Socio-Emotional Development

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Becoming a Moral Child: The Socialization of Shame among Young Chinese Children Author(s): Heidi Fung Source: Ethos, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 180-209 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/640656 Accessed: 15-08-2018 14:28 UTC

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Becoming a Moral Child: The Socialization of Shame among Young Chinese Children HEIDI FUNG

In an effort to understand shame in Chinese terms, this ethno­ graphic study examines parental beliefs and practices with re­ spect to shame, as well as young children's participation in shaming events. Nine middle-class Taiwanese families partici­ pated in this study. Interviews with the primary caregivers and longitudinal observations of spontaneous home interactions re­ vealed that the socialization of shame was well underway by age two-and-a-half Two types of events were identified, most inci­ dents of which were playful and involved the child's active par­ ticipation. The child's rudimentary sense of shame was manipulated in order to teach right from wrong and to motivate the child to amend. These events were vivid illustrations of the practice of opportunity education.

What distinguishes the human being from the animal is shame. When a person does not know shame, his/her conscience would vanish. For such a person, parents would have no way to discipline; teachers and friends would have no way to advise. Without the will to strive upward, how could one improve? To be an official without shame is treacherous; how could he be loyal? To be a son without shame is disobedient; how could he be filial? To be a neighbor without shame is wicked; how could he be kind? ... As one knows shame, the sense of right and wrong would be realized, and his dying conscience would have a chance to revive.

-The Pedigree (and Familial Instructions) of the Zhou Clan

T his study asks, how does the young "shameless" Chinese child become a competent social member who knows shame? This question is based on the premise that shame is a meaning system that cannot be understood apart from its social and cultural con­ texts. Although the young come into the world equipped with

Ethos 27(2):180-209. Copyright© 1999, American Anthropological Association.

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Becoming a Moral Child • 181

primitive means of expressing emotion, they must acquire, discover, con­ struct, and reconstruct the preexisting, collectively shared norms and dis­ play rules through repeated interaction with more mature social members. The socialization of emotion refers to this interactive and dynamic process by which a member inducts, structures, and interprets the novice's emo­ tional experience, and the novice accedes to, resists, or playfully transforms the messages and norms held out to him or her. Although every emotion is subject to culturally patterned norms and assumptions and requires sociali­ zation (Kitayama and Markus 1994; Lutz 1988; Lutz and White 1986; Miller and Sperry 1987; Rosaldo 1984; Shweder 1993; White 1992, 1994), shame, as the quintessential sociomoral emotion, is particularly illuminating in this regard (Barrett 1995; Karen 1992; Lewis 1992).

Chinese culture, along with other Asian cultures, has long been char­ acterized as a "shame culture" (Benedict 1946; Chu 1972; Leighton and Kluckhohn 1947; Mead 1937). Despite the fact that the dualistic formula­ tion of shame-versus-guilt cultures has been strongly criticized, shame is indeed an important part of Chinese experience, as attested by Chinese literature, clinical cases, and scientific research (Chu 1972; Hu 1994; Klein­ man 1986; Kleinman and Kleinman 1985; Schoenhals 1993; Tan 1989; Wilson 1970, 1981 ). Yet surprisingly little is known about the socialization of shame in Chinese cultures, particularly in the early years of life. This study fills this gap in two ways: first by attempting to understand the so­ cialization of shame in Taiwanese terms by investigating local beliefs and mundane practices. Second, it advances a person-centered discursive ap­ proach to the socialization of emotion, an approach advocated by several leading psychological anthropologists (Lutz 1983; Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990; Lutz and White 1986; Menon and Shweder 1994; Miller and Sperry 1987; Shweder and Much 1991; White 1992, 1994).

STUDYING MEANINGS OF SHAME ACROSS CULTURES

Following a period of relative neglect, the experience of shame is gen­ erating renewed interest in the psychological and psychiatric communi­ ties. Several provocative new works have done much to restore shame to its rightful place in the emotional spectrum and to revitalize thinking about this complex social and moral emotion (see Broucek 1991; Harper and Hoopes 1990;Jacoby 1994; Lewis 1992; Morrison 1989, 1996;Nathanson 1992; Scheff 1990; Twitchell 1997; Wurmser 1981). Shame is often men­ tioned together with or compared to guilt, although they are believed to be two discrete emotions. According to the psychoanalytic literature (for a review and comparison, see, for example, Benson and Lyons 1991; Tang­ ney 1998), in the process of growth, the superego and the ego ideal, en­ forced respectively by guilt and shame, are developed as the superstructure

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for self-regulation. Guilt is associated with transgression, meaning "I do bad things" in experiential terms; it comes from the internal voice of the superego or conscience. Shame, however, accompanies failure and short­ comings. It implies "I am weak, incompetent, and inferior." Shame is aroused by being seen; if there is no audience, either real or imaginary, one doesn't feel shame. Guilt originates in the child's fear of active pun­ ishment by superiors, whereas shame originates in the child's fear of social expulsion and abandonment. Moreover, guilt deals with the specific acts done or undone, and the pain associated with guilt may actually be eased or relieved by confession and reparation. However, the global self is the central focus of attribution and evaluation in shame, which therefore often makes shame intensely painful and irreversible. The behavioral charac­ teristics of guilt responses to wrongdoing can be labeled as amenders, and those of shame-relevant responses as avoiders (Barrett 1993). The Latin root of the word shame denotes a strong desire to hide, to turn away, or to conceal, and includes the implication that shame can strike one dead (Darwin 1872; Nathanson 1992).

With few exceptions, contemporary Western theorists tend to treat shame negatively and primitively as a problem to be solved or a disease to cure; shame is often associated with children, savages, and neurotics (Creighton 1990; Schneider 1977, 1987). In a recent review, Kilborne noted:

... from Ancient Greece to the present ... there has been an evolution culturally from shame as socially intelligible related to honor, to shame as emblematic of a basic flaw in the self, a deep, narcissistic vulnerability, and bewildering identity confusion, with shame over both. (1995:296)

This bias has also been demonstrated in the guilt culture versus shame culture dichotomy. The polar opposition of shame and guilt, con­ sistent with the dichotomous fashion of studying culture in general, cre­ ates such divisions as mind versus body, public versus private, person versus culture, thought versus feeling, sociocentricism versus individual­ ism, inner versus outer, modern versus primitive, and egalitarian versus hierarchical (Lutz 1988; Rosaldo 1983; White 1993). These dichotomies have been widely and justly criticized for their ethnocentric flavor and for severely reducing the complexity of affect at both cultural and individual levels (Creighton 1990; Killen 1997; Lebra 1971, 1983; Piers and Singer 1953; Schneider 1987). The flawless coherence of the underlying opera­ tion of emotion (shame or guilt) in all aspects of individual behavior, such as interpersonal interaction and child rearing (as well as in collective en­ terprises, such as social control mechanisms, religion, and art), makes one wonder to what extent a single psychological state can represent or con­ tribute to the configuration of a whole personality and culture. Most of all, cultures that dichotomize guilt and shame reveal a prejudice against

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Becoming a Moral Child • 183

shame, as asserted by Creighton: "Westerners viewed guilt as belonging to a higher level of moral development than shame, and hence, considered cultures integrated by guilt sanctions to be superior to those integrated by shame sanctions" (1990:280). As a result, to use the shame/guilt contrast to delineate Western from non-Western and developed from developing societies is to extricate Westerners' own shame experience as full human beings (Schneider 1987).

The importance of shame in Chinese culture is reflected in its empha­ ses on face, criticism, and evaluation in interpersonal relationships (Gabrenya and Hwang 1996; Ho 1976; Hu 1944; Hwang 1987; King and Myers 1977; Zhai 1995), and in its rich variety of lexical terms and labels for shame, humiliation, embarrassment, face, and related notions (Her 1990; Russell and Yik 1996; Shaver et al. 1992; Wilson 1981). By analyzing the texts of Confucianism and Chinese philosophy, Chu (1972) found that more than one-tenth of the Confucian Analects are devoted to the value of shame. Accordingly, he maintained that Confucianism is oriented towards shame through its emphasis on social norms and its reference to moral ideas as models of behavior. In this tradition, a virtuous man often means a man who knows shame. In an ethnographic study on the paradoxical relationship between teachers and students in a middle school in China, Schoenhals (1993:192) concluded that, instead of being a shame culture, Chinese culture is rather a "shame-socialized culture" in which individu­ als "are strongly socialized to be aware of what others think of them, and are encouraged to act so as to maximize the positive esteem they are granted from others, while trying to avoid incurring their disapproval." What distinguishes this from a "non-shame-socialized culture" is that (1) members are explicitly expected to acquire a sensitivity to shame and to other people's opinions, judgments, and evaluations, and (2) failing to ac­ quire this sensitivity has great social consequences and earns the con­ tempt of others (Schoenhals 1993:191-193).

Moreover, in the Chinese experience, shame is often a group, rather than an individual, concern. Wilson (1970, 1981), in his works on the political socialization in Taiwan primary schools, found that shaming, with an element of ostracism or abandonment by the group, was one dominant moral training technique. This threat of social opprobrium was constantly manipulated by teachers, and served the dual purpose of correcting the child's misdeed while, at the same time, emphasizing the group's disap­ proval and reinforcing the rightness of the other members' behavior. Simi­ larly, on the Chinese concepts of face, Hu observed that

a Chinese person almost always belongs to a closely integrated group on which is re­ flected some of his glory or shame. His family, the wider community of friends, and his superiors, all have an interest in his advancement or set-backs. So a person does not simply "lose his own face." (1944:50]

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184 e ETHOS

This is consistent with the interdependent construing of the self as pro­ posed by Markus and Kitayama (1991:227), who see "the person not as separate from the social context, but as more connected and less differen­ tiated from others." Consequently, the enhancement of one's autonomy and self-esteem becomes secondary to, and is constrained by, the more important task of maintaining interdependence among individuals.

Systematic documentation of the process of how the young shameless Chinese child transforms to a full-fledged adult who knows shame is virtu­ ally nonexistent. Nevertheless, two studies suggest that this process begins early in Chinese society. In response to a questionnaire survey, 43 percent of parents of preschoolers in Taipei, Taiwan, agreed with the statement, "A preschool-age child should be shamed if he or she does not follow social rules," whereas none of their Euro-American counterparts in Chicago did (Wang 1992:52-62). Chinese children also acquire shame-related terms earlier than American children. When mothers of preschoolers in main­ land China and the United States were asked to report which emotion words their children learned the earliest, 95 percent of the Chinese moth­ ers claimed that their children understood xiu (shame or shyness) by age three. In contrast, only a small number of American mothers reported that their three-year-olds could understand embarrassed (16. 7 percent) or ashamed (10 percent) (Shaver et al. 1992:197-199).

Even though shame has not been directly addressed, a large body of literature on Chinese socialization bears on this issue. Rooted in the Con­ fucian ideal of filial piety, Chinese parents traditionally tend to hold high expectations of their offspring and their parenting style is often charac­ terized as authoritarian, strict, or even harsh (Chao 1994; Ho 1986, 1996; Lay et al. 1997; Lin and Wang 1994; Wu 1981, 1996). While recognizing the wide variation within the Chinese culture, Ho (1986:35) concluded in his thorough review that "Chinese parents tend to be highly lenient or even indulgent in their attitudes toward the infant and young child, in sharp contrast to the strict discipline they impose on older children." This shift is believed to begin when the child reaches "the age of understanding" at around four to six years, when disciplinary techniques such as threat­ ening, scolding, shaming, and physical punishment become acceptable and are frequently applied (Ho 1986:16). However, Miller et al. (1996, 1997) found that the use of narratives as a didactic resource to enforce strict discipline has already started by age two-and-a-half in Taiwanese families. Although shame has been an important part of Chinese socio­ emotional life, the point when the socialization process begins-and how it is practiced in Chinese families-still remains unclear.

In contrast to the primary emotions present from birth, shame, one of the "self-conscious emotions" (along with guilt, embarrassment, and pride) is reported to emerge later in life among American children, beginning at

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Becoming a Horal Child • 185

around two-and-a-half to three years of age. Its emergence depends upon several precursors: the maturation of cortical and limbic structures, the sense of self as a distinct physical entity, and the growing ability to sym­ bolically represent a standard of behavior (Dunn 1987; Kagan 1981; Lewis 1992; Schore 1994; Stipek 1983, 1995). Socialization is crucial to devel­ opment of a sense of shame

not only because it is an important source of information about rules, standards, self, and so on; more importantly, it is primarily responsible for endowing those standards with significance, and making adherence to those standards an important goal for the individual. [Barrett 1995:50]

In socialization studies, language has long served as both a tool of inquiry and an object of inquiry (Gaskins et al. 1992; Heath 1983; Ochs 1988; Schieffelin 1990; Shweder et al. 1998; Shweder and Much 1991 ). Language here is defined much more broadly as discursive pragmatics. As such, it goes beyond syntactical and representational systems and in­ cludes not only the said, but also the suggested, the implied, and the un­ said. Following a discursive model of the socialization of emotion advocated by Miller and Sperry (1987), Lutz (1983, 1988), Lutz and White (1986), and White (1992), this study takes the position that the cultural meanings of emotion are contingent upon the context of practical actions in which the emotion is expressed, talked about, and negotiated for. The cultural meanings of shame are revealed through identifying a set of prob­ lems in social relationship and in real or symbolic violation of cultural codes. These problems and violations may provide a platform for the caregiver to conceptualize, classify, or explain the ethnotheories to the young novice. In other words, the unit of analysis is the event of shame­ how the meaning of shame is situated in the recurring shaming practices. In these situated events, shame is best understood not as an essence to be extracted, but as an integral part of a complex configuration of affective meaning conveyed by the multichanneled communicative system (includ­ ing verbal, nonverbal, and paralinguistic) and embedded in multiple con­ texts of everyday moral socialization in the family. Context here refers to a dynamic and fluid process, rather than a static and monolithic given. It should be seen as an ongoing accomplishment of all participants, including the child, through their active interpretation, construction and recon­ struction in the semiotically mediated activities. In addition to the imme­ diate interactional context in which shame is socialized and responded to, broader levels of context, such as the caregivers' own experiences of shame and their child-rearing beliefs with respect to shame, are also taken into account. These multiple levels of context overlap, weaving together in complex ways and mutually influencing one another (Cole 1995; Harkness and Super 1996; Miller and Goodnow 1995; Miller and Sperry 1987).

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THE CURRENT STUDY: CONTEXT AND DESIGN

This study took place in Taipei, Taiwan, where I am a native. 1 Taiwan is a subtropical island 240 miles long and 90 miles wide, which lies off the southern coast of China. Taiwan's history and culture have been shaped by successive waves of migration and colonization by the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, Japanese, and, primarily, Chinese. The Chinese on the mainland first extended imperial control over Taiwan in the 17th century during the Ching (or Qing) Dynasty. The descendants of those immigrants from the coast provinces (mainly Fujian) are known as today's "native Taiwanese,'' who constitute over 80 percent of the current population. After World War II, when Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party (or Kuo­ mingtang, KMT) lost the civil war to Mao Tse-tung's Communist Party on the mainland, another wave of immigrants, mainly Chiang's soldiers, bu­ reaucrats, and followers from various inland provinces, fled to Taiwan in 1949. Even though intermarriages are common between the early and the late comers, these people and their Taiwan-born descendants are referred to as "mainlanders" and make up less than 20 percent of the current popu­ lation.

With generous aid from the United States and an established infra­ structure left by the Japanese (who had colonized Taiwan for SO years until the end of World War II), the KMT quickly built up its new regime on Taiwan. Mandarin was established as the official language, and Confucian values were conveyed in its nine-year mandatory education. By the 1980s, Taiwan had become the world's 13th-largest trading nation and the fifth­ largest U.S. trading partner. Taiwan was characterized as one of the "Four Little Dragons" in Asia (Cohen 1988; Gold 1986). Although liberalization has come much later than prosperity, in the last decade Taiwan has gone through drastic social changes and political reforms. Since martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwan residents have been allowed to visit their mainland relatives for the first time and political protests and opposition parties were legalized. After almost 40 years of rule by Chiang's family, a native Taiwanese KMT member, Lee Teng-hui, won the first presidential election in 1996. In 1997, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (or DPP), won two-thirds of the seats in islandwide local government elections.

Taipei, Taiwan's capital and largest city, with a population of 3 mil­ lion, has been run by a DPP mayor since 1994.2 Today, the rice fields, water buffalo, and irrigation canals, which were familiar scenes in my childhood (and the childhood of the parents in this study), have all disap­ peared. Space is now at a premium. Urban planning, public constructions, and legal systems, however, have not kept up with this rapid development. Growing up among the congested and chaotic traffic, an increasing crime rate, and heavily polluted air, Taipei children nowadays live a much more

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Becoming a Moral Child • 187

affluent and Westernized lifestyle than earlier generations. They buy toys at Toys "R" Us, watch Disney movies and Japanese cartoons, take English classes as early as they can, hold birthday parties at McDonald's, and travel inland or abroad with their parents during holidays. Despite these influ­ ences and changes, recent research (Miller et al. 1996, 1997) suggests that Confucian values may still be alive and well in the contemporary Taiwan society.

Nine middle-class Taipei families participated in this study. They were recruited through various sources, such as a local church, several kinder­ gartens, and mutual acquaintances. Each household consisted of two gen­ erations: husband and wife and their two children. However, female relatives in the extended family (such as grandmothers and aunts) still often helped with child care responsibilities, and contacts with the older generation were frequent. Among the grandparents, there were about as many mainlanders as native Taiwanese. Like most families in Taipei, they spoke Mandarin Chinese, the language of schooling, at home. Half of them also spoke Taiwanese. All parents were born on Taiwan after 1949 and were educated under the KMT regime. The majority of fathers were col­ lege-educated and held white-collar jobs (such as engineers, physicians, technicians, and architects), while mothers had at least a high school edu­ cation. Half of the mothers quit working after having children, while the other half remained in the workforce as teachers or clerks. Each family owned property and an automobile and was economically secure. The families in this study were unacquainted with one another and scattered throughout the metropolitan area. They lived in similar-sized apartments with similar floor plans. Each apartment was about 1,200 square feet, di­ vided into a living room, a dining area, a small kitchen, three bedrooms, and one or two bathrooms. All the focal children were developing normally and were healthy. They were balanced according to gender and birth order (five girls and four boys; four first-borns and five second-horns). Half of the children attended day care by age two, and by age three-and-a-half, all of the children attended kindergarten. Although reliance on institutional support or private nurses or maids was increasing, early childhood was still spent in close physical and emotional proximity to the parents.

This study is ethnographic in approach and longitudinal in design, following the subjects from age two-and-a-half to age four. The core of the study consisted of intensive and systematic observations of family inter­ action in the home setting, supplemented by in-depth interviews with the caregivers. After rapport and trust were established, the focal children's spontaneous interaction with family members in their homes was observed and videotaped for two, two-hour sessions at each sampling point, spaced at intervals of three months.3 The parents were told that I was interested in discovering how children learn to communicate under everyday conditions.

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During the taping sessions my interactions with the children and their families were relaxed and low-key.4 I did not attempt to lead or intervene in the conversation, but joined in, following up on topics as an interested participant when it seemed appropriate to do so. The parents encouraged the children to address me by a kinship term, Auntie. Over time, my role as a researcher gradually developed into that of family friend. The families often shared private experiences and problems with me and invited me to gatherings with their extended family members. Currently, I continue to be friends with several of these families.

The present analysis was based on interviews with primary caregivers in the nine families and over 16 hours of home observations for all children at the ages of two-and-a-half, three, three-and-a-half, and four (except one child, who missed the two-and-a-half data point). These 140 hours of videotaped, spontaneous family interactions were transcribed in full. Each transcript includes records of what the focal child said, what other speakers said, descriptions of all participants' nonverbal expressions and behavior, and contextual features. The standardized transcription conventions of CHAT were adopted (MacWhinney 1991). 5

To ensure the accuracy of the transcripts, each first draft was sub­ sequently checked at least two more times by different transcribers, all of whom were native Mandarin speakers. The final draft was always con­ firmed and compiled by the researcher.

Intensive discourse analysis was first done on the two most verbally sophisticated and expressive children, Didi, a boy, and Angu, a girl, both of whom had most elaborate communicative exchanges with their family members. Even though they might not be representative in this respect, they were the most informative informants, providing a fertile source of insights into the meaning of shame. Events of shame were hence identified from the transcripts, and codes along several dimensions (prototypical vs. nonprototypical events, turns, participants, rules transgressed, and key­ ing) were also generated. These codes will be defined below in connection with the relevant findings, and were then applied to the remaining seven children to test whether the patterns developed from Didi and Angu would still hold. 6

After the final observational session was completed when the children reached four, a semistructured in-depth interview was conducted with the primary caregiver of each child. 7 Each interview was audiotaped and lasted about two hours. Questions concerned parental beliefs and norms regarding discipline and shame. They included: "What makes a good child?" "What are the most important goals for you in raising your child?" "What is the most effective way to correct your child's misbehavior?" "What do you expect your child to feel after being punished?" "Does sham­ ing damage the child's self-esteem?" and "What would happen to a child

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Becoming a Moral Child• 189

if his/her parents never shamed him/her?" The verbatim transcribed in­ terviews with the primary caregivers of the nine children were also coded and analyzed along the dimensions of the caregiver's goals and methods regarding child rearing and disciplining, the child's understanding about shame, and whether shame was related to moral education, and if so, in what ways. Each data source was analyzed with respect to the primary research question, and then compared with the others in an attempt to seek convergent validity among the different kinds of evidence.

PARENTAL BELIEFS ABOUT SHAME AND DISCIPLINE

When asked about their child-rearing beliefs and values with respect to child discipline, all nine parents located shame squarely within the moral domain. They considered providing a healthy, secure, and happy childhood as the highest parenting goal. Furthermore, they assumed full responsibility for their youngsters' moral education. In order to do the job well, parents tried hard to understand their children and to learn from different sources, such as from experiences of other parents and through books written by professionals. Their children made them proud when they behaved and performed well in front of other people, particularly when they showed good upbringing or jiajiao (family education). Their youngsters made them lose face when they failed to do so. Parents made a distinction between ai (love) and niai (spoiling). The former meant love with discipline, and the latter, too much love, and too little discipline, or literally, "drown with love" (see also Wu 1981). One father said, "I'd rather let my child dislike me now, instead of letting other people dislike my child in the future." He further explained how he trained his child not to be a spoiled brat:

So, sometimes for kids, you cannot always satisfy them; you cannot let them become too picky. One thing is food, another is clothes. You cannot let them be too picky and wear whatever they want to. Like this one [referring to the focal child), I would insist that he puts on the clothes he refuses to wear. The more resistant he is, the more I insist. I want to let him know that he can't always easily get whatever he wants.

Although individual opinions were respected, tinghua (listening to words, or obedience) was also of a great concern. Youngsters were ex­ pected to listen attentively to their parents, comprehend what was said, and behave accordingly. The parents believed that they had to explicitly point out their young children's misdeeds, to patiently and repeatedly re­ mind them of the rules, and to explain to them how to behave properly. However, they also realized that too much direct preaching in the abstract only makes children tired of listening, and leads them to ignore or disobey. A much more subtle way of helping the child to learn was jihui jiaoyu (opportunity education). This notion implies two connecting ideas. First,

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190 e ETHOS

the child's immediate experience provides an opportunity to situate the lesson in concrete terms. Second, parents should take every opportunity to do so. The following quote from a mother illustrates why this method seemed to work better:

I think opportunity education is the most important thing. You have to remind him whenever you find an opportunity. It's better than teaching them deliberately. For instance, when we see another child who's misbehaved, I would go, "Look, because he didn't behave, such and such happened to him." It's very effective. Because if we simply lecture him, he won't understand how to apply it. But when he's right in the real situ­ ation and then you remind him, he would immediately comprehend it. Like when I took my daughter to her cousin's, after listening to her cousin playing the piano, she said spontaneously and naturally, "I want to be as good as she." I said, "Yes, only if you work as hard as she does, you can play this well." She cared and listened. Otherwise, even if you tell her one hundred times, "If you don't work hard, you would blah blah blah," it doesn't work. It won't .... So, it's tricky to firmly grasp the opportunity when it comes.

Young children were encouraged to openly express their feelings and emotions, and put them into words, particularly for emotions like anger, fear, and frustration. Most parents reported that by preschool age (with an average of three-and-a-half-years), children already had some sense of shame. The children's initial knowledge of shame was demonstrated by their embarrassment when exposing their bodies, by spontaneous shame expressions they displayed when they knew their parents were disap­ pointed, or by complaints of losing face due to their younger siblings' per­ sistent crying in public. However, in order to let the child understand the fuller meanings of shame, the caregivers, as mature social members, had to explain and reason with the child, as suggested in the following quote from a mother:

Like her [referring to the focal child's older sister who was six at the time], she now knows [shame). She would cry when she does something wrong, since she herself knows it [without our reprimand). However, we, as parents, cannot let her go as if she has confessed just because she cries. We still have to fully explain to her and let her understand. Communication is necessary. We need to tell her what we expec~ her to do, what we expect her to comprehend, and why and what she has transgressed this time.

Although none of them offered a term for shaming as a disciplinary measure, most of them believed that it was necessary to have their chil­ dren feel ashamed when they transgressed. However, shaming was to be used only as a means of achieving the goal of teaching the child right from wrong. Shaming itself was not the ultimate goal. As pointed out by one aunt, too much shame would only risk harming the child's self-esteem, excluding them from interaction, and making them escape from their own responsibilities to amend and improve. She said:

When she was in the piano lesson, the teacher asked her whether she had practiced before the class, and she said, "No." "If no, go face the wall." But, unlike my son, he

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Becoming a Moral Child • 191

once was punished, and was so discouraged, he gave it up. So, I was worried she would give it up too. But see, she understood it was a punishment, and felt funny and amused at the same time. But she knew it was because she didn't practice. And since that time, she always practices. Every week, she practices, more or less. But she does; she won't go to the class without practicing anymore. So, I think the goal has been achieved. You don't give up, and don't get hurt either, no. I'd rather she be like this .... Actually to let her feel ashamed is a method, not the goal. It shouldn't make her give up. The goal is to make her repent, right?

This aunt went on to criticize two of her son's teachers (one in grade school, another in high school) for their excessive shaming by saying things like "You are so stupid," which led him to withdraw and give up, and failed to serve its disciplinary function. Nevertheless, interestingly, maintaining well-balanced shaming was not solely the adults' responsibil­ ity. The child, in fact, was also expected to be able to bear and handle a reasonable amount of shame. This caregiver admired how her four-year­ old niece dealt with the piano teacher's punishment in a playful manner xipi xiaolian (with a big smile on her face). She commented that the child's qingxu chulifangshi (style of emotional management) was suc­ cessful because on the one hand, she was able to appreciate the teacher's intention and improved herself, while on the other, she did not take it too seriously when compared to her cousin. From the caregiver's point of view, the purpose of shaming was accomplished jointly by the adult and the child.

Although there was a great deal of consensus among the caregivers concerning child rearing and shame, there were several points on which there was considerable variation. For instance, when asked whether boys and girls should be disciplined differently, some parents agreed whereas others believed that individual character, rather than gender, was a better reason for treating one child differently than the other. Some parents said consistency between the two parents was very important; even if one par­ ent disagreed with the other's disciplining, they should align with each other in front of the child. Other parents believed that their roles should be divided-when one played the disciplinary role of hei Lian (black face) who was stern and demanding, the other should mitigate and play the benign bai Lian (white face).

OBSERVATIONS OF EVENTS OF SHAME

Didi and Angu

As derived from the observed practices in the families of Didi and Angu, an event of shame was defined as a stretch of interaction in which at least one participant (1) anticipated wrongdoing or attributed it to the focal child, (2) used a variety of communicative resources to reprimand

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192 e ETHOS

the focal child and put him or her in an unfavorable light, and (3) at­ tempted not only to forestall or bring an end to the transgression, but also to elicit shame feelings from the child. The boundary of the emotionally charged event involved all the consequent shaming activities directed to­ wards the focal child, organized around his/her transgression until the par­ ticipants' attention and topic shifted. Events of shame ranged along a continuum from explicit to implicit. Explicit means that one or more of the participants made explicit reference to shame by using such labels as "shame on you," "shameful," "ashamed," and "losing face" (e.g., xiuxiu lian, xiu siren, hao xiu, cankui, diu, lian, diu siren), gestures for shame (e.g., striking index finger on cheek), idiomatic expressions for shame (e.g., "I want to bury my head into the ground," "You made your mother lose face," "Aren't you embarrassed for yourself?"). Implicit refers to be­ haviors such as turning the whole body away from the child, reminding the child that other people are watching, saying sarcastically, "How come I have such a child?" or "No spanking for a few days, your skin has become itchy," comparing the child against other "well-behaved" and "normal" children or siblings, suggesting that the whole family should go to the play­ ground without taking the child, and spanking the child in front of the camera. These implicit events were similar in all respects to explicit events, except they did not contain the explicit shame markers.

Thus, it is important to note that no single behavioral form defined shaming. What set the event apart from other behavior was rather a con­ figuration of assorted markers and channels. These communicative mark­ ers included verbal (e.g., name-callings, derogatory attributions, threats of abandonment, invoking a third party to sit in judgment of the child, social comparisons, warnings of punishment), paralinguistic (e.g., emphatic stress, angry intonation, loud or slow delivery), vocal (e.g., sighs, making disapproving sounds), nonverbal techniques (e.g., displaying shame ges­ ture such as staring at the child, frowning, pursing up lips, removing the child from his/her favorite toy or snack, or enacting physical punitive acts) as well as reticence and silence.

By this definition, events of shame directed at the focal child occurred at a rate of about five episodes per hour for both Didi and Angu and occu­ pied a significant amount of time (91 minutes on the average in 16 hours of observation). Moreover, for both of them, the majority of events of shame (80 percent for Didi, and 72 percent for Angu) are what I call pro­ totypical events of shame: they occurred in response to a perceived threat of transgression or a precipitating transgression committed by the child in the here and now. Example 1 illustrates what a prototypical event of shame was like.

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Becoming a Moral Child • 193

Example 1: A prototypical event of shame

While engaging in conversation, Didi, at age three, approached the researcher's unattended camcorder. As soon as his mother found out, she yelled, "Eh, eh, Didi! What has Mama told you? You never [listen] .... You cannot! I'm gonna spank you (wo lai da ni pigu). You're a child who doesn't obey rules (bu shou guiju de xiaohaizi)." By this time, the child had stopped misbehaving. The mother walked up to spank him and the child sat down on the floor, crying. Mother continued to upbraid him for being "such a disobedient child" (bu guai de xiaohaizi), threatened to ostracize and withdraw love from him, "We don't want you; you stand here," "Let him cry; it doesn't matter," "Mama is mad," and made dispar­ aging comments, "Look how ugly your cryir.g will be on tape". His five­ year-old sister soon joined in, "Ugly monster, ugly monster ( chou ba guai), shame on you (xiuxiulian)." She urged the mother to enforce more public reprimand, and spanked Didi herself. This instance lasted nearly 4.5 min­ utes and included 90 turns at speaking.

Indeed, a precipitating transgression is an essential element in the events of shame, as suggested in the following example of a negative evi­ dence. In this "no shame" event, the caregiver explained to the sibling why the child should not be shamed.8

Example 2: A "no shame" event

When he was three years old, Didi scratched his leg while playing with his sister on the floor. His sister mimicked him and said to the researcher, "He always likes to touch hisjiji" (child talk for penis). Mother, who sat in the other end of the room, heard Sister and was about to join the sister to shame Didi. She yelled, "No, no, don't do it. It's ugly, very ugly. Mom won't ... " Didi quickly and repeatedly explained that he was only scratching his leg. Mother now turned to Sister instead and punished her for her incorrect shaming by having her hit her own hand. Sister unhappily argued, "He did it last time." Mother replied, "Yes, but he now doesn't do it. Last time is what happened last time and Mom told [him] already." While Sister was still arguing with Mom, the researcher laughed. Mother said, "Look, Auntie is laughing. This, this is our family business (jiali de shi); [you] shouldn't, shouldn't let others (bieren) know, because ... "This minute-long episode ended when the two kids finally fought with each other on the floor, and had 29 turns at speaking.

In this instance, Didi's mother implied that (1) if the child has amended his/her behavior, his/her past transgression should not be a focus of shame, and (2) the child's shameful behavior or "domestic scandal" should not be publicized to outsiders. Although I was certainly not a stranger to the family, my granted kin status, Auntie, did not necessarily

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194 e ETHOS

make me a family member. Since all events of shame occurred while I was present, either the role of the researcher might shift from "outsider" to "insider" as situation required, or the caregiver (not the sibling) had the privilege to determine when and how to invoke or utilize this "outsider." Moreover, as opposed to the first point made by Didi's mother, compliance did not necessarily bring an end to shaming. There also existed another type of event, in which the caregiver brought up the child's past transgres­ sion or shameful experience as a way to shame him/her (see discussion of "nonprototypical events" below).

In 90 percent of all prototypical events of shame for both Didi and Angu, the child complied with the caregiver's demands. In more than 80 percent of those instances, the shaming still proceeded after the compli­ ance. For instance, in Example 1, although Didi quickly responded (within 10 seconds) by leaving the camcorder alone, his cry after being reprimanded was interpreted as another transgression-an inappropriate response to shaming, and brought about more shaming. Again, within SO seconds, he stopped crying, and his mother pulled him up from the floor and held him in her lap, but shaming along with reasoning continued for another 3.5 minutes. Most prototypical events followed this sequence: Child's Precipitating Transgression ~ Caregiver's Reprimand and Elici­ tation of Shame Feelings ~ [Child's Resistance) ~ Child's Compli­ ance ~ More Care-giver's Shaming and Reasoning.

As mentioned earlier, in fact, shaming could occur out of the blue without any precipitating transgression on the child's side. In such cases, a specific transgression committed by the child in the distant past or a class of the child's habitual breach( es) (e.g., his/her general tendency to disobey) was invoked and shaming thereafter followed. This sort of non­ prototypical events accounted for 20 percent of Didi's shaming events and 28 percent of Angu's. The following is an example of a nonprototypical event.

Example 3: A nonprototypical event of shame

When Angu was two-and-a-half, in the middle of a regular conversa­ tion, her aunt, the primary caregiver who was a retired nurse, suddenly attempted to prompt Angu to recount and enact a past transgression com­ mitted by her, in which the child had scribbled on the wall in the aunt's home at midnight, and then made a phone call to her mother to falsely accuse her aunt of mistreating her. After 17 unsuccessful prompts, Angu finally provided a partial confession, quoting the complaint against her aunt that she made on the phone. However, the aunt persistently at­ tempted to elicit a more detailed account from Angu through 72 more turns, by threatening to abandon her (e.g., turning her body away from the child, pushing the child away from her, and standing up while saying,

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Becoming a Moral Child • 195

"We're leaving. Good-bye"), withdrawing love and privilege from her (e.g., taking her food away, and saying "I don't like you anyway"), making dis­ paraging comments (e.g., "Look, what a rascal (nikan, hao huidan)," "We don't like you anyway"), and teasingly giving her injections and spanking her. The child resisted cooperation, saying occasionally, "I've fainted (wo hundao le)," and the aunt finally gave in by having her recount another less serious past transgression. This whole episode lasted over 5.5 minutes and consisted of 110 turns at speaking.

In each of these two types of events, the participant structure was coded in terms of the number of turns contributed by each person who actively participated in the shaming. A turn was defined as an interaction unit of talk which continues until another speaker begins to talk or until there is a marked pause. These turns could be purely verbal (e.g., utter­ ances and laughter, etc.) or behavioral (e.g., making faces and spanking, etc.), or a combination of both, and had to be produced by each of the participants in their exchanges of interaction during the ongoing event and directly related to the focal child and his/her transgression. Interspersed digressions unrelated to the event of shame would not be counted. The caregiver consistently contributed most of the turns in events of shame across all ages for both Didi (SO percent, or 948 turns) and Angu ( 48 per­ cent, or 824 turns). Although the focal children were the targets of shame, they also actively participated in these events and ranked the second-high­ est for their contribution (27 percent, or 519 turns for Didi, and 35 per­ cent, or 605 turns for Angu). Didi's elder sister was the third-highest contributor (13 percent, or 256 turns) and I, the researcher, always con­ tributed the least (10 percent, or 185 turns for Didi and 17 percent, or 286 turns for Angu).

The child's precipitating transgression, either a perceived threat or a real one, in the prototypical event or the past transgression being invoked in the nonprototypical event was also coded. A transgressive behavior could be coded differently according to the caregiver's different interpre­ tations of the rules. For instance, the child's attempt to open the candy box given by the researcher could be interpreted by the caregiver at one time as a lack of etiquette and politeness (according to Chinese custom, the gift is not supposed to be opened in front of the guest), and at another time as inappropriate eating behavior (because lunch was about ready). Although the specific particulars of the children's transgressions varied ~reatly, basically they fell into three categories and for both Angu and Didi, these categories followed the same order in terms of their frequencies. The most frequently attributed transgressions were related to social-oriented rules (46 percent for Didi, and 64 for Angu), which was due to a concern for maintaining or enhancing social relationships among people. Examples of these breaches involved inappropriate crying and rowdy behavior,

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196 e ETHOS

inappropriate aggressive behavior, inappropriate age and gender behavior, and lack of etiquette or politeness. The next most frequent transgressions involved property-oriented rules (26 percent for Didi and 20 percent for Angu), which included appropriation of other's property without permis­ sion, disorder of own property, and engaging in damaging activity. Trans­ gressions of health-oriented rules ranked third (24 percent for Didi and 12 percent for Angu), in which fostering healthy or hygienic habits was the major concern. Examples included the lack of control of body, unhygienic behavior and habit, and inappropriate eating behavior.

Each episode was also coded by its key, which was defined as the connotation of verbal signals-mocking or serious. As indicated by Hymes (1972:62), "the significance of key is underlined by the fact that, when it is in conflict with the overt content of a speech act, it often overrides the latter." The signaling of key is determined by the linguistic, nonlinguistic, and paralinguistic cues provided by all participants, including the child, embedded in the larger context or situation in the interaction. The judg­ ment was made upon the manner and spirit in which the whole event was carried out and how it was resolved. The following instance, for example, is a playfully keyed event in which Didi's mother shamed him for inappro­ priately crying and making a spectacle of himself at his sister's piano class.

Example 4: A shaming event keyed playfully

When Didi was two-and-a-half, his mother invoked a past event which had occurred when Didi, as an onlooker in his sister's Yamaha music class, cried out loudly as the teacher handed out stickers to all the pupils without giving him one. The caregiver used explicit emotional descriptors and metaphors for shame (e.g., "You made your mom have no face (ni hai ni mama hao mei mianzi)," "I wanted to bury my head in the ground," and "Mommy almost fainted"), and reproduced the scene of Didi's transgres­ sion (repeatedly mimicking his crying and whining, "Why didn't you give me a sticker?" wiping eyes, and angrily moving fists away from body). Nevertheless, the whole episode was filled with smiles, laughter, and dra­ matic gestures and body movements. Didi's mother invited the child to relate his transgression with a delightful tone, "Was that [going to Sister's class] fun? What didn't the teacher give you?" Didi later appropriated, exaggerated, and played with his mother's metaphor, "faint," by pointing to his cheek, indicating that it was he who fainted, and by throwing his head and body back against the sofa. This whole episode lasted about two minutes and consisted of 71 turns at speaking.

The majority of all types of events of shame, prototypical as well as non prototypical, were, in fact, keyed playfully for both Didi and Angu, ( 61 percent and 63 percent, respectively). Only 18 percent for Didi and 23

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Becoming a Moral Child • 197

percent for Angu were keyed in serious tone, and the remaining were neu­ tral or ambiguous.

With regard to the child's responses in the events, as time passed, they seemed able to incorporate a greater variety of roles, from more passive ones, such as confessing or acceding, to more active ones, such as resist­ ing, negotiating, and goading. By age four, they were able to challenge back or join in to shame other people (e.g., an older sibling). The following ex­ ample shows how a child of four could challenge the caregiver for inappro­ priate shaming. 9

Example 5: A child's challenge to an "unbalanced" shaming

When Angu was four, her aunt reproached her for her inappropriate eating behavior by shouting and repeatedly invoking a series of her past misdeeds-knocking off dishes and spilling food. About an hour and a half later, when her aunt became much more relaxed, Angu pointed to her aunt, saying, "Mama [that is how Angu usually addressed her aunt], let me ask you a question. Why when I kicked dishes far away, how come you were unreasonable to me (nijiu bujiangli)? Tell me." The aunt asked how come she did not walk carefully but rushed into a pile of dishes and said to Angu's baby sister (who was drinking milk in the aunt's arms), "Your sister is quarreling. Boy, isn't she mad." Angu explained that it was unin­ tentional, and that she tripped. Aunt further asked the child why she could never eat appropriately without spilling the food. Angu argued that since her aunt was also once small, she should have been more sympathetic. She said, "But why didn't you reason with me nicely (bu gen wo haohao jian­ gli)? It's not that you didn't have Daddy and Mommy. You had Daddy and Mommy before. When you were young, hadn't you spilt?" Her aunt laughed and said that she was well-behaved and never spilt, and suggested Angu check with her mother. Angu went to the phone to ask her grand­ mother instead (the mother of both her aunt and mother), but unfortu­ nately no one answered the phone.

From the child's perspective, her retaliatory act was well grounded: the caregiver had transgressed the balanced shaming rule and shamed her too harshly in front of the researcher. Although the aunt never apologized to the child, she recognized the child's anger and allowed her to talk back and make her point.

All Children

All the codes derived from Didi and Angu were applied to the remain­ ing seven children. A summary of the results appears in Table l. Several points deserve attention:

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198 e ETHOS

• Socialization of shame was well underway by age two-and-a-half. Events of shame, both prototypical and nonprototypical, occurred at all ages in all families (except for Jingjing, whose events only occurred at ages three and four).

• As expected, the events of shame occurred more frequently in Didi's and Angu's families ( 4.8 and 5.2 times per hour, respectively) than in the families of the other nine children. Perhaps due to Didi's and Angu's ad­ vanced verbal abilities, the rate of occurrence of other types of activities in their families also tended to be higher than in the other families. These activities included emergent literacy (Fung, in preparation) and pretend play (Haight et al., in press). However, the caregivers (either father or mother) in the families of Jingjing and Yoyo (who had occurring rates of only 0.3 and 0.6, respectively) were educated abroad. Without system­ atic data, it is difficult to determine to what extent the experience of liv­ ing in a Western country might have influenced the beliefs and practices of the family. 10

• Despite differences in the occurring rate, the remaining patterns were remarkably similar across all children with a few exceptions. Axin and Xiaofen, the two most physically aggressive children, coincidentally had a much lower compliance rate (72 percent and 71 percent, respectively) and percentage of playful key (52 percent) compared to other children. In terms of keying, Jingjing's events were the most playful (80 percent), while the average length of the events in terms of time and turns was the longest. For the initial transgressions in the prototypical and nonproto­ typical events of shame, although the remaining order could differ, so­ cially oriented rules always ranked first across all children at an average of 58 percent, ranging from 43 percent to 80 percent. In the participant structure, the caregiver (ranging from 43 percent to 52 percent, with a mean of 48 percent) and the child (ranging from 25 percent to 35 per­ cent, with a mean of 32 percent) consistently occupied the two top ranks, followed by the researcher and the sibling. 11

• The effects of parental socialization practices across all children were examined. Analyses were performed for each code, making comparisons across gender and age points (that is, ages two-and-a-half, three, three­ and-a-half, and four). No significant results emerged from these analy­ ses, suggesting that gender and developmental trends could not be identified within this age range.

• Mean comparisons of prototypical and nonprototypical events revealed several significant differences. First of all, prototypical events consis­ tently occurred more frequently across all children (t (8) = 4.12, p = 0.003). Second, nonprototypical events were consistently more playful

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Becoming a Moral Child • 199

than prototypical events (t (8) = -5.13, p = 0.001). Third, the re­ searcher significantly contributed more turns in nonprototypical events than prototypical ones, (t (8) = -4.10, p = 0.003). Since nonprototypi­ cal events were in the form of narratives, the researcher, as an interested listener, was often invited to respond or would request clarifications when necessary. However, of the total 79 nonprototypical events (22 percent of the total events of shame), only 2.5 percent were initiated by the researcher, 3.8 percent by siblings, and 3.8 percent by the children themselves. The vast majority of 89.9 percent were initiated by the caregivers. Finally, although not reaching the 0.05 level of statistical sig­ nificance, property-oriented rules showed a tendency to occur more fre­ quently in prototypical events than in nonprototypical events (t (8) = 2.0,p = 0.82).

• In about one-third of the prototypical and nonprototypical events of shame, episodes tended to occur in chains-that is, one episode trig­ gered another. For instance, the child's precipitating transgression (a prototypical event) might remind the caregiver of a similar transgression in the past. The caregiver then invoked that past event to warn the child that the same punishment would be forthcoming if the child did not stop misbehaving (a non prototypical event). The child's response to the caregiver's ongoing reprimand for the transgression, such as hitting the mother or talking back, might be interpreted as another here-and-now transgression (a prototypical event), and more shaming, reprimanding, or reasoning followed. According to the coding criteria, these chained episodes belonged to the same unit of analysis, and some of the codes, such as type of event, type of transgression, and the child's compliance rate, were applied only to the identified initial episode. A more refined sequential analysis of the consecutive episodes within an event is neces­ sary for further studies. Such an analysis would shed more light on the mutually constituent and dialectic nature of these interactions.

CONClUSION

Despite psychological anthropologists' long-standing interest in shame in Chinese culture, studies of the socialization of shame, especially in the early years of life, are virtually nonexistent. This study was under­ taken in order to fill the gap in our understanding of the early socialization of shame in Chinese families and to do so in a way that reflects the local meaning systems of the participants themselves. With such a small num­ ber of subjects, it is important to clarify that this study did not attempt to generalize its results to all Taiwanese children, and certainly not all Chi­ nese children. Nor did it assume a homogeneous and static cultural model

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Table 1 "' Summary of Major Findings In Home Observational Samples. 0 0 • rtl

Didi Angu Axin Jingjing Longlong Meimi Wenwen Xiao fen Yoyo TOTAL ± 0

{Boy} {Girl} {Boy} {Girl} {Boy} {Girl} {Girl} {Girl} {Boy} (/I

Total hours of 16 16 16 16 16 16 12 16 16 140 observation

Total number of 76 83 44 5 43 20 26 46 9 352 events of shame

Rate of events of 4.8 5.2 2.8 0.3 2.7 1.3 2.2 2.9 0.6 2.5 shame (per hour)

Mean length of events 1:16 1:01 1:13 1:38 1:24 1:30 0:55 0:55 1:13 1:10 of shame (min:sec)

Mean length of events 25 21 21 33 18 16 19 19 22 22 of shame (turns)

Proportion of 80% 72% 81% 80% 86% 85% 77% 74% 44% 78% prototypical events

Proportion of child's 90% 90% 72% 100% 92% 94% 80% 71% 100% 86% compliance

Participant caregiver> caregiver> caregiver> caregiver> caregiver> caregiver> caregiver> caregiver> caregiver> 48% structure child> child> child> child> child> child> child> child> child> 32%

sibling> researcher researcher sibling> researcher researcher researcher> researcher> sibling> researcher sibling> sibling> researcher sibling> sibling sibling sibling researcher

Type of social> social> social> social> social> soci'.!b social> social> social> 58% transgression property> property> property> health health> property> health> property> property

health health health property health property health

Proportion of 61% 63% 52% 80% 63% 70% 62% 52% 56% 62% playful key

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Becoming a Moral Child • 201

without taking possible social and historical changes into account, particu­ larly in today's postmodern world. Nevertheless, regardless of individual variations in such a rapidly developing society, caregivers in this study were able and willing to talk about their socializing beliefs and practices, and were quick to locate shame within the moral domain. From their standpoint, the central question of this study, "how does the young 'shameless' Chinese child become a competent and skillful social member who knows shame?" contains an erroneous assumption. They believe that young children already have a rudimentary sense of shame by age two­ and-a-half. This was manipulated as a major means of teaching them moral messages and making them "confess and repent (zhicuo huigai)." It was thought that this would, in turn, foster a more mature sense of shame and eventually prepare the child to enter the adult world.

According to parents' informal ethnotheories, shaming was closely related to the notion of opportunity education-that is, situating the les­ son concretely in the child's immediate experience. The longitudinal ob­ servational data demonstrated how caregiv~rs put opportunity education into practice. The requirements for immediacy, promptness, concrete­ ness, and situatedness may explain why prototypical events occurred much more frequently than nonprototypical ones. When the child trans­ gressed in the here-and-now, the caregiver might not only feel obligated to correct the child on the spot, but also to take advantage of this occurrence by bringing the lesson to its fullest effect by shaming the child. In nonpro­ totypical events of shame, even though they lacked a precipitating trans­ gression, the caregiver invoked a narrative of the child's past transgression by shaming the child. In effect, she created an opportunity where none existed. In addition, the presence of the researcher might also be con­ strued as an opportunity to preach or remind the child with the added weight of another respected person as witness. The current paper adds further support to Miller et al. (1997), which showed how opportunity edu­ cation was put into practice by the same parents through storytelling.

The finding that most shaming events occurred in a playful manner supports the caregiver's claim that shaming was not done for the purpose of harming the child. In many seriously keyed events, the child was often labeled as a "recidivist," rather than a "first offender," for repeatedly vio­ lating either a specific rule or a more general rule of "not listening to words (bu tinghua)." Although caregivers constantly played the role of shamer, they also mitigated and protected the child from too much shaming. For instance, as shown in examples 1 and 2, Didi's sibling was allowed to shame him, but only to a certain extent for justifiable reasons. When his older sister went beyond the limit, the mother immediately intervened and stopped her. In addition, after shaming the child, when the child's status shifted from a ratified interlocutor to an unratified one, the caregiver

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202 e ETHOS

might sympathetically reinterpret the transgression from the child's per­ spective. For instance, in example 4, when Didi walked away from the mother (still in the same room), his mother explained to the researcher, referring to the child in the third person, that his crying was in fact due to his lack of the "feeling of participation (canyugan)" when the teacher passed out stickers to all the "little friends (xiao pengyou)" in the class­ room except him, the only young onlooker. Similarly, several minutes after a co-constructed narrative account of Angu's being publicly reprimanded by her aunt in front of the church people, the aunt retold it to the researcher in the child's presence, referring to her in the third person, explaining that she herself did not perceive Angu's behavior as mischievous and destruc­ tive, and most of the church people were in fact quite fond of Angu.

While most events were playful, nonprototypical events tended to be more playful than prototypical ones. One speculated explanation, again, has to do with the notion of "opportunity education." Since compared to prototypical events, nonprototypical events had lost most of the advan­ tages of opportunity education, the parents might therefore take the op­ portunity less seriously. Also, nonprototypical events might serve a social, if not entertaining, function as one way to relate the child or the family to the researcher by sharing and reenacting the child's past experiences, good or bad. As a consequence, the researcher also participated more in nonprototypical events by responding to this social invitation.

The fact that the children actively participated in both types of events demonstrated that the caregiver never discouraged or excluded them from interaction. From the caregiver's perspective, the purpose was to motivate the children to take responsibility for their own actions and to improve and strive upward. Shaming was hence often accompanied by reasoning, as well as a demand for confession. This echoes the quote cited at the beginning of this article, which is adopted from a Chinese familial instruc­ tion dated about 100 years ago. In other words, children were expected to be amenders rather than avoiders, which may also explain why compli­ ance might not necessarily bring an end to shaming, and why past trans­ gressions were brought up and reenacted.

The findings of this study on the parents' expressed beliefs and their observed caregiving practices resonate strongly with a distinction made by Schneider (1977). According to him, there are two aspects of shame­ "shame as discretion" and "shame as disgrace." Disgrace shame is an af­ fect, an intrapsychic state, "a painful experience of the disintegration of one's world" (Schneider 1977:22). In contrast, discretion shame refers to "a total situation," an order of things, an ethical element, which falls into the moral domain (Schneider 1977:21). Indeed, even though, on the sur­ face, shaming was filled with threats of ostracism and abandonment, what the Chinese parents intended to do was to transmit the cultural values of

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Becoming a Moral Child • 203

discretion shame, therefore protecting the child from disgrace shame, par­ ticularly from being condemned by people outside the family, or by society in general. In other words, parents engaged in shaming for the purpose of teaching children how to be part of society, to include them rather than to set them apart. 12

Although shaming was a routine practice in the families studied, it is important to note that it is only one of many disciplinary measures used. Transgressions did not always lead to shaming, and rules could be taught, intentionally or unintentionally, in the absence of transgression and sham­ ing in various ways, such as rewarding or praising, book reading, story-telling, and setting good examples. Although it may seem that severe discipline began earlier than the existing literature suggests, the socialization of shame, in fact, contributes to recent efforts to appreciate Chinese parent­ ing on its own terms (Chao 1994, 1995; Lieber et al. 1998; Miller et al. 1996, 1997). Chao (1994), for example, has shown that even though Chi­ nese parents (recent immigrants to the United States) scored higher than their American counterparts on standard scales of authoritarian parenting style, applying the Western concept of this approach to Chinese parents can be misleading. The concept of authoritarian parenting style, which is rooted in evangelical and Puritan religious influences, implies a notion of hostility, dominance, aggression, and rejection. In contrast, in Chinese parenting, "training" (guanjiao) takes place in the context of a supportive, involved, and physically close mother-child relationship. As a way to show love and caring, " [caregivers] are responsible for early training by expos­ ing the child to explicit examples of proper behavior and restricting expo­ sure to examples of undesirable behaviors" (Chao 1994:1112). Shaming, done in a balanced way, can be seen as part of these parental responsibilities.

On the other hand, taking the presumptive Western construct of shame out of its sociocultural context and applying it to the Chinese cul­ ture may not be appropriate. Indeed, as maintained by Gaskins et al. (1992:9), "by the very nature of children and contexts as interdependent systems, it is not possible to extract a separate model of the child from the world or culture in which he or she is situated." By meticulous analysis of everyday discursive practices combined with interviews, and situating so­ cialization of emotion into the broader context of every moral training and child-rearing practice, this study was able to discover and generate cate­ gories that take culture-specific meaning into account. Only when the mu­ tually interdependent nature of development and culture is fully appreciated on its own terms can valid cross-cultural comparison be achieved.

HEIDI FUNG is Assistant Research Fellow in the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Nankang, Taipei, Taiwan (e-mail: [email protected]).

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204 e ETHOS

NOTES

Acknowledgments. This study was supported in part by a grant from the Research Grants Council, Hong Kong Government, and by grants from the National Science Council, Taiwan Government. Data for this project were collected under a grant from the Spencer Founda­ tion, awarded to Peggy J. Miller. The author wishes to thank all the families for their partici­ pation in this study, Professor Miller for her patient and inspirational mentoring throughout the work, and the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.

1. For a detailed ethnographic account, please refer to Miller et al. 1996 and Fung 1994. 2. While I was doing the final editing of this article in December 1998, the KMT swept the

island-wide election, including the Taipei mayoral race. 3. This yielded a total corpus of 240 hours of videotaped observational data. 4. In these families, video cameras were not completely unknown. Each family had one

or two VCRs and access to camcorders owned by close relatives. 5. CHAT stands for Codes for the Human Analysis of Transcripts, which is a standard

transcription system for the Child Language Data Exchange System Project developed by Brian MacWhinney. For a detailed description of its conventions, please see his book, The CHILDES Project (MacWhinney 1991).

6. Two Mandarin-speaking coders independently coded one quarter (i.e., eight hours) of Didi's and Angu's tapes for the intercoder reliability check. The percentage agreements of the identification of events of shame was 0.86 and for the rest of the codes ranged from 0.82 to 1.00 (mean= 0.96).

7. These interviews were conducted with one father, six mothers, and two female rela­ tives--one child's aunt and another child's grandmother. They all shared child care duties on a daily basis.

8. This type of negative example sheds further light on the meaning of shame. However, in this study, such examples were not included in the socialization corpus for further analy­ sis.

9. Although this instance was an excellent illustration of the possible acquisition end in the socialization process, it was not included in the data for further analysis in this paper, because the caregivers did not reprimand or shame the child

10. Yoyo's mother reported in the interview that two things in her child-rearing practices were influenced by her experience of living in France for five years: respecting the child's choices and putting the child to bed at eight o'clock every night.

11. If the focal child had a younger sibling, or one several years older, the researcher always contributed more turns than the sibling. However, as in the families of Didi, Jingjing, and Yoyo, where the sibling was only one or two years older, the sibling participated more than the researcher and ranked third.

12. This finding is very similar to those of Schieffelin's work in Western Samoa (1990) and Ochs's (1988) in Kaluli, Papua New Guinea.

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  • Contents
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  • Issue Table of Contents
    • Ethos, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 119-244
      • Front Matter
      • Israeli and Japanese Immigrants to Canada: Home, Belonging, and the Territorialization of Identity [pp. 119-144]
      • Transnational Migration and the Nationalization of Ethnic Identity among Japanese Brazilian Return Migrants [pp. 145-179]
      • Becoming a Moral Child: The Socialization of Shame among Young Chinese Children [pp. 180-209]
      • De-Homogenizing American Individualism: Socializing Hard and Soft Individualism in Manhattan and Queens [pp. 210-234]
      • Encomium for Robert A. LeVine [pp. 235-244]
      • Back Matter