Discussion: Recognizing the Connection Between Job Attitudes, Individual Performance, and Organizational Effectiveness

AII/lu. Rev. Psychol. 1993. 44: 117-54 Copyright © 1993 by Annual Reviews Inc.

ATTITUDES AND ATTITUDE

CHANGE

James M. Ols on

Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A5C2

Mark P. Zanna

Department of Psychology , University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G 1

KEYWORDS: persuasion, beliefs, prejudice, stereotypes, values

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 118

ATTITUDE STRUCTURE ....................................................................................................... 118

Definitions of Attitude............................. ............................ ................................. I 19 Affective, Cognitive, and Behavioral Correlates of Attitudes.............................. 120 Attitude Attributes................................................................................................. 122 Meas urement of Attitudes ...... .... ........... ..... .. .......... ..... ..... .... .. ... ......... .. ... ..... ..... . .. . 123

VALUES AND ATTITUDES ................................................................................................... 125

Value-Attitude Relations....................................................................................... 125 Functions of Attitudes: Value Expression Versus Object Appraisal................... 125

ATTITUDE FORMATION ....................................................................................................... 127 Conditioning of Attitudes ..... ............ ......... ............. ....... .. ............ .............. ........... 127 Heritability of Attitudes ........... ........ .. ........... ...... ..... .... .. ... .. ........ .... ... .. ...... .. ... ...... 128

ATTITUDES AND INFORMATION-PROCESSING ............................................................. 129 Selective Interpretation .. ....... .. ............. ........... .......... .... .. . ..... ... .. .. ... .... ..... .. .... .... .. 129 Selective Memory . ........ ... ........ .. .......... ........ .... . ........ ..... ....... .... . . ... .. .. .. . . .. ........ ... ... 130

ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS ............................................................................................ 131 Theory of Reas oned Action .................. .... ................ ..................... ....... ............. ... 131 Alternative Models of the Attitude-Behavior Relation......................................... 132 Effects of Behavior on Attitudes .. ....... . .. ..... ... .. . .. .. ...... . . .. .. .. .. .. .. ..... .. ... ... .. ... ...... . . .. 133

PERSUASION ................................................................................................... ......... .............. 135

Elaboration-Likelihood and Heuristic-Systematic Models of Persuasion .... ... .. . 135 Mes sage Reception ...... ............ ... .. ................ ............ ...... .. .... ...... ......... .. ...... .. ...... . 136

0066-4308/93/1201-0117$02.00 117

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

118 OLSON & ZANNA

Source Characteristics .......................... ............................................................... 138 Message Characteristics ...... .......................................... .................................. . . .. 138 Recipient Characteristics..................................................................................... 140

STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE .......... ................................................... . .............. . . .......... 14 1 Stereotypes ................................. . .......................................................................... 141 Prejudice ............................................................................................................... 143

CONCLUSIONS ................... ... ........................... ....................... .. """"''''''''' .... , ........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

INTRODUCTION

Attitudes and attitude change remain among the most extensively researched topics by social psychologists. Our task is to review the attitudes literature from 1989 to 1991. Some papers published or in press early in 1992 (prior to the due date for our manuscript) are also included.

We were overwhelmed by the number of articles and chapters on attitudes that appeared in the three-year period of our review. We were forced to exclude several hundred relevant papers to meet space limitations. For exam­ ple, we excluded many fascinating applications of attitudes research to social problems (e.g. health promotion; effects of salient events on attitudes). We also excluded studies that focused on advertising and research examining the influence of the media on attitudes and behaviors. Studies of group influence (e.g. minority influence), intergroup relations (e.g. social identity theory), and self-presentation were also largely excluded despite their relevance to attitude processes; some of these topics have been reviewed recently elsewhere in this series (e.g. Schlenker & Weigold 1992). Even with these exclusions, we had to be highly selective in citing the relevant articles that remained. We focused on the papers that we found most interesting, provocative, and informative about underlying processes.

The level of activity in the attitudes literature is underscored by the number of books that have appeared recently. In addition to numerous texts for under­ graduates (e.g. Milburn 1991; O' Keefe 1990; Oskamp 1991; Rajecki 1990; Reardon 1991; Zimbardo & Leippe 1991), specialized books have appeared on attitude measures (Robinson et al 1991), social judgment (Eiser 1990), propaganda (Pratkanis & Aronson 1991), and prejudice (Mackie & Hamilton 1992; Zanna & Olson 1992). The most noteworthy addition to the literature is an extraordinary book by Eagly & Chaiken (1992), which provides a com­ prehensive review and analysis of the attitudes literature; we refer readers to this scholarly book for elaboration of many issues raised in our review.

ATTITUDE STRUCTURE

In the last decade, structural issues have become a central interest of attitude researchers (see McGuire 1985; Pratkanis et al 1989), as indicated by the emergence of sections on attitude structure in the two preceding reviews of attitudes published in this series (Chaiken & Stangor 1987; Tesser & Shaffer

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

AITITUDES 119

1990). Although a few researchers have examined how attitudes toward differ­ ent topics are interrelated (e.g. the relationship of political expertise and con­ sistency among political attitudes: see Judd & Downing 1990), attention has focused on questions of intra-attitudinal structure.

Definiti ons of Attitude

The most basic structural question about attitudes concerns the nature of the concept itself. Despite the long history of research on attitudes, there is no universally agreed-upon definition. Influential theorists variously define attitudes primarily in terms of evaluation (e.g. "a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or

disfavor," Eagly & Chaiken 1992), affect (e.g. "the affect associated with a mental object," Greenwald 1989 p. 432), cognition (e.g. "a special type of knowledge, notably knowledge of which content is evaluative or affective,"

Kruglanski 1989 p. 139), and behavioral predispositions (e.g. "a state of a person that predisposes a favorable or unfavorable response to an object,

person, or idea" Triandis 1991 p. 485).

Notwithstanding these differences, we think that most attitude theorists agree that (a) evaluation constitutes a central, perhaps predominant, aspect of attitudes, (b) attitudes are represented in memory, and (c) affective, cognitive, and behavioral antecedents of attitudes can be distinguished, as can affective, cognitive, and behavioral consequences of attitudes.

A TIITUDES AS EV ALUA nONS Most theorists implicate evaluation in their definitions of attitudes. Eagly & Chaiken (1992) argue that attitudes do not form until individuals respond evaluatively to an entity and that, once formed, attitudes predispose evaluative responses when the attitude object is subse­ quently encountered. Eagly & Chaiken also note that evaluative responses can be overt or covert and cognitive, affective, or behavioral.

ATTITUDES AS REPRESENTATIONS IN MEMORY A second common assumption among attitude researchers is that attitudes are represented in memory. For example, attitudes have been characterized as knowledge structures (e.g. An­ derson & Armstrong 1989; Kruglanski 1989) and as associative networks of interconnected evaluations and beliefs (e.g. Fazio 1990; Pratkanis & Greenwald 1989). These perspectives imply that elicitation of one attitude or belief will make closely related attitudes and beliefs more accessible through a process of spreading activation. In a clever demonstration of this idea, Tourangeau et al (1991) timed respondents as they indicated agreement or disagreement with statements about abortion and welfare. These statements had previously been scaled for their topical similarity (reflecting similarity on dimensions indepen­ dent of evaluation). Agree/disagree judgments were faster when an item fol­ lowed a topically related item.

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

120 OLSON & ZANNA

One model that nicely integrates the representational and evaluative fea­

tures of attitudes is the sociocognitive model proposed by Pratkanis &

Greenwald (1989). According to these authors, an attitude is represented in

memory by (a) an object label, (b) an evaluative summary, and (c) a knowl­

edge structure supporting the evaluation. Using principles of social cognition,

Pratkanis & Greenwald describe how attitudes provide simple strategies for problem-solving, organize memory for events, and maintain self-worth. These authors view attitudes as cognitive representations of evaluations, which serve a fundamental role in relating an individual to the social world.

Breckler & Wiggins (1989a) define attitudes explicitly as "mental and neural representations." They point out that representations take various forms and that the same object can be represented in multiple ways. For example, an individual's attitude toward sour milk consists of verbal knowledge (e.g. eval­

uative words and labels) and nonverbal responses to the olfactory stimulation of sour milk itself; these components may be stored in distinct symbolic

systems. This representational perspective underscores that verbal, self-report

measures of attitudes may not capture the full range of the concept, especially

its nonverbal (often affective) component.

Affective, Cognitive, and Behavioral Correlates of Attitudes

The tripartite view of attitude£ has been influential from the very beginning of research on this concept (see McGuire 1985). Rather than assuming that all attitudes necessarily have affective, cognitive, and behavioral components, however, recent researchers have focused on these domains as correlates of attitudes. For example, Zanna & Rempel (1988) argued that attitudes can be based upon, or develop from, affective information (as in the case of condi­ tioning), cognitive information (as in the case of knowledge-based evalua­

tions), and behavioral information (as in the case of self-perception inferences

from prior actions). Eagly & Chaiken (1992) explain how attitudes can gener­ ate affective responses (e.g. liking for an object), cognitive responses (e.g.

attributions for the target's actions), and behavioral responses (e.g. overt ac­ tions toward the target).

Thus, the affective-cognitive-behavioral framework provides a useful heu­

ristic for thinking about both the antecedents and consequences of attitudes, but these domains will not necessarily all apply to a given attitude. Indeed, consistency among affective, cognitive, and behavioral correlates of attitudes

is an empirical issue.

EVALUATION VERSUS AFFECT IN ATTITUDES Breckler & Wiggins ( 1989b, 1991) have distinguished between affect and evaluation in the structure of

attitudes. Their procedure involves asking subjects to rate the attitude object on a series of bipolar adjective scales (e.g. bad/good, wise/foolish), once according to how the object makes them feel ("affect") and once according to how the

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

ATIITUDES 1 2 1

object is ("evaluation," though based principally o n cognitive beliefs about the object). These ratings do not yield equivalent values. Rather, affect and evalu­ ation correlate uniquely with self-ratings of liking for the object (which Breckler & Wiggins call the global attitude). Also, affect sometimes does a better job of predicting self-report behaviors than does evaluation (e.g. in the domain of blood donation). The authors conclude from their studies that affect and evalu­ ation constitute distinct attitude components.

We prefer to maintain the view of attitudes as evaluative judgments that are stored in memory (as previously articulated), of which affect is one possible source. Nevertheless, Breckler & Wiggins have identified attitude domains where overall evaluations do not fully capture subjects' affective reactions to the objects. Because affect can drive psychological processes and behavior, it has unique predictive utility beyond summary evaluative judgments in these domains.

AFFECT VERSUS COGNITION IN ATTITUDES Whether attitudes are based on affective or cognitive information seems to be important. Edwards (1990) induced subjects to form either affect-based or cognition-based attitudes, for example by having subjects either taste a new soft drink before reading about its features or read about the features before tasting it. Subjects were then exposed either to an affective or a cognitive means of persuasion, for example the drink's mildly aversive odor or a written description of several negative features of the drink. For affect-based attitudes, subjects showed more attitude change when the persuasive appeal employed an affective approach; cognition­ based attitudes were equally influenced by each type of appeal. In contrast to

these findings, Millar & Millar (1990) classified subjects as possessing either affect-based or cognition-based attitudes (e.g. liking a beverage because it makes you feel refreshed vs liking it because it is low in calories) and found that persuasive appeals were more effective when they adopted the perspective that did not match the presumed basis of the attitude (e.g. when an affective appeal attacked a cognition-based attitude).

Two methodological differences between these studies seem most pertinent to explaining the divergent results. First, Millar & Millar studied relatively well-formed attitudes; hence, subjects were probably able to counterargue more effectively messages that matched their attitude than mismatched mes­ sages. Second, the appeals used by Millar & Millar were all argument-based, providing information either about others' emotional or rational reactions to the object; these authors did not give subjects a new, personal affective experi­ ence concerning the object (as Edwards did when she exposed subjects to an aversive odor). Combining these points, we suspect that, for well-established attitudes, rational and emotional arguments will yield "mismatch" effects (as in Millar & Millar 1990). On the other hand, new affective experiences will be generally powerful sources of influence, perhaps especially for affect-based attitudes (as in Edwards 1990).

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

122 OLSON & ZANNA

Another issue related to the distinction between affect-based and cognition­ based attitudes, which again has generated apparently divergent results, con­

cerns the effects of introspection on attitude-behavior consistency. Wilson and colleagues (Wilson 1990; Wilson et al 1989) have shown that asking subjects to think about the reasons for their attitudes produces attitude expressions that are less predictive of behavior. In contrast, Millar, Tesser, and colleagues (e.g.

Millar & Tesser 1989; Tesser et al 1992) have found that asking subjects to think about their attitudes can produce more confident and extreme attitudes, which seem to predict behavior better. Of course, thinking about the reasons underlying one's attitude is not the same as thinking about one's attitude; the former instructions can bring to mind incomplete or inaccurate explanations

that induce temporary shifts of opinion (Wilson 1990), whereas the latter instructions may evoke attitude-consistent thoughts that polarize evaluations, especially when underlying values are consistent with the attitude (Liberman

& Chaiken 1991). Also, when the relevant behaviors are "consummatory" (driven by feelings and emotions) rather than "instrumental" (driven by cogni­ tions), thinking about the reasons underlying one's attitudes might be espe­ cially disruptive of attitude-behavior consistency (Millar & Tesser 1992).

Attitude Attributes

Several characteristics of attitudes have been shown to be associated with noteworthy effects, such as biased interpretation of attitude-relevant informa­ tion, resistance to persuasion, and strong prediction of behavior.

ACCESSIBILITY Fazio and colleagues (see Fazio 1990 for a review) have collected data showing that the ease or speed with which evaluations can be retrieved from memory predicts the influence of those attitudes on subsequent perceptions of and actions toward the attitude object. Highly accessible attitudes are more likely to bias interpretation of relevant information and shape behavior in a direction consistent with the attitude.

Fazio argues that when object-evaluation associations are strong, the mere presentation of the attitude object can automatically activate the evaluation. For example, he has used a priming paradigm to show that the presentation of highly accessible attitude objects makes subsequent judgments about evaluative1y congruent adjectives faster. Recently, Bargh et al ( 1992) found that the strength of this automatic acti vation effect correlated not only with the accessibility of an attitude for a particular individual, but also with the norma­ tive accessibility of an attitude across subjects (i.e. with the mean latency of all subjects' responses to an attitude item). These findings may reflect, however, the covariation of normative and idiosyncratic accessibility (see Fazio 1992).

STRENGTH Attitude strength has been increasingly studied over the last few years, as indicated by the forthcoming volume on this topic edited by Petty &

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

ATIITUDES 123

Krosnick (1992). Strong attitudes serve as important sources of identity, resist most attempts at change, and exert widespread effects on perception and behavior. Krosnick & Abelson (1992) argue cogently that strength should be routinely measured in attitudes research. These authors review research on five dimensions that presumably reflect attitude strength: extremity, intensity, cer­ tainty, importance, and knowledge. Attitude strength has also been related to accessibility: Krosnick (1989) found that attitudes that people consider person­ ally important are reported more quickly than unimportant attitudes. Of course, whether importance underlies accessibility or vice versa is unclear.

AMBIVALENCE Ambivalent attitudes are conflicted evaluations-attitudes that contain both positive and negative elements. To the extent that positive and negative elements are equal and extreme, greater ambivalence is present (see Thompson et al 1992). In an interesting program of research, Katz and col­ leagues (e.g. Hass et a11991; Katz & Hass 1988) studied the consequences of ambivalent racial attitudes. These authors propose that many members of majority groups have conflicting attitudes toward minorities, consisting of feelings of both aversion and friendly concern. Consequently, majority group evaluations of minority group members tend to be more polarized (both posi­ tively and negatively) than evaluations of their own members. Hass et al (1991) found that, indeed, a measure of attitude ambivalence predicted polarized cross-racial evaluations.

Measurement of Attitudes

The most common technique for measuring attitudes continues to be global self-reports, such as ratings of the attitude object on bipolar evaluative dimen­ sions (good-bad, favorable-unfavorable, etc). An excellent summary of attitude measurement techniques is provided by Himmelfarb (1992). Attitude researchers are also employing varied methodologies to test theories, includ­ ing meta-analytic techniques (e.g. Johnson & Eagly 1989) and computer simu­ lation (e.g. Nowak et aI1990). In a cogent critique of the use of multiplicative composites, Evans (1991) pointed out that tests of theoretical models contain­ ing multiplicative terms should not use those composites in subsequent corre­ lational analyses. For example, tests of Fishbein & Ajzen's 1975 theory of reasoned action (where attitudes are expectancy-value products) should enter the components of the attitudes into hierarchical regression analyses to predict subsequent variables (e.g. behavioral intentions).

NEW TECHNIQUES Several new techniques for measuring attitudes have ap­ peared recently. Bassili & Fletcher (1991) designed a methodology for record­ ing response times in telephone interviews, which holds promise for assessing such qualities as attitude accessibility. Methods that allow for tailored or individually adapted surveys have also been introduced (Balasubramanian &

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

124 OLSON & ZANNA

Kamakura 1989 ; Singh et aI199 0), which pose only those scale items that are most informative about respondents' attitudes, thereby maximizing both the efficiency and quality of the survey. Indirect assessments of attitudes, such as implicit measures of memory, can document both conscious and unconscious effects of attitudes (B anaji & Greenwald 1992 ; Dovidio & Fazio 1992 ).

In the psychophysiological domain, Cacioppo and colleagues (Cacioppo et

al 1989 ; Cacioppo & Tassinary 199 0) continue their innovative work on

physiological manifestations of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. With re­

spect to attitudes, these researchers have focused on facial EMG in structured

situations as a means of assessing individuals' affective and evaluative re­

sponses.

RESPONSE EFFECTS Respondents' answers to attitude and opinion items in surveys are influenced by a variety of methodological factors. Perhaps most obviously, the way questions are worded can affect responses. Relatively minor variations in question wording have been shown to substantially alter expressed support for such issues as government spending (Rasinski 1989 ) and treatment of criminals (Zamble & Kalm 199 0). The response scales offered to subjects can also influence their answers. For example, Gray (1990) found much greater belief in scientifically unsubstantiated phenomena when subj ects were asked to rate the degree of their belief or unbelief in each phenomenon than when they were asked to indicate with checkmarks those phenomena they believed in. Schwarz (199 0) has outlined several ways that response categories constitute a source of information for respondents, including providing a frame of reference for judgments.

Answers to an item can also be affected by the preceding items. Question

order or context effects have received much attention recently, often within

the framework of either social judgment theory (see Sarup et al 1991 for an

interesting test of this theory) or representational network models of attitude

structure (Ottati et al 1989; Tourangeau et al 1989). For example, Schwarz and

colleagues (e.g. Schwarz et al199 0; Schwarz et al1991 b) have studied assim­

ilation and contrast effects in attitude measurement. When preceding questions

in a survey activate information that is part of the relevant information for

answering a current question (e.g. when judgments of present marital satisfac­

tion precede judgments of present life satisfaction), then assimilation typically

occurs, such that answers to the current question move in the direction of

answers to the preceding question. On the other hand, when information

activated by a prior question is outside of the data relevant to the current

question (e.g. when judgments of life satisfaction 1 0 years ago precede judg­

ments of present life satisfaction), then contrast effects can occur, because the

activated information serves as a standard of comparison or reference point for

anchoring the response scale.

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

ATTITUDES 125

VALUES AND ATIITUDES

Value-Attitude Relati ons

Values are generally conceptualized as higher-order evaluative standards, re­ ferring to desirable means and ends of action (e.g. Rokeach 1973). As such, values are viewed as potential determinants of preferences and attitudes. For example, values have been shown to predict attitudes toward nuclear weapons (Kristiansen & Matheson 1990), attitudes toward the unemployed (Heaven 1990), and beliefs in a just world (Feather 1991).

If values are abstract standards, then their influence on behavior may typi­ cally be mediated by more proximal factors. Using an expectancy-value framework, Feather ( 1990) has provided data suggesting that values affect behavior by influencing individuals' evaluations of the consequences of ac­ tions. Values can influence perceived valences both of alternative ways of behaving and of expected outcomes of the actions.

The best-known scale for measuring values is the Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach 1973), which distinguishes between instrumental and terminal val­ ues (see Crosby et al 1990 for a recent factor analysis of the RVS). Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz & Bilsky 1990; Schwartz et al 1992) have devel­ oped a comprehensive value survey that distinguishes broad content domains of values (e.g. achievement, security, conformity). Research in 20 countries has provided evidence of cross-cultural generality for 10 of the content do­ mains. Also, analyses indicate that two fundamental dimensions underlie the content domains: openness to change versus conservation (whether the values motivate behavior along unpredictable vs predictable paths) and self-enhance­ ment versus self-transcendence (whether the values motivate self-interested actions or promote the welfare of others; see also Triandis et al 1990). Interest­ ingly' Rokeach's distinction between instrumental and terminal values (means vs ends) has not emerged as an underlying dimension in Schwartz's research.

Functi ons of Attitudes: Value Expression Versus Object Appraisal

A theoretical approach that explicitly addresses the connection between values and attitudes is the functional view of attitudes. From this perspective, attitudes fulfill psychological needs for the individual. Two primary functions of attitudes have received the most attention in recent work: value expression and object appraisal. Value expressive attitudes communicate important val­ ues and/or seek social approval (this latter, social approval aspect is sometimes labelled separately as the social adjustive function). Thus, these attitudes serve both private and public identity concerns (Eagly & Chaiken 1992; Shavitt 1989). The object appraisal function derives from the previously-discussed

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

126 OLSON & ZANNA

representational nature of attitudes. Attitudes facilitate the categorization of

objects and events. This function is presumably fulfilled by most attitudes, but

especially by strong and accessible attitudes (Fazio 1990; Pratkanis &

Greenwald 1989).

Various strategies have been used to explore how certain attitudes operate

to serve corresponding personal needs (see Eagly & Chaiken 1992; Shavitt

1989; Tesser & Shaffer 1990). Attitudes toward certain kinds of objects (e.g.

perfume) are more likely to serve value expressive needs than are attitudes

toward other objects (e.g. coffee; Shavitt 1990). Under certain situational conditions, such as time pressure, attitudes are more likely to serve object

appraisal needs (Sanbonmatsu & Fazio 1990). Some personality variables are

associated with particular attitude functions (e.g. self-monitoring, see

Kristiansen & Zanna 1991; Snyder & DeBono 1987).

Shavitt (1990) investigated the responsiveness of attitudes fulfilling differ­ ent functions to congruent versus incongruent persuasive appeals. Subjects

read advertisements for products that primarily serve either social identity

(similar to value expressive) or utilitarian (similar to object appraisal) needs.

The advertisements focused either on how the product reflects important val­ ues or on the qualities of the product (social identity vs utilitarian appeals). Subjects expressed stronger preference for products advertised in a manner

that matched the attitude's underlying function.

Jamieson & Zanna ( 1989) showed that the object appraisal function of attitudes is moderated by self-monitoring. Subjects read summaries of court cases dealing with affirmative action or capital punishment and were asked to

rcnder judgments. Some subjects were given only three minutes per case to

complete this task, whereas others had unlimited time. When subjects had

unlimited time, their judgments were generally unrelated to their attitudes

toward affirmative action or capital punishment, presumably because they

were instructed to be impartial and to base their decisions on the merits of the cases. Under time pressure, however, low self-monitors rendered judgments

that were strongly related to their attitudes.

Pryor and colleagues (Pryor et al 1989; Pryor et al 1991) propose that

attitudes toward persons with AIDS can serve both instrumental and symbolic

functions. The instrumental function reflects perceptions of the possible con­ sequences of interacting with such persons (similar to object appraisal). The

symbolic function reflects judgments about homosexual promiscuity (similar

to value expression). Education campaigns that stress the minimal risks associ­

ated with interacting with infected persons may be effective only for individu­

als whose attitudes fulfill the instrumental function (see Pryor et al 1991). In a similar vein, Snyder & Miene (1992) argue that stereotypes of the elderly can

fulfill different functions and that the success of intervention strategies de­ pends on matching those functions.

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

ATTITUDE FORMATION

ATTITUDES 127

A relatively neglected question in the attitudes literature has been when attitudes form. Researchers are now beginning to identify conditions that foster crystalization of evaluations, including expecting to interact with the attitude object (Gerard & Orive 1987), being asked about one's attitude (Fazio 1987), and having a lot of knowledge about an issue (Judd & Downing 1990). These analyses underscore the important functions attitudes fulfill in orienting people to the social environment.

A more widely examined question has been how attitudes form. For exam­ ple, repeated exposure to a stimulus results in heightened positive evaluations (Zajonc 1968), although boredom is a limiting condition on this "mere expo­ sure effect" (see Bomstein et al 1990). In an informative review and meta­ analysis of the mere exposure literature, Bomstein (1989) identified numerous predictors of the strength of exposure effects, including stimulus complexity and exposure duration. Other interesting work on attitude formation has ad­ dressed long-standing topics such as conditioning and new topics such as the heritability of attitudes.

C onditi oning of Attitudes

Pairing neutral attitude objects with pOSItIve (or negative) stimuli should evoke more positive (or negative) evaluations of the object through classical and/or instrumental conditioning. Recent research has identified boundary conditions for conditioning and explored implications of attitudinal condition­ ing for seemingly unrelated judgments. Cacioppo et al (1992) paired electric shock with neutral words and nonwords; conditioning was stronger for non­ words, suggesting that prior knowledge about objects can dilute the evaluative consequences of conditioned affect. Kuykendall & Keating (1990) paired positive or negative words with the country names Brazil and Turkey; subjects' judgments about the favorability of the economic conditions in the two countries were affected. Perdue et al ( 1990) showed that nonsense sylla­ bles previously paired with ingroup pronouns (we, us) were rated more favor­ ably than control syllables or syllables paired with outgroup pronouns.

In an intriguing study, Krosnick et al (1992) obtained evidence of sublimi­ nal conditioning of attitudes. Subjects viewed slides of a young woman en­ gaged in everyday activities such as getting into a car. Immediately preceding each slide was a subliminal presentation of an affect-arousing photograph, either positive or negative in valence (e.g. kittens, a face on fire). Subjects exposed to positive affect-inducing photos expressed more favorable attitudes toward the woman than did subjects exposed to negative affect-inducing pho­ tos. These data suggest that perceivers do not have to be consciously aware of unconditioned stimuli in order for conditioning to occur. It should be noted, however, that a priming interpretation of these findings may be possible, such

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

128 OLSON & ZANNA

that induced mood altered subjects' interpretations of the woman's actions (see Eagly & Chaiken 1 992 ) .

Heritability of Attitudes

The field of behavioral genetics has begun to exert an influence on social psychologists, including attitude researchers. A fascinating, though controver­ sial, question that has been addressed concerns the heritability of social attitudes. On the face of it, questions about the heritability of attitudes toward capital punishment or abortion may seem absurd, but such reactions may reflect a faulty assumption that genetic findings imply that specific genes directly produce complex social behaviors (which is unlikely). Instead, genetic findings may be traceable to such indirect factors as biological differences in body chemistry, inborn temperament differences, and innate intellectual abili­ ties (see Tesser 1 992 ; Oskamp 1 991 ).

Based on a twin study methodology, Arvey et al (1989 ) estimated that approximately 3 0% of the observed variance in job satisfaction was attribut­ able to genetic factors. In other words, subjects' attitudes towards their jobs were assumed to be partly inherited. Eaves et al (1989 ) report the findings from numerous studies of the heritability of social attitudes, which produced heritability estimates ranging from zero to more than 50% of the observed variance. Some of the most "heritable" attitude items related to the treatment of criminals (perhaps reflecting biologically based differences in aggressive­ ness or assertiveness), whereas items relating to socialism tended to be among those most heavily influenced by family environments.

In a stimulating paper, Tesser ( 1 992) argues that heritability has important implications for attitude researchers. In a series of studies, he shows that attitudes identified by other researchers as high in heritability produce faster response latencies from subjects and less conformity to alleged normative information than do low heritability attitudes. Also, similarity to a stranger on highly heritable attitudes evokes greater liking than does similarity on low heritability attitudes. Tesser concludes that highly heritable attitudes are "stronger" (e.g. more accessible, more resistant to change), perhaps because they have a biological substrate that makes change uncomfortable and moti­ vates psychological protection mechanisms around them.

We agree with Tesser that genetic perspectives on attitudes deserve atten­ tion and are confident that his provocative analysis will stimulate research. At the same time, we have some concerns about the use of heritability estimates in attitude research. First, heritability coefficients say nothing directly about the operation of genes within individuals (Eaves et al 1 98 9; Weizmann et al 1 990), being dependent on environmental and genetic variability within the population under study (see Cropanzano & James 1 990 for a related critique of Arvey et al's 1 98 9 genetic analysis of work attitudes). In fact, any characteris­ tics on which natural selection has operated so strongly as to produce univer­ sality will have low heritabilities, because the degree of genetic variability will

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

AITITUDES 129

be restricted. Second, we wonder about the role of intellectual abilities in past findings; perhaps attitudes that appear to be heritable are those that correlate with intelligence. To our knowledge, researchers have not partialled out the effects of intelligence when examining the heritability of social attitudes; we think such data are essential in order to validate the notion of biological substrates underlying attitudes.

Despite these concerns, we welcome a genetic perspective on attitudes and believe that it raises many interesting questions for existing theories. Behav­ ioral genetic methods can be used to examine environmental influences as well as genetic ones (e.g. Caspi et al 1992), and sophisticated evolutionary psychologists stress the interplay of environmental and genetic factors in the determination of behavior (e.g. Caporael & Brewer 1991).

ATTITUDES AND INFORMATION-PROCESSING

Attitudes can exert profound effects on perceivers' judgments of their social world. Indeed, theorists have argued that attitudes and beliefs can influence every step of the information-processing sequence, including attention, encod­ ing, comprehension, interpretation, elaboration, and memory (e.g. Eagly & Chaiken 1992; Fazio 1990; Hamilton et al 1990; Kunda 1990; but see Jussim 1991 for an alternative perspective).

Selective Interpretation

Attitudes can affect the labelling of information, the interpretation of actions, and predictions about future behaviors (e.g. Anderson & Kellam 1992; Hilton & von Hippel 1990). For example, "enemy" images of the former Soviet Union generated negative labels and attributions of self-serving intent for USSR actions (Sande et al 1989; Silverstein & Flamenbaum 1989).

In an interesting study, Friedrich et al (1989) investigated the "naturalistic fallacy," which is the tendency to infer moral guides from empirical findings (e.g. to infer that sugared-food advertising should be restricted because chil­ dren exposed to such advertising have been found to choose sugared over nutritious foods). Subjects read descriptive summaries of social science re­ search. Immediately and seven weeks later, subjects responded to several items assessing inferences that the findings "prove" that certain actions need to be taken. Subjects' attitudes toward the issues addressed in the empirical research predicted the occurrence of the naturalistic fallacy on the immediate test and especially on the delayed test, suggesting a causal effect of attitudes on the fallacy. When subjects' attitudes were consistent with the direction of the studies' findings, they were more likely to draw inferences about moral prescriptions.

Liberman & Chaiken (1992) exposed coffee drinkers and nondrinkers to high or low threat messages on the health consequences of caffeine. Coffee drinkers expressed less belief in the seriousness of the threat than did non-

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

130 OLSON & ZANNA

drinkers, irrespective of the threat contained in the message. No evidence was obtained for defensive inattention by coffee drinkers. Instead, coffee drinkers appeared to process the threatening parts of the messages in a biased fashion, actively discounting and counterarguing threats to the self.

The mechanisms underlying selective interpretation were investigated by Houston & Fazio ( 1989 ). Subjects evaluated the convincingness and method­ ological rigor of two alleged studies on capital punishment, one concluding that the death penalty is a deterrent to murder and the other coming to the opposite conclusion. Subjects' own attitudes toward the death penalty pre­ dicted how they evaluated these studies, such that the study supporting subjects' views was judged superior to the study contradicting their views. This pattern occurred only when subjects' attitudes toward the death penalty were highly accessible, however.

Selective Memory

One of the oldest ideas in the attitude literature is that people find information supporting their attitudes easier to learn and remember than information con­

tradicting their attitudes (for a review, see Eagly & Chaiken 1992). Research­ ers have found that preferential recall of attitude-consistent information is more likely when the underlying attitude has a unipolar rather than bipolar structure (see Pratkanis & Greenwald 1989 ). For example, attitudes toward music tend to be unipolar and to produce selective memory, whereas attitudes toward nuclear power tend to be bipolar and to produce heightened recall of both consistent and inconsistent information.

Ross (1989 ) has documented the role of attitudes in reconstructive memory. When subjects' attitudes are altered by experimental manipulations, their re­ call or reconstruction of information in memory is affected. For example, persuading subjects that too much toothbrushing is harmful results in esti­ mates of less frequent previous toothbrushing. Ross argues that people possess intuitive theories that (a) attitudes are stable and (b) behavior is consistent with attitudes. Thus, when attitudes are altered by a persuasive message, people incorrectly assume that they always believed what they now believe and that their previous actions were consistent with their current attitude.

Echabe & Rovira ( 1989 ) demonstrated the practical relevance of under­ standing selective memory. Subjects' attitudes towards AIDS divided into two major subgroups: conservative-blaming and liberal representations. Subjects were given technical information about AIDS and tested for recall of the information two weeks later. Subjects showed better recall of information congruent with their representation of AIDS and distorted incongruent infor­ mation to make it more compatible with their attitude.

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

ATIITUDES AND BEHAVIORS

ATTITUDES 131

The utility of the attitude concept rests on the assumption that attitudes influ­ ence behaviors. Researchers continue to elucidate the conditions that enhance or reduce consistency between attitudes and behaviors (e.g. Lord et al 1991). For example, Shavitt & Fazio (1991) showed that attitude expressions can be influenced by momentarily salient characteristics of the attitude object, thereby potentially reducing the predictive utility of those expressions for subsequent behavior (unless the salient characteristics happen to be those that normally guide the individuals' evaluations).

Theory of Reasoned Action

In their theory of reasoned action, Fishbein & Ajzen (1975) proposed that attitudes and subjective norms combine to determine behavioral intentions, which in turn cause volitional behaviors. This theory remains the dominant theoretical framework in the attitude-behavior literature. Not only is it used to

predict behavior in many contexts, but inevitably it serves as the standard to which new ideas and theories are compared.

Recent applications of the theory of reasoned action have been diverse. The theory has been used successfully to predict intentions or behaviors in various domains, including smoking (Norman & Tedeschi 1989), seat belt use (Stas­ son & Fishbein 1990), applying for a nursing program (Strader & Katz 1990), and performing testicular self-exams (Steffen 1990).

CRITICISMS OF THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION Many researchers have criticizcd the theory of reasoned action (for a summary, see Eagly & Chaiken 1992). We will mention only those issues that have received empirical attention during the period covered by our review.

The role of external variables, especially prior behavior, continues to be an issue of debate (e.g. Sutton & Hallett 1989; Eiser et al 1989). It appears that the effects of external variables and prior behaviors are not always fully mediated by the attitudinal and normative components of the model (Bauman et al 1989; Granberg & Holmberg 1990).

Warshaw & Davis (1985) argued that behavioral expectations are better predictors of behavior than are behavioral intentions, because expectations take into account the probability of successful completion of the action (e.g. intending vs expecting to hit a home mn). Consistent with this reasoning, Gordon (1989) found that expectations were better predictors of students' academic performances than were intentions. In a related vein, Nederhof (1989) showed that the certainty of subjects' intentions moderated the inten­ tion-behavior relation, such that more certain intentions were better predictors of behavior. Kendzierski (1990) distinguished decision making from decision implementation. The intention to exercise physically was more likely to be

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

132 OLSON & ZANNA

implemented when individuals had engaged in planning than when they had

not. Bagozzi & Yi (1989) examined whether the clarity of intentions moderated

the attitude-behavior relation. They found that when intentions were well formed, intentions completely mediated the effects of attitudes on behavior (as predicted by the theory of reasoned action). When intentions were poorly formed, however, attitudes had a direct effect on behavior, unmediated by intentions. Using similar logic, Bagozzi et al (199 0) tested whether the level of effort required for a behavior moderated the attitude-behavior relation. In a field experiment involving homework projects for students, these authors found that when the behavior required substantial effort, intentions completely mediated the effects of attitudes on behavior. In contrast, when the behavior required little effort, attitudes had a direct effect on behavior, unmediated by

intentions, presumably because minimal deliberate planning was necessary. The relative importance of attitudes versus subjective norms in predicting

behavior has also received recent attention. Skinner & Cattarello (1989) found that behavioral commitment (operationalized as the length of time an individ­ ual has engaged in a behavior) moderated the relative predictive utility of attitudes versus norms. As commitment increased, norms became increasingly important relative to attitudes. The authors speculate that behavioral commit­ ment is associated with the development of a peer culture that comes to control behavior independently of attitudes. Grube & Morgan (1990) investigated possible contingent consistency interactions between attitudes and norms, based on the idea that attitudes will affect behavior only (or mainly) when the environment is seen to support the attitude (the theory of reasoned action treats attitudes and subjective norms as independent predictors of intentions). Among students aged 12 to 18, attitudes toward substance use (drinking, smoking, drug use) and perceived substance use by friends consistently inter­ acted to predict behavioral measures.

Alternative Models of the Attitude-Behavior Relation

Given the range of criticisms leveled against the theory of reasoned action, it is not surprising that several alternative theories have been proposed. Some of these models have been developed to explain behavior within specific do­ mains (e.g. see Fisher & Fisher 1992 for a model of AIDS preventive behav­ iors). Other models, including those described below, have been proposed as general theories of attitude-behavior relations.

MODE MODEL Fazio (199 0) proposed the MODE model (reflecting an empha­ sis on motivation and opportunity as determinants of how attitudes influence behavior). Fazio argued that when individuals are highly motivated to think deliberatively about an attitude object and when they have the opportunity to do so, attitudes will affect behaviors in the manner outlined in the theory of reasoned action (see Sanbonmatsu & Fazio 1 990). When either motivation or

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

ATTITUDES 1 3 3

opportunity i s missing, however (which may b e the norm rather than the exception), Fazio suggests that only highly accessible attitudes will guide behaviors (see Fazio et aI 1 989). Thus, Fazio distinguished between deliberative and automatic effects of attitudes on behavior. The MODE model provides a compelling analysis of how attitudes can spontaneously affect actions.

THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR The competing model that has received the most attention was proposed by one of the original authors of the theory of reasoned action. Ajzen ' s ( 1 985) theory of planned behavior adds perceived behavioral control (a concept similar to self-efficacy) as a third predictor of intentions, independent from attitudes and subjective norms. The addition of perceived control was designed to expand the model to incorporate behaviors not fully under volitional control.

Although some researchers comparing the predictive powers of the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior have concluded that the older theory performs just as well as the newer one (e.g. Fishbein & Stasson 1990; Hinsz & Nelson 1 990), most comparisons of the two models have found a predictive advantage for the theory of planned behavior (e.g. Beck & Ajzen 1 99 1 ; Bruba­ ker & Fowler 1 990; Madden et al 1 992; Schlegel et al 1 992). In a review of relevant studies, Aj zen ( 1 99 1 ) concluded that the evidence supports the re­ vised model and that adding further variables to the model (such as moral obligation or past behavior) would improve its predictive power only slightly.

HAUL Y & CHAIKEN'S COMPOSITE MODEL In our opinion, another serious con­ tender for pre-eminence among attitude-behavior theories is a composite model of the attitude-behavior relation proposed by Eagly & Chaiken ( 1 992). Although this model has not yet been tested empirically, it seems comprehensive and integrative. For example, Eagly & Chaiken include both attitudes toward objects and attitudes toward behaviors in their model - a unique aspect of the theory. They propose that attitudes toward objects can influence attitudes toward behaviors in a relatively "spontaneous" fashion (e.g. paralleling the automatic influences outlined in Fazio ' s 1 990 MODE model). Eagly & Chaiken also include habit in their model, both as a possible antecedent of attitudes (e.g. self-perception) and as a direct determinant of behavior. Other features of the model include self-identity considerations as possible antecedents of attitudes toward behaviors, and grealer consideration of multiple paths between concepts (e.g. attitudes toward behaviors can potentially affect behavior directly, unme­ diated by intentions, following Bagozzi & Yi 1 989; Bagozzi et aI 1 990).

Effects of Behavi or on Attitud es

An important insight provided by social psychology is that behavior affects attitudes, not just the reverse. We will review two explanations of how actions can affect attitudes: self-perception and dissonance.

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

134 OLSON & ZANNA

SELF-PERCEPTION THEORY Bern ( 1 972) proposed that when internal states (attitudes, emotions) are weak or ambiguous, individuals must infer these states from knowledge about their overt behavior and the circumstances in which the behavior occurred. Recent studies of self-perception have examined the effects of rewards on intrinsic motivation (the "overjustification effect," e.g. Enzle et a1 1 99 1 ) and inferences of emotional states (e.g. Olson 1 990). Kellerman et al ( 1 989) showed that opposite sex strangers who were induced to exchange mutual unbroken gaze for two minutes reported increased feelings of passionate attraction. Damrad-Frye & Laird ( 1 989) found that subjects reported feeling bored when they were distracted from a listening task by extraneous noise that was not loud enough to be perceived as distracting, compared to subjects who were not distracted at all or who were distracted by an obviously loud noise; the first group of subj ects presumably inferred that the task must be boring from their inability to pay attention.

Olson ( 1 992) examined the role of self-perception processes in evaluations of humor. All subjects read two sets of jokes; a "laugh track" was played through their headphones for one set but not the other. Subjects had been told that the laugh track would either increase, decrease, or have no effect on their mirth. In a subsequent free time period, subj ects had access to the two books from which the two sets of jokes had been taken. As predicted, subjects who were told that the laugh track would increase mirth spent most of their time reading the book whose jokes had not been accompanied by the laugh track - a discounting effect. Subjects who were told that the laugh track would de­ crease mirth spent most of their time reading the book whose jokes were accompanied by the laugh track - an augmentation effect.

DISSONANCE THEORY Despite contrasting laments that dissonance theory ei­ ther has been prematurely abandoned (e.g. Berkowitz & Devine 1 989) or should be permanently retired (e.g. Schlenker 1992), creative work continues to appear under the dissonance rubric (e.g. Joule 1 99 1 ; Losch & Cacioppo 1 990). Axsom ( 1 989) clarified the role of dissonance reduction in psychotherapy. In two studies using effort j ustification procedures, snake phobic and speech anxious subjects showed behavioral improvement when they willingly agreed to un­ dergo effortful "therapies," compared to low effort and/or low freedom condi­ tions.

Scher & Cooper ( 1 989; Cooper & Scher 1 992) proposed a conceptual revision to dissonance theory. These authors argue that dissonance is aroused whenever individuals feel responsible for aversive outcomes, whether the behavior that produced those outcomes is consistent or inconsistent with their attitudes. For example, Scher & Cooper ( 1 989) asked student subjects to write an essay strongly opposing an increase in tuition fees (a position they sup­ ported). When these subjects were led to believe that their essay would have a "boomerang" effect on an important decision making group (i.e. that it would make the target group more in favor of increased tuition fees), they reported

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

ATTITUDES 1 35

being more favorable toward increased tuition fees themselves. This apparent dissonance reduction following pro attitudinal behavior suggests that aversive consequences play an important role in motivating attitude change.

PERSUASION

The single largest topic within the attitudes literature is persuasion: attitude change resulting from exposure to information from others. Such exposure typically occurs via written or spoken messages, delivered by a source to a recipient.

Elaboration-Likelihood and Heuristic-Systematic Models of Persuasion

Two dual-process theories dominate current research on persuasion: Petty & Cacioppo' s ( 1 986) elaboration-likelihood model and Chaiken' s heuristic-sys­ tematic model (Chaiken 1987; Chaiken et al 1 989). In both models, individu­ als are assumed to process a message carefully when they are motivated and able to do so. Under these circumstances (the "central route" to persuasion or "systematic processing"), argument strength will be a primary determinant of whether persuasion occurs, and attitude change that does occur will be rela­ tively enduring or stable. When individuals are unable or unmotivated to process carefully (the "peripheral route" or "heuristic processing," although these terms are not interchangeable - see Chaiken & Stangor 1987; Eagly & Chaiken 1 992), cues, heuristics, and other processes besides consideration of message arguments will determine whether persuasion occurs. Any attitude change that does result from heuristic processing will often be temporary or unstable. Although one or another type of processing can dominate, Chaiken et al ( 1 989) do not view systematic and heuristic processing as mutually exclusive. For example, heuristics like source credibility can affect perceivers even when they are processing carefully.

DETERMINANTS O F PROCESSING STRATEGIES V a r i ous f a c t o rs a f f e c t individuals' motivation and ability t o process a message carefully, thereby determining which processing strategy will dominate (for reviews, see Eagly & Chaiken 1 992; Petty & Cacioppo 1 986; Tesser & Shaffer 1 990). For example, Burnkrant & Unnava ( 1 989) induced some subjects to use a self-referent processing strategy by encouraging them within the message to remember their own experiences with the attitude object; these subjects were more influenced by argument strength than were subjects not exposed to the self-referencing manipulation, presumably because self-referencing motivated greater elabora­ tion. Maheswaran & Chaiken ( 1 99 1 ) tested the sufficiency principle from the heuristic-systematic model, which is that perceivers will engage only in what­ ever amount of deliberation is necessary to provide them with "sufficient" judgmental confidence. Subjects i n this research exhibited greater systematic

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

136 OLSON & ZANNA

processing when a task was important rather than unimportant (presumably,

important tasks generate higher sufficiency thresholds); more interestingly, subjects exhibited systematic processing even when the task was unimportant if the message was incongruent (rather than congruent) with their prior expec­

tations, presumably because incongruency undermined actual confidence.

Involvement and Persuasion In their original forms, both the elaboration-like­ lihood and heuristic-systematic models implied that as issue importance or involvement increased for a message recipient, careful message-based process­ ing should increase as well. Consistent with this reasoning, Petty & Cacioppo ( 1 986) reviewed numerous studies where cogent messages produced more persuasion under high than low "issue involvement," whereas specious mes­ sages resulted in less persuasion under high than low involvement. Johnson & Eagly (1989), however, distinguished between outcome-relevant involvement (where the issue will affect the outcomes of the perceiver) and value-relevant involvement (where the issue is relevant to the perceiver's important values). Based on a meta-analysis of past studies, Johnson & Eagly concluded that whereas outcome-relevant involvement had the effects described by Petty & Cacioppo (1986), value-relevant involvement was associated with reduced persuasion (though especially for weak rather than strong arguments). In a reply, Petty & Cacioppo (1990) argued that the studies alleged to have manipulated "value-relevanf' involvement by Johnson & Eagly had confounded involve­ ment with other variables that might have inhibited persuasion, such as prior attitudes and knowledge.

Whether involvement should be conceptualized as a unitary or multidimen­ sional construct in terms of its effects on persuasion is not yet clear (see Eagly & Chaiken 1 992; Johnson & Eagly 1990; Petty & Cacioppo 1990). Research directly examining this issue is sure to appear in the next few years. Partly in response to the concerns raised by Johnson & Eagly ( 1 989), Chaiken et al (1989) expanded the heuristic-systematic model to provide a general model of social influence, including motives other than accuracy. Specifically, these authors proposed that perceivers can have the additional goals of (a) defending or confmning preferred attitude positions and (b) expressing socially accept­ able attitudes. As with the accuracy goal, these goals can generate either systematic or heuristic processing, i.e. extensive consideration of relevant information or reliance on simple heuristics.

Message R ec eption

In 1968, McGuire argued that persuasion requires both reception of a message (attention and comprehension) and yielding to the conclusions. Reflecting the information-processing perspective in current persuasion research, there has been a revival of interest in the role of message encoding and reception (e.g. McCann et al 1991; Rhodes & Wood 1992; Zanna 1992). For example, Ratneshwar & Chaiken (1991) found that comprehension moderated the influ-

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

ATTITUDES 137

ence of source credibility on attitudes. When recipients could not easily com­ prehend a message, they used source credibility to infer level of agreement with the recommendations. On the other hand, when comprehensibility was

high, source credibility did not affect subjects' attitudes. Mackie & Asuncion ( 1 990) examined how recall of message content af­

fected persuasion. These authors distinguished on-line from memory-based

attitude change. Some subjects were given tasks to perform during message exposure that inhibited cognitive elaboration; subsequent attitude change for these subjects was related to their recall of message content. Other subjects

elaborated on the message as it was presented; subsequent attitude change for

these subjects was not related to recall, presumably because evaluations were

formed during exposure to the message (and, indeed, attitude j udgments were

made more quickly by these subjects).

Rhodes & Wood ( 1 992) conducted a meta-analysis testing the prediction that self-esteem would be curvilinearly related to persuasibility. McGuire ( 1968) hypothesized that low self-esteem individuals have difficulty with message reception due to anxiety or lack of attention, whereas high self-es­ teem individuals tend not to yield to influence attempts. Thus, intermediate

levels of self-esteem should be associated with the greatest persuasibility. The results of the meta-analysis supported this prediction.

Several fascinating studies have examined how perceivers process asser­ tions. Arkes et al ( 1 99 1 ) showed that simply repeating a statement causes it to be judged more true, compared to nonrepeated control statements, presumably because familiarity is used as one basis for j udging validity (this effect is similar to Jacoby et aI's 1989 demonstration that previous exposure to a name

increases its judged fame). Gilbert et al ( 1 990) proposed that all assertions are initially represented as true and that false information must then be "unac­

cepted." Consistent with this reasoning, subjects who were interrupted while processing a false statement were more likely to identify it incorrectly as true than were uninterrupted subjects, whereas interruption did not increase the erroneous identification of true statements as false. Gruenfeld & Wyer ( 1992) used a "conversational logic" perspective to examine perceivers ' beliefs in assertions. One of the rules governing social communication is the infonna­

tiveness principle: recipients assume that communicators intend their state­ ments to convey new information. To the extent that an assertion meets this

assumption, it should increase recipients' beliefs in the validity of the asser­ tion. However, if an assertion is redundant with recipients' prior knowledge

(e.g. "President Reagan is not an alcoholic"), then recipients will wonder why it was offered and may suspect that the communicator actually possesses information disconfirming what he or she has asserted. Such suspicions could generate a boomerang effect (e.g. to cause suspicion that President Reagan might have a drinking problem). The results of several studies supported this analysis.

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

1 3 8 OLSON & ZANNA

Source Characteristics

What kinds of sources are most likely to be persuasive? Recent research has identified a variety of nonverbal characteristics that are associated with per­ suasiveness, including vocal pleasantness and facial expressiveness (Burgoon et al 1990). People with a babyish facial appearance are perceived as more trustworthy (Brownlow & Zebrowitz 1 990). Speed of speech can also influ­

ence persuasiveness, although this depends on whether the message generates favorable or unfavorable thoughts (e.g. whether it is proattitudinal or coun­ terattitudinal). Based on reasoning from the elaboration-likelihood model,

Smith & Shaffer (1991) predicted and found that rapid speech inhibits the

generation of unfavorable thoughts to a counterattitudinal message and thereby enhances agreement, whereas rapid speech inhibits the generation of

favorable thoughts to a proattitudinal message and thereby reduces agreement.

In an interesting pair of studies, Carli (1990) found that women who spoke

tentatively (with frequent disclaimers, hedges, etc) were more persuasive with

men than were women who spoke assertively, presumably because men found tentative female speakers to be more trustworthy and likeable (though also less competent and knowledgeable) . In contrast, tentative language reduced the effectiveness of women speaking to other women, presumably because women found tentative female speakers to be less likeable, believeable, com­ petent, and knowledgeable. Language had no influence on perceptions of male speakers or their effectiveness with either men or women.

Cialdini et al (1992) explored the implications of the reciprocity norm for persuasion. These authors found that people will express more agreement with persuaders who have previously yielded to them than with previously non­ compliant persuaders. Moreover, such reciprocity-induced public attitude change can translate into private acceptance when the arguments are strong and subjects can attribute their agreement to the cogency of the arguments.

People are usually more influenced by ingroup than outgroup sources (Wil­ der 1990), although weak arguments can undermine this effect (Mackie et al 1 990). Presumably, perceivers process ingroup messages carefully, which can expose weak arguments, whereas outgroup messages are given little thought.

Me ssage C har acteri stics

Message characteristics often interact with other variables to influence persua­ sion, as has been shown recently for the use of rhetorical questions (Howard 1990), direct versus indirect verbal claims (Yi 1 990), and message repetition (Anand & Stemthal 1 990). For example, Cacioppo & Petty ( 1 989) showed that three (vs one) exposures to auditory messages increased the effectiveness of appeals based on strong arguments but decreased the effectiveness of ap­ peals based on weak arguments, presumably because repeated exposure al­ lowed greatcr elaboration on the messages.

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

A TfITUDES 139

Elaboration is also an important factor in the effectiveness of other message characteristics, including the use of humor (Chattopadhyay & Basu 1 990) and discounting appeals (Schul & Mazursky 1 990). McGill & Anand ( 1 989) found that vivid information exerts greater influence on attitudinal j udgments than nonvivid information only when recipients elaborate extensively on the mes­ sage. Also, positively framed messages (describing benefits gained from a product) are more effective than negatively framed messages (describing ben­ efits lost by not using a product) when elaboration is minimal, but the reverse is true when elaboration is extensive (Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy 1 990).

In a fascinating set of studies, Janiszewski ( 1 990a, 1 990b) explored how subconscious or incidental processing of information can affect persuasion.

Based on hemispheric processing theories, Janiszewski begins his analysis with the assumption that pictorial information primarily engages the right hemisphere, whereas verbal information primarily engages the left hemi­ sphere. In addition, nonattended stimuli in the right visual field (i.e. stimuli

placed to the right of the visual focus of attention) will be sent to the left hemisphere, whereas nonattended stimuli in the left visual field will be sent to the right hemisphere. Finally, nonattended information will receive greater elaboration if it is sent to the hemisphere that is not primarily engaged with attentive tasks. Based on these assumptions, Janiszewski ( 1 990a) proposed that a simple brand name (which can be subconsciously processed equally well by either hemisphere) will receive greater subconscious processing and therefore be better liked when it is placed to the right rather than to the left of dominant pictorial information (e.g. a photograph) but to the left rather than to the right of dominant verbal information (e.g. a slogan). The results of several experiments supported this reasoning.

FEAR APPEALS Fcar appeals have probably received more research attention than any other message characteri stic. The dominant theoretical framework in this literature is Rogers ' s ( 1 983) protection motivation theory, which proposes that threatening messages will be effective to the extent that they convince recipients that (a) the problem is serious, (b) the recipient is susceptible to the problem, (c) the recommendations will effectively avoid the problem, and (d) the recipient is capable of performing the recommmendations. Recent research within this framework has supported its utility for understanding the influence of messages on a variety of issues, including earthquake preparedness (Mulilis & Lippa 1 990), condom use (Struckman-Johnson et al 1 990), and informing children about sexual abuse (Campis et aI 1 989). Some personality groups may not respond in the predicted fashion to threatening messages, however (e.g. depressed recipients; Self & Rogers 1 990).

Recent work holds promise for linking protection motivation theory with the general dual-process models of persuasion. Gleicher & Petty ( 1 992) led some subjects to be concerned about crime on campus . These subjects pro­ cessed a message about crime prevention carefully when it contained informa-

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

140 OLSON & ZANNA

tion that might reassure them about the problem, but exhibited only superficial processing when their fear had already been reassured and the message might serve to raise doubts. Interestingly, similar patterns of processing of the mes­ sage about crime prevention obtained when fear was aroused on an unrelated topic (illness on campus), suggesting that fear arouses a general protection motivation that can affect processing of all safety-related messages .

Recipient Characteristics

Both chronic dispositions and situationally-induced states of message recipi­ ents can influence the success of persuasive messages (e.g. DeBono & Telesca 1 990; Hutton & Baumeister 1 992). Tyler & Schuller ( 1 99 1 ) studied aging and found that older adults (e.g. over 50) exhibited as much attitude change in response to personal experiences as did younger adults (e.g. 1 8-25). These authors concluded that people remain open to attitude change throughout their lives, a conclusion that differs from some authors' views (e.g. Krosnick & Alwin 1 989). In the consumer domain, B earden et al ( 1 989) have developed a measure of general susceptibility to interpersonal influence, which might have applicability to some persuasive communication settings.

Meyers-Levy & Sternthal ( 1 99 1 ) have made the provocative suggestion that women, compared to men, have a lower threshold for elaborating on message cues. Thus, cues may be better recalled and exert more influence on judgments for women than men, unless the cues either are so subtle that they prompt no attention at all or are so powerful that they exceed both genders' attention thresholds. Results from two experiments supported this reasoning. For example, women were more affected than men by two pieces of informa­ tion about the taste of a toothpaste when both pieces appeared together in a message; when the two cues about taste were separated in the message (in order to push them below the attention threshold), neither gender was affected by them.

MOOD AND PERSUASION Much attention has recently been directed to under­ standing the influence of recipient mood on persuasion (for reviews of this work, see Eagly & Chaiken 1 992; Petty et al 1 99 1 ; Schwarz et aI 1 99 1 a) . Numerous researchers have found that people in good moods process messages less systematically than people in neutral moods (e.g. Bless et al 1 990; Mackie & Worth 1 989; but see Smith & Shaffer 1 992). For example, good moods typically reduce cognitive elaboration and blunt the importance of argument strength (Bless et al 1 990; Mackie & Worth 1989). Whether these effects of positive mood are attributable to motivational or capacity mechanisms is unclear, however. Mackie & Worth ( 1 989) concluded that a capacity explanation is more plausible (e.g. good moods reduce the ability to elaborate by eliciting positive thoughts, which take up the limited cognitive capacity available), because giving subjects in a good mood unlimited time to process a message eliminated differences between mood conditions (i.e. subjects in a good mood who were

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

ATTITUDES 141

given unlimited time processed the message just as systematically as did neutral mood subjects). Other theorists have concluded that a motivational explanation is more compelling (e.g. people in a good mood don ' t want to ruin their mood by expending cognitive effort), because telling subjects to pay attention to the message can eliminate mood effects (Bless et al 1 990). As with many ability versus motivation debates, we suspect that both capacity and motivational mechanisms can produce the effect.

An approach congenial with this last point has been taken by Petty et al ( 1 99 1 ), who proposed that affect (e.g. mood, fear, conditioned arousal) can influence persuasion in various ways. Under conditions of low elaboration (e.g. issues of low personal relevance), Petty et al suggested that affect serves as a peripheral cue, and attitudes will move in the direction of the affect (e.g. positive affect causing positive evaluations). Under conditions of moderate elaboration, Petty et al suggested that, consistent with Mackie & Worth ( 1 989), positive affect reduces cognitive elaboration. Under conditions of high elaboration (e.g. very important issues), Petty et al suggested that affect can bias elaboration in a manner consistent with the state (e.g. make positive information accessible) and serve as an argument in its own right (e.g. "I love my wife").

STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE

A major reason why social psychologists originally became interested in the concept of attitudes was its relevance to stereotypes and prejudice, which involve beliefs about, evaluations of, and feelings toward groups of people. Stereotypes and prejudice have been studied for many years, but there has been a recent surge of interest in this topic (e.g. Mackie & Hamilton 1 992; Zanna & Olson 1 992). Part of this increased interest may be attributable to the conceptual links being drawn between intra-individual attitude processes and inter-group perceptions (e.g. Brewer 1 992; Dovidio & Gaertner 1 992).

Ster eo typ es

Stereotypes have been defined both as shared, consensual beliefs about a group and as individual perceivers ' beliefs about a group (see Gardner 1 992). Recent studies have clarified the content of many consensual stereotypes, including the physical attractiveness stereotype (Eagly et al 1 99 1 ; Feingold 1992) and gender stereotypes (Biernat 199 1 ; Dion & Schuller 1991).

DEVELOPMENT OF STEREOTYPES Processes underlying the development of stereotypes have received attention in several recent studies. For example, Maass et al ( 1 989) collected data showing that people encode and communicate desirable behaviors by ingroup members and undesirable behaviors by outgroup members at a more abstract level (e.g. in terms of traits) than undesirable behaviors by ingroup members and desirable behaviors by outgroup members.

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

142 OLSON & ZANNA

Maass et al speculate that language contributes to the transmission and persis­ tence of social stereotypes.

Hoffman & Hurst ( 1 990) proposed a rationalization hypothesis for stereo­ types, whereby divisons of labor between groups cause the attribution of intrinsic personality differences that are consistent with the social roles. Two experiments showed that subjects formed stereotypes about fictional groups based on the group members' typical roles and that the stereotypes affected judgments even when a target' s personal role was specified. The authors speculate that gender stereotypes may serve to rationalize existing sexual divisions of labor.

Perhaps the most studied possible cause of stereotypes has been illusory correlations, whereby the co-occurrence of unusual behaviors and minority group status is overestimated. Because unusual behaviors are often undesir­ able, such biases could generate negative stereotypes about minority groups. Illusory correlation effects are robust (see Mullen & Johnson 1 990 for a review). The psychological mechanisms underlying illusory correlations are a matter of debate, however. Hamilton & Gifford ( 1 976) proposed a distinctive­ ness explanation, whereby infrequent events (unusual behaviors, minority group status) are more salient and receive deeper processing. Fiedler ( 1 99 1 ) argued that information loss and regression effects may underlie the phenome­ non, based on demonstrations of illusory correlations in conditions that seem incompatible with distinctiveness (e.g. even zero-frequency events can be overestimated despite their null distinctiveness). Moreover, Smith ( 1 99 1 ) showed that a computer simulation of a quantitative model of long-term mem­ ory reproduced the illusory correlation effect despite the absence of distinc­ tiv e n e s s - b a s e d e n c o d i n g or retrieval b i a s e s . S mith propose d that exemplar-based memory processes, which are influenced by the total frequen­ cies (not only the proportions) of events, might account for the phenomenon. Finally, Schaller & Maass ( 1 989) found illusory correlation effects mainly for uninvolved ohserverf< of groups, whereas group members exhibited ingroup favoritism (more favorable evaluations of their own group). These findings underscore that motivational factors can influence stereotype formation inde­ pendently of cognitive factors (see also Schaller 1 99 1 ).

WHEN DO PERCEIVERS USE STEREOTYPES? The issue of when perceivers rely on category information (stereotypes) to make judgments about individuals is both theoretically interesting and practically important. Fiske & Neuberg ( 1 990) have proposed a continuum of impression formation ranging from category­ based to individuated processing (see also Brewer 1 988; Dovidio & Gaertner 1 992). Perceivers are assumed initially to make category-based judgments about targets; if personal relevance is high and if available information about the target is inconsistent with category-based expectations, then piecemeal processing (based on specific attributes of the target) can occur. Ruscher et al ( 1 99 1 ) showed that factors such as competitive interdependence affect the degree of

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

ATTITUDES 143

piecemeal processing, presumably by affecting perceivers' motivation to form accurate impressions (for other factors int1uencing stereotype use, see Paulhus et al 1 992; Kaplan et aI 1 992).

Several researchers have documented that perceivers rely more on stereo­ types when their processing capacities are reduced. For example, Pratto & Bargh ( 1 99 1 ) manipulated the speed at which information was presented to subjects; impressions were more stereotypic when subjects did not have time to integrate individuating information. Similarly, Stangor & Duan ( 1 99 1 ) showed that requiring perceivers to engage i n multiple tasks while encoding information about social groups inhibited recall of behaviors inconsistent with group expectancies. Gilbert & Hixon ( 1 99 1 ) showed that cognitive busyness can interfere with the activation of stereotypes (presumably because activation requires cognitive effort), but if a stereotype is activated, cognitive busyness heightens its int1uence on judgments (presumably because perceivers have insufficient capacity to consider individuating information). In a clever pair of studies, Bodenhausen ( 1 990) found that subjects exhibited more pronounced stereotypic biases in their j udgments when tested at a nonoptimal, as opposed to optimal, time of day (e.g. in the morning for "night people"). Presumably, circadian variations in arousal levels influence perceivers' motivation and/or ability to process individuating information.

Prejudice

Prej udice is usually defined as unfavorable evaluations of and negative affect toward members of a group (see Gardner 1 992 for alternate definitions). As such, prejudice is often assumed to develop from unfavorable stereotypes of the group and to predict discriminatory behavior toward group members. Some researchers have investigated how perceivers decide that others are prejudiced against a group (e.g. Rodin et al I990), or the psychological conse­ quences of being a victim of prejudice and discrimination (e.g. Crocker & Major 1992; Lalonde & Cameron 1992; Taylor et al 1992). More common, though, has been research on the determinants and consequences of prej udice within individuals.

DETERMINANTS OF PREJUDICE Prejudiced attitudes and behaviors develop with age (e.g. Lerner & Grant 1990) and are associated with such personal characteristics as authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1 992) and certain kinds of relig­ iosity (Batson & Burris 1 992). Social conditions can induce perceived threat and thereby increase authoritarianism and prejudice (Doty et aI 1991).

Several researchers have addressed the role of affective or emotional fac­ tors in prej udice. For example, work on ambivalence in racial attitudes (e.g. Hass et al 1 99 1 ) assumes that polarized evaluations of minority group mem­ bers reflect the simultaneous presence of both sympathy and aversion in majority group members ' attitudes. Fiske & Ruscher ( 1 992) suggested that outgroups are spontaneously assumed to hinder one ' s goals; this negative

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

144 OLSON & ZANNA

interdependence arouses negative affect, which can trigger prejudice and dis­ crimination. Esses et al ( 1 992b) examined the influence of moods on the stereotyping of ethnic groups. In several experiments, induced negative moods increased the expression of negative intergroup stereotypes, presumably be­ cause perceivers interpreted their stereotypes in more unfavorable terms .

Finally, the relative predictive utility o f cognitive versus affective determi­ nants of prejudice has also been explored. Stangor et al ( 1 992) compared the importance of stereotypic beliefs about groups (e.g. traits associated with groups) and affective feelings toward groups (e.g. whether the groups make you feel hopeful, respectful, afraid, disgusted, etc) as predictors of global evaluations and social distance measures. Emotional responses consistently predicted attitudes and social distance more strongly than did cognitive stereo­ types. In the most comprehensive examination of this issue, Esses et al ( 1 992a) examined stereotypic beliefs, affective feelings, and symbolic beliefs (beliefs that social groups violate or uphold cherished values) as predictors of overall attitudes. Again, stereotypic beliefs did not predict intergroup attitudes strongly. Both emotions and symbolic beliefs had better predictive power, but were particularly relevant within specific personality subgroups. Symbolic beliefs were the strongest predictors of intergroup attitudes for highly authori­ tarian individuals, whereas emotions predicted attitudes best for individuals low in authoritarianism.

A NEW RACISM? The just-mentioned notion of symbolic beliefs raises a con­ troversial issue in the prejudice literature, namely whether a new form of racism has evolved, replacing conscious beliefs in racial differences and endorsement of segregation. Dovidio, Gaertner, and colleagues (e.g. Dovidio et al 1 9 89) propose that a new, relatively subtle form of racism is now common, which they term aversive racism. These authors argue that the historically racist culture of the United States has led most majority group members to develop feelings of

superiority; most individuals also have convictions of racial fairness and equal­ ity, however. These conflicting feelings restrain overtly racist actions, but when negative responses can be rationalized on the basis of some factor other than race, they will emerge. This analysis focuses on subtle racism among liberals .

Sears and colleagues (e.g. Sears 1 988; Sears & Funk 199 1 ) argue that old-fashioned racism has been replaced by something they term symbolic racism. These authors hypothesize that minority groups are seen to violate traditional American values; racism reflects a mixture of strong anti-minority affect with endorsement of race-neutral values like the Protestant work ethic. This analysis focuses on subtle racism among conservatives.

The concepts of aversive and symbolic racism have been criticized, both on conceptual and empirical grounds . For example, Sniderman et al ( 19 9 1 ) ob­ tained evidence suggesting that the violation of traditional values has little to do with expressions of discrimination. Devine ( 1 989) found that low-prejudice subjects consciously inhibited racial stereotypes when making judgments

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

ATIITUDES 145

about minority group members; when subjects were unaware that a stereotype had been subliminally activated, however, even low-prej udice subjects exhib­ ited stereotypic j udgments. Devine concluded that liberal, low-prejudice per­ sons must deliberately inhibit implicitly-held stereotypes, consistent with both the aversive racism perspective and ambivalence models of racial attitudes. In subsequent research, Devine et al ( 1 99 1 ) found that many individuals are aware of discrepancies between how they think minority group members

should be treated and how they think they would treat such persons. Devine et al interpreted these data as supporting ambivalence models and disconfirming aversive racism, because the latter view assumes that negative reactions to minorities are excluded from conscious awareness.

REDUCING PREJUDICE Whether modern racism is qualitatively different from old-fashioned racism or is simply the same old prejudice packaged in different

ways, the problem of reducing racial enmity remains paramount. We believe that social psychologists have much to offer in this domain and expect that the

topic of prejudice reduction will receive increased empirical attention over the next few years.

The technique that has been most widely suggested and studied is contact with members of outgroups. Correlational evidence certainly makes contact appear beneficial, although favorable attitudes might motivate contact rather than the reverse. Contact with homosexuals is associated with more favorable beliefs and attitudes toward this group among heterosexuals (e.g. Whitely 1 990), and prejudiced, authoritarian individuals report less contact in general with members of outgroups (Altemeyer 1 992).

Intergroup contact must satisfy certain requirements in order to reduce prejudice, however, including that the groups cooperate and be of equal status (see Fiske & Ruscher 1 992; Gaertner et al 1 990). These requirements are inherent parts of Cook ' s ( 1 990) technique for reducing prej udice and Aronson ' s ( 1 990) jigsaw method for fostering positive racial attitudes in de­ segregated classrooms, both of which have been shown to be effective. In a recent experiment, Desforges et al ( 1 9 9 1 ) had undergraduate subjects interact with an alleged former mental patient; the interactions involved either scripted cooperative learning (Dansereau 1 988), jigsaw cooperative learning, or indi­

vidual study. Both scripted and j igsaw cooperative learning (which differ only in particulars) led to more favorable attitudes among initially prejudiced sub­ jects, whereas individual study produced no changes in attitudes.

CONCLUSIONS

We are impressed with the continuing vitality of the attitudes literature. The attitude concept remains useful for understanding a wide variety of phenom­ ena, and theoretical models of attitude processes show increasing sophistica-

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

146 OLSON & ZANNA

tion as researchers integrate knowledge from related fields, such as social cognition and intergroup relations.

Among the noteworthy trends in the attitudes literature is an increasing view of attitudes as cognitive representations, with evaluation as a central element. Interest in attitude attributes, including strength, importance, and ambivalence, is also growing steadily. The psychophysical or social judgment approach is more popular than ever before.

We find a few emerging topics and perspectives particularly welcome. First, we are delighted by the renewed interest in attitude formation; research­ ers have traditionally focused on how existing attitudes change, but many important attitude phenomena occur early in the formative process. Second, we are excited by possible integrative models of the attitude-behavior relation, including the theory of planned behavior and Eagly & Chaiken ' s composite model. Third, the continuing development of the dual-process models in the persuasion literature has been remarkable. Fourth, we laud renewed attention to message reception processes in persuasion. Finally, we are happy about resurgent interest in the topic of prejudice and are confident that research can yield truly significant advances both in understanding and treatment of this social problem.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This review was prepared while both authors were supported by research grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We thank Victoria M. Esses and Neal J. Roese for their comments on a previous draft.

Literature Cited

Ajzen, I. 1985. From intentions to actions: a theory of planned behavior. In Action· Con­ trol: From Cognition to Behavior, ed . J. Kuhl & J. Beckman, pp. 1 1 -39 . Heidel­ berg : Springer

Aj zen, I. 1 99 1 . The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behav. and Hum. Decision Processes 50: 1 -33

Altemeyer, B. 1 992. Reducing prej udice in right-wing authoritarians. See Zanna & Olson 1992, In press

Anand, P. , Stemthal, B. 1990. Ease of message processing as a moderator of repetition ef­ fects i n advertising. 1. Marketing Res. 27:345-53

Anderson, C . A., Kellam, K. L. 1992. Belief preserverance, biased assimilation, and covariation detection: the effects of hypo­ thetical social theories and new data. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. In press

Anderson, N. H., Armstrong, N. A. 1 989. Cog­ nitive theory and methodology for studying marital interaction. In Dyadic Decision

Making, ed. D . Brindberg & D . Jaccard, pp. 3-49. New York: Springer-Verlag

Arkes, H. R . , Boehm, L. E., Xu, G. 1 99 1 . De­ terminants of judged validity. 1. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 27:576-605

Aronson, E. 1 990. Applying social psychology to desegregation and energy conservation. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. Bul!. 1 6 : 1 1 R-32

Arvey, R . D., Bouchard, T. J ., Segal, N. L., Abraham, L. M . 1989. Job satisfaction: en­ vironmental and genetic components. 1. App!. Psycho!. 74: 1 87-92

Axsom, D. 1989. Cognitive dissonance and be­ havior change in psychotherapy. 1. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 25: 234-52

Bagozzi, R. P., Yi, Y. 1989. The degree of intention formation as a moderator of the attitude-behavior relationship. Soc. Psy­ chol. Q. 52:266-79

Bagozzi, R. P., Yi, Y., Baumgartner, J. 1990. The level of effort required for behaviour as a moderator of the attitude-behaviour re­ lation. Eur. 1. Soc. Psychol. 20:45-59

B alasubramanian, S. K . , Kamakura, W. A .

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

1 989. Measuring consumer attitudes to­ ward the marketplace with tailored inter­ views . .T. Marketing Res. 26: 3 1 1-26

Banaji, M . R., Greenwald, A . G. 1992. Implicit stereotyping and prejudice. See Zanna & Olson 1 992, In press

Bargh, J. A ., Chaiken, S . , Govender, R., Pratto. F. 1992. The generality of the automatic attitude activation effect. .T. Pers. Soc. Psy­ cho!. 62:893-9 1 2

Bassili, J. N . , Fletcher, J. F . 1 99 1 . Response­ time measurement in survey research: a method for CA TI and a new look at non­ attitudes. Public Opin. Q. 5 5 : 329-44

Batson, C. D., Burris, C. T. 1 992. Personal reli­ gion: depressant or stimulant of prejudice and discrimination? See Zanna & Olson 1992, In press

Bauman, K. E., Fisher, L. A., Koch, G. G. 1989. External variables, subjective ex­ pected utility, and adolescent behavior with alcohol and cigarettes . .I. App!. Soc. Psy­ cho!. 19:789-804

Bearden, W. O., Neterneyer, R. G., Tee1, J. E. 1989. Measurement of consumer suscepti­ bility to interpersonal influence. 1. Con­ sum. Res. 1 5:473-8 1

Beck, L., Ajzen, I. 1 99 1 . Predicting dishonest actions using the theory of planned behav­ ior. .I. Res. Pers. 25:285-301

Bern, D . J. 1 972. Self-perception theory. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 6 : 1 -62

Berkowitz, L., Devine P. G. 1 989. Research traditions, analysis, and synthesis in social psychological theories: the case of disso­ nance theory. Pers. Soc. Psycho I. Bull. 1 5 :493-507

Biernat, M. 1 99 1 . Gender stcreotypes and thc relationship between masculinity and femi­ ninity: a developmental analysis. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 61 :351-65

Bless, H., Bohner, G., Schwarz, N., Strack, F. 1 990. Mood and persuasion: a cognitive re­ sponsc analysis. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. Bull. 1 1 6: 3 3 1-45

Bodenhausen, G. V. 1 990. Stereotypes asjudg­ mental heuristics: evidence of circadian variations in discrimination. Psycho!. Sci. 1 : 3 1 9-22

Bomstein, R. F. 1 989. Exposure and affect: overvicw and meta-analysis of research, 1 968-1987. Psychol. Bull. 106:265-89

Bornstein, R. P., Kale, A. R., Cornell, K. R. 1 990. Boredom as a limiting condition on the mere exposure effect. 1. Pers. Soc. Psy­ cho!. 58:79 1-800

Breckler, S. J., Wiggins, E. C. 1 989a. On defin­ ing attitude and attitude theory: once more with feeling. See Pratkanis et al 1 989, pp. 407-27

Breckler, S. J., Wiggins, E. C. 1 989b. Affect versus evaluation in the structure of attitudes . .I. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 25 : 253-71

Breckler, S. J., Wiggins, E. C. 1 99 1 . Cognitive responses in persuasion: affectivc and eval-

ATIITUDES 147

uative determinants. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 27 : 1 80-200

Brewer, M. B . 1988. A dual process model of impression formation. In Advances in So­ cial Cognition, ed. R. S. Wyer, Jr. & T. K Srull, 1 : 1-36. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum

Brewer, M. B. 1992. The social psychology of prejudice: getting it all together. See Zanna & Olson 1992, In press

Brownlow, S., Zebrowitz, L. A. 1 990. Facial appearance, gender, and credibility in tele­ vision commercials. J. Nonverbal Behav. 2:5 1 -60

Brubaker, R. G., Fowler, C. 1 990. Encouraging college males to perform testicular self-ex­ amination: evaluation of a persuasive mes­ sage based on the re v i se d theory o f reasoncd action. 1 . Appl. Soc. Psycho/, 1 7 : 1 4 1 1 -22

Burgoon, J. K, Birk, T., Pfau, M. 1 990. Non­ verbal behaviors, persuasion, and credibil­ ity. Hum. Commun. Res. 1 7 : 1 40-69

Bumkrant, R. E., Unnava, H. R. 1 989. Self-ref­ erencing: a strategy for increasing process­ ing of message content. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1 5 :628-38

Cacioppo, J. T . , Marshall-Goodell, B. S . , Tassinary, L . G . , Petty, R. E. 1992. Rudi­ mentary determinants of attitudes: classical conditioning is more effective when prior know ledge about the attitude stimulus is low than high . .I. Exp. Soc. Psycho I. 28:207-33

Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E. 19t19. Effects of message repetition on argument processing, recall, and persuasion. Basic Appl. Soc. Psychol. 10:3- 1 2

Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E . , Tassinary, L. G . 1 989. Social psychophysiology: a new look. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 22:39-9 1

Cacioppo, 1. T., Tassinary, L. G. 1 990. Infer­ ring psychological significance from physi­ ological signals. Amer. Psychol. 45: 1 6-28

Campis, L. K, Prentice-Dunn, S., Lyman, R. D . 1 989. Coping appraisal and parents' in­ tentions to inform their children about sex­ ua1 abuse: a protection motivation theory analysis. J. Soc. Clin. Psycho!. 8:304- 1 6

Caporael. L. R., Brewer, M. B . 1 99 1 . Reviving evolutionary psychology: biology meets society. J. Soc. Issues 47(3): 1 87-95

Carli, L. L. 1 990. Gender, language, and influ­ ence . .I. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 59:941-51

Caspi, A., Herbener, E. S., Ozer, D. J. 1992. Shared experiences and the similarity of personalities: a longitudinal study of mar­ ried couples. 1. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 62:281- 9 1

Chaiken, S . 1987. The heuristic model of per­ suasion. See Zanna, Olson, & Herman 1987, pp. 3-39

Chaiken, S., Liberman, A., Eagly, A. H. 1989. Heuristic and systematic information pro­ cessing within and beyond the persuasion context. In Unintended Thought, ed. J. S .

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

148 OLSON & ZANNA

Uleman & J. A. Bargh, pp. 2 1 2-52. New York: Guilford Press

Chaiken, S . , Stangor, C. 1987. Attitudes and attitude c h an g e . A n n u . Rev. Psychol. 38: 575-630

Chattopadhyay, A., Basu, K. 1990. Humor i n adverti sing: the moderating role o f prior b r a n d e v a l u ati o n . J. Marketing R e s . 27:466-76

Cialdini, R. B . , Green, B . L . , Rusch, A. J. 1992. When tactical pronouncements of change become real change: the case of reciprocal persuasion. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 63: 30-40

Cook, S. W . 1990. Toward a psychology of improving justi ce: research on extending the equality principle to victims uf social injustice. J. Soc. Issues 46( 1 ) : 1 47--61

Cooper, J., Scher, S . J. 1 992. Actions and attitudes: the role of responsibility and aversive consequences in persuasion. In The Psychology of Persuasion, e d . T . Brock & S . Shavitt. San Francisco: W. H . Freeman . In press

Crocker, J . , M aj or, B. 1 992. Reactions to stigma: the moderating role of j ustifica­ tions. See Zanna & Olson 1 992, In press

Cropanzano, R., James, J . 1 990. Some method­ ological considerations for the behavioral genetic analy sis of work attitudes. J. Appl. Psychol. 7 5 : 433-39

Crosby, L. A . , Bitner, M. J., Gill J. D. 1 990. Organizational structure of values. J. Bus. Res. 20: 1 23-34

Damrad-Frye, R., Laird, J. D . 1989. The expe­ rience of boredom: the role of the self-per­ ception of attention. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 5 7 : 3 1 5-20

Dansereau, D . F. 1 9 8 8 . Cooperative learning strategies. I n Learning and Study Strate­ gies: Issues in Assessment, Instruction, and Evaluation, e d . C . E. Weinstein, E. T. Goetz, & P. A . Alexander, pp. 1 03-20. San Diego, CA: Academic Press

DeBono, K. G., TcJesca, C. 1 990. The influ­ ence of source physical attractiveness on advertising effectiveness: a functional per­ spective . .I. Appl. Soc. Psycho!. 20: 1 3 83-95

Desforges, D. M . , Lord, C. G . , Ramsey, S. L., Mason, J. A . , Van Leeuwen, M . D . et al 1 99 1 . Effec ts of structured cooperative contact on changing negative attitudes to­ ward stigmati zed social groups. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 60: 5 3 1 -44

Devine, P. G. 1989. Stereotypes and prejudice: their automatic and controlled components. 1. Pers. Soc. Psycho/. 56:5-18

Devine, P. G., Monteith, M . J . , Zuwerink, 1. R., Elliot, A . J. 1 99 1 . Prejudice with and with­ out compunction. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 60:8 1 7-30

Dion, K. L . , Schuller, R. A. 1 99 1 . The Ms. stereotype: its generality and its relation to managerial and marital status stereotypes. Canad. J. Behav. Sci. 23:25-40

Doty, R. M . , Peterson, B. E . , Winter, D. G. 1 99 1 . Threat and authoritarianism in the

United States, 1 978-1987. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 61 :629-40

Dovidio, J. F., Fazio, R. H. 1 992. New technol­ ogies for the direct and indirect assessment of attitudes. See Tanur 1992, pp. 204-37

Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L. 1 992. Stereo­ types and evaluative intergroup bias. See Mackie & Hamilton 1992, In press

Dovidio, J. F., Mann, J., Gaertner, S. L. 1989. Resistance to affirmative action: the im­ plications of aversive racism. In Affirma­ tive Action in Perspective, e d . P. A . Blanchard & F . 1 . Crosby, pp. 83-102. New York: Springer-Verlag

Eagly, A . H., Ashmore, R . D., Makhijani, M . G . , Longo, L . C . 1 99 1 . What is beautiful i s good, but. . . : a meta-analytic review o f re­ search on the physical attractiveness stereo­ type. Psychol. Bull. 1 1 0: 1 09-28

Eagly, A . H., Chaiken, S. 1992. The Psychol­ ogy of Attitudes. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Janovich

Eaves, L . J., E ysenck, H. J., M artin, N. G. 1989. Genes, Culture. and Personality: An Empirical Approach . London: Academic Press

Echabe, A. E., Rovira, D. P. 1 989. Social rep­ resentations and memory: the case of AIDS. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 1 9:543-5 1

Edwards, K. 1 990. The interplay of affect and cognition in attitude formation and change. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 5 9 : 202-1 6

Eiser, J . R . 1 990. Social Judgment. Bucking­ ham: Open University Press

Eiser, J. R., Morgan, M . , Ganunage, P., Gray, E. 1 989. Adolescent smOking: attitudes, normS and parental influence. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 28: 1 93-202

Enzle, M. E., Roggeveen, J. P., Look, S. C. 1 99 1 . Self- versus other-reward administra­ tion and intrinsic motivation. J. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 27:468-79

Esses, V . M . , Haddock, G . , Zanna, M. P . 1 992a. Values, stereotypes, and emotions as determinants of intergroup attitudes. See Mackie & Hamilton 1992, In press

Esses, V . M . , Haddock, G., Zanna, M. P. 1 992b. The role of mood in the expression of intergroup stereotypes. See Zanna & Olson 1992, In press

Evans, M. 1 99 1 . The problem of analyzing multiplicative composites. Amer. Psycho/' 46:6- 1 5

Fazio, R . H . 1 987. Self-perception theory: a current perspective. See Zanna, Olson, & Herman 1 9 8 7 , pp. 1 29-50

Fazio, R . H. 1990. Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behavior: the MODE model as an integrative framework. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psycho/, 23:75-109

Fazio, R . H . 1 992. Variability in the likelihood of automatic attitude activation: a data re­ analysis and commentary on the paper by Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. In press

Fazio, R. H., Powell, M. c., Williams, C. J .

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

1989 . The role of attitude accessibility i n the attitude-to-behavior process. J . Con­ sum. Res. 1 6: 280-88

Feather, N. T. 1990. Bridging the gap between values and actions: recent applications of the expectancy-value model. In Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: Foundations of Social Behavior, ed. E. T. Higgins & R. M . S orre n t i n o , 2 : 1 5 1 -9 2 . New York: Guilford Press

Feather. N. T. 1 99 1 . Human values, global self-esteem, and belief in a just world. J. Pers. 59:R3-106

Feingold, A . 1 992. Good-looking people are not what we think. Psycho!. Bull. 1 1 1 :304- 4 1

Fiedler, K. 1 9 9 1 . The tricky nature of skewed frequency tables: an information loss ac­ count of distinctiveness-based illusory cor­ relations. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho I. 60:24-36

Fishbein, M . , Aj zcn, I. 1 975. Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research . Reading, MA: Addi­ son-Wesley

Fishbein, M., Stasson, M. 1 990. The role of desires, self-predictions, and perceived control in the prediction of training session attendance. J. App!. Soc. Psycho!. 20: 1 73- 98

Fisher, J. D., Fisher, W. A. 1 992. Changing A I D S r i s k b e h a v i o r . Psychol. Bull. 1 1 1 :455-74

Fiske, S . T., Neuberg, S. L. 1990. A continuum of i mpression formation, from category­ based to individuating processes: influ­ ences of information and motivation on attention and interpretation. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 23 : 1 -74

FiSke,' S . T., Ruscher, J. B. 1992. Negative in­ terdependence and prejudice: whence the affect? See Mackie & Hamilton 1 992, In press

Friedrich, J., Kiemiesky, N., Cardon, L. 1 989. Drawing moral inferences from descriptive science: the impact of attitudes on natural­ istic fallacy errors. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. Bull. 1 5 : 4 1 4-25

Gaertner, S. L., Mann, J. A . , Dovidio, J. F., Murrell, A. J., Pomare, M . 1 990. How does cooperation reduce intergroup bias? J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 59: 692-704

Gardner, R. C. 1992. Stereotypes as consensual beliefs. See Zanna & Olson 1 992, In press

Gerard, H. B . , Orive, R. 1 987. The dynamics of opinion formation. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 20: 1 7 1 -200

Gilbert, D. T., Hixon, J. G. 1 99 1 . The trouble of thinking: activation and application of stereotypic beliefs. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 60:509- 1 7 .

Giloert, D . T . , Krull, D. S . , Malone, P . S . 1990. Unbelieving the unbelievaole: some proo­ lems in the rejection of false information. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 5 9: 60 1 -1 3

Gleicher, F., Petty, R. E . 1 992. Expectations of reassurance influence the nature of fear-

ATIITUDES 149

stimulated attitude change. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 28:86--100

Gordon, R . A . 1989. Intention and expectation measures as predictors of academic perfor­ mance. J. Appl. Soc. Psycho!. 1 9 :405- 1 5

Granberg, D . , Holmberg, S . 1990. The inten­ tion-behavior relationship among U.S. and Swedish voters. Soc. Psycho!. Q. 5 3 : 44-54

Gray, T. 1 990. Questionnaire format and item context affect level of belief i n both scien­ tifically unsubstantiated and substantiated phenomena. Canad. J. Behav. Sci. 22: 1 73- 80

Greenwald, A. G. 1 989. Why attitudes are im­ portant: defining attitude and attitude the­ ory 20 years later. See Pratkanis et al 1 989, pp. 429-40

Grube, I. W., Morgan, M. 1 990. Attitude-social support interactions: contingent consis­ tency effects in the prediction of adolescent smoking, drinking, and drug use. Soc. Psy­ chol. Q. 53: 329-39

Gruenfeld, D. H., Wyer, R. S. Jr. 1 992. The semantics and · pragmatics of social influ­ ence: how affirmations and denials affect beliefs i n referent propositions. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. In press

Hamilton, D. L., Gifford, R. K. 1 976. Illusory correlation in interpersonal percepti on: a cognitive oasis of stereotypic judgments. J. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 1 2 : 392-407

Hamilton, D. L., Sherman, S. I., Ruvolo, C. M. 1 990. Stereotype based expectancies: ef­ fects on information processing and social behavior. J. Soc. Issues 46(2): 35-60

Hass, R. G . , Katz, L, Rizzo, N., Bai ley, I., Eisenstadt, D. 1 9 9 1 . Cross-racial appraisal as related to attitude ambivalence and cog­ nitive complexity. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. Bull. 1 7 : 8 3-92

Heaven, P. C. L. 1 990. Human values and sug­ gestions for reducing unemployment. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 29: 257-M

Hilton, J. L., von Hippel, W. 1 990. The role of consistency in the judgment of stereotype­ relevant behaviors. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. Bull. 1 6:430-48

H immelfarb, S. 1 992. The measurement of attitudes. See TIagly & Chaiken 1 992, pp. 23-87

Hinsz, V. B., Nelson, L. C . 1 990. Testing mod­ els of turnover intentions with uni versity faculty. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 20:68-84

Hoffman, C, Hurst, N. 1 990. Gender stereo­ types: perception or rationalization? J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 58: 1 97-208

Houston, D, A . , Fazio, R. H. 1 989. Biased pro­ cessing as a function of attitude accessibil­ i t y : m a k i n g o bj e c t i v e j u d g m e n t s subjectively. Soc. Cogn. 7 : 5 1 -66

Howard, D . J. 1 990. Rhetorical question effects on message processing and persuasion: the role of information availability and the elic­ itation of judgment. 1. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 26: 2 1 7-39

Hutton, D. G" Baumeister, R. F. 1 992. Self-

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

1 50 OLSON & ZANNA

awareness and attitude change: seeing one· self on the central route to persuasion. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. Bull. 1 8 :68-75

Jacoby, L. L., Kelly, C . , Brown, J., Jasechko, 1. 1 989. Becoming famous overnight: limits on the ability to avoid unconscious influ­ ences of the past. J. Pers. Soc. P,ychol. 56:326-38

Jamieson, D. W . , Zanna, M. P. 1 989. Need for structure in attitude formation and expres­ sion. See Pratkanis et a1 1989, pp. 383-406

Janiszewski, C. 1 990a. The influence of print advertisement organization on affect to· ward a brand name. J. Consum. Res. 1 7 :53- 65

Janiszewski, C . 1 990b. The influence of non· attended material on the processing of ad· verti s i ng c l a i m s . J. Ma r k e t i n g R e s . 27:263-78

Johnson, B. T., Eagly, A . H . 1989. Effects of involvement on persuasion: a meta·analy· sis. Psycho!. Bull. 1 06:290--3 1 4

Johnson, B . T., Eagly, A . H . 1990. Involve­ ment and persuasion: types, traditions, and the evidence. Psychol. Bull. 1 0 7 : 375-84

Joule, R. 1 99 1 . Practicing and arguing for ab· stinence from smoking: a test of the double forced compliance paradigm. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 2 1 : 1 1 9-29

Judd, C. M . , Downing, J. W. 1 990. Political expertise and the development of attitude consistency. Soc. Cogn. 8 : 104-24

Jussim, L. 1 99 1 . Social perception and social reality: a reflection-construction model. Psychol. Rev. 98 :54-73

Kaplan, M . F., Wanshula, L. T., Zanna, M . P. 1 992. Time pressure and information inte­ gration in social judgment: the effect of need for structure. In Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making, ed. O. Svenson & J. Maule. New York: Plenum. In press

Katz, I., Hass, R. G. 1988. Racial ambivalence and American value conflict: correlational and priming studies of dual cognitive struc­ tures. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 5 5 : 893-905

Kellerman, J., Lewis, J . , Laird, J. D. 1 9 89. Looking and loving: the effects of mutual gaze on feelings of romantic love. J. Res. Pers. 23: 145-61

Kendzierski, D. 1 990. Decision making versus decision implementation: an action control approach to exercise adoption and adher­ ence. J. App!. Soc. Psycho I. 20:27-45

Kristiansen, C. M., Matheson, K. 1990. Value conflict, value justification, and attitudes toward nuclear weapons. J. Soc. Psycho/' 1 3 0:665-75

Kristiansen, C . M., Zanna, M. P. 1 99 1 . Value relevance and the value-attitude relation: value-expressiveness versus halo effects. Basic App!. Soc. Psycho!. 1 2 : 47 1 -!l3

Krosnick, J. A . 1989. Attitude importance and attitude accessibility. Pers. Soc. Psychol Bull. 1 5 : 297-308

Krosnick, J. A., Abelson, R. P. 1992. The case

for measuring attitude strength in surveys. See Tanur 1 992

Krosnick, J . A., Alwin, D. F. 1989. Aging and susceptibility to attitude change. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 5 7 : 4 1 6-25

Krosnick, J. A . , Betz, A . L., Jussim, L. J . , Lynn, A . R., Stephens, L . 1 9 9 2 . Subliminal conditioning of attitudes. Pers. Soc. Psy· cho/. Bull. 1 8 : 1 52-62

Kruglanski, A . W. 1989. Lay Epistemics and Human Knowledge: Cognitive and Motiva· tional Bases. New York: Plenum

Kunda, Z. 1990. The case for motivated rea­ soning. Psycho!. Bull. 108:480--98

Kuykendall, D., Keating, J. P. 1 990. Altering thoughts and judgements through repeated association. Br. J. Soc. Psycho!. 29: 79-86

L al o n d e , R. N . , C a m e r o n , 1 . E . 1 9 9 2 . Behavioural responses t o discrimination: a focus on action. See Zanna & Olson 1 992, In press

Lerner, M. 1., Grant, P. R. 1 990. The influences of commitment to justice and ethnocen­ trism on children' s allocations of pay. Suc. Psychol. Q. 5 3 : 229-38

Liberman, A., Chaiken, S. 1 99 1 . Value conflict and thought-induced attitude change. J. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 27:203- 1 6

L iberman, A., Chaiken, S . 1 992. Defensive processing of personally relevant health messages. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. In press

Lord, C. G . , Desforges, D. M . , Ramsey, S. L., Trezza, G . R., Lepper, M. R. 1 99 1 . Typi· cality effects in attitude-behavior consis­ tency: effects of category discrimination and category knowledge. J. Exp. Soc. Psy· cho!. 27:550--75

Losch, M. E., Cacioppo, J . T. 1 990. Cognitive dissonance may enhance sympathetic tonus, but attitudes are changed to reduce negati ve affect rather than arousal. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 26:289-304

Maass, A . , Salvi, D . , Arcuri, L., Semin, G . 1 989. Language u s e i n intergroup contexts : the linguistic intergroup bias. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 5 7 : 9 8 1 -93

Mackie, D. M., Asuncion, A . G . 1990. On-line a n d m e m o r y · b as e d m o d i fi c a t i o n o f attitudes: determinants o f message recall­ attitude change correspondencc. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 59:5-16

Mackie, D . M., Hamilton, D. L., eds. 1992. Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Inter· active Processes in Group Perception. New York: Academic. In prcss

Mackie, D. M . , Worth, L. T. 1989. Processing deficits and the mediation of positive affect in persuasion. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 57:27- 40

Mackie, D. M., Worth, L. T . , Asuncion, A. G . 1 990. Processing of persuasive in-group messages. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 5 8 : 8 1 2-22

Madden, T. J., Ellen, P. S . , Ajzen, I. 1 992. A comparison of the theory of planned behav­ ior and the theory of reasoned action. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1 8 : 3-9

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

Maheswaran, D., Chaiken, S. 1 99 1 . Promoting systematic processing in low-motivation settings: effect of incongruent information on processing and judgment. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 6 1 : 1 3-25

Maheswaran, D., Meyers-Levy, 1. 1 990. The influence of message framing and issue in­ volvement. J. Marketing Res. 27:36 1-67

McCann, C . D., Higgins, E. T., Fondacaro, R. 1 99 1 . Primacy and recency in communica­ tion and self-persuasion: how successive audiences and multiple encodings influence subsequent evaluation j u dgments. Soc. Cogn. 9:47-66

McGill, A . L., Anand, P. 1 989. The effect of vivid attributes on the evaluation of alterna­ tives: the role of differential attention and cognitive elaboration. J. Consum. Res. 1 6: 1 8 8-96

McGuire, W. 1. 1 968. Personality and attitude change: an information processing theory . In Psychological Foundations of Attitudes, ed. A. G. Greenwald, T. C. Brock, T. M . Ostrom, pp. 1 7 1 -96. San Diego, C A : Aca­ demic Press

McGuire, W . 1. 1985. Attitudes and attitude change. In Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. G. Lindzey, E. Aronson, 2:233-346. New York: Random House. 3rd ed.

Meyers-Levy, I., Sternthal, B. 1 99 1 . Gender differences in the use of message cues and judgments. 1. Marketing Res. 28: 84-96

Milburn, M. A. 1 99 1 . Persuasion and Politics: The Social Psychology of Public Opinion. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth

Millar, M. G . , Millar, K. U. 1 990. Attitude change as a function of attitude type and argument type. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 59:21 7-28

Millar, M. G., Tesser, A. 1989. The effects of affective-cognitive consistency and thought on the attitude-behavior relation. J. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 25 : 1 89-202

Millar, M. G . , Tesser, A. 1992. The role of beliefs and feelings in guiding behavior: the mis-match model. In Construction of Social Judgment, ed. L. Martin, A. Tesser. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. In press

Mulilis, 1., Lippa, R. 1 990. Behavioral change in earthquake preparedness due to negative threat appeals: a test of protection motiva­ tion theory. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 20:6 1 9- 38

Mullen, B . , 10hnson, C . 1 990. Distinctiveness­ based illusory correlations and stereotyp­ ing: a meta-analytic integration. Br. J. Soc. Psycho!. 29: 1 1 -28

Nederhof, A . 1. 1 989. Self-involvement, inten­ tion certainty and attitude-intention consis­ tency. Br. J. Soc. Psycho!. 28: 1 23-33

Norman, N . M., Tedeschi, 1. T. 1989. Self-pre­ sentation, reasoned action, and adolescents' decisions to smoke cigarettes. J. App!. Soc. Psycho!. 1 9 :543-58

Nowak, A., Szamrej , 1., Latane, B. 1990. From private attitude to public opinion: a dy-

ATTITUDES 1 5 1

namic theory of social impact. Psychol. Rev. 97:362-76

O ' Keefe, D. J . 1 990. Persuasion: Theory and Practice. Newbury Park, CA: Sage

Olson, J. M. 1 990. Self-inference processes in emotion. See Olson & Zanna 1 990, 6: 1 7 - 4 1

Olson, J . M . 1992. Self-perception o f humor: evidence for discounting and augmentation effects. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 62:369-77

Olson, 1. M . , Zanna, M. P. 1 990. Self-Inference Processes: The Ontario Symposium. Vo!' 6. Hillsdale, Nl: Erlbaum

Oskamp, S. 1 99 1 . Attitudes and Opinions. En­ glewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 2nd ed.

Ottati, V. c., Riggle, E. I., Wyer, R. S . Jr., Schwarz, N., Kuklinski, J . 1989. Cognitive and affective bases of opinion survey re­ sponses. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 57:404- 1 5

Paulhus, D . L., Martin , C . L., Murphy, G . 1992. Some effects of arousal o n sex ste­ reotyping. Pers. Soc. Psychol. B u l l . 1 8 : 325-30

Perdue, C . W., Dovidio, J. F., Gurtman, M . B . , Tyler, R . B . 1990. "Us" and "them": social categorization and the process of inter­ group bias. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 59:475- 86

Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, 1. T. 1 986. The elabora­ tion likelihood model of persuasion. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 1 9 : 1 23-205

Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T. 1 990. Involvement and persuasion: tradition versus integration. Psychol. Bull. 1 0 7 : 367-74

Petty, R. E., Gleicher, F., Baker, S. M. 1 99 1 . Multiple roles for affect i n persuasion. In Emotion and Social Judgments. ed. 1. P. Forgas, pp. 1 8 1 -200. Oxford: Pergamon Press

Petty, R. E . , Krosnick, J. A. 1 992. Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences. Hillsdale, Nl: Erlbaum. In press

Pratkanis, A. R., Aronson, E. 1 99 1 . Age of Pro­ paganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion. New York: W. H. Freeman

Pratkanis, A. R . , Breckler, S. J., Greenwald, A. G., eds. 1989. Attitude Structure and Func­ tion. Hillsdale, Nl: Erlbaum

Pratkanis, A. R., Greenwald, A. G. 1 989. A sociocognitive model of attitude structure and function. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 22:245-85

Pratto, F., Bargh, J . A . 1 99 1 . Stereotyping based on apparently individuating informa­ tion: trait and global components of sex ste­ reotypes under attention overload. 1. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 27:26-47

Pryor, J. B . , Reeder, G. D . , McManus, 1. A. 1 99 1 . Fear and loathing in the workplace: reactions to AIDS-infected co-workers. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. Bull. 1 7 : 1 33-39

Pryor, J. B., Reeder, G. D., Vinacco, R. lr., Kott, T. L. 1989. The instrumental and symbolic functions of attitudes toward per­ sons with AIDS. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 1 9: 377-404

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

1 52 OLSON & ZANNA

Rajecki, D. W. 1 990. Attitudes. Sunderland, MA : Sinauer

Rasinski, K. A. 1989. The effect of question wording on public support for government �pending. Public Opin. Q. 53:388-94

R a t n e s h w ar , S . , C h a i k e n , S . 1 9 9 1 . Comprehension ' s role in persuasion: the ca�e of its moderating effect on the persua­ sive impact of source cues. J. Consum. Res. 1 8:52-62

Reardon, K. K. 1 99 1 . Persuasion in Practice. Newbury Park, CA: Sage

Rhode�, N., Wood, W. 1992. Self-esteem and intelligence affect influenceability: the me­ diating role of message reception. Psychol. Bull. 1 1 1 : 1 5 6-7 1

Robinson, J. P . , Shaver, P. R., Wrightsman, L. S., eds. 1 99 1 . Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Attitudes. San Diego, CA: Academic Press

Rodin, M. J . , Price, J. M . , Bryson, J. B . , San­ chez, F. J. 1990. Asymmetry in prej udice attribution. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 26:481- 504

Rogers, R. W . 1983. Cognitive and physiologi­ cal processes in fear appeals and attitude change: a revised theory of protection moti­ vation. In Social Psychophysiology, ed. J. T. Cacioppo, R. E. Petty, pp. 1 5 3-76. New York: Guilford

Rokeach, M. 1 9 7 3 . The Nature of Human Val­ ues. New York: Free Press

Ross, M . 1 989. Relation of implicit theories to the construction of personal histories. Psy­ chol. Rev. 96:341-57

Ruscher, J. B., Fiske, S . T., Miki, H., Van Manen, S. 1 99 1 . Individuating processes in competition: interpersonal versus inter­ group. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1 7 :595- 605

Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Fazio, R . H . 1 990. The role of attitudes in memory-based decision making. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 5 9 : 6 1 4-22

Sande, G. N., Goethals, G. R., Ferrari , L . , Worth, L. T . 1 989. Value-guided attribu­ tions: maintaining the moral self-image and the diabolical enemy-image. J. Soc. Issues 45(2):9 1 - 1 1 8

Sarup, G., Suchner, R . W . , Gaylur, G . 1 9 9 1 . Contrast effects and attitude change: a test of the two-stage hypothesis of social judg­ ment theory. Soc. Psychol. Q. 54:364-72

Schaller, M. 1 99 1 . Social categorization and the formation of group stereutypes: further evidence for biased information processing in the perception of group-behavior corre­ lations. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 2 1 : 25-35

Schaller, M., Maass, A. 1989. Illusory correla­ tion and social categorization: toward an integration uf motivational and cognitive factors in �tereotype formation. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 56: 709-2 1

Scher, S . J., Cooper, J. 1 989. Motivational basis of dissonance: the singular role of be­ havioral consequences. J. Pers. Soc. Psy­ chol. 56: 899-906

Schlegel, R. P., d ' A vernas, J. R., Zanna, M. P., DeCourville, N. H., Manske, S. R. 1992. Problem drinking: a problem for the theory of reasoned action? J. App. Soc. Psychol. 22:358-85

Schlenker, B. R. 1992. Of shape shifters and theories. Psychol. Inquiry. In press

Schlenker, B . R., Weigold, M . F. 1992. Inter­ personal processes involving impression regulation and management. Annu. Rev. Psycho/, 44:

Schul, Y., Mazur�ky, D. 1 990. Conditions fa­ c ilitating successful di�cuunting in con­ sumer decision making . J. Consum. Res. 1 6 : 442-5 1

Schwartz, S. H., Bilsky, W. 1 990. Toward a theory of the universal content and struc­ ture of valnes: extensions and cross-cul­ tural replications. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 5 8 : 878-9 1

Schwartz, S. H., Roccos, S., Sagiv, L. 1992. Universals in the content and structure of values: theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psy­ cho!. In press

Schwarz, N. 1 990. What respondents learn from scales: the informative functions of response alternatives. Int. J. Public Opin. Res. 2: 274-85

Schwarz, N., Bless, H . , Bohner, G. 1 9 9 1 a . Mood and persuasion: affective states in­ fluence the processing of persuasive com­ munications. Adv. Exp . Soc. Psychol. 24 : 1 6 1-99

Schwarz, N., Munkel, T., Hippler, H. 1990. What determines a 'perspective'? Contrast effects as a function of the dimension tapped by preceding questions. Eur. J. Soc. Psycho!. 20:357-6 1

Schwarz, N., Strack, F., Mai, H. 1 9 9 1 b. Assim­ ilation and contrast effects in part-whole question seqnences: a conversational logic analysis. Public Opin. Q. 5 5 : 3-23

Sears, D. O. 1988. Symbolic racism. In Elimi­ nating Racism: Profiles in Controversy, ed. P. A. Katz, D. A . Taylor, pp. 53-84. New York: Plenum Press

Sears, D. O., Funk, C. L. 1 99 1 . The role of self-interest in social and political attitudes. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 24:1-91

Self, C. A., Rogers, R. W . 1 990. Coping with threats to health: effects of persuasive ap­ peals on depressed, normal, and antisocial personalities. J. Behav. Med. 1 3 : 343-57

Shavitt, S. 1989. Operationalizing functional theories of attitude. See Pratkanis et al 1989, pp. 3 1 1-37

Shavitt, S. 1 990. The role of attitude objects in attitude functions. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 26:124-48

Shavitt, S . , Fazio, R. H. 1 99 1 . Effects of attri­ bute salience on the consistency between attitudes and behavior predictions. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1 7:507- 1 6

Silverstein, B . , Flamenbaum, C . 1989. Biases

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

i n the perception and cognition of the ac­ tions of enemies. J. Soc. Issues 45(2) : 5 1 -7 2

Singh. J., Howell, R . D . , Rhoads, G. K 1990. Adaptive designs for Likert-type data: an approach for implementing marketing sur­ veys. J. Marketing Res. 27: 304-2 1

Skinner, W. F., Cattarello, A . M. 1 989. Under­ standing the relationships among attitudes, group norms, and behavior using behav­ ioral commitment: a structural equation analysis of marij uana use. J. App!. Soc. Psycho!. 1 9 : 1 268-91

Smith, E. R . 1 99 1 . Illusory correlation i n a sim­ ulated exemplar-based memory. J. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 27: 107-23

Smith, S. M . , Shaffer, D . R . 1 99 1 . Celerity and cajolery: rapid speech may promote or in­ hibit persuasion through its impact on mes­ sage elaboration. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. Bull. 1 7 : 663-69

Smith, S. M . , Shaffer, D . R. 1992. The effects of good moods on systematic processing: "Willing but not able, or able but not will­ ing?" Motivation & Emotion. In press

Sniderman, P. M., Piazza, T. , Tetlock, P. E., Kendrick, A. 1 99 1 . The new racism. Am. J. Polito Sci. 35 :423-47

Snyder, M., DeBono, K G. 1987. A functional approach to attitudes and persuasion. See Zanna et al 1 987, pp. 107-25

Snyder, M., Miene, P. 1 992. On the functions of stereotypes and prej udice. See Zanna & Olson 1992, In press

Stangor, C . , Duan, C 1 99 1 . Effects of multiple task demands upon memory for informa­ tion about social groups. J. Exp. Soc. Psy­ chol. 27:357-78

Stangor, C., Sullivan, L . A., Ford, T. E . 1992. Affective and cognitive determinants of prejudice. Soc. Cogn. In press

Stasson, M., Fishbein, M. 1990. The relation between perccived and preventive action: a within-subject analysis of percei ved driv­ ing risk and intentions to wear seatbeIts. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 20: 1 541-57

Steffen, V . J. 1 990. Men's motivation to per­ form the testicle self-exam: effects of prior knowledge and an educational brochure. J. App!. Soc. Psycho!. 20:68 1 -702

Strader, M . K, Katz, B. M. 1 990. Effects of a pcrsuasive communication on belicfs, attitudes, and career choice. J. Soc. Psy­ cho!. 1 30: 1 4 1 -50

Struckman-Johnson, C. J., Gilliland, R . C., Struckman-Johnson, D . L., North , T. C . 1 990. The effects of fear of AIDS and gen­ der on responses to fear-arousing condom adverti sements. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 20:1 396-4 1 0

Sutton, S . , Hallett, R . 1 989. Understanding seat-belt intentions and behavior: a deci­ sion-making approach. J. Appl. Soc. Psy­ cho!. 1 9 : 1 3 10-25

Tanur, 1. M., ed. 1 992. Questions about Ques­ tions: Inquiries into the Cognitive Bases of Surveys. New York: Russell Sage

ATTITUDES 1 53

Taylor, D . M . , Wright, S . C, Porter, L. E. 1992. Dimensions of perceived discrimina­ tion: the personal/group discrimination dis­ crepancy. See Zanna & Olson 1 992, In press

Tesser, A. 1992. On the importance of herita­ bility in psychological research: the case of attitudes. Psycho!. Rev. Tn press

Tesser, A., Martin , L., Mendolia, M. 1992. The r o l e of thought i n changi n g attitude strength. See Petty & Krosnick 1992, I n press

Tesser, A . , S haffer, P. 1 990. Attitudes and attitude c h a n g e . A n n u . Rev. Psycho!. 4 1 :479-523

Thompson, M. M., Zanna, M. P., Haddock, G. 1 9 9 2 . L e t ' s not b e i n d ifferent about (atti tudinal) ambivalence. See Petty & Krosnick 1 992, In Press

Tourangeau, R., Rasinski, K. A., Bradburn , N . 1 9 8 9 . Belief accessibility and context ef­ fects in attitude measurement. J. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 25:401-21

Tourangeau, R . , Rasinski, K. A., D' Andrade, R. 1 99 1 . Attitude structure and belief ac­ cessibility. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 27:48-75

Triandis, H. C. 1 99 1 . Attitude and attitude change. In Ency. Hum. Bio!. 1 :485-96. San Diego, CA: Academic Press

Triandis, H. C . , McCusker, C., Hui, C. H . 1 990. Multimethod probes o f individualism and collectivism. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 59: 1 006-20

Tyler, T. R., Schuller, R. A. 1 99 1 . Aging and attitude change. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 6 1 :689-97

Warshaw, P. R., Davis, F. D. 1 985. Disentan­ gling behavioral intention and behavioral expectation. J. Exp. Soc. Psycho!. 2 1 : 2 13- 28

Weizmann, F .. Wiener, N. I., Wiesenthal, D . L., Ziegler, M . 1 990. Differential K theory and racial hierarchies. Can. Psychol. 3 1 : I­ n

Whitely, B. E. Jr. 1 990. The relationship of heterosexuals' attributions for the causes of homosexuality to attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1 6: 369-77

Wilder, D. A. 1 990. Some determinants of the persuasive power of in-groups and out­ groups: organization of information and at­ tribution of independence. J. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 59: 1 202- 1 3

Wilson, T . D . 1990. Self-persuasion via self-re­ flection. See Olson & Zanna 1 990, 6:43-67

Wilson, T. D . , Dunn, D. S . , Kraft, D., Lisle, D. J. 1989. Introspection, attitude change, and attitude-behavior consistency: the disrup­ tive effects of explaining why we feel the w a y we d o . Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 2 2 : 278-343

Yi, Y. 1990. Direct and indirect approaches to advertising persuasion. Which is more ef­ fective? J. Bus. Res. 20:279-91

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

1 54 OLSON & ZANNA

Zajonc, R. B. 1968. Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. 1. Pers. Soc. Psycho!. 9 (2, pt. 2)

Zamble, E., Kalm, K. L. 1 990. General and specific measures of public attitudes to­ ward sentencing. Canad. 1. Behav. Sci. 22:327-37

Zanna, M. P. 1 992. Message receptivity: a new look at tbe old problem of open- vs. closed­ m i n d edness. In A dvenising Exposure, Memory, and ChOice, e d . A. Mitchell. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. In press

Zanna, M. P., Olson, J. M . , eds. 1992. The Psychology of Prejudice: The Ontario Sym-

posium, Vol. 7. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. In press

Zanna, M. P., Olson, J. M., Herman, C. P. , eds. 1987. Social Influence: The Ontario Sym­

posium, Vol. 5. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Zanna, M. P., Rempel, J. K. 1988. Attitudes: a

new look at an old concept. In The Social Psychology of Knowledge, ed. D. Bar-Tal, A. W. Kruglanski, pp. 3 1 5-34. New York: Cambridge University Press

Zimbardo, P. G . , Leippe, M. R. 1 99 1 . The Psy­ chology of Attitude Change and Social In­

fluence. New York: McGraw-Hill

A nn

u. R

ev . P

sy ch

ol . 1

99 3.

44 :1

17 -1

54 . D

ow nl

oa de

d fr

om w

w w

.a nn

ua lr

ev ie

w s.

or g

A cc

es s

pr ov

id ed

b y

W al

de n

U ni

ve rs

it y

on 0

5/ 11

/2 1.

F or

p er

so na

l us

e on

ly .

1. ar:
1. logo: