Philosophy

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David Hume wrote this text to be a new science of human nature. In it, Hume analyzes why we have such conceptions as

space and time, cause and effect, external objects, and personal identity. Moreover, he explains why it is that we assign

objects to such conceptions—why is it that we think causes are necessarily connected to effects; why do we think

enduring external objects exist; and why do we think of ourselves as enduring things called ‘selves’? It's important to note

that the subtitle is “an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects.” He argues that

although we want to make our principles as universal as possible, we cannot go past what experience affords us. He is

deeply distrustful of a priori reasoning (reasoning that is beyond or prior to sense experience) of the rationalists like

Descartes.

Note that Hume is trying to give us a system based on real experience, but he remains skeptical of certain ideas. His

skepticism is described through detailed arguments and counterexamples like we saw in Unit 1. If we have to rely on

direct sensory experience as proof or evidence for our claims, then he wants us to question claims that are not related to a

direct sensory experience.

Read this brief introduction by Dr. Shane Drefcinski of the University of Wisconsin-Platteville before engaging with the

excerpt from the Treatise 

A Very Brief Summary of David Hume

Is There a Real You? What makes you, you? Is it how you think of yourself, how others think of you, or something else entirely?

Philosopher Julian Baggini draws from philosophy and neuroscience to give a surprising answer. This talk was presented to a local

audience at TEDxYouth@Manchester, an independent event. TED's editors chose to feature it for you.

Questions to Consider

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A Treatise of Human Nature -  Book 1, Part IV, Section VI  (Of Personal Identity)

by David Hume - From Book I, part IV, section VI in “A Treatise of Human Nature (1793)”. The Project Gutenberg

There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we

feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its

perfect identity and simplicity. The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from

this view, only �x it the more intensely, and make us consider their in�uence on self either by their pain or pleasure. To

attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence; since no proof can be derived from any fact, of which we are

so intimately conscious; nor is there anything, of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this.

Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any

idea of self, after the manner it is here explained. For from what impression coued this idea be derived? This question it is

impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity; and yet it is a question, which must necessarily be

answered, if we would have the idea of self pass for clear and intelligible, It must be someone impression, that gives rise to

every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are

supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the

same, through the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression

constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at

the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived;

and consequently there is no such idea.

But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? All these are different, and

distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately considered, and may exist separately, and have no

Deed of tiny thing to support their existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they

connected with it? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular

perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time

without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any

time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions

removed by death, and coued I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should

be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one, upon

serious and unprejudiced re�ection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I call reason no longer with

him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He

may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such

principle in me.

But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to af�rm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing

but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a

perpetual �ux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still

As you read, consider the following questions:

Do we have an intimate connection to the “self” according to Hume?

Do we, in fact, have any experience or impression of the “self” according to Hume?

If one were to remove every thought, feeling, and sensation from an individual (such as

that which occurs at death), what would be left of the “self” according to Hume?

What, then, is the “self” according to Hume?

Making Connections

Notice that Hume’s discussion of the self depends on a logical claim, that we must have a direct experience or sense impression of the self if we are to conclude that the self exists. This is a form of deduction, “If I have a self, then I will have a direct impression of it. I do not have a direct impression of a self. Therefore, I do not have a self.”

As Hume describes death, how does it compare to what Socrates said regarding his charges in Athens the possibility that he will be given the death penalty?

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more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power

of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several

perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an in�nite variety of postures

and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propension we

may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the

successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these

scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is composed.

What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves

possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives? In order to answer this

question, we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our

passions or the concern we take in ourselves. The �rst is our present subject; and to explain it perfectly we must take the

matter pretty deep, and account for that identity, which we attribute to plants and animals; there being a great analogy

betwixt it, and the identity of a self or person.

We have a distinct idea of an object, that remains invariable and uninterrupted through a supposed variation of time; and

this idea we call that of identity or sameness. We have also a distinct idea of several different objects existing in

succession, and connected together by a close relation; and this to an accurate view affords as perfect a notion of

diversity, as if there was no manner of relation among the objects. But though these two ideas of identity, and a succession

of related objects be in themselves perfectly distinct, and even contrary, yet it is certain, that in our common way of

thinking they are generally confounded with each other. That action of the imagination, by which we consider the

uninterrupted and invariable object, and that by which we re�ect on the succession of related objects, are almost the

same to the feeling, nor is there much more effort of thought required in the latter case than in the former. The relation

facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another, and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated

one continued object. This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake, and makes us substitute the notion of

identity, instead of that of related objects. However at one instant we may consider the related succession as variable or

interrupted, we are sure the next to ascribe to it a perfect identity, and regard it as enviable and uninterrupted. Our

propensity to this mistake is so great from the resemblance above-mentioned, that we fall into it before we are aware;

and though we incessantly correct ourselves by re�ection, and return to a more accurate method of thinking, yet we

cannot long sustain our philosophy, or take off this biass from the imagination. Our last resource is to yield to it, and boldly

assert that these different related objects are in effect the same, however interrupted and variable. In order to justify to

ourselves this absurdity, we often feign some new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects together, and

prevents their interruption or variation. Thus we feign the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses, to

remove the interruption: and run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise the variation. But we may

farther observe, that where we do not give rise to such a �ction, our propension to confound identity with relation is so

great, that we are apt to imagine [FN 10] something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, beside their relation;

and this I take to be the case with regard to the identity we ascribe to plants and vegetables. And even when this does not

take place, we still feel a propensity to confound these ideas, though we a-re not able fully to satisfy ourselves in that

particular, nor �nd any thing invariable and uninterrupted to justify our notion of identity.

Check Your Answers

Hume notes that we struggle to understand personal identity because we look for a self that is:

(a) an impression must continue invariably the same

(b) a bundle or collection of different perceptions

(c) an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives

(d) all of the above

The correct answer is (d) all of the above.

But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to

have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same,

through the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner...What then gives us so great a

propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable

and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our live 

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[FN 10 If the reader is desirous to see how a great genius may be in�uencd by these seemingly trivial principles of the imagination,

as well as the mere vulgar, let him read my Lord SHAFTSBURYS reasonings concerning the uniting principle of the universe, and the

identity of plants and animals. See his MORALISTS: or, PHILOSOPHICAL RHAPSODY.]

Thus the controversy concerning identity is not merely a dispute of words. For when we attribute identity, in an improper

sense, to variable or interrupted objects, our mistake is not con�ned to the expression, but is commonly attended with a

�ction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable, or at least with a

propensity to such �ctions. What will suf�ce to prove this hypothesis to the satisfaction of every fair enquirer, is to shew

from daily experience and observation, that the objects, which are variable or interrupted, and yet are supposed to

continue the same, are such only as consist of a succession of parts, connected together by resemblance, contiguity, or

causation. For as such a succession answers evidently to our notion of diversity, it can only be by mistake we ascribe to it

an identity; and as the relation of parts, which leads us into this mistake, is really nothing but a quality, which produces an

association of ideas, and an easy transition of the imagination from one to another, it can only be from the resemblance,

which this act of the mind bears to that, by which we contemplate one continued object, that the error arises. Our chief

business, then, must be to prove, that all objects, to which we ascribe identity, without observing their invariableness and

uninterruptedness, are such as consist of a succession of related objects.

In order to this, suppose any mass of matter, of which the parts are contiguous and connected, to be placed before us; it is

plain we must attribute a perfect identity to this mass, provided all the parts continue uninterruptedly and invariably the

same, whatever motion or change of place we may observe either in the whole or in any of the parts. But supposing some

very small or inconsiderable part to be added to the mass, or subtracted from it; though this absolutely destroys the

identity of the whole, strictly speaking; yet as we seldom think so accurately, we scruple not to pronounce a mass of

matter the same, where we �nd so trivial an alteration. The passage of the thought from the object before the change to

the object after it, is so smooth and easy, that we scarce perceive the transition, and are apt to imagine, that it is nothing

but a continued survey of the same object.

There is a very remarkable circumstance, that attends this experiment; which is, that though the change of any

considerable part in a mass of matter destroys the identity of the whole, let we must measure the greatness of the part,

not absolutely, but by its proportion to the whole. The addition or diminution of a mountain would not be suf�cient to

produce a diversity in a planet: though the change of a very few inches would be able to destroy the identity of some

bodies. It will be impossible to account for this, but by re�ecting that objects operate upon the mind, and break or

interrupt the continuity of its actions not according to their real greatness, but according to their proportion to each

other: And therefore, since this interruption makes an object cease to appear the same, it must be the uninterrupted

progress o the thought, which constitutes the imperfect identity.

This may be con�rmed by another phenomenon. A change in any considerable part of a body destroys its identity; but it is

remarkable, that where the change is produced gradually and insensibly we are less apt to ascribe to it the same effect.

The reason can plainly be no other, than that the mind, in following the successive changes of the body, feels an easy

passage from the surveying its condition in one moment to the viewing of it in another, and at no particular time perceives

any interruption in its actions. From which continued perception, it ascribes a continued existence and identity to the

object.

But whatever precaution we may use in introducing the changes gradually, and making them proportionable to the whole,

it is certain, that where the changes are at last observed to become considerable, we make a scruple of ascribing identity

to such different objects. There is, however, another arti�ce, by which we may induce the imagination to advance a step

farther; and that is, by producing a reference of the parts to each other, and a combination to some common end or

purpose. A ship, of which a considerable part has been changed by frequent reparations, is still considered as the same;

Check Your Answer

Hume says the notion of a soul, a self, a substance, is something we use to disguise the variation between the

different objects and perceptions we experience.

(a) True

(b) False

The correct answer is (a) True.

Thus we feign the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption: and run into the

notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise the variation.

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nor does the difference of the materials hinder us from ascribing an identity to it. The common end, in which the parts

conspire, is the same under all their variations, and affords an easy transition of the imagination from one situation of the

body to another.

But this is still more remarkable, when we add a sympathy of parts to their common end, and suppose that they bear to

each other, the reciprocal relation of cause and effect in all their actions and operations. This is the case with all animals

and vegetables; where not only the several parts have a reference to some general purpose, but also a mutual dependence

on, and connexion with each other. The effect of so strong a relation is, that though everyone must allow, that in a very

few years both vegetables and animals endure a total change, yet we still attribute identity to them, while their form, size,

and substance are entirely altered. An oak, that grows from a small plant to a large tree, is still the same oak; though there

be not one particle of matter, or �gure of its parts the same. An infant becomes a man-, and is sometimes fat, sometimes

lean, without any change in his identity.

We may also consider the two following phaenomena, which are remarkable in their kind. The �rst is, that though we

commonly be able to distinguish pretty exactly betwixt numerical and speci�c identity, yet it sometimes happens, that we

confound them, and in our thinking and reasoning employ the one for the other. Thus a man, who bears a noise, that is

frequently interrupted and renewed, says, it is still the same noise; though it is evident the sounds have only a speci�c

identity or resemblance, and there is nothing numerically the same, but the cause, which produced them. In like manner it

may be said without breach of the propriety of language, that such a church, which was formerly of brick, fell to ruin, and

that the parish rebuilt the same church of free-stone, and according to modern architecture. Here neither the form nor

materials are the same, nor is there any thing common to the two objects, but their relation to the inhabitants of the

parish; and yet this alone is suf�cient to make us denominate them the same. But we must observe, that in these cases the

�rst object is in a manner annihilated before the second comes into existence; by which means, we are never presented in

any one point of time with the idea of difference and multiplicity: and for that reason are less scrupulous in calling them

the same.

Secondly, We may remark, that though in a succession of related objects, it be in a manner requisite, that the change of

parts be not sudden nor entire, in order to preserve the identity, yet where the objects are in their nature changeable and

inconstant, we admit of a more sudden transition, than would otherwise be consistent with that relation. Thus as the

nature of a river consists in the motion and change of parts; though in less than four and twenty hours these be totally

altered; this hinders not the river from continuing the same during several ages. What is natural and essential to any thing

is, in a manner, expected; and what is expected makes less impression, and appears of less moment, than what is unusual

and extraordinary. A considerable change of the former kind seems really less to the imagination, than the most trivial

alteration of the latter; and by breaking less the continuity of the thought, has less in�uence in destroying the identity.

We now proceed to explain the nature of personal identity, which has become so great a question ill philosophy, especially

of late years in England, where all the abstruser sciences are studyed with a peculiar ardour and application. And here it is

evident, the same method of reasoning must be continued which has so successfully explained the identity of plants, and

animals, and ships, and houses, and of all the compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature. The

identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a �ctitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to

vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the

imagination upon like objects.

Check Your Answer

Hume says a body has a continued existence and identity if it changes:

(a) slowly, bit by bit over time

(b) quickly, ef�ciently

(c) from the outside in

(d) while being used, like a ship

The correct answer is (a) slowly, bit by bit over time.

A change in any considerable part of a body destroys its identity; but it is remarkable, that where the change is

produced gradually and insensibly we are less apt to ascribe to it the same effect. The reason can plainly be no other,

than that the mind, in following the successive changes of the body, feels an easy passage from the surveying its

condition in one moment to the viewing of it in another, and at no particular time perceives any interruption in its

actions. From which continued perception, it ascribes a continued existence and identity to the object. 

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But lest this argument should not convince the reader; though in my opinion perfectly decisive; let him weigh the

following reasoning, which is still closer and more immediate. It is evident, that the identity, which we attribute to the

human mind, however perfect we may imagine it to be, is not able to run the several different perceptions into one, and

make them lose their characters of distinction and difference, which are essential to them. It is still true, that every

distinct perception, which enters into the composition of the mind, is a distinct existence, and is different, and

distinguishable, and separable from every other perception, either contemporary or successive. But, as, notwithstanding

this distinction and separability, we suppose the whole train of perceptions to be united by identity, a question naturally

arises concerning this relation of identity; whether it be something that really binds our several perceptions together, or

only associates their ideas in the imagination. That is, in other words, whether in pronouncing concerning the identity of a

person, we observe some real bond among his perceptions, or only feel one among the ideas we form of them. This

question we might easily decide, if we would recollect what has been already proud at large, that the understanding never

observes any real connexion among objects, and that even the union of cause and effect, when strictly examined, resolves

itself into a customary association of ideas. For from thence it evidently follows, that identity is nothing really belonging

to these different perceptions, and uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of

the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we re�ect upon them. Now the only qualities, which can give ideas an

union in the imagination, are these three relations above-mentioned. There are the uniting principles in the ideal world,

and without them every distinct object is separable by the mind, and may be separately considered, and appears not to

have any more connexion with any other object, than if disjoined by the greatest difference and remoteness. It is,

therefore, on some of these three relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation, that identity depends; and as the

very essence of these relations consists in their producing an easy transition of ideas; it follows, that our notions of

personal identity, proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected

ideas, according to the principles above-explained.

The only question, therefore, which remains, is, by what relations this uninterrupted progress of our thought is produced,

when we consider the successive existence of a mind or thinking person. And here it is evident we must con�ne ourselves

to resemblance and causation, and must drop contiguity, which has little or no in�uence in the present case.

To begin with resemblance; suppose we coued see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of

perceptions, which constitutes his mind or thinking principle, and suppose that he always preserves the memory of a

considerable part of past perceptions; it is evident that nothing coued more contribute to the bestowing a relation on this

succession amidst all its variations. For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past

perceptions? And as an image necessarily resembles its object, must not. The frequent placing of these resembling

perceptions in the chain of thought, convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole

seem like the continuance of one object? In this particular, then, the memory not only discovers the identity, but also

contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions. The case is the same

whether we consider ourselves or others.

As to causation; we may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different

perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce,

destroy, in�uence, and modify each other. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; said these ideas in their

turn produce other impressions. One thought chaces another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expelled in its turn.

In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the

several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who

propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as the same individual republic may not only

change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and

disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several

parts are still connected by the relation of causation. And in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to

corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions in�uence each other, and by giving

us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures.

Check Your Answer

Hume compares the soul or person to a:

(a) garden in which �owers bloom and die from season to season

(b) ocean in which waves ebb and �ow

(c) a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united

(d) a congregation united in fellowship

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As a memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, it is to be considered,

upon that account chie�y, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never should have any notion of

causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person. But having once

acquired this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the

identity of car persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have

entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed. For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any

memory? Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on the 1st of January 1715, the 11th of March

1719, and the 3rd of August 1733? Or will he af�rm, because he has entirely forgot the incidents of these days, that the

present self is not the same person with the self of that time; and by that means overturn all the most established notions

of personal identity? In this view, therefore, memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity, by shewing

us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions. It will be incumbent on those, who af�rm that

memory produces entirely our personal identity, to give a reason why we cm thus extend our identity beyond our

memory.

The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion, which is of great importance in the present affair, viz. that all the nice

and subtile questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as

gramatical than as philosophical dif�culties. Identity depends on the relations of ideas; and these relations produce

identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion. But as the relations, and the easiness of the transition may

diminish by insensible degrees, we have no just standard, by which we can decide any dispute concerning the time, when

they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity. All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are

merely verbal, except so fax as the relation of parts gives rise to some �ction or imaginary principle of union, as we have

already observed.

What I have said concerning the �rst origin and uncertainty of our notion of identity, as applied to the human mind, may

be extended with little or no variation to that of simplicity. An object, whose different co-existent parts are bound

together by a close relation, operates upon the imagination after much the same manner as one perfectly simple and

indivisible and requires not a much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception. From this similarity of operation

we attribute a simplicity to it, and feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity, and the center of all the

different parts and qualities of the object.

Thus we have �nished our examination of the several systems of philosophy, both of the intellectual and natural world;

and in our miscellaneous way of reasoning have been led into several topics; which will either illustrate and con�rm some

preceding part of this discourse, or prepare the way for our following opinions. It is now time to return to a more close

examination of our subject, and to proceed in the accurate anatomy of human nature, having fully explained the nature of

our judgment and understandings.

The correct answer is (c) a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united.

In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which

the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other

persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. 

Check Your Answer

Hume notes that if we rely on memory to establish our theory of personhood or the self, then we must:

(a) ensure our memories are accurate

(b) give a reason why we can thus extend our identity beyond our memory

(c) give a reason why our memory comes and goes for signi�cant events

(d) why our memory is lost in old age

The correct answer is (b) give a reason why we can thus extend our identity beyond our memory.

In this view, therefore, memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity, by shewing us the relation

of cause and effect among our different perceptions. It will be incumbent on those, who af�rm that memory

produces entirely our personal identity, to give a reason why we cm thus extend our identity beyond our memory.

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For additional practice testing your knowledge, feel free to complete the Unit 2 Self Assessment - Hume (not graded) self assessment.