Bay of Pigs Invasion

Bay of Pigs Invasion

from Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States Relations

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Originally name d Ope ration T rinidad, the Bay of Pigs was a faile d ope ration planne d by the Ce ntral

Inte llige nce Age ncy to bring down Fide l Castro's re gime . Amidst growing te nsions be twe e n the Unite d

State s and Cuba ove r the dire ction of the Cuban Re volution, in March 1960, Pre side nt Dwight D.

Eise nhowe r approve d the CIA proposal to train Cuban e xile s in Guate mala for an invasion of Cuba.

According to the CIA plan, the anticipate d e arly military succe sse s of the Cuban e xile brigade would

le ad to popular uprisings that would topple Castro.

Pre side nt-e le ct John F. Ke nne dy le arne d of the CIA plan in late Nove mbe r 1960 during a brie flng from

the age ncy's dire ctor, Alle n Dulle s. In discussions with Ke nne dy on De ce mbe r 6, 1960, and January 11,

1961, outgoing Pre side nt Eise nhowe r e ncourage d the acce le ration of the plan's imple me ntation. Like

Eise nhowe r, Ke nne dy came to office de te rmine d that Castro had to be re move d from powe r and that

whate ve r the plan to accomplish that obje ctive , the Unite d State s should be distance d from it.

Afte r taking office on January 28, 1961, Ke nne dy dire cte d the Pe ntagon to asse ss the planne d invasion

and the State De partme nt to asse ss the political conse que nce s of the propose d ope ration. On March

19, the joint chie fs of staff's (JCS) e valuation of the plan, which include d an on-site visit to the Cuban

e xile s' training base in Guate mala, was submitte d to the State De partme nt. T he JCS conclude d that the

plan could be carrie d out with the re quire d se cre cy but that its ultimate succe ss de pe nde d upon the

anticipate d inte rnal uprising in Cuba. T he State De partme nt was le ss e nthusiastic, conce rne d ove r the

possible political fallout in Latin Ame rica and at the Unite d Nations. T he State De partme nt pre fe rre d the

diplomatic isolation of Cuba. Pre side ntial advisor Arthur Schle singe r Jr. cautione d that the Cuban e xile s

could not re main in Guate mala inde finite ly and that the U.S. might be rushe d into a course of action

be cause the CIA had no othe r plans for the Cuban brigade e xce pt to bring the m back to the Unite d

State s, whe re the ir pre se nce would be a political e mbarrassme nt. Finally, dome stic conside rations

Influe nce d Ke nne dy's de cision. At home , he face d charge s of be ing "soft on communism." At a National

Se curity Council me e ting on March 11, 1961, Ke nne dy dire cte d the CIA to de vise a plan to transport the

Cuban brigade to Cuba and for the State De partme nt to pre pare a white pape r on Cuba and a

pre se ntation to the Organization of Ame rican State s (OAS).

With appare nt he sitancy, the Ke nne dy administration move d toward the imple me ntation of the invasion

plan. While the CIA proce e de d with the se le ction of possible landing site s in Cuba, othe r civilian

advisors cautione d the pre side nt in White House me e tings on April 4 and 11, 1961. In addition to

Schle singe r, Che ste r Bowle s and J. William Fulbright fore warne d of the adve rse impact that such an

invasion would have upon U.S. re lations with Latin Ame rica, that such an invasion contrave ne d the OAS

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charte r, and that the y doubte d if the U.S. role in the affair could be ke pt se cre t.

Ke nne dy approve d the ope ration on the assumption that U.S. support would re main cove rt. He made it

cle ar that U.S. troops would not be committe d if the invasion ran into trouble . T he brigade de parte d

Pue rto Cabe zas, Nicaragua, on April 12 and lande d on April 17 at Playa de Giron (Bay of Pigs). T he

invasion quickly be came a comple te de bacle . Within two days, and without additional supplie s or air

cove r, Castro's army capture d 1,200 me n. Anothe r 114 e xile s die d in battle . T he anticipate d inte rnal

uprising ne ve r occurre d.

At the time , se ve ral re asons we re give n for the invasion's failure . Castro had long anticipate d some kind

of attack. U.S. ne ws me dia and Castro's age nts, who pe ne trate d the Cuban-e xile community in Miami,

re porte d on the e xile training in Guate mala. In the days just prior to the invasion, Castro dire cte d the

rounding up and de te ntion of all known oppone nts in Cuba. On the military side , a dive rsionary landing,

sche dule d for April 14 and 15 to distract from the main invasion, was aborte d. Also, Ke nne dy de laye d a

se cond bomb run ove r Cuba to e liminate Castro's air force . Whe n that attack finally came on April 18,

Cuba's shore batte rie s shot down the thre e B26 aircraft se nt on the mission. T he batte rie s also

de stroye d two supply ships waiting offshore .

Subse que ntly, the re sults of two se cre t asse ssme nts of the Bay of Pigs invasion be came public. T he se

mate rials are available at the private ly funde d National Se curity Archive locate d at the Ge llman Library

of Ge orge Washington Unive rsity in Washington, D.C. T he first is a sanitize d copy of the CIAs Inspe ctor

Ge ne ral's 1961 inve stigation into the ope ration's failure . It provide s a de taile d asse ssme nt of the plan's

ope ration and imple me ntation but place s re sponsibility for its failure upon the "Unite d State s

Gove rnme nt," me aning the Ke nne dy administration, for thre e re asons:

1. an ove rall lack of re cognition on the part of the U.S. gove rnme nt as to the magnitude of the

ope ration re quire d to ove rthrow the Fide l Castro re gime ;

2. the failure on the part of the U.S. gove rnme nt to plan for all continge ncie s at the time of the

Cuban ope ration including the ne ce ssity for using re gular U.S. military force s in the e ve nt that the

e xile d Cubans could not do the job the mse lve s; and

3. the failure on the part of the U.S. gove rnme nt to be willing to commit to the Cuban ope ration, as

planne d and e xe cute d, those ne ce ssary re source s re quire d for its succe ss.

T he se cond, ide ntifie d as the T aylor Commission Re port, re sulte d from an ad hoc group appointe d by

Ke nne dy on April 22, 1961. T he commission was name d afte r its he ad, Ge ne ral Maxwe ll T aylor, and it

include d Attorne y Ge ne ral Robe rt F. Ke nne dy, CIA Dire ctor Alle n Dulle s, and Chie f of Naval Ope rations

Arle igh Burke . From April 22 until May 25, the T aylor Commission he ld twe nty me e tings and inte rvie we d

more than fifty witne sse s. A sanitize d ve rsion, re le ase d in 1977, re fle cte d the positions he ld by those

inte rvie we d. T hose close st to the pre side nt e xone rate d Ke nne dy, pointing to the inaccuracy of the

information supplie d by the CIA and the approval give n to the plan by the JCS. Witne sse s for the CIA

focuse d upon the justification for the invasion rathe r than its ope rational de tails. T he comple te re port

was re le ase d in 2000. Its most significant ne w disclosure re ve ale d that on April 9, 1961, the CIA le arne d

that the Sovie t Union kne w the e xact de tails of the plan, including time and place , and pre sumably

passe d this information on to Castro.

In the afte rmath of the faile d attack, Castro stre ngthe ne d his hand in Cuba. Picture s of him dire cting

military activitie s at the Bay of Pigs e nhance d his popularity and e nable d him to consolidate his political

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base . Both at home and abroad, Ke nne dy and the Unite d State s suffe re d se ve re criticism for

imple me nting the plan, but it did not dissuade Ke nne dy from continuing to se e k Castro's ouste r. In

De ce mbe r 1962, the 1,197 brigade prisone rs we re re le ase d from Cuba in e xchange for $35 million in

U.S. food, me dicine , and supplie s. Se e also Ke nne dy, John F.; Trac t ors f or Fre e dom Commit t e e

© 2010 [2004] McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers

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APA Bay of pigs invasion. (2010). In T . M. Le onard, Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States relations. Je ffe rson,

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Chicago "Bay of Pigs Invasion." In Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States Relations, by T homas M. Le onard.

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Harvard Bay of pigs invasion. (2010). In T .M. Le onard, Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States relations. [Online ].

Je ffe rson: McFarland. Available from: http://e zproxy.apus.e du/login?

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institutionId=8703 [Acce sse d 31 January 2018].

MLA "Bay of Pigs Invasion." Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States Relations, T homas M. Le onard, McFarland, 1st

e dition, 2010. Credo Reference, http://e zproxy.apus.e du/login?

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institutionId=8703. Acce sse d 31 Jan 2018.

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