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On the Autonomy of Psychology From Neuroscience: A Case Study of Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism and Behavior Analysis

Diego Zilio Federal University of Espírito Santo

The main goal of this article is to discuss the place of psychology in the domain of natural sciences as an autonomous endeavor from neuroscience. However, given that psychology is not a monolithic field, it is necessary to specify which particular psychological approach is being taken into account. Here, I take B. F. Skinner’s radical behaviorism and behavior analysis as a case study. The focus on Skinner’s behaviorism can be justified for at least 2 reasons: (a) Skinner is one of the most influential psychologists of the 20th century, and (b) he is well known for his defense of the autonomy of behavior analysis from neuroscience. The first part of this article is dedicated to the analysis of Skinner’s arguments for the autonomy of behavior analysis from neuroscience in 73 of his works, published between 1933 and 1993. In the second part of this article, I analyze Skinner’s arguments by taking into account contemporary neuroscience. Incredible advances occurred in neuroscience since the 1930s, and even the late 1980s, period in which Skinner developed his ideas. Therefore, it is important to discuss the pertinence of his arguments in light of today’s neuroscience in order to evaluate the validity of his “autonomy” position. I argue that the relation between behavior analysis and neuroscience can shed some light on the more general debate about the relation between psychology and neuroscience by presenting an interesting nonreductionist alternative free of the problems faced by cognitivist theories.

Keywords: Skinner, behavior analysis, neuroscience, autonomy, reductionism

It has been almost 20 years since Gazzaniga (1998) announced the “death” of psychology in his book, conveniently entitled The Mind’s Past. He wrote in the preface,

Psychology, which for many was the study of mental life, gave way during the past century to other disciplines. Today the mind sciences are the province of evolutionary biologists, cognitive scientists, neu- roscientists, psychophysicists, linguists, computer scientists you name it. . . . Psychology itself is dead. (p. xi)

Gazzaniga was not saying that there were not “psychological” problems anymore, therefore making psychology an obsolete sci- ence. The supposed “death” of psychology would be a conse- quence of those “psychological” problems being approached by sciences other than psychology, particularly neuroscience. In fact, Gazzaniga was not the first to defend such an idea. Paul and Patricia Churchland’s eliminative materialism is another good example (P. M. Churchland, 1981, 1989; P. S. Churchland, 1986) of the effort to reduce or eliminate psychological conceptual framework in favor of “the conceptual framework of a matured neuroscience” (P. S. Churchland, 1986, p. 396). Kandel and Hawk-

ins, in turn, also presented a reductive model with their cell- biological alphabet of learning (Hawkins & Kandel, 1984a, 1984b; cf. Gold & Stoljar, 1999). The reductive approach is clearly stated in their goal: “Our purpose in this brief theoretical review is to illustrate that several higher order features of classical condition- ing can be derived [emphasis added] from our current understand- ing of the cellular mechanisms of habituation, sensitization, and classical conditioning” (Hawkins & Kandel, 1984a, p. 376). More recently, Bickle (2003) made the case for what he called a “ruth- lessly reductive approach” to psychology, according to which “scientific practice in cellular and molecular neuroscience refuses to grant the psychological any genuine causal explanatory role once a real neurobiological successor is firmly in place” (p. 115).

The main issue surrounding those ideas is the possibility of reduction or elimination of psychology (or psychological explana- tions) in favor of neuroscience (or neuroscientific explanations). Hence, what is at stake here is the possibility of psychology as an autonomous science not reducible to or eliminated by neurosci- ence. There are at least two ways of approaching the autonomy between domains of knowledge (cf. Abney et al., 2014; Bunge, 1990; Dale, Dietrich, & Chemero, 2009). The first one is what I call “strong autonomy,” according to which psychology and neu- roscience are fully independent scientific endeavors, meaning that their subject matters, explanations, theories, and laws are insulated from one another. The second kind of autonomy is the “weak autonomy.” By “weak,” I mean that psychology and neuroscience are both part of the natural sciences. They are not insulated disciplines, which mean that they can influence each other. How- ever, psychology is not reducible to or eliminated by neuroscience because they essentially deal with different variables that are equally responsible for the production of behavioral phenomena.

This article was published Online First February 11, 2016. The writing of this article was supported by FAPESP—São Paulo

Research Foundation (2009/18324–1, 2013/17950–1). Parts of this article were presented at the Association for Behavior Analysis Theory & Phi- losophy Conference, Santa Fe, New Mexico, in 2012.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Diego Zilio, Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, Federal Uni- versity of Espírito Santo (UFES), Fernando Ferrari Avenue, 514, Goiabei- ras, Vitória–ES, Brazil 29075-910. E-mail: [email protected]

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Review of General Psychology © 2016 American Psychological Association 2016, Vol. 20, No. 2, 155–170 1089-2680/16/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000067

155

My goal in this article is to defend that there is a place for psychology in the domain of natural sciences as an autonomous endeavor in the weak sense of autonomy. The problem, however, is that psychology is not a monolithic field. There are psycholog- ical systems with divergent epistemologies, ontologies, and meth- odologies. Perhaps the most common example of divergence lies in the cognitivism versus behaviorism debate (Baars, 1986). Therefore, we cannot simply treat “psychology” in general, being paramount to restrict our analysis to one particular psychological approach. Here, I will discuss B. F. Skinner’s behavior analysis based on the philosophy of radical behaviorism. Besides the ne- cessity of restricting our analysis, the focus on Skinner’s behav- iorism can be justified for at least two more reasons: (a) Skinner is one of the most influential psychologists of the 20th century (Haggbloom et al., 2002), and (b) he is well known for his defense of the autonomy of behavior analysis from neuroscience (e.g., Baer, 1996; Bradnan, 1982; Bunge, 1990; García-Hoz, 2004; Ilardi & Feldman, 2001; Kandel, 1976; Konorski, 2013; Loucks, 1941; Machamer, 2009; Panksepp, 1990; Razran, 1965; Reese, 1996; Staddon & Bueno, 1991), to the point of even being wrongly accused of defending an antiphysiological position (Zilio, 2015, in press). In sum, in Skinner, we have a prominent figure in psychol- ogy who discussed the relation between the science of behavior and neuroscience in a systematic way (as we will see throughout this article), and who defended the autonomy between both sci- ences.

A key element in Skinner’s attempt to establish an autonomous science of behavior was his justifications for the independence of behavior analysis from physiology. According to Skinner (1989b), this was something inherent to radical behaviorism: “A declaration of independence from physiology was essential to ‘radical behav- iorism,’ . . . and I argued the case strenuously” (p. 129). Of course, the independence from physiology was essential to behavior anal- ysis in its early years so it could fortify its position as a viable science of behavior. However, consequences of Skinner’s justifi- cations are present until this day, existing in behavior-analytic literature that still argues for the autonomy of behavior analysis despite the changes both sciences passed through since Skinner presented his justifications (e.g., Baer, 1996; Greenberg, 1983; Greenberg & Lambdin, 2007; Reese, 1996), or in the critical literature that still maintains that behavior analysis is antiphysi- ological for denying any role to neuroscience in the explanation of behavior (e.g., Bunge, 1990; Machamer, 2009; Panksepp, 1990; Staddon & Bueno, 1991).

Considerable changes happened since Skinner first proposed his justifications for the autonomy of behavior analysis in the 1930s. Today, we have a well-established science of behavior under the domain of “behavior analysis” and a neuroscience that advanced remarkably since Skinner’s writings on the subject, which lead us to question this autonomy. Are Skinner’s arguments still relevant to justify the autonomy between behavior analysis and neurosci- ence in the search for explanations of behavior? Is Skinner de- fending a weak or a strong form of autonomy? To answer these questions, first we need to analyze the very arguments used by Skinner to justify the autonomy of behavior analysis. This analysis will allow us to understand what kind of autonomy he is defending. This is the first goal of this article. His arguments were divided into four categories. The first, definition of the subject matter, includes arguments focusing on the differences between the phe-

nomena studied by behavior analysis and neuroscience. The sec- ond category, explanation of behavior, presents arguments related to characteristics of neuroscientific and behavior-analytic expla- nations of behavior. The third category, concepts and philosophy of science, contains Skinner’s philosophical and conceptual argu- ments that would justify the independence of behavior analysis. The fourth category, practical issues, deals with arguments that highlight the practical advantages of behavior analysis and neuro- science dividing the labor in the process of explaining behavior. However, analyzing Skinner’s arguments by itself is not enough to provide an answer to our question concerning the pertinence of his “autonomy” position. We need to evaluate Skinner’s arguments taking into account the advances of contemporary neuroscience. This is my second goal in this article. As I said earlier, incredible advances occurred in neuroscience since the 1930s, and even the late 1980s, period in which Skinner developed his ideas. There- fore, it is important to discuss the pertinence of Skinner’s argu- ments in light of today’s neuroscience. Based on this analysis, I argue that the arguments that may indicate the defense of strong autonomy are quite fragile, whereas the ones associated with weak autonomy are still relevant—more than that, they can shed some light on the debate about the relation between psychology and neuroscience by presenting an interesting nonreductionist alterna- tive.

Method

The same method described here was also used in Zilio (in press), including the keywords (see Table 1) used to select the material. I started with the references gathered by Morris, Lazo, and Smith (2004), because the authors reviewed all the primary- source works that Skinner published during his career and selected the ones in which he addressed issues related to the role of biology (including neuroscience) in behavior. Morris et al. focused their analysis only on Skinner’s constructive comments, which may not necessarily include Skinner’s arguments for the independence/ autonomy of behavior analysis from physiology. That being the case, I added additional secondary-source works (mainly Skinner’s collections of papers, like Cumulative Record and Recent Issues in the Analysis of Behavior) to complement the bibliography selected by them. In addition, I did not adopt any restriction privileging Skinner’s constructive comments: All comments, critical or not, that could be interpreted as justifications for the independence/ autonomy of behavior analysis were selected. As a result, I started the analysis with a total of 148 texts, among books, chapters, and articles. The first reading (titles, abstracts, and the text itself) was to select material that contained keywords related to neuroscience (Table 1).

From the 148 texts, only 73 contained the keywords (see Zilio, in press, for the complete list). A second reading of the remaining 73 texts was made to select excerpts that could be interpreted as justifications for the independence/autonomy of behavior analysis from physiology or, more specifically, neuroscience. The results are in Table 2.

Definition of the Subject Matter

According to Skinner, behavior analysis is independent from neuroscience because their subject matters are distinct (Skinner,

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156 ZILIO

1959/1961e, p. 253; 1938/1966a, pp. 423–424; 1969b, p. 60; 1986a, p. 716; 1989a, p. 56; 1989c, p. 18; 1990a, p. 1208). Skinner (1938/1966a) presents this argument when dealing with the prob- lem of neural correlates of behavior:

The very notion of a “neurological correlate” implies what I am here contending—that there are two independent subject matters [empha- sis added] (behavior and the nervous system). . . . I am asserting, then, not only that a science of behavior is independent of neurology but that it must be established as a separate discipline whether or not a rapprochement with neurology is ever attempted. (pp. 423–424)

The vocabulary used to describe behavioral and neurophysio- logical phenomena indicates differences in subject matter. Neuro- scientists study neural processes that are “correlated” in some way with behavioral process and those who study the “correlate” of something do not necessarily study the “something” itself. Skinner (1986a) reiterated the distinction in subject matter, while discuss- ing the causal chain between environmental events, physiological events, and organisms’ actions:

Behavior and physiology are not two ways of approaching the same subject [emphasis added]. In a given episode the environment acts upon the organism, something happens inside, the organism then acts upon the environment, and certain consequences follow. The first, third, and fourth of these events is the field of a science of behavior, which undertakes to discover how they are related to each other. What happens inside is another part of the story. (p. 716)

Skinner (1953/1965) defines environment as “any event in the universe capable of affecting the organism” (p. 257), which means to produce physiological changes (something that “happens in- side”). The modified organism, in turn, acts on the environment, which is then modified by those actions. According to Skinner (1986a), behavior analysis deals with the functional relations be- tween environmental events (antecedent and consequent) and the actions of the organisms, which, by definition, constitute the three-term contingency (cf. Skinner, 1969a), the basic relational unit of operant behavior analysis. The second link in the causal chain, the physiological changes, would be the subject matter of neuroscience. Skinner (1989a) develops this idea in another pas- sage:

When human behavior is analyzed in its own right as a function of environmental variables, however, rather than as the expression of feelings and states of mind, the nervous system is seen to play a different role. Behavioral scientists observe three things: the action of the environment on an organism, the action of the organism on the environment, and changes which then follow. There are gaps in that account which only neurologists will eventually fill with their different instruments and techniques. Brain processes are not an- other “aspect” of behavior; they are another part of what an organism does. (p. 56)

This passage brings up several questions. It starts with the environmental-centered approach (Hineline, 1990), according to

Table 1 Keywords and Parts of Words Related to Neuroscience

Keywords Parts of words

Anatomist Neuro Anato Antiphysiological Neurologist Physio Autonomic Nervous system Neurology Bio Biological Neurological Neur Black box Neurones Nerv

Black-box Neuroscience Physico Biochemical system Neuropsychology Synap Biological Neurophysiology Stor Body-cum-brain Neuroanatomy Copy Bodily state(s) Nerve(s) Proprio

Body state(s) Nerves going to the right places Intero Brain Nerve impulse Mechani

Brain science Nervous Central nervous system Nervous impulses Central Processes Nervous system Cerebral Three nervous systems

Cerebral cortex Physiological Conceptual nervous system Physiologist(s) Cortex Physiology

Cortical states Physico-chemical neurology Inner state(s) Physical or chemical

Internal states(s) Psychobiology Inside story Psychopharmacology Mechanisms Psychophysiology Neural Sensory nerve(s)

Neural events Synapse(s) Neural homunculus Synaptic Neural science Reflex physiology Neural structure Representation

Storage Copy theory

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157SKINNER, BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

which behavior would be controlled by environmental variables rather than being a mere symptom of internal events, such as feelings, mental states, and, more importantly, physiological states. In Skinner’s words (Skinner, 1959/1961e), “In an acceptable ex- planatory scheme the ultimate causes of behavior must be found outside the organism” (p. 253). Later, Skinner (1988) notes that this is only a hypothesis: “It is certainly only a hypothesis, ‘testable only in principle’, to say that ‘all behavior, whether controlled by internal or external stimuli, is determined by external contingen- cies’” (p. 380). Given that behavior is not an effect whose causes we must search for in internal events, the role of neuroscience is to study the physiological processes related to organism’s interaction with the environment—in other words, the aforementioned second link in the causal chain. Precisely because it does not deal with this second link, behavior analysis has explanatory gaps to be filled by neuroscience.

In addition, Skinner states that neural processes are not aspects of behavior but constitute a different kind of process. This point is important and leads us to the very definition of behavior. Skinner (1938/1966a) defines it as “only part of the total activity of an organism,” specifically, “behavior is what an organism is doing . . . is that part of the functioning of an organism which is engaged in acting upon or having commerce with the outside world” (p. 6). In this definition, we find evidence of the Skinnerian division of the events that make up the causal chain between environmental events, physiological events, and an organism’s actions. In this description, behavior is defined by its functional relations with environmental events (antecedent and consequent). Physiological events are absent in this definition, which leads to the conclusion that “peculiar properties which make behavior a unitary and unique subject matter follow from this definition” (Skinner, 1938/ 1966a, p. 6).

The argument that behavior analysis and neuroscience possess distinct subject matters is also present in the thesis that the former would be the science of variation and selection:

Two established sciences, each with a clearly defined subject matter [emphasis added], have a bearing on human behavior. One is the physiology of the body-cum-brain—a matter of organs, tissues, and cells, and the electrical and chemical changes that occur within them. The other is a group of three sciences concerned with the variation and selection that determine the condition of that body-cum-brain at any moment: the natural selection of the behavior of species (ethology), the operant conditioning of the behavior of the individual (behavior analysis), and the evolution of the social environments that prime operant behavior and greatly expand its range (a part of anthropol- ogy). The three could be said to be related in this way: Physiology studies the product of which the sciences of variation and selection study the production. (Skinner, 1990a, p. 1208)

Ethology, behavior analysis, and a part of anthropology would study, respectively, the phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and cultural processes of variation and selection responsible for the origin and maintenance of behavior, whereas neuroscience would study the physiological changes caused by and integral to such processes.

Because behavior analysis and neuroscience deal with distinct subject matters, it is logical to assume, as Skinner did (Skinner, 1931/1961c, p. 336; 1956/1961g, p. 214; 1957/1961d, p. 116; 1959/1961e, p. 253; 1983a, p. 367; 1985, p. 297; 1986a, p. 716; 1987, p. 782; 1988, p. 53; 1989a, p. 56; 1989c, p. 18; 1989d, p. 11),

that they also have different goals and techniques. According to Skinner, the goal of behavior analysis is to study functional rela- tions (contingencies) between the actions of an organism and the environment (Skinner, 1953/1965, 1966b); it is to study the onto- genetic processes of variation and selection of behavior (Skinner, 1981, 1990a, 1993). By contrast, the goal of neuroscience is to study the physiological processes that make behavior possible (Skinner, 1963a, 1983b). In Skinner’s (1990a) words,

The body works as it does because of the laws of physics and chemistry; it does what it does because of its exposure to contingen- cies of variation and selection. Physiology tells us how the body works; the sciences of variation and selection tell us why it is a body that works that way. (p. 1208)

The thesis that behavior analysis and neuroscience have differ- ent subject matters is the starting point for Skinner’s declaration of independence of behavior analysis from neuroscience. Such a distinction is also important to understand the supposed limits of neuroscientific explanations of behavior as posed by Skinner to justify the autonomy of his science of behavior.

Explanation of Behavior

Based on the principle that behavior analysis and neuroscience have different subject matters, Skinner (1938/1966a, pp. 418–419; 1959/1961e, pp. 253–254) proceeded to argue that a science of behavior free from neuroscience is possible. In his words (Skinner, 1938/1966a),

The science of neurology achieved a degree of experimental rigor long before a science of behavior could do so. . . . But the historical advantage has not been conserved. It is now possible to apply scien- tific techniques to the behavior of a representative organism in such a way that behavior appears to be as lawful as the nervous system. I know of no experimental material, for example, concerning the central nervous system which consists of smoother or more easily reproduc- ible curves than are illustrated in many of the figures of this book. Accordingly, if we are to avoid historical influences in arriving at a modern verdict, we must discount the priority of the science of neurology; and in recognizing that the two sciences are of, let us say, equal validity, we may no longer subscribe to a point of view which regards a chaos of behavior as reducible to order through appeal to an internal ordered system. (pp. 418–419)

The history of physiological research dates back to a time when psychology did not exist as an autonomous scientific area, but only as a part of philosophy (cf. Finger, 1994, 2000; Kantor, 1963). It is natural, then, that neuroscience ended up developing scientific and methodological rigor earlier than psychology. Add to that the conception of behavior as a mere effect of what happens inside the body, an ephemeral phenomenon that seems chaotic if taken by itself, and you have the rationale Skinner is trying to discard. For Skinner, behavior is not a mere effect of what happens inside the body, but an object of study in itself. The “chaos” is put into order when behavior is studied through methods and techniques of behavior analysis. The experimental data that comprise The Be- havior of Organisms would be irrefutable evidence that behavior analysis reached a degree of scientific and methodological rigor matched to physiology. Underlying all Skinner’s arguments was the assumption that an independent science of behavior was pos- sible.

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158 ZILIO

Another reason given by Skinner for an autonomous science of behavior was the incompleteness of neuroscience (Skinner, 1954, p. 302; 1938/1966a, p. 4; 1969b, p. 25; 1974, pp. 213–214; 1975, p. 42; 1984, p. 949; 1987, p. 784; 1988, pp. 120–121; 1946, p. 169). Clearly, this is not a problem in itself. After all, we are dealing here with two areas of research that still are in constant development—and would there be, in fact, any science that has been properly “completed”?—behavior analysis and neuroscience. The problem would be to explain behavior based upon events which little is known about. Skinner (1946) argued as follows:

The abundance of “wrong” theories about behavior is due to the practice of keeping an eye on the nervous system. An unwarranted specificity is thus introduced, and this frequently proves to be in error because our present knowledge of the nervous system is deficient. (p. 169)

That is, a theory of behavior may be proven wrong just by being grounded in an incorrect neurophysiological theory. The chances that this may occur are significant because the knowledge we have about brain function is incomplete. One could contest that Skin- ner’s argument is dated. After all, many advances have occurred in the field of neuroscience since 1946. However, the author (Skin- ner, 1988) presents a similar position in the late 1980s:

I readily agree that the appeal to neurology is at the moment pretty much an article of faith. I do not have any way of observing the nervous system or its action, but I have reasonable “confidence” . . . that we shall eventually know much of what we need to know about the underlying “explanation” of behavior. (pp. 120–121)

It is interesting that, even assuming the incompleteness of neu- roscience and the risk of invoking it to explain behavior, Skinner seems to suggest that this is a temporary situation to be surpassed by the development of neuroscience; it is, therefore, an empirical matter.

In addition to the argument of incompleteness, Skinner (1938/ 1966a, p. 425; 1956/1961g, pp. 212–213) also states that neuro- science does not provide simpler explanations of behavior. The following passage is enlightening:

The clinical practice of looking into the organism is carried over in the widespread belief that neurological facts somehow illuminate behav- ior. If my statement of the relation of these two fields is essentially correct, the belief is ill-founded. It obviously springs from the ancient view of behavior as chaotic. . . . The same statement of the relation between neurology and behavior will serve to dismiss the claim that neurology offers a simpler description of behavioral facts. This view is again reminiscent of the belief that simplicity is not to be sought for in behavior itself. (Skinner, 1938/1966a, p. 425)

Complementing the idea of neuroscience being an incomplete science that would not necessarily provide simpler explanations, Skinner (1953/1965, pp. 28–29, 33–34; 1974, pp. 10–11, 213– 214) was also critical of the possibility of prediction and control of behavior through the manipulation of neurophysiological pro- cesses. On this topic, he (Skinner, 1953/1965) wrote,

Eventually a science of the nervous system based upon direct obser- vation rather than inference will describe the neural states and events which immediately precede instances of behavior. We shall know the precise neurological conditions which immediately precede, say, the response, “No, thank you.” These events in turn will be found to be

preceded by other neurological events, and these in turn by others. This series will lead us back to events outside the nervous system and, eventually, outside the organism. . . . We shall consider external events of this sort in some detail. We shall then be better able to evaluate the place of neurological explanations of behavior. However, we may note here that we do not have and may never have this sort of neurological information at the moment it is needed in order to predict a specific instance of behavior. It is even more unlikely that we shall be able to alter the nervous system directly in order to set up the antecedent conditions of a particular instance [emphasis added]. The causes to be sought in the nervous system are, therefore, of limited usefulness in the prediction and control of specific behavior. (pp. 28–29)

What Skinner seems to be defending is that, given the real neuroscience (that is, what we really know about the brain), it is possible to achieve a higher degree of prediction and control of behavior by manipulating contingencies instead of neuro- physiological processes. This condition, however, can change; the development of neuroscience may enable an increasing degree of control and prediction of behavior by the manipula- tion of neurophysiological events. Maybe one day a complete neurophysiological theory will tell us the exact events that take place during one’s particular action; perhaps one day neurosci- ence will be able to provide means for controlling behavior, and we will no longer need to manipulate environmental variables, but only rearrange organism’s neurophysiology, to create new behavioral classes in his repertoire.

Skinner also pointed out problems that are supposed to be inherent to neuroscientific explanations of behavior not dependent on empirical matters related to possible advances in the field. The first one is that neuroscience would not explain the origin of behavior (Skinner, 1957, p. 459; 1959/1961e, p. 253; 1971, p. 14; 1983a, pp. 278–279; 1988, pp. 204, 245, 434; 1989c, p. 18; 1989d, p. 11; 1990a, p. 1206; 1990b, p. 104; 1993, pp. 3–4). In Skinner’s (1989c) words, “No account of what is happening inside the human body, no matter how complete, will explain the origins of human behavior. What happens inside the body is not a beginning” (p. 18). For Skinner (1990b), this is a limit inherent to neurosci- ence, because as “a structure that obeys the laws of physics and chemistry, the brain is not a promising candidate for creator [of behavior]” (p. 104). By contrast, selection by consequences, the process responsible for the novelty and origin of behavior (Skin- ner, 1981, 1988), would not be “mechanical.” Skinner (1990a) is incisive on this point:

The two sciences observe very different causal principles. The body- cum-brain obeys the laws of physics and chemistry. It has no freedom and makes no choices. No other vision of “man a machine” (in this case a biochemical machine) has ever been so well supported. . . . [But] the more we know about the body-cum-brain as a biochemical machine, the less interesting it becomes in its bearing on behavior. If there is freedom, it is to be found in the randomness of variations. If new forms of behavior are created they are created by selection. (p. 1208)

Thus, even if we come to know, in a hypothetical future, everything there is to know about neurophysiological mechanisms, this knowledge does not enable us to explain the “origin” of behavior. The genesis of behavior is a question addressed to the

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159SKINNER, BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

sciences of variation and selection (Skinner, 1989c, p. 18; 1993, pp. 3–4).

However, the impossibility of explaining the origin of behavior is not the only limit inherent to neuroscience. Skinner (1933, p. 20; 1953/1965, p. 35; 1969b, p. 60; 1975, pp. 42–43; 1988, p. 184; 1989b, p. 130) goes one step further and argues that they are not even necessary and/or relevant in behavioral explanations. For example,

We can analyze a given instance of behavior in its relation to the current setting and to antecedent events in the history of the species and of the individual. Thus, we do not need an explicit account of the anatomy and physiology of genetic endowment in order to describe the behavior, or the behavioral processes, characteristic of a species, or to speculate about the contingencies of survival under which they might have evolved, as the ethologists have convincingly demon- strated. Nor do we need to consider anatomy and physiology in order to see how the behavior of the individual is changed by his exposure to contingencies of reinforcement during his life-time and how as a result he behaves in a given way on a given occasion [emphasis added]. I must confess to a predilection here for my own specialty, the experimental analysis of behavior, which is a quite explicit investi- gation of the effects upon individual organisms of extremely complex and subtle contingencies of reinforcement. (Skinner, 1975, pp. 42–43)

This passage brings up two characteristics of Skinner’s philos- ophy of science: the notion of explanation as description of func- tional relations between variables (Skinner, 1947/1961a, 1931/ 1961c, 1953/1965, 1938/1966a, 1966b), and prediction and control being the criteria for evaluating explanations (Skinner, 1953/1965, 1938/1966a). Behavior analysis studies functional relations be- tween environmental events (antecedent and consequent) and the actions of the organism, that is, contingencies of selection. The knowledge produced by this analysis allows behavior scientists to predict and control their subject matter with reasonable accuracy. Thus, neurophysiological processes that occur within the body while they are interacting with the environment would not be relevant if our goal is to predict and control behavior:

The objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that they are not relevant in a functional analysis [emphasis added]. . . . Unless there is a weak spot in our causal chain so that the second link is not lawfully determined by the first, or the third by the second, then the first and third links must be lawfully related. If we must always go back beyond the second link for prediction and control, we may avoid many tiresome and exhausting digressions by examining the third link as a function of the first. Valid information about the second link may throw light upon this relationship but can in no way alter it. (Skinner, 1953/1965, p. 35)

Skinner seems to be applying the logical rule of transitivity (Salmon, 1984/1993) on causal relationships: If Event A causes Event B, and Event B causes Event C, then A causes C. Putting in the language of Skinner’s causal chain: If environmental contin- gencies (Event A) cause certain changes in the organism’s neuro- physiological configuration (Event B) and such neurophysiologi- cal changes result in a given behavioral pattern (Event C), then, assuming that there is an orderly relation between these events, environmental contingencies are ultimately responsible for the behavior pattern. Summarizing Skinner (1969b), “we can predict and control behavior without knowing how our dependent and independent variables are connected” (p. 60). However, the pos-

sibility of explaining behavior based only on functional relations between events studied by behavior analysis does not imply that such an explanation is complete. It is not, and Skinner (1989b) was aware of this fact: “We can predict and control behavior without knowing anything about what is happening inside. A complete account will nevertheless require the joint action of both sciences, each with its own instruments and methods” (p. 130).

Complementing the idea that neuroscience is not necessary to predict and control behavior, Skinner argued that the difficulties in accessing neurophysiological events directly makes it impossible to predict and control behavior through their manipulation. In his words,

Physiology and, particularly with respect to behavior, neurology, have of course made great progress. Electrical and chemical properties of many neural activities are now directly observed and measured. The nervous system is, however, much less accessible than behavior and environment, and the difference takes its toll. We know some of the processes which affect large blocks of behavior—sensory, motor, motivational, and emotional—but we are still far short of knowing precisely what is happening when, say, a child learns to drink from a cup, to call an object by its name, or to find the right piece of a jigsaw puzzle, as we are still far short of making changes in the nervous system as a result of which a child will do these things. It is possible that we shall never directly observe what is happening in the nervous system at the time a response occurs, because something like the Heisenberg principle may apply: any means of observing neural mediation of behavior may disturb the behavior. (Skinner, 1974, pp. 213–214)

In quantum physics, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle asserts that in order to predict the position and velocity of a particle at time t2, it is necessary to know its position and velocity at time t1. The problem is that it is not possible to measure the velocity and the position of the particle at time t1 simultaneously. The experimental manipulation necessary to observe the particle’s ve- locity with a certain degree of accuracy would decrease the accu- racy of observing that same particle’s position and vice versa. For Skinner, an analogous situation occurs with behavioral and neu- rophysiological events. Applying the logic of the uncertainty prin- ciple to behavior: To predict the action of the organism at time t2, it is necessary to know the history of its interaction with the environment or its brain state at time t1. Behavior analysis pro- vides knowledge of an organism’s history, and by doing so, it gives us probabilistic indications about how the organism might behave at t2 without needing any kind of manipulation at t1. Neuroscience, in contrast, can provide knowledge of organism’s current brain state at time t1. However, to get this information, one must manipulate the organism, which can influence the very oc- currence of the behavior under study. In other words, it is impos- sible to measure simultaneously the neurophysiological events mediating a specific behavioral relation without affecting the be- havioral relation itself in the process.

Finally, Skinner also argues that neuroscience does not add anything new to behavioral explanations (Skinner, 1938/1966a, p. 424; 1969b, p. 63; 1980, p. 307; 1988, pp. 184, 470; 1989c, p. 18). For instance, the following quotations illustrate this idea:

The point at issue is not the possibility of successful correlation but its significance. Although the discovery of a lesion may be of first importance for diagnostic or prognostic purposes, a description of the

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phenomena of aphasia, in their relation to normal verbal behavior, is aided very slightly if at all by this added knowledge [emphasis added]. It is wholly a matter of the interests of the investigator, whether he makes this excursion into the nervous system. (Skinner, 1938/1966a, p. 424)

A machine which simulated human behavior in detail would indeed tell us the Inside Story. We should have only to look at the blueprints to see what entered into the creation of man. Like the Inside Story of physiology, however, it would tell us nothing new about behavior [emphasis added]. Only when we know what a man actually does can we adequately simulate his behavior. The Outside Story must be told first. (Skinner, 1969b, p. 63)

If sleep is a kind of behavior—or even the absence of behavior—then has “physiology” told us something we didn’t know? Only by ampli- fication. REM is observed behavior. So are reports of dreaming. Electroencephalo-grams are “physiology.” Do they throw any light on the behavior? Not on any explanatory mechanism [emphasis added]. Not on any bridging of past experience with current action. (Skinner, 1980, p. 307)

We now know much more about the chemistry and the architecture of the nervous system, but I believe it is still true, as I said in 1938 in The Behavior of Organisms, that no fact about the nervous system has yet told us anything new about behavior [emphasis added]. It has, of course, told us much that is new about the relation between the nervous system and behavior and has indicated things to be done to the nervous system to change behavior. We have not yet learned anything about the behavior of an organism in an experimental space from its physiology [emphasis added]. (Skinner, 1988, p. 470)

Presenting these quotes together serves to highlight the fact that Skinner remained relentless in his position over the years. In the 1930s, he argued that eventual discoveries about the correlation between behavioral relations and neural lesions, as in aphasia studies, would not be relevant to understanding the behavioral processes itself. We would know that a behavioral problem had a physical cause—a brain lesion—but this does not provide any information about the behavioral functions affected by the lesion or the fortuitous behavioral patterns that might emerge as a result of it. To understand, for example, aphasia as a verbal behavior, we should study the behavior of aphasics and not the lesions in their brains. A similar idea was presented in the early 1980s, when Skinner discussed the role of the electroencephalographic expla- nation of sleep, which tells us nothing about sleeping as a behav- ior.

By the late 1960s, Skinner had put the neuroscience and the computational cognitive science side by side in his criticisms. He contrasted the internal and external histories in the explanation of behavior. The knowledge of neurophysiological mechanisms (i.e., internal history) could serve as a basis for building machines that would accurately simulate the behavior of organisms. But this knowledge would not tell us anything new about the behavior itself. The explanation of behavior should focus on organisms’ history of interaction with its environment (i.e., external history). Moreover, we could say that the machine built would actually be simulating human behavior only if we knew how humans behave. Thus, the external history, or behavioral explanation, must precede the internal history, that is, the neurophysiological explanation, to be able to make sense of it.

Finally, in the late 1980s, Skinner reiterated his position pre- sented 50 years earlier: No fact about brain function presents any new information about behavioral principles. Skinner’s conclusion is a direct consequence of the argument with which I began this article: Behavior analysis and the neuroscience have different subject matters. If this is the case, then it is to be expected that nothing we can learn about the one will tell us anything about the other. In short, to understand behavior, we must study behavior, and to understand the brain, we must study the brain. However, to understand the relations between brain and behavior, we must collect data from both sciences.

Concepts and Philosophy of Science

The thesis that behavior analysis and neuroscience have distinct subject matters probably had its origin on Skinner’s (1931/1961c) historical analysis of the reflex concept. Skinner found that the term “reflex” always figured in physiological studies, and the very justification for its use indicated the influence of physiology: A stimulus causes a disturbance in the organism, which, in turn, passes through the central nervous system to finally be “reflected” in the muscles (Skinner, 1953/1965, 1938/1966a). Because for Skinner (1931/1961c), reflex was the appropriate concept to de- scribe behavioral relations, here we find one more justification in favor of the thesis that behavior should be considered as an object of study in itself, apart from neurophysiological events. The prob- lem is that a great deal of “physiological” research was actually dealing only with correlations between stimuli and responses. The nervous system appeared only as a conceptual apparatus inferred from these relations (Skinner, 1931/1961c, 1938/1966a, 1975). The relevance of the relational definition of reflex for the inde- pendence of behavior analysis is manifest, because it was the starting point for definitions of other behavioral phenomena free from physiological references. Skinner (1931/1961c) made the following comment on this subject:

The paper argued for the solid status of behavioral facts apart from imagined physiological counterparts. An important point is that op- erational definitions are suggested not only for reflex, but for drive, emotion, conditioning and other terms appropriate to the intact organ- ism. (p. 319)

Having different subject matters of analysis meant, for Skinner (1935/1961f, p. 365; 1947/1961a, pp. 232–233; 1938/1966a, pp. 428–429), that behavior analysis and neuroscience were on dis- tinct levels of analysis. Therefore, behavior analysis and neurosci- ence demands concepts proper to their subject matters and level of analysis (Skinner, 1950, p. 193; 1959/1961e, p. 253; 1974, pp. 232–233). This is what Skinner seems to suggest when he says more than once that behavior must be studied on its own terms (Skinner, 1956, p. 223; 1957/1961b, p. 195; 1959/1961e, pp. 253–254; 1938/1966a, pp. 440–441; 1986b, p. 208–209; 1988, pp. 460–461; 1989a, p. 56; 1989b, p. 122; 1993, p. 3; 1980/1998, p. 295). Skinner (1947/1961a) develops this point in the following passage:

The appeal to what we may call naive physiologizing, like the appeal to psychic determiners, is made in an attempt to explain behavior by shifting to a different level of observation [emphasis added]. These are “outside” theories, which account for one thing by pointing to some- thing which is going on somewhere else at the same time. For this

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reason they cannot fill the need for a theory of behavior [emphasis added], no matter how carefully they may be extended or repaired. What is emerging in psychology, as it has emerged at some point in the history of most sciences, is a theory which refers to facts at a single level of observation [emphasis added]. The logic of this is simple enough. We begin with behavior as a subject matter and devise an appropriate vocabulary [emphasis added]. We express the basic protocol facts of the science in the terms of this vocabulary. In the course of constructing a theory we may invent new terms, but they will not be invented to describe any new sort of fact. At no time will the theory generate terms which refer to a different subject matter [emphasis added], to mental states, for example, or neurones [empha- sis added]. It is not the purpose of such a theory to explain behavior by turning to “outside” determiners. (pp. 232–233)

Simply put, to say that behavior analysis and the neuroscience are at different levels of analysis is equal to saying that both are interested in distinct variables. Remembering the causal chain proposed by Skinner mentioned earlier in this article: environmen- tal events (Variable 1) affect the organism by causing physiolog- ical changes (Variable 2); those changes eventually lead to actions (Variable 3), which, in turn, are responsible for modifying the environment (Variable 4). Behavior analysis is interested in Vari- ables 1, 3, and 4, whereas neuroscience deals with Variable 2. Scientific concepts are abstractions established through functional relations between scientists’ verbal responses (the “terms” used by them) and the conditions that establish the occasion in which they occur (Skinner, 1945, 1957). It is a verbal relation called “tact.” For Skinner (1957), “tact may be defined as a verbal operant in which a response of given form is evoked (or at least strengthened) by a particular object or event or property of an object or event” (p. 82). In other words, tact is the verbal operant that has objects or events as discriminative stimuli. Concepts are extensions of tact known as abstractions. Again, with Skinner (1957), “any property of a stimulus present when a verbal response is reinforced acquires some degree of control over that response, and this control con- tinues to be exerted when the property appears in other combina- tions” (p. 107). Thus, for example, the concept of reflex is used to indicate the functional relation observed between stimuli and re- sponses. There are endless combinations of stimuli and responses that can be classified as “reflex,” but all of them must have at least one thing in common: They must be functionally related. Scientists can observe stimuli of various intensities, forms, and durations, and responses of various magnitudes and topographies, but if stimuli and responses are functionally related, then the concept of reflex applies. However, because behavior analysis and neurosci- ence focus their research on different variables, the events that establish the occasion for tact responses and, consequently, pro- vide the bases for the proposition of concepts are distinct. As a result, behavioral concepts relate only to behavioral events and neurophysiological concepts refer only to neurophysiological events. Finally, in his definition of explanation, Skinner (1931/ 1961c) adopts a Machian point of view (cf. Marr, 2003) by stating that behavior analysis “must describe the event not only for itself but in its relation to other events; and, in point of satisfaction, it must explain” (p. 337). As I said earlier, to explain is to describe functional relations between variables that are subject matters in a given science (Skinner, 1947/1961a, 1931/1961c, 1953/1965, 1938/1966a, 1966b). Based on those considerations, Skinner’s logic goes as follows: (a) behavior analysis and neuroscience have

different subject matters; (b) consequently, they are at different levels of analysis; (c) by being on different levels, their concepts refer to distinct events; (d) given the fact that to explain is to describe functional relations between events, neuroscientific ex- planations and their concepts say nothing about behavior because they relate to events other than the behavior itself. As a conse- quence, a behavioral science with its own vocabulary composed by concepts derived solely from behavioral events and that explains behavior by taking into account the contingencies of selection, seems to be a welcome endeavor. The fact that they have distinct subject matters adds to the idea that behavior analysis and neuro- science act on different levels of analysis and that their concepts must refer to events that constitute their specific levels of analysis. Here we find another argument in favor of the independence of behavior analysis from the neuroscience. According to Skinner (1938/1966a),

The first of these is hygienic. A definition of terms in a science of behavior at its own level offers the tremendous advantage of keeping the investigator aware of what he knows and of what he does not know. The use of terms with neural references when the observations upon which they are based are behavioral is misleading. An entirely erroneous conception of the actual state of knowledge is set up. (pp. 426–427)

Adhering to behavioral concepts in the explanation of behavior is advantageous because it keeps the scientist’s explanation con- cise, without references to events that are not part of the “behav- ioral” universe (Skinner, 1938/1966a, pp. 426–427; 1966b, p. 217). Furthermore, using neurophysiological concepts in the ex- planation of behavior may generate an illusion of explanation, blurring the line between what we know and think we know about behavior.

There is still another argument related to these ideas that seems to justify an autonomous science of behavior: For Skinner, the facts of behavior analysis would be insulated from the facts of neuroscience (1959/1961e, p. 253; 1953/1965, pp. 35, 54; Skinner, 1938/1966a, p. 432; 1969b, p. 60; 1974, pp. 214–215; 1975, p. 43; 1988, p. 128; 1989c, p. 18). This relates to the idea, presented in the previous section, that neuroscience would not add anything new to a behavioral explanation. If neuroscience has nothing to say in the context of behavioral explanations, then the laws, concepts, and theories that comprise those explanations would remain un- changed despite the advances and new findings in neuroscience. This is so because the concepts, laws, and theories presented in behavioral explanations refer only to events that constitute the behavioral level of analysis. This seems to be Skinner’s (1989c) conclusion: “The analysis of behavior need not wait until brain scientists have done their part. The behavioral facts will not be changed, and they suffice for both a science and a technology” (p. 18).

The last argument of this section is perhaps one of the most important presented by Skinner: To have an autonomous science of behavior is paramount because behavior analysis is responsible for establishing neuroscience’s research agenda, it informs the neuroscientist what to look for in the nervous system, or it gives meaning to neurophysiological processes (Skinner, 1935/1961f, p. 365; 1938/1966a, pp. 422, 429; 1969b, pp. 60, 63; 1974, pp. 210–211; 1975, p. 43; 1980, p. 341; 1983a, p. 367; 1985, p. 297; 1986c, p. 235; 1988, pp. 60, 128, 245, 470; 1989c, p. 18; 1993, pp.

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3–4). Behind this argument is Skinner’s idea that behavioral concepts precede neurophysiological concepts. He made this point clear when discussing the construction of reflex arc concept:

We may note . . . that the description of a reflex in functional terms (as a correlation of stimulus and response) is always prior to the description of its arc. In any available procedure the anatomical inference must always be drawn from an experiment in which the integrity of a function is critical. (1931/1961c, p. 333)

The definition of reflex as a functional relation between stimuli and responses always precedes the delimitation of its physiological correlate—its “arc.” It is possible to generalize the argument to any behavioral relation: The specific contingencies that make them unique will always precede the delimitation of its neurophysiolog- ical correlates. The argument is robust and simple: In order to understand the neurophysiological processes related to a given behavioral relation, it is necessary to first understand and have a clear definition of the behavioral relation. It is precisely for that reason that behavior analysis would present to neuroscience its research agenda: It establishes the behavioral parameters that guide the search for neurophysiological correlates of behavior. Skinner presented this idea several times along his career:

What is generally not understood by those interested in estab-lishing neurological bases is that a rigorous description at the level of behavior is necessary for the demonstration of a neurological corre- late [emphasis added]. The discovery of neurological facts may pro- ceed independently of a science of behavior if the facts are directly observed as structural and functional changes in tissue, but before such a fact may be shown to account for a fact of behavior, both must be quantitatively described and shown to correspond in all their properties. (Skinner, 1938/1966a, p. 422)

This passage indicates that only an analysis of behavioral vari- ables provides the appropriate parameters for searching the neu- rophysiological correlates of behavior. Skinner also argues that both sciences have autonomy. Although a behavioral science in- dependent of neuroscience is possible, a neuroscience independent of behavior analysis is possible as well. In this case, Skinner seems to suggest that such science would be interested in neurophysio- logical mechanisms as an end in itself. The problem emerges if neuroscience wants to go a step further and try to understand the correlations between neurophysiological mechanisms and behav- ior. At this moment enters behavior analysis. Continuing with Skinner’s comments on the subject,

It is often implied that behavior cannot be adequately de-scribed until more is known about the nervous system. A science of behavior is called “highly phenomenological” and is said to show a “studied indifference to brain mechanisms—to what is inside the black box.” But we cannot say that what goes on inside is an adequate explanation until we know what the black box does. A behavioral analysis is es-sentially a statement of the facts to be explained by studying the nervous system [emphasis added]. It tells the physiologist what to look for. (Skinner, 1969b, p. 60)

Skinner argues just the opposite that is normally said (at least according to him) about the necessity of neuroscience to validate a science of behavior: It is impossible to know the function of neurophysiological mechanisms and its relation to behavior until we know exactly the relevant behavioral facts. It is inconceivable,

for example, to search for the neurophysiological mechanisms related to operant learning without having clear knowledge of behavioral facts on operant relations. Skinner (1986c) concluded,

I think the experimental analysis of behavior can best proceed as it started, until the control of the behavior of an organism in an exper- imental space is very nearly total. A science of behavior will then have given neurology its clearest assignment [emphasis added]. (p. 235)

Practical Issues

In this section, I address some arguments that, although related, are not necessarily conceptual and/or philosophical. These argu- ments are “practical” in the sense of indicating the practical advantages of establishing an independent science of behavior. First, if we accept the autonomy of behavior analysis, the next logical step is the division of labor between behavior analysis and neuroscience: Each science would be in charge of answering different but complementary questions about behavior (Skinner, 1935/1961f, p. 365; 1956/1961g, p. 214; 1983b, p. 15; 1985, p. 295; 1990a, p. 1208). As Skinner wrote (1985), “How organisms are changed by contingencies of reinforcement is the field of a behavioral analysis. What is happening inside is a question to be answered by neurology, with its appropriate instruments and meth- ods” (p. 295). Moreover, the chances of faster progress in both areas are greater if the autonomy is accepted. The argument is simple: If each discovery about behavior is followed by the pursuit of its neurophysiological correlates, behavioral research will stop after each behavioral discovery (Skinner, 1938/1966a, pp. 427– 428, 429; 1979, pp. 166–167; 1989c, p. 18). This seems to be Skinner’s (1979) idea:

The argument against physiology is simply that we should get more done in the field of behavior if we confined ourselves to be-havior. When we rid ourselves of the delusion that we are getting down to fundamentals when we get into physiology, then the young man who discovers some fact of behavior will not immediately go after the “physiological correlates” but will go on discovering other facts of behavior. (pp. 166–167)

Finally, the last practical justification for the autonomy is that behavior analysis provides technological and experimental back- ground for neuroscience research (Skinner, 1956/1961g, p. 203; 1957/1961b, p. 197; 1957/1961d, p. 122; 1963b, p. 514; 1988, p. 128). Again, with Skinner,

The extent of the prediction and control which has been achieved is evident not only in “smoothness of curves” and uniformity of results from individual to individual or even species to species, but in the practical uses which are already being made of the techniques for example, in providing baselines for the study of pharmacological and neurological variables [emphasis added], or in converting a lower organism into a sensitive psychophysical observer. (Skinner, 1956/ 1961g, p. 203)

Another field in which important variables affecting behavior are studied is neurology. Performances under various schedules of rein- forcement supply baselines which are as useful here [emphasis added] as in the field of psychopharmacology. The classical pattern of re- search is to establish a performance containing features of interest, then to remove or damage part of the nervous system, and later to have another look at the behavior. The damaged performance shows the

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163SKINNER, BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE

effect of the lesion and helps in inferring the contribution of the area to normal behavior. (Skinner, 1957/1961d, p. 122)

The techniques and experimental designs of behavior analysis provide baselines of behavioral patterns stable enough to be used as a parameter in experiments that involves neurophysiological manipulations. Research that employs brain lesions or administra- tion of drugs, for example, would be less informative if there were not a behavioral technology that provides satisfactory degree of control of behavior in experimental contexts. Skinner (1988) syn- thesizes the argument as follows: “The use of operant techniques, in the brain science laboratory is the best demonstration I can offer of the contribution of an independent science of behavior in making the task of brain science clear” (p. 128).

Against Strong Autonomy

Table 2 contains all Skinner’s justifications for the autonomy of behavior analysis, divided into categories as well as the texts in which he presented his arguments. It is clear that Skinner presented arguments for the autonomy of behavior analysis during his entire career. It was, as he said, a crusade for the “declaration of inde- pendency” of behavior analysis from neuroscience (Skinner, 1980/ 1998, p. 295).

The first thing to notice is that substantial part of his arguments remained constant along his entire career, indicating that his po- sition did not change over time even with the advances in neuro- science during this period. The second point worth notice is that at least part of Skinner’s arguments seems to support the strong kind

of autonomy, according to which behavior analysis and neurosci- ence would be fully independent scientific endeavors, and, as a consequence, their subject matters, explanations, and theories would be insulated from one another. This seems to be, for instance, the position defended by Reese (1996): “Real physiology has so far not helped behavior analysts to explain the behavioral phenomena they study. Therefore, ignoring physiological pro- cesses seems unlikely to be an obstacle to progress in behavior analysis” (p. 68). In this section, I argue that Skinner’s arguments that may support strong autonomy are quite fragile. As a conse- quence, they can be easily disregarded as valid points in defense of strong autonomy.

To start, some of Skinner’s arguments are simply outdated; they do not quite capture the current zeitgeist among sciences and scientists dedicated to the study of brain and behavior (Craver, 2007; Kandel, Markram, Matthews, Yuste, & Koch, 2013; Wilson, 1999). The following arguments fall in this category: division of labor (4.1 in Table 2), faster progress in both sciences (4.2), different goals and techniques (1.3), behavior analysis provides support for neuroscience (4.3), and behavior analysis establishes the research program of neuroscience (3.6). Division of labor is still a good strategy if it means different sciences studying differ- ent variables related to the production of a phenomenon (cf. Craver, 2007). The problem is to transform an arbitrary division into a qualitative distinction between different domains of inquire and to use this distinction as justification for neglecting the work done in other areas of research. In addition, science is becoming more and more an interdisciplinary endeavor, particularly among

Table 2 Skinner’s Arguments for the Autonomy of Behavior Analysis From Neuroscience

Categories Arguments Texts

1. Definition of the subject matter

1.1 Distinct objects of study Skinner (1938/1966a, 1959/1961e, 1969b, 1986a, 1989a, 1989c, 1990a) 1.2 Behavior analysis: variation and selection Skinner (1990a) 1.3 Different goals and techniques Skinner (1931/1961c, 1956/1961g, 1957/1961d, 1959/1961e, 1983a,

1985, 1986a, 1987, 1989a, 1989c, 1989d) 2. Explanation of

behavior 2.1 A science of behavior is possible Skinner (1938/1966a, 1959/1961e) 2.2 Knowledge of the nervous system is deficient Skinner (1938/1966a, 1946, 1954, 1969b, 1974, 1975, 1984, 1987, 1988) 2.3 Neuroscience does not provide a simpler explanation Skinner (1938/1966a, 1956/1961g) 2.4 Prediction and control through neuroscience Skinner (1953/1965, 1974) 2.5 Neuroscience does not explain the origins of

behavior Skinner (1957, 1959/1961e, 1971, 1983a, 1988, 1989c, 1989d, 1990a,

1990b, 1993) 2.6 Neuroscience is not relevant or necessary to the

explanation of behavior Skinner (1933, 1953/1965, 1969b, 1975, 1988, 1989b)

2.7 “Uncertainty principle” and the manipulation of brain

Skinner (1974)

2.8 No fact about the nervous system adds anything new about behavior

Skinner (1938/1966a, 1969b, 1980, 1988, 1989c)

3. Concepts and philosophy of science

3.1 The analysis of reflex concept Skinner (1931/1961c, 1938/1966a, 1953/1965, 1975) 3.2 Different levels of analysis Skinner (1935/1961f, 1938/1966a, 1947/1961a) 3.3 Behavior should be studied by its own terms Skinner (1938/1966a, 1950, 1956, 1957/1961b, 1959/1961e, 1974, 1980/

1998, 1986b, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1993) 3.4 Advantages of using only behavioral concepts and

theories Skinner (1938/1966a, 1966b)

3.5 Behavioral facts are “immune” to neurological facts Skinner (1938/1966a, 1953/1965, 1959/1961e, 1969b, 1974, 1975, 1988, 1989c)

3.6 Behavior analysis establishes the research program of neuroscience

Skinner (1935/1961f, 1938/1966a, 1969b, 1974, 1975, 1980, 1983a, 1985, 1986c, 1988, 1989c, 1993)

4. Practical issues 4.1 Division of labor Skinner (1935/1961f, 1956/1961g, 1983b, 1985, 1990a) 4.2 Faster progress in both sciences Skinner (1938/1966a, 1979, 1989c) 4.3 Behavior analysis provides support for neuroscience Skinner (1956/1961g, 1957/1961b, 1957/1961d, 1963b, 1988)

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sciences that aim is to understand behavior. Boundaries and divi- sions are being dismantled. It is common to see psychologists, biologists, neuroscientists, physicists, chemists, computer scien- tists, engineers, and philosophers doing research together with one common goal: to understand behavior. The rule is not division of labor anymore, but collaborative and conjoint work.

It is wrong to assume that behavior analysis and neuroscience have different goals. Both fields are interested in how behavior works. The difference is that these fields focus on different aspects (contingencies and neurophysiological mechanisms) that are both necessary for the production of the phenomena. In addition, the argument that behavior analysis provides technological and exper- imental support for neuroscience, and that it establishes neurosci- ence’s research program, can go both ways: It is valid for behavior analysis, as Skinner said, but technologies and experimental pro- cedures related to the study of physiological events as independent variables can be used to support behavior analysis as well. Black- man and Pellon (1993) and Branch (2006), for instance, made a strong case for the importance of using pharmacological tech- niques and manipulations in the study of behavior. According to Branch, “research in behavioral pharmacology has implications not only for issues surrounding behavioral effects of drugs, but it can have significance for the understanding of behavior in general” (p. 421). A good example of this is Lubinski and Thompson’s (1987, 1993) experimental model for studying private events in which the discriminative function of the effects produced by different substances played an essential part in controlling discrim- inative behavior of rats. Perhaps closer to neuroscience than be- havioral pharmacology, techniques used in cellular and molecular neuroscience are another suitable example, such as in vitro rein- forcement (Stein, 1997; Stein, Xue, & Belluzzi, 1993, 1994) and preparations that use simplified neuronal circuits in order to un- derstand the physiological processes related to operant and respon- dent learning (Baxter & Byrne, 2006; Brembs, Baxter, & Byrne, 2004; Lorenzetti, Mozzachiodi, Baxter, & Byrne, 2006; Mozzach- iodi & Byrne, 2010; Mozzachiodi, Lorenzetti, Baxter, & Byrne, 2008). As I will argue, all this results in new neuroscientific findings that can pose new experimental and conceptual questions for behavior analysis (Zilio, 2013). This last point leads us to Skinner’s arguments for the independence of behavior analysis that have intrinsic problems.

Skinner explicitly said that neuroscience is not relevant or necessary in the explanation of behavior (2.6), that no fact about the nervous system adds anything new about behavior (2.8), and that behavioral facts are insulated from neurophysiological facts (3.5). Elsewhere I argued that this is true only in a very restrictive sense (Zilio, 2013). Behavioral laws (such as Matching Law or Law of Effect) will not be changed by neurophysiological facts because these laws are generic descriptions of observed regulari- ties between behavioral variables (environmental and related to the actions of organisms), not physiological ones (Skinner, 1945, 1957; see also Lee, 1985; Moore, 2008). Therefore, physiological events do not control the verbal behavior related to the proposition of behavioral laws. Neuroscience will not change behavioral laws because those laws have nothing to do with neurophysiology. Nevertheless, neuroscience can contribute to the explanation of behavior by exposing physiological mechanisms related to it. Neuroscience can influence the way we think about behavioral concepts and theories by bringing into discussion data that we

could not possible gather by behavior analysis alone (Zilio, 2013). The molecular and cellular studies mentioned earlier on neuro- physiological mechanisms of operant and respondent learning is, again, a perfect example. Based on those studies, Donahoe and colleagues (Donahoe, Burgos, & Palmer, 1993; Donahoe & Palmer, 1994; Donahoe, Palmer, & Burgos, 1997a, 1997b) pro- posed a “unified principle of reinforcement,” according to which operant and respondent relations are viewed as products of the same selection mechanism associated with changes in synaptic efficacy. According to Donahoe et al. (1993),

cellular research has shown that the introduction of dopamine into synapses immediately after a postsynaptic neuron has been activated by a presynaptic neuron produces long-lasting changes in synaptic efficacies. That is, the ability of the presynaptic neuron to initiate activity in the postsynaptic neuron is increased. (p. 24)

However, the same kind of molecular and cellular neurophysi- ological experiments that supported the unified principle of rein- forcement can also be used to discuss its validity. For instance, experiments done with Aplysia have shown that respondent and operant learning have different neurophysiological mechanisms related not only to changes in synaptic efficacy but also to changes in excitability of neurons (Lorenzetti et al., 2006; Mozzachiodi & Byrne, 2010; for a detailed analysis on this topic, see Zilio, 2013). The main point I make here is that neuroscience can influence theories and concepts about behavior—it can influence the behav- ioral “principles” but not the behavioral “laws” as defined here. Behavior analysis is not insulated or autonomous from neurosci- ence in any strong sense of these words, and this is a good thing because it shows that we are within the domain of natural sciences, in which there is no real separation between objects of study besides artificial ones proposed solely for convenience. Bunge’s (1990) thoughts on the autonomy of psychology in general can easily be applied to the particular case of behavior analysis:

A fully autonomous discipline cannot be part of the system of the sciences, since these constitute a system by virtue of their partial overlapping and their interactions. Of course some division of labor is necessary, but such division should not be carried to the extreme of isolating the various sciences, if only because every division of scientific work is largely conventional. . . . The isolation of a disci- pline from the total system of the sciences is a reliable indicator of its nonscientific character. (p. 126)

Skinner would probably agree with Bunge, as he defended, more than once, that behavior analysis is part of biological sci- ences (e.g., Skinner, 1956/1961g, p. 206; 1963a, p. 951; 1975, p. 42): “The experimental analysis of behavior is a rigorous, exten- sive, and rapidly expanding branch of biology” (Skinner, 1974, p. 231). This may be viewed as contradicting Skinner’s discourse for the “autonomy” of behavior analysis. After all, if behavior analysis is a branch of biological sciences, then it is not an autonomous endeavor in the sense of “strong autonomy” defined in the begin- ning of this article.

Another potentially problematic justification used by Skinner is the one about behavior analysis being the science of variation and selection, both processes not allegedly studied by neuroscience (1.2). The problem lies in the implication that behavior analysis (along with ethology and part of anthropology) is the only science concerned with variation and selection of behavior. After all, it is

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not possible to understand selection and variation processes with- out knowing the underlying physiological mechanisms. Behavioral contingencies are only part of what constitutes the process of selection of behavior. No enduring selection can occur without retention, that is, physiological modification (Donahoe & Palmer, 1994). What modifications those would be is a question addressed to neuroscience. The aforementioned example of molecular and cellular researches on neurophysiological mechanisms of operant and respondent learning applies here as well, because hypotheses about how selection of behavior occurs (as the “unified principle of reinforcement”) are largely informed by neuroscientific data. In addition, variation in patterns of behavior can occur as a function of behavioral contingencies (Neuringer, 2004), but it also can occur as a function of brain processes alone. There is a branch of neuroscience, for example, dedicated to the study of stochastic processes in brain and its function in controlling behavioral vari- ability on contingencies that involves decision making (Glimcher, 2005; Maye, Hsieh, Sugihara, & Brembs, 2007). In other words, both behavior analysis and neuroscience are fields interested in the study of variation and selection of behavior. However, these fields have their focus on different aspects of the phenomena.

Skinner also defended that neuroscience does not provide a simpler explanation of behavior (2.3), and that neuroscience does not explain the origins of behavior (2.5). The problem in both arguments is in the definition of “simplicity” and “origin.” What is a simple explanation? Neither behavior analysis nor neuroscience is simple. An explanation based on the history of contingencies of reinforcement is “simpler” than one based on how the mechanisms in a specific part of the brain works? How is this so? It is the same thing with the “origin” of behavior. Where is the origin of behav- ior? Can we point to a place or a moment in the behavioral flux and say “there is it: the origin of behavior X”? This is nonsense. As Skinner (1953/1965) himself defended, we are dealing with a process in constant flux—a succession of interrelated environmen- tal, behavioral, and physiological events. All of them have some place in the explanation of behavior X. Skinner (1953/1965) sug- gested that we could follow the “causal” sequence backward until we reach the environment events related to behavior, and so doing, we could put aside the “intermediary” physiological events in our explanations. This is true, but this does not mean that the origin is there. We can continue to follow the causal sequence until we get inside the organism again, and then get outside one more time, and then inside again, ad infinitum. Contingencies related to the history of organisms (normally, recent history) is just the point at which Skinner and, for that matter, behavior analysts chose to stop in their analysis of behavior.

Skinner also presented justifications for the autonomy of behav- ior analysis that are dependent on technological and empirical matters: knowledge of nervous system is deficient (2.2), prediction and control of behavior through neuroscience (2.4), and the “un- certainty principle” and the manipulation of brain events (2.7). Of course, our knowledge about the nervous system is not complete, but it is not deficient either. We do not know everything about the brain (as we do not know everything about behavior), but the possibility of prediction and control of behavior through the anal- ysis and manipulation of neurophysiological events are a reality today. One interesting example, among many others easily found in the specialized literature, is Kogan, Frankland, and Silva’s (2000) research on neural mechanisms related to social recognition

on mice (also used by Bickle, 2007, 2008, in his defense of reductionism of psychology to neuroscience). It is said that one mouse “recognizes” or “remembers” another when, as a result of a previous contact with it, it expends less time engaged in inves- tigative behaviors (mostly olfactory responses) directed toward its conspecifics. The procedure to measure the “recognition” usually involves a first session of exposure to conspecifics and a second session of exposure after a preestablished time interval. As a result, subjects expend less time during the second exposure session investigating conspecifics that they contacted before during the first session, which indicates (indirectly, at least) that they “rec- ognized” them. Knowing that social recognition learning depends on changes in synaptic efficacy in hippocampal neurons, Kogan et al. (2000) used the mutant mice CREB��� as subjects in this particular experiment. Those mice lack � and � isoforms of the cAMP response element-binding (CREB) in hippocampus. CREB is a protein that modulates the transcription of genes responsible for regulating the growth of neurons, a necessary step for the increase in synaptic efficacy associated with long-term memory to occur. The reasoning behind the experiment is quite simple: It is known that hippocampus plays an important role in the retention (“memory”) of social recognition behavior, so any kind of manip- ulation that disrupts the functioning of hippocampus would prob- ably have some effect on social recognition learning. That is exactly what Kogan et al. found. Compared with the control group (nonmutant mice), the mutant mice group did not show any sign of social recognition learning, which means that the time they expend investigating it conspecifics during the second session of exposure was not diminished due to the previous exposure. This happened with large time intervals between first and second exposure ses- sions (in this case, 24 hr), but not with smaller time intervals (in this case, 30 min), which indicates that the disruption of CREB affected only long-term memory (or retention), corroborating the hypothesis that the hippocampus plays an important role in some kinds of long-term memory. This conclusion was supported by data on mutant mice groups as well as by data on groups of subjects with hippocampal lesions and groups with subjects to which protein synthesis inhibitors were administered (Kogan et al., 2000).

However, the authors found that two groups of subjects pre- sented similar behavior to the mutant mice group (or any of the groups that passed through brain manipulation) in the social rec- ognition task, except they did not suffer any kind of neurophysi- ological manipulation. The difference was in their history. Sub- jects from the mutant mice and control groups were group-housed before the experiments occur, whereas the subjects of these two other groups were individually housed: Subjects from one group were isolated in individual cages for 3 weeks before the social recognition task (“chronic isolation”), and subjects from the other group were isolated in individual cages for 24 hr (“acute isola- tion”). In both cases, the isolation had the same effect found in mutant mice: Both mutant and isolated mice did not recognize their conspecifics after long-term intervals between first- and second-exposure sessions.

I chose to use this particular research as an example because it clearly shows how it is possible to control and predict behavior through manipulation and knowledge of neurophysiological pro- cesses. Knowing that we are dealing with subjects with hippocam- pal impairment is an important factor in predicting their behavior

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during social recognition tasks. In other words, we can use infor- mation about the brain to predict behavior. The possibility of manipulation of brain in order to produce some kind of behavioral pattern is also exemplified in Kogan et al.’s (2000) research by the administration of substances (protein synthesis inhibitor, anisomy- cin, and saline), hippocampal lesions, and genetic manipulation. Finally, this example is particularly interesting because here we have a case in which neurophysiological manipulation and envi- ronmental manipulation (history of isolation) produced the same behavioral effect. Of course, this example involves very specific and controlled situations, meaning we are very far away from generalizations such as “Every social behavior depends on hip- pocampus activities” or “It’s possible to control social behavior by controlling hippocampal process.” Still, the same could be said of Skinner’s first experiments on operant condition summarized in The Behavior of Organisms—the point being, Skinner’s criticisms of the possibility of control and prediction of behavior through neuroscience seem not to be sustainable anymore. Perhaps we are reaching a moment that Skinner (1969b) himself anticipated:

In a more advanced account of a behaving organism “historical” variables will be replaced by “causal” ones. When we can observe the momentary state of an organism, we shall be able to use it, instead of the history responsible for it, in predicting behavior. When we can generate or change a state directly, we shall be able to use it to control behavior. Neither the science nor the technology of behavior will then vanish, however. Physiological manipulations will simply be added to the armamentarium of the behavioral scientist. (p. 60)

Weak Autonomy Without Reduction

Nevertheless, Skinner also presented arguments that still remain relevant for the defense of the autonomy between behavior anal- ysis and neuroscience, although only in the weak sense of the word. The following arguments fall into this category: a science of behavior is possible (2.1); distinct object of study (1.1); the anal- ysis of the reflex and, as consequence, the concept of behavior (3.1); different level of analysis (3.2); behavior should be studied by its own terms (3.3); and the advantages of using only behavioral concepts, and theories (3.4). The core argument for the indepen- dence of behavior analysis is the very definition of its subject matter. By defining the subject matter of his behavioral science as the relations between environmental events and the actions of organisms, Skinner has extracted from it any reference to physi- ology. Neurophysiological events do not define behavioral events. Therefore, as was discussed earlier, we can say that both sciences have different objects of study and are in different level of anal- ysis, each one with its own terms, concepts, and theories. This does not mean, however, that behavioral variables (i.e., the ones studied in behavior analysis) are the only ones responsible for behavior. Neurophysiological events are as necessary as contingencies in the production of behavior. Here we find the core argument that justifies the weak autonomy between behavior analysis and neu- roscience.

Although the autonomy is not as robust as Skinner himself seems sometimes to suggest (see previous section), we should not be afraid of losing ground once the doors to neuroscience are open. Neuroscience will not substitute behavior analysis, nor will it reduce behavioral explanations to physiological explanations (Marr & Zilio, 2013). It is not possible to reduce a behavioral

concept or explanation to a neurophysiological concept or expla- nation. This endeavor does not make sense when we are dealing with two scientific domains that have different subject matters. On one side, we have behavior analysis, interested in the study of contingencies of selection (the relations between environmental events and the actions of organisms). On the other side, we have neuroscience, interested in the study of physiological mechanisms that mediates behavioral relations. Because behavior analysis and neuroscience focus on different variables of study, the events that set the occasion for scientists’ verbal behavior related to behav- ioral and neurophyisiological explanations are distinct. In behavior analysis, we find concepts like contingencies of selection, sched- ules of reinforcement, discriminative stimuli, operant and respon- dent responses, reinforcement and punishment, and so on. In neuroscience, we find concepts like neural networks and circuits, neurons, membranes, molecules, proteins, action potential, syn- apse, neural plasticity, and so on. Purely behavioral explanations refer only to the events studied in behavior analysis. Purely neu- rophysiological explanations refer only the events studied in neu- roscience. Reduction does not make any sense because those explanations have different referents and it is not possible to derive one for another (cf. Gold & Stoljar, 1999). How to reduce a particular operant response to a particular neurophysiological ac- tivity of motor cortex? How to reduce a specific consequence of reinforcement (an environmental event) to a specific activity of ventral tegmental area, a brain region assumed to be (at least in part) responsible for the process of reinforcement at the neural level through the modulation of the synaptic efficacy by the liberation of dopamine (Donahoe & Palmer, 1994; Phillmore, 2008; Zilio, 2013)? In sum, how to reduce contingencies of selec- tion to neurophysiological events?

The pursuit of reductionist explanations is only pertinent if some kind of identity between subject matters at different levels of analysis is assumed to exist. That is exactly the case of cognition and brain, which is probably why the reductionist literature men- tioned in the beginning of this article (Bickle, 2003; P. M. Church- land, 1981, 1989; P. S. Churchland, 1986; Gazzaniga, 1998; Hawkins & Kandel, 1984a, 1984b) focuses exclusively on the relation between cognitive processes and brain processes and not on behavioral processes (as defined in behavior analysis) and brain processes. In Bechtel’s (2008) words, “Underlying attempts to localize cognitive operations in brain structures is the assumption that there is an identity relation between particular mental mech- anisms and neural mechanisms” (p. 69). Defined as “heuristic identity theory,” for Bechtel, this thesis “can guide not only the elaboration of the two perspectives [cognitive and neurophysio- logical] which are linked by the identity claim, but it can use each to revise the other” (p. 71). One of the consequences of assuming the identity between cognition and brain is the possibility of reduction of cognitive processes or explanations to neurophysio- logical processes or explanations. There is an ontological thesis supporting the identity theory: Cognition is physical and it is somehow related to brain function. Reductionism is a valid en- deavor in this case because there is a synchronic relation between cognition and brain. The main assumption is that something inside the organism mediates behavior (usually defined in cognitive literature only as observed effects of what happens inside the organism, cf. Bechtel & Richardson, 2010; Hineline, 1990)— something called cognition, which, in turn, is related to brain

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processes. Synchronic relation can be defined as the coexistence in time of phenomena belonging to different levels of analysis. Briefly, at the same time, we have a brain process and a cognitive process occurring inside the organism, and both are supposed to cause behavior. In contrast, the relation between contingencies of selection and neurophysiological processes is diachronic. Dia- chronic relations occur across time. Therefore, brain events and behavioral events are not the same thing. Any attempt of reduction between behavior analysis and neuroscience is nonsensical. Think- ing more generally, as described here, the relation between behav- ior analysis and neuroscience can shed some light on the more general debate about the relation between psychology and neuro- science by presenting an interesting nonreductionist alternative free of the problems faced by cognitive-brain identity theories (cf. Uttal, 2011, 2013).

In sum, the relation or autonomy between behavior analysis and neuroscience is no different from the relation or autonomy be- tween, for instance, physics and chemistry or any domain of natural sciences. To use Donahoe’s (2013) words, “As a branch of biology, behavior-analysis is no less independent of—and no less interdependent upon—such sister sciences as neuroscience and biochemistry” (p. 366). As I said more than once in this article, behavior analysis and neuroscience deal with different variables equally necessary for the production of behavior. Behavior is not solely a product of contingencies of selection, nor is it a merely effect of what happens inside. It is both and probably more.

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Received August 14, 2015 Revision received December 20, 2015

Accepted January 5, 2016 �

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