Miranda Rights

1Background facts are derived from Plaintiff’s Complaint.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL BALTES, : No. 3:04cv2372 Plaintiff, :

: (Judge Munley) v. :

: ARROWHEAD LAKE : COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC. : and FRANK DeGRAND, :

Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court for disposition are Defendants Arrowhead Lake Community

Association, Inc. and Frank DeGrand’s motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). These matters have been briefed fully and are ripe for disposition. For

the following reasons, we find that the Plaintiff has satisfied his burden of stating a claim upon

which relief can be granted against both Defendants, and therefore, will deny the motions to

dismiss.

I. Background1

This case involves an alleged deprivation of Plaintiff Michael Baltes’s civil rights by

Defendants Arrowhead Lake Community Association, Inc. (“Arrowhead”), and its head security

guard, Defendant Frank DeGrand, on October 30, 2002. Plaintiff contends that while driving in

Defendant Arrowhead’s residential development, Arrowhead’s security personnel chased him

without reason, and continued the chase outside the development. During the chase, Plaintiff’s

Case 3:04-cv-02372-JMM Document 20 Filed 07/20/05 Page 1 of 9

2

pursuers alerted Defendant DeGrand to the situation (including their familiarity with Plaintiff’s

identity and address), and DeGrand ordered them to continue pursuit. Defendant DeGrand

joined the chase and fired his gun at Plaintiff several times. Defendant DeGrand and his

subordinates apprehended Plaintiff, threw him from his car, and kicked, punched, and

handcuffed him. Plaintiff further alleges that an unidentified Arrowhead security guard pointed

a gun at Plaintiff’s head.

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Arrowhead’s security contacted the Pocono

Regional Police Department, which responded and released Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff,

he was never cited or charged by either Arrowhead security or by the Pocono Regional Police,

but Defendant DeGrand was charged with several offenses, and later pled guilty to reckless

endangerment and false reports as a result of this incident. Several members of Defendant

Arrowhead’s security staff were charged with false reports and similar offenses.

Plaintiff filed a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wherein he alleges Defendants,

acting under color of state law, deprived him of his civil rights. Plaintiff also filed several

pendent state law claims.

Plaintiff’s complaint contains six counts: 1) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2)

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 3) False Arrest; 4) “Improper Supervision and

Training”; 5) Assault and Battery; and 6) False Imprisonment. The complaint seeks more than

$100,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.

II. Discussion

Case 3:04-cv-02372-JMM Document 20 Filed 07/20/05 Page 2 of 9

3

When a 12(b)(6) motion is filed, the sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations are tested.

The issue is whether the facts alleged in the complaint, if true, support a claim upon which

relief can be granted. In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true all factual

allegations in the complaint and give the pleader the benefit of all reasonable inferences that

can fairly be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Morse

v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). “A court should not dismiss a

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief ‘unless it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle

him to relief.’” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 2002)

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

A. Color of Law Standard

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim under § 1983 because

it does not allege Defendants acted under color of law. However, we find Plaintiff clearly

alleges in his Complaint that Defendants acted under color of law.

Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 931 (1982) sets out the applicable standard

in § 1983 cases: Plaintiff must establish: 1) Defendants deprived him of a federally protected

constitutional or statutory right, and 2) Defendants acted under color of state law. To show

Defendants acted under color of state law, two elements must be present. First, the alleged

constitutional deprivation resulted from either a) an exercise of a right or privilege having its

source in state authority, or b) a rule of conduct imposed by the State or a person for whom the

state is responsible. Id. at 937. Second, the Defendant “‘could be described in all fairness’” as

Case 3:04-cv-02372-JMM Document 20 Filed 07/20/05 Page 3 of 9

4

a state actor. Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 801 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991)). Any of the following three

conditions satisfies this element: a) the Defendant “is a state official,” b) the Defendant “acted

together with or obtained significant aid from state officials,” or c) the Defendant’s “conduct is

otherwise chargeable to the State.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.

The Supreme Court has employed several tests or factors to determine whether a private

party’s actions are “otherwise chargeable to the State,” and thus “convert the party into a state

actor.” Id. at 937-38. These include the “public function” test, the “state compulsion” test, the

“nexus” test, and the “joint action” test (Id. at 938-39), as well as the “symbiotic relationship”

test. Brown, 250 F.3d at 801. Plaintiff relies on the public function analysis.

“Under the public function test, ‘when private individuals or groups are endowed by the

State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or

instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations.’ . . . The provision of

municipal services is a traditional public function for which a private party can be held

accountable as a state actor.” Robison v. Canterbury Village, Inc., 848 F.2d 424, 427 (3d Cir.

1988) (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)). Moreover, it is not enough that a

private group serves a public function; instead, “the question is whether the function performed

has been ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457

U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (citations omitted).

In the case sub judice, Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff failed to plead the first

prong of the Lugar test – that Defendants deprived him of a constitutional right. The key issue

Case 3:04-cv-02372-JMM Document 20 Filed 07/20/05 Page 4 of 9

5

is whether Plaintiff pled a set of facts which, if accepted as true, demonstrate Defendants acted

under color of state law.

To establish Defendants acted under color of state law, Plaintiff’s claims must show

that the deprivation of his rights resulted from an exercise of a right or privilege having its

source in state authority, or a rule of conduct imposed by the State or a person for whom the

state is responsible. No “rule of conduct” is in question here; the applicable portion of this

element is an exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority. Lugar, 457

U.S. at 937. Plaintiff asserts Defendants pursued him on a public roadway, ostensibly for his

commission of a traffic offense. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 12, 15.) Taking all inferences in his favor,

he also states that, pursuant to state law, Defendant Arrowhead provided its security guards with

the authority to function as police officers, including the authority to arrest, cite, and fine

citizens, and carry firearms and handcuffs. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 32.) Here, Plaintiff sufficiently has

alleged that Defendants acted pursuant to statutory authority.

Finally, Plaintiff also must establish Defendants fairly could be called state actors.

Brown, 250 F.3d at 801. Plaintiff will satisfy this element if he successfully illustrates

Defendants acted to serve a public function. Private parties may become state actors through

their “provision of municipal services.” Robison, 848 F.2d at 427. Because police work is a

type of municipal service, and because at this stage we make all inferences in favor of Plaintiff,

he could establish facts showing Defendants’ acts converted them into state actors – thus

fulfilling this element of the Lugar test. On the issue of whether Defendants acted under color

of state law, we do not find that “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

Case 3:04-cv-02372-JMM Document 20 Filed 07/20/05 Page 5 of 9

6

facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957). Therefore, Plaintiff has met his burden of stating a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

B. Criminal Sanctions and Their Effect on a § 1983 Claim

Defendants next assert they cannot be held liable as state actors because the security

officers faced criminal sanctions stemming from the acts in question. (Def. Arrowhead’s Br.

in Supp. 7; Def. DeGrand’s Br. in Supp. 4.) We find it premature to address this issue without

factual development regarding the source of the alleged state authority. Under certain factual

scenario, “[t]he plaintiffs’ allegation that [the defendant] misused her power . . . does not

deprive her actions of the imprimatur of state authority.” Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 636

(3d Cir. 1990). The possibility that Defendants abused their power does not preclude them

from having acted under color of state law.

C. Negligence Under § 1983

Defendant Arrowhead also argues Plaintiff’s claims against it are based solely on

negligence, and therefore cannot support a § 1983 claim. We find Plaintiff’s claims are not

based solely on negligence. “[M]ere negligence is insufficient to trigger constitutional

liability.” Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1305 (3d Cir. 1994). Thus Plaintiff’s

allegations of negligence do not advance the § 1983 action. However, reckless or grossly

negligent acts may support a claim under § 1983. Id.; see also Colburn v. Upper Darby

Township, 838 F.2d 663, 668 (3d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff pled Defendants acted “willfully,”

“intentionally,” “maliciously,” “outrageous[ly],” and “in gross disregard” for Plaintiff’s rights.

Case 3:04-cv-02372-JMM Document 20 Filed 07/20/05 Page 6 of 9

7

(Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 33, 35, 41, 54.) When Plaintiff’s claimed facts are accepted as true, firing

upon a motorist after a minor traffic offense undoubtedly could be viewed as reckless or

outrageous. Thus, his claims are not based solely on negligence.

D. Vicarious Liability Under § 1983

Lastly, Defendant Arrowhead argues it cannot be held vicariously liable for its

employees’ actions. We find Arrowhead can be held liable if it is shown to have acted with

deliberate indifference. “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat

superior theory of liability.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). But a

municipality may be liable for a failure to train its police force, if its failure “amounts to

‘deliberate indifference to the [constitutional] rights of persons with whom the police come in

contact.’” Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 324 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting

Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir.1991)). Making all inferences in

Plaintiff’s favor, Defendant Arrowhead – a residential association – may be viewed as having

acted in the role of a municipality, for the purpose of furnishing a security force.

Plaintiff asserts Defendant Arrowhead failed to train and supervise its security force.

(Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 25-28.) Whether or not the alleged failure to train rises to the Woloszyn

level of deliberate indifference is a factual question. Many of Plaintiff’s claims involve

Arrowhead’s staff, and not Arrowhead. But on the issue of Arrowhead’s potential liability

under § 1983, Plaintiff has set forth facts which, if true, may entitle him to relief.

III. Conclusion

For the above stated reasons, we find the Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief

Case 3:04-cv-02372-JMM Document 20 Filed 07/20/05 Page 7 of 9

8

can be granted against both Defendants. Therefore, we will deny Defendant Arrowhead’s and

Defendant DeGrand’s Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). An appropriate order follows.

Case 3:04-cv-02372-JMM Document 20 Filed 07/20/05 Page 8 of 9

9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL BALTES, : No. 3:04cv2372 Plaintiff, :

: (Judge Munley) v. :

: ARROWHEAD LAKE : COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC. : and FRANK DeGRAND, :

Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

ORDER

AND NOW, to wit, this 20th day of July 2005, Defendant Arrowhead’s motion to

dismiss (Doc. 3) and Defendant DeGrand’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 13) are hereby DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

s/ James M. Munley JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY United States District Court

Case 3:04-cv-02372-JMM Document 20 Filed 07/20/05 Page 9 of 9