military history

Introduction

There were many actions to the D-Day invasion, the majority of which saw servicemen storming the beaches at Utah, Omaha, Gold Juno, and Sword. The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions participated in the airborne operation the evening prior to the beach landings. There was also a smaller unit action that only included three specialized infantry companies. In the big picture of D-Day, a small force with a specialized mission captures the attention those who appreciate the sacrifice of men who will themselves to go above and beyond the scope of duty. The men of the 2nd Ranger Battalion at Pointe Du Hoc have an exceptional story on a day when every story and every fight was exceptional. The assault on June 6th, 1944 on the cliffs at Pointe Du Hoc has been studied and retold through the regiments within the Special Operations community as an example of what training, great leadership, and a mental mindset that refuses to fail. These men were given the most dangerous mission on D-Day, and their infamy will live on and will serve as an example for generations of servicemen and women.

The Operational Situation

The allies began looking at invading Europe by sometime in June of 1944. The operational environment had been set. The success in the Atlantic, the Eastern Front, North Africa, Sicily, and Japan had all worked to set the stage for the liberation of Europe. A weakened Germany was what the allies had hoped for and now had. President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower, and the subordinate commanders and policy makers had decided the location for the invasion would be the Normandy Beaches in France, a plan two years in the making. [footnoteRef:1] [1: Omaha Beachhead (06 June-13June 1944), Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC 20 Sep 1945. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/100-11/100-11.HTM , (accessed June 2014). 1.]

The allies had selected the 50-mile length of coastline as the starting point in breaking through Hitler’s Atlantic Wall defense line. [footnoteRef:2] The assault on Pointe Du Hoc fell within the Omaha Beach landing, as part of Operation Neptune (the amphibious beach landings at Normandy), and finally within the complex Operation Overlord, which encompassed the entirety of the European invasion. [footnoteRef:3] [2: Ibid, 1.] [3: Ibid, 2.]

General Omar Bradley was in command of the Utah and Omaha Beach landings and Major General Leonard Gerow had command of the forces at Omaha, which included Pointe Du Hoc. [footnoteRef:4] The follow on mission included the capture of Cherbourg and Caen. V Corps, of the U.S. First Army was responsible for the area between Vierville and Colleville. Their mission was to secure the beachhead four miles inland extending from the Drôme River to the vicinity of Isigny. The 1st and 29th Divisions received this task, along with attachments of armor and artillery. [footnoteRef:5] Given the indirect fire support and aerial bombings, the numbers would be sufficient. [4: Ibid, 5. ] [5: Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1946. 1. ]

Col. Gen. Friedrich Dollmann of the German Seventh Army commanded the German defense, with a headquarters at le Mans in Normandy. LXXXIV Corps was responsible for the defense of the French coast from the Orne River to the northeast corner of Brittany. He was supported by five Infantry Divisions and could be supported by the 21st Panzer Division and two more Infantry Divisions. [footnoteRef:6] These numbers would not be sufficient in the face of the allied advance. In addition, the Germans faced the threat of the French resistance forces that would increase their irregular warfare tactics, with the assistance of the Jedburgh teams, after the European invasion. [6: Omaha Beachhead (06 June-13June 1944), Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC 20 Sep 1945. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/100-11/100-11.HTM , (accessed June 2014). 5.]

The goals of both the Germans and the Allies were simple. For the Germans, it was to defend the Atlantic coastline wall against an allied invasion force at all costs. For the Allies, gaining the beachhead along the Normandy coastline had to be secured in order for follow on forces. Removing the threat of the 155mm howitzer along the coastline was a large part of these efforts. [footnoteRef:7] [7: Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1946. 1.]

The combined allied bombings of vital German infrastructure in France prior to June 6th would set the stage in limiting German resupply and reinforcements from effectively and rapidly reaching the coast. The airborne operations infiltrating behind enemy lines the evening prior to Operation Neptune commenced Operation Overlord. The continued bombing of German positions up and down the coast from naval and aerial platforms until H-5 minutes would soften enemy resistance to the coming of the largest invasion in history for the allies. [footnoteRef:8] [8: Omaha Beachhead (06 June-13June 1944), Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC 20 Sep 1945. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/100-11/100-11.HTM , (accessed June 2014). 29. ]

Figure 1, Normandy Landings

Figure 2, Omaha Beach

Figure 3 Omaha Beach Assault Plan

The Tactical Situation

In describing the conditions that had an effect on the tactical level for the 2nd Ranger Battalion, in the After Battle Report of Pointe Du Hoc, the sea voyage from Britain to France was “rough” with “much sea-sickness”. [footnoteRef:9] The period of poor weather and rain prior to 6 June was responsible for the rough seas. On the 6th itself, the weather was in the 50’s with the water temperature in the high 40’s. The storm front that had delayed the planned invasion on the 5th was now passing east through Europe. The brief break in weather, allowed the allies to continue with the invasion, much to the surprise of the Germans, who did not expect the attack given the poor weather. [footnoteRef:10] [9: James Rudder, After-Battle-Report, Point Du Hoc. War Department, The Adjutant General’s Office, Washington DC, 22 July 1944. (redacted and declassified). Provided by the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Historian’s Office, Ft. Bragg, NC. June 2014. ] [10: Klein, Christopher, The Weather Forecast That Saved D-Day, June 2014. History.com. http://www.history.com/news/the-weather-forecast-that-saved-d-day , (accessed June 2014).]

The rough seas were partially to blame for wet gear once on the beach. The ropes that were brought for climbing the cliffs at the pointe were wet, making it much more difficult to ascend. Many of the rockets used to “shoot” the ropes over the top of the cliffs failed due to the extra weight of the wet ropes. [footnoteRef:11] No doubt that the men had difficulty handling the equipment with such dampness and cool air temperature. All being said, the biggest advantage that the weather provided was the unexpectedness of the attack. Although it added a slight dimension to the battle, neither side received a distinct advantage due to the weather. In addition, the cliffs were muddy and contained a lot of clay, making it difficult to climb, as the ropes became muddy as well. First Sergeant Lomell recalled that “Foremost in our minds was the challenge of getting up that cliff, which was wet from rain and clay and very slippery.” [footnoteRef:12] [11: James Rudder, After-Battle-Report, Point Du Hoc. War Department, The Adjutant General’s Office, Washington DC, 22 July 1944. (redacted and declassified). Provided by the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Historian’s Office, Ft. Bragg, NC. June 2014.] [12: Frederick, Michael, D-Day: Interview with Two U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion Members Who Describe the Attack at Point-du-Hoc. WW II Magazine, July 2001. http://www.historynet.com/d-day-interview-with-two-us-2nd-ranger-battalion- members-who-describe-the-attack-at-pointe-du-hoc.htm , (accessed June 2014). ]

The terrain at Point Du Hoc was some of the most difficult in all of the Normandy Beaches. The assault is studied mainly due to the difficulty of the terrain and the cliffs in which the Rangers were tasked to climb up. Protected from attack by the channel, the cliffs themselves were between 80 and 100 feet in height. The German defenders felt that the pointe was an unlikely position in which the allies would attack, as it was viewed as “impregnable”. [footnoteRef:13] The Germans expected, if any, attack to come from inland. Aerial photography confirmed what the allies expected, and that was that the point was nearly impregnable from the seaward side. Defenses were constructed facing inland and were susceptible to indirect fire. Direct fire from the beach was impossible. Not until the Rangers reached the top, would direct fire weaponry be effective. Opposing the Rangers, the Germans had the advantage of lobbing hand grenades down towards the base of the cliffs and some direct fire capabilities. [footnoteRef:14] [13: Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1946. 2. ] [14: James Rudder, After-Battle-Report, Point Du Hoc. War Department, The Adjutant General’s Office, Washington DC, 22 July 1944. (redacted and declassified). Provided by the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Historian’s Office, Ft. Bragg, NC. June 2014.]

In regards to the approach, the Rangers were limited to the beach landing, as it fit into the overall operational planning and support. The Rangers were required to fight up the cliffs and until they could get enough men to hold ground for more Rangers to come up. E and F Companies would approach the pointe to the east, and by D Company to the west and the climbing of the cliffs took place at each location to maximize the chances of success. [footnoteRef:15] The weather had affected the climb by making the cliffs wet and slippery and not to mention the 30-yard distance between the ocean and the base of the cliffs.[footnoteRef:16] [15: Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1946. 5-6.] [16: Ibid, 9.]

The pointe itself was considered key terrain by the allies, as the location was one of the most dangerous coastal defense positions. The suspected six 155 howitzers could emplace fire on the Omaha and Utah Beaches and could reach 25,000 yards with its fires. Removing the German threat would ensure success on the other phases of the operation by removing the threat of the 155’s. The side that could successfully hold the terrain would control the outcome of the invasion on the beaches. At the beach, the men found the bomb craters to be a handicap in moving themselves and their gear to the relative protection of the cliff base. At the top of the cliffs, most of the German fortifications were either damaged or destroyed. The Rangers used the terrain for cover and there was very little concealment from the enemy until they reached the cliff base. The entire plan relied on getting as quick as possible to the base of the cliffs and up to the top. [footnoteRef:17] [17: Frederick, Michael, D-Day: Interview with Two U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion Members Who Describe the Attack at Point-du-Hoc. WW II Magazine, July 2001. http://www.historynet.com/d-day-interview-with-two-us-2nd-ranger-battalion- members-who-describe-the-attack-at-pointe-du-hoc.htm , (accessed June 2014). ]

Figure 4, Assault Plan

The 2nd Ranger Battalion at Pointe Du Hoc consisted of three companies of D, E, and F, totaling 190 men, while the rest of the force waited offshore until the pointe could be secured. [footnoteRef:18] Meanwhile, enemy troop strength was an estimated 125 infantry troops and 85 artillerymen of the 716th Infantry Division. Numerically, the Germans held the advantage in number superiority, but the Rangers were far better prepared. [footnoteRef:19] Elements of the 726th Infantry Regiment held widely sporadic lines adjacent to the 716th, however, the Germans just plain did not make great preparations to defend this length of the coast in depth. [footnoteRef:20] [18: Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1946. 18.] [19: Ibid, 2. ] [20: Ibid, 3.]

The Germans along with having six of the 155 howitzers also had small arms weapons and hand grenades. As the Germans moved to fire upon the Rangers below, Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) fire would pick them off, serving in over-watching positions as the Rangers assaulted the cliffs. The allies, arriving fully prepared, versus the Germans who had limited supplies, were able to fight the Germans head on with overwhelming success. [footnoteRef:21] [21: Ibid, 13.]

German communications, like the allies, used encrypted radio communications. Overall, the Germans had a level of confusion in reacting to the Rangers at the pointe. Their lack of response may have been due to the heavy allied bombing prior to the assault. The Rangers meanwhile relied on the 500 radio, which was heavy and had a large antenna for the transmission of its radio waves supported the passage and reception of information. [footnoteRef:22] [22: Frederick, Michael, D-Day: Interview with Two U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion Members Who Describe the Attack at Point-du-Hoc. WW II Magazine, July 2001. http://www.historynet.com/d-day-interview-with-two-us-2nd-ranger-battalion- members-who-describe-the-attack-at-pointe-du-hoc.htm , (accessed June 2014).]

The Germans knew there was an impending invasion, the answer that they didn’t know was where the invasion would come from. Given the previously mentioned bad weather, even when the attack came, the Germans were caught off guard. Even the allied bombing campaign did not give away the operation, as attacks were taking place all over France and Germany. For the allies, aerial imagery was the best intelligence tool. As mentioned, the Rangers were tasked to take out the 155mm batteries. Allied intelligence clearly showed encasements for these weapons and that is how and why the mission came about. [footnoteRef:23] By the time the Rangers reached the cliff tops, the guns had been moved, but were discovered nearby after sweeping the area. [footnoteRef:24] The lack of allied forces on continental Europe hindered intelligence efforts in German controlled territory. [23: Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1946. 2.] [24: Hogan, David, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, Center of Military History Publication 70-42. Department of the Army, Washington, DC. 1992. Chapter 3. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/70-42/70-42c.htm , (accessed June 2014).]

The Rangers, for their role on D-Day, trained continuously in preparation. Initially surprised at the task assigned him, LTC Rudder focused training on cliff climbing and amphibious assault tactics, as well as physical training. [footnoteRef:25] The Rangers were a small unit infantry unit, meaning they excelled at the tactical level in battle drills and combat actions. The Germans were far less trained and prepared for battle, as the more experienced and capable units were fighting in the eastern Front against Russia. [25: Ibid.]

The Germans, at this point in the course of the war were generally optimistic, however, many in the higher echelons believed the war was lost, like Rommel. For the Rangers, this was their first solo mission in the war. They had accompanied British commandos during raids on German installations. [footnoteRef:26] Although facing a tough mission, the men were well trained and prepared and were up to the challenge. The difficulty in the poor weather no doubt played with emotions, wondering when the mission would actually be executed, however there is no reporting on any negative morale issues. The Rangers were as prepared to conduct this mission as they possibly could be and they were more than accepting of the challenge. [26: Ibid.]

Lieutenant Colonel James Earl Rudder led the 2nd Ranger Battalion. [footnoteRef:27] Rudder, a former football coach from Texas was a popular leader in the Ranger Battalion. He hosted monthly “gripe sessions” in which soldiers were afforded the opportunity to vocalize complaints such as food and barracks conditions. For his part, Rudder demanded a lot from his men and had high standards for the unit. [footnoteRef:28] [27: James Rudder, After-Battle-Report, Point Du Hoc. War Department, The Adjutant General’s Office, Washington DC, 22 July 1944. (redacted and declassified). Provided by the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Historian’s Office, Ft. Bragg, NC. June 2014.] [28: Hogan, David, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, Center of Military History Publication 70-42. Department of the Army, Washington, DC. 1992. Chapter 3. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/70-42/70-42c.htm , (accessed June 2014).]

One of the more famous soldiers of the war and the first Ranger wounded during the assault was First Sergeant Leonard Lomell, honored in Tom Brokaw’s book, The Greatest Generation. [footnoteRef:29] Men like Rudder and Lomell peppered the ranks of the Rangers and increased the odds of success with their leadership. [29: Michael Frederick, D-Day: Interview with Two U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion Members Who Describe the Attack at Point-du-Hoc. WW II Magazine, July 2001. http://www.historynet.com/d-day-interview-with-two-us-2nd-ranger-battalion- members-who-describe-the-attack-at-pointe-du-hoc.htm , (accessed June 2014). ]

Figure 5, LTC James Rudder, Commander during the Point Du Hoc assault.

Provided that there was very little room for deviation from the assault plan, Rudder had the men prepare for the attack by rehearsing non-stop. Studying terrain imagery, enemy defenses, as well as preparing his men, LTC Rudder was prepared to execute the mission. The fact that he had Rangers on top of the cliffs within ten minutes of the first craft landing gives testimony to his leadership and ability. For the German defense, as mentioned, they were woefully unprepared for the attack at their location. The allied fires continuing until an H-5 minute was also a display of allied timing, coordination, and execution ability. Essentially all the Germans had to do was repel the attack in support of the Atlantic Wall defense.

Describe the Action

The roughly 200 enemy troops at Pointe Du Hoc had suffered an endless bombing campaign, destroying much of the defense, but were still capable of putting up a fight. In the commencing chronology of events from the After Battle Report from the 2nd Ranger Battalion, D, E, and F Companies would soon accomplish the seemingly impossible. At 1630 on 05 June, the group departed Britain for France. At 0300 on 6 June, D-Day, they reached the transport area. At 0445 LTC Rudder began movement on the DUKW to Pointe Du Hoc. The men landed at the pointe at 0705, 35 minutes past their scheduled time due to a navigational error that was corrected. The end of naval gunfire at H-5 allowed the enemy to recover from “bombardment and man positions.” [footnoteRef:30] [30: James Rudder, After-Battle-Report, Point Du Hoc. War Department, The Adjutant General’s Office, Washington DC, 22 July 1944. (redacted and declassified). Provided by the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Historian’s Office, Ft. Bragg, NC. June 2014.]

Under German sniper and machine gun fire, along with a “constant rain of grenades”, the Rangers moved the 30 yards of beach to the base of the cliffs where a temporary command post (CP) was established. [footnoteRef:31] The allied bombing had effectively destroyed one anti-aircraft gun, three 155mm emplacements and one of the suspected six 155mm howitzers. Although the Rangers had men on top of the cliffs within 10 minutes, the enemy was inflicting casualties. By 1200, they had received at least 7 killed, and 24 wounded from E and F Companies. Later in the afternoon, the Ranger Battalion only had accountability of 70 men for all three Companies. [footnoteRef:32] [31: Ibid.] [32: Ibid. ]

With an initial foothold secured, the Rangers signaled back to the awaiting force offshore by Carrier Pigeon, Radio, and lamp signals. The latter was stated to be the most reliable in controlling naval fires. The ability to think on their feet and find a means in which to successfully communicate with their supporting elements while simultaneously fighting on the beach speaks to the level of training and proficiency of the Rangers. One BAR gunner was even credited for killing 30 enemy Germans firing upon the advancing Rangers. [footnoteRef:33] [33: Ibid. ]

The Ranger Companies used speed as their main weapon on the assault at Pointe Du Hoc. Surprising the enemy and not allowing them to gain a defensive advantage served them well, even despite the later than expected arrival, which allowed the Germans to leave their bunkers earlier than the allies had planned. Unlike other locations on D-Day, the Ranger Battalion was not disappointed in the pre-landing bombardment. The areas at the top of the cliffs, the German fortifications, were completely destroyed, a “bewildering wasteland” of twisted metal and torn earth. [footnoteRef:34] [34: Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1946. 18. ]

As the elements on top of the cliffs re-organized, the men of D, E, and F Companies set out on their main objective of finding and destroying the remaining five 155mm’s. The remaining five were discovered a short distance away and destroyed. The Rangers, low on ammunition by early afternoon, were resupplied with food, ammunition and one platoon of reinforcements to bolster their numbers due to casualties. By night of D+1, the 2nd Ranger Battalion had been reinforced with the other Ranger elements. By D+2, the Rangers had completed their mission and were relieved. [footnoteRef:35] [35: Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1946. 62.]

Down to 90 fighting men, LTC Rudder was able to accomplish his mission. He had relayed messages of his high casualty numbers, which were treated as reinforcements were sent ashore. The men effectively captured German soldiers and interrogated them for any possible intelligence. For the Germans, they suffered a complete route, but still attempted offensive attacks on the evening of D+1 to no minimal effect. The invasion would begin the retreat of the German forces from France and unable to surmount a major offensive of their own until the Battle of the Bulge. [footnoteRef:36] [36: Ibid, 62.]

Figure 6, Depicting Point Du Hoc on D-Day.

Significance of the Action

The immediate effect of the Ranger forces at Pointe Du Hoc was the verification of the 155mm howitzers. Although five had been moved, all six were put out of commission. The 2nd and 5th Battalions were able to advance past the pointe itself and move inland where it disrupted the German defense. This is significant because of the main force at Omaha Beach was having many difficulties. Alleviating some of the effects that the Germans would have had on them was a much-deserved bonus. Cleary the Rangers had the advantage of speed and surprise in defeating the Germans at Point Du Hoc, along with the extremely successful allied bombardment. The Allies quickly won Caen and St Mere Eglise from the Germans and destroyed their Atlantic Wall defensive plan. The Germans would surrender to the Allies in less than a year.

The Pointe Du Hoc assault was one of the shining examples of American spirit and ability. Strategically, the operation assisted in freeing the French from a long occupation of German forces and German rule. The Germans would be forced to pull back to the Siegfried Line by winter. The success of the allied invasion at Normandy is celebrated as one of the greatest of our time, and in history. The Battle of Pointe Du Hoc did not solely determine the outcome of the war in Europe or of World War II, it did however serve as a display of American ability and might. “Rangers Lead The Way” is the creed in which the men of Ranger Regiment still live by today, thanks to their predecessors, who did not shirk in the face of adversity and incredible odds at Point Du Hoc.

Bibliography

Omaha Beachhead (06 June-13June 1944), Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC 20 Sep 1945. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/100-11/100-11.HTM , (accessed June 2014).

Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1946. Pgs 1-63.

James Rudder, After-Battle-Report, Point Du Hoc. War Department, The Adjutant General’s Office, Washington DC, 22 July 1944. (redacted and declassified). Provided by the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Historian’s Office, Ft. Bragg, NC. June 2014.

Christopher Klein, The Weather Forecast That Saved D-Day, June 2014. History.com. http://www.history.com/news/the-weather-forecast-that-saved-d-day , (accessed June 2014).

Michael Frederick, D-Day: Interview with Two U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion Members Who Describe the Attack at Point-du-Hoc. WW II Magazine, July 2001. http://www.historynet.com/d-day-interview-with-two-us-2nd-ranger-battalion- members-who-describe-the-attack-at-pointe-du-hoc.htm , (accessed June 2014).

David Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, Center of Military History Publication 70-42. Department of the Army, Washington, DC. 1992. Chapter 3. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/70-42/70-42c.htm , (accessed June 2014).

Figure 1: https://encrypted- tbn3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcTRf7OMbk71e0LTFyHjd3QbT4qA- kA5Nu_WEn9QAb8lp0GpOk7B

Figure 2: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/70-42/map4.JPG

Figure 3: Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1946. Pg 1.

Figure 4: Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1946. Pg 5.

Figure 5: David Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, Center of Military History Publication 70-42. Department of the Army, Washington, DC. 1992. Chapter 3. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/70-42/70-42c.htm , (accessed June 2014).

Figure 6: Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, U.S. War Department, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1946. Pg 31.