

grammes of this kind, but it will be a decade before we shall be able to consider the results.

However, we can examine core-periphery relations as exemplified in the prestige goods exchange. Excavations at Southampton, for instance, indicate no signs of the *increased flow* that Renfrew predicts. Instead (as at other European gateway communities) these settlements began on a level which was more or less maintained, depending upon the relations between participating élites. Their role was to achieve a level of economic stability, and many factors prevented an increased volume of trade. One obvious one in the Anglo-Saxon period was that the boats of the time had very restricted cargo capacities, and only a major technological improvement or many new craft could enable the volume of goods to be increased (Hodges 1982a: 94-100). The population was evidently increasing at a slow rate, and the gradual improvement in the climate allowed agrarian resources to expand. But of one matter we can be sure: regional production increased slowly and élite wealth increased at the same pace. Social change leading to the formation of the nation state transformed the bases of society, and population, production and regional distribution increased on a scale that is readily detected even by second-rate archaeological programmes.

By contrast, competition and symbolic entrainment were evidently key factors governing political change. Competition between polities and the slow increases in agrarian production provided the foundations of political change, but the transformation itself seems to have been effected with the support of an exogenous ideology. Hence, Christianity was the means by which seventh-century kings changed the social order, but the Church itself, of course, made use of the developments which preceded its arrival, as well as the interaction between the polities accentuated by its arrival. We have yet to establish the context for the massive increase in long-distance trade at the end of the seventh century, but we can be sure that the West Saxon trade and the Northumbrian renaissance (responsible for such masterpieces as the Lindisfarne Gospels) are part of an important change in the *structure* of Anglo-Saxon society. We can be in no doubt that ideology was a critical variable in medieval society, one appreciated by Alfred and so in all likelihood not lost on early Anglo-Saxon kings. The use of new concepts, like the use made of great scholars, was often as machiavellian as the political gamesmanship with which we are familiar (cf. Ullmann 1969). To detect this, however, we must be able to place the cognitive and cultural aspects of the archaeological record in their systemic context. Peer polity interaction seems to emphasise this point *contra* many recent polemical statements on cognitive archaeology (cf. Hodder 1982b).

(vi) *We predict transformations in these polities associated with the intensification of production and the further development of hierarchical structures for the exercise of power. Here, Anglo-Saxon archaeology*

indicates quite the opposite. Instead, at the point of political transformation (in each horizon), it is possible to show the existence of moderately increasing production before and after the moment of change. However, the management of resources appears to change at the inception of a new political horizon. The 'Middle Saxon shuffle', like the incidence of land charters, is a mark of this development. The complex laws of Ina, King of Wessex, written down as Hamwih was being created, may reflect further managerial changes at the end of the seventh century. The Tribal Hidage is another index of changing managerial attitudes to resources. But there is no evidence of an increased volume of agrarian produce, and if we use other archaeological measures, such as coinage or pottery, as a means of illustrating the pattern of production during the Middle Saxon period, we must seriously doubt any archaeologically detectable phase of 'intensification' as such. Intensification, however, most clearly occurred in the tenth century, on a scale which transformed the character of the land. As I have shown elsewhere (Hodges 1982a: 185-98), production was organised to meet the needs of the political élite. The number of specialists (in the Church, on the land, in the royal administration etc.) was extremely small before the creation of the state, at which time a new energy system came into being with all the ramifications that that entailed (Gall and Saxe 1977).

Conclusion

Peer polity interaction is a valuable concept for the Anglo-Saxon period because it directs attention to two important aspects of this epoch. First, it emphasises the circumstances upon which socio-political transformation can be built; it focuses on the systemic interactions which make change possible. Secondly, it qualifies the useful models proposed by neo-Marxist anthropologists and geographers. On the one hand, it emphasises the existence of balanced trade in the substantivist framework (Dalton 1975), as opposed to the exploitative frameworks that form the guiding principle of the core-periphery model used by Wallerstein (1974), Smith (1976) and Friedman (1982). On the other hand, it underlines the mediation between the polities and the imported ideas as well as the luxuries, which in these circumstances often proved to be a critical variable in stabilising political change. This concept, therefore, draws attention to the interaction between processes and individual action. It emphasises the stepped (or punctuated) evolution of complex societies and the systemic consequences of this transition. To appreciate such a complex trajectory, however, calls for sound archaeological data and a fine chronology, as I have indicated. In these circumstances, the concept of peer polity analysis enhances our comprehension of the interaction between the three levels of history defined by Braudel; it compels us to investigate the relations between archaeology and history; and, above all, it sheds light on the processes of the past which are too often reduced in a meaningless manner when such concepts are lacking (cf. Adams 1974).

Chapter 6

Jiehao, tonghao: peer relations in East Asia Gina L. Barnes

One of the most pressing problems in East Asian archaeology today is the assessment of the relationships between China, Korea and Japan (Fig. 6.1) in bringing about complex social development in the Yellow Sea region. North China developed relatively early: by 1200 BC there was a highly stratified society known as the Shang, indicated archaeologically at Anyang by elaborate shaft-tomb graves, craft specialisation in bronze, jade and ceramics, and the beginnings of literacy and administration, seen in the oracle bones (Chang 1980). Competition and then warfare between the feudal states of the Zhou period, which developed in the wake of the Shang civilisation (Table 6.1), characterised much of the first millennium BC. Unification of these feudal states under the Han Dynasty in 206 BC marked the beginning of an expansionist empire. Chinese military outposts were established on the continent around the periphery of the empire, including Luolang and Taifang on the Korean peninsula, drawing local populations into a complex system of trade and exchange (Yu 1967). Furthermore, the courts of Han and Wei, a subsequent dynasty, frequently dispatched envoys to distant lands to record the customs of local inhabitants. As a result, we are given our first historical glimpse of life in the Japanese islands during what is known archaeologically as the Yayoi period. Island envoys to the Chinese court are also recorded from AD 57 onwards in the Chinese dynastic chronicles, and by the mid-third century AD, 30 'countries' (*kuni*) in Japan

were said to be maintaining relations with the Chinese court (Tsunoda and Goodrich 1951: 8).

Because of the undeniable fact of the incorporation of the Korean peninsula and the Japanese islands into the greater Han cultural sphere, the development of complex societies in these areas has often been explained away as a secondary manifestation of Chinese culture. For example, it has been standard practice to derive the formation of the four Korean kingdoms of the middle first millennium AD—Paekche, Kaya, Silla and Koguryo—directly from the military occupation of the peninsula by the Chinese beginning in 108 BC, although there is currently a trend to reject this interpretation (Pearson 1979). In turn, the impetus for Japanese state formation has been characterised by some as the conquest of the islands by a horse-riding élite from the Korean peninsula (Egami 1964; 1967; Ledyard 1975).

These explanations explicitly embody a core-periphery, superior-inferior framework for looking at cultural development, first in the case of China versus Korea and then in the case of Korea versus Japan. In both cases, reliance on the concepts of diffusion and colonisation prematurely obviates any investigation of the possibility of an indigenous elaboration of social organisation. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that states are intricate forms of social organisation, requiring economic and political foundations that are more than diffused traits and that cannot be created overnight. The




Fig. 6.1. Yellow Sea interaction sphere: north China, Korean peninsula and western Japanese islands.

Table 6.1. East Asian chronological chart

	Chinese mainland	Korean peninsula	Japanese islands
BC			
1700			
1500	Shang civilisation	Chulmun (mesolithic)	Jomon (mesolithic)
1300			
1100			
900	Zhou period	Bronze–Iron Age	
700			
500			
300			
	221 Qin Dynasty		
	206	108 Establishment of Luolang commandary	Yayoi (agriculturalists)
100			
AD			
100	Han Dynasty		
	220		
300	Three kingdoms Six dynasties	Three kingdoms Koguryo Paekche Silla	Kofun (Mounded Tomb culture)
500			
	581 Sui Dynasty		
	618		
700	Tang Dynasty	668 United Silla	710 Nara period

qualitative transformation of a simple society into one with the complexity of a fully-fledged state occurs through time within a systemic context, and involves changes in basic socio-economic variables which can be monitored archaeologically. These include demographic changes, increasing specialisation in crafts and agricultural production, increasingly hierarchical organisation, and the development of specialised administrative facilities.

Although societies in both the Korean peninsula and the Japanese islands were constantly subject to influence from the central Chinese area, their trajectories of social development, in terms of the above variables, are more similar to each other than to China. In particular, the emergence of state-like polities occurred at approximately the same time in both Korea and Japan, namely around the fifth century AD. This suggests that the development of complex society in these two areas occurred as part of a single process involving both of them equally, a process which can and should be segregated from the more generalised influences of China on each. Several facts support this line of thinking:

1 Archaeologically identifiable polities in Korea developed four to five centuries after the initial Chinese colonisation, so the latter's influence on actual state formation must have been of secondary importance.

2 The simultaneous appearance of strong Japanese and Korean polities took place at a time when China itself was divided into smaller contending states, none of which pursued a policy of foreign aggression or intervention such as had occurred during the Han Dynasty.

3 Early Japanese polities utilised objects derived from the continent for the symbolic expression of political relations; however, the relations expressed were not those between China and Japan, but those between polities in Japan itself.

4 The peninsular and insular kings mentioned in the early chronicles maintained contact with China, and their relations with the Chinese court might be characterised as hierarchical. However, as Hirano (1977: 72) emphasises, 'the relations [between Korea and Japan] are more properly described by the frequently repeated terms [in the Chinese accounts] for peer relations, *jiehao* and *tonghao*'.¹ Military conflicts between various kings are also attested to in stele inscriptions on the peninsula (Szczesniak 1952), as well as in the early Japanese chronicles covering the period in question (Aston 1896).

Thus, it is possible to view the developments in Korea and Japan in the context of a nexus of interactions which were

tangential to China proper. While the presence of core-periphery relationships between China and Japan/Korea is acknowledged, I am suggesting that they were not of prime importance in bringing the peripheral states into existence. Instead, it can be postulated that the crucial relationships occurred within the Korea-Japan subregion and took the form of interaction between political groupings that were essentially 'peer' to each other.

The developmental sequence in this subregion can be divided into two stages: (a) when polity interrelations were conditioned by, and confined to, interactions within Japan and Korea respectively, and (b) when the major polity interactions took place between Japan and Korea. The first stage encompasses the second to fourth centuries AD, while the second stage covers the fifth and sixth centuries. Before examining the details of this developmental sequence, it is necessary first to clarify how I understand the concept of peer polity interaction and how I will be using it to illuminate the East Asian case.

Us versus them: a model for elite interaction

Although in Renfrew's formulation of the peer polity interaction model (this volume: Ch. 1) the units in interaction may be anything from the autonomous village to the state, here I will confine my definition of 'polity' to those social units with formal political structure—that is, centralised societies occupying hierarchically organised territories. Within these centralised hierarchical polities, it is interaction at the upper social levels that I see as the crucial driving force for social development and organisational elaboration. Thus, in this paper I will use the concept of peer polity interaction only in the sense of interaction among élites of equivalent political groupings.

Peer polity interaction is judged to be an effective concept for organising the East Asian data primarily because, unlike earlier formulations of interaction, it specifies the unit of social activity: the stratified polity. In doing so, it avoids the assumption of undifferentiated social space implicitly built into diffusionist models of interaction, and it avoids the assumption of 'through flow' in network models of interaction, where the social unit is merely a node through which interaction activities pass. (Compare Irwin-Williams (1977) and Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza (1979) with Alden (1979) and Struever and Houart (1972).) The peer polity concept places the focus of interaction squarely on the different status groups of people occupying the polity.

The peer polity concept as originally defined does not provide a model for elite interaction, since it was designed to be of use in a wide range of social situations; thus it is first necessary to develop such a model. In this section I will draw on concepts from three existing spheres of investigation in order to construct a synthetic model of how interaction between peer polities can foster organisational elaboration. These existing concepts are (i) that for determining social identity, (ii) that for interest group formation, and (iii) that

for prestige goods production and distribution. First, a formulation of interpersonal social relations derived from Japan may be useful in structuring an approach to elite interaction: this is the concept of in-group (*uchi*)/out-group (*soto*) relations (Nakane 1970). Commonly applied to account for patterns of interaction in modern Japanese society, this concept specifies individual identity in terms of us/them relations. At any particular moment, individuals interact with an 'in-group' as participating members and everyone else is considered part of the 'out-group'. However, the composition of both groups will change at different moments according to the identity needs of the individual; they may shift focus, or expand or contract in size. The concept focuses on the individual and can be extended to include first the family, then the neighbourhood, the place of work, the region of residence and finally the nation state. Depending on the particular needs of the moment, individuals may place themselves as members within any one of these units. The two important aspects of this concept are (i) that membership identification is continually shifting between small and large groups and (ii) that people who are considered as outsiders at a lower level of inclusion ('my family versus our family') are often considered as insiders at a higher level ('our neighbourhood versus that other neighbourhood'). The level of group identification is determined by social context and not by absolute or invariant criteria.

This insider/outsider concept is clearly not related to a particular level of social organisation; nevertheless, it can serve to clarify what may be happening during peer polity formation. An important element in the formation of hierarchical polities is the emergence of an élite. Current models of social evolution postulate that in some cases this may be effected by a particular lineage assuming the role of representatives of the ancestors, mediating access by the other lineages to the ancestral (and territorial) spirits (Friedman and Rowlands 1977). The élite at the apex of such conically arranged societies are thus very much involved, as the deities' major representatives, with the internal structuring, scheduling and functioning of activities. Nevertheless, personal interactive ties are established outside the conical unit with the élite of other similar social formations. The élite therefore have the choice of identification with either their own local polity or a supralocal élite grouping.

The intensity with which members identify with one or the other may determine whether elite objects and social 'structures' are shared between polities or whether local differences are stressed to maintain identity differences. If identification is essentially local, then interaction may lead to the trading of certain ideas or material items between polities, but these are then reinterpreted in a local context. Elite interests directed internally, therefore, may lead to 'balkanization' (Freidel 1981a), with a number of shared traits but no coherent integrative system connecting the polities. On the other hand, if identification is with the supralocal grouping, then interaction may lead to the retention and

reproduction of traded items and ideas with minimal reinterpretation. A homogeneous symbolic content is maintained because it represents membership in the wider, élite group; it is also the key to that membership and ensures its continuation. Elite interests directed externally, then, will result in activities and social 'structures' having considerable homogeneity and conformity through space. This conformity is predicated on participation and a feeling of membership, not on anonymous transactions.

The formation of an élite subculture is essentially the objectification of social stratification in material terms. Stratification or the formation of social classes has long been a crucial concept in the study of state origins; yet in the study of modern society, where the concept of 'class' has been most used, it is falling into disfavour as an analytical concept. Instead, attention is coming to be focused on smaller 'interest' groups (Cohen 1974). Cohen stresses that membership in, or identification with, an interest group is always accompanied by the manipulation of symbolic forms—material symbols as generalised as style of dress, and non-material symbols including language, dialect, accent, etc. It is by these symbols that members recognise each other and proceed to communicate or interact, knowing that they share similar value systems and basic background information.

It is my perception that the crucial step in the formation of an élite subculture is the development of qualitatively different material objects that symbolise élite group membership. Thus the formation of a supralocal élite interaction network is postulated to coincide with the creation of prestige goods which are subject to sumptuary rules. These prestige goods are more than indicators of wealth; they are the material symbols of group membership. Therefore, the distribution of the objects through social space reflects not merely the ability to acquire them through trade relations, but reflects even more the restrictions against acquiring them without belonging to the 'in-group'. These sumptuary rules pose a problem, namely the maintenance of restricted access to those goods during both production and distribution. Essentially, such goods may be acquired in one of two ways: they may be extracted from, or obtained through, exclusive trade arrangements with social units which are not part of the élite membership group; or they may be produced locally under élite control. These conditions will have differing effects on the structural elaboration of society: the former may lead to the territorial expansion of the élite group to include those from whom it obtains its needed goods; and the latter may lead to greater craft and administrative specialisation within the local polity.

Combining these three concepts—of insider/outsider identity distinction, interest group formation, and prestige goods production—we arrive at a model which specifies that the degree to which the élites of particular polities identify themselves on a supralocal basis will correlate with the degree of homogeneity of material goods manipulated or utilised by the élites. Greater homogeneity of goods implies standardisation—that is, control over the production of the

goods. Whether this control is in the form of adherence to social convention or explicit specifications of dimensions and design is unclear. But either convention or regulation is implied by this model for both prestige goods production and their distribution limiting the accessibility of the final product.

This argument gives theoretical underpinning to the archaeological interpretation of homogeneous élite cultural assemblages as representing the extension of political authority. This is a standard interpretation of the expansion of the Mounded Tomb culture in protohistoric Japan (Kobayashi 1961). I would argue, however, that the 'political authority' in question was not a centralised one controlling the entire broad region of the Mounded Tomb culture, but took the form of the establishment of a network of political relations based on group identity. The nodes in this network, the individual polities, were then available for rearrangement into hierarchical orderings at a later date when one or more became dominant over their peers. In the succeeding sections, we shall investigate the nature of polity formation in protohistoric Japan and the evidence for élite interaction, together with its effects on production.

Polity identification

Our first task in investigating peer polity interaction in Japan is to identify the polities that form the basis of our analysis. Two sources of data can be exploited to that end: ethnohistorical records in the Chinese chronicles and archaeological evidence in the form of mounded tomb distributions. The Chinese dynastic history for AD 221–65, the *Wei Zhi* (compiled between 233 and 297), provides evidence for the presence of centralised territorial groupings, as described below, but it is difficult to determine whether these territories were hierarchically organised in a spatial sense. The *Wei Zhi* states that 'The people of Wa [Japan] . . . formerly comprised more than one hundred communities. During the [Later] Han Dynasty [Wa envoys] appeared at the Court; today thirty of their communities maintain intercourse [with us] through envoys and scribes' (Tsunoda and Goodrich 1951: 8). Further ethnographic accounts of these communities include the data given in Table 6.2.

The transliterations of place names and official positions given here, taken unchanged from Tsunoda and Goodrich (1951), are of dubious accuracy for various reasons; still, it is occasionally possible to make tentative identifications between places mentioned in the *Wei Zhi* and known locations in ancient Japan. Most of the 'countries' (*kuni*) from Tsushima to Toma in Table 6.2 are thought to have existed in or near Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan's main islands and the closest to Korea. The location of Yamadai/Yamatai, however, has been a raging historiographical controversy for the last millennium (Young 1958). Essentially, the proponents are divided between the Kyushu theory and the Yamato theory, the first locating Yamatai in Kyushu's Fukuoka Prefecture and the second putting it at the head of the Inland Sea in Yamato (present-day Nara Prefecture) (Fig. 6.2). I do not propose to

Table 6.2. *Wei Zhi* data on third-century polities in Japan

Size	Country	Chief official	Next-in-rank	Households
400 sq. <i>li</i>	Tsushima	hiku	hinumori	1,000 +
300 sq. <i>li</i>	?	hiku	hinumori	3,000
—	Matsuro	—	—	4,000 +
—	Izu	niki	semmoku, hekkuko	1,000 +
—	Nu	shimako	hinumori	20,000 +
—	Fumi	tamo	hinumori	1,000 +
—	Toma	mimi	miminari	50,000
—	Yamadai	Queen Himiko	ikima, mimasho, mimagushi, nakato	70,000 +

continue the arguments here, but only to point out that Japanese society of the time, as seen through Chinese eyes, consisted of several important components:

- 1 spatially defined political units with
- 2 centralised leadership and
- 3 fairly large populations

In general, the data on polity sizes are inadequate. Using the Han and Wei Dynasty values for the *li* (Han *li* = 346.5 m; Wei *li* = 415 m (Young 1958: 35)), we can calculate that Tsushima's area of 400 sq. *li* would correspond to roughly 48 or 69 sq. km, and the unnamed polity would have been about 36 or 52 sq. km in area. The *Wei Zhi* also gives the distances, in *li* or days, between these various polities; but at the present stage of historiographical knowledge, these figures must be adjudged too imprecise (or even apocryphal) to be of use to us. The further list of neighbouring 'countries', however, at least gives an idea of the multiplicity of polities in Japan at that time. Countries beyond Yamatai to the north and under its queen's dominion were Shima, Ippoki, Iza, Tsuki, Minu, Kasoto, Fuku, Shanu, Tsusu, Sonu, Koyi, Kenuson, Ki, Igo, Kinu, Yama, Kushi, Hari, Kiwi, Wunu, and Nu. To the south and not under the queen's dominion was Kunu, 12,000 *li* (between 4,000 and 5,000 km) from Yamatai, with a chief official called *kukochi-hiko*.

It is unclear from these historical data whether the polities recorded actually consisted of territorial hierarchies. The problem is linguistic and involves the interpretation of the semantic components of the names listed in Table 6.2 for the next-in-rank. The word *hinumori* is used in four cases, and Tsunoda suggests it is related to *hinamori*, whose components mean 'outlying' (*hina*) and 'to guard over' (*mori*) (Tsunoda and Goodrich 1951: 17). This interpretation suggests the existence of secondary settlements, or the guarding of the border (Miller 1967: 20), where individuals of secondary rank had their operation base. In contrast, if *hinumori* is broken into three semantic components (*hi-nu-mori*) instead of two, and if the *hi* is interpreted as the same component as in the words *hi-me* (*hi*-female = princess), *hi-ko* (*hi*-male = prince) and *hi-miko* (*hi*-shaman), the meaning of *hinumori* changes to something like 'protector of the *hi*', the connective *nu* being

a possessive. One of the meanings of the native word *hi* is sun; knowing that the later imperial line claimed descent from the sun goddess, we may interpret the *hi* element as meaning 'sun', in reference to both the ruler and the goddess. Such a concordance of meaning agrees well with theoretical predictions of ruler-deity identity (Friedman and Rowlands 1977). This interpretation is at least as likely linguistically as *hinamori* ('outlying' and 'guard over') (D.W. Hughes, personal communication); however, it does not support territorial hierarchisation, only hierarchical role differentiation.

Queen Himiko/Pimiko is recorded by the Chinese as having had a mound '100 paces in diameter' erected over her grave (Tsunoda and Goodrich 1951). This passage in the *Wei Zhi* is the source of great historiographical controversy, since the first of the mounded tombs in Japan is not reckoned to have been constructed until 50 years later than the Chinese dating of Himiko's death. Nevertheless, more Japanese archaeologists today are considering the possibility that the Mounded Tomb culture began earlier than hitherto supposed in Japan (K. Terasawa, personal communication), and I think it reasonable to use the archaeological evidence traditionally dated to the fourth century to complement these documentary data for the mid-third century.

The archaeological evidence concerning polity size is less ambiguous than the historical evidence; hierarchically organised territories are indicated by mounded tomb distributions at least in the Nara Basin, one of the two possible locations of the Yamatai polity mentioned in the Chinese histories. In examining tomb distributions, I shall focus mainly on those mounded tombs that are keyhole-shaped in ground plan. They are just one of several tomb shape-types; others include round mounds and square mounds.

The existence of keyhole tombs (Fig. 6.3) around the edge of the Nara Basin has been known for a considerable time (Date 1963); however, the data have not been used very efficiently in identifying regional groupings. Instead of treating all keyhole tombs together, as in past studies, I have endeavoured to divide them into size groups and map each group separately. The segregation of tombs into distinct size classes (Fig. 6.4), based on measurements given in the 1970s




Fig. 6.2. Alternative locations of the legendary Yamatai in western Japan.

survey lists (Nara-ken Kyoiku Inkaikai 1974), is statistically supported (Barnes 1983). By mapping only the large-sized keyhole tombs from the Early Kofun period (fourth century), we find that the tombs appear to be clustered into two groups: a northern and a south-eastern group (Fig. 6.5). It will be noted that the south-eastern group is strung out along the eastern basin margin; however, the distances separating the elements of that group are insignificant when compared to the

gap between the northern and southern groups as wholes. Mapping the medium-sized keyhole tombs from the Early Kofun period produced spatially discrete clusters, some in the areas not occupied by the large tombs (Fig. 6.6).

If two assumptions are made concerning the assignment of meaning to the tomb size distributions, then the above patterns can be interpreted as representing the central foci (the large keyhole tombs) and the outlying centres (the medium



Fig. 6.3. Large keyhole tomb of Emperor Suinin, fourth century AD, Japan, Nara Prefecture (photograph courtesy of Shibundo Publishing company).

keyhole tombs) of a territorial hierarchy. The necessary assumptions are that tomb size is a direct reflection of rank in the socio-political hierarchy and that the tomb locations represent settlement locations. Currently, there is no unequivocal data on the distribution of actual settlements in the basin that are contemporaneous with these tombs, but the centres of gravity of the large keyhole tomb clusters coincide with important areas of activity attested by archaeological excavation (at the Makimuku and Saki sites) and literary references to important personages ('Prince Saho' and the Sujin line of kings) living in these respective areas (Barnes 1983). The size-rank assumption, moreover, is not merely




Fig. 6.4. Early and Middle Kofun period keyhole tomb lengths in Nara.

based on calculations of the availability of labour resources for construction, but is also supported by sumptuary rules governing tomb sizes recorded in the early chronicles of Japan (Aston 1896).

If these assumptions are allowed, then not just one, but two, territorial groupings are indicated in the basin, focused on the large keyhole tomb clusters and probably composed of three hierarchical levels: centre, subcentre and village. By splitting the distance between the centres of gravity of the two large-sized tomb clusters, one can posit two non-overlapping territories with radii of 8 or 9 km (c. 225 sq. km each). There is, however, no real reason to assume these territories were either circular in shape or equivalent in area; given the geographical layout of the basin, the northern polity might have been half the size of the southern polity. In any case, the




Fig. 6.5. Early Kofun large-sized keyhole tomb distributions and postulated territories in the Nara Basin.




Fig. 6.6. Early Kofun medium-sized keyhole tomb clusters and territories in the Nara Basin.

size of the basin containing both of these polities, measuring 750 sq. km to the surrounding mountain tops, with 320 sq. km of arable, is far smaller than the 1,500 sq. km calculated by Renfrew (1975) for early state modules.

I contend that the first stage of protohistoric polity development that is known from both literary and archaeological evidence in Japan is represented, in size and structure, by the territorial units centered on the two-tiered Early Kofun keyhole tomb distributions. Polities of this size could easily have been duplicated thirty times in the Inland Sea area; therefore the Chinese accounts of the existence of various 'countries' in Japan are not unreasonable from a logistical point of view.

In the fifth century, during the Middle Kofun period, there is evidence for higher-order integration. No longer

were the Nara tombs the largest in the size hierarchy, for much larger structures were being built in the Osaka plains area to the immediate west: the Nintoku mausoleum reaches 486 m in length. This gives us good reason to suppose that the Nara polities were integrated into a supra-basin hierarchy. Nara's tomb distribution shows a surprising shift at this juncture; the location of the southern large-size tomb cluster shifts from the eastern to the western side of the basin. It is not known whether this represents the superseding of a former polity by a newer one or merely the removal of a polity centre, but I think it possible that proximity to the higher-order centre on the opposite side of the mountains may have been a factor in the shift. The addition of the higher-order centre in Osaka implies that this new polity was composed of a four-tiered territorial hierarchy, assuming the original three levels represented in the Nara Basin as centres (large tombs), subcentres (medium tombs) and villages were incorporated without modification.

The size of this coalescent polity that was focused on the Osaka plains is difficult to judge since we have no firm evidence of its boundaries. Known as the 'Yamato court' in the early Japanese chronicles (as opposed to the Chinese chronicles), it has traditionally been recognised as the only polity in Japan at the time and is therefore thought to have encompassed the entire area from modern Tokyo to Kyushu. However, some Japanese historians reject this view of a unified Japan in the fifth century (Hirano 1977). Friction between the Yamato court and Kyushu, in the form of the Iwai rebellion, is recorded in the *Nihon Shoki* chronicles (Aston 1896), and the Izumo area (modern Shimane Prefecture) on the Japan Sea coast was independent enough to have necessitated the incorporation of the local mythology into the Yamato pantheon. Finally, the third largest tomb in Japan was built in Kibi (Okayama Prefecture), rivalling the two great fifth-century tombs of the Kinai region, the Nintoku and Ojin mausolea on the southern Osaka plains. It is plausible, especially if considered within the framework of peer polity interaction, that separate polities may have existed in these areas of north Kyushu, Kibi and Izumo even though all written evidence presents only the traditions of the central Yamato area.

If, then, the Yamato polity occupied only the Kinai area and not all of western Japan, what was its size? The Kinai is described in the early chronicles as being delimited by four geographical points (Senda 1980: 109). This area is considered to have been the extent of direct Yamato authority in the early seventh century, although after the institution of the provincial system in the mid-seventh century, the Kinai came to be consonant with the 'five home provinces' (*gokinai*), a slightly larger area than that encompassed between the four geographical points. The earlier Kinai boundaries enclosed approximately 20,000 sq. km, with a nominal radius of 80 km (Fig. 6.7). This polity is contemporaneous with the Paekche and Silla polities in the southern Korean peninsula, which were probably comparable in size. There is at present no way of measuring the extents of those polities, but core areas of




Fig. 6.7. Possible distributions of incipient state territories of c. 20,000 sq. km, fifth century AD.

20,000 sq. km are not unreasonable given the peninsular geography.

Thus the successive polity formations that we are dealing with in Japan are of two scales: a three-level hierarchy of territorial settlement extending over an estimated minimum of c. 225 sq. km during the second to fourth centuries AD, and a four-level hierarchy of territorial settlement in the fifth to sixth centuries AD extending over 20,000 sq. km. For Korea, a similar two-stage sequence of polity development has been discerned quite independently of this study (Lee 1982), and the fact that the results of these studies coincide reinforces my postulation of a co-ordinated developmental trajectory for Japan and Korea separate from that of China.

Symbols of elite identity and elite interaction

One of the propositions put forward in this chapter is that the formation of a supralocal elite grouping will be objectively symbolised through a homogeneous material culture denoting group membership. The first element of this proposition—the formation of a social elite—is irrefutably embodied in the mounded tomb evidence: social stratification is clearly implied by (i) the manipulation of mass labour to construct the tombs and (ii) access to both specialist labour and precious raw materials for the production of prestige goods. Second, it is undeniable that a homogeneous body of material objects was associated with the elite (Kondo, in press). These objects include the keyhole-shaped tombs themselves; the stone bracelets, triangular-rim bronze mirrors (Fig. 6.8), large cylindrical beads and curved *magatama* jewels deposited in the tombs; and the ceramic minijars and stands discovered in special-function rubbish deposits (Barnes 1983). What remains to be demonstrated is that

these objects were actually manipulated in the definition of elite social identity.

Supporting evidence is obtainable from the eighth-century *Nihon Shoki* chronicles (Aston 1896), which cover events of the fourth and fifth centuries. Several passages indicate how these prestige goods may have functioned to facilitate identity recognition and communication among the elite. The first tells of Emperor Keiko's travels from the Kinai region to the western part of the Inland Sea (20 days distant); his party is met by a local chieftain's ship bearing a white flag and a *sakaki* (*Cleyera japonica*) tree branch hung with the imperial regalia: a sword, a mirror and a jewel (Aston 1896, I: 193). Similar stories are related about Emperor Chuai, who also travels to the western Inland Sea and is met by two different chieftains, who erected *sakaki* branches on their ships and hung them with mirror, sword and jewel for the occasion (Aston 1896, I: 219–21). The second chieftain is said to have presented these materials to Emperor Chuai. Another passage illustrates how these objects also functioned in communicating with the gods as well as among the elite themselves. The sun goddess isolated herself in a cave, whereupon a *sakaki* branch was decorated with a mirror, jewel and tree bark fibres, and then a liturgy was recited to lure her out again (Aston 1896, I: 49). This story indicates the use of these objects in reconciliation and currying favour.

The inclusion of geographical referents in at least two of these stories makes it clear that identity recognition, facilitated by such special objects, occurred throughout the Inland Sea region; it therefore supports our interpretation of a 'supralocal' elite grouping. Such an interpretation, however, does not dictate the nature of the interaction within this




Fig. 6.8. Symbolic grave goods from a fourth-century AD keyhole tomb, Shikinzan, Osaka Prefecture: bronze mirrors, jasper and shell bracelets, curved and cylindrical beads, and spindlewhorl-like ornaments (photograph courtesy of Kodansha Publishing Company).

élite membership. There is a variety of archaeological and documentary data indicating both friendly and hostile interaction, including warfare, marriage exchange, trade, gift exchanges and feasting.

One particular story is of interest since it illustrates simultaneously marriage alliance and hostility, and it may be one of the few literary references that can be co-ordinated with the archaeologically defined polities in Nara. In the *Nihon Shoki* story known as the 'Saho Uprising' (Aston 1896, I: 171–2), Prince Saho, brother of Emperor Suinin's consort, attempts to 'usurp the throne' by having his sister murder the emperor. She, however, reveals all to the emperor, who immediately raises troops and storms a temporarily constructed fortification, routing the prince after a one-month siege. The empress voluntarily joins her brother in immolation.

Emperor Suinin is known from the documents to have occupied a palace in the Makimuku area of the south-eastern Nara Basin; Saho, on the other hand, is the name of the river that flows through in the north-western part of the basin (Fig. 6.5). These are two general areas that we have identified, on the basis of concentrations of large keyhole tombs, as the central foci of the two polities in the Nara Basin during the Early Kofun period. Although the relationship between these two polities is cast as hierarchical in the literature (emperor and prince), no absolute differences are recognisable in the style of the tombs, their sizes or construction; thus we must give at least equal consideration to the possibility of peer status relations between them, based on the archaeological evidence.

Prestige goods production and exchange

In accounting for the development of peer polities in

Japan and the manipulation of material objects to symbolise group membership, we have seen that one of the most important questions concerns the controls over the production and distribution of prestige goods. In essence, two different strategies for obtaining the goods were pursued: long-distance importation and localised manufacture. These strategies were highly interrelated, since it can be seen from the Japanese case that objects which were initially imported were subsequently manufactured locally. Using modern market terminology, we can say that importation 'whetted the appetite' for an item, creating a demand that could only be met by initiating its local production.

Although I do not think that these were the actual dynamics of the process, which I call the 'localisation of production', localisation nevertheless entailed the transformation and elaboration of the *local* productive system in response to the circulation of *exotic* goods. The eventual consequence of localised production was the devaluation of the exotic item into a more common consumer good. This pattern of 'conical diffusion', an archaeological version of 'trickle-down', can be traced with many craft goods in protohistoric and early historic Japan, including continental bronze mirrors, iron tools, bronze and iron weapons, grey stoneware, gilt bronze horse-trappings and dress ornaments, gold jewellery, and native ornamental stone bracelets and beads.

The process of localisation described here implies that production and exchange on the local and inter-regional levels are closely linked rather than being the independent spheres that they have previously been treated as being in the literature (Wright 1969; 1972; Wright and Johnson 1975). The Japanese case suggests that inter-regional trade volumes

stimulate the intensification of local production volumes. Since importation is essentially *substitutive* while local craft production and specialisation are *additive*, the structural elaboration of a polity would be advanced more by the latter than by the former. The question we must ask, therefore, is which aspects of peer polity interaction would encourage the localisation of production?

The range of objects found in tombs and burials of the late third and early fourth centuries suggests the existence of a very elaborate production and trading network which has never been adequately elucidated. A possible example of one node in this trading network might be the unusual Late Yayoi burial at Tatesuki in Kibi (modern Okayama Prefecture); it was positioned on a high hill but without the large mound characteristic of later tombs. The burial facility consisted of a wooden coffin, which did not survive, but its estimated interior contained one jade *magatama* bead, 27 jasper and one agate large cylindrical beads, several hundred thin cylindrical beads and a similar number of glass beads, one iron sword and over 30 kilograms of vermilion, which was spread in the bottom of the coffin (Kondo 1980).

Major production areas of jasper beads and vermilion are known later in the protohistoric period from the Japan Sea coast north of Okayama and Nara respectively. Thus, it is possible that the Okayama region, represented by this chiefly burial, may have played an intermediary role in a procurement network, supplying jasper beads to the Kinai area and receiving vermilion in return. This hypothetical scheme suggests that some of the possibilities for the origin of goods and their movement lie in a supra-regional production and trade network within Japan. We also know that several goods were being imported into Japan from the continent: bronze mirrors from China and iron (Kiyonaga 1982) from the southern Korean peninsula. At this initial level of analysis, therefore, it appears that the network was based on the exploitation of regional resources and the exchange of finished products.

The relationship of the Tatesuki burial to the mounded tombs in temporal and functional terms is a difficult question, but one that is significant for our investigation of peer polity interaction. The excavator interprets the burial as a transitional form leading into the Mounded Tomb culture; his inference of an early date is based on the absence of a large mound, bronze mirrors and stone bracelets—all of which were characteristic of early fourth-century tombs. But, since we know that mounded tomb construction apparently began in the Nara region, spreading very quickly throughout the Inland Sea area to the west, there is another possible view: that the Tatesuki burial was contemporaneous with the very earliest tombs in Nara, and that the exchange of objects between these two areas, with their similar social development but different burial modes, was followed by the diffusion of mounded tomb construction to the west and cylindrical bead utilisation to the east. This homogenisation of the elite material culture (Kondo, in press), accomplished by combining regional elements into a pan-regional subculture, can then be viewed as the develop-

ment of the supralocal elite grouping predicted by our model of social stratification.

The initial extent of this grouping is described by Japanese archaeologists as having encompassed the Inland Sea region; it is interesting that one of the most important artefact categories in the early tomb assemblages of this core area—stone bracelets—was apparently manufactured outside the area. The few bead-making sites which have yielded evidence of bracelet manufacture are all in either the Japan Sea coastal region or the Kanto area around modern Tokyo (Teramura 1966). Presumably the elite of the core polities maintained exchange relations with the peripheral manufacturing centres to acquire these prestige objects. This situation is reminiscent of the models developed to describe the relationship of highland Oaxacan magnetite mirror-producing communities to the lowland Olmec consumers (Flannery 1968), and of the highland chlorite bowl-producing communities in Iran to lowland Mesopotamian consumers (Kohl 1978). These models utilise a core-periphery orientation in postulating the developmental elaboration of the peripheral societies through their institution of the production of consumer goods for the core elite. In Japan, it appears that these peripheral societies soon became incorporated in the elite network, since the Mounded Tomb culture had spread into the bead-making areas by the end of the fourth century. But by this time, stone bracelets had disappeared from the repertoire of elite objects, so the relations of production and exchange between core and periphery can be assumed to have been transformed during this expansion of the elite network.

A model of one-to-one regional production and exchange, whereby the elite of each region exploited a single precious resource and traded the product to elites of other regions, is much too simplistic. Nevertheless, the early tombs yield some evidence for the distributional control of certain products by particular local elites. Kobayashi (1961) has produced a model for the distribution of triangular-rim bronze mirrors with deity-beast designs. Of these mirrors excavated from the mounded tombs, 211 have been identified as products of 71 different casting moulds. Kobayashi plotted the geographical distribution of the mirrors cast from the same mould and found that significant numbers of each mould set are found in the Kinai region. The Otsukayama Tomb in Kyoto Prefecture yielded the greatest number of these mirrors as well as the greatest number of mould links to mirrors excavated from other tombs in the area; Kobayashi postulated, therefore, that the authority figure interred in the Otsukayama Tomb might have been the disburser of bronze mirrors as authority symbols to those subordinate units under Yamato power.

The triangular-rim deity-beast mirrors were made with such technical skill that it was originally thought they could be nothing but Chinese products; however, such mirrors are unknown in China itself. One of the current opinions on their manufacture is that they were made by Chinese craftsmen in Japan (Tanaka 1979). Unfortunately, the locus (or loci) of

manufacture is not yet known, although a major manufacturing centre of Yayoi bronze bells is located only 20 km from Otsukayama Tomb, and a 'Mirror-making Shrine' (*Kagami-zukuri Jinja*) occurs in the central Nara Basin near the Karako site, where clay moulds for casting bronze bells have also been recovered. Finally, a ceramic fragment from the Kazu site in the south-western Nara Basin appears to me to be the handle to a casting mould much like the one from Karako. I have previously included it when considering possible locations for bronze bell production (Barnes 1978; 1983), but the fragment, rather than curved as it should be for a bell, is quite flat in profile. That it is part of a mirror-casting mould is a possibility that should not be overlooked.

In the case of the mirrors, it can be hypothesised that one of the reasons for the localisation of production was to establish local control over the supply of mirrors and their distribution, rather than rely on the exchange network for their supply and be unable to control either their design or their distribution. This is one method of compensating for uncertainty or assuring competitive edge (Adams 1975). Localisation in this sense, however, does not imply the cessation of trade, since at least the raw materials for production must have been obtained through exchange or extraction. With localisation, therefore, a shift from trade in finished products to trade in raw materials might be expected.

Little is yet known about copper mining for bronze production in Japan, but iron and bead production in the fifth and sixth centuries do reflect such a shift. At the Soga and Furu sites in Nara, iron slag, crucibles, and jasper and talc flakes have been recovered dating to the mid-to-late fifth century—the first appearance of these crafts in the basin (Kashiwara 1983; Furu Iseki Han'i Kakunin Chosa Iinkai 1979: 61–3). And at the bead-producing site of Tamazukuri in Izumo (modern Shimane Prefecture), an estimated 95 per cent of the remains from its peak period of production in the sixth century consist of undrilled and unpolished blocky pieces (Maejima, personal communication), which I interpret as cylindrical bead blanks for export to finishing sites elsewhere. The Furu site has produced evidence for such finishing activities, but on talc rather than jasper beads. Most of the talc cylindrical bead remnants recovered from Furu are either circular flakes detached from the ends of the cylinders or beads damaged during the drilling of the central holes (personal observation).

We know from the early Japanese chronicles that prior to AD 645 many of the clan heads were delegated by the Yamato emperor to oversee certain elite craft manufacturing activities. What we do not know is how far back in time these administrative duties extended. However, it seems fairly clear that the fifth and sixth centuries saw a rapid initiation of local production of a variety of goods under elite control, the result of which was the gradual extension of administration over extractive activities as well (Barnes, in press). This is exemplified by the establishment in Izumo of a shrine dedicated to the head of the clan at court in charge of bead-making.

As we have seen from the tomb distribution data, the fifth century appears to have been a time of hierarchical consolidation in the Kinai region. With the growth and consolidation of a polity or polities in Japan, the focus of interaction on a peer basis also shifted from within Japan to beyond. The contents of fifth-century tombs indicate increased contact with Korea and the sharing of an elite material culture between the two areas, as we would expect with such interaction. There is also a movement towards the further localisation of production of continental goods, such as the hard-fired grey Sue ware and gilt bronze ornaments, following in the wake of bronze mirror production.

In summary, then, I hope to have established the necessity of specifying the changing relationships between local groupings of elites *vis-à-vis* the production and exchange of objects signifying their shared identity, in order to understand both the objectification of social elites through a material subculture and the organisational elaboration of polities through the localisation of production. It has been suggested here that competition and/or uncertainty over the procurement of goods important to maintaining identity relations prompted the elaboration of local productive systems.

Epilogue

I find it significant that although I have been able to discern patterns of multiple hierarchical polity formation in a sphere of East Asia distinct from that of northern China, I have been unable to exercise core-periphery relationships from the important processes contributing to peer polity development. Asymmetrical relationships, especially between China and the southern Korean peninsula or the Japanese islands, can be eliminated from consideration as important causal mechanisms in institutional development within the latter areas; however, such relationships—and their material bases within Japan and Korea—apparently played crucial roles in organisational elaboration. The most noticeable asymmetrical relationships are those between core and periphery, redefined within Japan as the nuclear Inland Sea region on the one hand and the Japan Sea coastal areas and eastern Honshū on the other. Finer analyses of artefacts in terms of both style and raw material composition, accessible in the Japanese archaeological literature, must be integrated into the spatial and social context specified by peer polity interaction to elucidate further the nature of co-operative and competitive peer relations.

Note

1. These terms, printed in characters in Hirano's text but transliterated in Pinyin here, both imply good (*hao*) communications (*tong*) and ties (*jie*) between the peninsular and insular polities. Hirano's independent translation of these terms as 'peer relations' fits nicely with the thesis given here for peer polity interaction.