EXAM # 1

TheGulfWar did not

take place

Jean paudrillard

Translated and with an introduction by

Paul Patton

DS 7g. 7;) .f33~J3 )195

5AO INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS BLOOMINGTON & INDIANAPousiNDIANA UNIVERSITY

SOUTH B~ND SCHURZ LIBRARY

The Gulf War will not tal(e place

From the beginning, we knew that this war would never hap-

pen. After the hot war (the violence of conflict), after the cold

war (the balance of terror), here comes the dead war- the

unfrozen cold war - which leaves us to grapple with the

corpse of war and the necessity of dealing with this decompos-

ing corpse which nobody from the Gulf has managed to revive.

,t\merica, Saddam Hussein and the Gulf powers are fighting

.over the corpse of war.

War has entered into a definitive crisis. It is too late for the

, Jhot) WW III: this has already taken place, distilled down the

:;,: years into the Cold War. There will be no other. It might have

supposed that the defection of the Eastern Bloc would

"have opened up new spaces of freedom for war by unlocking

deterrence. Nothing of the sort, since deterrence has not come

to an end, on the contrary. In the past it functioned as recipro-

deterrence between the two blocs on the basis of a virtual

of the means of destruction. Today it functions all the

24 The Gulf War

more effectively as self-deterrence, total self-deterrence up to

and including the self-dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, the pro-

found self-deterrence of American power and of Western power

in general. paralysed by its own strength and incapable of

assuming it in the form of relations afforce.

This is why the Gulf War will not take place. It is neither

reassuring nor comforting that it has become bogged in inter-

minable suspense. In this sense, the gravity of the non-event in

the Gulf is even greater than the event of war: it corresponds to

the highly toxic period which affects a rotting corpse and which

can cause nausea and powerless stupor. Here again, our sym-

bolic defences are weak: the mastery of the end of war escapes

us and we live all this in a uniform shameful indifference, just

like the hostages. Non-war is characterised by that degenerate form of war

which includes hostage manipulation and negotiation.

Hostages and blackmail are the purest products of deterrence.

The hostage has taken the place of the warrior. He has become

the principal actor, the simulacra! protagonist, or rather, in his

pure inaction, the protagoniser of non-war. The warriors bury

themselves in the desert leaving only hostages to occupy the

stage, including all of us as information hostages on the world

media stage. The hostage is the phantom actor, the extra who

occupies the powerless stage of war. Today, it is the hostage at

the strategic site, tomorrow the hostage as Christmas present,

as exchange value and liquidity. Fantastic degradation of that

which was the very figure of impossible exchange. With

Saddam Hussein, even that strong value has weakened and

become the symbol of weak war. Saddam has made himself the

'}.

will not take place 25

capitalist of hostage value; after the market in slaves and prole-

tarians. the vulgar merchant of the hostage market. Taking the

place of the warrior's challenge, hostage value has become syn-

onymous with the debility of war. We are all hostages of media

intoxication, induced to believe in the war just as we were once

led to believe in the revolution in Romania, and confined to the

simulacrum of war as though confined to quarters. We are

already all strategic hostages in situ; our site is the screen on

which we are virtually bombarded day by day, even while serv-

ing as exchange value. In this sense, the grotesque vaudeville

played by Saddam Hussein is a diversion, at once a diversion of

both war and international terrorism. His soft terrorism will at

least have put an end to the hard terrorism of Palestinians and

others, thereby showing him to be in this as in many other

respects the perfect accomplice of the West.

This impossibility of proceeding to the act, this absence of

strategy, implies the triumph of blackmail as strategy (in the

case of Iran, there was still a challenge; with Saddam there is

only blackmail). Saddam Hussein's abjection lies in his having

vulgarised everything: religious challenge has become fake

holy war, the sacrificial hostage a commercial hostage, the vio-

lent refusal of the West a nationalistic scam and war an impos-

sible comedy. But we have helped him to do this. By allowing

him to believe that he had won the war against Iran, we drove

him towards the mirage of a victory against the West- this

mercenary's revolt is indeed the only ironic and pleasing trait

of this whole.story.

26 The Gulf War

We are in neither a logic of war nor a logic of peace but in a

logic of deterrence which has wound its way inexorably

through forty years of cold war to a denouement in our cur-

rent events; a logic of weak events, to which belong those in

Eastern Europe as well as the Gulf War. Peripeteias of an

anorexic history or an anorexic war which can no longer

devour the enemy because it is incapable of conceiving the

enemy as worthy of being challenged or annihilated - and

God knows Saddam Hussein is worthy of neither challenge nor

annihilation - and thus devours itself. It is the de-intensified

state of war, that of the right to war under the green light of

the UN and with an abundance of precautions and conces-

sions. It is the bellicose equivalent of safe sex: make war like

love with a condom! On the Richter scale, the Gulf War would

not even reach two or three. The build-up is unreal, as though

the fiction of an earthquake were created by manipulating the

measuring instruments. It is neither the strong form nor the

degree zero of war, but the weak or phthisical degree, the asymp-

totic form which allows a brush with war but no encounter, the

transparent degree which allows war to be seen from the depths

of the darkroom.

We should have been suspicious about the disappearance

of the declaration of war, the disappearance of the symbolic

passage to the act, which already presaged the disappearance

of the end of hostilities, then of the distinction between win-

ners and losers (the winner readily becomes the hostage of the

loser: the Stockholm syndrome), then of operations them-

selves. Since it never began, this war is therefore interminable.

By dint of dreaming of pure war, of an orbital war purged of all

will not take place 27

local and political peripeteias, we have fallen into soft war,

intO the virtual impossibility of war which translates into the

paltry fantasia where adversaries compete in de-escalation, as

though the irruption or the event of war had become obscene

and insupportable, no longer sustainable, like every real event

moreover. Everything is therefore transposed into the virtual,

and we are confronted with a virtual apocalypse, a hegemony

ultimately much more dangerous than real apocalypse.

The most widespread belief is in a logical progression from

virtual to actual, according to which no available weapon will

not one day be used and such a concentration of force cannot

but lead to conflict. However, this is an Aristotelian logic

which is no longer our own. Our virtual has definitively over-

taken the actual and we must be content with this extreme

virtuality which, unlike the Aristotelian, deters any passage to

action. We are no longer in a logic of the passage from virtual

· , to actual but in a hyperrealist logic of the deterrence of the real

by the virtual.

In this process, the hostages are once again revealing.

Extracted like molecules in an experimental process, then dis-

tilled one by one in the exchange, it is their virtual death that is

at issue, not their real death. Moreover, they never die: at best

they disappear. There will never be a monument to the

unknown hostage, everyone is too ashamed of him: the collec-

tive shame which attaches to the hostage reflects the absolute

degradation of real hostility (war) into virtual hospitality

· (Saddam Hussein's "guests").

The passage to action suffers widespread infamy: it suppos-

edly corresponds to a brutal lifting of repression, thus to a psy-

28 The Gulf War

chotic process. It seems that this obsession with the passage to

action today governs all our behaviour: obsession with every

real, with every real event, with every real violence, with every

pleasure which is too real. Against this obsession with the real

we have created a gigantic apparatus of simulation which

allows us to pass to the act "in vitro" (this is true even of pro-

creation). We prefer the exile of the virtual, of which television

is the universal mirror, to the catastrophe of the real.

War has not escaped this virtualisation which is like a sur-

gical operation, the aim of which is to present a face-lifted war,

the cosmetically treated spectre of its death, and its even more

deceptive televisual subterfuge (as we saw at Timisoara). Even

the military has lost the privilege of use value, the privilege of

real war. Deterrence has passed by that way and it spares no-

one. No more than the politicians, the military personnel do

not know what to make of their real function, their function of

death and destruction. They are pledged to the decoy of war as

the others are to the decoy of power.

PS To demonstrate the impossibility of war just at the moment

when it must take place, when the signs of its occurrence are

accumulating, is a stupid gamble. But it would have been even

more stupid not to seize the opportunity.

The Gulf War: is it really tal<:ing place?

We may well ask. On the available evidence (absence of images

and profusion of commentary), we could suppose an immense

promotional exercise like that one which once advertised a

brand-name (GARAP) whose product never became known.

Pure promotion which enjoyed an immense success because it

belonged to pure speculation.

The war is also pure and speculative, to the extent that we

do not see the real event that it could be or that it would signify.

It reminds us of that recent suspense advertisement: today I

take off the top, tomorrow I take off the bottom; today I unleash

virtual war, tomorrow I unleash real war. In the background, a

third advertisement in which an avaricious and lubricious

banker says: your money appeals to me. This sadly celebrated

advertisement is reincarnated by Saddam Hussein saying to the

West: your power appeals to me (as they rushed to palm off a

good share of it to him); then to the Arabs, with the same

hypocrisy: your religious war appeals to me (as they rushed to

30 The Gulf War:

put all their money on him).

In this manner, the war makes its way by promotion and

speculation, including the use of hostages transformed into

marketing ploys, and in the absence of any clarification of

plans, balance sheets, losses or operations. No enterprise would

survive such uncertainty, except precisely speculative risk

management, otherwise known as the strategy of turning a

profit from the worst, in other words, war ( = Highly Profitable Senseless Project or HPSP). War itself has taken this specula-

tive turn: it is highly profitable but uncertain. It can collapse

from one day to the next.

Nevertheless, from this point onwards the promotional

advantages are fabulous. Defeated or not, Saddam is assured

of an unforgettable and charismatic label. Victorious or not,

American armaments will have acquired an unequalled tech-

nological label. And the sumptuary expenditure in material is

already equivalent to that of a real war, even if it has not

taken place.

We have still not left the virtual war, in other words a

sophisticated although often laughable build-up against the

backdrop of a global indeterminacy of will to make war, even in

Saddam' s case. Hence the absence of images - which is nei-

ther accidental nor due to censorship but to the impossibility of

illustrating this indeterminacy of the war.

Promotional, speculative, virtual: this war no longer corre-

sponds to Clausewitz's formula of politics pursued by other

means, it rather amounts to the absence of politics pursued by

other means. Non-war is a terrible test of the status and the

uncertainty of politics, just as a stock market crash (the specu-

is it really taking place? 31

lative universe) is a crucial test of the economy and of the

uncertainty of economic aims, just as any event whatever is a

terrible test of the uncertainty and the aims of information.

· Thus "real time" information loses itself in a completely unreal

space, finally furnishing the images of pure, useless, instanta-

neous television where its primordial function irrupts, namely

that of filling a vacuum, blocking up the screen hole through

which escapes the substance of events.

Nor is promotion the pursuit of the economy by other

means. On the contrary, it is the pure product of uncertainty

with regard to the rational aims of production. This is why it

has become a relentless function, the emptiness of which fills

our screens to the extent of the absence of any economic finali-

ty or rationality. This is why it competes victoriously with the

war on our screens, both alternating in the same virtual credit

of the image.

The media promote the war, the war promotes the media,

and advertising competes with the war. Promotion is the most

thick-skinned para~ite in our culture. It would undoubtedly - - . survive a nuclear conflict. ft is our Last Judgement. But it is

. a~g like a biological function: it devours our substance, but it

allows us to metabolise what we absorb, like a parasitic

Pla~t or intestinal flora, it allows us to turn the world and the .~·--·

vtolence of the world into a consumable substance .. So •. war or

The war, along with the fake and presumptive warriors,

enough, am I operational enough, am I spectacular

32 The Gulf War:

enough, am I sophisticated enough to make an entry onto the

historical stage? Of course, this anxious interrogation increases

the uncertainty with respect to its possible irruption. And this

uncertainty invades our screens like a real oil slick, in the

image of that blind sea bird stranded on a beach in the Gulf,

which will remain the symbol-image of what we all are in front

of our screens, in front of that sticky and unintelligible event.

Unlike earlier wars, in which there were political aims either of

conquest or domination, what is at stake in this one is war

itself: its status, its meaning, its future. It is beholden not to

have an objective but to prove its very existence (this crisis of

identity affects the existence of us all). In effect, it has lost much

of its credibility. Who, apart from the Arab masses, is still capa-

ble of believing in it and becoming inflamed by it? Never~~~~~-~~·

the spectacular drive of war remains intact. In the abs~nce of the(g~~~tl;-di~inished) will. to. power, and the (probl~matic) will to knowledge, there remains today the widespread will to spectacle, and with it the obstinate desire to preserve its spectre

or fiction (this is the fate of religions: they are no longer

believed, but the disincarnate practice remains). Can wa~_stli_l

bes&ved?

Certainly, Iran and Iraq did as much as they could to save the

fiction of murderous, fratricidal, sacrificial and interminable

(1914 style) war. But they were savages and that war from

another period proved nothing with regard to the status and

is it really taking place? 33

the possibility of a modern war. WW III did not take place and

yet we are already beyond it, as though in the utopian space of

a post-war-which-did-not-take-place, and it is in the suspense

created by this non-place that the present confrontations

unfold and the question is posed: can a war still take place?

This one is perhaps only a test, a desperate attempt to see

whether war is still possible.

Empty war: it brings to mind those games in World Cup football

which often had to be decided by penalties (sorry spectacle),

because of the impossibility of forcing a decision. As though the

players punished themselves by means of "penalties" for not

having been able to play and take the match in full battle. We

might as well have begun with the penalties and dispensed

with the game and its sterile stand-off. So with the war: it could

have begun at the end and spared us the forced spectacle of this

unreal war where nothing is extreme and which, whatever the

outcome, will leave behind the smell of undigested program-

ming, and the entire world irritated as though after an unsuc-

cessful copulation.

It is a war of excesses (of means, of material. etc.), a war of

shedding or purging stocks, of experimental deployment, of liq-

uidation and firesale, along with the display of future ranges of

weaponry. A war between excessive, superabundant and over-

equipped societies (Iraq included), committed both to waste

(including human waste) and the necessity of getting rid of it.

34 The Gulf War:

Just as the waste of time nourishes the hell ofleisure, so techno-

logical wastes nourish the hell of war. Wastes which incarnate

the secret violence of this society, uncoerced and non-degrad-

able defecation. The renowned American stocks of WW II sur-

plus, which appeared to us as luxury, have become a suffocat-

ing global burden, and war functions well within its possibili-

ties in this role of purgative and expenditure.

If the critical intellectual is in the process of disappearing, it

seems by contrast that his phobia of the real and of action has

been distilled throughout the sanguineous and cerebral net-

work of our institutions. In this sense, the entire world includ-

ing the military is caught up in a process ofintellectualisation.

See them become confused in explanations, outdo them-

selves in justifications and lose themselves in technical details

(war drifts slowly into technological mannerism) or in the

deontology of a pure electronic war without hitches: these are

aesthetes speaking, postponing settlement dates into the

interminable and decisions into the undecidable. Their war-

processors, their radars, their lasers and their screens render

the passage to war as futile and impossible as the use of a

word-processor renders futile and impossible the passage to

the act of writing, because it removes from it in advance any

dramatic uncertainty.

The generals also exhaust their artificial intelligence in cor-

recting their scenario, polishing their war script so much that

they sometimes make errors of manipulation and lose the plot.

The famous philosophical epoche has become universal, on the

is it really taking place? 35

screens as much as on the field of battle.

Should we applaud the fact that all these techniques of war-

processing culminate in the elision of the duration and the vio-

lence of war? Only eventually, for the indefinite delay of the

war is itself heavy with deadly consequences in all domains.

By virtue of having been anticipated in all its details and

exhausted by all the scenarios, this war ends up resembling the

hero of Italien des Roses (Richard Bohringer in the film by

Charles Matton), who hesitates to dive from the top of a build-

ing for an hour and a half, before a crowd at first hanging on

his movements, then disappointed and overcome by the sus-

pense, exactly as we are today by the media blackmail and the

illusion of war. It is as though it had taken place ten times

already: why would we want it to take place again? It is the

same in Italien des Roses : we know that his imaginary credit is

exhausted and that he will not jump, and in the end nobody

gives a damn whether he jumps or not because the real event is

already left behind.

This is the problem with anticipation. Is there still a chance

that something which has been meticulously programmed will

occur? Does a truth which has been meticulously demonstrated

still have a chance of being true? When too many things point

in the same direction, when the objective reasons pile up, the

effect is reversed. Thus everything which points to war is

ambiguous: the build-up of force, the play of tension, the con-

centration of weapons, even the green light from the UN. Far

from reinforcing the probability of the conflict, these function

36 The Gulf War:

as a preventative accumulation, as a substitution for and diver-

sion from the transition to war.

Virtual for five months, the war will shortly enter its terminal

phase, according to the rule which says that what never began

ends without having taken place. The profound indeterminacy

of this war stems from the fact of its being both terminated in

advance and interminable. The virtual succeeds itself - acci-

dents aside, which could only be the irruption of the other in

the field. But no-one wants to hear talk of the other. Ultimately,

the undecidability of the war is grounded in the disappearance

of alterity, of primitive hostility, and of the enemy. War has

become a celibate machine.

Thanks to this war, the extraordinary confusion in the Arab

world is in the process of infecting the West- just revenge. In

return, we try desperately to unify and stabilise them in order

to exercise better control. It is an historic arm-wrestle: who will

stabilise the other before being destabilised themselves?

Confronted by the virulent and ungraspable instability of the

Arabs and of Islam, whose defence is that of the hysteric in all

his versatility, the West is in the process of demonstrating that

its values can no longer lay claim to any universality than that

(extremely fragile) of the UN.

Faced with the Western logic of under-compensation (the

West tends towards the euphemisation and even the inhibition

of its power), the Oriental logic of Saddam responds with over-

is it really taking place? 37

compensation. Although far from having proved himself

against Iran, he attacks the West. He operates beyond the

reach of his own forces, there where only God can help him. He

undertakes an act of magical provocation and it is left to God,

or some other predestined connection, to do the rest (this was

in principle the role allotted to the Arab masses).

By contrast, through a kind of egocentric generosity or stu-

pidity, the Americans can only imagine and combat an enemy

in their own image. They are at once both missionaries and

converts of their own way of life, which they triumphally pro-

ject onto the world. They cannot imagine the Other, nor there-

fore personally make war upon it. What they make war upon is

the alterity of the other, and what they want is to reduce that

alterity, to convert it or failing that to annihilate it if it proves

irreducible (the Indians). They cannot imagine that conversion

and repentance, borne by their own good will, should have no

echo in the other, and they are literally disturbed when they

see Saddam playing with them and refusing to accede to their

reasons. This is perhaps why they have decided to annihilate

him, not out of hatred or calculation, but for the crime of

felony, treachery, malevolent will and trickery (exactly as with

the Indians).

For their part, the Israelis have no such tenderness. They

see the Other in all its bare adversity without illusions or scru-

ples. The Other, the Arab, is unconvertible, his alterity is with-

out appeal; it must not be changed, it must be beaten down and

subjugated. In doing so, however, while they may not under-

stand they at least recognise it. The Americans, for their part,

understand nothing and do not even recognise this fact.

38 The Gulf War:

It is not an important match which is being played out in the

Gulf, between Western hegemony and the challenge from the

rest of the world. It is the West in conflict with itself, by means

of an interposed mercenary, after having been in conflict with

Islam (Iran), also by means of an interposed Saddam. Saddam

remains the fake enemy. At first the champion of the West

against Islam, then the champion oflslam against the West. In

both cases he is a traitor to his own cause since, even more

than the few thousand incidental Westerners, it is the Arab

masses that he holds hostage, captures for his own profit and

immobilises in their suicidal enthusiasm. It is moreover

towards Christmas, at the very moment when he frees the

hostages (thereby skilfully stroking the Westerners with the

same demagogy that he strokes the children in front of the TV),

that he launches his call to the Arab people on the holy war.

It is thus a mistake to think that he would contribute to the

unification of the Arab world and to honour him for that. In

fact, he only did it to hoodwink them, to make them work for

him, to deceive them once again and to render them powerless.

People like him are necessary from time to time in order to

channel irruptive forces. They serve as a poultice or an artifical

purgative. It is a form of deterrence, certainly a Western strate-

gy, but one of which Saddam, in his pride and his stupidity, is a

perfect executant. He who loves decoys so much is himself no

more than a decoy and his elimination can only demystify this

war by putting an end to that objective complicity which itself

is no decoy.

But, for this very reason, is the West determined to elimi-

nate him?

is it really taking place? 39

The exhibition of American prisoners on Iraqi TV. Once more

the politics of blackmail, of hostages, the humiliation of the

USA by the spectacle of those "repentants" forced to avow sym-

bolically American dishonour. Our own as well, we whom the

screens submit to the same violence, that of the battered,

manipulated and powerless prisoner, that of forced voyeurism

in response to the forced exhibitionism of the images. Along

with the spectacle of these prisoners or these hostages, the

screens offer us the spectacle of our powerlessness. In a case

such as this, information exactly fulfills its role which is to con-

vince us of our own abjection by the obscenity of what is seen.

The forced perversion of the look amounts to the avowal of our

own dishonour, and makes repentants of us as well.

That the Americans should have allowed themselves to be

ridiculed without departing from their own program and war

indicates a weakness in their symbolic detonator. Humiliation

remains the worst kind oftest, arrogance (Saddam's) the worst

kind of conduct, blackmail the worst kind of relationship and

the acceptance of blackmail the worst kind of dishonour. The

fact that this symbolic violence, worse than any sexual vio-

lence, should finally have been withstood without flinching

testifies to the depth or the unconscious character of Western

masochism. This is the rule of the American way of life:

nothing personal! And they make war in the same manner:

pragmatically and not symbolically. They thereby expose

themselves to deadly situations which they are unable to con-

front. But perhaps they accept this in expiation of their power,

in an equivalence which is after all symbolic?

40 The Gulf War:

Two intense images, two or perhaps three scenes which all con-

cern disfigured forms or costumes which correspond to the

masquerade of this war: the CNN journalists with their gas

masks in the Jerusalem studios; the drugged and beaten prison-

ers repenting on the screen of Iraqi TV; and perhaps that sea-

bird covered in oil and pointing its blind eyes towards the Gulf

sky. It is a masquerade of information: branded faces delivered

over to the prostitution of the image, the image of an unintelli-

gible distress. No images of the field of battle, but images of

masks, of blind or defeated faces, images of falsification. It is not

war taking place over there but the disfiguration of the world.

There is a profound scorn in the kind of "clean" war which ren-

ders the other powerless without destroying its flesh, which

makes it a point of honour to disarm and neutralise but not to

kill. In a sense, it is worse than the other kind of war because it

spares life. It is like humiliation: by taking less than life it is

worse than taking life. There is undoubtedly a political error

here, in so far as it is acceptable to be defeated but not to be put

out of action. In this manner, the Americans inflict a particular

insult by not making war on the other but simply eliminating

him, the same as one would by not bargaining over the price of

an object and thereby refusing any personal relationship with

the vendor. The one whose price you accept without discussion

despises you. The one whom you disarm without seeing is

insulted and must be avenged. There is perhaps something of

this in the presentation of those humiliated captives on televi-

sion. It is in a sense to say to America: you who do not wish to

is it really taking place? 41

see us, we will show you what you are like.

Just as the psychical or the screen of the psyche transforms

every illness into a symptom (there is no organic illness which

does not find its meaning elsewhere, in an interpretation of the

ailment on another level: all the symptoms pass through a sort

of black box in which the psychic images are jumbled and

inverted, the illness becomes reversible, ungraspable, escaping

any form of realistic medicine), so war, when it has been turned

into information, ceases to be a realistic war and becomes a vir-

tual war, in some way symptomatic. And just as everything

psychical becomes the object of interminable speculation, so

everything which is turned into information becomes the

object of endless speculation, the site of total uncertainty. We

are left with the symptomatic reading on our screens of the

effects of the war, or the effects of discourse about the war, or

completely speculative strategic evaluations which are analo-

gous to those evaluations of opinion provided by polls. In this

manner, we have gone in a week from 20% to 50% and then to

30% destruction of Iraqi military potential. The figure fluctu-

ates exactly like the fortunes of the stock market. "The land

offensive is anticipated today, tomorrow, in a few hours, in any

case sometime this week ... the climatic conditions are ideal for

a confrontation, etc." Whom to believe? There is nothing to

believe. We must learn to read symptoms as symptoms, and

television as the hysterical symptom of a war which has noth-

ing to do with its critical mass. Moreover, it does not seem to

have to reach its critical mass but remains in its inertial phase,

42 The Gulf War:

while the implosion of the apparatus of information along with

the accompanying tendency of the rate of information to fall

seems to reinforce the implosion of war itself, with its accompa-

nying tendency of the rate of confrontation to fall.

Information is like an unintelligent missile which never finds its

target (nor, unfortunately, its anti-missile!), and therefore

crashes anywhere or gets lost in space on an unpredictable

orbit in which it eternally revolves as junk.

Information is only ever an erratic missile with a fuzzy desti-

nation which seeks its target but is drawn to every decoy- it is

itself a decoy, in fact it scatters all over the environs and the

result is mostly nil. The utopia of a targetted promotion or tar-

getted information is the same as that of the targetted missile: it

knows not where it lands and perhaps its mission is not to land

but, like the missile, essentially to have been launched (as its

name indicates). In fact, the only impressive images of missiles,

rockets or satellites are those of the launch. It is the same with

promotions or five year plans: the campaign launch is what

counts, the impact or the end results are so uncertain that one

frequently hears no more about them. The entire effect is in the

programming, the success is that of the virtual model. Consider

the Scuds: their strategic effectiveness is nil and their only (psy-

chological) effect lies in the fact that Saddam succeeded in

launching them.

The fact that the production of decoys has become an

important br_al1chofthe war industry, just qS the producti()!!_()!:_

placebos has become an important branch of the med_~t:~l

is it really taking place? 43

industry and forgery a flourishing branch of the art industry - ""---·~--···-··-·- .. ---~-·--·-

not to mention the fact that information has become a privi-

leged br?nc;hofJndustry as such- all of this is a sign that .we ----·-- . ··-" .. have ~!lteredadeceptive world in which an tmt~r~c.:ult1:1re

------~-~~~

labours assiduously at its counterfeit. This also mea11.s.tbat it no

~g~~-h~rbours any illusion about itself.

It all began with the leitmotif of precision, of surgical, mathe-

matical and punctual efficacy, which is another way of not

recognising the enemy as such, just as lobotomy is a way of not

recognising madness as such. And then all that technical virtu-

osity finished up in the most ridiculous uncertainty. The isola-

tion of the enemy by all kinds of electronic interference creates

a sort of barricade behind which he becomes invisible. He also

becomes "stealthy," and his capacity for resistance becomes

indeterminable. In annihilating him at a distance and as it

were by transparency, it becomes impossible to discern

whether or not he is dead.

The idea of a clean war, like that of a clean bomb or an intelli-

gent missile, this whole war conceived as a technological

extrapolation of the brain is a sure sign of madness. It is like

those characters in Hieronymus Bosch with a glass bell or a

soap bubble around their head as a sign of their mental debility.

A war enclosed in a glass coffin, like Snow White, purged of

any carnal contamination or warrior's passion. A clean war

which ends up in an oil slick.

44 The Gulf War:

The French supplied the planes and the nuclear power stations,

the Russians the tanks, the English the underground bunkers

and runways, the Germans the gas, the Dutch the gas masks,

while the Italians supplied the decoy equivalents of everything

- tanks, bunkers, inflatable bombers, missiles with artificial

thermal emissions, etc. Before so many marvels, one is drawn

to compete in diabolical imagination: why not false gas masks

for the Palestinians? Why not put the hostages at decoy strate-

gic sites, a fake chemical factory for example?

Has a French plane been downed? The question becomes burn-

ing, it is our honour which is at stake. That would constitute a

proof of our involvement, and the Iraqis appear to take a mali-

cious pleasure in denying it (perhaps they have a more accu-

rate idea of our involvement?). Whatever the situation, it will

be necessary here too to set up decoys, simulated losses and

trompe l'oeil victims (as with the fake destruction of civic build-

ings in Timisoara or Baghdad).

A war of high technological concentration but poor definition.

Perhaps it has gone beyond its critical mass by too strong a

concentration?

Fine illustration of the communication schema in which

emitter and receiver on opposite sides of the screen, never con-

nect with each other. Instead of messages, it is missiles and

bombs which fly from one side to the other, but any dual or per-

sonal relation is altogether absent. Thus an aerial attack on

is it really taking place? 45

Iraq may be read in terms of coding, decoding and feedback (in

this case, very bad: we cannot even know what we have

destroyed). This explains the tolerance of the Israelis: they have

only been hit by abstract projectiles, namely missiles. The least

live bombing attack on Israel would have provoked immediate

retaliation.

Communication is also a clean relation: in principle, it

excludes any violent or personal affect. It is strange to see this

disaffection, this profound indifference to one another, played

out at the very heart of violence and war.

The fact that the undetectable Stealth bombers should have

begun the war by aiming at decoys and undoubtedly destroying

fake objectives, that the Secret Services (also "furtive") should

have been so mistaken in so many ways about the realities of

Iraqi weaponry, and the strategists so wrong about the effects

of the intensive electronic war, all testifies to the illusionism of

force once it is no longer measured against an adversary but

against its abstract operation alone. All the generals, admirals

and other meretricious experts should be sent to an inflatable

strategic site, to see whether these decoys wouldn't in fact

attract a real bomb on their heads.

Conversely, the Americans' innocence in admitting their

mistake (declaring five months later that the Iraqi forces are

almost intact while they themselves are not ready to attack)

and all that counter-propaganda which adds to the confusion

would be moving if it did not testify to the same strategic idiocy

as the triumphal declarations at the outset, and did not further

46 The Gulf War:

take us for complicit witnesses of this suspicious sincerity of the

kind which says: you see, we tell you everything. We can

always give credit to the Americans for knowing how to exploit

their failures by means of a sort of trompe I' oeil can dour.

A UN bedtime story: the UN awoke (or was awakened) from its

glass coffin (the building in New York). As the coffin fell and

was shattered (at the same time as the Eastern Bloc), she spat

out the apple and revived, as fresh as a rose, only to find at once

the waiting Prince Charming: the Gulf War, also fresh from the

arms of the cold war after a long period of mourning. No doubt

together they will give birth to a New World Order, or else end

up like two ghosts locked in vampiric embrace.

Seeing how Saddam uses his cameras on the hostages, the

caressed children, the (fake) strategic targets, on his own smil-

ing face, on the ruins of the milk factory, one cannot help

thinking that in the West we still have a hypocritical vision of

television and information, to the extent that, despite all the

evidence, we hope for their proper use. Saddam, for his part,

knows what the media and information are: he makes a radi-

cal, unconditional, perfectly cynical and therefore perfectly

instrumental use of them. The Romanians too were able to

make a perfectly immoral and mystificatory use of them (from

our point of view). We may regret this, but given the principle

of simulation which governs all information, even the most

pious and objective, and given the structural unreality of

is it really taking place? 47

images and their proud indifference to the truth, these cynics

alone are right about information when they employ it as an

unconditional simulacrum. We believe that they immorally

pervert images. Not so. They alone are conscious of the pro-

found immorality of images, just as the Bokassas and Amin

Dadas reveal, through the parodic and Ubuesque use they

make of them, the obscene truth of the Western political and

democratic structures they borrowed. The secret of the under-

developed is to parody their model and render it ridiculous by

exaggeration. We alone retain the illusion of information and

of a right to information. They are not so naive.

Never any acting out, or passage to action, but simply acting:

roll cameras! But there is too much film, or none at all, or it was

desensitised by remaining too long in the humidity of the cold

war. In short, there is quite simply nothing to see. Later, there

will be something to see for the viewers of archival cassettes

and the generations of video-zombies who will never cease

reconstituting the event, never having had the intuition of the

non-event of this war.

The archive also belongs to virtual time; it is the comple-

ment of the event "in real time," of that instantaneity of the

event and its diffusion. Moreover, rather than the "revolution"

of real time of which Virilio speaks, we should speak of an invo-

lution in real time; of an involution of the event in the instanta-

neity of everything at once, and of its vanishing in information

itself. If we take note of the speed of light and the temporal

short-circuit of pure war (the nanosecond), we see that this

48 The Gulf War:

involution precipitates us precisely into the virtuality of war

and not into its reality, it precipitates us into the absence of

war. Must we denounce the speed of light?

Utopia of real time which renders the event simultaneous at all

points on the globe. In fact, what we live in real time is not the

event, but rather in larger than life (in other words, in the vir-

tual size of the image) the spectacle of the degradation of the

event and its spectral evocation (the "spiritualism of informa-

tion": event, are you there? Gulf War. are you there?) in the

commentary, gloss, and verbose mise en scene of talking heads

which only underlines the impossibility of the image and the

correlative unreality of the war. It is the same aporia as that of

cinema verite which seeks to short-circuit the unreality of the

image in order to present us the truth of the object. In this man-

ner, CNN seeks to be a stethoscope attached to the hypothetical

heart of the war, and to present us with its hypothetical pulse.

But this auscultation only provides a confused ultrasound,

undecidable symptoms, and an assortment of vague and con-

tradictory diagnoses. All that we can hope for is to see them die

live (metaphorically of course), in other words that some event

or other should overwhelm the information instead of the infor-

mation inventing the event and commenting artificially upon

it. The only real information revolution would be this one, but

it is not likely to occur in the near future: it would presuppose a

reversal of the idea we have of information. In the meantime,

we will continue with the involution and encrustation of the

event in and by information, and the closer we approach the

is it really taking place? 49

live and real time, the further we will go in this direction.

The same illusion of progress occurred with the appearance

of speech and then colour on screen: at each stage of this

progress we moved further away from the imaginary intensity

of the image. The closer we supposedly approach the real or the

truth, the further we draw away from them both, since neither

one nor the other exists. The closer we approach the real time

of the event, the more we fall into the illusion of the virtual.

God save us from the illusion of war.

At a certain speed, the speed of light, you lose even your shad-

ow. At a certain speed, the speed of information, things lose

their sense. There is a great risk of announcing (or denouncing)

the Apocalypse of real time, when it is precisely at this point that

the event volatilises and becomes a black hole from which light

no longer escapes. War implodes in real time. history implodes

in real time, all communication and all signification implode in

real time. The Apocalypse itself, understood as the arrival of cat-

astrophe, is unlikely. It falls prey to the prophetic illusion. The

world is not sufficiently coherent to lead to the Apocalypse.

Nevertheless. in confronting our opinions on the war with

the diametrically opposed opinions of Paul Virilio, one of us bet-

ting on apocalyptic escalation and the other on deterrence and

the indefinite virtuality of war, we concluded that this decided-

ly strange war went in both directions at once. The war's pro-

grammed escalation is relentless and its non-occurrence no less

inevitable: the war proceeds at once towards the two extremes

of intensification and deterrence. The war and the non-war

50 The Gulf War:

take place at the same time, with the same period of deploy-

ment and suspense and the same possibilities of de-escalation

or maximal increase.

What is most extraordinary is that the two hypotheses, the

apocalypse of real time and pure war along with the triumph of

the virtual over the real, are realised at the same time, in the

same space-time, each in implacable pursuit of the other. It is a

sign that the space of the event has become a hyperspace with

multiple refractivity, and that the space of war has become defini-

tively non-Euclidean. And that there will undoubtedly be no res-

olution of this situation: we will remain in the undecidability of

war, which is the undecidability created by the unleashing of

the two opposed principles.

Soft war and pure war go boating.

There is a degree of popular good will in the micro-panic dis-

tilled by the airwaves. ~~e_ pu\)lic ultimately consents ta_b.e_

frightened, and to b(! gently terrorised by the bacteriological

scenarios, on the basis of a kind of affective patriotism, even

while ft preserves a fairly profound indifference to the war. But

it censors this indifference, on the grounds that we must not

cut ourselves off from the world scene, that we must be

mobilised at least as extras in order to rescue war: we have no

other passion with which to replace it. It is the same with politi-

cal participation under normal circumstances: this is largely

second hand, taking place against a backdrop of spontaneous

indifference. It is the same with God: even when we no longer

believe, we continue to believe that we believe. In this hysteri-

is it really taking place? 51

cal replacement function, we identify at once those who are

superfluous and they are many. By contrast, the few who -----~------.,.,~-·-~·- ~~·~~--~-·-~---

advance the hypothesis of this profound indifference will be ' •.. ~..._·-~·-~·--"--.~~~~~-·· .. ,.--~·-"" .. - ... ..,,;,....c.~-.. -·, .... ~ ...... --,-,.-~.~~-·~· .. ,,. "•'"' .,

received as traitors.

By the force of the media, this war liberates an exponential

mass of stupidity, not the particular stupidity of war, which is

considerable, but the professional and functional stupidity of

those who pontificate in perpetual commentary on the event:

all the Bouvards and Pecuchets for hire, the would-be raiders of

the lost image, the CNN types and all the master singers of

strategy and information who make us experience the empti-

ness of television as never before. This war, it must be said, con-

stitutes a merciless test. Fortunately, no one will hold this

expert or general or that intellectual for hire to account for the

idiocies or absurdities proffered the day before, since these will

be erased by those of the following day. In this manner, every-

one is amnestied by the ultra-rapid succession of phony events

and phony discourses. The laundering of stupidity by the esca-

lation of stupidity which reconstitutes a sort of total innocence,

namely the innocence of washed and bleached brains, stupefied

not by the violence but by the sinister insignificance of the

images.

Chevenement in the desert: Morituri te salutant! Ridiculous.

France with its old Jaguars and its presidential slippers.

Capillon on television: the benefit of this war will have been

52 The Gulf War:

to recycle our military leaders on television. One shudders at

the thought that in another time, in a real war, they were oper-

ational on the battlefield.

Imbroglio: that pacifist demonstration in Paris, thus indirectly

for Saddam Hussein, who does want war, and against the

French Government which does not want it, and which from

the outset gives all the signs of refusing to take part, or of doing

so reluctantly.

Deserted shops, suspended vacations, the slowdown of activity,

the city turned over to the absent masses: it may well be that,

behind the alibi of panic, this war should be the dreamed-for

opportunity to soft-pedal, the opportunity to slow down, to ease

off the pace. The crazed particles calm down, the war erases the

guerrilla warfare of everyday life. Catharsis? No: renovation. Or

perhaps, with everyone glued at home, TV plays out fully its

role of social control by collective stupefaction: turning useless-

ly upon itself like a dervish, it affiXes populations all the better

for deceiving them, as with a bad detective novel which we

cannot believe could be so pointless.

Iraq is being rebuilt even before it has been destroyed. After-

sales service. Such anticipation reduces even further the credi-

bility of the war, which did not need this to discourage those

who wanted to believe in it.

is it really taking place? 53

S?metimes a glimmer of black humour: the twelve thou-

sand coffins sent along with the arms and ammunition. Here

too, the Americans demonstrate their presumption: their pro-

jections and their losses are without common measure. But

Saddam challenged them with being incapable of sacrificing

ten thousand men in a war: they replied by sending twelve

thousand coffins.

The overestimation of losses is part of the same megaloma-

niac light show as the publicised deployment of "Desert Shield"

and the orgy of bombardment. The pilots no longer even have

any targets. The Iraqis no longer even have enough decoys to

cater for the incessant raids. The same target must be bombed

five times. Mockery.

The British artillery unleashed for twenty four hours. Long

since there was nothing left to destroy. Why then? In order "to

cover the noise of the armoured columns advancing towards

the front by the noise of the bombardment." Of course, the

effect of surprise must be maintained (it is February 21). The

best part is that there was no longer anyone there, the Iraqis

had already left. Absurdity.

Saddam is a mercenary, the Americans are missionaries. But

once the mercenary is beaten, the missionaries become de facto

the mercenaries of the entire world. But the price for becoming

a perfect mercenary is to be stripped of all political intelligence

and all will. The Americans cannot escape it: if they want to be

the police of the world and the New World Order, they must

lose all political authority in favour of their operational capaci-

ty alone. They will become pure executants and everyone else

The Gulf War did not take place

Since this war was won in advance, we will never know what it

would have been like had it existed. We will never know what

an Iraqi taking part with a chance of fighting would have been

like. We will never know what an American taking part with a

chance of being beaten would have been like. We have seen

what an ultra-modern process of electrocution is like, a process

of paralysis or lobotomy of an experimental enemy away from

the field of battle with no possibility of reaction. But this is not a

war, any more than 10,000 tonnes of bombs per day is suffi-

cient to make it a war. Any more than the direct transmission

by CNN of real time information is sufficient to authenticate a

war. One is reminded of Capricorn One in which the flight of a

manned rocket to Mars, which only took place in a desert stu-

dio, was relayed live to all the television stations in the world.

It has been called a surgical war, and it is true that there is

something in common between this in vitro destruction and in

vitro fertilisation -the latter also produces a living being but it

54 The Gulf War:

pure extras in the consensual and policed New World Order.

Whoever the dictator to be destroyed, any punitive force

sure of itself is even more frightening. Having assumed the

Israeli style, the Americans will henceforth export it every-

where and, just as the Israelis did, lock themselves into the spi-

ral of unconditional repression.

For the Americans, the enemy does not exist as such. Nothing

personal. Your war is of no interest to me, your resistance is of no

interest to me. I will destroy you when I am ready. Refusal to

bargain, whereas Saddam Hussein, for his part, bargains his

war by overbidding in order to fall back, attempting to force the

hand by pressure and blackmail, like a hustler trying to sell his

goods. The Americans understand nothing in this whole psy-

chodrama of bargaining, they are had every time until, with the

wounded pride of the Westerner, they stiffen and impose their

conditions. They understand nothing of this floating duel, this

passage of arms in which, for a brief moment, the honour and

dishonour of each is in play. They know only their virtue, and

they are proud of their virtue. If the other wants to play, to trick

and to challenge, they will virtuously employ their force. They

will oppose the other's traps with their character armour and

their armoured tanks. For them, the time of exchange does not

exist. But the other, even if he knows that he will concede, can-

not do so without another form of procedure. He must be recog-

nised as interlocutor: this is the goal of the exchange. He must

be recognised as an enemy: this is the whole aim of the war. For

the Americans, bargaining is cheap whereas for the others it is a

is it really taking place? 55

matter of honour, (mutual) personal recognition, linguistic

strategy (language exists, it must be honoured) and respect for

time (altercation demands a rhythm, it is the price of there being

an Other). The Americans take no account of these primitive

subtleties. They have much to learn about symbolic exchange.

By contrast, they are winners from an economic point of

view. No time lost in discussion, no psychological risk in any

duel with the other: it is a way of proving that time does not

exist, that the other does not exist, and that all that matters is

the model and mastery of the model.

From a military point of view, to allow this war to endure in

the way they have (instead of applying an Israeli solution and

immediately exploiting the imbalance of force while short-cir-

cuiting all retaliatory effects), is a clumsy solution lacking in

glory and full of perverse effects (Saddam's aura among the

Arab masses). Nevertheless, in doing this, they impose a sus-

pense, a temporal vacuum in which they present to themselves

and to the entire world the spectacle of their virtual power.

They will have allowed the war to endure as long as it takes,

not to win but to persuade the whole world of the infallibility of

their machine.

The victory of the model is more important than victory on

the ground. Military success consecrates the triumph of arms,

but the programming success consecrates the defeat of time.

War-processing, the transparency of the model in the unfolding

of the war, the strategy of relentless execution of a program,

the electrocution of all reaction and any live initiative, includ-

ing their own: these are more important from the point of view

of general deterrence (of friends and foes alike) than the final

56 The Gulf War:

result on the ground. Clean war, white war, programmed war:

more lethal than the war which sacrifices human lives.

We are a long way from annihilation, holocaust and atomic

apocalypse, the total war which functions as the archaic imagi-

nary of media hysteria. On the contrary, this kind of preventa-

tive, deterrent and punitive war is a warning to everyone not to

take extreme measures and inflict upon themselves what they

inflict on others (the missionary complex): the rule of the game

that says everyone must remain within the limits of their

power and not make war by any means whatever. Power must

remain virtual and exemplary, in other words, virtuous. The

decisive test is the planetary apprenticeship in this regulation.

Just as wealth is no longer measured by the ostentation of

wealth but by the secret circulation of speculative capital, so

war is not measured by being waged but by its speculative

unfolding in an abstract, electronic and informational space,

the same space in which capital moves.

While this conjuncture does not exclude all accident ( disor-

der in the virtual), it is nevertheless true that the probability of

the irruption of those extreme measures and mutual violence

which we call war is increasingly low.

Saddam the hysteric. Interminable shit kicker. The hysteric

cannot be crushed: he is reborn from his symptoms as though

from his ashes. Confronted by a hysteric, the other becomes

paranoid, he deploys a massive apparatus of protection and

is it really taking place? 57

mistrust. He suspects the hysteric of bad faith, of ruse and dis-

simulation. He wants to constrain him to the truth and to

transparency. The hysteric is irreducible. His means are decoys

and the overturning of alliances. Confronted with this lubricity,

this duplicity, the paranoid can only become more rigid, more

obsessional. The most violent reproach addressed to Saddam

Hussein by Bush is that of being a liar, a traitor, a bad player, a

trickster. Lying son of a bitch/ Saddam, like a good hysteric, has

never given birth to his own war: for him, it is only a phantom

pregnancy. By contrast, he has until now succeeded in prevent-

ing Bush from giving birth to his. And, with the complicity of

Gorbachev, he almost succeeded in fucking him up the ass. But

the hysteric is not suicidal, this is the advantageous other side

to Saddam. He is neither mad nor suicidal. perhaps he should

be treated by hypnosis?

The Iraqis and the Americans have at least one thing in com-

mon, a heinous crime which they (and with them the West)

share. Many things about this war are explained by this anteri-

or crime from which both sides sought to profit with impunity.

The secret expiation of this crime feeds the Gulf War in its con-

fusion and its allure of the settling of accounts. Such is the

shared agreement to forget it that little is spoken about this

prior episode (even by the Iranians), namely the war against

Iran. Saddam must avenge his failure to win, even though he

was the aggressor and sure of his impunity. He must avenge

himself against the West which trained him for it, while the

Americans, for their part, must suppress him as the embarrass-

58 The Gulf War:

ing accomplice in that criminal act.

For any government official or despot, power over his own

people takes precedence over everything else. In the case of the

Gulf War, this provides the only chance of a solution or a de-

escalation. Saddam will prefer to concede rather than destroy

his internal hegemony or sacrifice his army, etc. In this sense,

sheltering his planes in Iran is a good sign: rather than an

offensive sign, it is the ploy of a burglar who stashes his haul in

order to retrieve it when he comes out of prison, thus an argu-

ment against any heroic or suicidal intention.

While one fraction of the intellectuals and politicians, special-

ists in the reserve army of mental labour, are whole-heartedly

in favour of the war, and another fraction are against it from

the bottom of their hearts, but for reasons no less disturbing, all

are agreed on one point: this war exists, we have seen it. There

is no interrogation into the event itself or its reality; or into the

fraudulence of this war, the programmed and always delayed

illusion of battle; or into the machination of this war and its

amplification by information, not to mention the improbable

orgy of material, the systematic manipulation of data, the artifi-

cial dramatisation ... I~ we do not have practical intelligence

about the war (and none among us has), at least let us haye a

sceptical intelligence towards it, without renouncing the

pathetic feeling of its absurdity.

But there is more than one kind of absurdity: that of the

massacre and that of being caught up in the illusion of mas-

sacre. It is just as in La Fontaine's fable: the day there is a real

is it really taking place? 59

war you will not even be able to tell the difference. The real vic-

tory of the simulators of war is to have drawn everyone into

this rotten simulation.

62 The Gulf War

is not sufficient to produce a child. Except in the New Genetic

Order, a child issues from sexual copulation. Except in the New

World Order, war is born of an antagonistic, destructive but

dual relation between two adversaries. This war is an asexual

surgical war, a matter of war-processing in which the enemy

only appears as a computerised target, just as sexual partners

only appear as code-names on the screen of Minitel Rose. If we

can speak of sex in the latter case then perhaps the Gulf War

can pass for a war.

The Iraqis blow up civilian buildings in order to give the

impression of a dirty war. The Americans disguise satellite

information to give the impression of a clean war. Everything

in trompe I' oeil! The final Iraqi ploy: to secretly evacuate Kuwait

and thereby mock the great offensive. With hindsight, the

Presidential Guard itself was perhaps only a mirage; in any

case, it was exploited as such until the end. All this is no more

than a stratagem and the war ended in general boredom, or

worse in the feeling of having been duped. Iraqi boasting,

American hypocrisy. It is as though there was a virus infecting

this war from the beginning which emptied it of all credibility.

It is perhaps because the two adversaries did not even confront

each other face to face, the one lost in its virtual war won in

advance, the other buried in its traditional war lost in advance.

They never saw each other: when the Americans finally

appeared behind their curtain of bombs the Iraqis had already

disappeared behind their curtain of smoke ...

The general effect is of a farce which we will not even have

did not take place 63

had time to applaud. The only escalation will have been in

decoys. opening onto the final era of great confrontations

which vanish in the mist. The events in Eastern Europe still

gave the impression of a divine surprise. No such thing in the

Gulf, where it is as though events were devoured in advance by

the parasite virus, the retro-virus of history. This is why we

could advance the hypothesis that this war would not take

place. And now that it is over, we can realise at last that it did

not take place.

It was buried for too long, whether in the concrete and

sand Iraqi bunkers or in the Americans' electronic sky, or

behind that other form of sepulchre, the chattering television

screens. Today everything tends to go underground. includ-

ing information in its informational bunkers. Even war has

gone underground in order to survive. In this forum of war

which is the Gulf, everything is hidden: the planes are hidden,

the tanks are buried, Israel plays dead, the images are cen-

sored and all information is blockaded in the desert: only TV

functions as a medium without a message, giving at last the

image of pure television.

Like an animal. the war goes to ground. It hides in the sand, it

hides in the sky. It is like the Iraqi planes: it knows that it has no

chance if it surfaces. It awaits its hour ... which will never come.

The Americans themselves are the vectors of this catalepsy.

There is no question that the war came from their plan and its

programmed unfolding. No question that, in their war, the

Iraqis went to war. No question that the Other came from their

computers. All reaction, even on their part (as we saw in the

episode of the prisoners, which should have produced a violent

64 The Gulf War

reaction), all abreaction against the program, all improvisation

is abolished (even the Israelis were muzzled). What is tested

here in this foreclosure of the enemy, this experimental reclu-

sion of war, is the future validity for the entire planet of this

type of suffocating and machinic performance, virtual and

relentless in its unfolding. In this perspective, war could not

take place. There is no more room for war than for any form of

living impulse.

War stripped of its passions, its phantasms, its finery, its veils,

its violence, its images; war stripped bare by its technicians

even, and then reclothed by them with all the artifices of elec-

tronics, as though with a second skin. But these too are a kind

of decoy that technology sets up before itself. Saddam Hussein's

decoys still aim to deceive the enemy, whereas the American

technological decoy only aims to deceive itself. The first days of

the lightning attack, dominated by this technological mystifica-

tion, will remain one of the finest bluffs. one of the finest collec-

tive mirages of contemporary History (along with Timisoara).

We are all accomplices in these fantasmagoria, it must be said,

as we are in any publicity campaign. In the past, the unem-

ployed constituted the reserve army of Capital; today, in our

enslavement to information, we constitute the reserve army of

all planetary mystifications.

Saddam constructed his entire war as a decoy (whether deliber-

ately or not), including the decoy of defeat which even more

did not take place 65

resembles a hysterical syncope of the type: peek-a-boo, I am no

longer there! But the Americans also constructed their affair as

a decoy, like a parabolic mirror of their own power, taking no

account of what was before them, or hallucinating those oppo-

site to be a threat of comparable size to themselves: otherwise

they would not even have been able to believe in their own vic-

tory. Their victory itself in the form of a triumphal decoy echoes

the Iraqi decoy of defeat. Ultimately, both were accomplices as

thick as thieves, and we were collectively abused. This is why

the war remains indefinable and ungraspable, all strategy hav-

ing given way to stratagem.

One of the two adversaries is a rug salesman, the other an

arms salesman: they have neither the same logic nor the same

strategy, even though they are both crooks. There is not

enough communication between them to enable them to make

war upon each other. Saddam will never fight, while the

Americans will fight against a fictive double on screen. They

see Saddam as he should be, a modernist hero, worth defeating

(the fourth biggest army in the world!). Saddam remains a rug

salesman who takes the Americans for rug salesmen like him-

self, stronger than he but less gifted for the scam. He hears

nothing of deterrence. For there to be deterrence, there must be

communication. It is a game of rational strategy which presup-

poses real time communication between the two adversaries;

whereas in this war there was never communication at any

moment, but always dislocation in time, Saddam evolving in a

long time, that of blackmail, of procrastination, false advance,

of retreat: the recurrent time of The Thousand and One Nights -

exactly the inverse of real time. Deterrence in fact presupposes

66 The Gulf War

a virtual escalation between the two adversaries. By contrast,

Saddam's entire strategy rests upon de-escalation (one sets a

maximal price then descends from it in stages). And their

respective denouements are not at all the same. The failure of

the sales pitch is marked by evasive action: the salesman rolls

up his rug and leaves. Thus, Saddam disappears without fur-

ther ado. The failure of deterrence is marked by force: this is the

case with the Americans. Once again, there is no relation

between the two, each plays in his own space and misses the

other. We cannot even say that the Americans defeated

Saddam: he defaulted on them, he de-escalated and they were

not able to escalate sufficiently to destroy him.

Finally, who could have rendered more service to everyone, in

such a short time at such little cost, than Saddam Hussein? He

reinforced the security oflsrael (reflux of the Intifada, revival of

world opinion for Israel), assured the glory of American arms,

gave Gorbachev a political chance, opened the door to Iran and

Shiism, relaunched the UN, etc., all for free since he alone paid

the price ofblood. Can we conceive of so admirable a man? And

he did not even falll He remains a hero for the Arab masses. It is

as though he were an agent of the CIA disguised as Saladin.

Resist the probability of any image or information whatever.

Be more virtual than events themselves, do not seek to re-estab-

lish the truth, we do not have the means, but do not be duped,

and to that end re-immerse the war and all information in the

did not take place 67

virtuality from whence they come. Turn deterrence back

against itself. Be meteorologically sensitive to stupidity.

In the case of this war, it is a question of the living illustra-

tion of an implacable logic which renders us incapable of envis-

aging any hypothesis other than that of its real occurrence.

The realist logic which lives on the illusion of the final result.

The denial of the facts is never one of them. The final resolution

of an equation as complex as a war is never immediately appar-

ent in the war. It is a question of seizing the logic of its unfold-

ing, in the absence of any prophetic illusion. To be for or

against the war is idiotic if the question of the very probability

of this war, its credibility or degree of reality has not been raised

even for a moment. All political and ideological speculations

fall under mental deterrence (stupidity). By virtue of their

immediate consensus on the evidence they feed the unreality of

this war, they reinforce its bluff by their unconscious dupery.

The real warmongers are those who live on the ideology of

the veracity of this war, while the war itself wreaks its havoc at

another level by trickery, hyperreality, simulacra, and by the

entire mental strategy of deterrence which is played out in the

facts and in the images, in the anticipation of the real by the

virtual, of the event by virtual time, and in the inexorable con-

fusion of the two. All those who understand nothing of this

involuntarily reinforce this halo of bluff which surrounds us.

It is as though the Iraqis were electrocuted, lobotomised, run-

ning towards the television journalists in order to surrender or

immobilised beside their tanks, not even demoralised: de-cere-

68 The Gulf War

bralised, stupefied rather than defeated - can this be called a

war? Today we see the shreds of this war rot in the desert just

like the shreds of the map in Borges' fable rotting at the four

corners of the territory (moreover, strangely, he situates his

fable in the same oriental regions of the Empire).

Fake war, deceptive war, not even the illusion but the disil-

lusion of war, linked not only to defensive calculation, which

translates into the monstrous prophylaxis of this military

machine, but also to the mental disillusion of the combatants

themselves, and to the global disillusion of everyone else by

means of information. For deterrence is a total machine (it is

the true war machine), and it not only operates at the heart of

the event - where electronic coverage of the war devoured

time and space, where virtuality (the decoy, programming, the

anticipation of the end) devoured all the oxygen of war like a

fuel-air explosive bomb - it also operates in our heads.

Information has a profound function of deception. It matters ~~---··---- --- ·-·--····-. ---~·-· - ---· ""'"•···--~---~·-""""" ···-~- -- ._. _ _. ___ ___ little what it "informs" us about, its "coverage" of events mat-

ters little since it is precisely no more than a cover: its purp()se

is to produce consensus by flat encephalogram. The comple-

ment of the unconditional simulacrum in the field is to train

everyone in the unconditional reception of broadcast simu-

lacra. Abolish any intelligence of the event. The result is a suf-

focating atmosphere of deception and stupidity. And if people

are vaguely aware of being caught up in this appeasement and

this disillusion by images, they swallow the deception and

remain fascinated by the evidence of the montage of this war

with which we are inoculated everywhere: through the eyes,

the senses and in discourse.

did not take place 69

There are ironic balance sheets which help to temper the shock

or the bluff of this war. A simple calculation shows that, of the

500,000 American soldiers involved during the seven months

of operations in the Gulf, three times as many would have died

from road accidents alone had they stayed in civilian life.

Should we consider multiplying clean wars in order to reduce

th,e murderous death toll of peacetime?

On this basis, we could develop a philosophy of perverse

effects, which we tend to regard as always maleficent whereas

in fact maleficent causes (war, illness, viruses) often produce

beneficial perverse effects. They are no less perverse as a result,

but more interesting than the others, in particular because it

has been a matter of principle never to study them. Except for

Mandeville, of course, in The Fable of the Bees, where he shows

that every society prospers on the basis of its vices. But the

course of events has drawn us further and further away from

an intelligence of this order.

An example: deterrence itself. It only functions well

between equal forces. Ideally, each party should possess the

same weapons before agreeing to renounce their use. It is

therefore the dissemination of (atomic) weapons alone which

can ensure effective global deterrence and the indefinite sus-

pension of war. The present politics of non-dissemination plays

with fire: there will always be enough madmen to launch an

archaic challenge below the level of an atomic riposte - wit-

ness Saddam. Things being as they are, we should place our

hopes in the spread of weapons rather than in their (never

respected) limitation. Here too, the beneficial perverse effect of

dissemination should be taken into account. We should esca-

70 The Gulf War

late in the virtual (of destruction) under penalty of de-escalat-

ing in the real. This is the paradox of deterrence. It is like infor-

mation, culture or other material and spiritual goods: only

their profusion renders them indifferent and neutralises their

negative perverse effects. Multiply vices in order to ensure the

collective good.

That said, the consequences of what did not take place may

be as substantial as those of an historical event. The hypothe-

sis would be that, in the case of the Gulf War as in the case of

the events in Eastern Europe, we are no longer dealing with

"historical events" but with places of collapse. Eastern Europe

saw the collapse of communism, the construction of which

had indeed been an historic event, borne by a vision of the

world and a utopia. By contrast, its collapse is borne by noth-

ing and bears nothing, but only opens onto a confused desert

left vacant by the retreat of history and immediately invaded

by its refuse.

The Gulf War is also a place of collapse, a virtual and metic-

ulous operation which leaves the same impression of a non-

event where the military confrontation fell short and where no

political power proved itself. The collapse of Iraq and stupefac-

tion of the Arab world are the consequences of a confrontation

which did not take place and which undoubtedly never could

take place. But this non-war in the form of a victory also conse-

crates the Western political collapse throughout the Middle

East, incapable even of eliminating Saddam and of imagining

or imposing anything apart from this new desert and police

did not take place 71

order called world order.

As a consequence of this non-event and living proof of

Western political weakness, Saddam is indeed still there, once

again what he always was, the mercenary of the West, deserv-

ing punishment for not remaining in his place, but also worthy

of continuing to gas the Kurds and the Shiites since he had the

tact not to employ these weapons against those Western dogs,

and worthy of keeping his Presidential Guard since he had the

heart to not sacrifice them in combat. Miraculously (they were

thought to have been destroyed), the Presidential Guard recov-

ers all its valour against the insurgents. Moreover, it is typical

of Saddam to prove his combativity and ferocity only against

his internal enemies: as with every true dictator, the ultimate

end of politics, carefully masked elsewhere by the effects of

democracy, is to maintain control of one's own people by any

means, including terror. This function embodied by dictator-

ships - that of being politically revealing and at the same time

an alibi for democracies - no doubt explains the inexplicable

weakness of the large powers towards them. Saddam liquidates

the communists, Moscow flirts even more with him; he gasses

the Kurds, it is not held against him; he eliminates the religious

cadres, the whole of Islam makes peace with him. Whence this

impunity? Why are we content to inflict a perfect semblance of

military defeat upon him in exchange for a perfect semblance of

victory for the Americans? This ignominious remounting of

Saddam, replacing him in the saddle after his clown act at the

head of the holy war, clearly shows that on all sides the war is

considered not to have taken place. Even the last phase of this

armed mystification will have changed nothing, for the

72 The Gulf War

100,000 Iraqi dead will only have been the final decoy that

Saddam will have sacrificed, the blood money paid in forfeit

according to a calculated equivalence, in order to conserve his

power. What is worse is that these dead still serve as an alibi for

those who do not want to have been excited for nothing, nor to

have been had for nothing: at least the dead would prove that

this war was indeed a war and not a shameful and pointless

hoax, a programmed and melodramatic version of what was

the drama of war (Marx once spoke of this second, melodra-

matic version of a primary event). But we can rest assured that

the next soap opera in this genre will enjoy an even fresher and

more joyful credulity.

What a job Saddam has done for the Americans, from his

combat with Iran up to this full scale debacle! Nevertheless,

everything is ambiguous since this collapse removes any

demonstrative value from American power, along with any

belief in the Western ideologies of modernity, democracy, or

secularity, of which Saddam had been made the incarnation

in the Arab world.

We can see that the Western powers dreamt of an Islamic pere-

stroika, on the newly formed model of Eastern Europe: democ-

racy irresistibly establishing itself in those countries conquered

by the forces of Good. The Arab countries will be liberated (the

peoples cannot but want to be liberated), and the women of

Saudi Arabia will have the right to drive. Alas! this is not to be.

did not take place 73

The conquered have not been convinced and have withdrawn,

leaving the victors only the bitter taste of an unreal made-to-

order victory. Defeat can also be a rival bid and a new begin-

ning, the chain of implication never stops. The eventual out-

come is unpredictable and certainly will not be reckoned in

terms of freedom.

No accidents occurred in this war, everything unfolded accord-

ing to programmatic order, in the absence of passional disor-

der. Nothing occurred which would have metamorphosed

events into a duel.

Even the status of the deaths may be questioned, on both sides.

The minimal losses of the coalition pose a serious problem,

which never arose in any earlier war. The paltry number of

deaths may be cause for self-congratulation, but nothing will

prevent this figure being paltry. Strangely, a war without vic-

tims does not seem like a real war but rather the prefiguration

of an experimental, blank war, or a war even more inhuman

because it is without human losses. No heroes on the other side

either, where death was most often that of sacrificed extras, left

as cover in the trenches of Kuwait, or civilians serving as bait

and martyrs for the dirty war. Disappeared, abandoned to their

lot, in the thick fog of war, held in utter contempt by their chief,

without even the collective glory of a number (we do not know

how many they are).

Along with the hostage or the repentant, the figure of the

74 The Gulf War

"disappeared" has become emblematic in our political universe.

Before, there were the dead and traitors, now there are the dis-

appeared and the repentant: both blanks. Even the dead are

blanks: "We have already buried them, they can no longer be

counted," dixit Schwarzkopf. At Timisoara, there were too

many of them, here there are not enough, but the effect is the

same. The non-will to know is part of the non-war. Lies and

shame appeared throughout this war like a sexually transmit-

ted disease.

Blank out the war. Just as Kuwait and Iraq were rebuilt before

they were destroyed, so at every phase of this war things

unfolded as though they were virtually completed. It is not for

lack of brandishing the threat of a chemical war, a bloody war,

a world war - everyone had their say - as though it were

necessary to give ourselves a fright, to maintain everyone in a

state of erection for fear of seeing the flaccid member of war fall

down. This futile masturbation was the delight of all the TVs.

Ordinarily we denounce this kind of behaviour as emphatic or

as empty and theatrical affectation: why not denounce an

entire event when it is affected by the same hysteria?

In many respects, this war was a scandal of the same type

as Timisoara. Not so much the war itself but the manipulation

of minds and blackmail by the scenario. The worst scandal

being the collective demand for intoxication, the complicity of

all in the effects of war, the effects of reality and false trans-

parency in this war. We could almost speak of media harass-

ment along the lines of sexual harassment. Alas! the problem

did not take place 75

always remains the same and it is insoluble: where does real

violence begin, where does consenting violence end? Bluff and

information serve as aphrodisiacs for war, just as the corpses at

Timisoara and their global diffusion served as aphrodisiacs for

the Romanian revolution.

But, ultimately, what have you got against aphrodisiacs?

Nothing so long as orgasm is attained. The media mix has

become the prerequisite to any orgasmic event. Weneed.it pre-

cisely because the event escapes us, because conviction escapes

us. We have a pressing need of simulation, even that of war,

much more than we have of milk, jam or liberty, and we have

an,immediate intuition of the means necessary to obtain it.

This is indeed the fundamental advance of our democracy: the

image-function, the blackmail-function, the information-func-

tion, the speculation-function. The obscene aphrodisiac func-

tion fulfilled by the decoy of the event, by the decoy of war.

Dfug~function.

-· We have neither need of nor the taste for real drama or real

war. What we require is the aphrodisiac spice of the multiplica-

tion of fakes and the hallucination of violence, for we have a

hallucinogenic pleasure in all things, which, as in the case of

drugs, is also the pleasure in our indifference and our irrespon-

sibility and thus in our true liberty. Here is the supreme form of

democracy. Through it our definitive retreat from the world

takes shape: the pleasure of mental speculation in images

equalling that of capital in a stock market run, or that of the

corpses in the charnel house of Timisoara. But, ultimately,

what have you got against drugs?

Nothing. Apart from fact that the collective disillusion is

76 The Gulf War

terrible once the spell is broken; for example, when the

corpses at Timisoara were uncovered, or when awareness of

the subterfuge of the war takes hold. The scandal today is no

longer in the assault on moral values but in the assault on the

reality principle. The profound scandal which hereafter

infects the whole sphere of information with a Timisoara-

complex lay in the compulsory participation of the corpses,

the transformation of the corpses into extras which in the

same moment transforms all those who saw and believed in it

into compulsory extras, so that they themselves become

corpses in the charnel house of news signs. The odium lies in

the malversation of the real, the faking of the event and the

malversation of the war. The charnel houses of Timisoara are

such a parody, so paltry by contrast with the real slaughter-

houses of history! This Gulf War is such a sham, so paltry: the

point is not to rehabilitate other wars, but rather that the

recourse to the same pathos is all the more odious when there

is no longer even the alibi of a war.

The presumption of information and the media here doubles

the political arrogance of the Western empire. All those jour-

nalists who set themselves up as bearers of the universal con-

science, all those presenters who set themselves up as strate-

gists, all the while overwhelming us with a flood of useless

images. Emotional blackmail by massacre, fraud. Instead of dis-

cussing the threshold of social tolerance for immigration we

would do better to discuss the threshold of mental tolerance for

information. With regard to the latter, we can say that it was

deliberately crossed.

did not take place 77

The delirious spectacle of wars which never happened: the

transparent glacier of flights which never flew. All these events,

from Eastern Europe or from the Gulf, which under the colours of

war and liberation led only to political and historical disillusion-

ment (it seems that the famous Chinese Cultural Revolution was

the same: a whole strategy of more or less concerted internal desta-

bilisation which short-circuited popular spontaneity), post-syn-

chronisation events where one has the impression of never having

seen the original. Bad actors, bad doubles, bad striptease: through-

out these seven months, the war has unfolded like a long

striptease, following the calculated escalation of undressing and

approaching the incandescent point of explosion (like that of erotic

effusion) but at the same time withdrawing from it and maintain-

ing a deceptive suspense (teasing), such that when the naked body

finally appears, it is no longer naked, desire no longer exists and the

orgasm is cut short. In this manner, the escalation was adminis-

tered to us by drip-feed, removing us further and further from the

passage to action and, in any case, from the war. It is like truth

according to Nietzsche: we no longer believe that the truth is true

when all its veils have been removed. Similarly, we do not believe

that war is war when all uncertainty is supposedly removed and it

appears as a naked operation. The nudity of war is no less virtual

than that of the erotic body in the apparatus of striptease.

On the slopes at Courchevel, the news from the Gulf War is

relayed by loudspeakers during the intensive bombardments.

Did the others over there, the Iraqis in the sand bunkers receive

the snow reports from Courchevel?

78 The Gulf War

February 22 was the day of the Apocalypse: the day of the

unleashing of the land offensive behind its curtain of bombs,

and in France, by a kind of black humour, the day of the worst

traffic jam on the autoroutes to the snow. While the tanks

advanced to the assault on Kuwait, the automobile hordes

advanced to the assault on the snowfields. Moreover, the tanks

went through much more easily than the waves ofleisure-seek-

ers. And the dead were more numerous on the snow front than

on the war front. Are we so lacking in death, even in time of

war, that it must be sought on the playing fields?

Stuck in traffic, one can always amuse oneself by listening to

the Gulf radio reports: the time of information never stops, the

slower things are on the roads the more things circulate on the

wavelengths. Another distraction was that of the young couple

who switched between watching the war on TV and their child

to be, filmed and recorded in the mother's womb and made

available on ultrasound cassette. When the war stops, they

watch the kid. At the level of images it is the same combat: war

before it has broken out, the child before it has been born.

Leisure in the virtual era.

The liquidation of the Shiites and the Kurds by Saddam under

the benevolent eye of the American divisions mysteriously

stopped in their lightning advance "in order not to humiliate

an entire people" offers a bloody analogy with the crushing of

the Paris Commune in 18 71 under the eye of the Prussian

did not take place 79

armies. And the good souls who cried out for seven months, for

or against the war but always for the good cause, those who

denounced the aberrations of the pro-Iraqi policy ten years

after the event when it was no longer relevant, and all the

repentants of the Rights of Man, once again do nothing. The

world accepts this as the wages of defeat, or rather, on the

American side, as the wages of victory. The same Americans

who, after having dumped hundreds of thousands of tonnes of

bombs, today claim to abstain from "intervening in the internal

affairs of a State."

It is nevertheless admirable that we call the Arabs and Moslems

traditionalists with the same repulsion that we call someone

racist, even though we live in a typically traditionalist society

although one simultaneously on the way to disintegration. We

do not practise hard fundamentalist traditionalism, we practise

soft, subtle and shameful democratic traditionalism by consen-

sus. However, consensual traditionalism (that of the

Enlightenment, the Rights of Man, the Left in power, the repen-

tant intellectual and sentimental humanism) is every bit as

fierce as that of any tribal religion or primitive society.

It denounces the other as absolute Evil in exactly the same

manner (these are the words ofFranc;ois Mitterand apropos the

Salman Rushdie affair: whence does he derive such an archaic

form of thought?). The difference between the two tradition-

alisms (hard and soft) lies in the fact that our own (the soft)

holds all the means to destroy the other and does not resile

from their use. As though by chance, it is always the

80 The Gulf War

Enlightenment fundamentalist who oppresses and destroys the

other, who can only defy it symbolically. In order to justify our-

selves, we give substance to the threat by turning the fatwa

against Salman Rushdie into a sword of Damocles hanging

over the Western world, sustaining a disproportionate terror in

complete misrecognition of the difference between symbolic

challenge and technical aggression. In the long run, the sym-

bolic challenge is more serious than a victorious aggression. If a

simplefatwa, a simple death sentence can plunge the West into

such depression (the vaudeville of terror on the part of writers

and intellectuals on this occasion could never be portrayed cru-

elly enough), if the West prefers to believe in this threat, it is

because it is paralysed by its own power, in which it does not

believe, precisely because of its enormity (the Islamic "neuro-

sis" would be due to the excessive tension created by the dispro-

portion of ends; the disproportion of means from which we

suffer creates by contrast a serious depression, a neurosis of

powerlessness). If the West believed in its own power, it would

not give a moment's thought to this threat. The most amusing

aspect, however, is that the other does not believe in his power-

lessness either, and he who does not believe in his powerless-

ness is stronger than he who does not believe in his power, be

this a thousand times greater. The Arab Book of Ruses gives a

thousand examples of this, but the West has no intelligence of

such matters.

This is how we arrive at an unreal war in which the over-

dimensioned technical power in turn over-evaluates the real

forces of an enemy which it cannot see. And if it is astonished

when it so easily triumphs this is because it knows neither how

did not take place 81

to believe in itself nor how to ruse with itself. By contrast, what

it does know obscurely is that in its present form it can be anni-

hilated by the least ruse.

The Americans would do well to be more astonished at their

"victory," to be astonished at their force and to find an equiva-

lent for it in the intelligence (of the other), lest their power play

tricks with them. Thus, if the cunning but stupid Saddam had

conceded one week earlier, he would have inflicted a consider-

able political defeat on the Americans. But did he want to? In

any case, he succeeded in his own reinstatement, whereas they

had sworn to destroy him. But did they swear it? Saddam

played the Americans' game at every turn, but even defeated

he was the better player at ruse and diversion. The Book of

Ruses still harbours many secrets unknown to the Pentagon.

Brecht: "This beer isn't a beer, but that is compensated for by

the fact that this cigar isn't a cigar either. If this beer wasn't a

beer and this cigar really was a cigar, then there would be a

problem." In the same manner, this war is not a war, but this is

compensated for by the fact that information is not information

either. Thus everything is in order. If this war had not been a

war and the images had been real images, there would have

been a problem. For in that case the non-war would have

appeared for what it is: a scandal. Similarly, if the war had been

a real war and the information had not been information, this

non-information would have appeared for what it is: a scandal.

In both cases, there would have been a problem.

There is one further problem for those who believe that this

82 The Gulf War

war took place: how is it that a real war did not generate real

images? Same problem for those who believe in the Americans'

"victory": how is it that Saddam is still there as though nothing

had happened?

Whereas everything becomes coherent if we suppose that,

given this victory was not a victory, the defeat of Saddam was

not a defeat either. Everything evens out and everything is in

order: the war, the victory and the defeat are all equally unreal,

equally non-existent. The same coherence in the irreality of the

adversaries: the fact that the Americans never saw the Iraqis is

compensated for by the fact that the Iraqis never fought them.

Brecht again: "As for the place not desired, there is something

there and that's disorder. As for the desired place, there is noth-

ing there and that's order."

The New World Order is made up of all these compensa-

tions and the fact that there is nothing rather than some-

thing, on the ground, on the screens, in our heads: consensus

by deterrence. At the desired place (the GulO, nothing took

place, non-war. At the desired place (TV, information), noth-

ing took place, no images, nothing but filler. Not much took

place in all our heads either, and that too is in order. The fact

that there was nothing at this or that desired place was har-

moniously compensated for by the fact that there was noth-

ing elsewhere either. In this manner, the global order unifies

all the partial orders.

In Eastern Europe, global order was re-established in accor-

dance with the same paradoxical dialectic: where there was

did not take place 83

something (communism, but this was precisely disorder from a

global point of view), today there is nothing, but there is order.

Things are in democratic order, even if they are in the worst

confusion.

The Arabs: there where they should not be (immigrants),

there is disorder. There where they should be (in Palestine) but

are not, there is order. The fact that in the Arab world nothing

is possible, not even war, and that Arabs are deterred, disap-

pointed, powerless and neutralised, that is order. But this is

harmoniously compensated for by the fact that at the marked

place of power (America), there is no longer anything but a

total political powerlessness.

Such is the New World Order.

A variant on Clausewitz: non-war is the absence of politics pursued

by other means ... It no longer proceeds from a political will to

dominate or from a vital impulsion or an antagonistic violence,

but from the will to impose a general consensus by deterrence.

This consensual violence can be as deadly as conflictual vio-

lence, but its aim is to overcome any hegemonic rivalry, even

when cold and balanced by terror, as it has been over the last

forty years. It was already at work in all the democracies taken

one by one; it operates today on a global level which is con-

ceived as an immense democracy governed by a homogeneous

order which has as its emblem the UN and the Rights of Man.

The Gulf War is the first consensual war, the first war conduct-

ed legally and globally with a view to putting an end to war

and liquidating any confrontation likely to threaten the hence-

84 The Gulf War

forward unified system of control. This was already the aim of

dualistic (East and West) deterrence; today we pass to the

monopolistic stage under the aegis of American power.

Logically, this democratic and consensual form should be able

to dispense with war, but it will no doubt continue to have local

and episodic need of it. The Gulf War is one of these transitive

episodes, hesitating for this reason between hard and soft

forms: virtual war or real war? But the balance is in the process

of definitively inclining in one direction, and tomorrow there

will be nothing but the virtual violence of consensus, the simul-

taneity in real time of the global consensus: this will happen

tomorrow and it will be the beginning of a world with no

tomorrow.

Electronic war no longer has any political objective strictly

speaking: it functions as a preventative electroshock against

any future conflict. Just as in modern communication there is

no longer any interlocutor, so in this electronic war there is no

longer any enemy, there is only a refractory element which

must be neutralised and consensualised. This is what the

Americans seek to do, these missionary people bearing electro-

shocks which will shepherd everybody towards democracy. It is

therefore pointless to question the political aims of this war: the

only (transpolitical) aim is to align everybody with the global

lowest common denominator, the democratic denominator

(which, in its extension, approaches ever closer to the degree

zero of politics). The lowest common multiplier being informa-

tion in all its forms, which, as it extends towards infinity, also

approaches ever closer to the degree zero of its content.

In this sense, consensus as the degree zero of democracy

did not take place 85

and information as the degree zero of opinion are in total affin-

ity: the New World Order will be both consensual and televisu-

al. That is indeed why the targeted bombings carefully avoided

the Iraqi television antennae (which stand out like a sore

thumb in the sky over Baghdad). War is no longer what it

used to be ...

The crucial stake, the decisive stake in this whole affair is the

consensual reduction of Islam to the global order. Not to

destroy but to domesticate it, by whatever means: modernisa-

tion, even military, politicisation, nationalism, democracy, the

Rights of Man, anything at all to electrocute the resistances

and the symbolic challenge that Islam represents for the entire

West. There is no miracle, the confrontation will last as long as

this process has not reached its term; by contrast, it will stop as

though of its own accord the day when this form of radical

challenge has been liquidated. This was how it happened in the

Vietnam war: the day when China was neutralised, when the

"wild" Vietnam with its forces of liberation and revolt was

replaced by a truly bureaucratic and military organisation

capable of ensuring the continuation of Order, the Vietnam

war stopped immediately - but ten years were necessary for

this political domestication to take place (whether it took place

under communism or democracy is of no importance). Same

thing with the Algerian war: its end, which was believed to be

impossible, took place of its own accord, not by virtue of De

Gaulle's sagacity, but from the moment the maquis with their

revolutionary potential were finally liquidated and an Algerian

86 The Gulf War

army and a bureaucracy, which had been set up in Tunisia

without ever engaging in combat, were in a position to ensure

the continuation of power and the exercise of order.

Our wars thus have less to do with the confrontation of

warriors than with the domestication of the refractory forces

on the planet, those uncontrollable elements as the police

would say, to which belong not only Islam in its entirety but

wild ethnic groups, minority languages etc. All that is singular

and irreducible must be reduced and absorbed. This is the law

of democracy and the New World Order. In this sense, the Iran-

Iraq war was a successful first phase: Iraq served to liquidate

the most radical form of the anti-Western challenge, even

though it never defeated it.

The fact that this mercenary prowess should give rise to the

present reversal and to the necessity ofits own destruction is a

cruel irony, but perfectly justified. We will have shamefully

merited everything which happens to us. This does not excuse

Iraq, which remains the objective accomplice of the West, even

in the present confrontation, to the extent that the challenge of

Islam, with its irreducible and dangerous alterity and symbolic

challenge, has once again been channelled, subtilised and

politically, militarily and religiously deflected by Saddam's

undertaking. Even in the war against the West he played his

role in the domestication of an Islam for which he has no use.

His elimination, if it should take place, will only raise a danger-

ous mortgage. The real stake, the challenge of Islam and

behind it that of all the forms of culture refractory to the occi-

dental world, remains intact. Nobody knows who will win. For

as Holderlin said, "where danger threatens, that which saves

did not take place 87

us from it also grows." As a result, the more the hegemony of

the global consensus is reinforced, the greater the risk, or the

chances, of its collapse.