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Beyond ‘kawaii’ pop culture: Japan’s normative soft power as global trouble-shooter

Yee-Kuang Heng

Abstract Many studies of Japan’s soft power are premised on the ‘affective’ dimensions of its kawaii pop culture that generate liking or interest. While entirely warranted, emphasising cultural attraction does not do sufficient justice to the multi-faceted foundations of Japanese soft power. Neither does it recognise other components of Joseph Nye’s soft power framework stressing the ‘normative’ appeal of policies that reflect global norms. This article investigates the ‘normative’ dimensions of Japan’s soft power on climate change, and whether it translates into international influence, as Nye predicted. The first section examines the Cabinet’s 2010 New Growth Strategy, identifying a potential source of ‘normative’ soft power in its self-proclaimed desire to reinvent Japan as a ‘trouble-shooting nation on global issues’, specifically environmental challenges. Next, it analyses how Japanese entities (government, corporations, and NGOs) can transmit ‘normative’ soft power, and obstacles encountered. These transmission mechanisms include ‘Cool Earth Partnership’ programmes, the ‘Future City Initiative’ and the values-based Satoyama Initiative. The final section addresses conceptual implications that arise, and assesses whether Japan’s ‘normative’ soft power has paid dividends. Drawing from literature on pioneer states and external reviews of Japan’s alignment with key climate norms, the paper suggests that Japan’s normative soft power is lacking in driving agendas at global climate forums. At a pragmatic problem-solving level, however, Japan is increasingly perceived as an attractive source of transferable solutions, reflecting climate norms such as developing eco-friendly technologies and providing assistance to help vulnerable countries mitigate climate change

Keywords Japan; normative soft power; trouble-shooter; climate change

Introduction

Whether Japan was a rising power (Kano 1976) or a declining one (Fukushima 2011), the country’s future international role has long pro- voked debate. Depending on who you read, Japan was becoming a

Yee-Kuang Heng is Associate Professor of International Relations and Assistant Dean (Research) at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

Address: Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Email: [email protected]

� 2014 Taylor & Francis

The Pacific Review, 2014 Vol. 27, No. 2, 169–192, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2014.882391

‘normal’ military power (Hughes 2004), a middle power (Soeya 2005), ‘soft power superpower’ (McConell 2008), or ‘global ordinary power’ (Inoguchi and Bacon 2006). Japan’s transition ‘from economic superpower to what power’ (Drifte 1996) continues to befuddle analysts.

In this context, soft power supposedly provides an untapped reservoir of influence. The Asahi Shimbun (2007) stated that ‘Japan’s economic power has peaked out, and the challenge today for this country is how to polish and best its soft power.’ While Japan might possess the greatest soft power potential in Asia (Nye 2005), academic analyses have focused largely on its cultural assets and/or public diplomacy (McGray 2002; Lam 2007; Nakano 2008; Otmazgin 2008; Vyas 2011; Sugiura 2008). Under the ‘Cool Japan’ slogan, initiatives rolled out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) include unveiling cartoon cat Doraemon as Anime ambassador in 2008; co- hosting of the Annual World Cosplay (costume play) Summit; and kawaii (cute) ambassadors in 2009. Even all-girl pop phenomenon AKB48 is drawing official attention, for the group ‘provides new content with the potential to substantially improve the image of Japan’ (Toyoda 2011). Focusing on cultural attraction is unsurprising because ‘typically when peo- ple think of soft power, they tend to focus on a country’s contributions to global culture – food, music, novels, movies’ (Hymans 2009: 252). Japan however has soft power assets beyond cultural means, for instance its sci- ence and technology innovations (Amako 2007).

Furthermore, ‘a heavy official emphasis on “Cool Japan” risks diluting the potency of the “Japan Brand” hip factor – while at the same time dis- tracting attention from the real source of Japan’s attraction’ as Asia’s democracy pioneer (Smith 2012). This paper argues that Japan’s recent attempts to address climate change are another missing link to understand- ing the nation’s soft power. It bears reminding that soft power – defined as the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments (Nye 2004: x) – encompasses broader components than Japan’s cultural appeal that analysts usually write about. A country’s soft power ‘rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attrac- tive to others; its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and hav- ing moral authority)’ (Nye 2006).

Yet, soft power is ‘one of those concepts, that like culture or national identity, are notoriously difficult to define and even harder to measure’ (Berger 2010: 567). Mattern (2005) feels the concept misinterprets the very notion of power. For Lukes (2007), Nye’s framework suffers from a ‘vehicle fallacy’ confusing the resources that might produce behaviour with desired behaviour itself. Soft power can even generate unintended out- comes and repulsion rather than attraction, such as Egyptian intellectual Sayyid Qutb’s disdain for the materialism and sexuality of American cul- ture during his 1950s visit. Japanese restaurants as symbols of Japanese

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culture were targeted by Chinese rioters during protests over the Senkaku islands. Berger (2010: 568) summarises the conceptual drawbacks well:

As a relational concept, soft power has to be understood in relation to the outcome a country is seeking to achieve. Soft power depends on its impact on attitudes, and attitudes are extremely difficult to gauge. Surveys and polls suffer from well-known methodological flaws such as framing of question etc. Furthermore, the extent to which such attitudes translate into behaviour is even more unclear, even on the individual level, not to mention the governmental level. Trying to trace the relationship between the sources of soft power and its impact on the actual behaviour of states is thus a perilous enterprise.

The truth is that ‘soft power remains an elusive concept for most officials and indeed, many academics’ (Lee and Melissen 2011: 1) Yet, because it has caught on in the minds of policy-makers, ‘the question of how foreign ministries can instrumentalise soft power is testing their diplomats’ flexibil- ity to the full’ (Melissen 2005: 5). As Lee (2011: 14) notes, ‘while concep- tual debates are important, the discussions regarding soft power’s development, application, and implementation in countries throughout the world are just as crucial’. One can contribute to a better understanding of soft power through the ‘prism of experiences in East Asia’ where there are ‘specific examples of how soft power is being utilised in various ways’ (Lee and Melissen 2011: 1).

In particular, ‘Japanese scholars and policymakers have enthusiastically taken it up, eagerly exploring how Japan’s soft power resources could be exploited to burnish Japan’s image in the world and help reshape its envi- ronment’ (Berger et al. 2010: 570). For Japan, soft power allows some com- pensation for lack of other power resources and is a relatively low-cost option. Having overcome its domestic pollution through world-leading tech- nology and regulations, and facing a stuttering economy with limits to mili- tary projections, Japanese leaders saw environmental cooperation as a ‘diplomatic niche’ to raise the country’s global profile in the post-Cold War world (Pajon 2010). This explains Nye’s (2008) suggestion that Tokyo counter its fears of marginalisation through better use of its soft power to tackle shared trans-national threats such as infectious diseases and climate change. In a surprisingly overlooked set of statements, Japan’s New Growth Strategy (Cabinet Office 2009: 6) expressed a similar desire to become ‘a country hat solves global-scale problems’. But in what ways can this ‘trouble-shooting’ role be conceptualised as soft power and has it worked?

Here, we are concerned with what Lee (2011: 15) calls the ‘normative’ dimension of soft power: whether or not countries regard a state’s policies as legitimate and justifiable depends on how far its policies reflected or enhanced international norms and shared values. This is different from the

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‘affective’ soft power generated by a superficial liking for Japan’s subculture genres such as maid caf�es. Hayden (2011: 115) suggests that because culture appears to predominate in Japan’s soft power, there is a ‘marked tendency toward the objectification of culture, through products which in turn have a kind of affective power- the ability to convey something about Japan that cultivates interest’. By contrast, ‘normative’ soft power derives from legiti- macy and degree of alignment with global norms (Melissen 2011: 24).

The normative potential of Chinese soft power was recently explored by Callahan (2012: 6) who sought to redress an imbalance where ‘much less attention has been paid to the normative aspect of China’s soft power’. In order to do the same for Japan, this paper proceeds as follows. First, it pla- ces the New Growth Strategy’s vision of becoming a problem-solving nation in the context of attempts to redefine Japan’s global role. The document hints at potential sources of Japan’s ‘normative’ soft power in combating climate change. This issue is our focus here because of its strong resonance as a global norm. The 2007 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Intergovern- mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and ‘shock events’ (Hurricane Katrina or floods in Thailand) have crystallised a sense of crisis. Since 2007, global norms on climate change have consolidated (Garcia 2010), building on the 1992 Rio summit; the Kyoto Protocol, the 1992 UN Frame- work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), and IPCC reports. These norms include the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; ‘sustainable development’ (UNFCC Art. 1–4); provision of ‘new and additional resources’ by industrialised countries to aid mitigation and adaptation efforts of developing states (UNFCC Art. 4.3) and ‘facilitation of environ- mentally sound technology’ (UNFCC Art. 4.5). These are deployed here as benchmarks for evaluating Japan’s alignment with climate change norms.

The second section shows how Japan, through the government, NGOs and corporations, can instrumentalise ‘normative’ soft power. It focuses on the ‘Future City Initiative’ in the Growth Strategy; the Cool Earth Partner- ship programme; and the Satoyama Initiative on biodiversity. Some obstacles are discussed, including bureaucratic hurdles and lack of govern- ment funding. The final section reflects on theoretical implications that arise and determines whether Japan’s normative soft power has paid off. ‘Success’ is defined on two levels: whether Japan’s diplomatic clout at global forums has improved, and at a more pragmatic level, how far the country is now perceived positively as a trouble-shooter providing solu- tions to climate change.

Attempting to demonstrate the causality of Japan’s normative soft power is an imprecise science. One baseline to begin with would be Maull’s (1991) assessment of Japan’s environmental image as ‘abysmal’. Since then, there exist mainly descriptions of attempts to repair that image through domestic legislative reform, global and regional activities, and the ‘greening’ of overseas development assistance (ODA), NGOs and

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corporations (Schreurs 2004; Kameyama 2002). From the perspective of ‘normative’ soft power however, these descriptions are insufficiently differ- entiated and do not specify which climate norms Japan is aligned with. To plug this gap, reviews by global organisations (like the World Bank), for- eign leaders, and trans-national NGOs are surveyed for evidence of how Japan’s problem-solving approach on three key issue-areas that it has cho- sen to emphasise (urbanisation; environmental aid; and technological solu- tions) is seen by others to enhance key climate change norms (such as providing assistance to vulnerable countries and facilitation of technical solutions). The paper concludes that Japan’s environmental image has improved from the late 1980s nadir. Its normative soft power however lies more in its providing assistance to vulnerable countries and perceived abil- ity to transfer innovative solutions, rather than global agenda-setting at diplomatic negotiations.

The New Growth Strategy on being a global ‘trouble-shooter’

In 2009, the White Paper on International Trade of the Ministry of Econ- omy, Trade and Industry (METI) proposed a new role for Japan as ‘a prob- lem-solving country that can proactively contribute to solving problems facing the international community and take advantage of such contribu- tions for boosting its national power in a win-win manner to benefit both itself and the world’ (METI 2009: 498). Ex-Prime Minister Aso (2009) also singled out environmental problems because ‘overcoming global warming is the greatest challenge of the 21st century’ and Japan should be ‘leading the world in the low-carbon emission revolution’. In other words, Japan is to become ‘a trouble-shooting nation for global issues’ (Agence France Press 2009).

These suggestions re-appeared as the centrepiece of the 2010 New Growth Strategy, which argued that since developing Asia faces numerous environmental problems, Japan can assume leadership positions ‘by lead- ing other countries in presenting models of how problems can be over- come’ (Cabinet Office 2010: 4). The New Growth Strategy (Basic Policies) pinpointed two global problems on which to ‘manifest a Japan that can live together with other nations in Asia as a country that solves global-scale problems’ (Cabinet Office 2009: 5).

The first area comprises global warming (energy) measures. By mov- ing Japan toward becoming a world-leading low-carbon society, new demand will be generated across a wide range of fields including life- styles, the transportation sector, and urban development. The second area comprises measures that respond to the aging of society with a low birth rate.

(Cabinet Office 2009: 5–6)

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Given word constraints, this article focuses on climate change. While there are problems with the strategy’s underlying assumptions of Japan’s growth rate and short of specifics, Nomura Securities economist Sakagami Ryota (cited in Nakamoto 2009) felt the document was at least ‘useful in provid- ing a clear sign of the areas the government want(s) to focus on’. In crystal- lising Japan’s trouble-shooting of global problems, this high-profile Cabinet-level document mirrored the prescriptions of several scholars on the potential advantages for Japan’s soft power. Nye (2007) had previously recommended that Japan’s third reinvention (after the Meiji and post-1945 reforms) should enable it to play a ‘leading role with soft power’ to tackle global problems such as poverty, ageing, climate change and ‘providing global public goods. . .something from all can benefit and none can be excluded’. The ‘Innovation 25 Strategy Council’ likewise envisioned Japan as a ‘model nation for the world’, helping to address global challenges (Segers 2008: Preface xiv–xv). To sum up, as MOFA’s former Director-General for Public Diplomacy Monji Kenjiro (2009) argued, ‘showing how to solve the world’s problems such as infectious diseases; climate change; ageing societies; and economic meltdown can be a great source for Japan’s soft power’.

Japan potentially holds what Nye (2004: 13) called ‘an ideal combination of soft power’ comprising an attractive culture plus appealing policies on combating climate change. Aligning with climate norms can help boost Japan’s ‘normative’ soft power since ‘compatibility with other nations’ val- ues and interests can be as important as the exercise of hard power to achieve a nation’s desired objectives‘ (Lee 2011: 11). Japan can also share environmental lessons learnt from its own growth process because ‘experiencing hardships earlier than other countries is one of Japan’s strengths. They can benefit from Japan’s store of knowledge and experi- ence as something like public goods’ (Hatoyama 2009). Addressing climate challenges plays to Japan’s strengths because:

‘If Japan plays a major role in passing on its superior environmental technology to countries seriously suffering from both the security and economic threats of deforestation, desertification and acid rain caused by CO2 [carbon dioxide] emissions, it will be able to increase its soft power’

(Yakushiji 2008: 62–3).

Projecting Japan’s ‘normative’ soft power

Japan is positioning to trouble-shoot accelerating urbanisation; demon- strating how cities can develop sustainably in harmony with the environ- ment is a major global challenge since more than half of humanity now lives in urban areas. Kitakyushu, one of the worst polluted urban areas, became METI’s first Eco-Town project in 1997 based on the concept of

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‘zero emissions’. In July 2008, Yokohama was designated an ‘eco-model city’ by the Japanese government for its low-carbon urban planning model. The New Growth Strategy builds on this with ‘The Future City Initiative’ as one of several ‘national strategic projects related to green innovation’ (Cabinet Office 2010: 48–9) in order to ‘realize world-leading successful cases through future-oriented technologies, schemes and services and dif- fuse these achievements nationwide as well as overseas’. A combination of smart grids, renewable energies, and next-generation vehicles will under- pin such cities. In early 2012, the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation (NEDO) proposed to the Portuguese govern- ment to help turn Lisbon into a smart city. In 2012, Japan and Indonesia also signed agreements to develop smart communities in Indonesia. In this way, Tokyo can be seen as an ‘active pusher’ (Janicke 2005: 29) transfer- ring its smart cities and sustainable urbanisation as role models overseas. Cities such as Denmark’s Copenhagen and Malaysia’s Cyberjaya have been selected as partners. In February 2012, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Hitachi Ltd and Mitsubishi Corp. were jointly selected by NEDO as con- tractors for the Smart Community System Demonstration Project in part- nership with the Malaga Smart City Project in Spain. Hitachi is also involved in a joint US-Japan smart grid project in Hawaii.

The agents that can transmit normative soft power are therefore not just Japanese government agencies, but business entities as well as civil society NGOs. Japan’s ambassador to Denmark Kondo Seiichi (2009) noted, ‘Japan’s soft power, based on its sense of oneness with nature and its advanced technology, has been translated into an increasing number of cli- mate change-related movements in both the public and private sectors’. Launched in 2010, the ‘Yokohama Smart City Project’ is a five-year pilot programme with a consortium of Nissan Motor Co., Panasonic Corp., Toshiba Corp., Tokyo Electric Power Co., Tokyo Gas Co., Accenture’s Japan unit and Meidensha Corp. ‘We want to build a social model to take overseas’, claims Masato Nobutoki, executive director of Yokohama’s Cli- mate Change Policy Headquarters (Hosoka 2010). Described as a possible ‘sign of things to come’ by the UK’s Guardian broadsheet, Panasonic’s spokesperson for the Fujisawa Sustainable Smart Town said ‘Our aim is to build a smart town that will be the model for “smart life”’ called for worldwide’ (Balch 2011). The smart city will be one key to solving global environmental challenges (Canton 2011).

The New Growth Strategy desires to ‘make Japan the foremost global environment and energy power’ through ‘green innovation’ and ‘putting Japan’s world-leading technology to use’ (Cabinet Office 2010: 20, 48). Such innovation was on display when for the first time in 2010, the Com- bined Exhibition of Advanced Technologies (CEATEC) in Chiba devoted one area of the show floor to selling a vision of eco-friendly urban life (Hosoka 2010). Real estate firm Mitsui Fudosan Co. is building one of the largest smart cities, Kashiwanoha Campus City in cooperation with the

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University of Tokyo and Chiba University. Home builder Toyota Housing Corp. is selling smart-energy houses as part of a low-carbon community project in Toyota, Aichi Prefecture. Toyota Motor Corp. separately launched its own home smart grid system to coincide with its plug-in hybrid cars going on sale in early 2012.

Japan’s leading car-makers have also embraced ‘an uncharacteristically broadminded search for solutions to some of the biggest challenges facing mankind’ (BBC 2011). Electric vehicles are marketed for not just their drivability, but their ability to reduce emissions in ‘smart cities’. At the 2011 Tokyo Motor Show, a poster highlighted the Nissan Leaf electric car’s ability to discharge electricity to a range of household appliances, including a vacuum cleaner, a washing machine and fridge freezer. A special exhibit, dubbed ‘Smart Mobility City’, allowed car-makers, along with technology companies and universities to exhibit energy conservation solutions aimed at reducing waste and emissions. The exhibit differs from previous displays, by stressing also the relationship with the home and gadgets within it.

Japan’s aid programmes have also been going ‘green’. Since the early 1990s, Japan has launched initiatives to address the impact of climate change, through ODA loans, grants, and technology transfer. In 2006, Japan offered China a grant of 6.82 million dollars to combat sulphur diox- ide and yellow sand dust. Japan also helped the Philippines develop its recycling industry, and river protection. Japan is also assisting Mexico with reducing electric consumption through more efficient household applian- ces, and supplying Malaysian factories with climate-control-equipment. Tokyo has also been providing ‘green’ aid to the Pacific Islands Forum, pledging <50 billion at the May 2009 summit in Hokkaido. Palau received a 5 million dollar loan for a solar electricity generation system at the Palau International Airport. Such environment-related projects took about four per cent of annual Japanese ODA during the 1990s. By 2008, this had risen to more than 20 per cent (Kakuchi 2010; Pajon 2010). ‘Originally linked with Japanese commercial and bureaucratic interests, Japanese foreign aid has been used to promote a number of broader ideological goals including protecting the environment, disarmament and spread of democratic values’ (Berger 2010: 573).

Other ‘green’ initiatives include ‘Cool Earth 50’, launched in 2007 to reduce global CO2 emissions by 50 per cent by 2050. This will ‘demonstrate the “Japan model” in the world, which utilizes its traditions and advanced technologies to create a society in harmony with the environment’ (Abe 2007). The follow-up ‘Cool Earth Partnership’ was unveiled in 2008. With an initial budget of 10 billion US dollars, ‘Japan will cooperate actively with developing countries’ efforts to reduce emissions, such as efforts to enhance energy efficiency. At the same time, we will extend the hand of assistance to developing countries suffering severe adverse impacts as a result of climate change‘ (Fukuda 2008). ‘Climate Change Japanese ODA Loans’ with preferential interest were created and the first was a 300 million

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dollar loan to Indonesia to prevent deforestation, increase geothermal capacity and improve the water management sector. Japan also partnered with the UN Development Programme to offer climate change adaptation measures to Africa.

Besides disbursing grants and technological solutions, Japan has also promoted positive human-nature relationships and values to achieve socie- ties in harmony with nature, especially principles in managing ecological systems and biodiversity. The Ministry of the Environment and the United Nations University Institute of Advanced Studies (UNU-IAS), together with NGOs such as World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Japan, are jointly working on the Satoyama Initiative. This demonstrates how traditional Japanese land and marine conservation efforts known as ‘satoyama’ and ‘satoumi’ can serve as examples of how other nations can preserve ecosys- tems and biodiversity.

Obstacles and difficulties

Despite the prominence of ‘The Future City Initiative’ in the Growth Strat- egy, the development of smart cities has been slow, partly due to the absence of successful prior business models. Yokohoma’s partnership with Panasonic or business partnerships with educational institutions like Tokyo University on the Kashiwanoha Campus City may provide a useful model. Other obstacles include a generally pro-nuclear power bureaucracy, the entrenched positions of power utilities like Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and heavy industries such as Toshiba that build nuclear power plants. The Yomiuri Shimbun (2011) further complained that ‘the growth strategy is a compilation of please-everyone programs collected from various government offices, and the government has so far been slow in implementing them’. The lack of a clear integrated unifying principle on where to concentrate resources means that ‘Japanese enter- prises are on the global cutting edge of lithium ion batteries, solar power, electric vehicles, and other technologies that are elements of smart grid technology, but from the standpoint of building a new network infrastruc- ture that integrates those technologies, Japan is far from cutting-edge’ (Takahashi 2010). The requisite reforms of competitive environments and new regulations for this new energy infrastructure are not in place. Indeed, as Miyagawa (2010) points out, Japan has rolled out several ‘policy pack- ages that have been formulated and implemented under the name of a “growth strategy” to this day, we have seen no rapid improvement in Japan’s economic performance over the years’

It is worth noting that in 2003, Japan once led the world in green technol- ogy innovations, especially solar panels. But Tokyo soon dropped its solar subsidies. China by 2012 held the lead in solar panels with massive state financial assistance and low-interest loans. Germany and Spain have also

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started subsidising solar energy. At the G8 Summit in May 2011, ex-Prime Minister Kan, playing catch-up, announced the ‘Sunrise’ Project to have solar panels on 10 million Japanese homes by 2020. The issue here is how policies which support innovation of climate change technologies can be crucial (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2011). For instance, in April 2009, the gov- ernment introduced successful tax breaks for purchasing eco-cars. We shall see later how policies such as ‘Top Runner’ and ‘eco-towns’ have helped enhance Japan’s ‘green’ attractiveness.

Yet, the move to cast Japan as a ‘green superpower’ is not new. Politi- cians and bureaucrats in the 1990s were already stressing Japan’s potential contribution to solving global warming (Hall 2001). But ‘the international community did not take seriously most of Japan’s contributions on envi- ronmental matters in the 1980s’ (Miyaoka 1999: 7). Japan was criticised for hosting major international conferences to generate publicity and for being over-reliant on technological solutions without fundamental changes in value systems.

Conceptual implications and has Japan’s normative soft power paid off?

Before turning to the impact of Japan’s normative soft power, there are several conceptual implications that arise for the theory of soft power. Berger’s (2010) claim that Japan’s soft power is declining revolved around three assets: economic influence; membership in regional institutions, and overall image amongst neighbouring countries. But, Berger under-emphas- ised the role of norm-alignment and this could be significant for Japan in the area of climate change because the most influential soft powers such as Japan can possess ideas that ‘are closer to prevailing global norms; and whose credibility is enhanced by domestic and international values and policies’ (Nye 2004, 32).

When transmitting such ideas, the best communicators are not govern- ments, but civilians (Nye 2004: 142). ‘Active participation of NGOs, pri- vate individuals, business and civil society is mandatory in efforts to develop soft power.’ (Lee 2011: 17). Japan wields an advantage here because ‘its strength lies not in hard power but in soft power with strong emphasis on civilian sectors. There is high investment in R&D at 3.5 per cent of GDP, highest of all G8 countries: 80 per cent of research is made by private sector’ (Yakushiji 2008: 62–3). Indeed, as Lee (2011: 28) observed, ‘Japan, with its vigorous NGO community, has developed tre- mendous soft power and influence in human rights issues, environmental issues, and other non-traditional security areas’. Mekong Watch for instance works to bridge gaps between Japanese aid policies and recipients of such aid in the Mekong region. With regard to the role of corporations, METI (2009: 451) argued that ‘excellent technologies of Japanese-owned

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companies succeeded in solving water shortage issues overseas’. Under an intriguing caption – ‘Can Japanese weeds save the world?’ –, METI (2009: 457) cited how countries such as Algeria have imported the weed lippia nodiflora to control soil erosion from Japan’s Green Produce Inc. Sakata Seed Corporation also produces plants that purify the environment by absorbing four times more CO2 than other plants. It has distributed nine million seeds worldwide. Japanese business entities, not just the state, have central roles in combating climate change. Very often ‘the problem is that the conception of soft power is overly related to government efforts’ (Lee 2011: 17), Japan luckily appears to have a surfeit of non-governmental actors that generate normative soft power.

Where the government is involved, a cooperative model of soft power projection is adopted such as the Cool Earth partnership with Africa and the Mekong region to combat climate change. This cooperative approach, with corporations, NGOs and international partners, is also reflected in the ‘Future City Initiative’ of the New Growth Strategy. Murakami Shuzo who leads the expert panel on this future city concept, reiterated that ‘we have to approach the realization of future cities with an open country mindset in which we collaborate with interested parties from overseas from the initial planning stages’ (Murakami 2011: 19). Presenting Japan as the vanguard of cooperative efforts against climate change, ex-Prime Minister Hatoyama stressed that ‘we must cooperate to save a “Green Asia.” No country on earth can escape from the threat posed by climate change’ (Hatoyama 2009). Members of the International Partnership for the Satoyama Initia- tive are also working to promote the ‘satoyama’ principles of preserving ecosystems. As of November 2013, there are 155 diverse organisations involved. These include Japan’s Ministry of Environment, the UN Envi- ronment Program, international NGOs such as the German Association for Landcare and Green Senegal, overseas educational institutions such as Kathmandu Forestry College, local governments such as Ishikawa prefec- ture, and corporations such as Canon. Japan’s cooperative approach is making ‘soft’ power a plus-sum game (Ogoura 2008). Rather than a com- petitive zero-sum game; countries can cooperatively increase their soft power for solving trans-national challenges (McConnell 2008, xxiii).

The ‘normative’ dimensions of Japan’s soft power as a global trouble- shooter can also address criticisms of its ‘pop culture diplomacy’ for lacking typically Japanese values (Otmazgin 2008). Japan has long cherished the sentiment of mottainai (literally, ‘don’t waste what is valuable’) that has helped promote recycling and respect for the environment. The concept of wa also emphasises the element of ‘harmony’ with nature. These are values reflected in the Satoyama Initative and the Future City Initiative.

However, just as criticisms were previously levelled at Tokyo’s attempts to boost its cultural industries where ‘soft power may be a justification of convenience for industrial policy’ (Hayden 2011: 115), mercantilist calcula- tions also underpin attempts to redefine Japan as an environmental

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trouble-shooter. For instance, market research firm Zpryme estimates the global smart grid market will be worth $171.4 billion in 2013, compared with $69.3 billion in 2009. Indeed, the New Growth Strategy clearly hopes that smart cities and ‘green innovation’ will jumpstart an ailing economy. The Future City Initiative is a key national strategic project because it is ‘expected to make great contribution to economic growth.’ (Cabinet Office 2010: 47). ‘Green innovation’ boosts the economy because ‘by moving Japan toward becoming a world-leading low-carbon society, new demand will be generated across a wide range of fields including lifestyles, the transportation sector, and urban development.’ (Cabinet Office 2009: 6). Whether the New Growth Strategy was focused on environmental protec- tion or to cultivate particular industries, ‘the original goal has become indiscernible’ (Takahashi 2010). In other words, like the cultural industries, the New Growth Strategy’s focus on ‘green innovation’ merely reflects ‘policy-makers’ attempts to explore new arenas for state intervention in a newly emerging industrial sector’ (Otmazgin 2008, 83). Yet, while the state’s interference usually undermines the ‘edginess’ of cultural soft power which arises spontaneously, climate initiatives such as ‘eco-towns’ are indispensable in raising their attractive profile globally, as we see below.

Finally, several points can be made about how Japan’s ‘normative’ soft power compares with existing literature on normative power. This is often associated today with the ‘ideational impact’ of the EU’s promotion of peace, human rights, and sustainable development (Manners 2002: 238–9). Where such ideas are attractive, they generate soft power for actors such as the EU that promote, enhance or are identified with such norms. The normative dimension also involves the expression of an actor’s identity (Manners 2002). Japan desires a new identity as a trouble-shooter on cli- mate change. But Tokyo has lagged behind the EU as an active ‘norm entrepreneur’. On the other hand, while initially slow to enter the climate change debate, Japan is belatedly becoming a more ‘proactive’ actor (Kameyama 2003) launching partnerships with the Mekong region and the South Pacific and ‘smart city’ collaborations with Europe and Indonesia.

Callahan (2012) uses the term ‘normative soft power’ to describe how an idealized version of China’s imperial past informs discussions about a Chi- nese-style world order: China ‘needs to develop normative soft power in order to export its understandings of the world’ (Callahan 2012: 6), using ideas such as ‘harmonious world’ to shape debates about global politics. How- ever, the ‘normative’ understanding of soft power employed in this article dif- fers in that it describes how Japan generates attraction by reflecting global norms about climate change rather than promoting a vision of world order. These two conceptual approaches may well be divergent, but taken together they highlight emerging research on the ‘normative’ dimensions of soft power, nudging the agenda beyond simply ‘affective’ cultural attractiveness.

Questions about Japan’s potential for environmental leadership are not new (Maddock 1994; Kameyama 2002), but has Japan’s recent push paid

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dividends? This immensely difficult issue relates to the ‘perilous enterprise’ (Berger 2010) of tracing the causal effects of soft power. Whether Japan’s environmental image was deemed ‘abysmal’ (Maull 1991) or ‘exemplary’ (Maddock 1994), authors supported their claims by assembling evidence ranging from newspaper or magazine headlines, to opinion polls, and reports by global bodies such as the World Bank. But neither of these authors links their analysis to the notion of normative soft power. Schreurs (2004) compared measures of the ecological footprints of different coun- tries (such as CO2 emissions) to rank Japan but this tells us little about the wider perceptions of Japan’s normative soft power. A Cabinet Office poll of public opinion survey of foreign affairs in October 2009 found that ‘solving global environmental problems’ came top when the Japanese were asked about Tokyo’s appropriate role in the world. But how do others view Japan’s normative soft power? MOFA has commissioned opinion polls to gauge US opinion of Japan. On climate change in 2012, 69 per cent of Americans thought Japan was a significant or very significant global actor. These numbers suggest an improvement, compared to 2003 when 63 per cent of Americans thought Japan was ‘not at all significant’ on climate change (MOFA 2012). Yet, there is insufficient analytical breakdown of which specific climate norms Japan was deemed attractive.

To address this question, the following adopts a broad-based analytical framework focusing on three areas that Japan has emphasised: urbanisa- tion; ‘green’ aid; and technological solutions. These are mutually reinforc- ing rather than considered on a stand-alone basis. The aim is to assess how perceptions of Japan’s performance on these issues demonstrates align- ment or enhancement of the climate norms highlighted earlier on sustain- able development; helping vulnerable countries, and developing technical solutions. Evidence is drawn from poll data; official reports of international organisations; speeches of foreign leaders; and indices compiled by global NGOs. Tracing the actual impact of normative soft power on outcomes is a controversy that cannot be definitively resolved here, but if Japan is to be an environmental trouble-shooter, the first step is to generate a snapshot of how far Japanese initiatives have been endorsed by others to be attrac- tive or world-leading.

Theoretically, I engage with existing works on how environmental actions of some states can have impact beyond their borders as an attrac- tive source of inspiration and emulation for other countries or supra- national organisations (Busch 2008). An environmental pioneer state intro- duces the most stringent approach to environmental protection as a whole or in a sub-field or individual measure, intentionally or unintentionally set- ting an example: ‘their solutions for general environmental problems are adopted by other countries’ (Janicke 2005: 129) where these solutions are seen as transferable and useful. The existing literature focuses mainly on regulatory policy and the role of international institutions that enable a pioneer state to set benchmarks. In Japan’s case however, its normative

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soft power strengths lie not in international institutions, but in pragmatic solutions that are desired or emulated by other countries. Japan might not possess coercive or entrepreneurial leadership but rather intellectual or instrumental leadership (Kameyama 2002).

Japan is one of the most energy-efficient countries in the world, with cut- ting-edge technologies. This calls to mind the climate norm on ‘facilitating environmentally sound technology’. As Denmark’s ambassador to Tokyo noted, ‘the world needs Japan’s technology to achieve a low-carbon society.’1 Under the headline ‘Japan pioneers smart energy’, the Technology Review website published by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) praised Japanese technologies that ‘go beyond anything implemented in the US or elsewhere’ (Bullis 2010). In 2012, Toyota was number one on the Interbrands ‘Best Global Green Brands Report’ for its ‘unparalleled sustainability leadership’. Panasonic jumped four spots to number six. Interbrand commented that that the Fujisawa sustainable smart town project enabled Panasonic to ‘showcase its leadership and com- prehensive green technologies’. The Fujisawa project also featured posi- tively in major global media outlets like the New York Times.

The UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) announced in 2010 it would help share the experience learnt from the city of Kitakyushu in areas of environmental technology and waste recycling services with developing countries. Kitakyushu has since adopted a collective measure for treatment of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), based on complete POPs waste-management and recycling including segregation, collection, treatment and disposal (zero waste). UNIDO Head Yumkella said ‘this is why Kitakyushu today is without doubt one of the greenest cities in the world (UNIDO 2010). Yumkella further noted that ‘Japanese industries have shown world-class energy intensities in several sectors. Through tech- nology transfer, Japan can play a leading role in global issues such as energy and climate change.’ (UNIDO 2011) UNIDO co-organised the Tokyo Green Summit in 2011 to highlight the technological solutions that Japan is well-known for. The UN’s 2011 World Economic and Social Sur- vey contained wholesome praise for Japan’s ‘Top Runner program’ as an ‘excellent’ example for turning the most energy-efficient product into a standard to be met by other manufacturers within a given time period (UN 2011: xv). The report recommended that a global programme based on this rationale be considered, where Japan as the global front-runner could set energy-efficiency targets for other countries to follow (UN 2011: 55). Other scholars however argue that ‘Top Runner comes close to ‘green protectionism’ giving an edge to advanced Japanese technology (Janicke 2005). Top Runner has now been diffused to vehicle standards in Califor- nia and China. The International Energy Agency writes approvingly that as a ‘world leader in R&D funding and energy technology, Japan is taking a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific by encouraging countries to set energy efficiency goals and action plans’ (IEA 2008: 41). Japanese proposals to set

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country goals on energy efficiency were accepted in the 2007 Cebu Decla- ration at the second East Asia summit.

Regarding the norm of helping vulnerable countries mitigate climate change, Japan spreads its own model through development aid and cooper- ation. At a pragmatic and problem-solving level in ameliorating climate change: ‘Japan is considered a real leader in Asia’ (Pajon 2010: 59) The Tokyo Strategy inked at the Japan–Mekong summit 2012 installed climate challenges as a priority task for Japan and Mekong partners. Thailand, Cambodia and Laos have jointly approached Japan to help assess the envi- ronmental impact of dams along the Mekong. At the first summit in 2009, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen acclaimed Japan’s strengths in ‘providing financial assistance and technology transfer and equipment to ensure adequate capacity for clean energy development, biodiversity improvement, forestry and fisheries management’ (Hun Sen 2009). In the South Pacific, the Okinawa Kizuna declaration at the 2012 Pacific Island Leaders Summit installed climate change as shared priority areas. Vanuatu Prime Minister Edward Natapei has expressed attraction towards Tokyo’s ‘green’ assistance, saying Japan ‘has been one of the pioneers in ensuring that we have funding available when we need it most’ (cited in Kakuchi 2010). Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (2011), Tuiloma Neroni Slade, commenting on Japan’s ‘green’ aid in the area, ‘I also take this opportunity to thank the Government of Japan and its people for this generous contribution, which will no doubt assist the Government of Samoa in its efforts to reduce carbon emissions through the use of renewable energy options.’ In Africa, Nigeria’s Environment Minister appealed for Japanese technological assistance on renewable power and light (Oloruntobi 2012). Kenyan environmentalist Wangari Maathai, 2004 Nobel Peace Prize winner, sought Japanese help in preserving the diversity of African seeds. Kenyan Prime Minister Odinga stated that ‘I am now optimistic that Kenya is likely to make major strides in mitigating the effects of climate change now that main players like Japan have made efforts to bail out vulnerable countries’ (Xinhua 2010). With Japanese environmental aid dispensed around the world, the Organisation for Eco- nomic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD 2010: 7) latest review of Japan’s environmental performance noted that ‘Japan has played a proac- tive and constructive role in international environmental cooperation, par- ticularly in areas of climate change, waste management, and more recently biodiversity. . .these activities have contributed to real improvements in some countries, such as China and Indonesia.’

Sustainable development is another key climate norm where Japan is drawing praise. Sanden Corporation’s Akagi Plant is an example of ‘good practice’ for manufacturing in harmony with nature, according to the OECD’s Sustainable Manufacturing Toolkit that recommends best ‘green’ practices for businesses around the world (OECD 2011). On eco-friendly urbanisation, Yokohama’s success in waste reduction was lauded in the

Y.-K. Heng: Japan’s normative soft power 183

2011 UN report Climate Change and Cities (UN 2011a: 100). Japan’s ‘compact urbanisation’ was touted as an example of urban living without excessive energy and waste requirements (UN 2011: 42). Yokohama also received the accolade of ‘best practice city’ in the World Bank’s 2010 report Eco2Cities. The Asian Development Bank (ADB 2012: 34) also endorsed Kawasaki as an illustration of how ‘an old industrial area can be turned into an efficient eco-town’. In 2011, Tokyo received the Government Lead- ership Award for ‘its ground-breaking policy’ on the world’s first urban cap-and-trade schemes from the World Green Building Council, an inter- national organisation that promotes sustainable buildings. China is consid- ering a similar programme. The World Bank (2010) also cited Tokyo’s experience where the ‘lessons are widely applicable’ as a case study. Pre- senting Kitakyushu’s model of ‘green growth’ where ‘tremendous employ- ment opportunities’ arise from strategic waste management and recycling, the OECD (2010a) praised Japan’s Eco-Town programme as an ‘example of a large-scale public program to maximise business and resource-saving opportunities’ that ‘successfully contributed to improving the environment and industrial productivity’ (OECD 2010a: 19).

As for ‘formal’ diplomatic successes, in October 2010 at the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD-COP10), Japan succeeded in gaining formal recognition of the Satoyama Initiative as a potentially useful tool for managing biodiversity and human well- being. The Initiative has now gone international, with many partners (NGOs such as Conservation International, and government agencies from countries such as Peru and Gabon) and projects based on ‘satoyama’ prin- ciples in the Philippines, Malawi, Nepal, Cuba, Italy, and the United States. Japan will provide $2 billion over the next three years to help developing countries stem biodiversity loss. However, at other diplomatic forums, because US, China and India remained outside the framework, Tokyo decided not to extend the Kyoto Protocol. Japanese diplomacy at global forums has thus been labelled ‘ambiguous’, casting doubts on Tokyo’s abil- ity to be a leader because of this sometimes contradictory stance (Pajon 2010). ‘Cool Earth Partnership’ was widely derided by NGOs for not set- ting explicit mid-term targets; Japan was consistently labelled the ‘fossil of the day’ at the Copenhagen conference. Being already energy-efficient, high marginal costs accompanying any further efficiency explains its reti- cence on ambitious global targets for cuts. The influential Keidanren (Japan Business Federation comprising 1,300 representative companies of Japan) and MITI also support industry voices.

Before 3/11 [the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster], Japan’s targets for renewable energy lagged other advanced countries, because of opposition from the nuclear industry and bureaucracy (Dewit and Tetsunari 2011). The public aversion towards nuclear power after 3/11 has unsurprisingly renewed interest in wind, solar and hydro. Then-Prime Minister Kan’s proposal to scrap new nuclear power plants received

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plaudits by Greenpeace (2011): ‘governments around the world should now follow Japan’s lead and adopt energy policies based on clean and renewable energy sources. Shutting nuclear plants though means higher emissions in the short term from burning fossil fuels, while the close links revealed between regulators and the nuclear energy industry are hardly exemplary models of regulation. Before resigning in September 2011, Kan passed legislation for Feed-in Tariff (FIT) for renewable energy, which went into effect in July 2012. Cited as ‘one of the world’s most aggressive examples of FIT’, Japan became seen as ‘a closely-watched model for any nation seeking a cleaner energy future’. (Wilder 2012) However, Japan’s restrictive focus on solar attests to the continuing influence of bureaucratic interests (Dewit and Tetsunari 2011). Then-Prime Minister Noda restarted nuclear plants as a short-term measure and in September 2012, while the government diluted plans to eliminate nuclear energy by 2030. The new administration under Abe Shinzo that swept to power in December 2012 has not only pledged to restart nuclear reactors; in October 2013 Abe trav- elled to Turkey to sign an agreement reached by a Japanese-French con- sortium (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Areva) to build Turkey’s second nuclear reactor. This was the first export of Japanese nuclear technology since the Fukushima crisis began in 2011. Businesses and private actors however have helped keep momentum going, amid governmental vacilla- tion. In September 2011, Softbank founder Masayoshi Son proposed a ‘supergrid’ to transmit renewable energy across the country. In March 2012, Softbank finalised a deal with Mitsui Co. to build a 30MW solar farm. For its efforts to embrace clean energy and influence decisions, Soft- bank received the highest political advocacy score ever from Greenpeace’s 2012 ‘Cool IT Leaderboard’ report.

Conclusion

Japan’s foreign policies are the expressions of an ‘adaptive state’ (Berger, Mochizuki and Tsuchiyama 2007) adopting incremental changes to serve its national interest as circumstances evolve. This pattern is recurring as ‘Japan has begun tapping into new sources of strength in order to remain a key player in Asia, just as it has many times before’ (Green 2007: 144). While Nye’s notion of soft power appeared to suggest a new power source for some, Tokyo’s initiatives in promoting its cultural and sub-cultural appeal have gained much academic attention. Yet, ‘soft power’xtends beyond the ‘affective’ dimension of Japanese anime or cosplay. The New Growth Strategy’s proposed reinvention of Japan as a global trouble- shooter on climate change points to a source of ‘normative’ soft power in close alignment with prevailing international norms and values. In an entirely different context of Japan’s rising economic might in the 1970s, concerns arose over whether Japan would act selfishly as a ‘trouble-maker’

Y.-K. Heng: Japan’s normative soft power 185

(Kosaka 1976: 182). Japan was once described as an ‘eco-predator’ (Maull 1991). By contrast in the 2010s, Japan is viewed more positively as a ‘trouble-shooter’ and source of innovative solutions.

This paper evaluated the agents (state and non-state) that can project Japan’s ability to trouble-shoot climate change. Whether it is through the ‘Cool Earth’ partnership, or developing solutions for urbanisation and sus- tainable development, or transmitting conservation values to preserve bio- diversity, thanks to its vibrant civil society NGOs and business corpora- tions, Japan wields an ideal combination of agents that help to generate and project ‘normative’ soft power. With its focus on developing climate change solutions and their dissemination, Japan can be seen as a ‘directional leader’ with its ambition to lead by example and propagate its model internationally (Pajon 2010; 85). However, normative soft power has not resulted in leadership roles at grand global forums like Copenha- gen. While the World WideFund for Nature noted positively that ‘only Japan has top runner standards for vehicle efficiency’ (WWF 2009: 8), it also gave Tokyo poor marks for leadership on climate negotiations. Instead Japan implements cooperative problem-solving initiatives as part of its normative soft power. From provision of ODA to developing countries to mitigate climate change, to smart cities and innovative technologies, Japa- nese initiatives have been endorsed by global organisations from the World Bank to OECD as exemplary models to emulate. Japan’s earlier woeful environmental image has received a make-over: it is now seen to advance key climate norms including sustainable development, facilitating technical environmentally-friendly solutions, and assistance to vulnerable countries. However, Tokyo’s focus on ‘green’ technology transfer is attracting brick- bats for neglecting more fine-grained norms of environmental aid, includ- ing good governance, human development and corporate social responsibility (Kakuchi 2010; Hall 2010). Japan’s ODA remains saddled with bureaucratic constraints, as multiple ministries and corporate interests all set competing preferences. Paul Harris even claims that environmental aid was ‘in large measure to promote Japanese business’ (cited in Hall 2010: 171). What Japanese ODA considers ‘environmental’ such as sewage systems are also not necessarily shared by global standards. Perhaps more worryingly, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, in his focus on economic growth, ‘has made virtually no mention of environmental issues’. (Sawa 2013). Others like Dewit (2013) however point to some positive signs from the Information and Communication Technology Growth Strategy of June 2013, which ‘ostensibly aims at the evolution of a new model of efficient, resilient and green urban and rural infrastructures’. It remains to be seen how the Abe administration will affect Japan’s green credentials in the future.

At this juncture, it is worth noting that other nations also possess similar ‘normative’ soft power assets and intentions. Rising powers such as Brazil are deploying a similar strategy of global trouble-shooting. ‘Particularly

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adept at leveraging what is described as soft power, Brazil’s rising influence can be traced to. . . high-profile diplomatic roles in negotiating to address key global issues such as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and trade liberalisation’ (Lee and Gomez 2011: 62).

China too is recognising that its culture has ‘more to offer than visual arts, music and literature alone; it may also provide appealing alternative values in addressing international problems’ (D‘Hooghe 2011: 166). The goal ’is no longer just to “save China” but also to “save the world” (Calla- ghan 2012: 2). As Tsinghua University’s Yan Xuetong (cited in Leonard 2008: 94) noted, ‘in the age of globalization, the sphere of competition is no longer about land, resources or markets but rule-making, setting regula- tions, norms or customs’. China wants a say, using normative soft power.

Similarly, the Head of South Korea’s Presidential Council on Nation Branding has recognised that ‘we have to move beyond hallyu’ (the wave of interest in Korean pop stars and dramas) and ‘to introduce to the rest of the world that we have more than K-Pop’ (cited in Martin 2011). Like Japan’s ‘green innovation’ strategy, Seoul has launched a ‘green growth’ strategy. President Lee Myung Bak set up a Presidential Committee on Green Growth and a ‘Green Technology Centre’ in January 2012. Even Japan’s lead in ‘green’ technologies may come under threat. US automaker Ford has a successful Fusion hybrid model that rivals Toyota’s Prius. South Korea has launched a $200 million smart grid project on Jeju Island and Australia has allocated $100 million to a commercial-scale smart grid proj- ect in New South Wales (Hosaka 2010).

Outspoken Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintaro (1976: 78-9) once criticised Japan’s rush to modernisation for being based on a ‘hunger mentality’ and far-reaching inferiority complex as it tried to catch up with Western civilisation. This provided a powerful driving force, but for Ishi- hara, national ideals based on such ‘hunger’ only reflect their narrowness and lack of depth. Kenneth Pyle (2007: 361) might well be right that ‘Heisei leaders (the period beginning from Emperor Akihito’s ascension to the throne in 1989 onwards) have yet to define clear new national goals or a sense of national purpose that might someday form the basis of a new national consensus.’ Aligning with climate change norms that have become globally and domestically resonant, Japan could well find greater purpose with ‘green’ innovation and ‘normative’ soft power as an environmental trouble-shooter.

Acknowledgements

The author conducted research for this paper while on sabbatical as a Visit- ing Scholar at the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Japan. He is especially grateful to Professor Shinohara Hatsue for hosting him, and for discussions with academics and senior diplomats in Tokyo and Singapore during 2010 and 2011. The author also acknowledges the

Y.-K. Heng: Japan’s normative soft power 187

support of the National University of Singapore’s Start-up Grant, and the Humanities and Social Science (HSS) Fellowship in the course of research- ing and writing this article.

Note

1. Cited in Highlighting Japan, February 2010, http://www.gov-online.go.jp/pdf/ hlj_ar/vol_0031e/21-23.pdf.

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