Please post one paragraph of critical questions and/or analysis on Azuma's "Japanese Immigrant Settler Colonialism and the Construction of a US Security Regime Against the Transborder 'Yellow Peril'" and/or Peattie's "South into the Pacific."

University of Hawai'i Press

Chapter Title: JAPANESE IMMIGRANT SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A US NATIONAL SECURITY REGIME AGAINST THE TRANSBORDER “YELLOW PERIL” Chapter Author(s): EIICHIRO AZUMA

Book Title: Pacific America Book Subtitle: Histories of Transoceanic Crossings Book Editor(s): Lon Kurashige Published by: University of Hawai'i Press. (2017) Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvvn1mj.16

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JAPA NESE IMMIGRANT SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A US NATIONAL SECURITY REGIME AGAINST THE TRANSBORDER “YELLOW PERIL” EII CH IR O A ZUM A

Look out; California! Beware! . . . But while we watch and wait, They’re inside the Golden Gate! They’ve battleships, they say, On Magdalena Bay! Uncle Sam, won’t you listen when we warn you?

In July  1916 the Hearst newspapers printed this “Anti- Japanese Hymn of Hate” as a stern warning to the white republic. The two locations mentioned in this manifesto— San Francisco and Magdalena Bay— carried specific his- torical meanings, throwing light on an emergent notion of a hemispheric “Yellow Peril” that revolved around the presence of Japa nese immigrants (Is- sei) in the western United States and Baja California. The “Hymn” elucidates an unknown aspect of anti- Japanese race politics in pre– World War II Amer- i ca. Most studies on the Yellow Peril look at Issei as an object of anti- Asian racialization in a US po liti cal context or as a mere distraction in US- Japanese diplomacy.1 Seldom have historians considered its ramifications outside do- mestic race relations or bilateral imperialist rivalry. As Erika Lee has shown, the US racial- nationalist formation permeated throughout the Western Hemi sphere before the 1940s, producing a complex constellation of exclu- sionist politics that brought together North and South American states in the eforts to create a “no Asian” zone.2 It is also impor tant that the existing lit er a ture on the Yellow Peril lacks perspective on the specific impact of Japa- nese immigrant practice on hemispheric geopo liti cal development— one that spread from California to the US- Mexican borderlands, and beyond. This chapter uncovers the complex roles that Issei actions, as well as their unintended consequences, played in the development of transborder Yellow

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Peril scaremongering. Misrepre sen ta tions of Issei intentions and their con- tingent relationships to Japan eventually propelled white Amer i ca to reaffirm its commitment to the time- honored Monroe Doctrine, shifting the main at- tention of the US endeavor to preserve its hemispheric hegemony from the traditional Eu ro pean rivals to the Japa nese racial enemy.

This study, like Brian Hayashi’s in chapter 9, complicates the existing understanding of the Yellow Peril, but it does so from the vantage point of what Augusto  F. Espiritu in this book calls “inter- imperial rivalry.” The Western Hemi sphere of the 1910s through the 1930s constituted an emergent geopo liti cal site where the United States aspired to construct a national se- curity regime against a threat of an expansionist Japan and its presumed co- conspirators, Issei border crossers. Specifically, my analy sis centers on the mutually constitutive relationship of California- originated exclusionist pol- itics, transborder Japa nese migration and colonialism, and transborder Yel- low Peril scaremongering between the 1910s and the 1930s. In a response to racial exclusion from the Golden State, Issei practices of “frontier conquest” and settlement south of the border not only confounded California’s anti- Japanese agitation but also had a significant impact on US imperialist diplomacy in the Amer i cas. The Yellow Peril—as a discourse and as a basis for po liti cal formation within and without the white republic— entailed the entanglements of transnational Issei colonization, mediated and articulated by their frequent border crossing, and US hemispheric imperialism, rooted in the Monroe Doctrine. Such racial- imperialist politics culminated in the mak- ing of a US- led “hemispheric alliance”— a transnational national security re- gime of the early 1940s— against Japa nese residents and their expanding racial homeland.

ORIGINS OF ISSEI SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE MAKING OF A TRANSBORDER FRONTIER

Inspired by the US example of “frontier conquest,” Issei settler colonialism took shape in the context of their lived experience as a racialized minority. Until the late 1890s, the majority of California’s Japa nese were indigent student- laborers. Well educated and po liti cally conscious, most of these early Issei congregated in San Francisco.3 Considering the American West as their own frontier, these youth felt they were as civilized and progressive as white Americans. Imported into Japan through translated books, the idea of “fron- tier,” with all its constitutive racism against nonwhites, became adapted to Japan’s national experience and underpinned what would become a discourse on “overseas Japa nese development.” Often accompanied by pseudoscientific theories that stressed the overseas origins of the ancient Japa nese, this popu- lar discourse posited “expansive traits” of the Japa nese nation and race.4 In the early phase of imperial Japan’s discursive formation, self- styled Issei

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“frontiersmen” made notable contributions, for they could speak from their firsthand, real- life experience of the “ trials and tribulations” of conquering the New World frontier.

Constituting a nucleus of the “discourse on overseas development,” Is- sei settler colonialism envisaged a combination of mass migration and agri- cultural colonization to create a “new Japan” in a foreign land. Until the early 1890s, the US West, especially California, occupied a central place in the dream of “overseas Japa nese development,” since it was the prototypical and most au then tic “frontier” of all. In the first published “guidebook for going to Amer i ca,” a San Francisco resident wrote in 1887: “The United States is a land for new development, which awaits the coming of ambitious youth . . . . When you come to the United States, you must have the determination to create the second, new Japan there, which also helps enhance the interest and prestige of the imperial government and our nation.”5

Between 1892 and 1894, the Issei unconditional embrace of the US fron- tier underwent an adjustment due to white racism. In the spring of 1892, San Francisco Issei endured the first or ga nized anti- Japanese campaign. Ten years after the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, local newspapers like the Morning Call and the Eve ning Bulletin cranked out reports and commen- taries on the new “Oriental” menace, drawing a parallel between the excluded Chinese and the increasing Japa nese in the white republic. That comparison registered as an unbearable afront to the immigrant expan- sionists and their homeland supporters, who considered themselves to be equal participants in Western modernity. “In no way do we, energetic and brilliant Japa nese men, stand below (or on a par with) those lowly Chinese,” one immigrant wrote in a local vernacular paper.6 The first of many similar occurrences, this bitter encounter with white supremacist attitudes called into question the naïve belief in racial compatibility, which educated Japa nese had presumed in their understanding of modernity as something universal. Many Issei came to realize that being modern, civilized, and expansionist did not automatically earn them respectful treatment and ac cep tance in the West- ern world. Increasingly, race became a central factor in Japa nese expansionist thought, and their outlook on a par tic u lar “frontier” often hinged on the state of race relations there—an idea that also influenced how homeland expan- sionists thought about overseas Japa nese development.7

In the pages of immigrant newspapers, one can easily detect how the prob lem of race negatively afected the Issei prognosis of California’s poten- tial as a site for Japa nese development after the spring of 1892. Earlier in August 1891, an expansionist Issei monthly carried a special column that anticipated unrestricted success in the conquest of the California frontier on the basis of the pre ce dent set by “vari ous foreign settlers [Eu ro pe ans] for the last thirty some years.”8 A few months after the 1892 racist press campaign, however, the same journal showed little trace of its earlier optimism, lament-

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ing instead the “prevalence of white domination” that “would never let other races prosper” in their land.9 In order to ensure a favorable outcome for Japa- nese immigration and colonization, the San Francisco expansionist journal asserted, it was crucial to study current world afairs and search for “an un- touched land with a people and po liti cal system that would not shut us out.”10 No longer did the American West seem to ofer such a place, due to the Anglo- Saxon mono poly of its frontier. The 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian kingdom by US- backed haole in Honolulu only reinforced the notion that Anglo- Saxons had no intention of sharing the prize of civilization’s conquest with the Japa nese. Yet many educated Issei in California still envisioned a promised land just south of the border, because no counterpart to white American racism appeared to have existed in Mexico and its contiguous frontiers. Seen from the racist standpoint of Issei expansionists, Mexicans were “as spineless as Chinese,” whose homelands had been already (semi) colonized; they hence appeared “easy to dominate”—so much so that Japa nese newcomers would have little trou ble rising to the status of a “master” race.11 While scholars of American empire have generally considered the western seaboard of Mexico a US- dominated region, it actually had more compli- cated histories in terms of broader inter- imperial relations throughout the Pacific.

Members of the “Expedition Society” (Enseisha) in San Francisco played a central role in drawing a new map for Japa nese development in the West- ern Hemi sphere, a map that gravitated toward the Latin American frontiers free of Anglo- Saxon hegemony. Takekawa Tōtarō, a key ideologue of the Is- sei expansionist society, spearheaded the new discourse on southward remi- gration and Mexican colonization. A typical argument defined the Latin American country as a “site for a decisive strug gle of [racial] survival that ambitious men of the cherry- blossom nation (Japan) must undertake with bravery and grand tact.”12 Takekawa and his Issei associates were no longer content with vacuous talk of colonial fantasy. “The time has come,” he urged, “for our compatriots to leap with determination out of complacency and inaction to put their bodies in the middle of a great [racial] strug gle on the tablelands of Mexico.”13 In 1893 more than thirty Issei also or ga nized a Spanish study group in San Francisco, in order to be equipped with the lan- guage skills necessary for expeditions and future colonization eforts south of the border.14

Populated with experienced Issei frontiersmen who could readily cross its southern border, California remained as a base for Issei expansion into Latin Amer i ca, despite the loss of the US West to white hegemony. US ethnic communities could still provide aspiring Japa nese settler colonists with the opportunity to undergo practical training in frontier farming and to accumulate necessary capital through manual labor. Indeed, for that very purpose, a group of San Francisco Issei, including Takekawa’s associates,

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established the Society for the Promotion of Colonization (Shokumin shōreikai) in 1894. This enterprise set out to turn dry land near Bakersfield into a “Japa nese village” surrounded by rice paddies. The society also proposed to run a labor- contracting firm to allow an increasing number of working- class newcomers to make money, settle down, and help erect a “colonial cornerstone” in California under the guidance of “enlightened” expansionist Issei. That “cornerstone” would serve as a “way station” into “Mexico, South Amer i ca, and other open frontiers” of the New World.15

This vision, which combined the transplantation of common laborers and settler colonialism, sustained the operation of so- called emigration com- panies in the triangular expansionist cir cuits that tied the US- Mexican bor- derlands to Japan. Often operated by immigrant returnees, these companies mushroomed in Japan after around 1894, mirroring the impor tant position of North Amer i ca in Japa nese expansionist thought of the time. In the cir- cles of Tokyo’s expansionist pundits, the Sino- Japanese War of 1894–1895, as well as Issei reports on the loss of California and Hawai‘i, had temporarily steered much of the colonial gaze toward Korea and Manchuria. Yet the med- dling of Rus sia compelled victorious Japan to cede the Liaotung peninsula back to China and accept its waning influence over Korea. This geopo liti cal development rendered the Asian continent a less promising outpost of set- tler colonialism, quickly resurrecting the interconnected frontiers of the US West and rural Mexico in Japan’s public discourse.16 Issei and home- land advocates of transpacific emigration continued to exert influence in the polemics of Japan’s overseas development and colonial expansion after the mid-1890s.

Just as the first wave of the anti- Japanese campaign had forced Issei set- tler colonialism to re orient itself, the resurgence of California’s exclusionist attack in 1900 accelerated the flow of Japa nese immigrants toward the con- tiguous frontier through the agency of emigration companies.17 This agita- tion resulted in the temporary suspension of Japa nese immigration to the US mainland from August 1900 to June 1902, followed by Tokyo’s virtual ban on labor migration in the context of the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement with Washington. Northern Mexico thus emerged as a primary emigrant desti- nation after the turn of the century. The new immigration flow included both itinerant laborers and aspiring frontier settlers. Catering to more than eighty- seven hundred newcomers, three par tic u lar emigration companies facili- tated this spillover migration to Mexico between 1901 and 1908. The top management of each com pany consisted largely of former US residents who had maintained close business ties with Issei “ labor contractors” in Califor- nia on the basis of shared settler colonialist visions. These transpacific agents of human trafficking collapsed their business calculations and expansionist agendas while shipping thousands of new immigrants into the US- Mexican borderlands.18

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TRANSBORDER JAPA NESE SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE RISE OF THE YELLOW PERIL DISCOURSE

The Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908 between the United States and Japan put an end to transpacific labor contracting and mass migration to North Amer i ca. In response to the or ga nized agitation in California, Wash- ington and Tokyo moved to prevent localized racist politics from negatively afecting bilateral relations. The agreement entailed a US ban on the entry of Japa nese into the United States through Mexico, while Japan stopped issu- ing passports to common laborers bound for both the United States and Mexico. This diplomatic solution addressed the increasing presence and movement of Japa nese in the US- Mexican borderlands. Indeed, many immi- grant workers in Mexico had opted to cross the northern border to Texas and California for better- paying jobs, while some Japa nese residents in the United States sought refuge from racism and unrestricted colonial opportu- nities south of the border.19 The contiguous frontier thus constituted a highly mobile space, where the working- class pursuit of material gains collocated with immigrant settler colonialism. After 1908 Issei expansionists continued to carry the torch of settler colonialism into the US- Mexican borderlands, especially Baja California. They articulated a complex vision that harmo- nized, on the one hand, with Japan’s national motto of overseas development and, on the other, with their self- conscious efort to contribute to the Ameri- can mandate of frontier conquest.

Despite the end of labor immigration after the Gentlemen’s Agree- ment, cross- border Japa nese mobility sparked the ire of white exclusionists, prompting them to transnationalize their fight against the “Japa nese prob lem.” Many pundits presumed that a sinister conspiracy between imperial Japan and Japa nese Amer i ca underlay transborder Issei movements and invest- ments. Such misreadings spawned an alliance among grassroots Western agitators, belligerent national leaders, and opportunistic journalists in their aspirations for a national security regime through the imperialist diplomacy of hemispheric racial exclusion. A departure from existing practice, this diplomacy strove to seal of the US backyard mainly from the racial and military threats of migrating Japa nese, not from traditional Eu ro pean rivals. Thus, just as a number of US Issei took it upon themselves to erect “new Japans” south of the border, intensified talks of the Yellow Peril served to undermine their endeavors of settler colonialism there through the 1910s.

One example of frustrated Issei settler colonialism involved Abiko Kyūtarō and Noda Otosaburō, well- known ethnic community leaders who aspired to weave their enterprise in California into agricultural colonization in Mexico. Established in 1906, the American Land and Produce Com pany (ALPC) took charge of that transborder endeavor. With Abiko as the presi- dent and Noda as the general man ag er, the ALPC first obtained thirty- two

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hundred acres of undeveloped land in Central California. Since 1902 these Issei had been engaged in labor contracting— a business that enabled them to secure start-up capital. Subdividing the land into forty- acre units, the ALPC allowed an individual Issei to live as an in de pen dent “frontiersman.”20 The new settlement would become the “Yamato Colony” of Livingston in 1907.

This episode is well documented in Japa nese American history, albeit in a rather limited manner. Scholars have only examined how Abiko’s group strove to sink roots into US soil by practicing Christian- based social adapta- tion and permanent settlement. What is missing in that interpretation is that the ALPC also operated self- consciously within a larger Japa nese colonialist diaspora that viewed all manifestations of migration and colonization as linked to national/racial expansion, whether inside or outside the Asian empire. In the eyes of many educated Issei, their aspirations to participate in mainstream US society did not contradict with their identities as front- line prac ti tion ers of overseas Japa nese development.21 Printed in a maga- zine in Japan, ALPC’s publicity material elucidated its embrace of settler colonialism:

Now many Japa nese nationals are involved in enterprises of overseas colonization. The rise of the homeland depends on the success of colo- nization. In view of ongoing Japa nese development [in the wider world], the American Land and Produce Com pany is prepared to help steady entrepreneurs and hardworking farmers to build an ideal colony in the North American frontier.22

In early 1911 this expansionist perspective found another opportunity, when Abiko and Noda received an ofer to acquire control of two thousand acres near Magdalena Bay in Baja California. The US- owned Chartered Com pany of Lower California proposed to sell the Issei a 35 to 50  percent interest in its entire landholdings.23 In order to assess the prospect for agri- cultural colonization there, Noda personally traveled to Magdalena Bay. He wasted no time in producing a positive report that praised the area in terms of its fertile soil, good weather, and fishing. Noda concluded that “the Japa- nese can easily penetrate in the midst of natives to form the core- class to guide them, exploit natu ral resources, and attain healthy agricultural and fishing development.”24 Because white Americans were preoccupied with speculative mining ventures rather than farming, Noda insisted, the un- touched land of Magdalena Bay awaited the arrival of Issei settler colonists with open arms.25 Abiko and Noda deci ded to solicit support from “home- land cap i tal ists” in Tokyo to make a go of their Mexican colonization.26

The Issei business plan, however, soon ran into the roadblock created by the first Yellow Peril scaremongering campaign. When their white business

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partners informed US Secretary of State Philander C. Knox of the ongoing negotiations, the official warned: “a transfer [of landownership to Japa nese] would be quite certain to be interpreted in some quarters in a manner to cause a great outcry.”27 Indeed, once the news leaked out, the press was quick to assert that the Issei purchase of the Baja California properties revealed Japan’s nefarious design to undermine the US mono poly of the Western Hemi sphere.28 Magdalena Bay had been a site of inter- imperial contestation between Germany and the United States, where the former had unsuccess- fully sought landownership “for naval purposes,” and the latter had engaged in naval target practice between 1900 and 1910.29 Imperial Japan suddenly appeared as another player, and its presumed militarist intrigue was deemed congruent with the dubious intentions of the Issei border crossers.

A long- term advocate of US imperialism, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge quickly seized the occasion to clarify with President William Howard Taft “ whether or not such acquisitions of property or concessions [in Baja Cali- fornia], if allowed, encroach upon the Monroe doctrine.”30 Lodge had been a familiar voice of belligerence against Japan’s expansionist ambition as early as 1897 when he helped garner congressional support for the annexation of Hawai’i.31 Fifteen years later Lodge’s question reinforced the power ful admoni- tion of Homer Lea, who had just prophesied the Japa nese takeover of Califor- nia and a coming war with Japan in The Valor of Ignorance in 1909. Now, the undiferentiated threat of Japa nese migration and military invasion was alleg- edly being extended to the Pacific shores of Mexico, where the invocation of the Monroe Doctrine was reckoned indispensable for its defense. Lodge’s sen- sationalist spin made Abiko’s business transaction look like a major assault on US national security via its back door. Speculating that imperial Japan was conspiring to set up a coaling station in Magdalena Bay, the New York Times warned the public of Japan’s “growing appetite for new territory” that had already swallowed up Korea and parts of Manchuria. The editorial asserted that the United States “could not consent to or permit the establishment of a Japa nese naval station on this continent.”32 According to the racial- nationalist rendition of Issei settler colonialism, an attempt to or ga nize a Japa nese farming settlement on the Mexican seaboard was no dif er ent from the building of an imperial Japa nese military outpost.

Thus, although the East Coast regional press was yet “not as alarmed as” West Coast and Hearst newspapers, a national consensus was emerging about the meaning of Japa nese mobility and settlement in and around the United States.33 It reawakened the US sense of owner ship about its hemi- spheric “backyard,” with a strong racial undertone that had seldom been pres ent in the previous articulations directed at Eu ro pe ans. Conflating trans- border Issei mobility and Japan’s alleged imperialist designs, the emergent discourse culminated in the 1912 Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The US Senate ratified it promptly to prevent “any foreign power” (meaning

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Japan) from obtaining a place of strategic interest in the Western Hemi- sphere.34 While drawing on Theodore Roo se velt’s corollary of 1904, which reserved the United States’ right to exert military force in Latin Amer i ca, this congressional action diverged in impor tant and fundamental ways from con- ventional hemispheric diplomacy. No longer did the Monroe Doctrine sim- ply intend to keep out the po liti cal influence of Eu ro pean powers. It now aimed to purge the Amer i cas of Japa nese presence— political, military, and especially racial.35 The princi ple of geopo liti cal nonintervention was trans- muting into a racial- imperialist endeavor to build a national security regime against the Yellow Peril that spilled beyond the confines of sovereign US territory.

Imbued by domestic race politics, diplomacy henceforth constituted a primary site in the fight against hemispheric “Japa nese penetration” under aegis of local Western exclusionists, press scaremongers, and bellicose US of- ficials. Owing to its extraterritorial nature, the southward migration and settlement of Issei exceeded the scope of existing US laws and eluded pos si- ble governmental mea sures to handle it. Reaffirmed in the 1911–1912 Mag- dalena Bay controversy, the Monroe Doctrine proved to be not only the most efective device of new race- based imperialist diplomacy, but its very justifi- cation. Because it could empower the United States to resort to military force as declared by Roo se velt earlier, the renewed US commitment to hemispheric imperialism— with a veiled threat of punitive naval action— quickly led Ja- pan and Mexico to declare publicly no support for the Issei acquisition of the land in Baja California.36

The legacy of this failed attempt at Japa nese development was far- reaching. The rhe toric that conflated Japa nese immigrant land purchases with Japan’s “appetite for territory” across and beyond the Pacific became a hallmark of the Yellow Peril argument in the ensuing years, and its po liti cal efects reverberated through inter- American relations. First, the national se- curity implications of Issei property acquisition of the US backyard resonated with a notable shift in California’s anti- Japanese movement, which had pro- duced an alien land bill in 1911— the same time frame when Abiko had com- menced negotiations with Baja California landowners. Enacted shortly after the Lodge Corollary, the 1913 Alien Land Law subsequently attempted to tackle the prob lem of Japa nese farming success and land acquisition within the Golden State.37 Yet the extraterritorial dimension of Issei agri- cultural colonization, albeit still only a possibility, remained unresolved. Etched in the consciousness of white Amer i ca, the Magdalena Bay scare would serve as a pivotal reminder of this sober real ity.

Second, the so- called Zimmermann Tele gram of 1917 valorized the meaning of the Lodge Corollary. Sent from the German Foreign Minister, the confidential proposal not only urged Mexico to enter war against the United States but also requested the Latin American country to broker an alliance

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between Germany and Japan. Intercepted and disclosed by British intelli- gence, the German tele gram and intrigue exacerbated US distrust of war- torn Mexico when the US expeditionary forces were hunting for Mexican revolutionaries like Pancho Villa. Moreover, the German’s implication of Ja- pan in its scheme, despite Tokyo’s quick rebuttal, stoked public anx i eties about Japa nese presence in what appeared to be the hostile neighbor.38 As the Hearst’s “Anti- Japanese Hymn of Hate” called the nation’s attention to it, Magdalena Bay became a key trope of an anticipated scourge of a transpa- cific and transborder Japa nese conspiracy apparently brewing south of the border. After 1912, the Yellow Peril periodically revivified US imperialist di- plomacy based on the Lodge Corollary in its relations to Mexico and other hemispheric neighbors.

JAPA NESE EXCLUSION AND THE DEFENSE OF THE US RACIAL EMPIRE IN THE WESTERN HEMI SPHERE

In the de cades of the 1910s and the 1920s, the circular relationship of domes- tic exclusionist agitation, transborder Issei migration, and the Yellow Peril demagoguery manifested itself on several occasions. Immediately after Abiko’s failed attempt at settler colonialism in Baja California, California’s first alien land law prohibited Japa nese immigrant landownership, catalyz- ing the mobility of many Issei farmers from California to the contiguous Mexican frontier. Similar to Abiko’s Yamato Colony scheme, the Nichi- Boku Industrial Corporation (NBIC) of Los Angeles exemplified the craze for remigration and colonization in northern Mexico during the 1910s. The com pany acquired eighty- five thousand acres in Sinaloa, which it subdi- vided for aspiring Issei frontier farmers.39 A younger brother of Takekawa Tōtarō, who had been a key ideologue of settler colonialism in Mexico in the mid-1890s, Takekawa Minetarō played a central role in organ izing this ma- jor land com pany in 1912. Although most investors were Japa nese residents of Los Angeles, a number of colonial- minded investors in Japan chipped in, as well.40 Between 1914 and 1921, a total of 104 Issei signed purchase agree- ments for an aggregate 12,379 acres, and an additional 57 individuals reserved purchase orders for 4,820 acres.41 A number of first- generation resi- dents, whom the orthodox narrative of Japa nese Mexican history now celebrates as ethnic “pioneers,” actually originated from these California Is- sei, who were inspired by a rosy image of Mexico as an integrated frontier.42

The cross- border movement of Issei settler colonists gathered more steam in response to the or ga nized anti- Japanese campaigns of 1919–1924 in the US West. This postwar agitation completed what the earlier movements had demanded: to put a stop to Issei agricultural development and land control. Western border states, including California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, adopted stringent alien land laws that denied Issei not only landownership but

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also tenancy. These exclusionist actions articulated white Amer i ca’s resolve to seal of US sovereign land from the Japa nese race.43

No longer able to sustain an in de pen dent economic life under this legis- lation, a fair number of Issei farmers understandably took a keener interest in moving their farming operations south of the border. Community leaders and journalists also discussed the advantages of Mexican agricultural colo- nization in the vernacular press after their frustrated legal battle.44 Accord- ing to them, Mexico was free from the ideology of white supremacy, with no law prohibiting the Japa nese from buying land. Northern Mexico was still a largely untouched frontier, much like Southern California of a few de cades before, which Issei had steadfastly developed into fertile farmlands. If Cali- fornia Japa nese with capital and farming expertise moved to the contiguous transborder frontier, expansion- minded immigrants believed that they would be able to build self- sufficient agricultural colonies connected to the existing ethnic farm interests in Los Angeles.45 Issei settler colonialism in the contiguous frontier paved the way to the formation of a transborder ethnic community that tied US and Mexican Californias. Rather than their “ will” to collaborate with Japan’s imperialist designs, their practice fundamentally articulated a minoritized immigrant vision of survival and empowerment, albeit in transnational fashion.46

The latter half of the 1920s saw a rise in the number of Issei resettlers to northwestern Mexico. Between 1924 and 1931, 275 and 274 Issei house holds went through Tijuana and Mexicali, respectively, to resettle elsewhere in Baja California.47 One group of nearly two hundred former US residents congre- gated in Ensenada, where they produced chili peppers, beans, and other commercial crops for the Los Angeles Japa nese wholesale market. While building a Mexican outpost of Japa nese development tied closely with the US side, Ensenada settlers also brought more than two hundred new immigrants directly from Japan to their farms.48 The population of Japa nese in Mexicali totaled more than eight hundred, most of whom worked on the vast cotton fields under the US- owned Colorado River Land Com pany. Some of its shareholders included white landowners who had sought to sell of their land holdings to Abiko in 1911. Perhaps with their backing, one Issei farmer named Shintani Kusujirō reportedly managed to establish virtual control over— but not legal owner ship of— nine thousand acres by the mid-1920s and ran an irrigation firm of his own near Mexicali.49 The making of these eth- nic settler communities swelled the demand for additional labor in northern Mexico, explaining a spike in Japa nese migration figures from fewer than one hundred to more than three hundred per year during the latter half of the 1920s.50

The flexible mobility of Japa nese settler colonists across the border, as well as the evolution of their enclaves in the contiguous frontier, caught the wary eyes of white Americans. No sooner had the exclusionary laws been

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enacted than contrived press reports on Japan’s expansionistic intrigues in Mexico poured in. In October 1924 major US newspapers warned about a “large colonization proj ect” of one hundred thousand acres in Baja Califor- nia. This would be a collaborative efort by Japa nese from Japan and the United States, as well as those already in Mexico. The San Francisco Bulletin misidentified a dozen Japa nese traveling from California to Mexicali as “representatives of the Japa nese general staf . . . financiers and industrial experts,” who purportedly schemed to import “20,000 Japa nese to Lower California and their settlement near here.”51 Sensationalized US press re- ports induced the governor of Baja California to look into the rumor, and in response, the Japa nese embassy in Mexico City hastily issued an official denial. Yet the following summer saw the magnitude of rumored Japa nese penetration into the borderlands inflated fivefold up to “100,000 men,” as reported in the San Francisco Daily News.52

Two years later white fear of the transborder Yellow Peril reared its ugly head again, condemning the alleged joint efort by imperial Japan and Japa nese Amer i ca to breach the US control of the Western Hemi sphere. In April 1926 Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., editorialized on yet another “rumor” that Japan was pursuing a two- million- acre concession near Magdalena Bay. His prognostication that the presence of Japa nese immigrants “along the Mexican seacoast . . . may prove very disastrous to the future of our Pacific ports” resonated with the thinking of western Senators William Borah (Idaho) and Hiram Johnson (California).53 Following the 1912 pre ce dent, their senatorial inquiry resulted in Amer i ca’s reaffirmation of the Lodge Cor- ollary to the Monroe Doctrine. What is noteworthy is that, although the rumor was baseless, the power ful symbolism of Magdalena Bay alarmed Congress enough to warrant the public proclamation of the nation’s imperi- alist resolution relative to transborder Japa nese threat.

The 1930s saw a sharp decline in Japa nese migration figures as a result of the efects of the Great Depression and Mexican agrarista movement, but many Americans, especially government and military officials, maintained their racial alarmist attitude against the hemispheric Yellow Peril. US gov- ernment reports unveiled a significant level of official concern about the con- sequences of Japa nese mobility and settlement— real or imagined—through the 1930s.54 Because the influx of Japa nese newcomers into the United States— but not the border crossing of resident Japanese— had been checked as the result of the 1924 Immigration Act, the Yellow Peril scare was increas- ingly divorced from its constitutive Western po liti cal context, thereby ac- quiring a life of its own as a purveyor of Amer i ca’s hemispheric imperialism and transborder anti- Japanese racism. The de cades following 1924 witnessed the rerouting of Japa nese migration flows from North Amer i ca to South Amer i ca; by the mid-1930s, the Japa nese populations of Peru and Brazil had quintupled and were twenty times larger than that of Mexico. These Latin

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American countries came to figure conspicuously in the US anti- Japanese discourse and diplomacy. Exemplified by immigration restrictions in Brazil and a race riot in Peru, US- bred hemispheric scaremongering also worked in tandem with the rising racial nationalisms of these countries. And, as Jefrey Lesser and Erika Lee show, there is evidence of the US role in whipping up local abhorrence of and hostility to Japa nese “infiltration” and “Yellow Peril” in South Amer i ca toward the end of the de cade.55

In Mexico, where Japa nese had been distinguished in state policy from the Chinese, who had been long- standing targets of local nativism, allegations of Japa nese penetration had less influence on public opinion.56 Nevertheless, a number of US diplomatic and intelligence reports continued to bring at- tention to rumors of Japan’s territorial ambitions, accentuated by narratives of surreptitious Issei remigration and land acquisitions in Baja California. As a symbolic site of a hemispheric race war and inter- imperial contestation, Magdalena Bay still remained pivotal in this phase of government- led racial scaremongering and the imperialist diplomacy based on it.

In 1934–1935, for example, B. P. Hastings, a US naval intelligence offi- cer, cooked up a bogus story of a tripartite anti- American conspiracy around the area, which purportedly involved the Japa nese of US California, Baja California, and their home empire. He alleged that a group of Los Angeles Issei and Nisei businessmen were plotting to secure concessions around Mag- dalena Bay to set up a clandestine military station and ammunition center for the Japa nese imperial navy. A fleet of fishing boats— presumably includ- ing those based in Southern California— would assem ble there, he cautioned, and they would “be manned by Japa nese naval officers [disguised as common immigrants] and prepared to serve as mine layers.”57 Follow-up reports, in- cluding those originating from other branches of the US government, cor- roborated this wild story with yet more fabrications that “a Japa nese [from California] recently landed cements, arms, and ammunition . . . for the pur- pose of erecting fortifications” in the bay.58 A US diplomat thus insisted that Washington must convince Mexicans to “adopt a policy of excluding the Japa nese as much as pos si ble from the west coast of Mexico and refusing to grant fishing and other concessions.”59

Although it might strike one simply as another example of heavy- handed US diplomacy, this recommendation also articulated the fundamental dilemma of white Amer i ca’s strug gle against the hemispheric Yellow Peril. Even with the backing of the Monroe Doctrine, diplomats and military men remained greatly frustrated by their inability to deal with the transborder Japa nese threat due to the limits of US sovereign control. Thus, from 1936 President Franklin  D. Roo se velt sought to use the inter- American confer- ences to forge a “hemispheric alliance” against Japa nese (and Germans) through discussions of common defense and security issues.60 At the con- ference in Havana in 1940, many governments in the Amer i cas reached an

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agreement on the perceived prob lem of hemispheric subversion, which en- compassed the racial peril of Japa nese immigrants, as well as the military and po liti cal intrigue of imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. In accordance with the Havana agreement, the FBI and US military intelligence formally began surveillance on and propaganda against Japa nese residents in Peru and other Latin American countries.61

After Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the US pursuit of a Japanese- free Western Hemi sphere intensified and became more unequivocal and direct. In January 1942, under the initiative of the US State Department, a confer- ence of the foreign ministers of the American states agreed to adopt mea sures for hemispheric removals, including preventive detention and deportation of Axis nationals, chiefly Japa nese, which seventeen Latin American countries carried out in a concerted manner.62 Mexico rid its northern border region of Japa nese residents— both aliens and citizens— through so- called voluntary relocation, even before the mass incarceration of West Coast Japa nese Amer- icans took place. Peru and a dozen other countries allowed the US military to orchestrate the forced removal and transport of more than twenty- two hun- dred Japa nese residents to stateside internment camps before their planned deportation to Japan.63 Thirty years after the first Magdalena Bay scare, the goal of the Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was fi nally being ful- filled, as the US national security regime was at work full steam for the con- tainment and elimination of the hemispheric racial threat.

This chapter has delineated a chain of ironic historical developments, in which US racial exclusionism produced and reproduced the kind of Japa nese immigrant settler colonialism that white Amer i ca desperately tried to stamp out from the US- Mexican borderlands in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. Far from the conventional image of Asian “sojourners,” many educated Issei considered themselves to be modern settler colonists intent on conquering a wilderness, just like their Anglo- Saxon pre de ces sors, for the sake of advanc- ing civilization. After 1892, the prob lem of race drove a wedge between their self- perception and the white American rendition of what pro gress and civilization entailed. Despite the paradox of Eurocentric modernity, many Issei acclimated to the closure of the American West, especially California, and they began to shift their gaze toward northern Mexico and move there. The Issei embrace and practice of US- style settler colonialism nonetheless compounded the public notion of a transborder Japa nese threat and conspiracy— and hence of their nonbelonging in either the white republic or its backyard. It then facilitated the merger of localized exclusionist politics with state- led hemispheric imperialism, based on shared fears of the spread- ing Japa nese racial threat. The transborder Yellow Peril discourse, which shaped a structure of national thought in the prewar United States, served as a power ful engine in shaping grassroots racial- nationalist politics and the US hemispheric diplomacy—as well as the making of an anti- Japanese

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national security regime based on it, beyond the confines of bilateral rela- tions between the two Pacific powers.

NOTES

Epigraph. The “hymn” was published nationwide si mul ta neously on July 23, 1916. See, for example, New York American and Los Angeles Examiner, July 23, 1916.

1. See Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti- Japanese Movement in California and the Strug gle for Japa nese Exclusion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 65–78.

2. On the idea of the hemispheric Yellow Peril, see Erika Lee, “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and Asian Exclusion in the Amer i cas,” Pacific Historical Review 76 (2007): 537–562. Her ex- cellent study is not concerned with how Issei settler colonialism, and the transborder migration cir cuits it produced, contributed to white Amer i ca’s formulation of the hemispheric Yellow Peril. On an example of a localized manifestation of the Yellow Peril demagoguery across the US- Mexican border region around Mexicali, see Eric Boime, “ ‘Beating Plowshares into Swords’: The Colorado River Delta, the Yellow Peril, and the Movement for Federal Reclamation, 1901–1928,” Pacific Historical Review 78 (2009): 30– 33, 43–45. Despite his attention to a borderlands context, Boime looks at the impact of the Yellow Peril on US reclamation eforts in the region.

3. Yuji Ichioka, The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japa nese Immigrants, 1885–1924 (New York: Free Press, 1988), 16–28; Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japa nese Amer i ca (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 35–36.

4. See Azuma, Between Two Empires, 91–92. 5. Shūyū Sanjin (pseudonym) and Ishida Kumajirō, Kitare Nihonjin [Come, Japa-

nese] (Tokyo: Kaishindō, 1887), 5–6. 6. “Zaibei Nihon minzokuon 2” [On the Japa nese race in Amer i ca], Aikoku [Patrio-

tism] 27, April 29, 1892. 7. The firsthand racial experience of Japa nese US residents, as I detailed in my first

book, set them apart from the people of Japan in the long run. While many early expan- sionists returned to Japan to pursue the life of a colonial master rather than that of a racial minority, those who stayed were compelled to seek interracial conciliation with, and ac cep tance by, white exclusionists for the sake of their survival. The people of Japan, including many returnees, became growingly indignant at white racism, providing a background for pan- Asianist ideologies of the 1930s. See Azuma, Between Two Empires, esp. chaps. 2–3.

8. Yamazaki Bungo, “Zai- Beikoku waga dōhō yūshi no jinshi ni nozomu” [Request for the like- minded compatriots in Amer i ca], Ensei [Expedition] 4 (August 1891): 2.

9. “Kōkai imin” [Emigrant on a voyage], in ibid., 13 (July 1892): 2–3. 10. Ibid., 3. 11. “Shokuminchi ni taisuru honkai no iken” [Our society’s commentary on colonial

settlement], ibid., 5 (September 1891): 2. 12. Takekawa Tōtarō, “Dai ni san ryū no jinbutsu wo motte Bokkoku wo tandai

tarashimeyo” [Let second or third tier people explore Mexico], in ibid., 27 (May 1893): 4.

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13. Ibid., 5. 14. “Imin no kyūmu Tankenka no ketsubō” [Urgent prob lem— dearth of explorers],

in ibid., 32 (October 1893): 4–6. 15. “Beikoku Sōkō Shokumin Shōreikai,” Shokumin Kyōkai hōkoku [Bulletin of the

Colonization Society] 23 (March 1895): 102. 16. See Nakai Yoshitarō, “Chōsen wo suteyo” [Forget about Korea], Nihonjin [Japa nese]

28 (October  1896): 14. A similar outlook gave birth to the Colonia Enomoto of Chiapas, Mexico, in 1897. See Daniel M. Masterson, The Japa nese in Latin Amer i ca (Urbana: Univer- sity of Illinois Press 2004), 27–28.

17. Azuma, Between Two Empires, 29–30. 18. See Nichiboku Kyōkai, ed., Nichiboku kōryūshi [History of Japanese- Mexican

relations] (Tokyo: PMC Shuppan, 1990), 246–319; Kurabe Kiyotaka, Tōge no bunkashi [Cultural history of mountain passes] (Tokyo: PMC Shuppan, 1989), 71–96.

19. Jesús A. Akachi, Carlos  T. Kasuga, Manuel  S. Murakami, María Elena Ota Mishima, Enrique Shibayama, and René Tanaka, “Japa nese Mexican Historical Overview,” in Encyclopedia of Japa nese Descendants in the Amer i cas: An Illustrated History of the Nikkei, ed. Akemi Kikumura- Yano, 206–210 (Walnut Creek, CA: Al- taMira Press 2002); Andrea Geiger, Subverting Exclusion: Transpacific Encounters with Race, Caste, and Border, 1885–1928 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 124–134.

20. Ichioka, The Issei, 149–150, 154, 159–160. 21. Azuma, Between Two Empires, 36–58, 91–98. 22. “Beikoku ni okeru yuiitsu no Nihonjin shokuminchi” [The one and only Japa-

nese colony in Amer i ca], Taiyō [Sun] 14 (January 1908). 23. “Need Larger Navy,” Washington Post, April  4, 1912; “Warning to Japan on

Magdalena Bay,” New York Times, April 5, 1912; US Senate Document No. 640, May 1, 1912, p. 4; and Nagai Matsuzō to David Starr Jordan, April 9, 1912, in “Bokkoku Taiheiyō engan ni oite Honpōjin gyogyōken shutoku ikken” [On the acquisition of fishing rights by Japa nese along the Pacific coast of Mexico] (hereafter BTH), Diplomatic Rec ords Office, Japan.

24. Noda Otosaburō, “Bokkoku ryokōdan” [On my trip to Mexico], Hokubei nōhō [North American agricultural journal] 3 (March 1912): 10.

25. Ibid., 6–7. See also Eugene Keith Chamberlin, “The Japa nese Scare at Magdalena Bay,” Pacific Historical Review 24 (1955): 351. Without consulting Japa nese immigrant sources, this article misrepresents Abiko Kyūtarō and Noda Otosaburō as having no in- tention to “establish there a Japa nese colony on a large scale.” Ibid., 351.

26. Nagai Matsuzō to Uchida Yasuya, March 14, 1912, in BTH. 27. US Senate Document No. 640, May 1, 1912, 4. 28. San Francisco Examiner, January 31, 1912; “Japa nese Deal with Mexico Is Blocked,”

Portland Tele gram, January 31, 1912. 29. David  H. Grover, “Maneuvering for Magdalena Bay: International Intrigue at a

Baja California Anchorage,” Southern California Quarterly 83 (2001): 265, 268. 30. “Fear Grip of Japan,” Washington Post, April 3, 1912; House Resolution No. 522,

May 3, 1912; US Senate Document No. 640, May 1, 1912, 1. 31. Tom Cofman, Nation Within: The Story of Amer i ca’s Annexation of the Nation of

Hawai‘ i (Kaneohe, HI: Epicenter, 1998), 220–221.

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32. “Japan and Mexico,” New York Times, April 4, 1912; see also Grover, “Maneuver- ing for Magdalena Bay,” 274–276. On exaggerated press reporting, see David Starr Jordan, Unseen Empire (Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1912), 116–122.

33. Grover, “Maneuvering for Magdalena Bay,” 275. 34. Congressional Rec ord, 62 Cong., 2 sess. (1912), 10045. 35. Walter LaFeber, “The Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine from Monroe to Rea-

gan,” in Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams, ed. Lloyd  C. Gardner, 139–140 (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1986); Grover, “Maneuvering for Magdalena Bay,” 276–277.

36. Ibid.; “Japan’s Premier Tells the Times There Is No Magdalena Bay Incident,” New York Times, April  6, 1912; US Senate, Report No.  996, July  31, 1912; Chinda Sutemi to Uchida Yasuya, April 14, 1912; and Chinda to Uchida, April 3, 1912, both in BTH.

37. Daniels, Politics of Prejudice, 46–64. 38. On the impact of the Zimmermann tele gram on triangular relations among the

United States, Mexico, and Japan, see Friedrich E. Schuler, Secret Wars and Secret Poli- cies in the Amer i cas, 1842–1929 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010), 196–228.

39. “Nichi- Boku Shokuminchi (Nichi- Boku Colony),” Sinaloa, Mexico, ca. 1914, 14– 15, and maps. See also “Nichi- Boku Sangyō Kabushiki Gaisha jigyō setsumei” [Explanation of operation plans of the Nichi- Boku Industrial Corporation], 1918; Takekawa Minetarō to Adachi Mineichirō, October 1, 1915, in “Honpō kaisha kankei zakken: Nichi- Boku Sangyō Kabushiki Gaisha” [Miscellaneous documents on Japanese- owned firms: Nichi- Boku Industrial Corporation] (hereafter HNB), Diplomatic Rec ords Office, Japan.

40. “Nichi- Boku Sangyō Kabushi Gaisha kabunishi roku” (ca. 1920–1921), in HNB; Ōkagawa Kō, “ ’Kyogyōka’ ni yoru giji benchā tōshi fando to risuku kanri” [Fake venture investment funds promoted by criminal- minded entrepreneurs and risk management], Shiga Daigaku Keizai Gakubu kenkyū nenpō [Annual research bulletin of Shiga Univer- sity Economic Department] 14 (2007): 14–15.

41. “Tochi baibai keiyakusha” [Parties who made a land purchase contract], ca. 1921, in HNB. Tally by the author from the list of land buyers.

42. See Nichiboku Kyōkai, Nichiboku kōryūshi, 422–423; Nihonjin Mekishiko Ijūshi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Nihonjin Mekishiko ijūshi [History of Japa nese immigration to Mex- ico] (Mexico City: Nihonjin Mekishiko Ijūshi Hensan Iinkai, 1971), 163–164, 235, 239– 241, 326–328; Murai Ken’ichi, Paionia retsuden [Who’s who of pioneers] (Mexico City: Privately printed, 1975), 63–64, 66–67, 101–102, 107.

43. Daniels, Politics of Prejudice, 79–105. 44. Ichioka, The Issei, 241–242. 45. See Fujioka Shirō, Minzoku hatten no senkusha [Pioneers of racial development]

(Tokyo: Dōbunsha, 1927), 167–297; Rafu Shimpō [Los Angeles Japa nese Daily News], April 10, 22, 1924.

46. Some Issei moved to Brazil, as well as Manchuria and other internal “frontiers” of the Japa nese empire. See Eiichiro Azuma, “Community Formation across the National Border: The Japa nese of the U.S.- Mexican Californias,” Review: Lit er a ture and Arts of the Amer i cas 39 (2006): 30–44; Azuma, Between Two Empires, 79–83.

47. María Elena Ota Mishima, Destino México (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1997), 107, 111.

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48. Kuga Narumi to Tanaka Giichi, “Bokkoku shucchōkata risei no ken” [Request for a business trip to Mexico], May  21, 1927, in “Honshō narabi zaigai kokan’in shucchō kankei zakken: Zaibei kakkan” [Business travels from the home ministry and overseas branches: consulates in the United States], Diplomatic Rec ords Office, Japan.

49. Yoshiyama Kitoku, Chūmoku subeki Mekishiko [Mexico that deserves our atten- tion] (San Francisco: Nichiboku Kenkyūkai, 1928), 301. Under Mexican law, foreigners could not own land within fifty kilo meters along the border, but many got around the restriction by setting up a land com pany or becoming a naturalized Mexican citizen—an option that Japa nese in California could not have after the early 1920s.

50. Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, ed., Waga Kokumin no Kaigai hatten: Shiryō- hen [Over- seas development of our nationals: reference materials] (Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1971), 140, 144.

51. “Japan Colony for Lower California Rumored,” San Francisco Bulletin, Octo- ber  23, 1924. On regionalized Yellow Peril discourse in the Imperial Valley during the 1910s, see Boime, “Beating Plowshares into Swords,” 40–45. While focusing on Japa nese presence around Mexicali, this earlier anti- Japanese discourse difered from one in the 1920s that advocated stronger national security mea sures, since the former was tied to the endeavor to marshal po liti cal support for a federal reclamation proj ect in the area.

52. “Japs Look to Mexico for Colonization,” San Francisco Daily News, August  3, 1925.

53. Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., “ Uncle Sam Should Be Watchful of Japa nese Activities in Mexico,” Illustrated Daily News, April  2, 1926; “Johnson Asks Inquiry in Mexican Land Deal,” New York Times, March 30, 1926.

54. Many reports on Japa nese in Mexico and other parts of Latin Amer i ca are depos- ited, for example, in boxes 220, 221, 226, and 228, Office of Naval Intelligence, Security Classified Administrative Correspondence, 1942–1946, Rec ords of the Chief of Naval Operations, Rec ord Group 38, National Archives, College Park, MD.

55. On the influences and roles of US- bred racial scaremongering in those nations in the 1930s, see Jefrey Lesser, Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Strug gle for Ethnicity in Brazil (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 93–94, 116–132, esp. 116; Erika Lee, “The ‘Yellow Peril’ in the United States and Peru: A Transnational History of Japa nese Exclusion, 1920s– World War Two,” in Transnational Crossroads: Remapping the Amer i cas and the Pacific, ed. Camilla Fojas and Rudy  P. Guevera, Jr., 315–358 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012).

56. Nichiboku Kyōkai, Nichiboku kōryūshi, 478–487. 57. B. P. Hastings, “Japa nese Activities— Baja California, Mexico,” January 21, 1935,

in box 226, Security Classified Administrative Correspondence. 58. Guy W. Ray, “Japa nese Activities in the Gulf of California and on the West Coast

of Mexico,” February 11, 1935, 1, in ibid. See also Howard A. Bowman to A. Cohn, Janu- ary 21, 1935, and Austin Spurlock, “Memorandum,” January 8, 1935, in ibid.

59. Guy W. Ray to Secretary of State, February 14, 1935, in ibid. 60. David Rock, “War and Postwar Intersections,” Latin Amer i ca in the 1940s: War

and Postwar Transitions, ed. David Rock, 23 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

61. John K. Emmerson, The Japa nese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Ser vice (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1978), 127.

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62. Michi Weglyn, Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of Amer i ca’s Concentration Camps (New York: William Morrow, 1976), 58–60.

63. Akachi et al., “Japa nese Mexican Historical Overview,” 213–214; C. Harvey Gar- diner, Pawns in the Triangle of Hate: The Peruvian Japa nese and the United States (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981).

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