Research Paper on Water Resources Development Act (for Hifsa Shaukat)

Chapter 7

BUILDING COALITIONS AND NETWORKS TO SUPPORT PLANS

Networking is most relevant in what may be called difficult planning situations - in situations we have already referred to as "wicked" or "messy." In these cases the Prince is uncertain which way to proceed, many interest groups exert pressure in different directions, and no one really knows how to address the problems. It is not clear what the consequences of different courses of action would be.

Our first task in this chapter is to define the terms networking and networks. We will then proceed to pay close attention to seven major networking tasks. Our main concern will be to clarify how networking helps in achieving the multiplier effect. We will therefore discuss how information is obtained, how the initial image is floated, how coalitions are formed, and how the multiplier is triggered. Finally, in the last section of the chapter we will look at four networking issues: First, what are the advantages and disadvantages of secrecy? Second, what is the importance of incentives in networking? Third, how do planners identify grass-roots movements in coalition building? And, finally, how do networking and coalition building rely on the Prince for support?

As mentioned above, our discussion of networking assumes a worst-case scenario. Obviously, much planning takes place in a more conventional or institutionalized framework. In those instances, forming coalitions or triggering the multiplier may be simpler processes because circumstances and the environment are more benign. The effective planner who understands the worst-case scenario can always function successfully in more structured, if more tedious, environments.

Networking and Networks

The term networking, as used here, refers to the linking of relevant stakeholders through formal or informal channels so as to bring about plan formulation and implementation. Networks are communication channels that may or may not be part of the formal organization. Networks operate at many levels. For example, a cocktail party or a dinner at an embassy is an informal channel that provides opportunities to meet and transact business. The informal and pleasant surroundings of embassy receptions greatly facilitated my work when I served in the Department of State in Washington, D.C. I found that I was even able to speak to my immediate superior when he attended these functions. Given the press of time and the constraints of office life down at Foggy Bottom, we found it easier to network at embassy parties.

Networking is using channels to reach individuals whom one might have difficulty reaching through the hierarchy. When I joined the State Department in the early days of the Kennedy administration, I was asked to chair an interagency coordinating committee. Our task was to set policies for U.S. assistance to education and science in Latin America. Interagency coordinating committees are a dime a dozen in Washington. Seidman and Gilmour (1986) call them "the crabgrass in the garden of government institutions" (p.226). They are supposed to coordinate agency action. Therefore, any and all government agencies that had anything to do with either education or science in Latin America had a representative on my committee. In fact, at our first meeting, I had no idea what some of the initials after their names stood for, and I was amazed at the large attendance. I was surprised that so many agencies were interested in doing something bold about education and science in Latin America. But I rapidly discovered that most of the participants on that coordinating committee were there to protect their agency's interest. They had little concern for most of what we were doing. They seemed to sleep during our meetings and only spring into action when they thought we were about to encroach on a portion of their precious turf. I had a mentor in the foreign aid agency who saw my plight. He advised me to cultivate friends wherever they might be and not worry too much about the committee. He pointed out that there were "bureaucratic engineers" everywhere in the administration. "The art of getting things done," he said, "consists in finding who they are, knowing them, and getting them to act. The rest is decoration and facade."

Some people on my committee were useful and informed. Through them, I learned who were the relevant actors and what were the important centers of power. Very soon I was visiting staff in the White House, meeting with informed undersecretaries in the Department of Defense, and attending Latin American embassy functions where all sorts of interesting people would surface. I discovered several networks of individuals working on science and education in Latin America. Some of these networks were more heavily oriented to education -they included a wide variety of individuals, ranging from charlatans who were pushing pet projects to"save" the world from whatever dire danger they thought was imminent, to thoughtful Latin American, U.S., and European educators concerned about the future of the schools in that important portion of our hemisphere. Other- networks were more concerned with science. Several active science networks linked Latin American and U.S. science communities. The private foundations, such as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, played an important role. Therefore, the policy debate was actually very rich and diverse - many projects were under way, many people were involved, and our little interagency coordinating committee was a small bubble on a vast sea of activity. In the course of time, our committee did come up with a U.S. position on science and education in Latin America that became a component of a plan ultimately adopted at an international meeting of ministers of education and science (Cerych, 1965).

The first lesson about networking is that much important work takes place outside formal channels because emergent ideas and activities are not always properly recognized by and linked to the formal structure. Much of the preparatory work takes place elsewhere. In the

example discussed above, informal links turned out to be as important as those provided by the formal committee. Networking took place at both formal and informal levels. It became clear that my mentor had been right. To get things done, one had to know who were the useful people and where they were located.

• Networks exist over time. Most informal networks have a history. Individuals who have worked together over long periods of time acquire mutual trust from this experience. They are able to bank on this trust relationship. When I served with UNESCO, I was impressed by how many informal networks remained in place long after the initial tasks that had brought them together had been completed. For example, there was a very active network of UNESCO staff members who had all worked, at one time or another, in Latin America. They kept in close touch, helped each other, and carried on many informal planning tasks that facilitated action, notwithstanding the very formidable UNESCO bureaucracy.

• Networks are invitational. Informal networks are affiliation groups. They include

people who share, or have shared, many similar experiences and people who share convictions, work on similar problems, pursue similar goals, or have similar professional interests. One does not force oneself into a network, one gradually becomes part of it. Networks are, in a sense, like social clubs, except that they are not formalized, have no management, no visible identity, no entrance committee, and no fixed admission fees. They are invisible colleges (Crane, 1972).

• Networks are numerous. There usually are a large number of networks across or within

organizations. Some are more important than others; some fulfill work functions, while others tend to be more oriented to play activities. But play networks can link individuals in work functions. If there are too many networks, however, networking can easily become an end in itself It is easy to waste time in networking, to become bogged down in unnecessary transactions, and to lose sight of what is to be accomplished.

• Networks have a limited capacity. Networks cannot address too many agendas or

become involved in too many causes at any one time. Therefore, there is an element of timing in using networks. One has to engage them at a moment when they are available, when few pressing tasks and causes preoccupy the membership, when the channels can be used.

• Networks are only as good as their members. Getting things done requires people who

can act, who do not feel that they must always be cautious and wait and see. The problem is that deadwood and climbers infiltrate networks. Obviously, one is looking for idea people, namely, those who are willing to take risks. But it is easy to be misled

here. Individuals encountered in an informal setting may appear to be vibrant activists, and yet, when they go back to their offices, they are again transformed into cautious mice. The network is impoverished when its members do not deliver.

• Networks depend on exchanges and incentives. Networks persist because they are

useful. Networking implies an exchange of goods and services, the ability to provide valued commodities and incentives. To get information, one may have to give some in return. This give-and-take is one raison d6tre of the network (Cook, 1977; Benson, 1975). Since most networks are informal, motivation for participation depends on the intrinsic benefits that its members receive. Successful networks accomplish tasks because these accomplishments motivate the participants. The exchange relations between participants and networks can therefore evolve to the extent that the network becomes an important focus for their commitment and allegiance.

• Networks tend to focus on selected issues. Since networks are informal and voluntary,

motivation is important for participation. Networks tend, therefore, to be self-selective. Their membership tends to be homogeneous and focused on selected issues. It tends to share a common baggage of assumptions about what is important and how to act. It tends to belong to a particular school of thought. It also tends to have professional convictions and to be devoted to given agendas (Heclo, 1978). Members of networks tend to be motivated by causes, by the appeal and drama surrounding action. They like to believe that they are contributing to history.

• Networks are channels for action. Networks are communication channels, but they can

also be used for collaborative implementation. When this happens, networks become organizations in their own right, crossing over and linking other organizations. When a network is involved in implementation, the motivation of its members depends on the importance of the tasks they are able to accomplish together. After informal networks have been actively implementing over a period of time, formalization usually takes place. Thus, an informal network linking many social agencies delivering different services to the same clients can, in time, be institutionalized into a consortium with its own management and funding.

• Networks are a source of power As several authors have shown, in complex situations,

power accrues to those who can link many causes, movements, or networks together (Castells, 1983; Blau and Alba, 1982). But the persistence of such linkage depends also on the rewards that those who participate obtain from their activities. Moreover, unequal exchanges within networks sooner or later result in the acquisition of more power by some members of the network (Cook, 1977; Mock, 1979).

• Networking takes place in a symbolic context. Symbols are important to networks. Opportunities to affirm convictions or to express the existence of a movement or new points of view maintain the commitment of the interested members. Visibility- for example, at conferences, in meetings, through publications -is important. But the greatest pleasures of networking come from knowing one is influencing policy, that one is part of the in-group close to power. Therefore, the process of networking acquires a value in its own right (March and Olsen, 1984).

• Networking is fashionable. Networking has become one of the fads of successful

management (Mueller, 1986; Lipnack and Stamps, 1982; Welch, 1980). This does not mean networking has become less important; it simply means that it can be overemphasized.

Seven Networking Tasks

Planning consists of seven principal networking tasks: (1) map the terrain, gather

information, and identify actors; (2) identify the relevant leverage points; (3) select the tentative coalition of supporters; (4) float the initial image to symbolize the possibility of action; (5) adapt the technical argument to the requirements of support and opposition; (6) organize the coalition to trigger the multiplier; and (7) maintain and feed the coalition as the process of planning moves toward implementation. Map the Terrain, Gather Information, and Identify Actors. Planning relies on information. Yet, much networking still takes place without anyone's being aware that it is in fact occurring. I recall interviewing a planner and asking whether he and his team had done enough networking. This individual replied that he was not familiar with my terminology. When I explained, he was quick to say that he had consulted a few people he knew here and there but had not thought about the process in any systematic fashion. He was not an untypical case. Yet a first purpose of networking is to obtain information. One cultivates networks for this purpose. The task is continuous. At first, the planner seeks to understand what the problem looks like: Who are the relevant actors? Where is learning taking place? What do the relevant stakeholders know, and how do they perceive the issues? To accomplish this, planners ask who are the relevant informants? Into what networks can they tap?

Later, as the planning process is set in motion, networking will be important to keep tabs on the perceptions and reactions of relevant groups and actors. Later still, the planners will want to keep in touch with reactions to their efforts and identify trouble spots, detours, and other traps on the way to implementation. At first networking is an unconscious activity. In due time, however, planners become aware of its importance and systemize their use of time and resources in light of what they seek to accomplish.

Networking is an exchange process - people contribute ideas, knowledge, or energy because they are motivated by the symbols and values that are pursued. Networking is akin to a political campaign. Much interest and energy are generated by a commitment to new ways of thinking or doing. Beyond this, networking can be valued because of the prestige it provides, that is, belonging to an elite group of activists who think that they can bring about fundamental changes in an organization, in a region, or even in the entire world.

Relevant networks are not always in place. Therefore, one has to create new networks when they do not exist. This might be accomplished informally when the ideas and ideologies pursued generate a considerable amount of commitment and interest. At times, it may also be useful to make formal arrangements-for example, creating temporary task forces and temporary study groups - to begin to explore issues and obtain information. Prestige and visibility may be an important motivation for participation in such undertakings.

When I studied the process of national educational planning in Mexico, I found that the planners who had been hired by the Minister of Education had encountered difficulty in obtaining the most common statistics (Benveniste, 1970). At that time computers were not yet widely used in Mexico. Educational statistics were collected manually and recorded on forms, and the forms were then sent from all parts of the country to the ministry in Mexico City. Since the ministry was divided into large independent fiefdoms, each fiefdom collected and preciously protected its own statistics. Thus, the Department of Primary Education collected its own data, the Department of Secondary Education did the same, and so on. Each had a statistics office. There were more than a half dozen in the ministry. I visited one of these statistics offices. The precious data were wrapped in cloth bundles, and these cloth bundles were stacked in a dark storeroom. Obtaining data about enrollments, teacher-pupil ratios, drop-outs, and so on was a serious business. Some one with the key to the relevant storeroom had to go in, with proper authorization of course, gather the bundles, unwrap them, and go through the tedious process of adding figures. Obviously, the computer has altered all this, although mainframes and microprocessors provide as many opportunities to protect data and act secretively as do cloth bundles and Marchant calculators.

The planners I was studying did not belong to the Ministry of Education. They came from the professional staff of another government agency and were therefore not linked to the networks in the Ministry. They had to create their own networks, and this they did. They suggested that a prestigious task force be set up with responsibility for preparing the most comprehensive and accurate data possible about education in the country. The minister agreed, and the task force was given considerable publicity. The planners staffed the task force with a few outsiders, a few of their own people, and the heads of the various statistics offices. The heads of these offices were, by and large, low- to middle level civil servants who rarely enjoyed either prestige or visibility. They were not accustomed to holding press conferences and receiving much attention. The prestige and fanfare energized them. They were only too happy to open the storerooms and unwrap the bundles. The planners worked closely with them

and thus obtained access to the data. They exchanged prestige and visibility for commitment and created their own data-gathering network.

Networking means exchanging favors or at least appearing to exchange favors even if one cannot deliver. For example, when I worked in Paris on a major study of future world energy needs, I attempted to obtain a report on European energy needs that had not yet been released by the research staff of the OECD. I had networked assiduously but could not obtain a copy. The report was awaiting approval of member governments, and the staff feared premature leaks to the press. The word was that it would not be made available to the public for an indefinite period of time. A colleague of mine, who had just flown in from the United States, assured me he would obtain the report in one week. A week went by and he did just that. "How did you man age?" I asked when he returned with the report. "Simple," he said, "very simple. I called Dr. Y [the main report author] and told him we were recruiting for an appointment in his field. Several people had recommended him to our search committee. Could we have lunch?" By the time the meal ended, Dr. Y had become interested in the job, and when my friend was about to leave him, he asked if he could have examples of recent professional studies that Dr. Y had completed to take back to the United States. After lunch, they went to his office and my friend was given the report.

Policy arenas are usually filled with ferment. A first networking task is to find good informants. Information is generally available if one takes the time to obtain it. But this requires asking questions to find out who knows what, who can describe the issues, and who can identify the innovators. Since time and resources are extremely limited for this, the problem consists in being able to gather good information rapidly-and, more important, in being able to distinguish true from bogus information. It is a fact that people in organizations like to be consulted and are usually willing to talk freely, particularly when they sense that they might have an impact on policy.

There is no theory or rule that tells us when we finally have learned enough about the local culture and have heard enough local gossip. But what planners know or do not know is not the only relevant issue; it is also important how they are perceived by the people in the field.

Experts who come, do a "quick and dirty" planning exercise, and leave after collecting their fees are unlikely to arrive at a thorough understanding of the problems or to learn much about the various interests at work. The first purpose of networking is to obtain information. A second is to make it known that the planners are concerned with the issues and committed to what is important. Networking makes it known that the planners understand that what happens in the field should receive attention. Tapping into networks increases the credibility of planners. The planner I interviewed, who was not familiar with the terminology of networking, was not particularly concerned about his own credibility. He had not thought about that aspect of his task either. But those in the know, in and out of organizations, are aware of existing

networks and can judge the performance of planners on their ability to tap these networks or to create new ones. Identify Leverage Points. Any significant change implies a multitude of simultaneous or sequential acts that have to be taken to achieve implementation of that change, and there will be many important actors who can influence implementation. Identifying leverage points consists in finding out who the important stakeholders are, that is, those who have power and can influence the outcome (Gergen, 1968). For example, suppose we wish to help peasants in a village in India change their traditional way of planting, growing, and harvesting crops. We will have to involve them in many different activities. Providing better seeds is not enough; making credit available is not enough; demonstrating uses for fertilizer is not enough; helping create marketing cooperatives is not enough. All this and more must take place simultaneously. We will, therefore, need a lot of information about the peasants - for example, how they perceive what they are doing and how they might perceive proposed changes. We will also need to know about the key operating organizations. What is the agricultural extension system doing? What rural credit institutions are in place? What about land-reform programs? What kind of agricultural strategy is the government pursuing? In due time, we might know enough to begin to answer such questions as, What decisions have to be taken? Who will influence these decisions? And when will the decisions have to be made? We will begin to learn what groups operate in the policy arena, what strategies they pursue, and what interests they promote.

As we become more sophisticated, we will learn where needed resources might come from, what agencies and staff might be involved, and what facilities are required. We will come to know what compromises and configurations might be promoted and have a chance of being accepted. We will arrive at some idea of who the bureaucratic engineers are and what they can contribute.

We will begin to describe leverage points: What actions should we initiate? When and where are decisions made? Which actions are necessary to begin to create a credible plan? What is the minimum coalition of support needed to begin the process?

Describing leverage points is a matter of understanding the dynamics of the situation: Which individuals are involved or interested in the issues? How can they be motivated to act? Obviously, this is not a simple task, and most planners are quite happy to disregard its importance since the task obliges them to pay far more attention to implementation issues than they usually do.

But understanding leverage points clarifies the importance of keeping the plan as simple as possible. If we complicate and extend the scope of the endeavor, we soon discover that too many leverage points have to be activated. Therefore, the art of keeping projects simple, meaningful, and implementable is the art of knowing how to define the problem so that it

remains manageable, so that the planning exercise can activate the relevant leverage points either directly or through the multiplier. Select Tentative Coalitions. Coalition building requires both accommodation to political interests and symbolic action (During, 1987). The plan must be activated in a political environment where exchanges take place continually. But while these transactions take place, the firm, the set of organizations, or, in the case of public-sector planning, the entire political system, maintains and affirms symbolic values. We have already discussed the importance of exchanges and of the technical argument in coalition building. It is now necessary to examine the symbolic nature of the values that the plan espouses. These will tend to be the values that have proven important in the past, and they will serve to motivate the participation of citizens or of members of an organization. For example, the goals of an organization may be an important component of its symbolic values: At XYZ Company, we believe in a quality product. We manufacture the best widget in the world. Or we may be concerned with larger symbolic values. San Francisco sees itselfas a costnopolitan city oriented to foreign influences, a melting pot of various cultures with a long liberal tradition. There exist shared values in San Francisco that are not present in cities of the same size in the Midwest or in the South of the United States.

The plan will provide an additional set of values and symbols that will motivate support. The symbols of the plan will not only have to fit with those of supporters but, more importantly, must not threaten those of opponents. Accommodation is always more easily achieved when it does not appear, symbolically, to reveal defeat or retreat. Successful planning efforts tend to be those that are visible, easily understood, and sufficiently important to motivate action. Since the symbolic nature of the plan must mesh with the prevailing symbolism of supporters and opponents, the ability of planners to resist changes and alterations will depend, in part, on the way that the relevant symbols interplay.

In the seventies, I was a consultant on the expansion of higher education in a Latin American country. The educational planners were under considerable political pressure to expand the number of universities in the country. Each province wanted its own university, and the governors of the provinces that had no institution of higher education wanted to move rapidly. They pressed for the democratization of access to higher education, but paid little attention to the obstacles to implementing this goal. Most importantly, there were simply not enough resources to create quality institutions in a short time span. One person in the know described the problem this way: "Our government supports the democratization of higher education. This has been the platform of various political parties, and most politicians of the right and left seem to be in favor of expanding access. Therefore, we cannot seem to appear to be opposed to the creation of new universities even when we know that it is not possible to move that fast. We are under considerable pressure from the governors of several provinces who do not want any delay. We point out to them that there is no faculty, no libraries, no laboratories, and that opening new universities so rapidly is bound to [create a] backlash in the

long run. But the governors are under pressure. They want to be able to show results. So they keep pressuring us."

The art of coalition building consists in finding approaches that convey enough meaning to motivate stakeholders (Feldman and March, 1981; Smircich and Morgan, 1982; Dutton and Ottensmeyer, 1987). The planners in this Latin American country searched for symbolic strategies of their own: "We have argued the great importance of maintaining and developing centers of excellence. We do not attempt to delay the expansion of the new universities -we emphasize instead the prerequisites for maintaining quality. This, if attended to, will inevitably delay implementation."

The educational planners sought to organize a coalition of supporters who would support demands for more full-time faculty, but there were very real limits to their ability to avoid creating white elephants: "How can we refuse to include a new medical school at - in the plan? The governor of that province has moved fast. He went ahead and inaugurated the school, although it does not exist and no central authority wants one there. But the governor has committed himself, and now we [will] look silly if we do not support him. So we include the school in the plan and insist on a full-time faculty and on commitments from the state budget. We want guarantees the school will provide a first-class education. But meanwhile, I am told they began classes with half-a-dozen part-time faculty. Now you understand the pressure we operate under!"

Planning provides both a symbolic and a technical framework for organizing coalitions. The desires and passions of individuals or groups are constrained by the logic of the plan and the symbols it provides. As mentioned previously, planning does not involve politics as usual. Exchanges and transactions take place, favors are bestowed, and the plan is bent to suit interests. But the symbols and values of the plan, together or as parts of the technical argument, legitimate constraints. At some point, the planners have to draw the line and try to resist those pressures that will destroy the coherence and symbolism of the plan. If they are to have any chance of succeeding, they have to be aware of the way the symbols they select for the plan can help them resist pressures in the subsequent battles over implementation. Float the Initial Image. The multiplier effect cannot take place as long as the plan has not been revealed because, until then, most of the networking has taken place informally and in partial secrecy. But there comes a time when the activity is made public, when the ideas are brought to the surface. The purpose of floating the initial image is to create an awareness of and belief in new ways of thinking and acting.

Floating the initial image serves several functions. First, it reassures the members of the coalition that they can survive open scrutiny. The mere assertion that new ideas or approaches are possible takes them one step closer to reality, and they begin to acquire as much importance as the conventional wisdom of the status quo. The members of the coalition are reassured that

they are not out on a limb because their proposals are now being openly discussed and asserted in many quarters.

Second, floating the initial image orients action and behavior toward the next steps of implementation. The fact that the proposal has been announced and so is out in the open implies that the next step can now be taken. It is the first move of the fledgling coalition.

Third, as the image is floated, both support and opposition start to build. Those who have not yet been recruited or who have been left out realize that the coalition process is under way. Idea people and even some climbers begin to gravitate toward the coalition. But, at the same time, those who sense they will be on the losing end if the plan is put into effect begin to organize the opposition. How well the organized coalition fares in attracting support and deterring the opposition depends heavily on the strength of the supporting coalition and the determination of the opposition.

Fourth, floating the image provides legitimacy for the new proposal. As long as the coalition remains hidden, it acts as a secret society; it has no legitimacy because formal action can rarely proceed until matters are out in the open. Floating the image may not be a formal participatory or democratic process, but it nevertheless represents the first move toward open assessment and discussion of the plan.

Fifth and last, floating the image is part of the learning process in planning. If planners circulate widely, consult stakeholders, assess the various possibilities and options, and make choices that reflect real needs, the float will survive and the planning process will continue, even if it sustains inevitable adaptations and modifications. But if the planners have not done their jobs, it is more probable that the float will stir the opposition into prompt action, and the opposition may then be able to scuttle the plan before any further moves can take place.

There are many different ways to float the initial image. Individuals in the know begin to hear from many different sources that change is in the offing. Meetings and conferences are held. Hearings are organized. Leaks are made to the mass media, and press conferences are held. In one way or another, the possibility of action is revealed and the image begins to be discussed openly. More importantly, the initial coalition starts to emerge. One learns that "so and so" has been arguing that the time has come to do something. Hence, the realization that changes are about to occur becomes widespread.

There exist two fundamental approaches to the float. Either the float is done formally, in an institutionalized setting, or it is done informally, prior to formalization. It might be preferable in some circumstances to act informally prior to formal procedures so as to mobilize external action. Thus a plan to introduce an education program on AIDS in the local public school district might be leaked prior to consideration by the school board to allow greater community participation in the days or weeks before the members of the board will have the

opportunity to discuss it. Leaks to the press might be used to create widespread interest and to mobilize public opinion. The choice of strategy depends heavily on the nature of the issue, the characteristics of the leverage points, and the nature of the cultural environment in which the planning exercise will take place. To be sure, where participatory schemes are institutionalized, formal procedures may have to be followed, whether informal procedures are used or not, and the impact of leaks or other disclosures on perceptions of the legitimacy of the undertaking has to be taken into account. At the same time, however, formal consultations and discussions sometimes lose importance when the issue has already received considerable informal public scrutiny and the mobilization of stakeholders is already under way.

I have already briefly mentioned the case of airline deregulation in the late seventies (Derthick and Quirk, 1985). Networking among academic economists had been going on for a long time. In contrast to most other economic policy issues, there existed a strong consensus in the academic community about the advantages of deregulation. It was generally felt that price regulation and the awarding of routes by regulatory bodies resulted in higher interstate fares, a fact revealed by the sharp differences between those fares and intrastate ones. But what makes this case unique is that the academic community was quite alone in pushing for airline deregulation. There was very little interest elsewhere. The airline industry had absolutely no interest in deregulation, nor did the regulatory agencies. More importantly, there was no public clamor for deregulation of the industry. On the contrary, the public was generally satisfied with airline regulation, and there was certainly no organized public interest movement around this issue.

Nevertheless, by 1971, a sufficient number of advocates for change were occupying positions in relevant government departments, notably in the president's Council of Economic Advisers, the Department of Transportation, and the Anti-Trust Division of the justice Department. Some of these advocates had gravitated in the direction of Congress, and were found, for example, on the staff of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee, under the chairmanship of Senator Edward Kennedy.

Although Senator Kennedy was at first cool to the idea, deregulation of the airline industry had a certain populist appeal. It meant opening up the industry to stiffer competition, and the notion that greater competition could reduce inefficiencies and result in lower prices appealed to both the right and the left.

Whether this particular exercise was a success is another matter. One can easily argue that the networking process was flawed because a single intellectual discipline dominated. It clearly demonstrates the pitfalls of having a narrow intellectual network-in this case it was economists - dominate the policy agenda. These economists did not take into account many noneconomic aspects of the problem, and they even failed to perceive some of the economic issues. As a result, the consequences of deregulation were not necessarily those originally intended. This is what Gifford (1988, p. 103) calls "tyranny by expertise" - namely, the narrowing of circles of

influence until a few experts are able to dominate the policy agenda. Still, this is a good illustration of the processes I have been analyzing in this book. And even if we have second thoughts about airline deregulation, we still should try to understand how this policy innovation was brought about.

The idea was floated during Senator Kennedy's 1975 hearings on the Civil Aeronautics Board. The hearings of his subcommittee received considerable attention in the press, and they had an important impact because they signified that deregulation was clearly on the agenda of Congress. President Gerald Ford had independently voiced support for such an approach. The fact that both the administration and Congress were active had an impact. The image was floated, and from then on, the process of deregulating this major industry was under way. Adapt the Technical Argument to a Political Configuration. If it has not already done so, the opposition will surface as soon as the idea is floated. Therefore, if the idea is floated too soon, the opposition will have considerable time to organize and oppose it. Of course, if the idea is delayed too long and not floated, the informal networks of support will begin to lose interest and move on to other topics.

Until the idea is floated, it is difficult to assess the reactions and behaviors of the opposition. As long as networking is informal and occurs outside policy leverage points, networking is not necessarily taken seriously. As mentioned previously, there exist in the policy world many networks with different agendas pushing many different ideas. Keeping tabs on them is one thing, taking them seriously is another. Therefore, it is usually necessary to float the idea first to really be able to assess how it will be received.

In the case of airline deregulation, there were two main potential sources of opposition: the regulators and the industry. As Derthick and Quirk (1985) point out, the staffs of regulating agencies have somewhat different agendas from those of the chairpersons or committees appointed to run them. Many staff members have made a career in the regulatory field. In contrast, the chairpersons who are appointed to head regulatory agencies are as much interested in their place in history as they are in the appointment. These appointees tended to see deregulation as an emergent reform of great significance. They adroitly removed some of the dissidents in the ranks of their staffs and were able, without too much difficulty, to lend their support and that of their agencies to the reform.

The industry was not able to organize its opposition. The Air Transport Association could not coordinate the industry because the airlines had mixed feelings about regulation. They wanted route security but had divergent views about price and other regulatory issues. Some airlines wanted to compromise and find an accommodation. Others wanted to resist the emergent legislation across the line. The opposition could not agree on the strategy to adopt and, therefore, did little to alter the course of events.

This is a unique case, made unique by the fact no one really knew who might gain or lose in the final outcome. It was not clear how each airline would be affected, nor was it clear which airlines would benefit and which would rapidly wither in the competition. Nor was it clear what changes deregulation would bring about, what routes would be affected, whether it would lead to industry consolidation, whether fares for local travel would go up, and so on. It was difficult, therefore, to work out a policy of accommodation, because there was little knowledge of the probable impact of deregulation.

This is not always the case in planning or policy exercises. Some of these efforts are more complex, because the opposition's interests are more clearly defined. Fear of making errors prevails, and the ability to adapt is often not there. The dead wood are entrenched and resisting, climbers do not see any advantage in taking risks, and the idea people are split, unable to mobilize, and, therefore, of little help in implementing the plan.

How do planners convince enough supporters that proposed new approaches will work, that organizations, clients, and the public will benefit, that there is something in it for everyone? Much networking will be required to reach mutually acceptable solutions because a good deal of information is needed to determine who can be turned around, who are the idea people, who are the climbers, how the plan can be packaged to gather support for it, and what minimum coalition of supporters is necessary to trigger the multiplier.

Why do plans fail when a coalition is not created? Most planning failures result from (1) a lack of perception of the need to negotiate, (2) an inability to negotiate and accommodate diverse interests, (3) the lack of sufficient incentives and penalties to be used for that purpose, and (4) the lack of trust engendered by inadequate levels of networking.

Planners usually have little training in, inclination toward, and experience of negotiation, and the same may be true of the Prince they serve, as well as of others in their immediate environment. It is therefore no surprise that negotiation tends to be an unknown dimension of planning. Concepts such as assisted negotiation, mediation, facilitation, and binding arbitration are rarely part of the planner's vocabulary, yet as Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) argue, consensual approaches to resolving public disputes are far more effective than protracted conflict and therefore should be an important component of any active planning process.

It is common for the affected parties to have little contact with planners. Dogmatic stances are taken and there is no give-and-take. Blowers (1982) has documented such an episode in Marston Vale in Bedforshire, England. Planners were attempting to have the local plant of an important brick works firm replace old equipment that produced excessive air pollution. The planners had expected understanding and cooperation but were unable to establish a working relationship with the company. Instead, there were a hardening of attitudes and a corresponding unwillingness to negotiate. The local government council took the planners' advice and decided to force the company to eliminate pollution. But their order did

not have the intended impact. The company responded by threatening to close the plant and move out of the area. The council, faced with this ultimatum, caved in, and the plan was abandoned.

Both planners and the council seemed unaware of what the company might do. They must have imagined that the company would never move and relocate, yet that is a quite plausible action, at least in the United States and increasingly in Europe. Maybe it was a simple issue of power. The company held the trump card and had no intention of negotiating. Or maybe it was a case where mutual mistrust of intentions dominated: If the company gave in on this issue, would the planners press for more? Again, maybe it was a case where the planners were unable to come up with enough incentives to make the change worthwhile to the company. We will never know exactly what went wrong, but it is clear that errors of judgment were made. Either the planners or the council or both had not evaluated the situation and, more importantly, had not been able to network, to establish trust, and to discover a way to accommodate conflicting interests. In the first round, they lost all, and the planning exercise failed. Trigger the Multiplier. As we know by now, triggering the multiplier requires a technical argument, a symbolic stance, and a visible coalition of supporters. There is also an element of timing involved since communications about ideas sooner or later are forgotten and lose their importance. Coming back to the brick works case, was the company opposed to any reduction in levels of pollution? There must have been conditions under which it might have begun to take steps to remedy the problem. One might assume that there were at least a few individuals in the brick works who did see advantage in a strategy that would place the company in a better light. Who might these individuals be? What positions did they occupy in the company? Under what conditions might serious negotiations begin?

From the planner's point of view, was it preferable to force the issue and be defeated in the end or would it have been better to begin the long process of adjustment and compromise? When conflicts dominate the planning environment, it is difficult to negotiate because relative costs are unknown. Planners appear to be intransigent because they are totally unaware of the stark realities faced by those who have to accommodate. This is why coalition building requires information and a cooperative search for solutions. The Lindblom precepts of taking small steps are not devoid of realism. But more importantly, understanding has to exist. What incentives or penalties would have decided some managers of the brick works to do something about pollution? How many of these managers were needed to trigger the multiplier? Could they do something worthwhile about pollution at a low cost? Probably not. What would happen if they bought totally new machinery? Could they finance it? Would they still be competitive? Those were the issues that required dialogue between the company and the planners and that could have led the planners to trigger a movement toward accommodation within the brick works.

But it is not easy to engage in formal dialogue in a confrontational situation. The need for secrecy and control limits such encounters. Distrust reigns. Therefore, one has to ask again whether the institutional arrangements for planning make sense. Do they increase or decrease trust? Do they facilitate negotiation?

The deregulation of the airline industry illustrates the importance of networking and engaging in dialogue as a prelude to triggering the multiplier. The coalition that carries the day has a momentum of its own. Its symbolic stance happens to be fashionable at that point in time. There is a general belief that the time has come to do something about the costs of excessive government regulation. More importantly, the entire industry cannot threaten to leave and go elsewhere. The coalition of supporters uses ideas and knowledge provided by economists and couples it to the interests of politicians in search of issues (Kingdom, 1984). Change-whether for good or for ill-is achieved.

Triggering the multiplier requires an understanding of how the multiplier operates. Too many planners know little about the process and are not attentive to its subtleties. Timing is crucial, particularly the timing of the float. The visibility of the coalition, the credibility of the technical argument, and the symbolic stance of the planners provide the basis for the trigger. But to achieve awareness of these unconventional dimensions of the planning process requires both experience and a kind of training different from that conventionally provided in the academy. Maintain and Feed the Coalition. The last task in networking is to maintain and feed the coalition so as to avoid plan derailment, a topic discussed at greater length in Chapter Nine. This task may require further negotiations and considerable learning and adjusting. But avoiding derailment of a plan also requires maintaining momentum and moving ahead, as well as being able to identify the trouble spots and the dissident stakeholders so as to be able to accommodate or resist their pressure. A first question is, therefore, Who are the stakeholders? Put simply, the stakeholders are all those who have a stake in the implementation of the proposed changes. From the planners' point of view, the most visible stakeholders are the Prince and the other implementers who have access to the resources needed to carry out the project. Planners tend to disregard other important stakeholders- namely, clients, beneficiaries, or the general public. There exist several good reasons for this:

First, under current conventional arrangements, planners play the role of technicians. They therefore have very little time and few budget resources to devote to networking and coalition building. If they are going to do any networking and coalition building, it will be among those who are immediately involved in the next step, namely, those involved in making the next decision or enacting the next bill. Out of necessity and lack of resources, planners focus on the Prince and his lieutenants. They do not necessarily wish to disregard clients or beneficiaries, but it is often easier to take their needs for granted, to assume they have little to offer, to think that one will have time

later on to attend to them -which means never, or after it is too late.

Second, planners are not necessarily well prepared to network with clients and beneficiaries. They may not know the milieu and may be unprepared to elicit information from them. More importantly, the planners' own sense of vulnerability tends to keep them away from encounters that they do not know how to manage. It is far easier to read about the ghetto in Rainwater's (1970) account and to argue in the protected environment of a planning office about the needs of ghetto dwellers than to encounter live clients in situ and to have to deal with their problems there.

Third, clients and beneficiaries are not always easily identified and are not always organized, cohesive, and of one mind. Moreover, they - and others - may not clearly understand their needs, and their ability to communicate may not be high.

Be that as it may, the logic of a planning process based on the assumption that planning is a technical, static staff activity will inevitably pay little attention to a large and relevant group of stakeholders. It will certainly tend to downgrade these stakeholders as long as they are inactive, and it will only begin to pay attention to them when they finally organize and fight back. Hall's (1975, 1980, 1988) studies of planning failures underscore how political opposition to planned changes diverts action. Many planning failures are the consequence of events engendered by strong opposition coming from many different quarters. This opposition either ends the project or, as is more likely, results in a series of compromises and modifications that rapidly increase costs and reduce or even ruin the fundamental quality of the endeavor. In the end, few are satisfied, and the planning exercise does not achieve the high hopes intended for it. Hall describes how planning for a third London airport, for a motorway ring around London, for the rapid Transit system of' San Francisco, for the Concorde supersonic airplane, and for the Sydney opera house proceeded from obstacle to obstacle to a final compromise that no one in his or her right mind would have proposed in the first place.

These experiences suggest two lines of thought. First, it is clear that planners need to be able to link up more effectively with relevant stakeholders. This is true for all forms of planning. It applies equally to city and regional planning, economic planning, policy analysis, and corporate strategic planning. Trust, as the important variable in negotiation, is an element, but in the last analysis, design matters most. Planners need to pay much more attention to the emergent aspirations and needs of all relevant stakeholders, which means that this activity must be budgeted for and recognized as an important function of the professional planning role.

Second, and concurrent with the above, planners cannot operate in a political environment without having access to a modicum of resources. As staff, they are devoid of authority and have to transact much of their business with their hands tied behind their backs. Much of the distress of planning has its source in this weakness of planners. The examples given by Hall were not complete failures since the projects were completed even if they cost much more than

originally estimated and had to be modified innumerable times. But they were clearly failures in terms of resolving conflicts and being able to arrive fairly rapidly at satisfying resolutions without incurring excessively high costs. They illustrate what happens when enough money is not spent on planning, and when planners do not have enough time, resources, or authority. The projects themselves cost much more than planned and society achieves less than it might. If messy or"wicked" problems are to be solved, planners have to be able to spend the time and energy it takes, first, to identify, attract, and create a coalition that will support a project and, second, to provide the longer-term effort needed to sustain or modify this coalition as it confronts opposition. This implies making sure, from the start, that the coalition has a high chance of succeeding and that the project attempts to satisfy a very large and significant constituency, including groups that may not now be mobilized but could be in the future.

Notwithstanding all the above, participation in planning cannot be perfect. I argued in preceding chapters that participation is the Achilles' heel of planning because planners can never attempt to replicate political processes. Planners deal at a level of decision making where cumbersome political arrangements are not effective. Therefore, they have to approximate participation in one way or another. Networking is probably the best substitute for participation, given the complexity of the decisions that have to be taken and the resources available to consult and obtain consent. But if networking is to be an effective substitute for participation, sufficient resources have to be provided for it.

Success stories in planning tend to reveal a dominant theme: The goals of the endeavor are challenging, important, well defined, and generally understood. The Prince and the planners work closely together. The planners are able to network widely and are linked with the stakeholders. More importantly, they are able to produce plans that meet everyone's needs because there are sufficient trust and resources to provide incentives to deal with the opposition and because the enterprise is managed with a firm hand (Hall, 1988; Young and Norris, 1988). In short, these planners are in an executive position, the planning body has a clear mandate, and results will follow.