Becoming "Japanese"

Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation

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CHAPTER ONE

Colonizing Taiwan

Japanese Colonialism, Decolonization, and the Politics of Colonialism Studies

We have admirably transformed this chaotic situation, restored peace, established order, realized financial independence, attended to the development of natural resources, promoted industrialization, and secured the livelihoods and properties of the people on this island. . . . The reason for our distinguished record in colonization is the result of the Japanese race's unique ability to rule another people and our skill in colonial management. It also speaks to the grand efficacy of managing a tropical colony.

Tōgō Minoru and Satō Shirō, Taiwan shokumin hattatsushi *[The development of colonial Taiwan], 1916*

Decolonization never takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and modifies them fundamentally. It transforms spectators crushed with their inessentiality into privileged actors, with the grandiose glare of history's floodlights upon them.

Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth

In a formal sense, Taiwan was the first addition to the Japanese overseas empire after the resounding victories of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895.[1] The acquisition of Taiwan at the time, however, was not a primary objective of the emerging Japanese imperial power. Let us not forget

that it was the desire to undermine and to unseat Chinese influence over the strategic positions of Korea and southern Manchuria that prompted Japanese aggression in the first place. The war was mainly fought on the Korean peninsula, and no battles were actually fought on Taiwan or in Japan. It is also important to remember that Japan's annexation of Taiwan corresponded to the period of "new imperialism," when Western powers competed for the remaining "unclaimed" territories in the world and subsequently created the modern colonial system.[2]

The incorporation of Taiwan into the Japanese Empire reveals the particular historical relationship of Japanese colonialism in the larger geopolitics of global colonialism. As an "imperialism without capital," it was argued, the operation of colonialism would be extremely difficult, and heavy subsidies would impose a weighty burden on the finances of the domestic government.[3] It was in terms of this economic imperative that some regarded the acquisition of Taiwan as a luxury that Japan could ill afford. Large expenditures during the early years of colonial rule led to the characterization of Taiwan as "a burden on the national treasury" and "a nuisance to Japan."[4] There was even serious consideration of selling the newly acquired colony to foreign powers or back to the Chinese. Nonetheless, Japan's resounding victory over China signaled the "replacing of the old Chinese Empire by the new Japanese imperialism in East Asia."[5] More important, the war had been very expensive for Japan, costing about ¥200 million, three times the annual government expenditure. While Japan was on the silver standard, it was difficult to raise foreign loans. The huge indemnity of ¥360 million was crucial to help put Japan on the gold standard for its capital accumulation and subsequent industrialization. Conversely, the large reparation payment extracted by the Japanese forestalled any chances of China's economic recovery and forced the Chinese government to borrow more from abroad, obliging it to cede territory to raise the money and enfeebling its defenses even more.[6]

However, as the only non-Western imperialist power, and in the

wake of the humiliating Tripartite Intervention, the possession by Japan of its first overseas colony became an exercise beyond purely economic calculations. The annexation of Taiwan and its subsequent administration were to have a profound effect on the perception of the Japanese nation as capable of undertaking the "great and glorious work" of colonialism,[7] a task and responsibility previously belonging solely to the Western nations. In short, caught in the contradictory position of being the only non-Western (read nonwhite) colonial power, Japan's domineering gaze toward its colonial subjects in the East invariably had to redirect itself to the imperialist glare of the West. In the words of Gotō Shimpei, the chief of the Civil Administration Bureau on the island, Taiwan was to be the "colonization university" for Japan's first experiment in colonial rule. Colonial Taiwan was first to demonstrate that Japan was the equal of Western imperialists and second to transcend Western rule in bringing welfare to the conquered territory.

Takekoshi Yosaburō, a Diet member and journalist, proclaimed proudly after his brief visit to the colony in 1904 that "Japan can point to her success thus far in Formosa as a proof of her worthiness to be admitted into the community of the world's great colonial powers."[8] More important, comparing the failures and successes of Western colonialism, Takekoshi saw Japanese rule in Taiwan as exceptional, given "how handicapped [Japan] always is by lack, not only of capital, but also of able and powerful merchants." The success of the first colony had legitimized Japan as a worthy imperialist and solidified its version of manifest destiny. He writes,

> I cannot but rejoice that we, the Japanese, have passed our first examination as a colonizing nation so creditably. The thought also of the future fills my heart with joy, because, as the Southern Cross seems to invite the mariner to investigate the wonders of the Southern Seas, so our successes in Formosa beckon us on to fulfill the great destiny that lies before us, and make our country "Queen of the Pacific."[9]

Takekoshi's jubilation was affirmed some years later by American travelers who, upon visiting the island, confirmed "Japan's greatness as a colonizing people" and saw Japan's achievement in Taiwan as "the exact counterpart of what the United States has done in the Philippine Islands, in Cuba, and in Porto Rico [*sic*]."[10] The colonization of Taiwan was as much a strategic consideration for Japan's interests in southern China and Southeast Asia as a symbolic demonstration of its parity with Western powers. By 1916, with the war among the imperialist nations, Taiwan's mission for the Japanese empire had become clearly defined by its administrators as the "base for executing the empire's Southern Advancement policy" and as the "test ground for the management of tropical colonies."[11] Although the role of colonial Taiwan was to diminish as Korea emerged as an integral and strategic conduit for Japanese expansion to Northeast Asia, Taiwan was to remain the stepping stone to the South and serve as Japan's "model" colony until the waning years of the empire.

It is tempting to view Japan's lack of expansive capital and its non-Western colonial status as having positioned it simultaneously as colonizer (in relation to Asia) and colonized (in relation to the West), occupying an ambivalent relationship between the two. It is true that Japan itself had only narrowly escaped colonial subjugation and that its own entrance into modernity, as for many of the Eastern nations, was enabled by and predicated on the process of Westernization. Japan did not, for example, recover its juridical autonomy under the restrictions of the unequal treaties imposed by the Western powers until 1899. Tariff autonomy was not recovered until 1911. Even as a colonial power, Japan was caustically mindful of its non-Western and nonwhite status among the imperialist nations. In the Versailles Conference following the First World War, for instance, Japan had formally tried to get a declaration of racial equality written into the Versailles Treaty, but the motion was opposed by a solid phalanx of the dominant Anglo-Saxons. There is no doubt that race constituted an important subtext that influenced the Japanese view of their relationship to the white imperialist and was a

fundamental element in its own colonizing ideology. But do the historical conditions of late development and the empirical facts of Western racism necessarily render Japanese colonialism an "anomaly"?[12] Put differently, are all Western imperialisms and colonialisms (British, French, German, Portuguese, American, etc.) the same? What are the intellectual and political stakes in comparing empires in this way? What are the enunciative modalities that insist on the difference of Japanese colonial empire from other—that is, white and Western—empires? In short, what difference does difference make?

In this chapter I argue, first of all, against the particularization of Japanese imperialism and colonialism as somehow different and unique. I agree to an extent "that only localized theories and historically specific accounts can provide much insight into the varied articulations of colonizing and countercolonial representations and practices."[13] The insistence on locality and specificity is undoubtedly important, given the tendencies of geographical and historical homogenization in recent colonial and postcolonial studies. Clearly, the ideology and procedures of British colonialism differed substantially in terms of administrative policies and cultural articulations from those of the French, the Germans, or the Portuguese. Nor does anyone doubt that the countries in South America experienced a rather different colonial history than, say, India or Korea. Overemphasis on the historical and spatial difference between colonial powers, however, masks the homogenizing force and the collaborative alliance among the various colonizers at different historical moments under shifting geopolitical configurations. At some level, we must acknowledge that most forms of modern colonialism share a certain generality—that is, the rule of force of a people by an external power. There might be historical and philosophical differences in the methods of colonization, but the fundamental structure of the relation between colonizer and colonized remains quite similar. I do not mean to suggest here that Japanese imperialism and colonialism are the same as any so-called Western imperialism and colonialism. Nor do I want to deny the specific conditions and strategies of Japanese colonial rule.

What I want to underscore is the interrelationship and interdependency of the specific Japanese case with, and within, the generality of global capitalist colonialism.[14]

Second, I argue that the lack of the decolonization process in the breakup of the Japanese Empire has prevented both Japan and Taiwan from addressing and confronting their particular colonial relationship and the overall Japanese colonial legacy. The abrupt dissolution of the Japanese Empire by an external mandate instead of through prolonged struggle and negotiation with its colonies has enabled Japan to circumvent and disavow its colonial question and, in turn, quickened its economic recovery. In Taiwan the sudden void left by the Japanese colonizer after "liberation" was filled not by the Taiwanese but by the takeover army from mainland China. The graft and corruption of the mainlanders fostered in the Taiwanese a deep resentment against the Chinese, and they consequently reconstituted and reimagined their colonial relationship with Japan.

JAPANESE IMPERIALISM IN FORM AND CONTENT

It is widely agreed that the limited political, military, and economic resources of the emerging Meiji state delimited the extension of Japan's imperialist assertions. Unlike most European expansions into distant lands, Japan's colonial empire was particular in its regional contiguity, restricted essentially to the northeastern Asian continent. This regional dimension of the empire, in turn, points to another Japanese colonial particularity. Japan's most important colonies, Taiwan and Korea, were well populated with people racially akin (as far as Western racial classification was concerned) to the Japanese colonizer and shared a common cultural heritage. This notion of cultural affinity with its subject peoples "made Japan unique among the colonial powers of modern times and profoundly shaped Japanese attitudes toward colonial governance once the empire was assembled."[15] The historical timing of

Japanese imperialism and the regional nature of its colonizing activity are therefore the temporal and spatial coordinates that influenced and informed the unique formation and configuration of the Japanese empire. There is little to argue about regarding the particular historical conditions from which Japanese imperialism emerged. But should this descriptive difference necessarily extend to an evaluative one that insists on positing Japanese imperialism and colonialism as essentially different from others? What I want to problematize here is the underlying assumptions of these two axiomatic theses that define the Japanese empire as unlike any others, as unique in the history of global colonialism.

The argument that the extreme shortage of expansive capital has made Japanese imperialism unique in modern empire building is generally accepted as a historical and economic truism. This fact runs against the generally accepted typology of colonialism from Hobson to Lenin, which viewed imperialism as expressing the political superstructure of a specific stage of capitalism in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself.[16] From this line of economic and developmentalist (if not reductionist) argument that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism (in Lenin's briefest possible definition), then obviously Japanese imperialism was an anomaly. Financial motives played little part in the creation of the Japanese empire, and certainly the kind of financial capital responsible for imperialist expansion was absent in imperial Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But does the Japanese case represent an anomaly that does not quite conform to the general theory, or is the theory itself the problem? In fact, Lenin's theory of imperialism does not even hold up within the Western model of imperialism. There was actually little correspondence between the pattern of Western capital investment and export abroad and the "new imperialism." For example, by 1911 the British had invested the largest percentage of its capital not in colonial Africa but in the United States and in the "white" dominions, and only an insignificant share of German capital went to the German colonies.[17] Anthony Brewer has also argued that Lenin failed to demonstrate the

interconnections of the various tendencies of capitalist development—concentration of production and capital, creation of financial capital, the export of capital, the formation of international monopolist capitalist combines, and the territorial division of the world among the capitalist powers—enough to merit a full-fledged contribution to the theory of imperialism. Furthermore, Great Britain, the country with the largest colonial empire, was relatively late in reaching the stage of monopoly capitalism.[18] Hence, we cannot deduce modern imperialism simply from capitalist relations of production as a particular stage of development. Must we therefore discard economic explanations entirely and throw the baby out with the bath water?

We must remember, as Fredric Jameson reminds us, that the early Marxist theories of imperialism (from Marx to Hilferding, from Bukahrin to Lenin) designated not the relationship of metropolis to colony, but the rivalry of the various imperial and metropolitan nation-states among themselves.[19] For Lenin in particular, imperialism did not specifically refer to the possession of colonies. He did, however, recognize that earlier stages of capitalism also involved colonial expansion, but for different reasons and with different results. In other words, imperialism here signified not so much a coming into being of particular nation-states in the developing stages of capitalism as a congregation of inter-imperialist rivalries on an already hierarchically defined system of nation-states. In his study of the nation form, Etienne Balibar, while rejecting the deterministic relationship between the nation form and capitalism, nonetheless insists on the systemic overdetermination of a "historical capitalism." Relying on the perspectives of Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein, he writes,

> The constitution of nations [is] bound up not with the abstraction of the capitalist market, but with its concrete historical form: that of a "world economy" which is always already hierarchically organized into a "core" and a "periphery," each of which have different methods of accumulation and exploitation of labour power, and between which relations of unequal exchange and domination are established. Beginning from the core, national units form out of the overall structure of the world economy, as a function of the role they play in that structure in a given period. More exactly, they form against one another as competing instruments in the service of the core's domination of the periphery.[20]

As a result, "the early forms of imperialism and the articulation of wars with colonization" played a decisive role in configuring a "historical capitalism" that prepared the formation of the modern nation-states. Thus Balibar emphasizes that "every modern nation is a product of colonization: it has always been to some degree colonized or colonizing, and sometimes both at the same time."[21] Balibar's qualification is important. Once the notion of imperialism is released from the economic reductionism of a particular nation-state and employed to designate a systemic relationship between competing nations of the world economy, we see that Japan, despite its belated capitalist development, is more than capable of generating an imperialist consciousness.

This characteristic of an "imperialism without capital" was well recognized by the Japanese liberal economist and scholar of colonialism, Yanaihara Tadao. Yanaihara, in his seminal study of Japanese imperialism in Taiwan, points out that although Japan lacked the "substance" (*jisshitsu*) of a practitioner of imperialism as a nation in the highly developed stage of monopoly capitalism, "ideologically" (*ideologitekini*) Japan was already a credible imperialist nation.[22] In other words, Japanese imperialism in its initial stage was not a logical outgrowth of an intrinsic tendency of Japanese capitalist development. Japanese imperialism took shape in the context of the Euro-American imperialist competition for the remaining territories of the world. What Yanaihara is suggesting, then, is that despite not having the appropriate content (export of financial capital, formation of monopolies, patterns of overproduction, etc.), Japan, by its annexation of Taiwan, had more than assumed the form of Western imperialism. In this regard, Yanaihara argues that the Sino-Japanese War cannot be conceived simply as a "national war"

(*kokumin sensō*), but must be seen as having the characteristics of a "premature imperialism" (*sōjuku teikokushugi*), an "earlier stage of imperialism" (*teikokushugi zenki*) that relied predominantly on political decisions and militaristic behaviors. Yanaihara calls this "a non-imperialist nation's practice of imperialism" (*hiteikokushugikoku no tekikokushugiteki jissen*).[23] It is important to note here that the gap between the content and the form of Japanese imperialism is only an appropriate description of Japanese imperialism in its early development. By the 1920s for instance, Yanaihara's own analysis has shown that Japanese colonialism in Taiwan was no longer an anomaly, but possessed all the characteristics of a Japanese capitalism in its monopolistic stage. The difference between Japanese and Western imperialism, then, is not predicated on the intrinsic nature of Japanese capitalist development, but on the extrinsic and inter-imperialist relationship that situated and determined the particular form of Japanese imperialism in the world system.

CONSTRUCTING AFFINITY AND DIFFERENCE

The second postulation of the difference between Japanese colonialism and Western colonialism is that Japan's empire was "Asian." Except for its Pacific territories, Japan's most important colonies, Taiwan and Korea, were populated with inhabitants who were racially akin to the Japanese and with whom the Japanese shared a common cultural heritage. This sense of cultural affinity with its subject peoples made Japan unique among the colonial powers of modern times. This seemingly objective if not obvious observation assumes that whereas Western imperialism and colonization were inscribed in the familiar duality between the West and the non-West, white and nonwhite, the Japanese empire was circumscribed within the singularity of a cultural and racial sameness. Leaving aside the problematic conflation of "culture" and "race," what are we to make of the putative difference of Japanese empire without and its putative identity within? In other words, what constitutes the

perspective that defines the Western colonial relationship as the *norm* against which the Japanese case is conceived as an *anomaly?* More important, if the concepts of cultural and racial differences (whether formulated in pseudoscientific discourse or anthropological discoveries) are modern inventions specific to the era of Western imperialism and colonization, should we not view affinity between Japan and its empire in the same way? In other words, if differences are not inherent attributes of peoples and cultures, but are historically constructed within the processes of Western expansionism, should we be surprised that racial and cultural affinity could also be articulated within colonial discourse? If one is to speak of certain aspects of sameness within Japan's Asian empire, that assertion must be placed within the larger context of a global colonial modernity—a historically delimited and preconstituted colonial system where racial or cultural identities within Japan and its Asian colonies are imagined, if not invented, during moments of its shifting relationship to both the West and Asia.

What I want to underscore here is that if we look closely at the various delineations of Japanese colonial discourses, the alleged identification with its colonial subjects is by no means evident or unanimous. In fact, in order for the colonial regime to legitimize itself, there had been persistent attempts to differentiate the Japanese people both racially and culturally from their neighbors. The military and political advantages of the modern Japanese state had easily been translated into the cultural and racial superiority of the Japanese nation and its people. Gōtō Shimpei, for example, said that it would take at least eighty years of cultural assimilation before the Taiwanese could be elevated to the level of the Japanese.[24] Likewise, in colonial Korea it has been argued that a stubborn sense of ethno-nationalism in Korea and the Koreans' lack of loyalty to the imperial family posed greater obstacles to assimilation between Japan and Korea than Western nations and their colonies.[25] I will have more to say about this in subsequent chapters. It is enough to say here that in the early phase of colonial rule, there was neither consistency nor consensus in imperial Japan's association with

its supposedly culturally and racially similar subjects. The call for cultural and racial affinity under the slogans of *dōbun dōshū* (same script, same race) and *isshi dōjin* (impartiality and equal favor) between the Japanese and its colonized peoples was not "natural." (If it were, there would be no need to say the obvious.) The discourse of racial and cultural affinity was incorporated into the overall colonial discourse of assimilation and imperialization at various historical moments to legitimize colonial rule on the one hand, and to differentiate and deter Western imperialism on the other. In short, the cultural and racial affinity between the Japanese colonizer and its colonized peoples should not be taken as a given, but as an aspect of specific colonial discourses that emerged within, and in response to, an already racialized world divided between the "whites" and the rest.[26]

"NOT QUITE / NOT WHITE, YET ALIKE"

There is no doubt that Japan's imperialism and its subsequent colonialism have their own characteristics that reflect the specific historical conditions of their emergence and the particular socioeconomic and political systems of its colonies. Furthermore, there was certainly a "time lag" between Japan's empire building and that of its Western counterparts (with the exception of Germany). Japanese imperialism intensified at the very moment when the rationalization for imperialist expansion and the maintaining of colonies by the Western powers were under severe criticism. The belatedness of Japanese imperialism and its "nonwhite" racial constitution have certainly required the Japanese to create different sets of what Edward Said has called the "strategy of positional superiority" in relation to its colonized.[27] Naoki Sakai succinctly defines this strategy as "the strange coexistence of an uncritical identification with the West and an equally uncritical rejection of the West."[28] In his reading of the Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō's travel writings, Sakai points out first of all that Watsuji identifies with the West as he ascribes the Indian's submission under colonial rule to the Indian's national character rather than the forces of British expansionism. However, when he is in Shanghai, the semicolonial city where Japanese imperialism was fully present, a colonial situation where the word *Anglo-Saxon* could easily be substituted for the word *Japanese*, Watsuji intentionally disavows the mimetic relationship between the Anglo-Saxons and the Japanese. Watsuji, despite occupying the position of the Japanese imperialist in China, refused to see the structural similarity between Japanese and Western imperialism. Instead, he launches a strong condemnation of Anglo-American imperialism and Eurocentrism. What is exercised here is "a displacement of a certain colonial guilt about the imperialism of his own country that finds its outlet in the description of the brutality of Anglo-American imperialism."[29] What is being disavowed here is both the mimetic relationship with the Anglo-Saxons *and* Japan's antagonistic relationship with the Chinese and other Asians. The antagonistic relationship between the Japanese and the colonized Asians is replaced by the paternalistic and racist call to liberate the peoples of the East from colonial domination by Europe and America.

Watsuji's articulatory practice of identification and dis-identification is symptomatic of Japanese colonial discourse in general. What is in question here is not whether Japanese colonial discourse is the same as or "different" from Western colonial discourse, but the enunciative position in which that identity or difference is articulated and configured in reference to the instituted differences between "Japan" and "others." What we need to be mindful of is how the insistence on the differences of Japanese colonialism conceals the structural sameness of its colonialist/imperialist practice compared with all other workings of imperialism and colonization. For it is often in the name of cultural and colonial differences that Japanese nationalists have distinguished their practices from those of Western imperialism as more "humane" and "beneficial" to the colonized.[30] In short, the inscription of Japanese differences presupposes a systemic economy of colonization and imperialism that makes the comparison possible in the first place.

Another way to underscore the co-occurrence of Japanese colonialism with that of colonialism elsewhere, and the colonial psyche it produces, is to attend to the question of modernity as manifested in the colonial intellectual's relationship to metropolitan Japan. In his reading of the colonial writer Oh Shō-yū's (Wang Ch'ang-hsiung) "A Torrent" (*Honryū*), the Taiwanese critic Lü Cheng-hui argues that Taiwanese intellectuals during the period of imperialization had conflated the colonial procedure of "imperialization" (*huang-min-hua*) with the desire for "modernity" (*hsien-tai-hua*). It was precisely their inability to disentangle the two formidable forces of colonialism, Lü suggests, that prevented the Taiwanese intellectuals from "intelligently" confronting the question of imperialization.[31] I discuss the colonial ideology of imperialization further in chapter 3. For now, what is important in the context of our discussion is that Lü has pointed to the asymmetrical colonial relationship that foregrounds the anxiety of the colonial intellectuals only in the binary opposition between an advanced Japan and an underdeveloped Taiwan. This mode of colonial pathology is presented in several literary texts that depict the Taiwanese intellectuals' longing for metropolitan Japan and their impatience with colonial Taiwan after returning from study abroad in Japan.

What the Taiwanese intellectuals yearn for in these texts is nothing other than the constellation of modernity mediated through the bustling streets of Tokyo. In contrast, the villages in Taiwan can only represent an inescapable boredom and an incredibly monotonous life. The gap between metropolitan Japan and colonial Taiwan thus became the starting point for the colonial intellectuals to contemplate the question of imperialization. The desire for modernity is consequently reduced to the problem of "Japanization" (*ji-pēn hua*). Lü writes,

> From the standpoint of colonial rule, it is very natural that Japan, especially Tokyo, has become the most important place to "study abroad" for the Taiwanese intellectuals. Under the existing colonial structure, it is rare for these intellectuals to travel to more advanced countries like England, the United States, Germany, or France. The only other choice, mainland China, surely lags behind Japan in its degree of modernity. As a result, Japan "monopolized" (*lung tuan*) the horizon of modernity for the Taiwanese intellectuals. Without a standpoint for comparison, they unknowingly assumed Japan to be the most modernized nation in the world, and conflated "modernization" with "Japanization."[32]

Despite the alleged racial and cultural affinity between the Japanese and the Taiwanese, the structural relationship that posits the opposition between modern and underdeveloped, between the colonizer and the colonized, is not dissimilar from, say, the relation of Indian intellectuals to London or of West African intellectuals to Paris. Regardless of Japan's ambivalent relationship to the West, for the Taiwanese intellectuals, Japan irrefutably represented the modern, as compared to the colonizing West.

COLONIALISM STUDIES AND ITS DISCONTENT

If we were to search out some difference between Japanese imperialism and colonialism and its Western counterparts, we would find it not in the actual practice of colonialism or imperialism, but in the current Western obsession with colonialism and imperialism as legitimate fields of study, mostly in the humanities, and Japan's relative indifference to it. Recent scholarship in critical theory has attempted to articulate and empower the accounts of heretofore oppressed and suppressed peoples—ethnic minorities, women, gays and lesbians, postcolonial diaspora, and so on. One of the major areas of study has been the reexamination and recontextualization of the history, language, and psychology of Western imperialism and the subjects of its colonization. This exploration of colonial cultural politics, following Foucault and other theorists of discourse, has shifted the analytic paradigm from exposing the raw materiality of colonial power to locating the power-in-representation in colonial languages and images. A conspicuously

missing element in the burgeoning critique of colonialism is the lack of any concerted reference to Japan, the only non-Western colonial power that, even in this postcolonial era, still situates itself ambivalently in the West/non-West divide.

In almost all the recent collections of essays on colonial discourse studies and postcolonial theories, Japan is noticeably absent. This does not mean that Japanese colonialism has not been the object of academic analysis. Indeed it has. What is symptomatic in the study of Japanese colonial discourse is its persisting ghettoization in Euro-American academia. Whereas studies of colonial India or colonial policy in Algeria are collected under the rubric of Cultural Studies, works on Japanese colonialism and colonial Korea or Taiwan are more often than not allocated to the specialization of Area Studies or the History department, notably Asian or East Asian studies. This superficial bifurcation reinforces the traditional academic territorialization where specialists in each field barricade themselves with venerable national languages and literature, paying scant attention to each other and their works. More important, as a result of this academic demarcation, topics such as colonialism are perceived categorically—each distinct and unique—and not relationally or associatively, with regard to the way their differences are interconnected and unequally organized.

What I am demanding here is not the inclusion of Japan in the multicultural or multinational curriculum of colonial studies. Rather, I want to stress the need to be cognizant of our complacency in reifying and essentializing imperialism and colonialism as solely a "Western" problematic in Euro-American academia. This indifference to the only non-Western colonial experience in the general critique of imperialism and colonization underscores the West's persisting obsession with its own authority to constitute itself as a body of knowledge *and* the author of its own criticism. It is as if the very thought of a non-Western, nonwhite perpetrator of an equally reprehensible colonial violence is unfathomable in the Eurocentric consciousness. Ironically, radical anti-Eurocentrism turns out to be the ultimate consolidation of Eurocentrism. This said, however, can we attribute the lack of recognition of Japan as an imperialist and colonizing nation within the larger matrix of Euro-American expansionism simply to deep-rooted and persistent Eurocentrism or equally Eurocentric ignorance? Or can we blame the exclusion solely on the division of labor among the disciplines? Or are there historical factors specific to the Japanese colonial experience that, until recently, have prevented Japan from constituting itself as an object of Colonialism Studies not only in Euro-American Cultural Studies but also in Japan? In this sense, another little-discussed case, that of German imperialism and colonialism, presents an interesting and compelling analogy.

In what is arguably the first interdisciplinary collection in English or German to focus entirely on German colonialism and its aftermath, the editors of *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy* underline a number of factors that have kept German Studies from investigating and exploring German colonialism and its postcoloniality.[33] The concern here obviously is not the exclusion of German colonialism from the general discussion and theorization of colonial discourse studies, but the time it has taken for the methodological approaches to gain a foothold in both Germany and German Studies in Euro-American academia. This tardiness in studying the German colonial and postcolonial experience, in the view of the editors, is not entirely negative. First of all, colonial and postcolonial theorists elsewhere are increasingly alarmed by the all-inclusive formulation that homogenizes very different national and racial formations and collapses diverse chronologies of colonial and postcolonial experiences. Thus, the specificity of German colonialism and its postcoloniality contributes to a more complex and heterogeneous mapping of colonial studies. Secondly, the adoption of theoretical approaches that place Germany within a postcolonial world "may have a salutary effect even on German cultural production itself." Theory will inevitably force the Germans out of their proverbial provincialism and toward a cosmopolitanism like that of the British and the French through their colonial history and their subsequent

disengagement from it. Finally, the location of German culture within postcolonial theory "might help Germans and scholars in a variety of fields to envision a new, different Germany." The editors quote an analogy from Catherine Hall as she speaks of the English case, when "identities have to be imagined anew, when 'we' are no longer the centre."[34] I am neither comfortable with the editors' uncritical acceptance of the polarization between "colonial and postcolonial theory" and the "German context," where the goal is to see "how postcolonial theory and analysis might be applied," nor convinced by the emancipatory potential of the postcolonial condition. For the context of our discussion, however, the "belatedness" of the attention given to German colonialism and its postcoloniality resembles the Japanese situation and therefore calls for certain specific, historical explanations.

The relatively slow development of German colonial and postcolonial studies can be attributed to a number of factors. First of all, Germany's rather brief period as a colonial power, from 1884 to 1919, "has seemed to make the entire question of colonialism far less relevant to Germany than it was for countries that enjoyed centuries of imperial prestige and then endured protracted and costly struggles over decolonization." Second, there is a lack of postcolonial texts in the German language and the absence of strong minority voices and minority intellectuals comparable to those "nomadic stars" in other Western European countries and the United States. Third, the German focus on the Holocaust as "the central and unavoidable fact of German history may also have occluded Germans' view of European colonialism and their own complicity as Europeans in it."[35] Although Japanese colonialism, especially in terms of its colonial policy of assimilating its subjects, has often been compared to French colonialism, the general structure of its colonial experience and aftermath is probably much closer to the German case. Japan's formal empire, with Taiwan as its most enduring colony (fifty years), pales in comparison to that of the French and the British in terms of imperial duration. But the duration of colonial rule seems to me less important than the overall intensity of colonial rule.

Furthermore, whereas Auschwitz has been the focus of modern German history, Hiroshima has emerged as the site of the construction of Japan as victim, which conceals its role as the aggressor in Asia.[36] Finally, the postwar myth of a homogeneous nation has instilled a cultural nationalism that to this day still captiously refers to Japan-born minorities as *zainichi* or only temporarily "residing in Japan."[37]

There is little doubt that the Germans have done far more in addressing and compensating for their crimes against the Jews during the Nazi era (but less with regard to the Second World War or its short-lived colonial past) than the Japanese have done for their war victims. In fact, Japanese officials continue to downplay or deny the existence of the infamous Nanjin Massacre. What remains less remarked upon, however, in comparisons of the Germans and the Japanese based on an unexamined moral conviction, is how Holocaust memory was instrumental in the making of postwar German national identity—an identity constructed on the ground of the moral decency of remembering one's own country's role as perpetrator.[38] The processes of remembering and the procedures of reparation displayed the kind of civility and sensitivity that meshed well with other prominent sources of German identity—the cultural genius represented by Goethe and Mozart. They worked to minimize the stark contrast between Goethe and Hitler that had profoundly confused the Germans in the immediate postwar years. In other words, only through compulsive mourning and collective remembering of the Holocaust can a German identity devoid of Nazi aberration be reconstituted in the postwar era. In the Japanese case, a new postwar national identity based on singularity and exclusivity, which have dominated the discussion of Japanese identity, was constructed by the effacement of the memories of war and empire. Instead of encompassing a vast imperial landscape, "Japan," as both a geographical and cultural signifier, is now enclosed and delimited within the borders of an "island country." The multiethnic constitution of the Japanese, necessitated by the incorporating logic of the empire, was discarded and disavowed in the immediate postwar years. Instead, a singular national/

racial identity, or what Oguma Eiji has called "the myth of the homogeneous nation," was inaugurated and consolidated in conjunction with Japan's refusal to confront its war crimes and colonial past.[39] The new understanding is that Japan has been a natural community integral to the Japanese archipelago since antiquity. In the postwar construction of Japanese national history, Japan's modern past was never properly grasped as a history of empire building, and former subjects of the Japanese Empire have been totally obliterated from its discourse. By effacing and denying the traces of those who "once were Japanese," the postwar cultural identity of the Japanese as a homogeneous people was able to establish itself as Japan's self-image.[40]

The analogy to the German situation requires us to interpret the lack of Japanese presence in Euro-American colonial discourse studies and the similarly belated concern in Japanese Studies in the United States and in Japan as a symptom of a historically incurred condition. I would like to argue that it is not the inherent attributes of the Japanese empire itself, but the abrupt dissolution of the Japanese empire and the new world order configured after the Second World War that assisted in deterring and deferring the exploration and interrogation of Japan's colonial experience. The attention given to the Japanese situation does not mean that somehow the West, in its engrossing concern with colonialism studies, has overcome its own historical legacy. Rather, the obsessive attention given to colonial discourse studies and postcolonial theory should alert us to the continuing neocolonial relationship between the West and the rest.

DECOLONIZATION AND THE VANISHING OF THE EMPIRE

Decolonization, as Fanon reminds us, is a historical process that "cannot become intelligible nor clear to itself except in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content." It is a process in which the colonial world, "after a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists," is overturned into a new legitimacy where "the last shall be first, and the first last."[41] In this sense, decolonization remains "unintelligible" to both the Japanese and its (ex)colonized. Arising in French Algeria during its independence movement, Fanon's anger against the colonial West effectively represented the dynamics of the fundamental situation of historical change. The formal dismantling of major (British and French) and lesser (Belgian, Portuguese, and Dutch) European colonial empires since the Second World War was affected by and contributed to changes in the global balance of power. It is important to keep in mind, however, that this global process was by no means linear and homogeneous. The transfer of power that led to Indian independence was relatively "peaceful," whereas the nationalist insurgence in the Algerian revolution was bloody and violent. Conflicts, hesitations, and uncertainties characterized the uneven and lengthy process by which the European powers relinquished their formal control of their empires on the one hand and began reconstituting an informal, imperial dependency on the other.[42] The dissolution of European colonial possessions has instigated political debates among metropolitan intellectuals and government incumbents, and at times even constituted serious political crises. For example, the British Suez invasion of 1956 and the collapse of the French Fourth Republic were results of the wars in Indochina and Algeria respectively. Japan's military defeat in the Second World War and the subsequent U.S. occupation have ironically prevented decolonization from becoming part of the Japanese national consciousness.

The Potsdam Declaration stripped Japan of all its colonial and occupied territories, with Japanese sovereignty limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku.[43] Unlike the British and the French, the Japanese did not have to concern themselves with the procedures of decolonization. There was no debate within Japan regarding the fate of its possessions; it was as obvious as the defeat itself. The Japanese empire

simply vanished. As a result, decolonization was never a domestic concern; it was the problem of other nations. What has been excluded from intellectual and popular discourses alike in postwar Japan is precisely the question, "What exactly constituted the decolonization of the Japanese empire?" Thus, Japan was deprived of (or conveniently relinquished) any sustainable discussion and debate regarding its responsibilities not only for the war, but for its overall colonial legacy. The vacancy created by the abrupt withdrawal of the Japanese colonizer has, however, produced dire consequences for those who found themselves thrust into an era of postcoloniality only to be mired in another neocolonial struggle.

After numerous early armed resistances against the Japanese and the moderate demands for home rule, the people of Taiwan found themselves suddenly "liberated" and "reverted" to China after Japan's surrender. Decolonization was neither the result of a metropolitan political decision nor a new form of nationalist assertion, as was common in European decolonization experiences. The decolonization of Taiwan was overseen by the ill-equipped and poorly trained takeover army from China. In the beginning, the defeat of Japan was received with enthusiasm and optimism; the natives expected a complete substitution of the positions previously occupied by the colonizers, and the joy of returning to the "fatherland" could be felt throughout the island.[44] However, the celebration was short-lived. The Japanese colonial legacy proved more resilient than the sentimentalism of reunification. More than half a century of colonial rule and separation from China had made the Taiwanese "incomplete" Chinese. Most Taiwanese had little or no knowledge of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government; even fewer spoke Mandarin Chinese, now a standardized "national" language. Furthermore, economic development during the colonial period had created other gaps between colonial Taiwan and war-ridden China. The occupying mainlanders led by the administrator-general of Taiwan, Chen Yi, governed Taiwan as an occupied territory instead of a liberated province. The postwar economic collapse and Chinese graft and corruption eventually led to the discontent of the Taiwanese that culminated in a massive clash and bloody subjugation known as the 2–28 Incident of 1947.[45]

After the ensuing civil war in China, the defeated Nationalist government "relocated" to the island in 1949 and proclaimed itself as temporarily residing in Taiwan, readying for a military repossession of China. While considering itself to be the legitimate government of China, and with American assistance, the Nationalists embarked on a neocolonial policy toward the very people they claimed as their citizenry.[46] The decolonization of Korea, another prized colony of Japan, proved to be strikingly similar.[47] What is important in the context of our discussion is that not only the colonized peoples of Korea and Taiwan but also the Japanese colonizers were excluded from the liberation and decolonization processes. The dominant narrative of Japanese historiography is therefore able to circumvent the dissolution of its empire altogether, insulating itself and moving briskly from defeat to U.S. occupation, from demilitarization to "democratization" and unprecedented economic "miracle." Decolonization was a distant event that happened to other people. With the disappearance of Japan's colonies, its colonial consciousness was concomitantly repressed. What replaced Japan's colonial, and hence necessarily multiethnic, consciousness in the postwar years was the gradual ascendance and consolidation of a singular Japanese people and nation.

It may be instructive here to look at the impact of decolonization on the French empire, with which the Japanese colonial administration, more than the British, shared a colonial philosophy and practice, and to speculate as to what decolonization might have meant for the Japanese. It is generally assumed that British colonial rule and institutions created the dominion system and institutionalized a procedure for gradually loosening control over possessions, which is commonly referred to as the policy of "association." In contrast to the British, both the French

and Japanese are said to have implemented the ideology of "assimilation" as legitimizing colonial rule and to have insisted on the indisputable authority of the central governments over the colonial administrations. Therefore, whereas the British typically spoke of self-government, the French and the Japanese aspired to making fellow citizens of their colonial subjects ("the Greater France of one hundred million Frenchmen," and the "imperial subjects of Great Japan"). Another significant correspondence between the French and the Japanese colonial regimes was the predominance of military and policing forces in the affairs of the colonies. In both empires, military expenditures almost always exceeded administrative spending, and in most cases colonies were acquired for their strategic rather than economic values. I discuss the similarities between Japanese and French colonial policies in more detail in the subsequent chapters.

The imperial union constructed by the predominance of militarism and the ideology of assimilation explain the tenacity of French colonialism and thus the violence and bloodshed of anti-imperialist struggles in Indochina and Algeria and the dire consequences that finally reached France itself. Fanon writes in half disbelief that "in November 1954, no one in the world suspected that after sixty months of fighting, French colonialism would still not have released its clutch and heeded the voice of the Algerian people."[48] Even in this day of globalization, the cultural, economic, and political interdependence between France and its former colonies remains substantial.[49] In Japan, however, the nature of its colonial dissolution precluded a prolonged and potentially agonizing engagement with its colonies. With Emperor Hirohito's broadcast of Japan's defeat, which signaled the end of Japan's colonial occupation, the imperial subjects reverted to their respective national subject positions. And as long as militarism was perceived as the primary source of Japan's aggression, demilitarization was to be interpreted as de facto decolonization.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DECOLONIZATION

I have deemed decolonization (or the lack thereof) as the locus for viewing the differing manifestations and attitudes toward colonial and postcolonial studies in the West and Japan because decolonization is to be apprehended not only as a politico-economic process, but also as an epistemological interrogation into the very notion of colonial knowledge. The founding categories of Western epistemology—civilization, reason, humanism, rationality, and so forth—that have generated and simultaneously been generated by imperialism and colonialism can no longer continue to deceive, on the eve of decolonization, the "one thousand five hundred million natives" who never had the Word, "only the use of it."[50] And as Aimé Césaire put it forcibly, decolonization has brought into the consciousness of both the colonizers and the colonized that "'Europe' is morally, spiritually indefensible."[51] The critique of Western foundationalism and metaphysics so characteristic of the so-called French poststructuralists, as Robert Young has argued, is both a symptom and a product of a particular decolonizing process: the Algerian War of Independence. It is significant that Derrida, Lyotard, and Cixous, not to mention nonpoststructuralists such as Sartre, Althusser, and de Beauvoir, among others, were all either born in Algeria or personally involved with the events of the war.[52] In other words, just as the West's inventing and imagining of its knowledge of the colonial others generated colonialism, decolonization has opened up a new vista for the critical interrogation of these assumptions. Young writes,

> What has been new in the years since the Second World War, during which, for the most part, the decolonization of the European empires has taken place, has been the accompanying attempt to decolonize European thought and the forms of its history as well. It thus marks that fundamental shift and cultural crisis currently characterized as postmodernism.[53]

At the close of Europe's formal colonial era, Europe's claim to universal validity associated with its economic domination and political hegemony could no longer go uncontested. A sense of hesitation and even distrust regarding the West's (and its intellectuals') own critical position on, and distance from, the non-West (the formerly colonized) is prevalent among these thinkers, of which crises of identity and representation are only partial manifestations.

While less optimistic about the supposed demise of Western knowledge, I agree with Young that the critique of Western epistemology is the direct result of decolonization or what he calls postmodernism. I want, however, to take up his more specific argument regarding the relationship between the self (West) and the other (non-West) in order to suggest that postmodernist thinking, and its obsession with the question of the "other," has not radically altered the colonial structure it has set out to refute. In short, postmodernism is ultimately another expression of Eurocentrism. By ignoring the very condition of its enunciation, its major concern remains the West's self-critique. This explains why Japan, the only non-Western colonial power, and most parts of the Asian continent impoverished by both Western and Japanese imperialism have been conspicuously missing from Western interrogation.

In his questioning of the limits of Western knowledge, Young argues for a nonhistoricist way of thinking and writing history that would deconstruct Eurocentric history, especially the traditional Marxist account based on the structure of the Hegelian dialectic. The problem with Marxism is that as long as it inherits the system of Hegelian "philosophical structure of the appropriation of the other as a form of knowledge," it remains deeply implicated in the very oppression that simulates the project of Western imperialism. Young writes, "The construction of knowledges which all operate through forms of expropriation and incorporation of the other mimics at a conceptual level the geographical and economic absorption of the non-European world by the West."[54] Young is quite right in pointing out that Marxism, the dominant force of opposition to capitalism, retains its ethnocentricity and remains in

complicity with the very system it opposes. He nevertheless completely ignores the appropriation and reformulation of Marxism by the anti-imperialist and anticapitalist struggles in non-Western contexts. The conflictual dyadic structure of Hegelianism, as long as it "works according to the structure of a subject perceiving an object, a same/other dialectic in which the other is first constituted by the same through its negation as other before being incorporated within it,"[55] offers no possibility of dialogue or exchange. The postmodernist attempt at the historical juncture of decolonization is to disrupt or deconstruct this oppressive self/other theorization of the Hegelian master/slave, colonizer/colonized narrative.

The postmodernists' distrust of universality and the demand for singularity or heterogeneity are, therefore, an attempt to overcome the violence implicit in the Hegelian model and to construct a form of knowledge that respects the other without absorbing it into the same. Reading the philosophical writings of Emmanuel Levinas, Young argues for a relation to the other outside the sphere of mastery, of negation, and of reduplication of the self. Viewing ontology itself as a "philosophy of power, an egotism in which the relation with the other is accomplished through its assimilation into the self," Levinas proposes ethics in its place, "substituting a respect for the other for a grasping of it, and a theory of desire not as negation and assimilation but as infinite separation."[56] What exactly constitutes this respect? How is this reverence towards the other different from the aestheticization or idealization of the other that are the dominant modes of colonial and Orientalist discourse? Who decides when or what to respect (or not to respect)? Is not the enunciative position of a self attempting to know and to respect the other already a privileged one? Furthermore, it is precisely the liquidation of colonial history (through the refutation of all history) that posits an essentialism of the other: a position where the other cannot not be the other. Young writes, "History is the realm of violence and war; it constitutes another form by which the other is appropriated into the same. For the other to remain other it must not derive its meaning

from History but must instead have a separate time which differs from historical time."[57] How is this absolute otherness to be articulated in the history of Western domination? To quote Rey Chow in a different context, "In an era in which the critique of the West has become not only possible but mandatory, where does this critique leave those ethnic peoples whose entry into culture is, precisely because of the history of Western imperialism, already 'Westernized' "?"[58] We are left with a colonized other that is neither the assimilated other-self nor the pure native-other. Between total sublation (Orientalism) and inassimilable excess (postmodernism), are there any other alternatives for the "colonized"?

If decolonization has paved the way for the deconstruction and decentralization of the forms of European thought, and postmodernism has been defined as the practice of this self-critique, does this mean that the West has lost its dominance and succumbed to its relativity, and that the history of colonialism is behind us now? Is not this sense of loss compensated by a continuous but different configuration of domination? Is it not a mythical simplification to conceive decolonization as that interregnum between the colonizers' withdrawal (the dissolution of the West) and the colonized's liberation (the emergence of the nonviolated and respected other)? In our present preoccupation with the deconstruction of Western knowledge and our frenzied obsession with our distancing of the other, are we not avoiding or obfuscating the very history of exploitation and domination that has persisted well after decolonization?

FROM POSTCOLONIALITY TO SUBORDINATE IMPERIALISM

Colonialism continues, albeit in a different form and under changing conditions. In most postcolonial countries decolonization is followed by neocolonial practices that, despite political autonomy, continue to invent and construct new kinds of domination (economic and cultural)

that strengthen, rather than weaken, the dependent relationship of the ex-colonies to the imperial centers. As the end of empires became inevitable after the Second World War, the concern of the imperial powers was not whether the colonies would be free, but which local nationalist faction they would favor with their support and over what piece of territory the new political elite would be permitted to rule. Both Britain and France came to realize that their best interest lay not in a revitalized imperium, but in international integration through the Atlantic Alliance, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. The postwar new world order would witness the emergence of the United States as the sole, unchallenged world power. The United States was clearly the heir to an earlier European imperialism, as illustrated in its inheritance of the legacies of these dying empires that continued to trouble international affairs: Korea and Vietnam in Asia, Israel in the Middle East, South Africa and Rhodesia in Africa, not to mention Latin America. Ironically, it is also within the context of global decolonization and anti-imperialist mass mobilization that the world witnessed the historically unprecedented growth of capitalism and the integration of the world market. In this new world order that came into being under the dyadic structure of the Cold War and the patronage of the United States, Japan was to achieve unprecedented economic prosperity and continues to circumvent and disavow the colonial question.

As we have seen, the political-intellectual force unleashed by the great movements of decolonization in British and French Africa anticipated and precipitated politico-cultural radicalism in the metropolises. (Fredric Jameson is quite right in marking the beginnings of what would come to be called the First World's 1960s in the Third World decolonizing process.)[59] The abrupt dissolution of the empire in Japan actually assisted in the eradication of that "exteriority." In the immediate years after the war, Japanese intellectuals had also begun a series of self-critiques. But precisely because the total defeat of Japanese militarism occurred at the hands of the Allied forces and not under the pressure of

its empire's disintegration, the questions did not concern the universal validity of enlightenment or rationality that anchored Western colonial knowledge. Rather they involved a more particular and contingent problematic specific to the Japanese context—the emperor system, war responsibility, *shutaisei* (subjectivity), and so on.[60] The exigent concern was not that of Japan's relationship to its decolonized "others," but to itself. As Masao Miyoshi writes,

> A series of interrelated questions was raised. Why was Japan defeated? What went wrong? The questions surrounding the destruction of the empire were at once replaced by those regarding the commencement of hostilities. Why did the Japanese invade China and attack Pearl Harbor? At whose instigation? Didn't they, people and rulers alike, know that Japan's resources were extremely meager? If not, what blinded them to this and other obvious facts? Such questions in turn led to those about the political makeup of the country. What made people accept the decisions of their leaders? Who were these leaders? How did Japan's decision-making process systematically exclude the populace at large? Or did the people participate? If yes, was the entire population to blame after all? Was the Japanese form of governance intrinsically inoperable and iniquitous? And, finally, is there something uniquely wrong about Japan? What are the "essential" features of the Japanese people?[61]

The discursive space of postwar Japan is an enclosed one. For intellectuals like Maruyama Masao, the immediate postwar philosophical concern was to interrogate Japanese modernity as an incomplete project. Far from the wartime advocates of "overcoming the modern," Maruyama argues that Japan's traumatic defeat indicates that the Japanese have yet to fully achieve the project of modernity.[62] As long as "subjectivity" is emblematic of modernity, the question of an incomplete modernity necessarily entails the reexamination of subjectivity, or Japan's lack of that subjectivity (*shutaisei*). In his "Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism," Maruyama attempts to analyze "the all-pervasive

psychological coercion" that drove the Japanese to embark on a war against the rest of the world.[63] Unlike the European nation-states that adopt a "neutral position on internal values, such as truth and justice," Japan after the restoration united prestige and power in the institution of the Emperor, and "there was no ecclesiastical force to assert the supremacy of any 'internal' world over this new, combined, unitary power."[64] Whereas national power in the West was based on formal and external sovereignty, the Japanese state never came to draw the distinction between the external and internal spheres, where authority was only valid for the former. In other words, the Japanese state has monopolized the right to determine values. Without any free, subjective awareness of individual action, the Japanese are therefore regulated by the "existence of people in a higher class—of people . . . who are closer to the ultimate value."[65] And in this structure of oligarchy, it is the "transfer of oppression"—by exercising arbitrary power on those who are below—that maintains the balance of the system. This transference of oppression was exercised in the international arena, in which Japan imitated Western imperialism and "plunged the world into the terrible conflagration in the Pacific." While Maruyama's analysis of the imperial structure is incisive, and his criticism of the lack of *shutaisei* in Japan is quite accurate, his blind acceptance and admiration of Western categories such as rationality, modernity, and subjectivity is rather problematic.[66] The very introspection of trying to locate an internal and specifically indigenous basis for Japan's aggression and defeat only results in Maruyama's forgetting to analyze Japan's role within the larger structural coordinates of global imperialism and colonization, and the complicity of Western categories with Western imperialism. By formulating the question only in relation to the self, that is Japan, any possible negotiation with the other is excluded. Unlike in the West (especially with regard to France and the United States in Vietnam), where decolonization was accompanied by a critical evaluation of its relationship to its "others" precisely because they were *still engaged in colonial wars*, in Japan defeat and subsequent

subjugation under American occupation only resulted in the rejection and disavowal of "exteriority." The incessant reevaluation and reinterpretation of "Japan" followed.

Another postwar contention that shares the self-examination of the question of *shutaisei* and yet potentially implies confronting the questions of colony and empire, and hence the possibility of inquiring into Japan's relationship to its neighbors, is the issue of war responsibility and reparation.[67] However, even this concern evades rather than confronts the larger question of colonialism. As long as the debate is centered on Japan's war responsibility, the fifteen-year war dating from the Manchuria Incident in 1931, responsibility and reparation for Japan's ex-colonies are almost never addressed. This, however, is not something unique to the Japanese. What Western colonial powers have ever spoken of responsibilities or made reparations for the exploitation and plundering of their colonies?

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was created in 1946 by the Allied powers for the purpose of trying the political leaders who were responsible for "crimes against peace." And on April 28, twenty-eight Class A war criminals, including Tōjō, were charged with "the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging" of aggressive war, in compliance with the Potsdam Declaration. The trial was unprecedented in war history because in addition to specific violations of the laws and customs of war, such as the abuse of war prisoners and acts of brutality, it also included the vaguely and broadly defined crime of war conspiracy and crimes against humanity. The entire tribunal was, of course, a theatrical demonstration of the losers' criminality and a farcical assertion of the victors' moral righteousness. Were the Allied forces, led by the United States, legally and morally justified, other than by winning the war, in judging the Germans and the Japanese? Were not the nuclear weapons dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki a "crime against humanity?" And what about the entire history of Western imperialism and colonization? The American hypocrisy reached its zenith in December of 1948 when convicted Class A criminals like Sasakawa and Kishi were

released, in line with the logical thrust of American world strategy as the Cold War intensified. Tōjō and seven others were executed, if only for the symbolic reason of putting the war behind and moving toward the integration of Japan under the American-dominated Western imperialist system. The inability of Japan to come to terms with its colonial other was caused, on the one hand, by the deception and opportunism of the United States and, on the other hand, by the lack of *shutaisei* in the Japanese people and government that would have allowed Japan to solve the problems of war crimes and, by extension, of its colonial legacy by itself. Once subsumed under the structure of the East-West conflict, the focus of postwar Japan shifted from political democratization to economic recovery, and the question of Japan's war responsibility to its neighboring nations remained unanswered.

The dissolution of the Japanese empire, as with its Western counterparts, did not signal the end of imperialism under the capitalist mode of production. On the contrary, Japan's defeat and its subsequent occupation by the United States prepared Japan for "a transition from seeking autonomous imperialism to accepting subordinate imperialism in a reorganized world in which the United States guaranteed Japanese capitalism the essential medium- to long-term conditions under which it could prosper."[68] One of the strategies adopted by the occupation for the rebuilding of the Japanese economy was to limit and at times halt the reparation program—an inversion of an earlier plan to deindustrialize Japan and to deprive Japan of its empire. The Pauley program of 1945 saw Japan's reparation as part of a larger scheme for a general restructuring of the entire East Asian economy. Pauley suggested that Japan should not simply pay reparations but send part of its industrial equipment to other East Asian countries, so as to prevent Japan from reconsolidating its economic superiority.[69] However, with the Communist upheaval in China and the intensification of the Cold War, the economic rehabilitation of Japan and the restoration of its industrial base came to be seen, from the American point of view, essential to the stability and prosperity of the Asian region.

In the mid-1950s, under John Foster Dulles, the United States initiated a triangular program to boost Japanese exports and to make the Japanese economy self-sufficient. The Americans put up funds for Southeast Asian countries to purchase Japanese exports, in return giving these same countries privileges in the American market. The United States also ensured that the World Bank and other "international" organizations would lavish loans on Japan. The plan was to facilitate capitalist development in the region to counteract the "perceivable" Communist threat. The war in Korea, of course, by promoting the militarization of Japanese industries, accelerated the process. The Korean conflict was extremely profitable to Japanese business, which benefited greatly from the increased American expenditure and thus also consolidated the role of Japan as the United States' counterrevolutionary ally in East Asia. And Japan's relation to its Asian neighbors began to assume a different configuration of economic domination. The reparation programs in connection with war responsibility were to be designed and instigated by the business community to assist the revival of the Japanese economy. In other words, together with financial "aid," they were nothing but disguised investment or export credits aimed at developing markets in Japan's ex-colonies for the exportation of Japanese and American goods.

FROM IMPERIALIST NATION TO *SNOW COUNTRY*

Perhaps more than any other literary text, Nobel Laureate Kawabata Yasunari's *Snow Country* best exemplifies the self-enclosure of Japan and the construction of that self-contained Japan under the American occupation in the postwar period. Kawabata began *Snow Country* in 1934, published it piecemeal between 1935 and 1937, and completed it in 1947. Translated into English in 1957, and eventually winning Kawabata the Nobel Prize in 1968, *Snow Country* has become one of the canonical texts of modern Japanese literature in both Japan and the

United States. As Karatani Kōjin has observed, *Snow Country* must be viewed from two different but mutually reinforcing trajectories that amount to a total denial of historical contextuality. The protagonist of the story, Shimamura, a well-to-do dilettante, arrives at the snow country after the train has passed through a long tunnel. Despite his involvement with the women in the snow country, Shimamura remains noncommittal, incapable of loving and always the indifferent bystander. His self-consciousness (*jiko ishiki*) is never shaken. This is because, argues Karatani, in the snow country, despite its obvious exteriority to where Shimamura comes from, he encounters no "other" (*tasha*). In other words, snow country "is the 'other world' invented so [one would] never have to come to terms with the 'other.' "[70] Throughout the war and its aftermath, Kawabata, not unlike Shimamura, remained elusive and indifferent to the historical changes while insisting on the "grief and beauty of Japan . . . liv[ing] with the mountains and rivers of Japan as [his] soul."[71] Furthermore, it was precisely this "grief and beauty of Japan," a feminized and helpless Japan, that the American occupation projected onto its own cultural imaginary. Japan was to become the "snow country" for the Americans—a country devoid of militarism and the memories of past aggression.

With the dissolution of the dyadic structure of the Cold War and the transnationalization of capitalism on a "global" scale, the question of colonialism has become a legitimate object of analysis here in the West and in Japan as well. This is inevitable as the colonial others—for example, Korean-Japanese writers and the growing number of migrant laborers from the ex-colonies—gradually make their irreducible difference and irrefutable presence felt in the cultural and economic fabric of Japanese society. Since, however, it has become more and more difficult to identify points of intervention in an increasingly complex social and economic structure, and to identify the agents and bearers of social transformation, the function of colonial studies is in danger of becoming one of compensation, not of critique. The West's obsession with and Japan's disavowal of the colonial question are ideological in the strictly

Marxist sense of obscuring reality and sustaining the status quo. The contemporary Japan/West that will not negotiate with the moral authority of their erstwhile others, is a Japan/West that will not pay a price or atone for their past colonization. However, any dominant subject position that is in the process of deconstructing or calling itself into question cannot do so either in solipsistic isolation or in a facile "dialogue" with those in subaltern positions. The task at hand is not to fetishize their differences and to posit their otherness in an enclosed historical past, but to simultaneously trace the structural continuity and discontinuity, identity and difference, between formal colonialism and its legacy, and to map out the very contradiction produced by these historical movements. The next chapter returns to the colonial scene and examines the historical emergence of ethnic and political identifications with mainland China and the formation of a semiautonomous Taiwanese identity within the general delineation of the Japanese empire. The Japanese legacy presently continues to form and inform not only the definition of a strictly "Taiwanese" identity, but also the historical role that Japanese colonialism has played in the constitution of that identity and its differentiation from mainland China.

CHAPTER TWO

Entangled Oppositions

Affiliations, Identities, and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan

Taiwan is at the same time the Taiwan of the empire and the Taiwan of us Taiwanese.

Ts'ai Pei-huo (Sai Bai-ka), Gotō to Gotō *[Our island and us], 1921*

The emancipation of the oppressed peoples in the colonies is the prerequisite for the emancipation of the Japanese proletariat. The liberation of the Japanese proletariat is the precondition for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of Taiwan and Korea.

Tokyo Taiwan Gakujutsu Kenkyūkai (Tokyo Taiwan Society of Learning), Sengen *[Declaration], 1925*

The quotations above represent the two primary yet divergent tendencies of anticolonial struggles in Taiwan from the early 1920s to the late 1930s. This period is marked by the coalescing and conflicting political ideologies that not only generated a plurality of identity formations, but also entailed the "official" inauguration of *dōka*, or assimilation policy, in the name of "extending the system of Japan to the colonies" (*naichi enchōshugi*). These tendencies also constitute the emergence of what can