Battle Analysis of Kennesaw Mountain
BATTLE ANALYSIS OF
The Arracourt Tank Battle September 18-29 1944
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Elements and Sequence
• Define battle
• Evaluate sources
• Define strategic/operational setting (context)
• Describe action
• Relate cause to effect
• Assess significance--insights/lessons
Define Battle The Battle of Arracourt took place between U.S. and German armored forces near the town of Arracourt, Lorraine, France between 18-29 September 1944
Evaluate Source(s)
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Authenticity |
Reliability |
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Hugh M. Cole, US army in World war II the lorraine campaign
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Good general outline; of the Fourth Armored Division military movement into Germany. Good maps of the battle of Arracourt.
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Unofficial/ first-hand account
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received his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota in 1937 in the field of European military history. He taught military history at the University of Chicago until 1942, when he joined the Army as an intelligence officer. After graduating from the Command and General Staff School he was assigned to the staff of the Third Army during its operations in Europe. Dr. Cole directed the work of the European Theater Section, Office of the Chief of Military History
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Major General Friedrich von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, Original Tittle: Panzerschlachten Langue: German and English
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personal recollections and operational information on the major operations in which he participated, across major theaters of the war, with substantial coverage of his time as Erwin Rommel’s intelligence officer in the Afrika Corps
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Unofficial/ first hand account . |
Soon after its release, Dartmouth history professor Henry L. Roberts, in a one-sentence "capsule review" in Foreign Affairs, called it an "excellent account", offering "interesting observations“ Some historians and academics have taken issue with the political and historical context of the book. Wolfram Wette who listed Mellenthin among German generals he considered to have authored apologetic, uncritical studies on World War II
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Give Setting (“Big Picture”)
Area of operations:
· West of the Moselle River the last natural barrier before entering Germany
· east to Arracourt,
· east to Moncourt,
· North to the Lauran Valley on the German border near Chateau Salan
· Conditions--As applicable: O - U.S tanks would hold the high ground to disguise their location and provide over watch on the fields to their front, A - With the U.S. holding the high ground, forced the Germans to cross open fields. K - The Moselle River the last natural barrier before entering Germany and a natural choke point O - the Moselle River and dense forest C- Rolling country side, dense fog and use of smoke canisters helped in concealment of U.S. troops setting in favorable defensive positions
· Compare opposing forces.
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US Army |
Germany
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Military systems |
Infantry artillery M4 Sherman tanks M18 Hellcat Tank Destroyer M7 Priest |
14,000 Infantry/ Panzer Grenadier's Panzer 4’s Panthers Tiger Tank |
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Previous performance |
World War I (1914-1918). |
World War I (1914-1918) |
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Doctrine, tactics |
Utilizing high ground, defilade, shooting and relocating, flanking maneuvers, air attacks, and the adherence to what we now call the characteristics of the defense. |
A large force broken down into smaller fire brigades, to surround and destroy Patton’s 3rd Army then push NW to drive a wedge between allied forces. |
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Combatants |
4th Armored Division 37th Tank Battalion · Combat Command A · Combat Command B · 19th Tactical Air Command · 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion |
5th Panzer Army · 2 Panzer Brigades · elements of 2 Panzer Divisions
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Causes of conflict: The impact of the Treaty of Versailles following WWI, the worldwide economic depression, failure of appeasement, the rise of militarism in Germany and Japan, and the failure of the League of Nations.
Chronology
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Date(s)/Period |
Event |
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Sep 18, 1944 |
The Germans 5th Panzer Army attacks U.S. 2nd Mechanized Cavalry under heavy fog cover to mask movement from air attack, losing 2 dozen panzers |
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Sep 19, 1944 |
113th Panzer Brigade penetrated CCA near Javrecort. Poor tactical deployment of the German tanks soon exposed their weaker side armor to Sherman’s, which flanked and knocked out 11 panzers using the fog as cover |
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Sep 20, 1944 |
General Patton moved his element North Panther tanks moved towards CCA's headquarters component, and several 4th Armored Division support units were pinned down or trapped by the German advance. Till an opening in the sky allowed the air attack to force the Germans back to their original starting position. |
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Sep 21, 1944 |
with skies clearing, P-47 Thunderbolts of the 405th Fighter Group, 84th Fighter Wing, were able to begin a relentless series of attacks on German ground forces. Mastery of ground-air tactical coordination was a significant factor in destroying the offensive capability of the German armored formations. |
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Sep 24, 1944 |
Most of the fighting had moved to Château-Salins, near the Louran Valley. With the U.S on the high ground would pull up from defilade fire 3-2 shots and then pull back so the germens couldn’t get a clear shot on them and then relocate to a new fighting position. As another platoon would move around to their flank and engage from the side were the armor was weak |
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Sep 25, 1944 |
The CCA received orders to suspend all offensive operations and consolidate its gains. In compliance with corps orders, the entire 4th Armored Division reverted to the defense |
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Sep 26, 1944 |
CCA withdrew 5 miles to more defensible ground, with the CCB linked up with the right flank. |
Describe Action
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Date(s)/Period |
Event |
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Sep 18, 1944 |
The Germans 5th Panzer Army attacks U.S. 2nd Mechanized Cavalry losing 2 dozen panzers |
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Sep 19, 1944 |
The battle of Arracourt had begun a company-sized elements of the 113th Panzer Brigade penetrated CCA outposts on the east and south faces of CCA. Two tank destroyer platoons and a medium tank company engaged the panzers in a running fight that extended into the vicinity of CCA's headquarters, where a battalion of M7 Priest engaged the panzers with close-range direct fire. |
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Sep 20-25, 1944 |
The 111th Panzer brigade responds to Pattons move to the NE attack the rear of the eloment near the town of Moncourt. LTC Abrams, Creighton of the 37th tank battalion one of the number 1 tank aces of WWII. Defended off the attack and the Germans retreated into Moncourt. |
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Sep 20, 1944 |
Panther tanks moved towards CCA's headquarters component, and several 4th Armored Division support units were pinned down or trapped by the German advance. An Army observation pilot, Major "Bazooka Charlie" Carpenter, took to the air with his bazooka-armed L-4 Cub, USAAF serial number 43-30426 and nicknamed Rosie the Rocketer, to attack the enemy. At first, Carpenter was unable to spot the enemy due to low clouds and heavy fog, which finally lifted around noon. Spotting a company of German Panther tanks advancing towards Arracourt, Carpenter dived through German ground fire in a series of attacks against the German panzers, firing all of his bazooka rockets in repeated passes. Returning to base to reload, Carpenter flew two more sorties that afternoon, firing no fewer than sixteen bazooka rockets at German tanks and armored cars, several of which were hit. Carpenter's actions that day were later credited and verified by ground troops with knocking out two Panther tanks and several armored cars, while killing or wounding a dozen or more enemy soldiers, and was eventually credited with destroying six enemy tanks, including two Tiger I heavy tanks. Carpenter's actions also forced the German tank formation to retreat to its starting position, in the process enabling a trapped 4th Armored water point support crew to escape capture and destruction. |
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Sep 21, 1944 |
with skies clearing, P-47 Thunderbolts of the 405th Fighter Group, 84th Fighter Wing of the U.S. XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC) were able to begin a relentless series of attacks on German ground forces. In addition to missions of opportunity flown by XIX TAC fighter-bombers, CCA was able to call in tactical air strikes against German panzer concentrations. The 4th Armored's close relationship with the USAAF's XIX TAC and mastery of ground-air tactical coordination was a significant factor in destroying the offensive capability of the German armored formations. |
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Sep 24, 1944 |
Most of the fighting had moved to Château-Salins, where a fierce attack by the 559th Volksgrenadier Division of the German First Army nearly overwhelmed 4th Armored's Combat Command B, before being routed by U.S. fighter-bombers. |
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Sep 25, 1944 |
The CCA Army received orders to suspend all offensive operations and consolidate its gains. In compliance with corps orders, the entire 4th Armored Division reverted to the defense |
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Sep 26, 1944 |
CCA withdrew 5 miles to more defensible ground, and CCB, relieved at Château-Salins by the 35th Division, linked up with the right flank of CCA. The Fifth Panzer Army, by now reduced to only 25 tanks, pressed its attacks unsuccessfully for three more days, until clearing weather and increased U.S. air activity forced the Germans to suspend their counteroffensive altogether and begin a retreat towards the German frontier |
Relate Cause and Effect The Battle of Arracourt was concurrent with the end of Third Army's rapid advance across France, which had been stopped short of entering Germany by Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower's decision to divert fuel supplies to other forces. The delay allowed the German Army to regroup for the defense of the German border on the Siegfried Line. Adolf Hitler, however, was less the pleased with the results of the German offensive, and relieved the commander of Army Group G, Johannes Blaskowitz.
Arracourt was the largest tank battle involving U.S. forces on the Western Front until the Battle of the Bulge, and has been used as an example of how tactical situations and crew quality can be far more important factors in determining the outcome of a tank battle than the technical merits of the tanks themselves
Assess Significance- With superior traing the U.S. was able to defend off a much larger much more heavily equipped German force, by using tactics and controlling the battle field by maintaining the high ground and using natural terrain to force the Germans into open fields that allowed U.S. forces to use direct fires on enemy personnel and also using air support in bombing runs. The actions of 37th Tank Battalion have become prime historical examples of the employment of the characteristics of the defense. Certain characteristics such as maneuver, mass and concentration, flexibility and disruption. A paradox of the Battle of Arracourt is that the Germans believed, despite their heavy losses, that they had succeeded in their objective of stopping the advance of Patton's Third Army, as the Third Army had come to a halt. Who knows what would have happened if Patton was given the rescores/ fuel he need to advance into Germany and what impact it would have had on the outcome of WWII.
6 War Fighting Functions-
1. Movement and maneuver, the U.S on the high ground would pull up from defilade fire 3-2 shots and then pull back so the germens couldn’t get a clear shot on them and then relocate to a new fighting position. As another platoon would move around to their flank and engage from the side were the armor was weak. Germany focused more on a frontal attack were there armor was thicker and U.S weapons had little to no impact on them
2. Intelligence, with the U.S scouts forward of the main attack and intelligence gathers were able to call in accurate bumming runs that caused heavy losses for the Germans. The Germans had no real scout assets and had no intelligence on the U.S. disposition.
3. fires, being able to choose the battle field allowed for indirect fire from CCA’s artillery, air attacks and direct fire from tanks holing the high ground turned the outcome of the battle from a much larger and superior fire power.
4. Sustainment, the 3rd Army’s commander General George S. Patton was informed that his fuel supplies were being restricted and that he would have to shift to a defensive posture. The fuel was required for other U.S. forces
5. Mission command, the trust the commanders had in their subordinates to make decisions on the battle field allowed troops to make decisive decisions to counter the attack of Germans and overall win the battle.
6. Protection, The utilization of smoke to mask their movement and the use of dense fog and elevated positions to protect and hide the U.S numbers and defensive positions.