equa-

tion in detail (see figure 2). For our purposes,

the matrix has been color-coded to reflect our

ability to affect each of the bioterrorist’s neces-

sary steps. A useful exercise is to look at the

matrix in greater detail to gain an understand-

ing of the potential for a bioterror incident and

our ability to positively affect outcomes.

Our ability to prevent a terrorist from

acquiring, processing, and weaponizing bio-

logical material is limited. Deadly pathogens

are naturally occurring, and with the prolifera-

tion in the life sciences of knowledge, equip-

ment, and capabilities, these collective steps

have experienced a lowering of thresholds that

allows for more biotechnology in the hands of

a larger number of people, some of whom may

desire to employ these capabilities as weapons.

Equipment for fermentation, freeze drying,

and milling—which can be found readily in

local hardware stores or ordered from the

comfort of one’s home—allows for developing

and weaponizing these biological capabilities.

This is not to say that all pathogens will be

available to all terrorists. International efforts

to prevent biological proliferation activities

such as the Australia Group and the Prolifera-

tion Security Initiative have limited effective-

ness given that pathogens are naturally occur-

ring and that the equipment requirements

for processing pathogens are not particularly

sophisticated. Some will prove to be too dif-

ficult or dangerous to work with; however,

a determined terrorist hoping to develop a

basic BW capability would see thresholds

lowered. In short, biological material suitable

for use in an attack has become less technically

Prevent

Acquire

BW Step

Homeland Security

Process

Weaponize

Scenario Development

(Planning)

Deployment

Protect Respond Recover

Significant ability to affect

Some ability to affect

Virtually no ability to affect

Not applicable

Prevention and Protection: anticipate, preempt, detect, and deter threats

Response and Recovery: coordinated, comprehensive Federal response and mount a swift and effective recovery effort

Note: Knowledge for the terrorist cuts across the other five steps.

Figure 2. Bioterror’s Two-sided Equation

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FEATURES | Bioterror in the Age of Biotechnology

challenging and therefore made these biologi-

cal capabilities more readily available.

Impacting the terrorists’ ability to

acquire, process, and weaponize a pathogen is

also limited by the modest requirements for

developing a BW capability. Unlike nuclear

weapons that have a requirement for highly

specialized equipment and radioactive material

with a large footprint and distinctive signature,

BW weapons can be constructed in a small,

confined space with little need for complex

equipment and no discernible signature. In

fact, the DTRA study conducted as part of

Project Bacchus established this clearly.

We do have some ability to prevent ter-

rorists from successfully planning and deploy-

ing such weapons. For example, buildings can

be designed to prevent employment of biologi-

cal weapons in certain scenarios. Standoff dis-

tances and limiting access to air intake systems

will limit use of biological weapons against

these types of hardened targets.

In the category of protection, we do have

greater ability to affect outcomes. Terrorists

desiring to acquire, process, and weaponize

a pathogen such as anthrax would likely be

deterred from doing so if they intended to

employ the BW weapon against a population

that had been fully immunized against the

pathogen. Development of vaccines and thera-

peutics can have an important deterrent effect

as well. Likewise, conducting an attack against

a building that has defensive measures built

into the air handling system would probably

not result in a successful attack and therefore

would also serve as a deterrence measure.

Developing and fielding new real-

time sensors that provide a detect-to-warn

capability will also be important. Today, the

current suite of sensors, such as those in the

BioWatch19 program, are detect-to-treat with

relatively long periods between exposure and

establishing that an attack has occurred. This

period may be as long as a day or more. In the

future, new age biotechnological capabilities

should begin to allow for real-time detection

that will permit warning of the attack as it is

occurring so people can be moved out of the

attack area and begin receiving immediate

treatment, and potential victims can be pre-

vented from entering contaminated areas.

Protection also implies the employment

of risk-based strategies to determine where

attacks are most likely, and the deployment

of deterrence and countermeasures to ensure

adequate coverage of important locations and

facilities.

Examining the last two categories,

respond and recover, we reach two important

conclusions. First, these actions have no appli-

cability to the terrorists’ ability to acquire,

process, or weaponize a biological weapon.

Second, these areas offer the greatest potential

for us to affect outcomes with well considered

and emplaced programs.

Response begins with the ability to sense

that an attack is in progress or has occurred.

It is related to our sensor technology as part

of the BioWatch program, but also includes

improved biosurveillance, stockpiling of critical

treatments and vaccines, increased resilience in

the health care system to handle surge require-

ments envisioned from a bioterror attack,

and trained and ready first responders. The

BioSense20 and BioShield21 programs are a start

at improving biosurveillance and stockpiling,

respectively, but more can and must be done.

The readiness of our public health com-

munity and first responders is also a vital link

in this system. Homeland Security Presiden-

tial Directive 21, “Public Health and Medical

Preparedness,” of October 2007 identified the

four most critical components of public health

and medical preparedness as biosurveillance,

countermeasure distribution, mass casualty

care, and community resilience.22

Today, we have no national biosurveil-

lance system. Rather, we have a collection of

state and local systems that have been cobbled

together and that continue to rely on the capa-

bilities of astute clinicians, doctors, and public

health personnel. The picture is even worse

globally as much of the reporting is spotty

and incomplete at best, and even subject to

politicization. Certainly, we have the technical

capability to develop an automated disease

tracking system linked to hospitals, clinics,

and public health facilities. Perhaps the more

relevant question is whether we have the

political will. On a positive note, the World

Health Organization International Health

Regulations that establish requirements for

global disease reporting by 2012 represent an

important step in global biosurveillance.

Just as advances in biotechnology allow

for the proliferation of increasingly danger-

ous dual-use capabilities, they also provide a

greater capacity to develop new age treatments

and prophylaxes. In the future, developing

technologies such as DNA engineering and

combinatorial chemistry combined with emerg-

terrorists desiring to acquire, process, and weaponize a pathogen such as anthrax would likely be deterred if they

intended to employ the BW weapon against a population that had been fully immunized

Marines prepare samples in simulated chemical

lab during Chemical Biological Incident Response

Force demonstration

U.S. Marine Corps (Leslie Palmer)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 57, 2 d quarter 2010 / JFQ 85

GERSTEIN

ing technology such as nanotechnology will

provide new opportunities for fighting naturally

occurring disease as well as bioterror attacks.

The importance of casualty care and

community resilience cannot be overstated.

A bioterror attack will likely result in a mass

casualty situation with large numbers of

affected individuals and worried well con-

verging on hospitals, clinics, and treatment

facilities. The ability to rapidly assess and

treat, instill public confidence, and commu-

nicate effectively will be essential for a quick

response and recovery effort.

The implications of the framework

are important to developing comprehensive

programs that are both effective and efficient

in dealing with an attack. In an era of scarce

resources, we must ensure that we are spend-

ing wisely. Biological laboratory safety and

control of dual-use technologies have received

much attention recently. Deficiencies at bio-

logical safety level (BSL) laboratories, both in

the labs and in their physical security, have

been publically noted. Better controls are nec-

essary for BSL facilities, but they are not suf-

ficient. Likewise, efforts such as those by the

Australia Group23 and through the Prolifera-

tion Security Initiative24 have less applicability

for biological weapons where the pathogens

are naturally occurring, and there are only

modest requirements for developing and

deploying BW weapons. This strongly implies

that novel approaches must be developed for

preventing, responding to, or recovering from

a potential bioterror attack.

Bioterrorism is a very real and growing

threat. We have seen a new type of terror-

ist emerge since the 1970s with a greater

tendency toward taking global action and

employing high violence strategies. This

emerging terrorist has also demonstrated the

propensity to employ nontraditional means

such as airliners and fertilizers as weapons of

mass destruction. It is becoming increasingly

likely with trends in biotechnology that ter-

rorists will turn to the use of biological patho-

gens for perpetrating bioterror attacks.

The nature of BW suggests that our

ability to prevent such bioterror attacks cannot

be assured, given the natural availability of

disease-causing pathogens and advances in

biotechnology that are allowing proliferation

of potentially dangerous biological capabilities.

However, we control our own destiny with

regard to protecting populations and mounting

an effective response and recovery. All indica-

tions are that the time to prepare is now. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Commission on the Prevention of WMD Pro-

liferation and Terrorism, World at Risk: The Report of

the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Prolifera-

tion and Terrorism (New York: Vintage, 2008), xv. 2 David A. Lake, “Rational Extremism: Under-

standing Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,”

Dialog-IO (Spring 2002), 1–29. 3 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York:

Columbia University Press, 2006), 3–40. 4 See “Statistics on Terrorism” at <www.john-

stonsarchive.net/terrorism/intlterror.html>. 5 National Counterterrorism Center, 2008

Report on Terrorism (Washington, DC: Office of

the Director of National Intelligence, April 30,

2009), available at <http://wits.nctc.gov/ReportPDF.

do?f=crt2008nctcannexfinal.pdf>. 6 See <www.rand.org/publications/randreview/

issues/spring2004/enemy3.html>. 7 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why

Religious Militants Kill (New York: HarperCollins,

2003), 148. 8 Hoffman, 209. 9 The Monterey Institute of International

Studies maintains a database on terrorist incidents

that was used in the study. 10 Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Final Report and

Commentary: Bioterrorism Threat Assessment and

Risk Management Workshop,” presented to the U.S.

Department of Energy, Monterey Institute of Interna-

tional Studies, June 24, 2003, 6. 11 According to Robert Baker at George Mason

University. 12 Vernellia R. Randall, seminar entitled “Bio-

terrorism, Public Health and the Law,” University

of Dayton syllabus, available at <http://academic.

udayton.edu/health/syllabi/bioterrorism/3bioterror/

bioterror05.htm>. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Jerry Seper, “Secret Project Manufactured

Mock Anthrax,” The Washington Times, October 26,

2001. 16 Department of Defense, Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and

Technology, The Militarily Critical Technologies List

Part II: Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies

(ADA 330102), “Section III: Biological Weapons

Technology,” February 1998, available at <www.fas.

org/irp/threat/mctl98-2/p2sec03.pdf>. 17 Ibid. 18 Joby Warrick, “Custom-Built Pathogens Raise

Bioterror Fears,” The Washington Post, July 31, 2006,

A1. 19 Project BioWatch is a cooperative effort

among the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),

and the Centers for Disease Controls (CDC)

Laboratory Response Network to provide an early

warning system for biothreats. There are currently

over 4,000 atmospheric monitoring stations nation-

wide for the detection of atmospheric pollutants.

Under the auspices of Project BioWatch, atmo-

spheric samples in numerous cities are monitored

around the clock for select agents. Filters from

the sampling apparatus are analyzed by the CDC

network for numerous biological threat agents. If

any such agents were detected, mechanisms and

protocols are in place for DHS, EPA, and CDC to

reach crucial public health decisions rapidly, and

promulgate a uniform course of action for local

public health officials on the front lines. 20 Project BioSense is intended to reduce the

lag time between the detection of a possible bio-

agent and an appropriate response. Distinct from

Project BioWatch, but integrated in function, Project

BioSense relies upon multiple streams of informa-

tion to facilitate rapid decisionmaking. Monitored

parameters include environmental data from Project

BioWatch, epidemiological information from hospi-

tals administered by the Department of Defense and

Veterans Affairs, reports from pharmacies across the

Nation, and other sources of relevant syndromic and

nontraditional data. All this information converges

at the CDC Biointelligence Center, first for analysis,

and then, if warranted, for coordinated response.

Having this single center examine data from many

different sources permits the detection of patterns

and anomalies that may not be apparent through

other means. Moreover, the CDC has long been

entrusted with both gathering information from

and disseminating information to frontline health

care providers. This new role is a logical extension of

that mission in which the CDC works hand in glove

with clinicians at the local level to determine if an

emergency response is warranted, and the necessary

magnitude of that action. 21 Project BioShield is a national security

measure to stockpile drugs and treatments against

terrorist threats first proposed by President George

W. Bush in January 2003. The Project BioShield Act

of 2004 was passed nearly unanimously by Congress

and signed by the President on July 21, 2004, 560

days after Bush’s initial proposal. Project BioShield

was allocated $5.6 billion over the next 10 years to

fund research and the purchase of vaccines, thera-

peutics, and other products (all pharmaceutical)

against chemical, biological, and radiological attacks. 22 Available at <www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/

gc_1219263961449.shtm#1>. 23 The Australia Group, formed in 1985, is a

body of approximately 40 likeminded nations that

collaborate to restrain proliferation through a series

of licensing measures on chemicals, biological agents,

and dual-use equipment. 24 The Proliferation Security Initiative,

announced by President George W. Bush in 2003,

was designed as a cooperative measure with nine

European allies, Australia, and Japan to interdict

WMD trafficking.

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