Ethical Decision-Making

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© 2016 by the American Counseling Association. All rights reserved.

Received 06/22/15 Revised 11/18/15

Accepted 11/23/15 DOI: 10.1002/johc.12027

Authenticity in Ethical Decision Making:

Reflections for Professional Counselors

Christin M. Jungers and Jocelyn Gregoire

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Ethical competence, maturity, and autonomy are foundations of good counseling; however, ethical autonomy can be eroded by a risk-management approach to ethics that tends to con- strict counselors’ creative responses to dilemmas. This article offers reflections on the notion of authenticity as described by existentialist philosophers Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger, as a means by which to balance risk-management and reductionist perspectives on ethics and to foster ethical autonomy. Applications of authenticity to counselors’ ap- proach to ethics are suggested, as are limitations of this concept as a stand-alone framework for decision making.

Keywords: ethics, decision making, authenticity, autonomy

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Ethical maturity, ethical autonomy, and ethical competence are bedrocks of good counseling and enable professional helpers to act benevolently toward clients (Ivey, Ivey, & Zalaquett, 2014). The counseling profession offers clinicians a number of means by which to shape their professional ethical selves. Primary among these is the ACA Code of Ethics (American Counseling Association [ACA], 2014) and the codes of the parent association’s divisions and sister organizations, such as the American School Counselor Association and the American Association of Marriage and Family Therapists. These codes are an invaluable and foundational tool for ethical decision making, because they represent current thought about evolving issues (Kaplan et al., 2009). In addition to the codes, ethical principles such as nonmaleficence, beneficence, autonomy, fidelity, and justice are often a point of reflection when clinicians are trying to reason through a clinical dilemma (Beauchamp & Childress, 1979; Kitchener, 1984; Urofsky, Engles, & Engebretson, 2008). Pragmatism and experience likewise have inspired counselors to generate decision-making models that can be applied to ethical issues (e.g., Corey,

Christin M. Jungers, Clinical Mental Health Counseling Department, Franciscan University of Steu- benville; Jocelyn Gregoire, Department of Counseling, Psychology, and Special Education, Duquesne University. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Christin M. Jungers, Clini- cal Mental Health Counseling Department, Franciscan University of Steubenville, 1235 University Boulevard, Steubenville, OH 43952 (e-mail: [email protected]).

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Corey, & Callanan, 2011; M. Hill, Glaser, & Harden, 1995; Rest, 1984; Sileo & Kopala, 1993; Steinman, Richardson, & McEnroe, 1998; Tarvydas, 1998; Tymchuk, 1986; Welfel, 2010). Decision-making models provide clinicians with steps for reflection and suggestions for consultative actions before they settle on a decision about an ethical dilemma. Finally, professional wisdom from those who have researched or resolved problems in the field is accessible in the counseling literature and can be reviewed when one is in need of counsel. For example, Pope and Keith-Spiegel (2008) recom- mended a set of helpful tips for addressing boundary dilemmas, although their insights easily can be applied to other ethical issues.

While acknowledging the value and necessity of the aforementioned resources for building ethical competence, we believe there is room for further conversation about how to foster ethical maturity and autonomy in the counseling field. The study of ethics in counselor education programs and the practice of working through ethical dilemmas, especially early in one’s career, sometimes can be experienced as an exercise in learning one’s ethical obligations and making sure one knows what not to do to protect one’s license or avoid a lawsuit. It is our opinion that the understanding and implementation of ethics in counseling has the distinct possibility of being limited by a reductive, risk-management approach to decision making. This is evidenced, in part, by literature that highlights the liability aspect of ethical decision making across the helping professions (e.g., Hermann & Herlihy, 2006; Hoffman & Kress, 2010; Magnuson, Norem, & Wilcoxon, 2000; Nolan & Moncure, 2012; Reamer, 2013; Sanders, 2006). There are problems with this approach to learning and practicing ethics. First, it tends neither to expand perspectives on what is good and right or bad and wrong, nor to fully appreciate the complexity of the human condition and the therapeutic relationship. Second, it does not encourage professionals to examine a range of possible behaviors that can be enacted with the good of the client in mind (Lazarus, 1994). Third, it can foster habits by which counselors relinquish their interested and passionate involvement in the process of making ethical decisions.

In an article that set out to define a humanities vision for the counseling field, Hansen (2012) proposed that the profession has been so influenced by a reductive, scientific ideology that counselors are trained to oversimplify the human experience and disregard a variety of perspectives on clini- cal issues in favor of the scientific view. Referring to the role of scientific ideology in the counseling profession, Lemberger (2012) similarly noted that, “[m]any counseling researchers and practitioners have embraced a system that compels these professionals to take a reductionistic stance in their scholarly and therapeutic work” (p. 166). The danger of this trend is that creativity, innovation, and the ability to be critical as a professional counselor can be lost (Hansen, 2012). We believe that what Hansen (2006, 2012) observed generally about counseling’s emphasis toward simplification and quest for a single truth (as exemplified in evidence-based treatment

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and best practice movements) is also at least partially true for the approach to and application of ethics. Notably, Cottone (2014) recently questioned whether counselors are even permitted to act autonomously in light of an ever more prescriptive ACA Code of Ethics (ACA, 2014). He stated,

On the issue of constraint, the counseling profession has limited the rights of counselors to morally object to certain actions defined within the counseling scope of practice, thereby nullifying the autonomy of practicing professionals. For example, if an ethics code prevents a counselor from conscientious objection regarding judgments about which clients may be served, it challenges the counselor ’s right to make decisions free of the shackles of professional imposition. (p. 243)

The sword of Damocles metaphorically hangs over counselors’ heads when they are faced with ethical quandaries, and the safest, surest way out from under this perilous spot is to consult and ultimately abide by a single truth: the ACA Code of Ethics (ACA, 2014). Our purpose in critiquing the reductive, risk-management approach to ethics and the “single truth” as embodied by the ACA Code of Ethics is not to suggest that either this approach to decision making or the ACA Code of Ethics itself are not useful; both, in fact, are necessary, as they represent and refer to the social, profes- sional, and even political worlds in which counselors operate. Rather, we are pondering what is lost when counselors abide.

In this article, we take to heart Hansen’s (2012) suggestion that from a hu- manities view of things, good counselors are akin to professors of literature or philosophy who explore important human questions, appreciate meaning, value subjectivity, and engage in dialogue and debate with colleagues for the purpose of expanding perspectives rather than constricting or simplifying them. Like other counselors in the humanistic tradition (e.g., Dollarhide & Oliver, 2014; Scholl, McGowan, & Hansen, 2012), we are invested in helping professionals engage in their work, and ethical reasoning in a way that is not reductive or taken for granted, but rather that supports and advances human and professional potentials. To that end, we also hope that this article helps counselors think about the self-development or intrapersonal aspects of counselor ethics. The relevance of self-development to counselor ethics is confirmed by virtue ethicists who point out that qualities of an individual’s personhood, such as sensitivity to others’ needs, reflectivity, openness, and awareness of personal biases, are useful to ethical decision making, as are developed habits of ethical behavior (A. L. Hill, 2004; Punzo & Meara, 1993; Stewart-Sicking, 2008). Our goal, therefore, is to consider the process and outcomes of ethical decision making from a philosophical—especially an existentialist—perspective, with an emphasis on the concept of authenticity. By considering this particular philosophical notion, counselors might think about not just what they are required to do ethically, but how they can (a) imagine a variety of ethical responses to clinical quandaries, (b) act in a way that is professionally upstanding, and (c) strive toward an autonomous ethical self that makes use of the wisdom of the professional counseling community

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but also does not surrender free and informed thinking to keep in lockstep with the majority view.

HistoriCaL and PHiLosoPHiCaL sketCH of autHentiCity

The notion of authenticity in the Western world developed in the 17th and 18th centuries when society began viewing the person as a unique and valuable individual rather than as a cog in the system whose worth and purpose was related to the ability to fulfill one’s social role and responsibili- ties (Varga & Guignon, 2014). A sharp attention to the individual during these early and subsequent centuries opened the door for philosophers to challenge conformist social behavior, as well as critique some long-held virtues, such as honesty and sincerity, both of which esteemed behavior that aligned with the expectations of a person’s place in society. According to Varga and Guignon (2014), the virtue of sincerity eventually was traded for the virtue of authenticity, which generally holds that being true to oneself for its own sake is preferable to being sincere as a means to uphold social norms or act as a placeholder in society.

The popularization of authenticity as a virtue is attributable largely to existentialists such as Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980). The meaning of authenticity to each of these philosophers is related to his broader work and thought; how- ever, the concept as they deal with it nevertheless tends to involve a critique of conformist attitudes and behavior and, simultaneously, an encouragement toward ownership of one’s own self and one’s place in the world. These qualities are what interest us insofar as they challenge counselors not to see ethics primarily in a risk-management light and not to come to ethical deci- sions in a fashion that focuses on the outcome (i.e., enacting the code) to the detriment of reflection, engagement, and personal commitment and respon- sibility to the decision. In addition, the notion of authenticity is connected to that of autonomy, which also is of interest to us here. Both concepts suggest that it is worthwhile for people to foster self-directed and self-governing qualities so that ethical decisions are made through one’s own reasoning and reflections about how to live life rather than necessarily in accord with an external set of standards or guidelines (Varga & Guignon, 2014). In the rest of this section, we examine aspects of Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s philosophies as two means through which to expand our understanding of authenticity. We also consider how these philosophers’ sense of this notion might advance the development of counselors’ ethical professional selves.

Kierkegaard on Authenticity

The beginning of the quest for authenticity is tied tightly by many writers to Kierkegaard’s (1996) yearning to find a truth that made sense to him and

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for which he personally could commit both his life and death. A central concern in Kierkegaard’s philosophy was how one goes about becoming a Christian. A fierce critic of his age and especially of his own Christian com- munity, Kierkegaard believed that being a Christian had nothing to do with being born or raised in that faith community or even with holding the tenets of Christianity. In themselves, these features did not lead to an authentic Christian existence. Indeed, he accused his contemporaries of being lulled into a passionless complacency—a sort of spiritual sickness—that led them into living inauthentic existences and espousing nonidentities (Welstead, 2014). The inauthentic existence was strongly associated for Kierkegaard with the crowd, which he saw not only as a source of untruth but also as a way of undermining people’s sense of responsibility, purpose, and invest- ment in their lives. Kierkegaard contended it was too easy to get lost in a crowd mentality and thereby relinquish one’s own self, never committing to an idea in which one truly believes.

As a way out of the complacent attitude toward life and faith he observed around him, Kierkegaard turned to subjectivity. Specifically, he suggested that being authentic involves cultivating inner passion to be who one truly is, such that one’s being becomes an issue for an individual—not abstractly but personally (Pattison, 2005). Moreover, the authentic person is one who fervently believes in and commits to something or someone and then takes a leap of faith into the unknown to participate fully in the commitment. An example of this kind of dedication and leap of faith can be seen in marriage insofar as it requires a person to jump into the unknown future to live in the relationship to which one has pledged himself or herself. In Kierkegaard’s case, the authentic existence ultimately was related to a strong personal dedication and leap of faith to God and Christianity.

Although Kierkegaard’s religious worldview and his conclusion about the normative human existence culminating in Christian dedication might not fit for all counselors, his philosophical reflections on authenticity still have much to offer clinicians who appreciate a humanities view of their profession and who are seeking to become ethically mature and autonomous. First, Kierkegaard reminds us that the way in which one approaches and participates in a moral framework, such as a code of ethics, is meaning- ful. Commenting on Kierkegaard’s work, Golomb (2013) highlighted this point, saying, “authentic life has less to do with a specific content, a what, and more to do with some particular existential walk of life, with a how” (p. 2). In other words, accepting a professional counseling worldview, including its moral framework as embodied in the code of ethics, because it is handed down from the community of helpers to which one belongs is not sufficient, nor does it make one a de facto authentic helper. On the other hand, if counselors take Kierkegaard’s understanding of authenticity to heart, they will ask themselves not only what the code of ethics recom- mends them to do in particular situations but also, more importantly, how they personally will become ethical and dedicated counselors. Moving to

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this subjective level entails deep, individual engagement with the mission of the counseling profession and the principles upon which it is grounded. The ACA Code of Ethics (ACA, 2014) outlines the profession’s mission to include such things as sensitivity to human development processes, re- spect for diversity, appreciation of clients’ autonomy and human dignity, engagement in social justice advocacy, and skillful and ethical practice—all in support of a client’s inalienable personal worth. This mission is the foun- dation from which ethical decisions are intended to flow. Counselors act with authenticity when they reflect on the mission to support human worth and dignity, personally choose to support that mission, and are cautious not to use professional group membership unthinkingly as a justification for their ethical decisions.

Second, Kierkegaard’s appeal to passion is a challenge to the compla- cency for the profession that can overcome counselors when they fall into using a risk-management approach to ethics. Risk management, with its emphasis on legal culpability, extinguishes passion and replaces it with self-serving fear. In a sense, risk management turns counselors inward, but it is an inwardness not directed at identifying that which one can live and die for, as Kierkegaard sought. Instead, it is an inwardness aimed at self-preservation. Operating from this mindset, counselors in the process of making an ethical decision might ponder a question such as “What must I do to be safe rather than sorry?” It is easy to imagine that when counsel- ors rely on risk management as a way of resolving ethical conflicts, they have the potential to become part of the crowd that accepts the ACA Code of Ethics (ACA, 2014) as a statement of truth without fervently engaging it or the mission of the profession on which it is grounded. When counselors are interested in being authentic in a Kierkegaardian sense, however, they cultivate an inward passion that extends outward to the profession and the people they serve. Likewise, they are willing to take a leap of faith into the mission of the profession and its investment in honoring clients’ dignity and worth (ACA, 2014), even if making that leap might not be fully aligned, at times, to best practice recommendations.

Heidegger on Authenticity

Turning now to Martin Heidegger, we see that the concept of authenticity, primarily as described in his work Being and Time (1927/1996), is grounded in his understanding of human existence and in the responsibility that he believed each person has to his or her own being. He used the term Dasein, or being-there (Macquarrie, 1968), to characterize the central nature of that existence, which is distinguished “by the fact that in its being, this being is concerned about its very being” (Heidegger, 1927/1996, p. 10). It is not some set of objectively determined qualities or properties of human persons that characterize their nature; rather, human beings are characterized by the reality that their existence is an issue for them, and they must decide

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about their being. Describing Dasein, Heidegger (1927/1996, p. 10) says, “the essential essence of this being cannot be accomplished by ascribing to it a ‘what’ that specifies a material content, because its essence lies rather in the fact that it in each instance has to be its being as its own.” This concern for its own existence is a primary reason why human persons stand out from all other objects or creatures in the world (Macquarrie, 1968).

Looking more carefully at the meaning of human existence, we see that Heidegger conceptualized three main attributes of Dasein. First, Dasein is always in the process of becoming and is never complete in itself. One can- not say that there are fixed or determined properties of the human person because the person is constituted fundamentally by his or her possibilities (Macquarrie, 1968). This is in contrast to the way one might describe the properties of other objects in the world and trust that those properties will remain true and the same from day to day. Second, Dasein is characterized by a “unique mineness” (Macquarrie, 1968, p. 13). Heidegger (1927/1996) put it this way: “The being which this being is concerned about in its be- ing is always my own” (p. 40). He is conveying that the human person is unique unto himself or herself and is not to be replaced by any other person. Although one might exchange one object for another similar object and never notice the difference, the same is not true of the human person, who in her or his uniqueness cannot be replaced by any other individual. Finally, Heidegger (1927/1996) says that Dasein is possibility. Possibility is much more than a characteristic or property of the human being; rather, as Heidegger expresses, it is what is essential to its being.

In describing Dasein as possibility, Heidegger talked about authenticity and inauthenticity. Authentic existence involves the self-possession of one’s possibilities for being, whereas inauthenticity is characterized by a turning away from or relinquishing of one’s potential for becoming by living a sort of everyday mode of existence (Macquarrie, 1968). Heidegger (1927/1996) noted that it was fairly common for people to exist inauthentically. The everydayness or averageness of the world entices people to blindly follow mainstream views, rules, or ideas; to get subsumed in routines and tasks of life; and to live as part of the collective mass rather than as a unique individual. Additionally, in an everyday way of being in the world, people relate to their environment and the objects within it as instruments; that is, objects within the environment are “ready-to-hand” or significant primar- ily to the extent that they are tools available to address people’s practical concerns (Macquarrie, 1968).

Without denying that people exist in—and are always in relationship to—a world constituted by certain environmental realities that set parameters for how one lives and works, Heidegger (1927/1996) prompted people to pursue possibility within their social structures. To do this involves a degree of resoluteness, or an engagement in the world that fully acknowledges the structures of everyday life and situations and, concurrently, does not yield to them or the collective mass (Carman, 2003). From Heidegger’s

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perspective, people who act with authenticity do not use their consciences to rubber-stamp decisions that fit established moral frameworks or cultural ideals, but they resolutely make decisions that allow them to become their “own-most persons.” Perhaps the most powerful means by which a person embraces his or her own-most possibility and acts with authenticity is in recognizing the limited nature of existence. Heidegger contended that the process of living is best worked out when people strive to take hold of their potentials for being that always are out in front them; death puts the life project into perspective. Heidegger pointed out that death places a limit on life, sets a boundary around it in such a way that one cannot help but realize that being and existence belong completely to oneself, and thus one bears responsibility to the decisions to be made in this life.

Counselors who aim to develop their autonomous ethical selves, and who also value a humanities view of counseling, can garner a number of lessons from Heidegger’s (1927/1996) insights into authenticity. First, in a counseling profession that currently emphasizes scientific ideology and tends to constrict perspectives on good and helpful approaches to counselor education, research, and intervention (Hansen, 2012; Lemberger, 2012), Heidegger’s work presents the value of possibility in and of itself. His philosophy, which is rooted in an understanding of the human person as possibility and a conceptualization of authenticity that calls for participation in one’s possibilities, challenges the reductive movement in the counseling field. Hansen (2012) pointed to things such as symptom checklists, identi- fied learning competencies for students, diagnostic approaches to care, and specialized skills training to exemplify how the profession has simplified and technicalized counseling and education; we add to this list a risk- management, reductive approach to ethics in which the right response to ethical dilemmas is treated as if it is contained within and mandated by the code. This type of approach to ethics does not tend to encourage counselors to expand their imaginations about how best to respond to ethical issues; it simplifies the range of responses to those that will minimize or prevent liability. Some options for how to serve clients caringly and with dignity are likely left off the table. Heideggerian authenticity invites counselors to recognize and engage their personal and professional possibilities as a means to expand their own and the profession’s potentialities through the choices they make with regard to ethical dilemmas.

Second, the notion of authenticity challenges counselors to take full own- ership of their personal and professional possibilities, even while operating within the given structures of the counseling world. There is perhaps no other document that so specifically describes the parameters of the counselor’s role and world as the ACA Code of Ethics (ACA, 2014). It puts boundar- ies around such things as the roles and responsibilities of counselors and clients, treatment of information revealed in the therapeutic environment, use of technology, record keeping, appropriate and inappropriate referral practices, and so on. Heidegger (1927/1996) fully acknowledged that people

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are thrown into a world constituted by a large number of givens and social or professional conventions, such as those outlined for counselors in the ACA Code of Ethics. Yet, his philosophy challenges people to be resolute while they are living in relationship to the world. Heidegger’s concern was that people too readily can become subsumed into the everydayness of the environment in which they exist. This happens when people surrender to conformist mentalities and routines to the extent that they lose their distinc- tive existence. Becoming an authentic and autonomous ethical counselor, therefore, involves guarding against a collectivistic mentality in which one unreflectively participates in the counseling world and accepts enacting ethical mandates as if disconnected from them. Furthermore, it requires counselors to be aware of, but also resolutely go beyond, the parameters of convention. In a sense, the ACA Code of Ethics both creates structure in the counseling world and is an instrument of that world that counselors use to address their practical concerns (i.e., ethical dilemmas). As a tool ready-to-hand, the ACA Code of Ethics can guide counselors toward deci- sions that indicate care for clients; conversely, it also can be absorbed by clinicians as a thing of convention that fails to inspire, and instead becomes a taken-for-granted backdrop of our professional engagements. This tool might even become a source of social pressure that dictates what counsel- ors can or cannot do in the name of “being ethical.” Authentic existence is meant to involve us in a dimension of the world that transcends the mere instrumental. Going beyond starts by acknowledging one’s limitedness (i.e., the reality of death) such that one’s being comes into focus and one cannot help but take responsibility for one’s own-most possibilities and, to a degree, for the world in which one lives. As counselors contemplate their own possibilities and those of the profession in an authentic way, they take pains not to consider ethical practices or actions only outlined in the ACA Code of Ethics. They seek to at least consider the possibility that caring for clients during ethical quandaries might entail creative and in- novative actions, similar to what is encouraged by a humanities vision of counseling. They ponder—and possibly enact—resolutions that can shape the counseling world in new ways. Ultimately, being authentic means that counseling professionals stand out in their professional world by taking full responsibility and ownership over their ethical decisions even—and especially—if they are not fully in compliance with current practices.

LiMitations and ConCLusions about usinG autHentiCity in etHiCaL reasoninG

The purpose of focusing on the notion of authenticity is to challenge the somewhat complacent or even disinterested attitude that can settle in when risk management becomes the usual means through which to resolve both weighty ethical dilemmas and more ordinary ethical decisions. We acknowledge that there are limits to using authenticity alone as a moral

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compass. Numerous writers (e.g., Golomb, 2013; Lodge, 2007; Varga & Guignon, 2014) have noted that overemphasizing one’s own self-created and self-imposed guidelines or one’s passions when resolving moral issues can lead to (a) a distorted sense of morality and (b) a failure to apply com- monly agreed upon ethical standards in decision making. Golomb (2013) asked, “if an authentic mode of living requires an individual’s total and passionate commitment and uncompromising rejection of anything that is alien or contradictory to it—could it be that a passionate Nazi or religious fanatic is to be regarded as an authentic subject deserving of our highest esteem?” (p. 4). His question cannot be ignored. Varga and Guignon (2014) noted that the concept of authenticity suggests a false dichotomy between the person and the community. With its extensive focus on the individual and the individual’s inner life and passions, the notion of authenticity can seem to suggest that the person fundamentally exists apart from the com- munity. These critiques of authenticity both are concerned that, in striving to be authentic, a person will become encapsulated in his or her own world and misperceive or devalue core principles and standards of care worth considering when making ethical decisions.

is one to abandon the notion of authenticity as useful to counselors’ decision-making process in light of these limitations? We would say no. at the beginning of this article, we noted that a foundation of good counseling includes competence, maturity, and autonomy in the area of ethical deci- sion making. Competence refers to a counselor ’s minimum knowledge base and skill level to be able to do the work that a counselor does. included in this knowledge base and skill set are comprehension of and ability to enact professional ethical standards and an appreciation for counselors’ positive view of the human person, such as is outlined in a humanities vision of the person as holistic and possessing inherent dignity, worth, and yearnings toward growth (scholl et al., 2012). Ethical competence is shaped when counselors maintain a connection with their professional world and use that world to inform ethical decision making insofar as it is grounded in an appreciation for the respect and dignity of all persons (aca, 2014). The counseling world can provide a “what”—that is, a moral framework necessary for ethical decision making. The ACA Code of Ethics (aca, 2014), in particular, acts as a balance to a counselor ’s own self- created guidelines and subjective sense of right and wrong. it cannot and should not be discarded in the pursuit of authenticity. However, insofar as counselors desire to develop ethical autonomy and not to accept risk man- agement and reductionism in their approach to doing ethics, authenticity is useful. The benefits of cultivating authenticity are that this virtue can help counselors (a) reorient their reflections on how to become personally invested and ethical professionals; (b) passionately and personally engage the mission of the profession upon which its moral framework rests; (c) fully acknowledge the variety of possibilities at hand for resolving ethical issues, not just those described in the ACA Code of Ethics; and (d) resolutely

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own the ethical decisions they make. ultimately, being authentic means forging a professional self that is fully conscious, informed by the profes- sion’s mission, and freely able to engage one’s own and the profession’s possibilities for growth and development.

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