Mid-Term Paper Assignment

rr.' ",f

¡I~

. f .. I

;~~ ~~I!~, ,\ . MIAMI LINGUISTICS SERIES !iJft_

No. r. Germanic Studies in Honor 01 Edluard Henry Sehrt Edited by Frithjof A. Haven,t Wolfrnm K.Legner and James C. Kin,1

No.2. A Linguistic Study of tJltlEtll/li.fJ, VtlTb By F. R. Palmer

NO.3. Multilingual Lexicon of Linguistics and Philology: English, German, French By Rose Nash

NO.4. Studies in Spanish Phonology By Tomás Navarro

NO.5. Studies in English Adverbial Usage By Sidney Greenbaum

No.6. General Characteristics of the Germanic Languages By Antoine Meillet

NO.7. Language: Its Structure and Evolution By Marcel Cohen

No.8. Problems in General Linguistics By Emile Benveniste

NO.9. Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development By Wilhelm von Humboldt

No. 10. Elicitation Experiments in English Linguistic Studies in Use an Attitude By Sidney Greenbaum and Randolph Quirk

';¡.,:,¡ 'ill .'"ilil~,

'.'lo '!....., ,Á" ..oP'ltv

:~~{'\'\ 'i1\ ~ <'

i~ .... 9...... '~~,..~ ~""1"'-\0' ~

I>'" '

z

Miami Linguistics Series No.8

Emile Benveniste

Problems in General ,Linguistics

translated by Mary Elizabeth Meek

ro University of Miami Press

Coral Gables, Florida

/(*. I:Y•illJ_

,::~( >,,1

The original French version, under the tide Problèmes de linguistique générale, was published in Paris.

© Editions Gallimard, 1966 Copyright © 1971 by

University of Miami Press Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 77-102692

SBN 87024-13Z-X All rights reserved, including rights of reproduction and use in any form or by an, means, including the makin¡ of copies by any photo process, or by electronic o~ mechanicaldevice,printedorwrittenororal,or recordingforsoundorvisualreproduc~ tion or for use In any knowled¡e or retrieval systemor device,unless permission if4iS writing is obtained fromthe copyrightproprietors,'!!,

Deligned by Mary Lipson Manufactured in the United States of America ,

Contents i.p I <. i" a~~1 '\

j

¡ü_

'f';\,'I::¡ . ...'"

... {'

Foreword vii Translator's Note ix Publisher's Note x Changes in Linguistics

I Recent Trends in General Linguistics 3 2 A Look at the Development of Linguistics 17 3 Saussure after Half a Century 29

Communication

.. i~~- ""'.:'). ~

I~~<\' ,+-

4 The Nature of the Linguistic Sign 43 5 Animal Communication and Human Language 49 6 Categories of Thought and Language 55 7 Remarks on the Function of Language in Freudian Theory 65

Structures and Analyses

8 "Structure" in Linguistics 79 9 The Classification of Languages 85 10 The Levels of Linguistic Analysis 101 II The SublogicalSystem of Prepositions in Latin II3 12 Toward an Analysis of Case Functions: The Latin Genitive 121

yntactic Functions .

13 The Nominal Sentence 131 14 Active and Middle Voice in the Verb 145 IS The Passive Construction of the Transitive Perfect 153 16 The Linguistic Functions of "To Be" and)'To Have" 163 17 The Relative Clause, a Problem of General Syntax 181

an and Language

18 Relationships of P~rson in the Verb 195 19 The Correlations of Tense in the French Verb 205

f.. :~}~(, '\~ il·'

I

"

~ :WfJi:~

TWENTY

The Nature of Pronouns

IN THE 8TII.-L OPEN DEBATE on the nature of pronouns, it is usual to consider these linguistic forms as constituting a class both formal and functional, in the manner of nominal or verbal forms, for example. Now all languages possess pronouns, and in all of them they are defined as referring to the same categories of expression (personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc.). The universality of these forms and these notions leads to the thought that the problem of pronouns is both a problem of language in general and a problem of individuallanguàges; or better, that it is a problem of individual languages only because it is primarily a problem of language in general. It is as a phenomenon of language that we pose the problem here, in order to show that pronouns do not constitute a unitary class but arè of different types depending on the mode of language of which they are the signs. Some belong to the syntax of a language, others are characteristics of what we shall call "instances of discourse," that is, the discrete and always unique acts by which the language is actualized in speech by a speaker. The situation of the personal pronouns should be considered first. It is

not enough to distinguish them from the other pronouns by a denomination that separates them. Itmust be seen that the ordinary definition of the per- sonal prónouns as containing the three terms, I, you, and he, simply dei}troys the notion of "person." "Person" belongs only to I/you and is lacking in he. This basic difference will be evident from an analysis of 1. Between I and a noun referring to a lexical notion, there are not only the

greatly varying formal differences that the morphological and syntactic struc- ture of particular languages imposes; there are also others that res~lt from the very process of linguistic utterance and which are of a more general and more basic nature. The utterançe containing I belongs 'to that level or type of language which Charles Mords calls pragmatic, which includes, with the signs, those who make use of them. A linguistic text of great length-a scientific treatise, for ex~ple--can be imagined in which I and you would not appear. a single time; conversely, it would be difficult to conceive of a short spoken,

il 1

1

1

1

1 .1

: ,; ~

218 PROBLEMS IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

text in which they were not employed. But the other signs of a language are distributed indifferently between these two types of texts. Besides 'this con- dition of use, which is itself distinctive, we shall call attention to a fundamental and moreover obvious property of I and you in the referential organization .of linguistic signs. Each instance of use of a noun is referred to a fixed and "objective" notion, capable of remaining potential or of being actualized in a p¡¡rticulat object and always identical with the mental image it awakens. But ~he instan~es of the use of I do not ~onstitute. a class of reference .si~ce t~ere 'Ii ISno "object" definable as I to which these mstances can refer m Idenocal . . fashion ..Each I has its own reference and corresponds each time to a UniqUe...•.•..:1...,. being who is set up as such. < What then is~h~reality to which I~ryou refers? It is solely a "realit! of dis-j l

course," and thIS ISa very strange thmg. I cannot be defined except m terms.':; ! of "locution," not in terms of objects as a nominal sign is. I signifies "the person who is uttering the present instance of the discourse containing J." This instance is unique by definition and has validity only in its uniqu~ness. If I perceive. two successive instances of discourse containing I, uttered in .the same voice, nothing guarantees to me that one of them is not a reported discourse, a quotation in which I could be imputed to another. It is thus necessary to stress this point: I can only be identified by the instance of dis- course that contains it and by that alone. It has no value except in thé instance in which it is produced. But in the same way it is also as an instance of form that I must be taken; the form of I has no linguistic existence except in the act of' speaking in which it is uttered. There is thus a combined double j instance in this process: the instance of I as referent anti the instance of I discourse. containing I as the referee. The definition can now be stated pre- '.' I cisely as: I is "the individual who utters the present instance of discourse if containing the linguistic instance J." Consequently, by introducing the •....'1' situation of "address," We obtain a symmetrical definition for you as the,,, ;. "individual spoken to in the ~resent instance of d.is.course containing the " 1 linguistic instance you." These definitions refer to I and you as a category ?f language ~d. are related ~otheir positi?n. in l~nguage. W.e.ar.e not .consider- l' mg the speCIficfoi:ms of thIS category wlthm gIVenlanguages, and It matters little whether .the.se.....f.OJ;TIlSmust figure. explicitly i.n the disc..ourse or may l' remain implicit· in it; . " " This constant ~dneéessary reference to the iristance~f discourse con-

stitutes the feature ~hat u,nit~s to l/you a series of "i~dicators". which, from their form and their systematic capacity, belong to different classes, some being pronouns, others adverbs, and still others, adverbial locutions. The demonstratives, this, etc., are such indicators inasmuch as their

organization correlates' with that oL the indicators of person, as in Lat ..

{

The Nature of Pronouns 219

hie/iste. Here there is a new and distinctive feature in this series: it is the identification of the object by an indicator uf ostension concomitant with the instance of discourse containing the indicator of person. By simultaneous ostension, this will be the object designated in the present instance of dis- course and the reference implicit in the form (for example, hie as opposed to iste), which associates it with I and you. Outside this class, but on the same plane and associated in the same frame of reference, we find the adverbs here and now. Their relationship with Twill be shown by defining them: here and now delimit the spatial and temporal instance coextensive and contemporary with the present instance of discourse containing 1. This series is not limited to here and now; it is increased by a great number of simple or complex terms that proceed from the same relationship: today, yesterday, tomorrow, in three days, etc. It is pointless to define these terms and the demonstratives in general by deixis, as is generally done, unless one adds that the deixis is I contemporary with the instance of discourse that carries the indicator of person; it is from this reference that the demonstrative takes its property of being unique and particular each time, which is the uniqueness of the instance of discourse to which it refers. The essential thing, then, is the relation between the indicator (of person,

time, place, object shown, etc.) and the present instance of discourse.' For front the moment that one no longer refers, by the expression itself, to' this 'relation of the indicator to the unique instance that manifests it, the lànguage has recourse to a series of distinct terms that have a one-to-one correspondence with the first and which refer; not to the instance of discourse, but to "re'al" objects, to "histotical"times andplace~. Hence correlations such as l: he- here: there-now: then-today: the very day-:-yesterday: the day before- tomorrow: the day after---next week: thefollowing week-(hree days ago:' three days before, etc. The language itself reveals the profound difference between these two planes. The reference to the "speaker" implicit in this whole group of expressions

has been treated too lightly and as being self-evident. We rob this reference of its inhell'entmeaning if we do not see the feature by which it is distinguished from other linguistic signs. Yet it is a fact both original and fundain~entalthat th~e "pronominal" forms do not refer to "reality" or to "objective" positions in space or time b~t ~othe utterance; unique each:time, that contains them, and thus they reflect thefr proper use. The importance of their function will be measured by the nature of the problem they;serve to solve, which is none other than that of intersubjective communication. Language has solved this problem by creating' an ensemble of "empty" signs that are nonreferentia. with respect to "reality." These signs are always available and become "full" a~ soon as a speaker introduces them· into each instance. of his discourse,

PROBLEMS IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS220

Since they lack material refer~nce, they cannot be misused; since they do not assert anything, they are not subject to the condition of truth and escape all denial. Their role is to provide the instrument of a conversion that one could call the conversion of language into discourse. It is by identifying himsèlf as a unique person pronouncing I that each speaker sets himself up in turn as the "subject." The use thus has as a condition the situation of discourse and no other. If each speaker, in order to express the feèling he has of his irre- ducible subjectivity, made use of a distinct identifying signal (in the sense in which each radio transmitting station has its own call letters), there would ,be as many languages as individuals and communication would become abso- lutely impossible. Language wards off this danger by instituting a unique but mobile sign, I, which can be assumed Dy each speaker on the condition that he refers each time only to the instance of his own discourse. This sign ,¡ is thus linked to the exercise of language and announces the speaker as speaker. It is this property that establishes the basis for individual discourse, in which each speaker takes over all the resources of language for his own behalf. Habit easily makes us unaware of this profound difference between language as a system of signs and language assumed into use by the individual."., 'I When the individµal appropriates it, language is turned into instances of " ,I, discourse, characterized by this system of internal references of which I is the key, and defining the individual by the particular linguistic construction he makes use of when he announces himself as the speaker. Thus the indica~;¡~ 1 tors I and you cannot exist as potentialities; they exist only insofar as they are '~3, actualized in the instance of discourse, in which, by each of their çwn , ~ 1 instances, they mark the process of appropriation by the speaker. The systematic nature of language causes the appropriation these indicators

signal to appear in the instance of discourse in all the elements capable of "agreeing" formally, especially in the verb, by means of processes that vary ,I according to the type of idiom. We must emphasize this point: the "verb form" is an inextricable part of the individual instance ,of discourse: it is, always and necessarily actualized by the act of discourse and in dependence on that act. It cannot admit of any potential and "objective" form. If the verb is usually represented by its infinitive as the lexical entry ina number of languages, this is putely by convention j the infinitive in language is some- thing completèl{different from the infinitive in the lexicographic metalan- guage. All the variation~' in the verbal paradigm-aspect, tense, gender, person, etc.-result ,from t;at actualization and from that dependence with respect to the instance of discourse, especially the "tense" of the verb, which is always relative to the instance. in which the verb form figures. A finite ,,~ ,personal utterance isthu,s cQnstituted on a double plane: it puts the denomina- ,~ tive function of language into operation for references to the object, WhiCh),;',',:,

Il , ~:

The Nature of Prono.uns 221

language establishes as distinctive lexical signs, and arranges these references to the object with the aid of self-referential indicators corresponding to each of the formal classes that the idiom recognizes. But is this always true? If language, as it is exercised, is by necessity pro-

duced in discrete instances, does not this necessity oblige it to consist only of "personal" instances? We know empirically that this is not the case. There are utt~rances in discourse that escape the condition of person in spite of their individual nature; that is, they refer not to themselves but to an '''object- ,ive" situàtion. This is the domain that we call the "third person;" The "third person" in fact represents the unmarked member of the corre-

lation of person. That is why it is not a truism to affirm that the non-person is the only mode of utterance possible for the instances of discourse not meant to refer to themselves but to predicate the process of someone or some- thing outside the instance itself, and this someone or something can' always be provided with an 0..!>i~~!iYeJ~ference. Thus, in the formal class of pronouns, those said to be of the "third person"

are, by their function and by their nature, completèly different from I and you. As has long been seen, forms ~ikehe, him, that, etc. only serve as abbre- viated suostitutes (Pierre is sick; he has a "fever"); they replace or relay one or another of the material elements of the utterance. But this function is not atta£ned only to pronouns; it can be served by elements of other classes-in French, on occasion by certain verbs ("cet enfant écrit maintenant mieux qu'il nefaisait l'année dernière" [similarly in English: that child writes better now than he did last year]). This is a function of syntactic "representation" which extends to terms taken from different "parts of speech" and which answers to a need for economy by replacillg one segment of the utterance, or even an entire utterance, with a more manageable substitute. Hence the) function of these substitutes has nothing in'common with that of the indicators of person. , Certain languages show that the "third person" is indeed literally a "non-

person."1 To take just one example among many, here is how the possessive pronominal prefixes are presented in two series (something like inalienable and alienable) in Yuma (California): first person, ?-, ?anll-; second person, m-, man:JI-; third person, zero, nll•2 The personal reference is a zero reference outside the I/you relationship. In other languages (Indo-European chiefly) the regularity of the formal structure and a, symmetry of secondary origin produce the impression of three coordinated persons. This is especially the case with modern languages with an obligatory pronoun in which he seems to be a member of a paraliigm ~ith three term's, on a'par with I and you, or in the inflection of the present in Indo-European with-mi, -si; -ti. In fact, t~ symmetry is only formal: What must be considered distinctive of the "third

, ~

"

222 PROBLEMS IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

person" is its property of (1) combining with any object reference, (2) ~r bc;:ingreflective of the instance of discourse, (3) admitting of a sometimes rather large number of pronominal or demonstrative variants, and (4) not bei1).gcompatible with the paradigm of referential terms like here,now, etc. Even a brief analysis of the forms that are iInprecisely classed as pro-

nominal leads thus to the recognition ainong them of classes of entirely dif- ferent natures and, consequently, to the distinction between, on the one hand; language as a repertory of signs and a system for combining them and, on the other, language as an activity manifested in instances of discourse which are characterized as such by particular signs.

From For Roman Jakobson, Morris Halle, Horace G. Lunt, Hugh McLean, and Comelis H. van Schooneveld,eds. (The HagYe,1956), pp. 34-37

1 ,,·1

€ 1 f,

'·1,o, ",b.. ~/~,, 1'. '"{i1

"í

"

:~ í

¡¡,i t"

",~:jf,' "<I ';\ (,i I,

TWENTY-ONE

" Subjectivity in Languag~ ~

I,f,''\ \ v "

t'1 IF LANGUAGEIS, as they say, the instrument of communication, to what does it owe this property? The question may cause surprise, as does everything that seems to challenge an obvious fact, but it is sometimes useful to require proof of, the obvious. Two answers come to mind. The one would be that language is in fact employed as the instrument of communication, probably because men have not found a better or more effective way in which to com- municate. Thís amounts to stating what one wishes, to understand. One might also think of replying that language has such qualities as make it suited to serve as an instrument; itlends itself to transmitting what I entrust to it- an order, a question, an announcement-and it elicits from the interlocutor it behavior which is adequate each time. Developing a more teçhnical, aspect of this idea:, one might add that the' behavior of language admits ofa be- haviorist description, in terms of stimul~s and response, from which one might draw conclusions as to the intermediary andinstrùmental nature of language. But is it really language of which we are speaking here? Are we not confusing it with discourse? If we posit that discourse is language put into action, and necessarily between partners, we sho,,!, amidst the confusion, that we are begging the question, since the, nature of this "instrument'! IS . 'explained by its situation as an "instrument." As for the role of transmission that language plays, one should not fail to observe, on the one hand, that tlí1s roje can devolve upon nonlinguistic means-gestures and mimicry-and, on the other himd, that; in speaking here of an "instrument," we ~re letting ourselves' be deceived by certain processes of transmission which in human societies withput exception come after language and imitate its functioning. 'All systems of signals, rudimentary or complex, are in this situation.

In fact, the comparison of language to an instru~ent-and it should neces" , ,sarily be a material instrument for the comparison to even be comprehensible -must fill us with mistrust, as should every simplistic notion about language. 'To speak of an instrument'is to put man and nature in'opposition. The pick, the arrow, and the wheel are not in nature. They are fabrications. Language

" I

i' \

~

;,í. J ~'1

~ !

,~ ~,_l