Written Assignment #4 – Week 8

7

STATE-SPONSORED CBRN TERRORISM: MOTIVATIONS AND

DISINCENTIVES

One of the principle independent variables in assessing the threat of CBRN and WMD terrorism is the possibility of state sponsorship. Acquiring a CBRN weapon from a state would make questions about the technological constraints on any particular terrorist group redundant. This would draw a much wider range of groups into assessments about the nature of the threat, because it brings in those groups that might have the motivation to use them but otherwise lack the technological capability to develop them independently. In the twentieth century there were a number of allegations of state complicity in terrorist plots involving CBRN weapons but none was ever proven. Despite the prevalence of state-sponsored terrorism, it has never crossed the threshold into CBRN or WMD terrorism. This chapter will explore why.

State Sponsorship of Terrorism

Since 9/11, state sponsorship of terrorism has become a major theme in US assessments of the potential threat from CBRN terrorism. Denying further state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists was one of the cornerstones of the 2003 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.1 There is no evidence of the complicity of a state in the events of 9/11, but the fact that several alleged proliferators of WMD also sponsor terrorism was enough to drive US foreign policy in the ‘war on terror’.2 In January 2002, President Bush delivered his infamous ‘Axis of Evil’ speech in his State of the Union address. Bush described an axis of evil comprising Iran,

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 1 1 . I . B . T a u r i s .

A l l r i g h t s r e s e r v e d . M a y n o t b e r e p r o d u c e d i n a n y f o r m w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n f r o m t h e p u b l i s h e r , e x c e p t f a i r u s e s p e r m i t t e d u n d e r U . S . o r a p p l i c a b l e c o p y r i g h t l a w .

EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 10/27/2021 10:32 PM via AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM AN: 355536 ; Benjamin Cole.; The Changing Face of Terrorism : How Real Is the Threat From Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons? Account: s7348467.main.ehost

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Iraq, and North Korea, which was arming to threaten global peace and security. The speech explicitly linked the threats of WMD proliferation and terrorism. Bush pledged to prevent regimes that sponsor terrorism from threatening the US and its allies with CBRN weapons. This re-iterated a previous announcement in January 2002 when Bush told the UN that ‘rogue States [are] the most likely sources of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons for terrorists … I will not wait on events while dangers gather’.3 To an extent, the USA was using the war against terrorism to solve its other security issues, but it also reflected a genuine concern that these states might one day cross the threshold to sponsor an act of CBRN terrorism.

State sponsorship of terrorism has increased markedly since the 1970s, much of it with political and ideological objectives such as the overthrow of specific regimes and the extension of the political influence of the sponsoring state. Bruce Hoffman argues that for state sponsors,

terrorism remains a useful and integral tool of their respective foreign policies: a clandestine weapon to be wielded whenever the situation is appropriate and the benefits palpable, but remaining sheathed when the risks of using it appear to outweigh the potential gains and the possible repercussions are likely to prove counterproductive. For the state sponsor, much as for the terrorist group itself, terrorism is not a mindless act of fanatical or indiscriminate violence but a purposefully targeted, deliberately calibrated method of pursuing specific objectives at acceptable cost.4

During the Cold War, the USA funded and armed numerous anti- communist groups in the developing world such as the Contras in Nicaragua and the Afghan Mujahideen, whilst the Soviet Union funded communist insurgencies around the world. The collapse of communism in eastern Europe between 1989 and 1990 brought new evidence to light of eastern intelligence agencies supporting terrorist groups in the West, although it fell short of proving that they actually controlled the activities of groups such as the RAF.5

In the post Cold War world, there was a shift in state sponsors of terrorism to states in the developing world. The seminal event for states using non-state actors to pursue their foreign policy goals occurred in 1979, when radical ‘students’ seized the US embassy in Iran, and held the occupants hostage for 444 days. The success of this act did not go unnoticed by radical states in the developing world, which realized that it could be an effective way, perhaps the only effective way, in which they could strike at the USA.

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So whilst the embassy crisis was the beginning of a long campaign of state- sponsored terrorism by the revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, it was also crucially significant as a precedent for a host of other regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere, which realized that the West was vulnerable to terrorism.

In 2007 the USA identified Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as states which have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.6 With the exception of Sudan, all of these states had been on the list for over a decade. There have also been allegations of some of these states co-operating in sponsoring terrorism. For instance, terrorist training camps in Sudan were allegedly financed and run by Iran,7 whilst Palestinian Islamic Jihad received support from both Syria and Iran.8 However, on the basis of the criteria that the US State Department uses to justify the inclusion of a state on the list, such as the provision of safe havens for terrorist groups, it could be argued that several other states should also have been added to the list. In particular, this includes Pakistan because of persistent allegations that elements within the Pakistani security establishment sponsor Islamist insurgent and terrorist groups operating in Indian controlled Kashmir as well as Afghanistan. Indeed, Pakistani support was critical to the Taliban seizing power in Afghanistan. There are also parts of Pakistan which are not under the direct control of the Pakistani government, in which terrorists have found a safe haven. This has led to the observation that to a certain extent, the inclusion of a state on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism, was also a reflection on its relations with the USA.9

The principle motivations for these to sponsor terrorism are national self interest, ideology, and revenge. The most obvious ways in which states use the sponsorship of terrorism to further their national interests is by using it to undermine hostile regimes, or to coerce another state into making political concessions. The motives of Syria in sponsoring Hezbollah for instance, are closely bound up with its interest in regaining control of the Golan Heights from Israel, regaining its influence in Lebanon, and generally enhancing its power in the Middle East. For ideologically driven states, sponsorship is often directed at terrorist groups that share the same ideology, for example communist regimes sponsoring left-wing terrorist groups. This also serves the national self interest for these regimes, if they can help to secure the victory of an ideological ally in another state. The ideological legitimacy accorded to these motives by the state sponsors means that they do not consider that they are supporting terrorism. Instead, they view their actions as legitimate support for freedom fighters who are struggling against oppressive regimes. Iran, Syria, and Pakistan define groups such as Hamas,

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Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and the insurgents in Indian controlled Kashmir as freedom fighters, whereas the West considers them to be terrorists. Ironically, this mirrors the situation with the Nicaraguan Contras during the 1980s. The USA described them as freedom fighters, but they were described by many other states as terrorists. These conceptual differences over the definition of terrorism lie at the heart of the problem of state- sponsored terrorism. There have also been cases of states sponsoring terrorism as a means of exacting revenge against another state. In the wake of the bombing of Tripoli by the USA in 1986, Libya sent several large shiploads of weapons and explosives to the IRA in Northern Ireland, as punishment for Britain’s involvement in the bombing raid.10

It is Iran however, that is considered to be the most active sponsor of terrorism, supporting numerous Islamist and fundamentalist groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian Territories, and Shi’a insurgents in Iraq. This potentially also makes it one of the most dangerous, because it supports some of the types of group which are most closely associated with the steady increase in the lethality of modern terrorism. Significantly however, Iran is ideologically divorced from the wider networks of Sunni Islamist groups and cells, including al-Qaeda, that have proliferated in the Middle East.

Iran’s policy is partly driven by ideological motivations. It presents its revolution as an example to Muslims across the world to re-assert the fundamental teachings of the Koran. Because it considers itself to be the only state to have begun the process of redemption by creating a ‘true’ Islamic state, it considers that it must be the advocate of oppressed and aggrieved Muslims everywhere.11 Consequently, exporting the Islamic revolution became an Iranian foreign policy goal, which has been manifest in its support for Shi’a groups and causes throughout the Middle East. In addition, Iran also sponsors terrorist groups for geo-political reasons, by either assisting groups that will be loyal to it or those with whom it shares a common enemy. Hence, in the early 1990s there were indications that Iran had shifted its policy to support not only Shi’a groups but also Sunni groups. This was interpreted as a move to increase Iranian influence in the Middle East following the first Gulf War by filling the vacuum caused by Iraq’s inability to sponsor some terrorist groups, and Syria’s interest in developing closer relations with the USA.12 The Iranian objective in sponsoring terrorism is the belief that increasing levels of terrorism will encourage governments to clamp down on their Muslim populations and subsequently enable Iran to act as a focus for the exploited and repressed Muslims in those states.13

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R. James Woolsey, a former Director of the CIA, stated in evidence before the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate that,

Iran is by far and away the most active and dangerous state sponsor … Tehran supports Lebanese Hezbollah both financially and militarily. In large part because of this support over the past decade, Hezbollah now poses a greater threat to US and Western interests than any other Middle Eastern terrorist group … and senior Iranian officials and Tehran’s media organizations are funnelling propaganda to the rest of the Islamic world that the US is the ‘Great Satan’ whose policy is to oppress Muslims.14

Besides being influenced by regional geo-political and strategic factors, Iranian policy on sponsoring terrorism also seems to vary according to internal political factors within Iran. In the early twenty-first century there was a schism in Iranian politics between the reformist President Khatami and the conservatives led by Ayatollah Khameini who sought to preserve the structure and principles of the 1979 revolution.15 Following the Axis of Evil speech in 2002, US-Iranian relations deteriorated and there was an apparent hardening of the Iranian approach to sponsoring terrorism. Of particular concern were allegations of Iranian support for al-Qaeda, particularly that it was helping al-Qaeda fighters escape from Afghanistan.16 Iran also continued to provide training bases for a number of militant groups, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.17 These activities might have been a consequence of a dislocation in decision making within Iran, centering around the reformist-conservative divide within Iranian politics, which led to the conservative elements acting independently.18 In 2005 however, the conservative President Ahmedinajad was elected President of Iran, and US-Iranian relations worsened even further as the USA attempted to use diplomatic and economic measures to coerce Iran into giving up its nuclear programme. This strategy failed, and Iranian support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi’a insurgents continued, if not increased.

On the other side of the state-terrorist relationship, there are major benefits for terrorists in seeking the support of a state. This comes in two basic forms: passive and active. Passive support includes the provision of safe havens. Syria for instance, has provided a haven for members of groups such as Hezbollah and various Palestinian groups. Active support can include the provision of logistical support, financing, training, weapons, intelligence, the use of diplomatic bags, and false papers. Iran for instance provides extensive active support to its client groups, particularly through

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164 The Changing Face of Terrorism

training, arms shipments, and finance,19 which it arranges through a network of safe houses, embassies, consulates, mosques, special schools, and tourism companies.20

Terrorists do not necessarily have to identify with their patron’s cause, to obtain its support. All they have to be willing to do is perform a service for a price. As such, it adds a new dimension to international terrorism because it is not geared to seeking publicity, but to achieve the foreign policy goals of their patron, by bringing pressure to bear through acts of violence. Consequently it operates under fewer constraints than ordinary terrorism. Bruce Hoffman argues that:

because state-sponsored terrorists do not depend on the local population for support, they do not concern themselves with the risk of alienating popular support or provoking a public backlash. Thus the state-sponsored terrorist and his patron can engage in acts of violence that are typically more destructive and bloodier than those carried out by groups acting on their own behalf. 21

In fact, Hoffman points out that overall, state-sponsored attacks were eight times more lethal than those carried out by groups without state support or assistance.22 Yet despite these figures, this does not necessarily mean that state-sponsored terrorists are unconstrained killers, or that their patrons are interested in causing indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks.

The extent of state sponsorship of terrorism can ebb and flow depending upon the geo-strategic situation of the sponsor. In the late 1990s evidence of state sponsorship of terrorism was limited. An analysis of the chronologies of 330 significant terrorist incidents identified by the State Department from 1992 to 1996 revealed only six in which states were purported to have had direct control over the alleged perpetrators. Over two-thirds of the incidents classified as international terrorism were directly attributable to non-state actors.23

Since 9/11 some regional security environments have changed completely, particularly in the Middle East. Here, regional states are concerned about the US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the aggressive use of military force by Israel in the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon, which it invaded in 2006. For those states identified in the ‘axis of evil’, or which appear on the US State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, there are acute security concerns about whether they will be next on the list for military intervention and regime change. At the same time, the instability in Iraq created opportunities for a power struggle between

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regional states. These drivers have established new incentives to support insurgent and terrorist groups inside Iraq as a means of tying down US military power and competing for political influence within the new Iraq. Iran in particular has been accused of actively supporting militia groups and acts of terrorism within Iraq, whilst Syria has been variously accused of complicity or negligence in acting as a transit point for Islamist terrorists into Iraq. Nevertheless, whilst the war in Iraq has led to an upsurge in state- sponsored terrorism, it has not led to a single act of state-sponsored CBRN terrorism. Both Iran and Syria have been successful in achieving their aims in Iraq through sponsorship of conventional forms of terrorism.

Allegations of State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism

One of the principal global developments which has underpinned the debate on terrorism and CBRN weapons has been the heightened interest of terrorist groups in CW, after states in the developing world used them in regional conflicts. This was particularly true of Iraq, which used CW during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980–88, and against the Kurdish town of Halabja in Northern Iraq in March 1988, which resulted in the deaths of 6,000 civilians.24 One commentator, has even argued that terrorist interest in CBRN weapons, ‘seems in large measure to be a consequence of state actions’.25

The first allegations of states assisting terrorists in developing CBRN weapons and planning attacks surfaced in the 1980s, but none was ever substantiated. A former member of the East German secret police (the Stasi) claimed that in the early 1980s an East German terrorist camp had been teaching terrorists to use CBW against civilian targets. Iraqis and Palestinians were allegedly taught how to disseminate CBW agents in public places, such as airports and train stations, and how to poison water supplies. The former Stasi officer also claimed that agents of the Iraqi secret police, the Mukhabarat, had been trained to use CBWs. This training allegedly took place in 1980- 1985, after which it continued in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Some experts believed that some Stasi officials who were reluctant to return to a unified Germany continued to train agents in Iraq.26

After the end of the Cold War, one of the principle threats of state- sponsored CBRN terrorism was considered to be posed by Iraq. During the 1991 Gulf War, there were reports that Iraq had plans to use BW against airports, airlines, schools, trains, railroads, oil refineries, and hospitals in Europe. Weapons inspectors working for UNSCOM discovered plans to use biological agents in terrorist activities, including an anonymous threat to contaminate the

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water supply of a city in British Colombia with a biological agent.27 Following the war, there were continued reports of Iraqi intentions to sponsor acts of CBRN terrorism. In 1998, British intelligence warned that Iraq was planning to smuggle anthrax into the UK in duty-free goods. An ‘all ports’ warning was issued, but government Ministers subsequently downplayed the reports and stated that there was no evidence of such a plot.28 It was also alleged that an Iraqi terrorist network was being maintained in the USA, which was equipped with biological agents that had been smuggled into the USA by Iraqi women.29 Whilst these warnings never amounted to anything (particularly because the Iraqi WMD programme was largely dismantled by UNSCOM after 1991), they heightened concerns that some states might resort to CBRN terrorism if they felt threatened enough, and were a major factor in the US decision to invade Iraq and oust the Saddam regime in 2003.

In the 1990s there were also persistent but unproven allegations of Islamist and Islamic fundamentalist terrorists receiving state support in acquiring and using CBRN weapons. In 1993, there was a report that proposals were made at a meeting of terrorist groups in Tehran, under the auspices of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, to poison the water supplies of major Western cities.30 Whilst in August 1996 there was a report that Israel had warned the USA of a plan by Iran to poison water resources in Western Europe and the USA with a biological agent, and that both the US and Israel believed that Iranian scientists had developed a BW aerosol that could be used by terrorists.31 But as was the case with the warnings about the threat from the Saddam regime, these warnings never came to anything.

Despite these reports and allegations, no states were involved in any of the previous incidents of CBRN terrorism. This suggests that states have previously been unwilling to release CBRN weapons to terrorist groups. The precise reasons for this will probably remain unknown, but it is possible to speculate that state sponsorship of CBRN terrorism would be inconsistent with the purposes for which states seek to acquire CBRN weapons. The main drivers of proliferation are deterrence and prestige, and releasing CBRN weapons to terrorist groups would be inconsistent with those purposes. Saddam Hussein for instance, saw the purpose of the Iraqi CBRN weapon arsenal as being to preserve his regime. They were considered to have been successful in this role when they were used during the Iran-Iraq war, and were also perceived to have deterred the US-led coalition from attempting to seize Baghdad during the 1991 Gulf War. If this was the primary purpose of the Iraqi CBRN weapon arsenal, it seems unlikely that the regime would have passed them to terrorists and risk a backlash that would crush the regime.

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However, there are unresolved questions about precisely what constitutes state sponsorship of CBRN terrorism. It is generally considered that it means the ordering and directly abetting of a CBRN attack. Yet many groups that have been implicated in efforts to procure and use CBRN weapons have received support from a state, even though the state concerned was not complicit in the specific CBRN plot. Therefore, even if a state is not directly implicated in an attack involving CBRN weapons, more general support for the group could be considered to constitute the sponsorship of that attack.

Potential Motivations for States to Sponsor CBRN Terrorism

As no government has ever previously sponsored an act of CBRN terrorism, debate about what factors might motivate states to do so in the future are highly speculative. An obvious observation is that ‘rogue’ states, which do not accept international norms of behaviour are candidates for doing so. Yet over nearly four decades of CBRN terrorism, no ‘rogue’ government has ever taken such a decision. Saddam Hussein is a prime example. Another observation is that regimes driven by extremist ideologies would do so. Again, this has never previously happened. Even President Ahmedinajad of Iran, who once declared that Israel should be wiped off the face off the map, has not done so.

Instead, one of the more likely factors which could potentially lead to the state sponsorship of CBRN terrorism are the actions of powerful rogue elements within governments or the security apparatus of the state, which have the power to release CBRN weapons from their national weapon arsenals to terrorist groups. In particular, the intelligence services of many states are frequently accused of operating independently, often outside of the rule of law. The role of Colonel Oliver North of the US National Security Council during the Iran-Contra scandal is indicative of the potential of such rogue elements, even within democratic societies. In this operation Colonel North sought to secure the release of US hostages being held in Lebanon by illegally selling arms to Iran, and then using the money to fund the Contras in Nicaragua. Similarly, ideologically driven agencies and individuals in other states have also proven capable of sponsoring terrorist attacks. In particular, the security services of some other states have occasionally been implicated in terrorist violence. In Italy during the 1970s and 1980s, elements of the Italian Intelligence Service (SIS) were directly involved in the campaign of violence being undertaken by various neo-fascist groups.32 Whilst elements of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland were occasionally accused of collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries during the war against the IRA.

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A key actor in contemporary state-sponsored terrorism is Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. In particular, the ISI has been accused of funding, arming, and training Islamic fundamentalist insurgents and terrorist groups operating in Indian controlled Kashmir. This support took place through an umbrella organization called Harkat ul-Ansar (HUA).33 HUA has expanded beyond its original remit in Kashmir and now plays a role within Pakistan itself. It also used to operate training camps in Afghanistan. After seven HUA members were killed by US Tomahawk cruise missile raids against al-Qaeda’s Afghan training camps in 1998, the group swore revenge against the USA.34 The ISI also had strong links to the Taliban. During the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 there were allegations of ISI collusion in the transport of weapons and other war materiel to the Taliban, despite the official support of the Pakistani government for the ‘war on terror’.35 Following 9/11, President Musharraff forced a number of Islamist generals and ISI officers to resign, but it is uncertain whether this has actually put a stop to ISI support for the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

A greater potential risk could perhaps come from rogue individuals within states’ CBRN weapons programmes. This potential risk was given credence by the discovery in 2004 of the clandestine nuclear supply network run by A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear weapon scientist known as the ‘father of the Pakistani bomb’. Khan’s network supplied Iran, North Korea, and Libya with nuclear technology and expertise for over two decades.36 Despite this, there is no evidence of the network supplying terrorist or other jihadi groups, perhaps because Khan was driven by financial rather than ideological considerations. It is individuals who are driven by ideological or religious motives that probably pose the biggest risk. This concern was given credence by the role of the two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmoud and Abdul Majid, who met bin Laden in August 2001 and discussed the development of CBRN weapons. Mehmoud and Majid appear to have been driven by ideological motives, since both of them had been forced out of their jobs in 1999 because they advocated equipping other Islamic nations with highly enriched uranium and plutonium-239.37

A further variable in government decision making on whether to sponsor an act of CBRN terrorism are the political and strategic threats to its future. As no state has ever resorted to an act of state-sponsored terrorism in response to a geo-strategic threat, it is difficult to identify what circumstances might prompt such a decision to be made. In the build up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, there was concern that the invasion would force Saddam Hussain into a ‘no win’ situation that would encourage him

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to use CBRN weapons against Israel and the West, and possibly to give them to terrorists. As it transpired, Saddam had no CBRN weapons, but the question remains of what would have happened if he did. In non-crisis situations it is hard to conceive of an incentive for a state to sponsor an act of CBRN terrorism. Therefore, for many of the states of concern, the principal factors which might lead them to resort to CBRN terrorism are probably linked to specific politico-military scenarios. The principal situation in which a state might resort to CBRN terrorism could be assumed to be one in which the regime is threatened, and it lashes out either to defend itself or in a final act of revenge. But no proliferator regime which both possesses CBRN weapons and sponsors terrorism, has ever been pushed into such a position, therefore it is difficult to test this proposition.

Disincentives for States to Sponsor CBRN Terrorism

The fundamental reason why states have not released CBRN weapons to terror groups is that they have been deterred from doing so by fear of the inevitable retribution from the victim state and the international community if they were ever discovered to be responsible. In the past, responses to acts of state-sponsored terrorism invariably centred around diplomatic and economic sanctions, but there were also a number of instances of states which have been the victims of terrorism retaliating with military force against the state sponsor of the group concerned. Israel in particular has repeatedly used military force against its neighbours in response to terrorist attacks launched from their territory. Some of this action was punitive in nature, but other operations such as the creation of a security zone in southern Lebanon in 1978, the Israeli army’s drive to Beirut in 1982, and the invasion of southern Lebanon 2006, had the wider objectives of attempting to secure Israel’s northern border and destroy the military power of the PLO and Hezbollah. Significantly however, Israel has placed some limits on its use of military force in these operations, notably in not attacking Iran for its sponsorship of Hezbollah and Hamas.

Prior to 9/11, retaliation by the USA against state sponsors of terrorism was rare and largely punitive in nature, such as the air strikes on Libya in 1986 following the bombing of a disco in Berlin in which a number of US servicemen were killed. Successive administrations in the USA were simply not prepared to risk significant military casualties when responding to limited acts of terrorism. However, the casualties and the damage caused on 9/11 were so great that President Bush felt compelled to use overwhelming military force to try and secure a lasting solution to the actual and perceived

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threats from terrorism. The subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated to the world that the USA and its allies will respond to threats of state-sponsored acts of mass destruction with military action to oust the regime responsible. This suggests that a state-sponsored terrorist incident involving a CBRN weapon would be such a major escalation in violence that it would also provoke the most severe backlash from the victim state and the international community. In such a situation it would also be unlikely that the state which was responsible would retain the support of its erstwhile allies.

There are also scenarios in which state sponsors of terrorism need to control the level of violence perpetrated by their proxies. This is particularly evident in the chaos in Iraq following the fall of the Saddam regime. Both Syria and Iran have been accused of supporting various insurgent and militia groups inside Iraq, or facilitating the transport of foreign fighters across their borders into Iraq. Iran in particular has been accused of providing specialist bomb-building skills and material to Shi’a militias. Both governments fear the implications arising from the creation of a pro-US regime in Baghdad. Given the ‘axis of evil’ speech, which was followed by the invasion of Iraq, they are naturally concerned that they will then be next in line for regime change. It is therefore in their interests for the USA to remain militarily bogged down in Iraq for as long as possible. But at the same time, neither Iran nor Syria wants instability on their borders. Both are threatened by internal instability, and both are extremely wary of the extreme Sunni Islamist elements operating in Iraq.38 As a consequence, they seek to sustain the Iraqi insurgency but to maintain it at a level which does not threaten to escalate out of control or provoke military retaliation from the USA.

Another factor which might inhibit state sponsors is that the weapons they pass on to terrorist groups could be turned against themselves one day. The USA has already learned this lesson the hard way. During the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the CIA supplied vast quantities of arms to the Afghan Mujahideen, including sophisticated Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. At the end of the war the surplus missiles risked falling into the hands of terrorist groups. The CIA attempted to buy the missiles back from the Mujahideen, but was unsuccessful. Similarly, during the time when he lived in Sudan, bin Laden was under observation by the Sudanese Intelligence Service, apparently because he was so extreme that even the radical Sudanese government considered that he might become a threat to them one day.39

The extent of this risk will be dependent upon the level of control which state sponsors have over their proxies. Iran does not appear to maintain

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tight control over its proxies. In fact, the Iranian regime deliberately avoided the creation of a unified central command for the terrorist groups it sponsored, because it considered that these groups should be left to plan their own campaigns. Instead, it satisfied itself with maintaining a small degree of influence through its ability to manipulate its ideological influence and financial powers.40 One intelligence source has commented that, ‘The Iranians do not appear to select the targets … Rather they hand out the equipment and the knowledge and each group get on with it. Sometimes the cash disappears, sometimes nothing happens but sometimes the terrorists attack’.41

However, if a state did pass a CBRN weapon to a terrorist group for a specific attack, the state sponsor would undoubtedly attempt to exercise some additional form of control over the group in order that the weapon was used for its intended purpose. There is evidence of some states maintaining tight control over their proxies. Part of the reason why Iraqi- sponsored terrorist attacks did not occur during the Gulf War was apparently because the Iraqis maintained strict control over the supply of arms to their proxies through their embassies, and insisted on giving the go-ahead for all attacks. When communications between the Iraqi foreign ministry and its embassies and intelligence agencies were destroyed, that permission was never received.42 Therefore, problems derived from a loss of control over their proxies should not be a major problem. In turn, this means that state sponsors should be able to ensure that the acts they sponsor meet their foreign policy objectives.

Most state sponsors of terrorism also have some form of relationship with the West which they would not want to jeopardize by sponsoring a CBRN terrorist attack. When Lebanese militias seized a number of Western hostages in the 1990s, both Syria and Iran became involved to secure their release in order to try and improve their relations with the USA. President Assad of Syria needed US backing for his political role in Lebanon, whilst President Rafsanjani of Iran wanted to open up his country to the Western world in order to rescue its economy.43 Even the most isolated states are in this position to a certain extent. North Korea for instance, needs international food aid and has been forced to negotiate with the USA over its nuclear weapons programme. Therefore, all state sponsors have something to lose from alienating the international community, and the USA in particular. The use of a CBRN weapon would be such a major act that it would severely damage relations with the West, and undoubtedly provoke the strongest reaction. So despite the generally higher levels of lethality associated with state-sponsored terrorist attacks, these sponsors

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still seem willing to calibrate levels of violence to acceptable levels, and will rein it back completely when political conditions require it. This was borne out after 9/11 when Sudan and Iran both co-operated with the USA in hunting down al-Qaeda operatives.44 Nevertheless, relations between states fluctuate, so the likely strength of this disincentive will vary depending upon changes in international relations. This can be seen in the worsening of US- Iranian relations following the election of President Ahmedinajad and the subsequent revelations about the Iranian nuclear weapons programme, which left Iran increasingly isolated.

The 2003 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism acknowledged these political disincentives, and stated that the USA will attempt to enhance them by working with its international partners to convince states to stop sponsoring terrorism. This approach includes the use of incentives such as material assistance, as well as punishments such as diplomatic and economic sanctions.45 An example of a state that has been brought in from the cold in this way is Libya, which was a former proliferator of WMD and a state sponsor of terrorism. In return for the dismantling of Libya’s WMD development programme and making financial restitution for the Lockerbie bombing, the West agreed to normalize relations with Libya, and remove longstanding economic sanctions. However, efforts by the USA and the West to incentivize Iran and Syria to stop supporting Hezbollah, Hamas, and the insurgents in Iraq have been a notable failure. For both of these states, there is more utility in continuing to sponsor terrorism than to accept the incentives that are being offered.

This leaves the question of whether regional states are equally deterred from sponsoring acts of CBRN terrorism against regional rivals, and there is strong evidence to suggest that they are. The likely reaction to such an incident from the international community and other regional partners is likely to be so strong that the potential repercussions would undoubtedly weigh heavily in decision making about whether to sponsor such an attack. One example involving two proliferators was the case of Iran and Iraq in the 1990s. Both supported armed opposition groups in each other’s territory. But whilst Iraq was willing to use CW against its internal dissidents, it was deterred from sponsoring such attacks in Iran.

Similarly, the likelihood of Pakistan, or possibly rogue elements within the Pakistani security apparatus releasing CBRN weapons to the Islamist insurgents in Indian controlled Kashmir can be considered to be small. Whilst the ISI is argued by some analysts to be acting semi-independently of the government in sponsoring Islamist terrorist groups, it is a wholly different proposition to suggest that it could or would extend this assistance to include

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CBRN weapons or materials such as nuclear isotopes. These weapons and materials are under strong command and control arrangements in Pakistan so doubts must be raised about whether the ISI has access to them. In addition, Pakistan is now in a state of nuclear deterrence with India and the use of a Pakistani supplied CBRN weapon by any of the militant groups operating in India would undoubtedly provoke a military response from India. This was evident from the Indian reaction to the suicide bomb attack on its Parliament building in December 2001, which killed 12 people. There was an immediate build up of military forces along the border with Pakistan which took months of diplomacy to defuse. Given Pakistani conventional military inferiority and the potential for any conflict to escalate into a nuclear war, Pakistan knows that it cannot win a war against India. Consequently, Pakistan needs the levels of violence in Kashmir to remain at a level which is sufficient to destabilize Indian political control of the state but not so high that it provokes Indian military retaliation against Pakistan itself.

Al-Qaeda and State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism

One of the main questions in the aftermath of 9/11 was whether al- Qaeda received state support for the attack and what the implications of this might be for CBRN terrorism. An immediate finger of suspicion was pointed at Iraq, but reports of al-Qaeda seeking state support had been around since the mid-1990s. Between 1991 and 1996 al-Qaeda was based in the Sudan, and during that time apparently worked closely with Sudan’s ruling National Islamic Front (NIF). Bin Laden’s interest in CBRN weapons seemingly began in this period, when it allegedly began to experiment with CW at a laboratory in Khartoum, supported by elements of the NIF and the Sudanese military.46 In 1997, a report published by an Arabic newspaper in France alleged that Dr Hasan al-Turabi, the speaker of the Sudanese Parliament and leader of the NIF, hosted a meeting with the leaders of several terrorist groups, including bin Laden. The report claimed that terrorist groups might have been constructing a ‘bacterial’ laboratory and that terrorist groups had been provided funding for the construction of a CBW facility in the Sudan.47 The following year, the USA bombed the Shaifa pharmaceutical plant near Khartoum, in retaliation for the bombing of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The discovery of the chemical empta in soil samples taken near the plant was cited as evidence that it was producing VX nerve agent, and other sources indicated that bin Laden might have been the owner of the plant. However, it is now widely accepted that it was not a CW facility.48 In November 1998, the CIA confirmed that al-Qaeda had

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attempted to develop or buy chemical weapons for use against US troops in the Persian Gulf. And in February 1999, Sandy Berger, a former National Security Adviser to President Clinton, informed a press conference that, ‘we know bin Laden was seeking chemical weapons’ and ‘we know that he had worked with the Sudanese government to acquire chemical weapons’.49 Sudan itself was alleged to have CW at that time but there is insufficient evidence in the public domain to determine whether the allegations are true. One possible explanation of these reports is that neither al-Qaeda nor the Sudanese regime actually possessed CW, but they agreed to work together to develop them. However, the relationship between Sudan and al-Qaeda broke down before these efforts came to fruition, and al-Qaeda moved its operational bases to Afghanistan in 1996.

In Afghanistan, al-Qaeda developed an extremely close relationship with the Taliban regime and the two came to depend on each other for their continued existence. Djamel Beghal, the alleged co-ordinator of a plot by suicide bombers to blow up the US embassy in Paris, stated that ‘Al-Qaeda is an integral part of the Taliban regime and its political and military structures … None of the terrorist operations of al-Qaeda could have been decided after May without the agreement of the Taliban and their Chief Mullah Omar’.50 Al-Qaeda provided the Taleban with troops, arms, and money, and was closely involved in Taleban military training, planning, and operations. It also provided infrastructure and humanitarian aid to the regime. A former Afghan government official described the Taleban and al-Qaeda as being ‘two sides of the same coin: Osama cannot exist in Afghanistan without the Taleban and the Taleban cannot exist without Osama’.51 As described in Chapter 2, the safe haven that al-Qaeda found in Afghanistan enabled it to build up a CBRN weapon development infrastructure, and gave its scientists the time and freedom to experiment and develop CBRN weapons.

Besides al-Qaeda’s links with the Taliban, there were also a significant number of reports which hinted at possible Iraqi state sponsorship of al-Qaeda during the time of the Saddam regime. In December 1998, bin Laden was reported to have met with the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey who was believed by some to be an agent of the Iraqi intelligence service, the Mukhabarat. There were also reports of contacts between bin Laden’s operatives and Iraq’s special security organization, which is responsible for protecting Iraq’s WMD programme. Bin Laden is also believed to have had numerous contacts with Iraqi agents during his years in Sudan.52 Papers recovered from the headquarters of the Mukhabarat reveal that an al-Qaeda envoy was invited to Baghdad in 1988, but there is no evidence of a meeting between bin Laden and Iraqi officials, or of any subsequent meetings.53

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Mohammed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers was also alleged to have met a low rank Iraqi intelligence officer early in 2001, some of these reports suggested that he was given a vial of anthrax at that meeting.54 There were also allegations that some al-Qaeda terrorists received false identities from Muslims who had been killed in Kuwait during the 1991 Iraqi invasion,55 and bin Laden himself was reported to have been in Baghdad in 1998 before the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.56 But despite these allegations, no convincing proof of links between the Saddam regime and al-Qaeda has ever been found.

There have also been some specific allegations of Iraqi sponsorship of CBRN terrorism activities. Reports in 2002 suggested that Islamist terrorists, including members of al-Qaeda, were being trained how to use CBW in secret camps near Baghdad, by instructors from Iraqi military intelligence.57 Subsequent reports in 2002 suggested that Iraqi military instructors had trained up to 250 al-Qaeda fighters in northern Iraq in the use of CBW and possibly nuclear weapons.58 Further allegations have been made that the Islamist group Asbat al-Ansar, a Lebanon based organization affiliated with al-Qaeda that was then operating in northern Iraq, had been given VX nerve agent by the Iraqi regime.59 Whilst captured members of Ansar al Islam suggested that the Saddam regime had supplied the group with CW.60 There were also allegations that Saddam planned to arm Palestinian terrorists with BW to attack Israeli and US targets. US and UK intelligence estimates suggested that Iraq was developing a simple weapon that could be used by terrorist groups.61 Again however, no firm evidence of such links has ever been uncovered.

This lack of evidence supports with assessments which expressed doubt about whether the Saddam regime and al-Qaeda could ever have worked together, given their ideological differences. Bin Laden was known to have referred to Saddam as a bad Muslim and denied the legitimacy of his regime. Whilst the Saddam regime might have had some short-term objectives that might have been served by working through al-Qaeda, there would have been limits to the extent that the Saddam regime would have wanted to use al-Qaeda. Despite this, the allegations of Iraqi state sponsorship of al-Qaeda were always given prominence over the ideological differences between the two by the USA, and others. In the lead up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US Administration reported intelligence of the Saddam regime’s support for al-Qaeda, suggesting that it might supply al-Qaeda with CBW. This became a key element of the Administration’s rationale for invading Iraq. In the aftermath of the invasion, Western intelligence agencies failed to find any significant evidence to support these allegations. Most

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significantly, it soon became apparent that Iraq did not actually possess any CBRN weapons, proving that the reports of the regime supplying them to al-Qaeda were baseless. When the Ansar al Islam base in northern Iraq was seized by US and Kurdish forces, small quantities of ricin were discovered but it was not known whether it had been supplied by the Iraqi state.

There is a general lack of clarity concerning the nature of al-Qaeda’s former relationships with Sudan and the Saddam regime, but what is clear, is that neither of them passed CBRN weapons to al-Qaeda. It can therefore be assumed that these two supposedly ‘rogue’ regimes were deterred from giving CBW to al-Qaeda. The allegations about Saddam and al-Qaeda nevertheless illustrate how allegations of state-sponsored CBRN terrorism can be over inflated by the media and also used by governments and others with vested interests in the pursuit of wider foreign policy objectives. Since the advent of the ‘war on terror’, other states have not stepped in to support al-Qaeda, although as mentioned previously, some al-Qaeda affiliates in Iraq have received state support.

Conclusion

State sponsorship is a wild card in any assessment of the potential threat of CBRN terrorism. However, the evidence suggests that state sponsors of terrorism make rational cost-benefit decisions in supporting terror groups, and it is difficult to conceive of situation, outside of a crisis situation in which a state would make a decision to give CBRN weapons to such a group. The fact that state-sponsored terrorist attacks are amongst the most lethal, is not an indicator that states will prove willing to release CBRN weapons to terrorist groups. In fact, it can even be argued that state sponsors might actually constrain terrorist groups from using CBRN weapons, for fear that they will be implicated in the attack and hence dragged into unwinnable wars with the USA or powerful regional neighbours. As a result, state sponsors generally seek to manage the level of violence perpetrated by their proxies in order to prevent it escalating uncontrollably. But whilst it is unlikely that a state would sponsor such an attack, the possibility cannot be ruled out entirely. The two most likely scenarios in which it might happen are ideologically driven government agencies or rogue elements acting independently; and when a regime is threatened with destruction, prompting it to release CBRN weapons to a terrorist group as an act of revenge against its enemies. In general though, it can be concluded that an act of state- sponsored terrorism would be such an extreme act that would likely result in such severe repercussions that it would only ever be an option of last resort.

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