Written Assignment #4 – Week 8

8

HOMELAND SECURITY AND TERRORIST DECISION MAKING

Terrorist groups that are intent on using CBRN weapons face a final series of constraints that they have to overcome in order to execute their attack – the security environment in which they have to operate. The threat posed by terrorist violence after 9/11 led to the introduction of the most far-reaching counter-terrorism measures ever seen. Whilst the vulnerability of Western democracies might make defence against terrorism more problematic, acts of CBRN and mass destruction terrorism are much more difficult to plan, prepare, and execute than conventional terrorist attacks. This gives states greater opportunities to detect and prevent future attacks. Many previous terrorist plots to use CBRN weapons have been prevented by law enforcement agencies, and even the experience with 9/11 and the attacks by Aum Shinrikyo indicates that there will probably be clues of future plots to use CBRN weapons. The security environment will also critically influence the tactics that terrorists use and the targets that they attempt to strike. Therefore the precise nature of the future threat from CBRN terrorism will be influenced and shaped by the effectiveness of national and international counter-terrorism measures.

Prevention

It is impossible to protect effectively all potential terrorist targets all of the time, but the threat from CBRN terrorism can be contained, and in respect of certain groups possibly even defeated, by generic anti-terrorism measures combined with a range of dedicated anti-CBRN terrorism measures. To that end, the USA and the West is pursuing an integrated strategy of policy

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 1 1 . I . B . T a u r i s .

A l l r i g h t s r e s e r v e d . M a y n o t b e r e p r o d u c e d i n a n y f o r m w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n f r o m t h e p u b l i s h e r , e x c e p t f a i r u s e s p e r m i t t e d u n d e r U . S . o r a p p l i c a b l e c o p y r i g h t l a w .

EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 10/27/2021 10:32 PM via AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM AN: 355536 ; Benjamin Cole.; The Changing Face of Terrorism : How Real Is the Threat From Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons? Account: s7348467.main.ehost

178 The Changing Face of Terrorism

responses at the national, bilateral, multilateral, and global levels. Each level of response has its individual strengths and weaknesses, but a multi-level approach of this kind has a synergistic effect, especially when co-operative ventures feed back into measures taken at the national level, encouraging states to implement their international obligations into domestic law.

The primary, and most critical, level of defence is at the national level. No two states are responding to the threat in exactly the same way because national organizational structures and operational capabilities vary considerably, as do threat perceptions and the level of resources that different states can devote to managing the threat. Implementing an effective defence against CBRN terrorism is predicated upon the establishment of a coherent national strategy and programme of long-term planning. The multi-faceted nature of the threat means that counter-terror programmes require the co- ordination of the activities of a wide range of government departments and agencies which have different areas of expertise and responsibility. In practice, this tends to create problems of intra- and inter-agency co- operation. Therefore, one of the first challenges confronting governments is to establish strong bureaucratic structures with clear lines of authority and responsibility. This is best achieved with a ‘top-down’ approach to co- ordinate the range of prevention and consequence-management measures that are implemented. The failure to prevent 9/11 led the USA to create the Department of Homeland Security in an attempt to improve bureaucratic co-ordination and enable the rationalization of resources.

The international dimension of counter-terrorism incorporates both legal and operational elements. At the global level, the counter-terrorism obligations of states are enshrined in 13 United Nations (UN) resolutions, conventions, and protocols. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 establishes states’ obligations for combating terrorism, whilst UNSCR 1540 requires all states to implement a variety of domestic measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring WMD, their means of delivery, and related materials. However, there is a long history of states failing to implement UN resolutions. Therefore, these measures are being complemented by a range of other international agreements and programmes which are intended to persuade reluctant states to abide by their obligations under these resolutions and conventions, and to provide assistance to those states that are willing, but lack the capacity to meet their obligations.

In 2005, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which provides the legal basis for international co-operation in the investigation, prosecution, and extradition of suspects who commit nuclear and radiological

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Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 179

terrorism. This was followed in 2006 by the USA and Russia launching the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. This initiative incorporates efforts to improve the accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear and radioactive substances. It also contains measures to suppress the illicit trafficking of these materials and to ensure co-operation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism, as well as commitments to strengthen national counter-terrorism legislation.1

At the operational level, many states co-operate in sharing intelligence, providing training assistance for law enforcement and military personnel, detaining and extraditing suspects, enhancing border security, preventing non-violent terrorism related activities on their territory, and providing other forms of material support. Most of this operational support takes place at bilateral level. However, there are also a number of global initiatives such as the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which was formed in 2002 to seek additional resources and partners for non-proliferation, disarmament, counter proliferation and nuclear safety projects in the FSU.2 The main problem with developing international co-operation on counter-terrorism is that it requires states to work with others that might not be their natural allies, or with whom they might normally have poor relations. Hence the USA had to work closely with the undemocratic Musharraff regime in Pakistan, and was at times frustrated by the regime’s seeming unwillingness to suppress militants operating inside Pakistan.

Legislative Framework The effectiveness of national law enforcement agencies in preventing future terrorist attacks is underpinned by the powers that they have under national anti-terrorism legislation. The consequences of weak anti-terrorism legislation were made apparent by the Japanese experience with Aum Shinrikyo. One of the reasons why the cult avoided close police scrutiny was because of Japanese laws on religious activities. The 1947 draft constitution provided strong and unambiguous guarantees of religious freedom and the 1951 Religious Corporation Act further strengthened the rights of religious organizations, giving them strong protection from state intrusion into their affairs. These legislative shortcomings were exacerbated by the fact that Japanese culture is extremely bureaucratic, and Japanese officialdom obeyed these legal dictums literally.3 This confluence of factors is unlikely to be repeated in other states but it is indicative of how weaknesses in national legislation can seriously hinder efforts to contain the threat from terrorism.

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There has always been a lack of uniformity between the anti-terrorism legislation of different states. This often begins with the very definition of ‘terrorism’ itself, but also encompasses broader issues such as the extradition of suspects or the suppression of non-violent terrorist activities such as fundraising or propaganda activities. The USA has frequently had difficulty in co-ordinating international economic sanctions against alleged state sponsors of terrorism, whilst the UK used to face tremendous difficulties in extraditing IRA suspects from the USA. This creates inconsistencies and loopholes which terrorists can exploit. Following 9/11 these differences diminished as states felt compelled to co-operate with the USA in sharing intelligence and extraditing suspects, but significant inconsistencies remain.

Counter-terrorism legislation in all democratic states is capable of being strengthened in areas such as the provision of greater rights of surveillance, the detention of suspects, ‘stop and search’ powers, as well as the banning of militant or terrorist groups and activities that are being undertaken on their behalf. However, there is an inherent tension between strengthening anti-terrorism legislation and maintaining civil liberties, and each state differs in how far it is willing to allow its legislation to encroach on civil liberties. As a result, terrorist groups are able to operate with greater levels of freedom in some states than others. This was illustrated by the relative freedom of action given to Islamist radicals and terrorists in the UK in the 1990s, after they had fled from other more repressive states.

The aftermath of 9/11 has seen the introduction of some of the most stringent anti-terrorism legislation ever enacted – legislation that would probably never have been introduced had it not been for 9/11 and the perceived ‘new’ threat. Many governments took the opportunity to introduce new anti-terrorism legislation to give their police and security forces wider powers to investigate and detain suspects, as well as new powers to prevent non-violent terrorist activity. In the USA this included the Patriot Act, which gives broad new powers to police forces and intelligence agencies, particularly in respect of tapping the telephones of suspected terrorists. Whilst in the UK, the government amended anti-terrorism legislation to include a much wider range of offences such as inciting terrorism, glorifying terrorism, as well as seeking and providing terrorism training (either in the UK or abroad). Most controversially, the government was also given the power to detain foreign terrorist suspects indefinitely without trial. The government also attempted to introduce a power to detain British terrorist suspects without charge for up to 90 days – a longer period of time than in any other Western democracy, but the proposal was rejected by Parliament.4

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Ironically, legislative provisions in respect of CBRN terrorism should be uniform because most states have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the BTWC, and the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The CWC and BTWC ban the production and possession of chemical, biological and toxin weapons in all signatory states. Consequently, the legislative instruments which states should have introduced to meet their obligations under these treaties and conventions should enhance the powers of law enforcement officials to investigate and prosecute individuals and groups for the possession or production of CBW, or the possession of fissile material. The CWC also requires companies to report their transfers and use of such chemicals to the CWC organization, which enables the improved tracking of precursor chemicals. This obliges governments and chemical companies to be more vigilant about transactions, and could be used to introduce tougher measures to monitor domestic activities involving dual-use chemicals.5

In reality however, the implementation of these treaties and conventions at national level has been variable. For instance, at the time of the Aum Shinrikyo attacks, it was not illegal to manufacture or possess sarin in Japan.6 In some states there are legal obligations on individuals to uphold the prohibition on the offensive application of biological pathogens, but outside of the USA the direct regulation of pathogens is largely restricted to imposing standards for bio-safety containment.7 The effectiveness of the national authorities that have to implement the provisions of the CWC and BTWC can also be undermined by factors such as their relative power vis- à-vis other government departments or agencies which have overlapping responsibilities or conflicting interests, and by the bureaucratic culture of the state. Despite these weaknesses, there is considerable opposition within many states to remedying it. The biotechnology industry in particular, generally dislikes the prospect of introducing verification and disclosure obligations under the BTWC because they can be onerous and intrusive. Therefore, in many states, greater steps could still be taken to bring domestic laws, administrative procedures, and regulations into conformity with these treaties.

Law Enforcement and Intelligence The key to preventing future CBRN terrorist attacks is good intelligence and police work. The impact that effective law enforcement can have was illustrated by the case of the Gemaah Islamiyah group in Egypt, which was virtually destroyed by the Egyptian security forces, prompting it to renounce the use of violence and enter mainstream politics. Similarly, groups such as

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the SLA and the RAF (Baader-Meinhof gang), which were linked to CBRN terrorist plots in the 1970s and 1980s, no longer exist after being defeated by the law enforcement and security forces of the states in which they operated. But even if the security forces cannot defeat a particular terrorist group they might be capable of severely curtailing its activities. The British security services infiltrated the IRA to such an extent that the IRA once admitted that 90 per cent of its operations were cancelled because of security force activity.8

In the West, the end of the Cold War led to additional intelligence resources and assets being focused on the proliferation of CBRN weapons and terrorism but this has not been sufficient to prevent all acts of terrorism or bring a halt to the proliferation of WMD technology. The situation is considerably worse in some regional states, where weak governments often lack the capacity to exercise effective law enforcement throughout their territory. This can create ‘ungoverned spaces’ which terrorists can exploit as safe havens. One of the more persistent of these ‘ungoverned spaces’ is the northwest of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, where bin Laden is believed to have found sanctuary after being ousted from Afghanistan in 2001. The USA is investing considerable resources in assisting regional states to shut down these ‘ungoverned spaces’ but the difficulties faced by the Pakistani government in imposing the rule of law over its provinces bordering Afghanistan suggests that it is incredibly difficult to empower weak states to achieve this.

Intelligence services face immense problems in penetrating terrorist organizations, particularly those with cell structures and those that are transnational in nature. Penetrating al-Qaeda’s senior leadership has proved particularly difficult, but these problems are not insurmountable. Whilst bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri remained at large, the majority of al- Qaeda’s top leadership at the time of 9/11 were gradually tracked down and either killed or captured. The intelligence agencies of several states have also proven to be very successful in obtaining intelligence on al-Qaeda affiliates and other terrorist cells that exist within the networks of Islamist militants at both national and global level. The British intelligence services in particular, have gathered good quality intelligence of the Islamist networks in the UK, which has enabled the police to prevent a significant number of terrorist attacks. Similarly, the FBI has been successful in infiltrating a number of extreme right-wing Christian militia groups, which over the years has led to the prevention of a number of CBRN terrorist plots.

Monitoring communications traffic has traditionally been an invaluable source of intelligence on terrorist activities, and whilst the use

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Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 183

of the internet and encryption technology has made it more difficult to intercept anything of value, intelligence agencies can still monitor terrorist communications. Since 9/11, several al-Qaeda cells operating in Europe have been arrested following the interception of communications traffic. However, communications intercepts have been of less use in tracking down bin Laden himself, and there is now evidence of al-Qaeda’s top leadership eschewing hi-tech communications and relying instead on couriers.

Intelligence can also be gleaned from terrorist defectors, or from the interrogation of captured terrorists. The plot by members of the Patriots’ Council to murder US federal officials using ricin in 1994 was discovered when the wife of one of the members informed the FBI.9 Similarly, the planned CW attacks by the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord were prevented when two members of the group revealed the plan to the FBI after being arrested on unrelated charges.10

Intelligence received from members of the public reporting suspicious activities could also play a critical role in preventing CBRN terror attacks. It was members of the public in Japan who first warned the police of noxious odours emanating from Aum Shinrikyo buildings. In this respect, the public debate on CBRN terrorism serves a useful purpose in terms of raising public awareness of the potential threat. This concept of ‘societal verification’ might prove to be one of the key sources of intelligence on covert CBRN acquisition activities. In states that have been the subject of terrorist attack for some time, governments encourage vigilance and the reporting of suspicious activities by members of the public and have often established mechanisms such as anonymous telephone lines that members of the public can call.

Beyond these traditional intelligence gathering activities, intelligence and law enforcement agencies now need to watch out for technical indicators from small-scale, clandestine CBRN weapon-development activities. One of the telling aspects of the Aum Shinrikyo case was that its CW development programme produced strong indicators of what the cult was up to, but these indicators were overlooked by the police when they were reported by members of the public. This suggests that there should be technical indicators of other terrorists’ clandestine CBRN weapon-development activities which law enforcement and intelligence agencies can potentially pick up on. Law enforcement agents can potentially use detection devices to actively find clandestine CBRN weapon-development facilities, but the generally limited range of existing detection devices means that they will need to rely on intelligence to narrow down the geographical area in which to search.

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184 The Changing Face of Terrorism

The greatest number of unequivocal technical indicators arise in respect of clandestine nuclear weapon development. Acquiring fissile material by theft or purchase is an unequivocal indicator of intent to develop a nuclear or radiological weapon. There are also a number of specialized production facilities and other key materials such as boron polycarbonate, which despite being dual use in nature, should arouse suspicion if an individual who was not linked to the nuclear industry attempted to purchase them.11 Potential technical indicators of small-scale CBW development activities are more difficult to identify because CW production can be easily disguised as a legitimate commercial activity. But there are a few key materials that are required for making some nerve gases, such as phosphoryl chloride and dimethlamine, but these are only required in small quantities. Nevertheless, standard industrial regulatory activities could be a source of useful information about suspicious activities. Chemical suppliers, particularly those in the West, know who they are dealing with, and are generally careful about who they sell to. As a result, some precursors are easier to obtain than others. Yet many chemicals can be obtained in small quantities without arousing much suspicion, because there is little control and reporting of sales in many states.12 Similarly, procuring biological pathogens from a commercial source will leave a record, although obtaining them from the environment will leave no indicators at all. The actual production of CW, as well as some BW manufacturing processes, is likely to produce noxious odours,13 but this just means that terrorists would need to locate their production facilities in places where those odours would not arouse suspicion.

The greater the sophistication of the CBRN weapon-development programme, and the larger its scale, the greater the number of indicators that might be given away. The other major factor that might contribute towards the detection of clandestine CBRN weapon-development facilities is the length of time it might take a group to develop its weapons. The longer it takes, the higher the chances of detection because of the higher likelihood of a security breach, and the greater time it gives the security forces to identify key individuals and look for patterns in their activities to indicate their involvement in CBRN weapon development. Aum Shinrikyo provided a number of significant indicators of its industrial-scale manufacture of sarin, by procuring a significant amount of specialized dual-use equipment, which any CW specialist would have identified as being usable to produce CW. In contrast, small-scale CW production activities are much more difficult to detect. The former director of the CIA, James Woolsey, told the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, ‘The chemical weapons problem

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Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 185

is so difficult from an intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have high confidence in our ability to detect non-compliance, especially on a small scale’.14 Overall therefore, terrorists can potentially produce CBW clandestinely without leaving significant technical indicators, especially by purchasing small quantities of precursors and choosing specific agents and production processes which can be more easily disguised as legitimate commercial activity.

Consequently, a technologically sophisticated terrorist group, that exercises a degree of caution, could choose to pursue technological options which will minimize the number of technical indicators that are likely to be picked up by the security forces. However, taking options which leave the fewest potential indicators will probably complicate the task of developing specific types of CBRN weapons and might increase the cost. It might also not necessarily be consistent with the goals of the group. For instance, the Aum Shinrikyo had to produce sarin on an industrial scale because of its genocidal objectives. Therefore, depending upon the roles for which the CBRN weapons are required, some groups could be compelled to pursue technological options that leave a higher number of indicators.

The limited and ambiguous indicators of covert CBRN weapon development that are likely to be picked up by the security forces will tend to make sense only if they can be linked to known terrorists. Therefore, it is primarily by monitoring the activities of known terrorists that clandestine CBRN weapon-development programmes might be identified. But despite what can be achieved by good intelligence and police work, it is impossible to stop determined terrorists all of the time. Nevertheless, developing CBRN weapons can increase the visibility of terrorist cells to the intelligence services. This will increase the chances that future CBRN weapon plots will be detected and prevented.

Preventing the Acquisition of CBRN Agents The most basic measures that can be implemented to contain the threat from CBRN terrorism are the imposition of effective physical controls over the relevant agents, materials and production facilities that are required for making these weapons. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is difficult to completely deny access to many CBW agents and production facilities because of their dual use nature. However, there is currently a wide range of control measures in place in many states, which restrict access to these agents and materials, and there is also a range of other measures that could potentially be put in place to restrict access even further.

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The greatest opportunities to restrict terrorists’ access to the materials and production facilities required to manufacture CBRN weapons, lie with nuclear weapons. Highly Enriched Uranium and plutonium have very few uses, and the number of commercial transactions involving these materials is limited. This means that terrorists are not going to be able to buy fissile material on the open market, and are extremely unlikely to be able to manufacture it themselves. Their only real options for procuring fissile material are either to steal it, or purchase it on the black market. So if states can effectively secure their stocks of fissile material, they should be able to deny terrorists the ability to produce nuclear weapons.

The UN Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material places a legal obligation on states to secure nuclear materials in storage and during transport, but it has been inadequately implemented. Standards of accountancy, control, and security of fissile material vary between states. In states such as the USA, France, and the UK, which can devote sufficient resources to securing their stockpiles, standards are high. In contrast, little is known about the security of stockpiles in Pakistan and India, whilst standards in Russia and the other states of the FSU are generally considered to be poor. One of the principle tasks for the international community has been to assist Russia in improving its accountancy, control and security measures, to ensure that they comply with international standards. The USA particularly, has invested considerable resources in programmes to secure and protect nuclear and radioactive materials in the FSU. This includes the Material Protection, Control and Accounting Programme and the 2005 Nuclear Security Cooperation Initiative, as well as programmes to strengthen border controls and the Container Security initiative. Other initiatives include the 2004 Global Threat Reduction Initiative which was designed to accelerate efforts to identify, secure, remove, and facilitate the disposition of high-risk vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world.15

The situation in respect of safeguarding radioactive substances that could potentially be used in a radiological weapon is much weaker. In many states the regulatory oversight of radiation sources that are used in radiotherapy and industrial radiography equipment is weak. The IAEA has published Physical Protection Guidelines, and in 2002 established a nuclear security programme to assist member states in improving the safety and security of nuclear and radiological materials.16 Despite this, standards of physical security in respect of both fissile material and other radioactive sources need to be improved further in many states.

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In contrast to nuclear weapons, CW can be developed from commercially available chemicals, which makes it difficult to prevent terrorists acquiring them. It is possible for governments and industry to achieve a measure of monitoring and control of chemical precursors through systems of supplier awareness and self-regulation. Chemical suppliers generally know who they are dealing with, and can monitor what they are supplying, and to whom. Some potential sales to terrorist groups might therefore be refused. This can potentially make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire the necessary precursor chemicals, but there are limits to what can be achieved, and a careful terrorist who is intent on developing CW should still be able to purchase the necessary precursors.

The biological agents that are most suitable for use in BW are generally contained in secure areas of government and commercial facilities, because of standard bio-safety regulations. This makes it difficult to steal these agents, but there is also a legitimate trade in these pathogens that terrorists can potentially exploit. The task of protecting these laboratories and monitoring the trade in pathogens is enormous. Even in 2001, the USA did not know which research and commercial laboratories retained virulent viruses, or who had access to them.17 All states could therefore take greater steps to tighten their regulations controlling the trade, transport, accountability and security of sensitive biological agents. Yet even if the regulation and physical protection of biological agents in research and commercial facilities can be tightened, BW agents can be acquired from the environment. Therefore, whilst it is impossible to completely deny terrorists access to biological pathogens, improved security and better regulation can make it considerably more difficult.

The imposition of effective controls of CBRN agents and materials could force terrorist groups that want to develop CBRN weapons down particular technological routes, which in turn will impact on the effectiveness and the operational use of the weapons that they might manage to develop. In particular, strong controls on stocks of fissile material makes the development of radiological weapons a much more viable prospect for terrorists than nuclear weapons. In the field of CW, restrictions on the availability of different chemicals coupled with the technological difficulty of developing some types of CW, could influence the technological choices that some terrorists make. On the one hand it has encouraged the use of the most easily available chemicals such as hydrogen cyanide or chlorine, but on the other hand it could also encourage some groups to innovate and procure agents that are not typically linked with CW. This is one possible interpretation of the decision by one UK-based cell to discuss acquiring

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osmium tetroxide, which is not listed in the CWC and had not previously been used as a CW. As discussed in Chapter 3, the type of agents that terrorists can acquire will significantly impact on their operational use and the likely level of casualties that they might cause. For instance, hydrogen cyanide is relatively easy to obtain but is of limited use outdoors. Similarly, ricin is the easiest BW to manufacture but cannot be easily weaponized into a WMD, making it useful primarily as a weapon for assassination or as a contaminant.

Physical Security of Potential Targets Physical security measures to protect individuals, buildings, or geographical areas adds another level of difficulty for terrorists planning to carry out an attack using CBRN weapons. Physical security measures can include the use of guards at strategic sites or buildings, the installation of truck bomb defences, the control of traffic flows in and out of specified areas, flooding areas with police and army units, and the use of CCTV cameras. These generic measures can be enhanced with the addition of CBRN weapon detectors at key locations. Existing versions of these devices have some inherent limitations, in terms of having a limited lifespan, or only being able to detect specific agents. Although improved models are under development. This means that security planners have to address the question of where to deploy these devices. The obvious choices are high value political, economic, or military targets, entry points to a state, as well as with the first-responder and specialist security force units which will have to deal with any attacks.

Following 9/11, the USA invested heavily in CBRN terrorism counter- measures. Police officers in New York were issued with radiation sensors to detect nuclear devices, and they were also fitted to cranes at sea ports. The Federal government also rushed sophisticated neutron flux detectors and gamma ray sensors to ‘choke points’ in Washington and New York.18 The US Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) also have helicopters and vans known as ‘Hot Spot Mobile Labs’ to search cities for radioactive substances. There was also discussion of creating a national network of radiation monitoring, similar to a system that operates in France. The Bush Administration also allocated additional funding to border security, particularly to prevent CBRN weapons being smuggled into the country, which included a new entry-exit visa database and tracking system.19 Particular attention was paid to cargo containers, because only two of the 18 million which entered the USA in 2001 were physically inspected. The risk that cargo containers might be used to smuggle a nuclear device into

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the USA was confirmed in October 2001, when an al-Qaeda suspect was discovered in one. To combat the risk, improved analytical computer tools have been developed to target searches.20

Additional physical security at nuclear power stations has also been identified as a necessity in several states. The US NRC has been analysing precautions to protect reactors against the threat posed by truck bombs. This includes creating buffer zones around the vital areas of a facility, although this could prove difficult at some smaller ones. Its rules require facilities to be prepared for attacks by small groups of trained terrorists, possibly working with a confederate inside the plant.21 Additional protection against the threat from an insider can also be provided by measures such as compartmentalization to restrict entry of personnel to key areas and the adoption of a two-person rule. This might prove difficult in existing power stations, but it is possible to design out vulnerable areas in new plants.22

However, there are limits to the effectiveness of physical protection measures against some forms of CBRN weapon attack, particularly attacks involving a WMD. There is no effective physical defence against an indiscriminate attack against the population of a state, because the terrorists could use the weapon at any location where there is a large concentration of people. The blast effects of nuclear weapons are so great that they can be used at a wide range of locations in a city in order to cause indiscriminate mass casualties. If the intention was to destroy a specific target such as a building or a commercial centre, a nuclear weapon would not need to be placed in the vicinity of it in order to destroy it. The same is also true of BW agents that can be spread person to person, as well as biological agents, radiological and chemical contamination which are capable of being spread on the wind. In contrast, the cruder types of CBRN weapons that terrorists are likely to be able to manufacture will be much less effective unless they can be brought into range of the target, and so physical defences could potentially play a role in constraining these threats.

Physical security measures can seriously complicate the task of executing an attack using CBRN weapons and increase the chance of failure or detection for the terrorist. Coupled with other constraints that restrict the types of weapons that terrorists can acquire, physical security can in certain scenarios have a significant impact on the nature of the threat. Al-Qaeda has experimented with hydrogen cyanide, but it is only really useable as a CW if it is used indoors. It requires the terrorist cell that possesses the cyanide to gain access to the target that it wishes to attack. Good security measures at potential target buildings will therefore impact on the ability of a terrorist cell to execute a successful attack using hydrogen cyanide and could encourage

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terrorists to attack targets with less protection. Alternatively, the presence of physical security measures could perhaps encourage terrorist cells to use CBRN weapons, if those weapons offer a way of getting around those defences. Many official buildings have explosives detectors which would not detect BW. In another scenario, smuggling a conventional explosive device into a soccer stadium would be very difficult, so one terrorist cell in the UK discussed the possibility of poisoning beer and burgers being sold by a fast food vendor in one stadium.23

Use of Military Force The use of military force has always been an integral part of counter- terrorism for virtually all states that have faced persistent terrorist threats. This can range from the use of military personnel to support police operations, to limited operations by special forces units or air strikes on specific targets, to the full-scale invasion of a state. However, the use of military force is dependent upon good intelligence in order to be effective. Israel has routinely used military force to strike at terrorist targets in the Palestinian territories and neighbouring states, with mixed success. It has been particularly successful in killing many senior leaders of the various armed Palestinian groups, but it has failed to destroy the military power of any of these groups, and these strikes have often resulted in the death of innocent civilians. Similarly, in response to the bombings of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the USA launched over 50 Tomahawk cruise missiles at targets in Afghanistan and Sudan that were linked to bin Laden. The attack caused limited damage to the Islamist training camps in Afghanistan and failed to kill bin Laden. The backlash that it generated only provided additional popular support for bin Laden in many Muslim states.

In the post 9/11 world, many states have placed an even greater emphasis on the use of military force for counter-terrorism purposes. The US National Security Doctrine codifies the use of military force to both track down terrorists and fight preventive wars when necessary. It states that the US,

must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn. As a matter of common sense and self defence, America will act against emerging threats before they are fully formed … Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership, command, control, and communications, material

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support and finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the terrorist’s ability to plan and operate.24

The doctrine also warned that the USA was ready to exercise its right of self defence by acting pre-emptively. It stated that

The US has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat to our national security the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the US will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.25

The doctrine acknowledged the need to enlist the support of the international community but also warned that the USA was willing to act unilaterally if necessary.

One of the most contentious elements of the doctrine is the provision it makes for the use of preventive military action against state sponsors of terrorism and states that proliferate CBRN weapons. As discussed in Chapter 7, there were no links between proliferator states and any previous of the incidents involving the use of a CBRN weapon, and there are good reasons to suggest that state sponsors of terrorism will continue to refrain from assisting terrorists with acquiring CBRN weapons. Nevertheless, this element of the doctrine was used to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Yet the war actually led to an increase in terrorism within Iraq, including some acts of CBRN terrorism. In addition, it has not prevented states such as Iran and Syria sponsoring terrorism within Lebanon and Iraq. There are also other inherent risks in using military force against proliferator regimes because it could potentially create the motivation for regime loyalists or nationalists to seek revenge on the USA by sponsoring acts of terrorism.

The fundamental problem with the use of military force for counter- terrorism purposes is the need to reconcile it with the political dimension of counter-terrorism policy. Any civilian deaths caused by military operations simply add to the underlying sense of repression and alienation that spawned the terror group in the first instance, and can undermine the positive impacts of any political programmes that have been put in place to address the political, social, and economic root causes of terrorism. Similarly, states can alienate potential international political support by being seen to overreact to terror threats with the use of military force. The USA,

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Russia, and Israel have all been heavily criticized for the way that they have used military force to combat terrorist and insurgent groups. Hence, there is a fundamental inconsistency between the military and political dimensions of the US National Security Doctrine. One of its major objectives is to win the support of moderate Muslims, yet the use of military force against Muslim states has actually alienated moderate Muslim opinion. Therefore, the longer-term effectiveness of the use of military force will depend upon how well states are able to mange the synergies between the military and political dimensions of counter-terrorism.

Despite these shortcomings, the use of military force will have an impact on managing the future threat of CBRN terrorism. Any intelligence that is received of clandestine CBRN weapon development in other states should now precipitate a strong military response to destroy it. However, in instances where accurate intelligence of the location of CBRN weapon development facilities is lacking, states will have to invade the state in question in order to uncover them, as the USA did in Afghanistan. There have been two previous examples of states using military force to destroy terrorist CBRN weapon- development facilities, which highlight both the potential and the limitations of the use of military force for this purpose. The first was the destruction of the Shaifa chemical plant in Sudan with cruise missiles following the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The second was the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, which successfully destroyed al-Qaeda’s CBRN weapon-development infrastructure and killed many key al-Qaeda leaders. Yet in both instances the limitations of the use of military force based on limited or flawed intelligence are also apparent. It soon became apparent that the Shaifa plant was not actually a CW-production facility. In Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda facilities were destroyed by bombing in 2001, but it was not until ground troops began to search the country that the full extent of al-Qaeda’s CBRN weapon development infrastructure became apparent. The invasion of Afghanistan severely disrupted al-Qaeda’s ability to directly control international terrorist activities, but failed to destroy it. After a few years al-Qaeda began to operate freely again in certain parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and its leadership began to resume more direct control of international terrorist activities.

Despite this, the greater willingness of states to use military force to pre-empt acts of CBRN terror, means that terrorist groups will no longer have completely safe havens in which they will have the time and freedom to develop CBRN weapons. This was evident when the al-Qaeda CW expert Abu Khabab was killed by an American air strike inside Pakistan, in 2008. This indicates that even in ostensibly safe havens, terrorists will

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have to ensure strict secrecy. However, as the initial success of the war in Afghanistan receded into the distance, to be replaced by a protracted counter-insurgency war, so the political willingness of Western states to intervene militarily in failed states may have weakened.

Capacity Building in Regional States The international dimension of contemporary terrorism, makes it imperative for states to work with, and through, other states in implementing their counter-terrorism policies. The US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism stresses the importance of enlisting the support of the international community, of adapting old alliances, and forging new partnerships, to facilitate regional solutions that isolate the spread of terrorism.26 This involves working with weak states that despite being willing to engage in counter-terrorism efforts, often lack the capacity to manage terrorism within their own borders. The war on terror has therefore seen the USA provide significant assistance, including direct military support, to build the counter-terrorism capacity of a number of regional states.

The first significant commitment of US assistance after 9/11 occurred in the Philippines where the security forces were fighting the Abu Sayyaf group. The group allegedly has links to al-Qaeda and had previously kidnapped and killed US citizens. The Philippines army had previously had only limited success in fighting the Abu Sayyaf. Now for the first time, US special forces troops were despatched to the Philippines to train the Filipino counter-terrorism forces. This was replicated in Georgia where al- Qaeda fugitives were thought to have joined hundreds of Chechen rebels hiding in the Pankisi gorge region, on the border with Chechnya. Georgia is riddled with corruption, beset by separatist conflicts, and hampered by weak government. At that time, its army was poorly equipped and over-stretched in dealing with these problems. To help the government re-establish control over the Pankisi gorge, the USA sent special forces soldiers to train the Georgian army and provided other forms of military assistance.27 The USA also provided weapons, money, and expertise to Yemen, Nepal, Jordan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, and Indonesia.28

The Political Dimension of Counter-terrorism Future threats of CBRN terrorism could also potentially be mitigated through political measures. The principal objective of a political approach to counter-terrorism is to deny terrorists popular support, and ultimately to persuade the terrorists themselves to give up their campaigns of violence, by addressing the root causes of terrorism. This can take the form of

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socio-economic programmes to improve the economic well being of the community that the terrorists purport to represent, political reforms to address the political objectives of the group, as well as measures to redress any perceived social inequalities. Since 9/11, the USA has recognized that in conjunction with action by security forces, political measures have the capacity to restrict the growth and activities of terrorist groups, by giving the political dimension of counter-terrorism a prominent role alongside the use of military force. The core elements of the political dimension of US counter-terrorism policy are to address the root causes of terrorism and to wage a war of ideas against terrorist ideologies in order to deny them popular legitimacy.

Many states that have experienced violence from indigenous terrorist groups have negotiated with them, and in doing so have entered a bargaining relationship. A number of states have demonstrated that it is possible to negotiate ceasefires with some terrorist and insurgent groups, and even achieve longer term peace agreements. The Philippines and Columbia have at times been able to secure ceasefires with the various ethno-nationalist separatist and left-wing revolutionary groups they are fighting, whilst they try to negotiate a lasting political solution. Peace in these states has proved elusive, but it demonstrates that states can negotiate with terrorist and insurgent groups, and in some instances these political approaches can potentially secure lasting peace deals.

The UK government engaged in several attempts at dialogue with the IRA during the course of the conflict in Northern Ireland. This ultimately led to a number of political compromises by both sides and resulted in the Anglo-Irish agreement and the Good Friday agreement in 1998 that brought the IRA’s campaign of violence to an end. This indicates that conflicts involving secular political or ethno-nationalist separatist groups can be resolved, although the emergence of the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA splinter groups indicated that political engagement will not necessarily draw in all of the most extreme elements within these groups. Therefore the success of political approaches may well remain partial. However, like the USA, the UK has categorically ruled out negotiations with al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups.

In contrast to the secular IRA however, engaging and meeting the aspirations of ‘religious’ terrorist groups, appears to be an entirely different proposition. The very nature of religious fundamentalism suggests that these types of group are incapable of compromising on their underlying goals and principles. Amir Taheri argues that, ‘Islamic fundamentalism has always viewed itself as a force capable of conquering the contemporary

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world from without. It cannot conceive of either coexistence or political compromise. To the exponents of Holy Terror, Islam must either dominate or be dominated’.29 This is clearly reflected in the ideology of al-Qaeda and the groups inspired by it, which believe that they are engaged in a ‘cosmic war’ of ‘good’ against ‘evil’. By the very nature of such a conflict, there can be no compromises with the enemy.

In many cases therefore, governments cannot accede to the optimum demands of many terrorist groups. The USA could potentially try to meet the political demands of al-Qaeda by withdrawing its troops from the Arabian peninsula, but political realities are such that it could not withdraw its support for Israel or the Muslim states in the Middle East which al-Qaeda seeks to overthrow. In any event, these political objectives are simply short- term objectives in al-Qaeda’s longer term ‘cosmic war’ against the forces of ‘evil’. Similarly, India is unwilling to grant Kashmir independence, Israel is not going to withdraw to its pre-1967 frontiers and the government of Columbia will not accede to the left-wing revolutionary demands of the FARC. The USA would have similar problems meeting the demands of the extreme right-wing and far-right terrorist groups within its own borders. Their racist agenda is not acceptable within a democratic society, and neither is the federal government going to legislate itself out of existence by devolving its powers to state and local level, simply because it suits a small minority of extremists. There does not seem to be room for compromise between the federal government and these groups, since the paranoia that fuels their belief systems is derived from the very existence of the federal government. At the far end of the spectrum, political solutions are not the answer to the threat posed by religious cults, because they are internally driven by religious- based doctrines of Armageddon. Cults cannot be engaged by governments because they do not seek political goals, and the social goals that they seek will be fulfilled only in the aftermath of Armageddon. Therefore they have no interest in bargaining with governments for concessions.

Yet, as is the case with secular terrorist groups, some ‘religious’ groups have shown a willingness to re-formulate their goals and adapt to changing circumstances. Hezbollah, for instance, has renounced the idea of establishing an Islamist state in Lebanon and has recognized the multi- confessional nature of Lebanese society. It has participated in elections and its members have served in the Lebanese parliament. As noted in Chapter 4, the objectives of many ‘religious’ terrorist groups are actually political in nature, and the attainment, or partial attainment of these objectives, can have an impact on the use of violence by terror groups. For example, suicide bombings by Hezbollah against American, French, and Israeli targets in the

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1980s, ended when these nations withdrew their troops from Lebanon. One of the main objectives of Hezbollah is to liberate all Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation. The last remaining dispute is over the Turnak Farms region. Israel has proven unwilling to negotiate over this disputed territory, so it remains to be seen whether it would be possible to negotiate a deal which returned the land to Lebanon in return for a permanent cessation of Hezbollah’s military activities against Israel. Similarly, there was a dramatic decline in Palestinian suicide bombings following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza between 2004 and 2005. Even some Islamist groups that were previously linked to al-Qaeda have proven willing to re-assess their use of violence. The Egyptian government’s overtures to Gemaah Islamiyah to renounce violence, were accepted after the Egyptian security forces had all but destroyed the group.

This analysis suggests that it is possible to mitigate some future terrorist threats through political measures, but that it is generally not possible to find political solutions that would meet the optimum demands of most of these groups. In particular, political solutions cannot guarantee to convince the most militant factions, or address the threat posed by ad hoc terrorist cells that are brought together for specific missions. But even if an all- encompassing political solution is impossible to find, it is only through engaging with moderate opinion within the terrorists’ own communities that governments can try to manage the threat of terrorism. As a consequence, political solutions do appear to have a potential role in managing the risks of CBRN terrorism.

Consequence Management

Strengthening national and international counter-terrorism measures will undoubtedly make it more difficult for terrorists to procure and use CBRN weapons, but it will never eliminate the threat entirely. This means that states also need effective consequence-management capabilities to cope with the effects of a CBRN attack. There are a wide range of measures that states can put in place to minimize the damage and casualties from most forms of CBRN attack. The combination of the poor quality CBRN weapons that terrorists are likely to produce in conjunction with good consequence management by the state, could significantly limit casualties from future CBRN attacks.

The response to a CBRN terrorist attack requires effective political and bureaucratic control of the emergency. People need timely and credible information from the government in order to avoid panic reactions such

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as hospitals being inundated with people who believe that they might have been exposed to the CBRN agent. The confusion and delays that marked the US government’s response to the anthrax letters in 2001 hints at the problems that might arise if a highly infectious pathogen such as smallpox is released. The inability of government officials to answer basic questions about the origin of the attack, the nature of the risks, and how long the letters might keep coming, meant that the administration was unable to contain the psychological impact of the attack on the American people. These unknowns contributed to the government’s inadequate handling of the public relations aspect of managing the attack. Contradictory public statements from government officials suggested a lack of clarity and purpose, which contributed to public anxiety. The difficulties of effectively managing this low level BW attack, raises fundamental questions about how to manage a WMD attack.

Following a CBRN terrorist attack, the most important operational community are the first responders. This includes the local police, hazardous material specialists, fire and medical services. They must be capable of mounting an effective no-notice response to an attack since there would be little or no time to bring in outside experts to deal with the immediate consequences. They have the greatest opportunity to limit the casualties in any attack. But in virtually all states, the vast majority of first responders have no specialist training or equipment to deal with an attack involving a CBRN weapon. However, it is possible to create a layered system of preparedness which would start with broad-based awareness training, and the provision of specialized equipment and training for local specialists (e.g. hazardous materials teams, bomb squads, and emergency management officials) and specialized medical units at regional level.30

These first responders at local and regional level can be supported by specialized national counter-CBRN response teams. In the USA this includes the NEST, the Chemical Biological Rapid Response Teams (CBRRT); the National Guard’s Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Teams (RAIDS), the FBI’s Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), the State Department’s Federal Emergency Support Team (FEST); the Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) and the Army’s Technical Escort Unit (TEU).31 The Public Health Service has also created medical-response teams that are capable of organizing an effective operational response to a large-scale attack.32 All of these response teams are being equipped with CBRN-related equipment.

Following an attack, the first issue for the government is to actually identify what is happening. This will not be an issue with nuclear weapons because

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the blast effects will be obvious. The contamination effects of a chemical or radiological attack will also be immediately apparent, although it may take time to identify the precise agent that has been used. In contrast, it will not be immediately apparent that a BW attack has occurred. An attack will probably first be detected by epidemiological surveillance systems when casualties begin arriving at hospitals. This makes public health specialists in infectious diseases a critical part of the front line of defence. It is through quick diagnosis of the disease and recognition that it has been the result of a deliberate release that casualties can be limited and the outbreak contained. Since the incubation period of some infectious diseases can be days, many lives can potentially be saved. Most developed states already have systems in place to detect, contain, and treat natural outbreaks of disease, but these would be inadequate to deal with the potentially large number of casualties from a WMD attack.

With an infectious disease, the medical response would have to be very fast. In the USA, the Epidemiological Surveillance system at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) provides early warning. Specialized equipment held at a few sites such as the CDC and the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases can identify an agent within three hours, although standard enzyme based tests can take 18–24 hours.33 The UK has adopted the innovative approach of combining specialist public health expertise in infectious diseases, radiation and chemical protection in one agency, the Health Protection Agency, which can support first responders anywhere in the country. The problems of managing the medical response to a CBRN weapon attack were apparent in the US Administration’s handling of the anthrax letter attack in 2001. The medical response to the attack was delayed by a dispute between the FBI and Army scientists over the quality of the anthrax, which prompted the FBI to withhold information from the CDC while it waited for more data about the anthrax. As a result, decision makers lacked the information they needed about how the spores might spread. This delayed the testing and treatment of postal workers and contributed to a number of deaths.34 Therefore, adequate training for public health professionals in the identification of cases of contamination by CBW agents coupled with an effective warning system that can rapidly identify the agent that has been used are critical in creating a system that can respond quickly to biological, chemical, and radiological attack.

The ability to treat large numbers of casualties will also be dependent upon local medical services having access to the necessary treatments and prophylaxis. Since 9/11, a number of states have invested heavily in developing new vaccines and treatments, and have procured stockpiles of vaccines, antibiotics, anti-toxins, and iodine tablets sufficient to treat large

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numbers of casualties. The quantities of vaccine, antitoxins or antibiotics required to deal with a WMD attack would be enormous. In a scenario involving a BW attack that caused 30,000 casualties, it would require approximately 2 tonnes of antibiotics which would have to be delivered overnight.35 VX is the easiest CW to treat if atropine is administered immediately, which will be a problem if the stocks are held too far away from the site of an attack. For large states therefore, logistics is a particular problem and stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines can only help to limit casualties rather than prevent them. In order to be effective these central stockpiles need to be maintained at a high state of readiness and to be capable of being delivered to the site of an attack extremely quickly. Israel has implemented the most widespread and effective programme of CBRN consequence-management measures of any state. All Israeli citizens are issued with protective kits which include gas masks, atropine injections, and powder to treat chemical burns,36 and the home front command has systems for distributing antibiotics within a very short space of time. Israel has the advantage of being a geographically small state and having a relatively small population, which means the Israeli programme cannot be replicated in most other states. It is impossible to determine how effectively the existing medical infrastructures of different states could deal with massive numbers of CBRN casualties. No state has enough isolation beds to cope with a massive outbreak of infectious disease, and most doctors have a lack of knowledge about uncommon agents and pathogens such as anthrax.37 Therefore, strengthening public health systems is one of the foremost consequence-management measures.

The armed forces of many states also have the capability to contribute significantly to civil defence plans because of their specialized knowledge, training and equipment for operating in large-scale CBRN environments. So as states improve the capabilities of their armed forces to cope with CBRN weapon threats they will also enhance their domestic capability to cope with the threat.

Technology can greatly enhance the capabilities of consequence- management programmes, but such technologies are invariably expensive, and policy makers have to strike a balance between the resources that they can afford to invest in technology and its inherent limitations. The key technologies are detection devices, protective suits, decontamination systems, and bomb disposal equipment. However, there is no technical fix to the threat from CBRN terrorism, new technologies are only one of a suite of responses and counter-measures that governments need to put in place to counter the threat.

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The majority of future CBRN terrorist attacks are likely to be crude agents that are poorly weaponized, or simply used as contaminants. The potential casualty levels from this kind of attack are likely to be small. This means that effective consequence-management measures have the potential to significantly contribute to limiting the casualties of any future attack. Even with a WMD attack, where casualties will be high, effective preparations such as mechanisms for delivering large quantities of medical counter-measures to the site of the attack at short notice will save lives.

Conclusion

Government counter-terrorism measures will never prevent all future CBRN terrorist attacks, but it is now much harder for terrorists to operate in many states and some future CBRN attacks will undoubtedly be prevented by such measures. Every minor improvement in capabilities could increase the chances of detecting and preventing a potential attack. Hence, counter-measures could potentially influence the technological choices that terrorists make in trying to develop CBRN weapons and will also influence terrorists’ operational decision making. Some groups may be deterred from even attempting to develop CBRN weapons because of the heightened risk of detection, others may make sporadic ad hoc efforts to develop CBRN weapons for specific attacks rather than a systematic development programme similar to what Aum Shinrikyo established. It could also encourage groups to develop the easiest and least visible types of agents and weapon, but even some of these options are capable of causing significant casualties, for instance if ricin was used to contaminate food or hydrogen cyanide was introduced into a building through its air conditioning system. But the most violent and committed groups are not likely to be deterred, and will simply accept the additional risk of detection. Similarly, consequence management will never be wholly effective, but continued improvements in response capabilities will reduce the potential damage and casualties from any CBRN attack. Governments need to achieve coherence in their programmes, so that even if they do not have significant resources they can at least focus on the lower cost responses that will enable them to maximize the value of the resources which they can invest. However, terrorists have proven themselves to be highly adaptive, and will continue to innovate in their use of weapons and tactics to defeat whatever defences states might put in their way.

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