Army Operational Approach

ATP 5-0.1 1

ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY 2

JULY 2015 3

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Headquarters, Department of the Army 5

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i

Army Techniques Publication

No. 5-0.1

Headquarters

Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 1 July 2015

Army Design Methodology

Contents

Page

PREFACE.............................................................................................................. iii

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... v

Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY ............................... 1-1 Mission Command and The Operations Process ............................................... 1-1 Planning .............................................................................................................. 1-2 Army Design Methodology ................................................................................. 1-3 Key Concepts ..................................................................................................... 1-5

Chapter 2 GETTING STARTED .......................................................................................... 2-1 When to Employ Army Design Methodology ...................................................... 2-1 Commander Involvement ................................................................................... 2-3 Forming the Planning Team ............................................................................... 2-4 Leading the Team ............................................................................................... 2-7 Sharing the Workload ......................................................................................... 2-7 Resources........................................................................................................... 2-8

Chapter 3 FRAMING OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS ................................................. 3-1 Operational Environment .................................................................................... 3-1 Framing Activities ............................................................................................... 3-1 Tools and Techniques ........................................................................................ 3-6

Chapter 4 FRAMING PROBLEMS ...................................................................................... 4-1 Nature of Problems ............................................................................................. 4-1 Framing Activities ............................................................................................... 4-2 Tools and Techniques ........................................................................................ 4-5

Chapter 5 FRAMING SOLUTIONS ..................................................................................... 5-1 Operational Approach ......................................................................................... 5-1 Activities.............................................................................................................. 5-2 Transitioning to Detailed Planning ...................................................................... 5-8

Chapter 6 ASSESSMENT AND REFRAMING ................................................................... 6-1 Organizational Learning ..................................................................................... 6-1 Assessment ........................................................................................................ 6-1 Reframing ........................................................................................................... 6-2

ATP 5-0.1

Contents

ii ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

Tools and Techniques ......................................................................................... 6-4

Appendix A THINKING CHALLENGES ................................................................................ A-1

Appendix B VIGNETTE ......................................................................................................... B-1

SOURCE NOTES .......................................................................... Source Notes-1

GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1

REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1

INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures

Figure 1-1. The operations process ....................................................................................... 1-2

Figure 1-2. Combining conceptual and detailed planning...................................................... 1-3

Figure 1-3. Systems thinking ................................................................................................. 1-8

Figure 2-1. Integrated planning .............................................................................................. 2-2

Figure 2-2. The commander’s role in the operations process ............................................... 2-3

Figure 2-3. Workspace setup ................................................................................................. 2-8

Figure 3-1. Framing an operational environment ................................................................... 3-2

Figure 3-2. Current state of the operational environment ...................................................... 3-4

Figure 3-3. Desired end state ................................................................................................ 3-6

Figure 3-4. Brainstorming....................................................................................................... 3-8

Figure 3-5. Mind map ........................................................................................................... 3-11

Figure 4-1. Problem frame ..................................................................................................... 4-3

Figure 5-1. Operational approach .......................................................................................... 5-1

Figure 5-2. Sample line of effort and line of operation ........................................................... 5-6

Figure 5-3. Sample operational approach.............................................................................. 5-9

Figure 6-1. Decisionmaking during execution and reframing ................................................ 6-3

Figure B-1. Network analysis 1 .............................................................................................. B-2

Figure B-2. Network analysis 2 .............................................................................................. B-3

Figure B-3. Network analysis 3 .............................................................................................. B-3

Figure B-4. Network analysis 4 .............................................................................................. B-4

Figure B-5. Network analysis 5 .............................................................................................. B-5

Figure B-6. Network analysis 6 .............................................................................................. B-6

Tables

Table 1-1. Elements of operational art ................................................................................... 1-6

Table 4-1. Types of problems and solution strategies ........................................................... 4-1

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 iii

Preface

Army techniques publication (ATP) 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology (ADM) is part of a continuing effort

focused on improving the critical and creative thinking abilities of leaders and teams to understand and solve

problems. This publication describes ADM in the context of the operations process and offers techniques for

forming and leading teams for group problem solving. It describes the major activities of ADM and provides

techniques for framing operational environments, framing problems, developing an operational approach, and

reframing.

To comprehend the doctrine contained in this publication, readers must first understand the fundamentals of the

operations process described in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process. In

addition, readers must understand the fundamentals of mission command described in ADRP 6-0, Mission

Command and the fundamentals of leadership found in ADRP 6-22, Leadership. Readers must also have a solid

foundation in various processes and procedures of mission command addressed in Field Manual (FM) 6-0,

Commander and Staff Organization and Operations.

ADM takes an interdisciplinary approach to planning and problem solving incorporating ideas associated to

critical and creative thinking, leadership, decisionmaking, and organizational learning. The professional field of

books and articles on these disciplines is vast and rich. Readers are encouraged to continue their study on these

topics beyond the material offered in this ATP.

The principal audience for this publication is Army commanders and staffs. Commanders and staffs of Army

headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer to applicable joint or

multinational doctrine concerning joint or multinational planning. Trainers and educators throughout the Army

will also use this publication as a guide for instructing ADM.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,

international, and, in some cases, host nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers

operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ATP 5-0.1 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the

glossary and the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 5-0.1 is not the proponent publication (the authority) for any terms.

ATP 5-0.1 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and

the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 5-0.1 is Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The preparing agency

is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and

recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to

Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D (ADRP 5-0),

300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to [email protected];

or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

This page intentionally left blank.

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 v

Introduction

Recognizing and solving problems is essential. Faced with unfamiliar or ambiguous situations, commanders

and staffs may feel overwhelmed by uncertainty. This is where Army design methodology (ADM) can help.

By first framing an operational environment and associated problems, ADM enables commanders and staffs

to think about the situation before developing ways to solve those problems. Based on this understanding,

commanders and staffs are better equipped to develop approaches to overcome identified problems.

Design thinking in Army doctrine resulted from a recognition that commanders and staffs had difficulty

understanding complex situations. This hindered their ability to distinguish between symptoms of problems

and their root causes. This difficulty led to solutions that addressed symptoms of problems rather than

problem causes. Beginning in 2005, the Army and Marine Corps began a multi-year effort to examine

methods to help commanders and staffs understand complex, ill-structured problems and visualize

approaches to solve them. Collectively referred to as “design,” the Army and Marine Corps incorporated

design into their respective doctrines by 2010. In 2011, the joint community adopted the critical and creative

thinking aspects of design in Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operations Planning. In 2012, the Army

modified its doctrine on design with the publication of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, The

Operations Process. ADP 5-0 replaced the term “design” with “Army design methodology” and associated

ADM with conceptual planning.

ADM helps commanders and staffs with understanding, visualizing, and describing operations and it is an

aid to conceptual planning. During operations, ADM supports organizational learning as the command adapts

to changing circumstances. The potential benefits for using ADM include:

 Enhanced dialogue between commanders, staffs, and unified action partners.

 Greater understanding of an operational environment.

 Deeper understanding of problems and their causes.

 Shared understanding of the operation’s purpose.

 Shared visualization of the conduct of an operation.

 Enhanced guidance to drive detailed planning.

 Expanded role of the assessment process.

This publication contains six chapters and two appendices.

Chapter 1 begins with an overview of mission command and the operations process. A review of the

fundamentals of planning follows. Next, this chapter defines ADM and describes its major activities. The

chapter concludes with ADM’s key concepts.

Chapter 2 addresses preparing for ADM. It begins with a discussion of when to employ ADM followed by

a discussion of commander involvement. The chapter then offers considerations for forming and leading a

planning team for the employment of ADM. This chapter concludes with discussions on sharing the workload

and resources commonly used when performing ADM.

Chapter 3 provides a general discussion of an operational environment and describes the operational

variables used to understand, visualize, and describe an operational environment. Next, this chapter offers an

approach for framing an operational environment. The chapter concludes with tools and techniques

commanders and staffs use to help understand both the current and future states of an operational

environment.

Chapter 4 begins with a general discussion of problems. Next, this chapter describes activities associated

with problem framing. The chapter concludes with tools and techniques used in framing problems.

Chapter 5 defines an operational approach and describes its purpose. Next, this chapter describes activities

associated with developing an operational approach to include documenting results and transitioning to

Introduction

vi ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

detailed planning. The chapter concludes with several tools and techniques used in developing an operational

approach.

Chapter 6 begins with a discussion of organizational learning. Next, it describes how assessment and

reframing helps commanders adapt operations to changing circumstances. The chapter concludes with tools

and techniques available to help the commander and staff with assessing operations and reframing.

Appendix A serves as an aid to effective thinking by describing several cognitive biases and logic errors to

guard against.

Appendix B provides an example of framing an operational environment from a systems perspective utilizing

a counter drug vignette.

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 1-1

Chapter 1

Fundamentals of Army Design Methodology

This chapter begins with an overview of mission command and the operations process.

A review of the fundamentals of planning follows. Next, this chapter defines Army

design methodology (ADM) and describes its major activities. The chapter concludes

with key concepts of ADM.

MISSION COMMAND AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

1-1. To appreciate how ADM helps commanders and staffs understand, visualize, and describe operations, leaders must first understand the nature of operations. Military operations are human endeavors characterized

by the continuous, mutual adaptation of give and take, moves, and countermoves among all participants. In

operations, friendly forces engage a thinking, multifaceted enemy. While friendly forces try to impose their

will on the enemy, the enemy resists and seeks to impose its will on the friendly force. In addition, operations

occur in and among populations whose desires influence and are influenced by military operations. The

results of these interactions are often unpredictable and in many instances uncontrollable.

1-2. Uncertainty pervades operations with unknowns about the enemy, the people, and the surroundings. Commanders cannot predict with certainty how enemies will act and react or how events will develop. During

operations leaders make decisions, develop plans, and direct actions under varying degrees of uncertainty.

Commanders counter the uncertainty of operations by empowering subordinates at the scene to make

decisions, act, and quickly adapt to changing circumstances. As such, mission command guides commanders,

staffs, and subordinates throughout the operations process.

1-3. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the

conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0). This philosophy of command requires an environment of

mutual trust and shared understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates. It requires a command

climate where commanders encourage subordinates to accept risk and exercise initiative to seize

opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent. Using mission orders, commanders issue

directives to subordinates that emphasize results to be attained, not how to achieve them. Doing this

minimizes detailed control and allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action to accomplish

missions within the commander’s intent. (See ADRP 6-0 for a detailed discussion of mission command.)

1-4. The Army’s framework for exercising mission command is the operations process—the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing

the operation (ADP 5-0). Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to understand,

visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and

assess military operations.

1-5. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations process. Upon completion of the initial order, planning

continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparing begins during planning and

continues through execution. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to seize, retain,

and exploit the initiative. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities.

1-6. Both the commander and staff have important roles in the operations process. Figure 1-1 on page 1-2 shows how the commander drives the operations process by understanding, visualizing, describing, directing,

leading, and assessing. The staff helps the commander understand situations and problems, implement

decisions, control operations, and assess progress. In addition, the staff helps subordinate units (commanders

and staffs) and keeps units and organizations outside the headquarters informed throughout the operations

process. See ADRP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of the operations process.

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1-2 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

Figure 1-1. The operations process

PLANNING

1-7. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning helps leaders understand and develop

solutions to problems, coordinate and synchronize action, and anticipate events to adapt to changing

circumstances. In its simplest form, planning helps determine how to move from the current state of affairs

to a more desirable future state.

1-8. Imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future are inherent in all planning. Planning cannot predict how enemies will react or how civilians will respond to the friendly force or the enemy. Nonetheless,

the understanding and learning that occurs during planning have great value. Even if units do not execute the

plan as envisioned—and few ever do—planning results in improved situational understanding that facilitates

future decisionmaking.

1-9. A product of planning is a plan or order—a directive for future action. Commanders issue plans and orders to subordinates to communicate their understanding of the situation and their visualization of how the

operation should unfold. A plan is a continuous, evolving framework of anticipated actions that maximizes

opportunities. It guides subordinates as they progress through each phase of the operation. The measure of a

good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned, but whether the plan facilitates effective action in

the face of unforeseen events.

1-10. Planning is a continuous learning activity of the operations process. While planning starts an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with production of an operations order. During preparation

and execution, the order is refined as the situation changes. Through assessment, subordinates and unified

action partners provide feedback that often results in modifications to the order. In some circumstances,

commanders determine that the current order (including associated branches and sequels) is no longer

relevant to the situation. In these instances, instead of modifying the current order, commanders reframe their

understanding of the operational environment and problems and develop a new plan. (See chapter 6 for a

discussion on assessment and reframing.)

Fundamentals of Army Design Methodology

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 1-3

1-11. Planning has a conceptual component and a detailed component as shown in figure 1-2. Conceptual planning involves understanding operational environments and problems, determining the operation’s end

state, and visualizing an operational approach to attain that end state. Conceptual planning corresponds to the

art of command and is the focus of the commander with staff support. Detailed planning translates the

commander’s operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is

associated with the science of control including synchronizing forces in time, space, and purpose to

accomplish missions. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical problems

involved with moving, sustaining, and synchronizing the actions of the force toward the desired end state.

Figure 1-2. Combining conceptual and detailed planning

1-12. Effective planning requires integrating the conceptual and detailed components. As such, Army leaders employ and integrate the following planning methodologies throughout an operation—

 ADM.

 The military decisionmaking process (MDMP). (See FM 6-0.)

 Troop leading procedures. (See FM 6-0.)

1-13. ADM helps commanders and staffs with the conceptual aspects of planning. These aspects include understanding, visualizing, and describing operations. The MDMP helps commanders and staffs translate the

commander’s vision into an operations plan or operations order that synchronizes the actions of the force in

time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions. Small-unit leaders use troop leading procedures as their

planning and preparation methodology. (See ADRP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of the fundamentals of

planning).

ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY

1-14. Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). ADM includes

interconnected thinking activities that aid in conceptual planning and decisionmaking. By first framing an

operational environment and associated problems, ADM enables commanders and staffs to think about the

situation in depth. From this understanding, commanders and staffs develop a more informed approach to

solve or manage identified problems. During operations, ADM supports organizational learning through

reframing—a maturing of understanding that leads to a new perspective on problems or their resolution.

1-15. There is no one-way or prescribed set of steps to employ ADM. There are, however, several activities associated with ADM including framing an operational environment, framing problems, framing solutions,

Chapter 1

1-4 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

and reframing when necessary. The learning from these activities results in a conceptual framework that

guides the development of an operations plan or operations order using the MDMP. While planners complete

some activities before others, the understanding and learning within one activity may require revisiting the

learning from another activity. Thus, ADM is iterative in nature.

FRAMING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-16. To understand something—an idea, a statement, an event, or a situation—commanders and staffs need to put that something into context. Establishing context involves discerning the relationships of that

something and its surrounding. Commanders initiate ADM by forming a planning team to help them develop

a contextual understanding of their operational environment. In framing the operational environment, the

team seeks to understand what is going on and why and what the future operational environment should look

like.

1-17. Framing an operational environment involves critical and creative thinking by a group to build models that represent the current conditions of the operational environment (current state) and models that represent

what the operational environment should look like at the conclusion of an operation (desired end state). The

planning team also models the future natural tendency of the operational environment and constructs models

of desired future states of other actors as points of comparison with the desired end state. Members of the

planning team capture their work in an environmental frame (visual models supported by narratives) that

describe and show the relationship among the operational variables including the history, culture,

relationships, and future goals of relevant actors for both the current state and future states of an operational

environment. (See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion on framing an operational environment.)

FRAMING PROBLEMS

1-18. Identifying and understanding problems is essential to solving problems. As the commander and planning team gain an initial understanding of an operational environment, they shift their efforts to

identifying and understanding those issues impeding progress toward achieving the desired end state.

Through critical thinking and dialogue, the planning team frames problems by examining the differences

between the current state of an operational environment and the desired end state. The also examine the

differences between the natural tendency of an operational environment and desired future states of relevant

actors with the desired end state. These differences are tensions (frictions, conflicts, and competitions)

between relevant actors including geographic, demographic, economic, religious, and resource consumption

trends. Combined, these tensions represent a set of interrelated problems (a system of problems) requiring

resolution. The planning team captures their work in a problem frame that describes the system of problems

in visual models supported by a narrative. (See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of framing problems.)

FRAMING SOLUTIONS

1-19. With an understanding of the operational environment and associated problems, the commander and planning team consider an operational approach—the broad general actions and means to solve or manage

identified problems. The commander and planning team use elements of operational art to visualize and

describe the operational approach. In developing the operational approach, the commander and planning team

consider resources to support the operational approach and considers associated risk. The team describes the

operational approach in a visual model with supporting text. The operational approach forms the basis for

the commander’s planning guidance used to develop an operations order or operations plan during the

MDMP. (See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of developing an operational approach.)

REFRAMING

1-20. Assessment precedes and guides the other activities (plan, prepare, execute) of the operations process. Assessment involves comparing forecasted outcomes with events to determine the effectiveness of force

employment. Assessment helps the commander determine progress towards attaining the desired end state,

achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It involves monitoring and evaluating the operational

environment to determine what changes affect operations.

Fundamentals of Army Design Methodology

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 1-5

1-21. Operations, however, may not proceed as visualized during planning. Commanders reframe after assessing that desired conditions have changed or are unattainable by executing the current plan (including

associated branches and sequels). Reframing includes revisiting early hypotheses, conclusions, and the

operational approach that underpins the current plan. In reframing, the commander and staff revise their

understanding of the operational environment and problem. If required, they develop a new operational

approach to overcome the challenges or opportunities that precipitated the need to reframe. (See chapter 6

for a discussion of assessment and reframing.)

KEY CONCEPTS

1-22. ADM is an interdisciplinary approach to planning and problem solving. It combines military theory, writings on the nature of problems, and the challenges of critical and creative thinking. Some of these

constructs such as operational art have long been associated with military planning. Other constructs such as

systems thinking and framing have recently taken on increased emphasis. Key concepts associated with the

ADM include—

 Operational art.

 Critical thinking and creative thinking.

 Collaboration and dialogue.

 Systems thinking.

 Framing.

 Visual modeling.

 Narrative construction.

OPERATIONAL ART

1-23. ADM helps commanders and staffs with the conceptual aspects of planning and applying operational art. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill,

knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to

organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). Operational art applies

to all levels of war, not just at the operational level. Through operational art, commanders and staffs combine

art and science to develop plans and orders that describe how (ways) the force employs its capabilities

(means) to achieve the desired end state (ends) while considering risk. This requires commanders to answer

the following questions:

 What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)?

 How will the force achieve these desired conditions (ways)?

 What sequence of actions helps attain these conditions (ways)?

 What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?

 What risks are associated with that sequence of actions and how can they be mitigated (risks)?

1-24. ADM supports operational art by helping commanders and staffs answer the ends—ways—means— risk questions. During ADM, commanders and their staffs use a set of intellectual tools known as the elements

of operational art (see table 1-1 on page 1-6). Commanders and staffs apply these elements to understand an

operational environment and problems and to visualize and describe an operational approach. Subsequent

chapters discuss elements of operational art as applied to the major activities of the ADM. For example,

chapter 3 describes how end state and conditions help frame an operational environment. Chapter 5 describes

how center of gravity, decisive points, lines of operations and lines of effort, and phasing help the commander

and planning team formulate an operational approach.

Chapter 1

1-6 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

Table 1-1. Elements of operational art

 End state and conditions

 Center of gravity

 Decisive points

 Lines of operations and lines of effort

 Operational reach

 Basing

 Tempo

 Phasing and transitions

 Culmination

 Risk

CRITICAL THINKING AND CREATIVE THINKING

1-25. Commanders and staffs apply critical thinking and creative thinking throughout the operations process to help them understand situations, make informed decisions, and direct action. Critical thinking and creative

thinking are central to ADM. This section summarizes critical thinking and creative thinking. Proceeding

chapters address tools and techniques for improving critical and creative thinking.

Critical Thinking

1-26. Cognition is thinking—it is the mental process of knowing that includes awareness, perception, reasoning, and intuition. Much of our thinking, however, is faulty and biased (prejudiced for or against

someone or something). As such, commanders and planners practice critical thinking throughout ADM and

the operations process to counter their biases and avoid logic errors.

1-27. Critical thinking is purposeful and reflective thought about what to believe or what to do in response to observations, experience, verbal or written expressions, or arguments. Critical thinking involves

questioning information, assumptions, conclusions, and points of view to interpret data and information,

evaluate evidence, and clarify goals. Critical thinking helps commanders and staffs understand situations,

identify causes of problems, arrive at justifiable conclusions, and make good judgments. Appendix A

describes several cognitive biases and logic errors to guard against to improve quality of thought.

1-28. By thinking critically, individuals formulate judgments about whether the information they encounter is true or false, or falls somewhere along a scale of plausibility between true or false. Critical thinking

involves considering background knowledge, situational facts, and speculative information. When

individuals think critically, they impose structure to ensure rigor and thoroughness. In turn, decisions about

what to believe guide individual actions and decisions about what to do. Done well, critical thinking increases

the likelihood that actions achieve their desired purposes.

Creative Thinking

1-29. Creative thinking examines problems from a fresh perspective to develop innovative solutions. Creative thinking creates new and useful ideas, and reevaluates or combines old ideas, to solve problems.

Leaders face unfamiliar or ill-structured problems that require new or original approaches to solve them. This

requires creativity and a willingness to accept change, newness, and a flexible outlook of new ideas and

possibilities.

1-30. Breaking old habits of thought, questioning the status quo, visualizing a better future, and devising responses to problems requires creative thinking. Leaders face problems unfamiliar or old problems under

new conditions. In these situations, leaders apply creative thinking to gain new insights, novel approaches,

fresh perspectives, and new ways of understanding and conceiving things.

Fundamentals of Army Design Methodology

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 1-7

COLLABORATION AND DIALOGUE

1-31. ADM is a team-based approach to understand, visualize, and describe operations. It includes considering diverse perspectives through collaboration and dialogue. Collaboration and dialogue help

develop shared understanding between the commander and staff and externally with other commanders and

unified action partners.

1-32. Collaboration is two or more people or organizations working together toward common goals by sharing knowledge and building consensus. Dialogue is a way to collaborate that involves the candid

exchange of ideas or opinions among participants and encourages frank discussions in areas of disagreement.

Throughout the operations process, commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action partners

collaborate and dialogue, sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to understand

situations and make decisions.

1-33. Through collaboration and dialogue, the commander creates a learning environment by allowing participants to think critically and creatively and share their ideas, opinions, and recommendations without

fear of retribution. Effective dialogue requires candor and a free, yet mutually respectful, competition of

ideas. Participants must feel free to make viewpoints based on their expertise, experience, and insight; this

includes sharing ideas that contradict the opinions held by those of higher rank. Successful commanders

listen to novel ideas and counterarguments concerning any problem.

1-34. Dialogue is the catalyst that drives planning teams to develop new ways of thinking about problems and identify innovative solutions. Effective dialogue ensures team members may question one another about

ideas, discuss alternatives, and refine the team’s thinking. When done well, dialogue helps:

 Reveal assumptions that underlie an argument or concept and reveal individual biases. It also

reveals what members are not thinking about the situation.

 Display diversity of ideas and expose a range of viewpoints.

 Explore concepts from different perspectives.

 Reveal areas where the team lacks diversity or experience and where external subject matter

experts are valuable.

 Develop shared mental models—individual beliefs about cause-effect relationships, assumptions

and biases about how the world works—concerning problems and solutions.

 Build trust in the team and the planning effort.

1-35. During ADM, and throughout the operations process, the commander promotes and encourages collaboration and dialogue. Effective collaboration and dialogue are not possible unless the commander

ensures it. Commanders establish a culture of collaboration and dialogue in the organization. They recognize

that they do not know everything, can be wrong, and recognize that they have something to learn from even

the most junior Soldier. Throughout the operations process, commanders demonstrate humility to learn and

understand from others to make better decisions. Commanders establish a command climate where

collaboration and dialogue routinely occur throughout the organization through personal example, coaching,

and mentorship.

SYSTEMS THINKING

1-36. A system is a group of interacting, interrelated, and interdependent components or subsystems that form a complex and unified whole. Systems have a purpose with their parts arranged in a way (structure) to

carry out their purpose. Understanding why a system exists, how the parts of the system serve that purpose,

and appreciating how that system interacts with its broader environment helps develop ways to change that

system.

1-37. Systems thinking is a process of understanding how parts of a system work and influence each other as part of a greater whole. It is an approach to problem solving that views problems as part of the greater

system and that these problems are interrelated. By understanding components and problems in a system in

relation with each other (as opposed to in isolation), problem solvers are better equipped to develop a holistic

approach to solving or managing identified problems.

Chapter 1

1-8 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

1-38. In applying systems thinking, commanders and the planning team view an operational environment as a system. The team reflects on how components of the system relate to each other from an internal perspective

to understand the system’s purpose, structure, and processes (internal logic). The team also seeks to

understand how a system interacts with, and is influenced by, its surrounding environment (including other

systems) as shown in figure 1-3 on page 1-8. In doing so, system thinking helps participants understand how

a system receives inputs, adapts to those inputs according to its internal logic, and provides outputs to the

surrounding environment.

1-39. The team also thinks about problems in an operational environment as part of the system. As the commander and staff learn about the operational environment, they start to identify a host of issues and

tensions in the system. These problems are often interrelated and change over time. As such, commanders

and staff think about these problems as a system of problems, as opposed to a single problem.

Figure 1-3. Systems thinking

1-40. Systems thinking helps planners break away from linear cause-effect and compartmentalized ways of addressing problems (such as considering components of a problem set in isolation). When teams adopt a

system-level view, members see subtleties, indirect influences, and interactive effects important to

understanding the complexity of problems and anticipating second and third order effects of possible actions.

1-41. A systems thinking approach is also useful during execution as commanders and staffs assess changes in their operational environment and the progress of operations. For example, military, economic, political,

and social systems are not static but adapt based on inputs. Collecting feedback from actions through

assessment helps the commander reinforce successful action while altering actions not leading to intended

results. Examining events and studying patterns and trends in a system among systems enable the command

to develop actions to create desired change with an operational environment.

FRAMING

1-42. In the context of ADM, framing is about building conceptual models of reality. When framing, planners use systems thinking to select, organize, interpret, and make sense of situations and problems by

establishing context—the set of circumstances that surround a particular event or situation. ADM involves

framing operational environments, problems, and solutions to problems through dialogue and critical

thinking by a group. When framing an operational environment, the planning team considers the perspectives

and worldviews of others to understand the situation. This contextual understanding of an operational

environment is a frame of reference to understand problems, develop solutions, and act.

1-43. Constructing systems models helps planners integrate the pieces of information to make sense of a situation. This leads to a deeper understanding of an operational environment and problems requiring

resolution. The usefulness of models increases as they become explicit and commonly understood. Building

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 1-9

explicit conceptual models of the situation and associated problems promotes understanding among

stakeholders. It is important to note that framing results in models based on current information. These

models may or may not approximate reality. As the commander and staff learn more about the situation or if

the situation changes significantly over time, commanders and staffs adjust their models and reframe as

required.

VISUAL MODELING

1-44. ADM relies heavily on forming and presenting ideas in narrative and visual form. Visual information is stimulating; therefore, visual models enhance critical and creative thinking. A visual model, based on

logical inference from evidence, helps creative thought develop into understanding. A diagram or sketch

points to hidden relationships not considered through conversation alone. In addition, showing periodic

summaries of work helps individuals see the results under consideration. This identifies new ways of thinking

and possible areas for further examination. In other words, seeing something drawn may help individuals

think through challenging problems, especially when examining abstract concepts. Graphic modeling

techniques available to the team include:

 Rich picture diagrams that use symbols and sketches that graphically tell the story of a situation.

 Influence diagrams that use symbols and words to show relationships among variables in a system.

 Mind-maps that use symbols and words to show relationships to an idea or a thing.

 Causal loop diagrams that use symbols and words to show reinforcing and balancing loops among

actors and things to show cause and effect between variables.

1-45. In addition, planning teams consider and use the capabilities of their unit’s geospatial intelligence teams. These teams help develop visual models that overlay a range of information on maps including terrain

and weather, infrastructure, and cultural demographics.

1-46. Throughout ADM, team members develop drawings and sketches of operational environments, problems, and approaches to solve those problems. These initial sketches are called working diagrams. The

group uses these to create a common understanding in the group. These sketches evolve into presentation

diagrams the planning team uses to present understanding to members outside their group. An effective

presentation diagram uses commonly understood doctrinal terms and graphics. It is helpful to have personnel

not involved in ADM review presentation diagrams to gauge the effectiveness of the diagrams to increase

understanding.

NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION

1-47. A narrative is a story that gives meaning to individuals, objects, and events. Individuals, groups, organizations, and countries all have narratives with many components that reflect and reveal how they define

themselves. Political parties, social organizations, and government institutions, for example, have stories

bound chronologically and spatially. They incorporate symbols, historical events, and artifacts tied together

with a logic that explains their reason for being.

1-48. Developing narratives is essential to ADM. Narrating is the production of a story–an explanation of an event or phenomenon by proposing a question or questions that relate to the artifacts themselves. These

questions include:

 What is the meaning of what I see?

 Where does the situation begin and end?

 What happened, is happening, and why?

 What information is missing?

1-49. Commanders, staffs, and unified action partners create a narrative to help understand and explain an operational environment, problems in an operational environment, and solutions. Not only is the narrative

useful to communicate to others, the act of constructing the narrative itself is a key learning event for the

command.

1-50. When developing a narrative, the team must be cautious of a common pitfall known as “narrative fallacy.” The narrative fallacy is a tendency of individuals to create a plausible narrative given only a small

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amount of information. Often, the fewer facts known about a situation, the easier it is to create a narrative,

and individuals have greater confidence in the accuracy of that narrative. To avoid the narrative fallacy, it is

important that the planning team studies and researches the situation in depth before engaging in narrative

construction. (See source note 1.)

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 2-1

Chapter 2

Getting Started

This chapter addresses preparing for Army design methodology (ADM). It begins with

a discussion of when to employ ADM followed by a discussion of commander

involvement. The chapter then offers considerations to form and lead a planning team.

The chapter concludes with discussions on sharing the workload and resources

commonly used when performing ADM.

WHEN TO EMPLOY ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY

2-1. Planning begins upon receipt of or in anticipation of a mission. The purpose of this step is to alert all participants of the pending planning requirements, determine how much available time for planning and

preparation, and decide on a planning approach. An important consideration for commanders upon receipt or

anticipation of a mission is how best to integrate the conceptual and detailed components of planning (see

Chapter 1). Depending on the situation, commanders employ ADM before, in parallel with, or after the

military decisionmaking process (MDMP).

2-2. Commanders need to recognize the triggers, cues, and characteristics of the situation that indicate when to apply ADM. In some cases, the operation’s end state may be unclear. In other cases, it is a sense of surprise,

uncertainty, or confusion that triggers a need for a deeper understanding of the situation. During execution,

commanders may decide to employ ADM after realizing that actions are not achieving expected results or

have unanticipated second- and third-order effects. Below are some questions commanders consider when

assessing whether ADM is appropriate.

 Is there enough information about the situation to move forward?

 Are problems and solutions self-evident?

 Is there a clear desired end state?

 Is a course of action evident?

 Are the known unknowns significant enough to distort detailed planning?

 Are means (resources and force structure) undetermined?

 Are there unexpected and/or surprising effects to actions?

 Are actions falling short of achieving the desired impact?

2-3. When problems are hard to identify or the operation’s end state is unclear, commanders may initiate ADM before the headquarters engages in detailed planning. This is often the case when developing long-

range plans or orders for an operation or a new phase of an operation. When using this approach, a complete

evolution of ADM is employed with the resulting products (environmental frame, problem frame, and

operational approach), informing the development of a plan or order using the MDMP. This approach is time

consuming but provides the greatest understanding of an operational environment and associated problems

resulting in effective planning products and orders.

2-4. Commanders may also perform ADM with the MDMP. This technique allows both planning efforts to inform each other. In this instance, the commander forms separate planning teams. One team performs ADM

while the other team leads the staff through the mission analysis step of the MDMP. Results from both ADM

and mission analysis inform the efforts of each team and help the commander develop the initial

commander’s intent and planning guidance. The two planning teams then merge and continue with the

remaining steps of the MDMP. Smaller headquarters, such as brigades and battalions, may not have enough

personnel to execute this approach.

2-5. Another option is to embed aspects of ADM in the mission analysis step of the MDMP, especially when time available for planning is compressed. In this case, the staff initially focuses on the intelligence

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preparation of the battlefield (IPB) steps of “define the operational environment” and “describe the effects of

the operational environment”. Based on this initial IPB, the commander and staff perform a planning session

or sessions to understand the operational environment and problems. The staff continues with mission

analysis and shares their results with the commander. See ATP 2-01.3 for a detailed discussion of IPB.

2-6. Sometimes planning time is limited as in crisis action planning. In this case, the commander and staff perform the MDMP in a time-constrained environment to produce an operations order to accomplish the

mission (see FM 6-0 for abbreviating the MDMP). As planning time becomes available during execution,

commanders initiate ADM to reframe their understanding of the operational environment and associated

problems and modify the plan as required.

2-7. Figure 2-1 shows a balance of conceptual and detailed planning efforts throughout an operation to illustrate the relationship of ADM and the MDMP. In this example, the balance of activities is initially on

conceptual planning. The commander and planning team frame the operational environment and associated

problems and develop an operational approach. The planning emphasis shifts to more detailed planning using

the MDMP after the commander issues the initial commander’s intent and planning guidance based on their

understanding and visualization developed during ADM.

2-8. During the MDMP, the commander and staff refine their understanding and develop, compare, and decide on a course of action and produce an operations order. During execution, the plan is refined based on

the continuous assessment of the operational environment and of the progress of the operation. If the current

operational approach is not leading to the intended results, if aspects of the operational environment or

problems change significantly, or if the operation meets with unexpected success, the commander may decide

to reframe. As such, the balance of activities shifts back to conceptual planning as shown on the right side of

figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1. Integrated planning

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 2-3

COMMANDER INVOLVEMENT

2-9. Commanders are the most important participants in the operations process. They drive operations through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations as shown in

figure 2-2. All of these commander activities occur during planning, preparation, execution, and assessment

but take on different emphasis throughout operations. For example, commanders focus their activities on

understanding, visualizing, and describing during planning. During execution, commanders focus on

directing, leading, and assessing while improving understanding and modifying visualization.

Figure 2-2. The commander’s role in the operations process

2-10. Commanders are an integral to any ADM effort. Working with their staffs, other commanders, and unified action partners, commanders employ ADM to understand the operational environment and associated

problems, visualize the desired end state and operational approach, and to describe that visualization in time,

space, purpose, and recourses.

2-11. While commander’s involvement is central to successful ADM, the responsibilities and demands on a commander’s time prevent continuous involvement in ADM. Before embarking on ADM, commanders

consider how to manage their own level of involvement and the benefits and risks associated with varying

levels of participation. There are the two primary techniques that reflect varying levels of commander

involvement:

 The commander leads the team and facilitates the dialogue.

 The commander comes in and out of the activities of ADM and is involved periodically at various

points throughout the effort.

2-12. It is important to recognize the risks of both limited commander involvement and too much involvement in ADM. Limited commander involvement poses a risk that the potential benefits of ADM are

unrealized and outcomes have limited impact. Commanders not engaged in the process find it difficult to

understand the logic behind the understanding developed during ADM. Too much involvement from the

commander poses risk to effective ADM. An important issue to recognize is the influence commanders have

over their staff. The commander has the potential to dampen dialogue by providing too many ideas and

interpretations upfront. To help determine their degree of involvement in ADM, commanders consider the

following questions:

 How much time can they devote to the planning effort?

 If they cannot be involved in all aspects, what are the critical parts they want to be involved in?

Where can they have the greatest impact?

 If they cannot be involved in all aspects, how do they want the team to communicate their logic

and insights? How frequently does the commander need updates and in what format?

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2-13. Because of the competing demands on the commander’s time, planning team leaders are selective on engaging the commander throughout ADM. Team leaders work with the chief of staff or executive officer to

get time on the unit battle rhythm with the commander. If the commander is fully engaged in an ADM effort,

an off-site with subordinate commanders and the planning team is an option. Scheduling periodic design

sessions (daily, every other day, weekly) is another option. Not all design sessions with the commander are

formal or structured. A design session with the commander, key leaders, and planners over dinner is an

example.

FORMING THE PLANNING TEAM

2-14. In a headquarters, the plans cell performs numerous planning tasks simultaneously. A technique for organizing the workload is to form planning teams for requirements. A planning team consists of a lead

planner [normally from the G-5 (S-5), plans or G-3 (S-3), operations], functional planners (e.g. fires,

protection, sustainment), and other subject matter experts as required. Commanders form a planning team

(sometimes referred to as a design team) to perform ADM. This team leverages multiple, diverse perspectives

and knowledge to help the commander understand an operational environment and problems, and develop

an operational approach to solve those problems.

2-15. Some higher Army headquarters commanders form a semipermanent staff section called a commander’s initiatives group. Commander’s initiative groups produce focused, professional studies,

projects, and products at the direction of the commander. For those units that create a commander’s initiatives

group, this group is another option to become the base for forming a planning team for ADM. However,

unless members of the commander’s initiative group continue to participate in the planning effort through

orders production, there is some risk to this option. Since the results of ADM—deeper and broader

understanding of the operational environment and problems—are best understood by those participating in

ADM, some of this understanding may be lost during translation if commander initiative group members are

not involved in the MDMP.

2-16. Teams offer advantages over individual’s endeavors. The interaction of personalities can lead to a set of team dynamics that require attention and energy to manage for a quality outcome. Selecting the right

individuals to serve on the planning team is important to successful ADM. The following are some

considerations when forming the planning team:

 Skills and characteristics of potential team members.

 Diversity of team members.

 Size of the team.

 Roles in the team.

SKILLS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF POTENTIAL TEAM MEMBERS

2-17. A key aspect of assembling the team is considering the knowledge, skills, abilities, work styles, and personality characteristics needed for the team’s tasks. Commanders consider the scope of the problem and

personnel resources when forming a planning team. While individuals are often selected to the team based

on their expertise associated to the problem (for example functional or regional knowledge), individuals

should also possess the following characteristics:

 Having an open mind for new ideas.

 Having an inquisitive mindset; being curious, and eager for knowledge.

 Being comfortable with ambiguity.

 Possessing critical thinking and creative thinking skills.

 Being willing to listen to others and valuing differing points of view.

 Being able to take and offer different perspectives.

 Possessing an investigative mindset and research skills.

 Able to communicate complex ideas in simple words.

 Not afraid of having own ideas critiqued by others.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 2-5

 Able to think visually and effectively use visual graphics.

 Having training in ADM and the philosophy and theory that underpin it.

DIVERSITY OF TEAM MEMBERS

2-18. Commanders and team leaders strive for variety of skill sets, knowledge levels, and personalities among individuals when forming the planning team. Planning teams comprised of people with widely varying

backgrounds and experiences have more perspectives to draw on for their work. Teams that are more diverse

can be more creative, engage in higher quality dialogue, and develop more innovative solutions. Commanders

and team leaders assemble a team with a rich mix of:

 Education level, training, credentials and qualifications.

 Rank.

 Assignments, deployment, and career history.

 Functional areas of expertise (such as planner, intelligence, logistics, special operations).

 Gender.

 Personality characteristics.

 Thinking styles and preferences (for example, big picture thinkers, detailed thinkers, abstract

thinkers, historical thinkers, or those who think about the future).

2-19. Commanders and team leaders recognize the advantages and disadvantages associated with team member diversity. For example, diverse teams have a wider range of perspectives on which to draw, but may

experience more interpersonal conflict and higher coordination needs. For teams with diverse rank, team

leaders spend time encouraging junior members to speak their mind and challenge ideas of those of senior

rank if they disagree with an idea.

SIZE OF THE TEAM

2-20. Team size is an additional consideration when forming the team. Determining the size of the team requires a fine balance between a team big enough to provide diversity of perspective but small enough to be

productive. A core team of six to nine people, with other subject matter experts participating as needed, is an

effective size. Larger teams manage their work by dividing into smaller subteams to complete tasks (for

example research) then come together to dialogue their findings.

2-21. The optimal team composition depends on the nature of problems facing the command and gaps in knowledge attributed to those problems. In many cases, it is not fully apparent on the required areas of

expertise needed on the planning team. It may only be after engaging in framing an operational environment

that the commander and planning team recognize the needs for a particular area of expertise.

ROLES IN THE TEAM

2-22. As the team forms, commanders and team leaders consider the roles of each team member. Roles assigned to team members may include but are not limited to:

 Team leader.

 Subject matter experts.

 Red team members.

 Note takers.

 Graphic artist.

Team Leader

2-23. The team leader is an active facilitator of the team and methodology. Team leaders are experienced with performing the activities of ADM and skilled in leading group work among peers, subordinates, and

superiors. Team leaders create an environment of learning among team members by encouraging wide

participation amongst all members of the team, and avoid over relying on any individual. Team leaders

engage individuals on the team to think creatively while monitoring and orchestrating the inquiry. The team

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leader controls the planning timeline and oversees the quality of resulting products. Team leader duties

include:

 Working with the commander to define the team’s purpose, establishing goals, and setting

expectations.

 Working with the commander to set the tone for open and honest discourse.

 Building and maintaining interpersonal trust and a sense of team cohesion.

 Managing personalities and associated team dynamics.

 Minimizing unproductive (interpersonal) conflict.

 Organizing the work of the team.

 Managing the team’s work pace and workflow.

 Encouraging and guiding team members to exchange, discuss, and integrate information.

 Helping the team avoid quick opinions that match the group consensus (i.e., groupthink) rather

than evaluating information.

 Maintaining awareness of the organizational context where the team is working, including the

commander’s and other stakeholders’ needs and preferences.

Subject Matter Experts

2-24. Various subject matter experts help form the team. Routinely, members of the team engaging in ADM are internal to the headquarters. This includes members of the G-2 (S-2), Intelligence and G-9 (S-9), Civil

Affairs staff sections. Not only do these individuals have expertise in their fields, they can access the

analytical and research capabilities of their respective staff sections.

2-25. As the team learns more about the situation, they recognize what they do not know. Areas and topics under consideration require individuals from outside the existing staff who have different perspectives and/or

specialized knowledge and expertise. Examples include human terrain teams, political advisors, economic

advisors, and historians. Request for subject matter expert support ranges from requesting individuals are

present in the headquarters or reaching back via teleconference, video teleconference, and e-mail. Reception

and orientation of new members to the team is vital to their integration into the core group.

Red Team Members

2-26. Red team qualified individuals are part of the commander’s staff at division through theater army and augment brigade headquarters as required. Trained and educated to think critically and creatively, red team

members help commanders and staffs think from different perspectives. They help commanders and staffs

explore alternatives in plans and orders and see things from the perspective of others. Red team members

help:

 Broaden the understanding of the operational environment.

 Identify problems and clarifying end state conditions.

 Challenge assumptions.

 Ensure the perspectives of the enemies, adversaries, and others are considered.

 Identify friendly and enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities.

 Identify areas for assessment.

 Anticipate cultural perceptions of partners, adversaries, and others.

2-27. Commanders and chiefs of staff (executive officers) consider how to use their red teams when forming the planning team. One technique is to form a red team to critically review and provide an alternative

perspective of products developed by the planning team. Another technique is for a red team qualified

individual to serve on the planning team as facilitator. In this role, the red team member helps the planning

team leader encourage constructive dialogue between group members and maintain order of the group

discussion to protect member’s ideas and manage time. Another technique is forming a red team to work on

a portion of ADM and compare their work with that of the planning team. For example, red team members

frame an operational environment from the perspective of the population.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 2-7

Note Takers

2-28. As the team works together, the team’s knowledge base expands and their understanding of the various problems deepens and evolves. A consideration for planning and problem solving teams throughout the

process is how to document the knowledge, the evolving logic, and the insights that emerge during the team’s

work.

2-29. In part, dealing with knowledge capture is a resource issue. The team lead considers how much time the team spends thinking and talking and how much time the team spends documenting thoughts and

discussion. While it is important that all members of the team keep diligent notes, it is helpful to assign a

dedicated note taker.

2-30. ADM relies on collaboration and dialogue among members on the team and with individuals outside of the team. The team captures key points in these discussions as the team moves through the activities of

ADM. The note taker records collaborative work sessions. Key information recorded includes assumptions,

reasoning or logic behind statements, areas of disagreement and commander’s guidance. If resources allow,

bringing in someone from outside the team helps free all team members to participate in the session.

Graphic Artist

2-31. Visual modeling or sketching is another key aspect of ADM (see chapter 1). Thinking visually is a skill that not all members of the team can do well. It is important for team leaders to seek out members in the

team that are good visual thinkers and graphic artists. These visual thinkers capture team thought and develop

clear visual models for presentation to others outside the group.

LEADING THE TEAM

2-32. A significant challenge for team leaders and commanders is establishing a collaborative and trusting environment where team members feel safe discussing, questioning, thinking creatively, and sharing ideas

openly. Team leaders encourage members to openly question and debate ideas with those who are higher in

rank. These behaviors may seem high-risk, uncomfortable, and inappropriate to those who are accustomed

to deferring to higher-ranking personnel in a hierarchical command structure.

2-33. Another challenge is a tendency of individuals to label ideas either “good” or “bad,” “right” or “wrong.” Individuals can tie their identity to the ideas they create and the esteem they get from being told

they are right. As a result, members of a planning team refrain from thinking creatively or putting forth

alternative ideas out of concern of being wrong or fear of being judged negatively by others.

2-34. The commander and team leader work to overcome these challenges. Despite rank, service, agency, or the background of team members, the commander and team leader create an atmosphere where members

share ideas, think critically, question assumptions, and challenge ideas without fear. Senior leaders are aware

of how they respond to others’ ideas and critiques. The commander and team leader reinforce the view that

an attack on an idea is not an attack on the person and that the debate is to develop a deeper understanding.

Creating a positive climate requires leadership that emphasizes and encourages continual learning, creative

and novel thought, and positively recognizes those who test ideas.

2-35. The team leader also plays a key role in activities external to the team. The planning team does not exist in a vacuum; rather the team exists in a particular organizational context that has a specific culture and

set of norms for interacting and performing business. The team has a “customer”—typically the commander,

in addition to other senior leaders and external organizations—who have needs and an interest in what the

team learns and produces. A team leader is aware of the organizational context where the team functions and

the team’s role in that context.

SHARING THE WORKLOAD

2-36. While ADM involves group work, the whole group does not work on all aspects of ADM. Leaders assign some work to subteams or to individuals. Large group work is optimal for shared understandings.

While slow at times, it is important that the entire planning team share their understanding and exchange

ideas. Small group work is effective when the large group has too many issues to sort through or the expertise

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of all members of the group are not needed for a particular inquiry or activity. Individual work is useful when

performing detailed research on a topic. The team leader remembers that the work of small groups or work

done by individuals is subject to criticism by those not present. Small group and individuals vet their work

with the larger group. This provides a chance for all to comment, but also shares understanding among the

team.

RESOURCES

2-37. One area to consider when preparing for ADM is the types of resources the activity requires. Resource considerations include physical space for the team to work and materials needed for communicating and

representing ideas.

2-38. Graphical depiction is a key element of ADM. It allows the team to visualize concepts and show relationships and interdependencies. The ability to share information across the team and to manipulate and

structure information in different ways is fundamental to ADM. It is helpful to have a workspace dedicated

to the ADM effort where the team leaves drawings and other products displayed throughout the ADM effort.

The room has ample wall space for posting work products. It is large enough to enable small group work if

the team determines it is beneficial to have smaller breakout groups working on particular aspects of the

problem set.

2-39. Team leaders organize workspace to facilitate group discussion and collaboration. A room or area where individuals see and hear each other and view the various visual products is ideal. When bringing the

group together to work on an activity, positioning members in a circle or oval facilitates effective dialogue

among members as shown in figure 2-3.

Figure 2-3. Workspace setup

Note: This picture of a typical briefing room arrangement on the left side of figure 2-3 discourages

dialogue. Team members in the front cannot see those in the back, and those in the back have

difficulty participating. The right side of figure 2-3 represents a collaborative setting that promotes

dialogue. In this setup, everyone sees and interacts with each other, including observing physical

reactions and facial expressions. Everyone has an equal place at the table and that signifies

everyone’s contribution is equally important.

2-40. The team shares and displays information, so it is necessary that the team access materials such as whiteboards and butcherblock paper for drawing, structuring, and displaying information. Materials for

consideration include:

 Maps and overlays.

 Whiteboards and butcher block paper.

 Markers and other drawing tools.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 2-9

 Post-it notes of varying sizes and colors.

 Notepads and sketch paper.

 Laptop computer.

 Video teleconferencing capability.

 Projector.

 Audio recorder.

 Camera.

 Command post of the future and other information systems.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 3-1

Chapter 3

Framing Operational Environments

This chapter begins with a description of an operational environment from a general

perspective. Next, this chapter offers an approach for framing an operational

environment. The chapter concludes with several techniques commanders and staffs

use to understand the current state of an operational environment and to visualize a

desired end state.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-1. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). An operational

environment includes physical areas (air, land, maritime, and space domains) and cyberspace. It also includes

the information that shapes conditions in those areas and enemy, friendly, and neutral aspects relevant to

operations. An operational environment is not isolated or independent but interconnected by various

influences (for example, information and economics) from around the globe. No two operational

environments are the same.

3-2. Whether designed to relieve suffering from a natural disaster or to defeat a large enemy force, military operations occur in complex and ever changing operational environments. Complexity describes situations

with many parts and subparts (structural complexity) and the numerous relationships and resulting behaviors

among those parts and subparts (interactive complexity). While aspects of an operational environment are

less complex than other aspects, an operational environment as a whole is both structurally and interactively

complex.

3-3. In addition, an operational environment is not static but evolves and redefines itself in potentially unpredictable ways. This evolution results from humans interacting in an operational environment and from

their ability to learn and adapt. The operational environment changes as people and organizations take action

in an operational environment. Some of these changes are anticipated while others are not. Some changes are

immediate and apparent while other changes are delayed or hidden. The complex and dynamic nature of an

operational environment makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and

contributes to the uncertainty of military operations.

3-4. Commanders and staffs employ systems thinking (see chapter 1) and use the operational variables to help understand, visualize, and describe an operational environment. Operational variables are those aspects

of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that differ from one operational area to another

and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational

environment but also the population’s influence on it. The eight interrelated operational variables are

political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-

PT). The operational variables are broad information categories that help the commander analyze and develop

a comprehensive understanding of an operational environment. The operational variables are information

categories used to describe an operational environment. (See ADRP 5-0 for a more detailed description of

the operational variables and a listing of associated subvariables).

FRAMING ACTIVITIES

3-5. Military operation occurs in a context larger than a unit’s mission. As such, the staff supports commanders in developing a contextual understanding of an operational environment through framing—the

act of constructing models that seek to describe reality. Framing involves selecting, organizing, interpreting,

and making sense of interrelated variables and relevant actors in an operational environment. When framing

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an operational environment, the commander and planning team understand the current state and visualize a

desired future state of an operational environment as shown in figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. Framing an operational environment

3-6. Understanding current conditions and desired future conditions of an operational environment helps commanders identify problems and develop approaches to solve or manage those problems. When framing

an operational environment, the commander and planning team answers questions such as:

 What is going on in an operational environment?

 Why has this situation developed?

 Who are the relevant actors?

 What is causing conflict among relevant actors?

 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant actors?

 Why is the situation (or the projected future situation) undesirable?

 What is the direction and guidance of higher authorities pertaining to the situation?

 What future conditions need to exist for success?

3-7. A product of framing an operational environment is an environmental frame. The environmental frame describes and depicts the context of the operational environment—how the context developed (historical and

cultural perspective), how the context currently exists (current conditions), and how the context could trend

in the future (projected future conditions). The environmental frame also includes a description of what the

operational environment should look like at the conclusion of an operation (desired end state conditions).

Note: As the planning team frames an operational environment, they will identify problems and

think about ways to solve those problems. The team should record these ideas and addresses them

in more detail during problem framing (see chapter 4).

3-8. There is no “one- way” or set of steps for framing an operational environment. There are, however, several activities that help the commander and staff develop an environmental frame including:

 Understand higher guidance and direction.

 Understand the current state of an operational environment.

 Project how an operational environment may trend in the future.

 Discern desired future states of other actors.

 Envision a desired end state.

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UNDERSTAND HIGHER GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION

3-9. Framing an operational environment involves understanding higher guidance and appreciating how higher authorities view the current state and future state of an operational environment. Army forces operate

within the context of a higher headquarters; whether that being a higher Army headquarters or a higher joint

force headquarters. As such, it is essential the commander and staff understand how their higher headquarters

perceives the operational environment, problems, and operational approach.

3-10. To understand higher guidance and direction, the planning team reviews relevant orders, directives, policy documents, written and oral guidance, and estimates of their higher and next higher headquarters.

They study strategic guidance and directives, international mandates, and other products that influence their

operational environment. As the commander and planning team frame their own operational environment,

they may see their operational environment, problems, and approaches to solve those problems differently

than higher headquarters. Commanders question contradictory or ambiguous guidance and directives.

Dialogue up and down the echelons and with unified action partners help work out these differences and help

build shared understanding throughout the planning effort.

UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT STATE OF AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-11. To envision an operational approach to solve problems, the commander and planning team understand those conditions that make up the current state of an operational environment. A condition is a state of

something essential in an operational environment. An example is a three-year drought in an area. Insurgent

control of a certain province is another example. Not only does the team identify current conditions, they

understand how those conditions came to be from a historical and cultural perspective.

3-12. One way to develop an understanding of an operational environment is from a systems perspective (see chapter 1). To develop this systems perspective, the planning team identifies and discerns the

relationships among relevant variables and actors in an operational environment. An actor is an individual or

group in a social network who acts to advance personal interests. Relevant actors include individuals, enemy

forces, states and governments, coalitions, terrorist networks, and criminal organizations. They also include

multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and others able to influence the situation. Once

identified, further research and analysis by the team helps clarify the roles and functions of each actor and

how they relate to other actors and the other variables in an operational environment. (See appendix B for an

example of using a systems approach in framing an operational environment.)

3-13. Building a diagram illustrating relevant actor functions, relationships, and tensions helps the commander and staff to understand an operational environment. Often relationships among actors have many

facets, and these relationships differ depending on the scale of interaction and temporal aspects (history,

duration, type, and frequency). Clarifying the relationships among actors requires intense effort since these

relationships require examination from multiple perspectives.

3-14. Figure 3-2 on page 3-4 is an influence diagram followed by a supporting narrative. This example is a presentation diagram. The purpose of a presentation diagram is to convey the main ideas to individuals

outside of the planning team. Detailed supporting diagrams, backed up by in-depth research, accompanies a

presentation diagram.

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Figure 3-2. Current state of the operational environment

Narrative: The Newland defense force controls the population and provides General E power.

The President provides direction to the Newland defense force to control the society. The people

comply with the direction provided by the President and the Newland defense forces. Those who

do not comply are oppressed. In exchange for sanctuary, the drug cartels provide funding to the

regime. They harass and terrorize the section of the society that opposes the regime. Countries X

and Y provide material capabilities to the Newland defense force and international legitimacy to

the regime. In turn, the regime maintains an anti-U.S. policy stance. Over the last six months, over

100,000 persons fled Newland to Country Z. Country Z provides Newland refugees humanitarian

assistance and protection. Several border clashes have erupted between Newland defense forces

and Country Z in the last three weeks. The antidemocratic dictatorship of Newland oppresses its

people, encourages instability in the region, and supports criminal and terrorist activities is

unacceptable to U.S. interests.

3-15. The environmental frame evolves as the commander and planning team discusses and debates their finding. For example, several questions may arise after the commander and team discuss the environmental

frame. Questions may include:

 What are the other sources of power in Newland beyond General E?

 What are the limits to the drug money provided by the cartels?

 Is the society this homogenous? What are the different groups and divisions in the population?

 What are some of the other key international relationships or interests with Newland?

 Are there limits to military aid provided by Country X and Country Y?

PROJECT HOW AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT MAY TREND

3-16. Part of framing an operational environment results in an appreciation for how an operational environment may trend into the future. An operational environment evolves even in the absence of friendly

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intervention. If no outside actors influence an operational environment, an operational environment will

change due to inherent tendencies in the system. Tendencies reflect an inclination to think or behave in a

certain manner. Tendencies are not deterministic, but models describing the thoughts or behaviors of relevant

actors. Tendencies identify likely patterns of relationships between actors without external influences. The

natural tendencies in an operational environment have the most momentum, and therefore difficult to change.

Tendencies can be positive and encouraged or viewed as obstacles that become the focus for change. Friendly

actions or activities that reinforce (or at least do not conflict with) natural trends may have the best chance to

succeed. Appreciating the natural tendencies in an operational environment better define the desired end state

and develops an operational approach that encourages or changes identified tendencies. Visual models

support this understanding by text capture.

DISCERN DESIRED FUTURE STATES OF OTHER ACTORS

3-17. The planning team describes alternative future states of relevant actors. Other actors affect an operational environment and have different desired end states. For example, the enemy has a desired set of

conditions for the future. These conditions describe their desired end state. Friendly or neutral actors may not

have opposing mindsets, but some of their desired conditions may be different from some of the command’s

desired end state conditions. Further, some desired conditions of other actors converge with the command’s

desired conditions, with a possibility of exploiting this convergence. The team’s understanding of the

differences between alternative future states and the command's desired end state help in problem framing.

The team captures its understanding of alternative future states of relevant actors in various visual models

and narratives.

ENVISION A DESIRED END STATE

3-18. The commander and planning team envision the desired end state based on higher guidance, the current state of an operational environment, and alternative future states of an operational environment. The

operation’s end state is a set of desired conditions that, if achieved, meet the objectives of policy, orders,

guidance, and directives issued to the commander. A desired condition is a sought-after future state of the

operational environment. Conditions are tangible or intangible, military or nonmilitary, or physical or

psychological. They describe or relate to perceptions, cohesion among groups, or relationship between

organizations or individuals. When determining desired end state conditions, the commander and planning

team consider their relevance to higher orders, directives, and guidance. The team also considers available

resources to ensure end state conditions are feasible.

3-19. Time is important when determining desired end state conditions. How time relates to the desired end state influences the expectation of higher authorities and influences how commanders use forces and

capabilities to achieve desired conditions. The commander and planning team use diligence during the

planning effort to account for the time expected to achieve desired conditions. They qualify whether the

desired conditions are intended to be lasting or transient in nature. This temporal dimension helps develop

an effective operational approach and manages expectation.

3-20. Commanders describe the operation’s end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly force in relationship to desired conditions of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. Commanders share and

discusses their desired end state with their higher commander to ensure unity of effort. Commanders may

elect to discuss several proposed end states, and their respective costs, for the higher commander to consider.

Figure 3-3 on page 3-6 provides a sample presentation diagram of the desired end state of Newland followed

by a narrative.

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Figure 3-3. Desired end state

The country of Newland is a friendly democracy that no longer oppresses its people, threatens its

neighbors, or provides sanctuary for criminal and terrorist organizations. The society has replaced

the Newland defense force as the source of power for the democratic government. The Newland

defense force is replaced with an army and navy that serves the society and protects the country

from external aggression. Local and national police forces serve the population by providing law

and order for society. World democracies support the new government by providing legitimacy

and capabilities to the government of Newland and the society. In turn, the new government of

Newland supports the rule of law among nations and human rights.

TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES

3-21. This section offers several tools and techniques that help the planning team with framing operational environments (and problems) including but not limited to:

 Brainstorming, researching, and mind mapping.

 Meta-questioning.

 Questioning of assumptions.

 Four ways of seeing.

BRAINSTORMING, RESEARCHING, AND MIND MAPPING

3-22. A technique for framing an operational environment is through a sequence of brainstorming, researching, and mind mapping. Brainstorming helps the team develop ideas and variables for further

research and analysis. Research helps the team understand identified variables to help the team map out the

relationships and interdependencies among variables in the operational environment. Combined with critical

thinking and continuous dialogue, the result of this technique leads to an in depth understanding of an

operational environment and problems in that operational environment.

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Brainstorming

3-23. Brainstorming develops an initial understanding of the relevant variables and actors in an operational environment. Brainstorming is a group creative thinking technique that uses different perspectives of

individuals in a group to develop and build on ideas. Brainstorming is a thinking tool used to surface a large

quantity of ideas without considering the relative value of each. This group process allows others to build on

initial ideas developed in the brainstorming secession.

Note: As a technique for stimulating new thinking, brainstorming also helps with framing

problems and developing an operational approach.

3-24. A key success in brainstorming is capturing many diverse ideas. Several guides that help reduce inhibition among group members and increase overall group creativity include:

 Allow time for individuals to develop ideas on their own for presentation to the group.

 Focus on quantity of ideas.

 Defer judgment of ideas and withhold criticism.

 Welcome new and unusual ideas.

 Combine and improve upon ideas.

3-25. There are many techniques for brainstorming. The difference between these techniques is the level of structure imposed on the brainstorming session. A less structured technique involves individuals in a group

developing ideas about a subject on their own. Individuals offer their ideas to the group while a note taker

records these ideas on a white board or paper for all to see. This technique is helpful in initial brainstorming

to identify relevant variables and actors in an operational environment.

3-26. A more structured approach involves a divergent thinking phase followed by a convergent phase with associated steps to each phase. The purpose of the divergent thinking phase is to develop and collect new

ideas and insights. This technique follows steps to stimulate thinking. Steps in this phase include:

 Pose a “focal question” to the group. For example, “Why is the insurgent movement gaining

support?” or “What are the sources of power and influence in region X.” Post the focal question

on a white board or large easel with white paper.

 Ask individuals to write down responses to the question using key words that fit on a sticky note.

 Stick all the notes on a white board, wall, or paper for all to see—treat all ideas the same.

 Allow for a pause after the initial flow of ideas and ask individuals to add new responses to the

question and post their answers.

 End the collection stage of ideas after two or three pauses.

3-27. A convergent phase follows the divergent phase that uses a technique known as affinity mapping. The purpose of the convergent phase is to arrange ideas identified into logical groups. For example, figure 3-4 on

page 3-8 groups ideas by recruiting, financing, and training. This includes:

 Asking group participants to arrange the sticky notes according to their commonalities or similar

concepts. The group may also copy some notes so ideas can be included in more than one group.

 Selecting a word or phrase that characterizes each grouping or cluster of notes.

 Identifying any notes that do not fit with others and consider them either not relevant or the

beginning of an idea that deserves further attention.

 Assess what the group has accomplished in terms of new ideas or concepts identified or new areas

that need more research.

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Figure 3-4. Brainstorming

Researching

3-28. Understanding an operational environment requires detailed research and study. Effective planning teams use the results of brainstorming to guide deliberate research of identified variables and actors. Research

can be a challenge if members of the planning team have not researched since graduating from civilian

schools. Team leaders should leverage those individuals skilled at research. For example, intelligence

analysts and civil affairs specialists have good research skills. Research skills are developed and sustained.

These skills include:

 Breadth.

 Depth.

 Description, explanation and meaning.

 Form, function, logic.

 Iteration.

Breadth

3-29. For research to be comprehensive, it must be broad. The team leader forms research teams when framing an operational environment to collect as much information as possible in the shortest amount of time.

An approach is to divide the planning team into two-person groups and assign each pair a set number of

categories, ideally related in some way. The pair researches each category and collects papers, briefings, and

videos and presents their findings during group dialogue sessions. Researchers consult with subject matter

experts external to the organization to better understand the context and extend the breadth of understanding.

Team members research additional categories that emerge during group sessions.

Depth

3-30. Researchers explore each category identified. Researchers consider multiple sources from many governmental, academic, corporate, public and private viewpoints. An internet search reveals relevant books,

papers, journals, newspapers, speeches, documentaries, and databases on a subject. In addition, subject matter

experts extend the depth of understanding of the research team. For example, a human terrain team that served

in the unit’s anticipated area of operations (AO) could provide detailed knowledge of the social, tribal, and

cultural factors in that area.

3-31. The more sources employed, the more in depth and reliable the research becomes. Sources are classified, unclassified, or open-source. Research note that unclassified and open-source information may be

more informative than classified information. To evaluate source credibility, researchers note the authors of

their respective documents; author known biases, and the publication dates of the sources. (See ATP 2-22.9,

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 3-9

Open-Source Intelligence, for various research techniques using open-sources and a detailed listing of

available open-sources).

3-32. One of the major factors that affect depth and breadth of the research is time. Effective research takes time. Time is a precious commodity in any problem solving or planning endeavor. It is important that

planning team leaders allocate enough time for research.

Description, Explanation and Meaning

3-33. Researchers are not content with collecting data and information. Research determines what the data and information means to the organization. Description, explanation, and meaning together lead to

understanding. Description provides an articulation of “what” is going on in a situation. Explanation

describes “how” something works and meaning explains “why” something is of particular value and

importance to the planning team. An accurate expression of description, explanation, and meaning helps the

commander and staff make sense of a situation.

3-34. Accurate expression requires analysis. This analysis is to ascribe and validate meaning. Individuals get to meaning through critical thinking and the application of deductive, inductive, and abductive logic to derive

an explanation for why the data or information obtained is the way it is. Using deductive reasoning, the

researcher draws conclusion from general rules or premises. In deductive reasoning, if all premises are true

and the rules of deductive logic are followed, then the conclusion is valid. In contrast to deductive reasoning,

inductive reasoning draws conclusion from examples or evidence. In inductive reasoning, premises supply

strong evidence for (not absolute proof of) the truth of the conclusion. The truth of an inductive argument is

probable based upon the evidence given.

3-35. Many are familiar with deductive and inductive reasoning, but less familiar with abductive reasoning. Abductive reasoning starts with a set of observations (often incomplete) and proceeds with developing to the

likeliest possible explanation for the set. Using abductive logic, individuals form a hypothesis of what the

various observations mean. A hypothesis is a proposed explanation of a phenomenon (for example, an

explanation of the causes of a conflict or problem). If further research does not support the hypothesis, another

hypothesis is formed and the reasoning continues until there is a conclusion.

3-36. Using the three types of reasoning, research teams answer the critical questions for their topics. For example, why are the drug cartels fighting each other and why are the insurgents moving back into a river

valley? There may be more than one explanation. The team considers each explanation until there is a reason

to discard that explanation. Developing these explanations facilitates meaningful and effective

decisionmaking. In developing these explanations, team members are aware that their thinking is biased and

prone to various logic errors. A way to guard against these bias and logic fallacies is first being aware of

them. Appendix A provides a listing of the more common cognitive biases and logic fallacies to guard against.

3-37. Achieving understanding of the meaning of observed data and information is the goal of research. Individuals or small groups that perform research achieve understanding through a clear articulation of the

description, explanation, and meaning of observed phenomena.

Form, Function, Logic

3-38. Researchers, whether operating individually or in small groups, think beyond what they see. Data or information describes the form (patterns and relationships) of what is observed. For example, research may

reveal three components of a terrorist cell. Researchers move beyond form to discover the function of what

they observe. What does the terrorist cell component do? How do they operate? What function do they

perform? What was the logic that guided the linkage of form and function or was the logic externally driven

by some other considerations? Perhaps one of the components of the terrorist cell provides a position for a

favorite son and has nothing to do with what the component does. The planning team understands the

relationship of the form, function, and logic of the relationships that create the component of each category.

Iteration

3-39. One pass through a research and synthesis cycle is not sufficient to understand a topic. After initial research and dialogue, the planning team cycles back through the research effort as many times as it takes to

achieve understanding for the organization. Some research is refined, some expanded to cover new topics in

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a category, some new categories will emerge, and some information will need to be confirmed or conflicts

in available information resolved. The planning team performs as many iterations as necessary to fill in the

gaps in knowledge, and deliberately correlate and validate information through both analysis and synthesis

to improve understanding as time permits.

Mind Mapping

3-40. Mind mapping is a technique for discerning and depicting the relationships of relevant variables and actors in an operational environment and problem. Mind mapping begins with a single idea or topic

represented in the center of a white board or paper (for example insurgent recruitment). The planning team

writes out secondary ideas and words associated to insurgent recruitment. The team uses lines, symbols,

pictures, and colors to show relationships. Examples of secondary ideas associated to “insurgent recruitment”

may include:

 Poverty and unemployment.

 Corruption and bad governance.

 Criminality.

 Ethnic factors.

 Civilian casualties.

3-41. The planning team may draw further relationships with criminality including the drug trade, money laundering, and extortion as shown in figure 3-5 on page 3-11. As they continue to map out relationships, the

planning team finds a relationship of poverty and unemployment with cultivation and production of illegal

narcotics (subcategories under criminality). They find a linkage among corrupt political leaders and the drug

trade through bribery and the facilitation of money laundering. The planning team refines various mind maps

and develops associated narratives for them to describe their understanding of the operational environment

and problems.

Meta-questioning

3-42. The use of disciplined questions or meta-questions helps commanders and staffs probe their own and others’ thinking during ADM and throughout the operations process. Meta-questioning is a critical thinking

skill that enables a more complete understanding of a topic by asking higher order questions. A way to

understand the concept of meta-questioning is by thinking of the different views one gets from different levels

of a ladder. An individual’s view is somewhat restricted when standing next to a ladder. As the individual

takes a few steps up the rungs of the ladder, the view becomes broader. This is true of meta-questions. As

individuals and groups ask and answer successively higher order questions, their understanding becomes

more comprehensive.

3-43. Meta-questions probe into complex issues that help get at the true qualities of the problem rather than superficial qualities. These higher order questions explore ideas, understand problems, and uncover

assumptions. They help challenge claims or premises by revealing a contradiction or internal inconsistency

in logic. Examples of questions that probe reasons and evidence include the following:

 Why did it happen?

 Why was it true?

 How does X relate to Y?

 All reasoning depends on the idea that X is the source of conflict. Why is reasoning based on X

instead of Y?

 Are there other possibilities?

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Figure 3-5. Mind map

Questioning Assumptions

3-44. An assumption is a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander

in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action

(JP 5-0). An assumption is true in the absence of actions or information contradicting it. Assumptions are

probably correct but cannot be verified at the time made. An assumption used during planning has two

characteristics:

 It is likely to be true.

 It is necessary to continue planning.

3-45. Assumptions are logical and reflect the reality of the situation. Commanders and staffs are careful with their assumptions to ensure they are not based on preconceptions, bias, false historical analogies, or wishful

thinking. Additionally, planners are aware of any unstated assumptions. Often, an unstated assumption is

more dangerous than a stated assumption proven wrong. Good assumptions support effective decision-

making and problem solving. Conversely, if assumptions are unsupportable or based on faulty reasoning or

knowledge, they result in poor decision-making and problem solving.

3-46. Commanders and staffs question whether their assumptions are valid throughout planning and the operations process. Key points concerning the use of assumptions include:

 Assumptions are logical, realistic, and considered likely to be true.

 Too many assumptions result in a higher probability that the plan or proposed solution may be

invalid.

 The use of assumptions requires the staff to develop branches and sequels to execute if one or

more key assumptions prove false.

3-47. The planning team develops assumptions in the lack of factual evidence as they frame an operational environment and problems. Planning teams record their assumptions and challenge them while planning.

Some key questions to help challenge assumptions include:

 Why must this assumption “be true”?

 How much confidence exists that this assumption is true?

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 What is the explanation for the degree of confidence for this assumption to be true?

 Could the assumption have been true in the past but less so now?

 If the assumption proves to be wrong, would it alter the line of thinking?

 Has checking assumptions identified new factors that need future analysis?

 What circumstance or information might underline this assumption?

3-48. The planning team works on these questions as a group, assigns a subteam to work on these questions, or solicits support from the unit’s red team to help with challenging assumptions.

Four Ways of Seeing

3-49. To develop a richer understanding of an operational environment and problems, it is helpful for the planning team to examine the situation from the perspectives of other actors in the operational environment.

For example:

 How does an enemy view the causes of conflict?

 What are the goals of the enemy force in an area?

 How does the enemy force perceive the goals of coalition forces in the area?

3-50. Four ways of seeing is a technique available to planning teams to develop and compare how other actors in an operational environment view a situation or problem. In four ways of seeing, the planning team

answers the following questions of actors represented as X and Y.

 How does X view itself?

 How does Y view itself?

 How does X view Y?

 How does Y view X?

3-51. Four ways of seeing is a flexible tool. The planning team can compare the friendly force with an enemy force or other actors or compare multiple actors with each other.

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 4-1

Chapter 4

Framing Problems

This chapter begins with a general discussion of problems. Next, this chapter describes

activities associated with problem framing. The chapter concludes with techniques

used in framing problems.

NATURE OF PROBLEMS

4-1. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. In a broad sense, a problem exists when an individual notices a difference between the current state and desired

end state. In the context of operations, an operational problem is a discrepancy between the state of affairs as

it is and the state of affairs as it ought to be that compels military actions to resolve it. An operational problem

includes those issues that impede commanders from accomplishing missions, achieving objectives, and

attaining the desired end state.

4-2. Army leaders are problem solvers and the complexity of problems they address range from well- structured problems to those extremely complex and ill-structured. The degree of interactive complexity (see

chapter 3) of a given situation is the primary factor that determines the problem’s structure. Another factor

determining problem structure is an individual perception of a problem. Perception of whether a problem is

well, medium, or ill-structured depends on the perceived familiarity and understanding of the problem. Table

4-1 describes three types of problems and offers potential solution strategies for each one.

Table 4-1. Types of problems and solution strategies

Well-structured Medium-structured Ill-structured

Perception The problem is self-evident.

Leaders easily agree on its structure.

Leaders have difficulty agreeing on problem structure and will have to agree on a shared hypothesis.

Solution development

Solution techniques are available and there are verifiable solutions.

There may be more than one “right” answer. Leaders may disagree on the best solution. Leaders can agree on a desired end state.

Leaders will disagree on—

 How the problem can be solved.

 The most desirable end state.

 Whether the end state can be attained.

Execution of solution

Success requires learning to perfect technique.

Success requires learning to perfect techniques and to adjust the solution.

Success requires learning to perfect technique, adjust the solution, and continuously refine understanding of the problem.

Adaptive iteration

No adaptive iteration required.

Adaptive iteration is required to find the best solution.

Adaptive iteration is required to refine the problem structure and solutions.

WELL-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS

4-3. Well-structured problems are easy to identify because required information is available. In addition, known methods (for example a math formula) are available to solve these types of problems. While difficult

to solve, well-structured problems display little interactive complexity and have verifiable solutions. Most

individuals are comfortable addressing well-structured problems. Such problems are easy to control through

technical means and systematic method-based solutions. The types of problems are easier to recognize and

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place in categories. For example, Army doctrine provides tasks, conditions, and standards for problems

ranging from tank gunnery to performing a movement to contact. The most structured problems, tank gunnery

for example, have one correct solution. Success in gunnery requires learning to perfect the established

technique.

MEDIUM-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS

4-4. Medium-structured problems are more interactively complex than well-structured problems. For example, a field manual describes how a combined arms battalion performs a defense, but it offers no single

solution that applies to all circumstances. Leaders can agree on the problem and the end state for the

operation. However, they may disagree about how to apply the doctrinal principles to a piece of terrain against

an enemy. Furthermore, a defense may succeed against one enemy yet fail against another under the same

circumstances. Success and failure differs as a function of interactive complexity or technical difference

between the two enemy forces. Success during execution requires not only learning to perfect a technique

but also adjusting the solution based on changing conditions.

ILL-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS

4-5. Ill-structured problems are complex, nonlinear, and dynamic. These problems are the most challenging to understand and solve. Unlike well or medium-structured problems, leaders disagree about how to solve

ill-structured problems, what the end state should be, and whether the desired end state is achievable. At the

root of this lack of consensus is the difficulty in agreeing on what is the problem. Unlike medium-structured

problems, there is no clear action to take because the nature of the problem itself is not clear. Classic examples

of ill-structured problems include social issues like crime, racism, and poverty and military operations as a

whole. ADM helps commanders and staffs identify and understand ill-structured problems.

FRAMING ACTIVITIES

4-6. Identifying and understanding problems is essential to solving them. As the planning team understands an operational environment and the desired end state, the planning team shifts their efforts to identifying and

understanding those issues that may impede progress toward achieving the desired end state. These

interrelated issues represent the problem situation or “system of problems” the command will need to address.

During problem framing, commanders and staffs answer questions such as:

 What is the difference between the current state of an operational environment and the desired end

state?

 What is the difference between the natural tendency of an operational environment and the desired

end state?

 What is the difference between the desired end state of other actors and the desired end state?

 What is preventing the command from reaching the desired end state?

 What needs to change?

 What does not need to change?

 What are the opportunities and threats from a friendly perspective?

 What are the opportunities and threats from an enemy and other actor’s perspective?

4-7. The planning team captures its work in a problem frame that describes the set of interrelated problems or system of problems in a narrative supported by visual models. The problem frame supports the

commander’s dialogue with higher commanders and unified action partners in defining problems and

developing common expectations regarding resolution. This is vital to develop an effective operational

approach to solve or manage identified problems.

4-8. Like framing an operational environment, there is no “one way” or set of steps for framing problems. There are three activities that help the commander and staff develop a problem frame.

 Review the environmental frame.

 Identify problems and map out their relationships.

 Capture the problem frame in text and graphics.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 4-3

REVIEW ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME

4-9. The problem frame is an extension of the environment frame as shown in figure 4-1. As such, the planning team begins framing the problem by reviewing the environmental frame. The team reviews the

following:

 Current state of the operational environment.

 Projections on how an operational environment may trend in the future.

 Desired future states of other actors.

 Desired end state.

 Problems identified during earlier design sessions.

Figure 4-1. Problem frame

IDENTIFY PROBLEMS AND MAP OUT THEIR RELATIONSHIPS

4-10. The goal of problem framing is to identify obstacles impeding progress toward achieving the desired end state. Effective commanders and planning teams recognize that no problem is solved in isolation, but set

in relation to other problems in an operational environment. Rarely is there a single problem facing the

command. For example, a unit tasked to neutralize insurgents, enable the host nation government to expand

its influence, and create a capable security force in an area of operations (AO) may be faced with the

following interrelated problems:

 Lack of resolve of the host nation’s security force to professionalize and win.

 Host nation security force systems (logistics, personnel, pay) are not functional.

 Host nation security force leadership is incompetent.

 Effective insurgent resistance.

 Lack of intelligence.

 Civilian casualties.

 Population’s lack of trust of coalition forces.

 Lack of commitment of the central government to the area.

 Corruption at the district and provincial level beyond the limit of tolerance.

 Security along main supply route.

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 The size of the AO.

 Task assigned versus troops available.

 Rotation schedule of higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.

 Limited unity of effort among some unified action partners.

4-11. A technique for identifying problems begins with two questions:

 What is the difference between the current state of the operational environment and the desired

state?

 What is preventing the force from reaching the desired end state?

4-12. The team identifies the differences between the desired end state and alternative future states (the natural tendency of an operational environment and desired end states conditions of other actors). These

differences are tensions—resistance or friction among and between actors. Combined, these tensions

represent the system of problems requiring resolution. In addition to identifying differences, the planning

team identifies any shared desired conditions among alternative future states and the friendly end state.

Shared desired conditions represent opportunities to leverage and consider when developing the operational

approach.

4-13. To help understand the system of problems, it is helpful to map the relationships of the problems identified (see chapter 3 for a discussion on mind mapping). Part of this mapping is explaining the causes or

contributors to the problem. For example, team members identify that a certain population group has a history

of not participating in the election process. While useful information in itself, the planning team understands

and explains why the group does not participate. As the planning team maps out the various problems and

related causes, they see that some of the issues are symptoms of a bigger issue. In addition, the team discerns

that some problems are outside the scope of their mission. Mapping helps isolate the root cause of problems

that the operational approach must address.

DEVELOP A PROBLEM FRAME

4-14. The planning team captures its work in a problem frame that describes the set of interrelated issues in a narrative supported by visual models. The problem frame identifies those issues preventing the command

from achieving its desired end state. The problem frame supports the commander’s dialogue with higher

commanders and unified action partners by defining the problem situation. This is an example of an initial

problem narrative based on the Newland scenario from chapter 3.

The Newland defense force is impeding the establishment of a democratic government in

Newland and the primary factor of instability in the region. For more than forty years, the

Newland defense force maintained power for itself and the regime by oppressing all opposition

in society. In addition, the Newland defense force has a history of intimidating Country Z

through force (both overtly and covertly). Corruption in the Newland defense force is rampant in

the leadership, and it has close ties to several drug cartels. General E is the latest of two dictators

emerging from the Newland defense force. Even if General E is removed from power, the

potential of a new dictator emerging from the Newland defense force is likely. There is no

indication that the leadership of the Newland defense force is willing to relinquish its power in

Newland.

4-15. The initial problem narrative develops as the commander and staff learn more about the operational environment and develop an operational approach. For example, the oppressive nature of the Newland

defense force is a significant issue, but not the only one. After discussing the problem narrative with the

commander and others, the planning team expands the narrative including problems associated with:

 Developing a democratic government.

 Potential for civil conflict.

 Reform and transformation of the armed forces.

 Influence of countries X and Y.

 Power and influence of the drug cartels.

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TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES

4-16. The tools and techniques used to frame an operational environment (see Chapter 3) also help frame problems including:

 Brainstorming

 Mind mapping.

 Meta-questioning.

 Questioning assumptions.

 Four ways of seeing.

4-17. Problem restatement is a technique that helps the planning team with framing problems. Before developing an operational approach, the commander and planning team spends some time discussing and

examining the results of the problem frame. How the command frames the problem situation directly affects

possible solutions. Poor problem framing leads to solutions that may not solve the real issues at hand. Poorly

framed problems:

 Are too vague or broad in definition.

 Are too narrow in definition.

 Contain inherent assumptions.

 Contain a presumed solution.

4-18. Problem restatement includes several activities related to the “proposed problem narrative” in a divergent thinking mode. The following activities lead to an alternative perspective to improve the problem

narrative:

 Paraphrase the problem situation—restate it using different words without losing the original

meaning. Saying the same thing with different words puts a different spin on the meaning, which

triggers new perspectives and informative insights.

 Turn the problem situation on its head by stating it in an opposite manner. This provides a different

perspective to consider the problem.

 Broaden the focus—restate the problem situation in a larger context. This reveals a narrowly

defined problem narrative.

 Redirect the focus—boldly, consciously change the focus of portions of the problem narrative. If

the original focus concerned troops available, look at the situation in terms of number of tasks.

This task involves looking for unexamined variables affecting the problem frame.

 Ask “Why?” Formulate a “why” to the issues identified in the problem narrative, answer them,

and do it again. Performing this activity may reveal insights obscured during previous framing

activities.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 5-1

Chapter 5

Framing Solutions

This chapter defines an operational approach and describes its purpose. Next, this

chapter describes activities associated with developing an operational approach. The

chapter concludes with techniques for documenting the results of ADM and

transitioning to detailed planning.

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

5-1. Once commanders and planners agree on the problem or set of problems, they develop ways to address them. They do this by developing an operational approach—a description of the broad actions the force must

take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 5-0). An operational approach is the

commander’s visualization of what needs to be done to solve or manage identified problems. It is the main

idea that informs detailed planning. The operational approach promotes mutual understanding and unity of

effort between the force and unified action partner on the way ahead.

5-2. The operational approach reflects understanding of the operational environment and the problem while describing the commander’s visualization of ways to achieve the desired end state as shown in figure 5-1.

The operational approach accounts for higher direction, describes required resources in general terms, and

identifies risk. Commanders, supported by their planning teams, describe their operational approach in a

narrative supported by graphics.

Figure 5-1. Operational approach

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Note: An operational approach is not a course of action—a scheme developed to accomplish a

mission (JP 5-0). An operational approach provides focus and boundaries for the development of

courses of action during the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). A course of action is more

detailed than an operational approach, including details such as task organization, unit boundaries,

and tasks to accomplish. (See FM 6-0 for more details on developing courses of action).

5-3. The operational approach is a conceptualization of “what needs to be done” to solve or manage identified problems. Like the other activities of ADM, commanders collaborate and dialogue with their staffs,

other commanders, and unified action partners as they formulate their operational approach. In developing

their operational approach, the commander and planning team synthesize early work concerning the

operational environment, problem, and desired end state and seek to answer questions such as:

 How do we go from the existing conditions to the desired end state?

 What obstacles or tensions exist between the two?

 What broad actions help attain these conditions?

 What type of resources are required?

 What are the risks?

ACTIVITIES

5-4. As with the other activities of ADM, there is no prescribed format for developing an operational approach. Several activities help the commander and staffs develop an operational approach and translate

that operational approach into a plan or order for execution. Activities include:

 Review the environmental and problem frames.

 Formulate an operational approach.

 Document results.

REVIEW THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND PROBLEM FRAMES

5-5. The commander describes the current state of the operational environment and how the operational environment looks when operations conclude (desired end state) to visualize an approach. As such, the

commander and planning team review their understanding of the operational environment. Commanders and

staffs review conditions that make up the desired end state and those obstacles or tensions that impede the

force from achieving that end state. They review their understanding of the enemy’s desired end state and

desired future states of unified action partners and other actors.

FORMULATE AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH

5-6. While there is no prescribed set of steps to develop an operational approach, the commander and planning team use the elements of operational art to formulate their operational approach. Earlier in ADM,

the planning team considered end state conditions. When formulating an operational approach, the

commander and planning team consider center of gravity, decisive points, objectives, line of operations, and

phasing. The following activities help the commanders and staffs apply the elements of operational art when

formulating an operational approach:

 Determine enemy and friendly center of gravity.

 Identify decisive points.

 Determine a direct or indirect approach.

 Establish objectives and devise lines of operations and lines of effort.

 Refine the operational approach.

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Center of Gravity

5-7. As an element of operational art, the center of gravity construct helps the planning team understand friendly, enemy, and other actors’ sources of strength in an operational environment. A center of gravity is

the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). Centers

of gravity are not limited to military forces and are either physical or moral. Physical centers of gravity, such

as a capital city or military force, are easier to identify. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible

and more difficult to influence. They can include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, religious

tradition, tribal influence, or strong-willed populace. Military means alone are often ineffective when

changing moral centers of gravity. Affecting them requires the collective, integrated efforts of all unified

action partners.

5-8. A technique for analyzing centers of gravity (enemy, friendly, and other actors) is a framework of three critical factors—capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. Critical capabilities enable a friendly, enemy,

or other actor to accomplish its objective(s). Critical requirements are the conditions, resources, and means

associated to a critical capability. Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of critical

requirements that are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or

significant results. Center of gravity analysis helps the commander and planning team determine ways to

undermine enemy strengths by exploiting enemy vulnerabilities while protecting friendly vulnerabilities from

enemies attempting to do the same. In addition, understanding the relationship among a center of gravity’s

critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities helps the team identify decisive points. See JP 5-0, and

JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, for a more detailed discussion of

center of gravity analysis.

Identify Decisive Points

5-9. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving

success (JP 5-0). Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are keys to attacking or protecting them.

Some decisive points are geographic. Examples include port facilities, distribution networks and nodes, and

bases of operations. Events and elements of an enemy force are decisive points. Examples of these events

include commitment of the enemy operational reserve or reopening a major oil refinery. A common

characteristic of decisive points is their importance to a center of gravity. A decisive point’s importance

requires the enemy to commit significant resources to defend it. The loss of a decisive point weakens a center

of gravity and may expose more decisive points.

5-10. Decisive points have a different character during operations dominated by stability or defense support of civil authorities. These decisive points are less tangible and associated with important events and

conditions. Examples include—

 Repairing a vital water treatment facility.

 Establishing a training academy for national security forces.

 Securing an election.

 Quantifiably reducing crime.

 Protecting property.

5-11. None of these examples is purely physical. Nonetheless, any may be vital to establishing conditions for transitioning to civil authority.

Determine a Direct or Indirect Approach

5-12. Based on an understanding of centers of gravity and decisive points, the commander and staff consider an approach to contend with a center of gravity. There are two approaches—direct or indirect. The direct

approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity or principal strength by applying combat power directly

against it. However, centers of gravity are well protected and not vulnerable to a direct approach. Thus,

commanders often choose an indirect approach. The indirect approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity

by applying combat power against a series of decisive points while avoiding enemy strength. Both approaches

use combinations of defeat or stability mechanisms, depending on the situation. Defeat and stability

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mechanisms are not tactical missions; rather, these mechanisms describe broad operational and tactical

effects.

Defeat Mechanisms

5-13. A defeat mechanism is the method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition (ADRP 3-0). A defeat mechanism is described in terms of the physical or psychological

effects it produces. Physical defeat deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims; psychological

defeat deprives them of the will to do so. Army forces are most successful when applying focused

combinations of defeat mechanisms. This produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable

with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves results proportional to the effort

expended. Used in combination, the effects are synergistic and lasting. Army forces at all echelons use

combinations of four defeat mechanisms:

 Destroy.

 Dislocate.

 Disintegrate.

 Isolate.

5-14. Destroy means to apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that it no longer performs any function and cannot be restored to a usable condition without rebuilding. The most effective way to destroy

enemy capabilities is with a single, decisive attack. When the necessary combat power is not massed

simultaneously, commanders apply it sequentially. This approach is called attrition. It defeats the enemy by

maintaining the highest possible rate of destruction over time.

5-15. Destruction may not force the enemy to surrender; well-disciplined forces and those able to reconstitute endure heavy losses without giving up. Defeat cannot be measured by terms of destruction. This is true when

criteria focus on narrow metrics, such as casualties, equipment destroyed, or perceived enemy strength.

Destruction is difficult to assess if friendly forces apply force indiscriminately. The effects of destruction are

transitory unless combined with isolation and dislocation.

5-16. Dislocate means to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s disposition less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. It makes the enemy expose forces by reacting to the

dislocating action. Dislocation requires the enemy commander to make a choice: accept neutralization of part

of their force or risk its destruction while repositioning. Turning movements and envelopments produce

dislocation. When combined with destruction, dislocation contributes to rapid success.

5-17. Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading the ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight. It exploits

the effects of dislocation and destruction to shatter the enemy’s coherence. Typically, disintegration follows

the loss of capabilities that enemy commanders use to develop and maintain situational understanding,

coupled with destruction and dislocation. Simultaneous operations produce the strongest disintegrative

effects. Disintegration is difficult to achieve; however, prolonged isolation, destruction, and dislocation can

produce it.

5-18. Isolate means to deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action. Isolation limits the enemy’s ability to perform

operations effectively by marginalizing one or more of these capabilities. It exposes the enemy to continued

degradation through the massed effects of the other defeat mechanisms. There are two types of isolation:

 Physical isolation, which is difficult to achieve but easier to assess. An isolated enemy loses

freedom of movement and access to support.

 Psychological isolation, which, while difficult to assess, is an enabler of disintegration. The most

important indicators include the breakdown of enemy morale and the alienation of a population

from the enemy.

5-19. Isolation rarely defeats an enemy. However, it complements and reinforces other defeat mechanisms’ effects. Offensive tasks focus on destroying personnel and equipment. They use maneuver to dislocate forces.

However, these effects multiply when combined with isolating the enemy from sources of physical and moral

support.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 5-5

Stability Mechanisms

5-20. A stability mechanism is the primary method where friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADRP 3-0). As with defeat mechanisms,

combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the

mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. The four stability mechanisms

are—

 Compel.

 Control.

 Influence.

 Support.

5-21. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. The appropriate and

discriminate use of lethal force reinforces efforts to stabilize a situation, gain consent, or ensure compliance.

Conversely, misusing force can adversely affect an operation’s legitimacy. Legitimacy is essential to

producing effective compliance. Compliance depends on how the local populace and others perceive the

force’s ability to exercise lethal force to accomplish the mission.

5-22. In the context of stability, control means imposing civil order. It includes securing borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals. It also involves physically occupying key terrain and

facilities. Control includes activities related to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as

security sector reform.

5-23. Influence means to alter the opinions and attitudes of a civilian population. It changes behaviors through nonlethal means. Influence is a product of public perception as a measure of operational success. It

reflects the ability of friendly forces to operate in the cultural and societal norms of the local populace while

accomplishing the mission. Influence requires legitimacy. Developing legitimacy requires time, patience, and

coordinated, cooperative efforts across the operational area.

5-24. Support means establishing, reinforcing, or setting the conditions necessary for other instruments of national power to function effectively. It requires coordination and cooperation with civilian agencies as they

assess the immediate needs of failed or failing states and plan, prepare for, or execute responses to them. In

extreme circumstances, support requires committing considerable resources for a protracted period. This

commitment involves establishing or reestablishing the institutions required for normal life. These typically

include a legitimate civil authority, market economy, and criminal justice system supported by government

institutions for health, education, and civil service.

ESTABLISH OBJECTIVES AND DEVISE LINES OF OPERATIONS AND LINES OF EFFORT

5-25. Normally, there are far more decisive points in a given operational area that can be attacked, seized, retained, controlled, or protected by available forces and capabilities. Accordingly, planners study and

analyze decisive points and determine which offer the best opportunity to attack the adversary’s center of

gravity, extend friendly operational reach, or enable the application of friendly forces and capabilities. The

art of planning includes selecting decisive points that best lead to creating end state conditions in a sequence

that most quickly and efficiently leads to mission success. Once identified for action, decisive points become

objectives. An objective can be physical (an enemy force or a terrain feature) or conceptual as a goal (rule of

law established). Combined with end state conditions, objectives form the building blocks for developing

lines of operation and lines of effort.

5-26. Commanders and the planning team devise lines of operations and lines of effort to link objectives in time, space, and purpose to attaining desired end state conditions as shown in figure 5-2 on page 5-6.

Commanders describe their operational approach along lines of operations, lines of effort, or a combination

of both. Commanders at all levels may use lines of operations and lines of effort to develop tasks to

subordinate units and allocate resources. Commanders designate one line as the decisive operation and others

as shaping operations. Commanders synchronize and sequence related actions along multiple lines. Seeing

these relationships helps commanders assess progress toward achieving the end state as forces perform tasks

and accomplish missions.

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Figure 5-2. Sample line of effort and line of operation

5-27. A line of operations is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and that links the force with its base of operations and objectives (ADRP 3-0). Lines

of operations connect a series of actions that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective.

Operations designed using lines of operations include a series of actions executed according to a well-defined

sequence.

5-28. A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions (ADRP 3-0). Commanders

describe their operational approach through lines of effort when positional references to an enemy or

adversary have little relevance. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort are the only

way to link tasks to the end state.

5-29. Commanders use lines of operations and lines of effort to connect objectives to a central, unifying purpose. The difference between lines of operations and lines of effort is that lines of operations are oriented

on physical linkages while lines of effort are oriented on logical linkages. While largely conceptual in nature

during this stage of planning, commanders and planners develop lines of operation and lines of effort with

an appreciation for required resources to execute the operational approach.

REFINE THE OPERATIONAL APPROACH

5-30. While an operational approach is broad in nature, it describes the commander’s visualization in time, space, and purpose. It also addresses resources required to support the operational approach and identify risk.

After forming a framework for the operational approach using lines of operations and lines of effort,

commanders and planning teams consider additional elements of operational art to refine the operational

approach. Additional elements of operational art to consider include:

 Operational reach, basing, and culmination.

 Tempo.

 Phasing and transitions.

 Risk.

Operational Reach, Basing, and Culmination

5-31. Commanders and the planning team develop the operational approach in anticipated resource constraints considered in framing an operational environment. To help visualize ways to sustain and protect

the force, the commander and planning team consider operational reach, basing, and culmination.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 5-7

5-32. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ its capabilities. The skillful positioning of forces, reserves, bases, and equipment extend operational reach.

Although reach might be constrained or limited by the geography, the enemy, and adversaries in and around

an operational area, reach is extended by—

 Forward positioning of capabilities and resources.

 Increasing the range and effectiveness of weapons systems.

 Leveraging host nation support and contract support.

5-33. Basing, in the broadest sense, is an indispensable part of operational art. It is tied to lines of operations and affects operational reach. In particular, the arrangement and positioning of bases in an operational area

underwrites the ability of the force to protect its components from enemy action while expanding the distance

and duration of capabilities. Commanders consider bases and base camps as intermediate staging bases,

lodgments (subsequently developed into base camps or potentially bases), and forward operating bases as

part of the operational approach.

5-34. Commanders consider culmination when developing their operational approach and visualizing resources to support it. A culminating point is that point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses

the capability to continue its current form of operations (ADRP 3-0). Culmination means a shift in relative

combat power. It is relevant to both attackers and defenders at each level of war. While conducting offensive

tasks, the culminating point occurs when the force cannot continue the attack and assumes a defensive posture

or executes an operational pause. While conducting defensive tasks, it occurs when the force cannot defend

itself and withdraws or risks destruction. The culminating point is difficult to identify when forces conduct

stability tasks. Two conditions result in culmination: units being too dispersed to secure an area of operations

(AO) or units lacking resources to achieve the end state.

Tempo

5-35. Tempo is another element to consider when developing an operational approach. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADRP 3-0). Tempo reflects

the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders keep the initiative during combat operations

or establish a sense of normalcy during humanitarian crises. During operations dominated by offensive and

defensive tasks, commanders maintain a higher tempo than the enemy does; a rapid tempo overwhelms an

enemy’s ability to counter friendly actions. It is the key to achieving a temporal advantage during operations.

During operations dominated by stability tasks, commanders control events and deny the enemy positions of

advantage. By acting faster than the situation deteriorates, commanders change the dynamics of a crisis and

restore stability.

5-36. Army forces expend more energy and resources when operating at a high tempo. Commanders assess the force’s capacity to operate at a higher tempo based on its performance and available resources. An

effective operational approach varies tempo throughout an operation to increase endurance while maintaining

appropriate speed and momentum.

Phasing and Transition

5-37. The ability Army forces to extend operations in time and space, coupled with a desire to dictate tempo, presents commanders with more objectives than the force can engage simultaneously. This requires

commanders and staffs to consider sequencing operations. Commanders do this by phasing an operation. A

phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADRP 3-0). A

change in phase involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement.

5-38. Phasing extends operational reach. Only when the force lacks the capability to accomplish the mission in a single action do commanders phase the operation. Each phase should—

 Focus effort.

 Concentrate combat power in time and space at a decisive point.

 Accomplish its objectives deliberately and logically.

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5-39. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities between the core competencies or among offensive, defensive,

stability, and defense support of civil authorities tasks involve a transition. Transitions require planning and

preparation before execution to maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. The force is vulnerable

during transitions and commanders establish clear conditions for execution.

Risk

5-40. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. During ADM, it is important for commanders, supported by their staffs, to identify and communicate risk to mission accomplishment. Part of

developing an operational approach includes answering the question, “What is the chance of failure or

unacceptable consequences in employing the operational approach?” Risks range from resource shortfalls to

an approach that alienates a potential friendly actor. Commanders and staffs evaluate assumptions to develop

the operational environment as potential areas of risk. Identified risks are communicated to higher

headquarters and risk mitigation guidance is provided in the commander’s planning guidance. (See ATP 5-

19 for a discussion of risk management.)

DOCUMENT RESULTS

5-41. A critical aspect of ADM is transferring the understanding and knowledge developed during ADM to others on the staff; subordinate, adjacent, and higher commanders; and unified action partners. The goal of

documenting the results of ADM is to capture the tacit knowledge gained during ADM into explicit

knowledge for others to apply. Tacit knowledge resides in an individual’s mind where explicit knowledge

consists of written or otherwise documented information. Products of ADM including the environmental

frame, problem frame, and operational approach, may be part of the unit’s operations order. (See FM 6-0 for

the Army’s operations order format.)

5-42. The planning team helps the commander summarize their understanding of the operational environment and the problem, along with describing the operational approach to solve the problem. Key

outputs of ADM conveyed in text and graphics include:

 Description of the operational environment.

 Description of the problem.

 Description of the operational approach

 Initial commander’s intent.

 Panning guidance including operational timings, resources requirements in broad terms, and risk.

5-43. Similar to an environmental frame and a problem frame, commanders and staff use graphics and text to describe the operational approach. Figure 5-3 on page 5-9 shows an operational approach using lines of

effort, defeat and stability mechanisms, objectives, and end state conditions.

TRANSITIONING TO DETAILED PLANNING

5-44. The products of ADM support the development of a detailed plan or order using the MDMP. The transition between ADM and the MDMP is important to convey the understanding and logic developed by

the planning team to those developing the detailed plan. Briefing the results of ADM and handing over

associated products to another planning team is not an effective approach. Often the same planning team that

led the design effort leads the staff through the MDMP. If not, key members of the planning team are part of

the core element of the planning team performing the MDMP.

5-45. During the mission analysis step of the MDMP, products of ADM are refined as the commander and staff learn more about the situation. The planning team rechecks and validates assumptions developed during

ADM. Commanders consider new information and modify their visualization as required before issuing

planning guidance for the development of courses of action.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 5-9

Figure 5-3. Sample operational approach

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 6-1

Chapter 6

Assessment and Reframing

The chapter begins with a general discussion of organizational learning. Next, it

describes how assessment and reframing helps commanders with adapting operations

to changing circumstances. The chapter concludes with techniques available to help

the commander and staff with assessing operations and reframing.

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

6-1. Organizational learning is a field of study that examines ways organizations learn and adapt. A premise behind this discipline is that in order for an organization to remain relevant, it must continue to grow and

adapt to changes in the environment. Organizations, however, do not normally adapt effectively by accident.

To adapt effectively, an organization must develop a deliberate system of learning to help that organization

make informed choices on ways to change.

6-2. Best practices suggest that successful Army units develop, maintain, and employ an organizational learning system that contributes to effective decisionmaking throughout an operation (from deployment to

redeployment). There are numerous tools and techniques that support the commander to promote

organizational learning throughout operations including:

 Knowledge management (see ATP 6-01.1).

 Collaboration and dialogue.

 Running estimates.

 Backbriefs and rehearsals.

 After action reviews.

 Center for Army Lessons Learned products and databases.

6-3. ADM helps commanders promote organizational learning. The collaborative nature of ADM encourages diverse perspectives. The creative thinking aspects of ADM help develop innovative solutions to

problems and ways to adapt the organization to changing circumstances. Continuous assessment and

reframing are other ways ADM enables organizational learning.

ASSESSMENT

6-4. Assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment involves comparing forecasted outcomes with events to

determine the effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps the commander

determine progress toward attaining desired end state conditions, achieving objectives, and accomplishing

tasks. Assessment involves monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine what

changes affect operations.

6-5. Throughout the operations process, commanders integrate their own assessments with those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other unified action partners. Primary tools for assessing progress of the

operation include the personal observations, the common operational picture, running estimates, and the

assessment plan. The latter includes measures of effectiveness (MOE), measures of performance (MOP), and

reframing indicators. The commander’s visualization forms the basis for the commander’s personal

assessment of progress. Running estimates provide information, conclusions, and recommendations from the

perspective of each staff section.

6-6. Assessment is continuous. It precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Broadly, assessment consists of, but is not limited to, the following

activities:

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6-2 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

 Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.

 Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing

tasks.

 Recommending or directing action for improvement.

6-7. Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation (ADRP 5- 0). Monitoring in the assessment process allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that

information about the current situation to compare to the forecasted situation described in the commander’s

intent and concept of operations. Commanders cannot judge progress or make effective decisions without an

accurate understanding of the current situation.

6-8. The staff analyzes relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate the operation’s progress. Evaluating is using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the

current degree of progress exists (ADRP 5-0). Evaluation is at the heart of the assessment process where

most of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps commanders determine what works and what does not work. It

also helps them gain insights into how to accomplish the mission.

6-9. Criteria in the forms of MOEs and MOPs help determine progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. MOEs determine if a task achieves its intended

results. MOPs help determine if a task is completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria—they do

not represent the assessment itself. MOEs and MOPs require relevant information as indicators for

evaluation.

6-10. Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, assessment is incomplete without recommending or directing action. Assessment may diagnose problems, but unless it results in recommended

adjustments, its use to the commander is limited. Based on the evaluation of progress, the staff brainstorms

possible improvements to the plan and makes preliminary judgments about the relative merit of those

changes. Staff members identify those changes possessing sufficient merit and provide them as

recommendations to the commander or make adjustments in their delegated authority. Recommendations to

the commander range from continuing the operation as planned, executing a branch, or reframing. (See

ADRP 5-0 and JP 5-0 for more information on assessment.)

REFRAMING

6-11. Through continuous assessment, the commander and staff monitor the operational environment and progress toward obtaining end state conditions and achieving objectives. Assessment helps commanders

measure the overall effectiveness of employing forces and capabilities to ensure that the operational approach

remains feasible and acceptable in the context of the higher commander’s intent and concept of operations.

If the current operational approach is failing to meet these criteria, or if aspects of the operational environment

or problem change significantly, the commander may decide to begin reframing efforts.

6-12. A reframe is a shift in understanding that leads to a new perspective on the problem or its resolution. Reframing is the activity of revisiting earlier hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current

operational approach. In essence, reframing reviews what the commander and staff believe they understand

about the operational environment, the problem, and the desired end state. At any time during the operations

process, the decision to reframe may be triggered by factors such as:

 Assessment reveals a lack of progress.

 Key assumptions prove invalid.

 Unanticipated success or failure.

 A major event that causes “catastrophic change” in the operational environment.

 A scheduled periodic review that shows a problem.

 A change in mission or end state issued by higher authority.

6-13. During operations, commanders reframe after realizing that desired conditions have changed, are not achievable, cannot be attained through the current operational approach, or because of change of mission or

end state. Reframing provides the freedom to operate beyond the limits of any single perspective. Conditions

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 6-3

change during execution, and such change is expected because forces interact in the operational environment.

Recognizing and anticipating these changes is fundamental to an organization’s ability to learn.

6-14. Reframing incorporates the concept of double-loop learning—an organizational learning concept that distinguishes the differences between single-loop and double-loop learning. In single-loop learning,

individuals, groups, or organizations modify their actions according to the difference between expected and

obtained outcomes. In single-loop learning, an organization detects errors and makes corrections to

accomplish existing goals and solve familiar problems. In contrast, double-loop involves error correction

where things are not so predictable. In double-loop learning, individuals, groups, or organizations question

the values, assumptions and policies that led to the actions in the first place. (See source note 2.)

6-15. Effective units incorporate single- and double-loop learning throughout operations. Army commanders and staffs practice single-loop learning to assess the progress of an operation and modify plans to bring

operations back on track with their original visualization. Operations rarely unfold as visualized during

planning. Commanders and staffs recognize the triggers, cues, and characteristics of the situation that indicate

the underlying logic behind the plan was flawed and is no longer applicable. This is not an easy task because

once an issue is framed and a mental model formed, it is natural for commanders and staffs to not see (or

even discard) indicators and events that do not conform to the original understanding and visualization of an

operation.

6-16. During execution, it is important that commanders, supported by the staff and subordinate commanders, question their original understanding and visualization of the operations. Commanders question

early assumptions, hypotheses, and conclusions that underpin the current plan during design sessions,

commander’s conferences, or long-range assessment meetings. This may lead to the commander directing an

effort to reframe the operational environment and problems and develop a new operational approach.

6-17. Figure 6-1 shows reframing in operations. As depicted, planning begins a cycle of the operations process. Because operations never occur as envisioned, commanders refine the plan during preparation and

execution. During execution, assessment helps identify variances to the commander’s original visualization.

A variance is the difference between the actual situation and forecasted situation at the time or event.

Figure 6-1. Decisionmaking during execution and reframing

6-18. Two forms of variances exist: opportunities and threats. An opportunity results from forecasted or unexpected success. When commanders recognize an opportunity, they alter the order to exploit it if the

change achieves the end state without incurring unacceptable risk. The second form of variance is a threat to

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6-4 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

mission accomplishment or survival of the force. When recognizing a threat, the commander adjusts the order

to eliminate the enemy advantage, restore the friendly advantage, and regain the initiative. Not all threats to

the force or mission involve hostile or neutral persons. Disease, toxic hazards, and natural disasters are

examples of other threats.

6-19. Depending on the magnitude of the variance identified, commanders make execution and adjustment decisions throughout execution. Execution decisions implement a planned action under circumstances

anticipated in the order. An adjustment decision is the selection of a course of action that modifies the order

to respond to opportunities or threats. In some instances, the variance is so extreme that no branch or sequel

is available or the current plan lacks the flexibility to respond to the variance. In this situation, the commander

and staff may reframe the operational environment and the problem resulting in a new plan. This starts a new

cycle of the operations process.

TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES

6-20. Tools and techniques that help the commander and staff assess operations and to reframe including:

 Assessment plan.

 Assessment working group.

 Reframing indicators.

 Periodic design sessions.

 Premortem analysis.

ASSESSMENT PLAN

6-21. The staff develops an assessment plan to help judge progress of an operation. The assessment plan incorporates criteria (MOP, MOE, and indicators) used to evaluate completed tasks, achieved objectives, and

obtained end state conditions. An effective assessment plan incorporates the logic used to build the plan.

Each plan is built on assumptions and an operational approach—a broad conceptualization of the actions that

produce the conditions to define the desired end state. The logic as to why the commander believes the actions

in the plan will produce the desired results is an important consideration when developing the assessment

plan. Recording and understanding this logic during ADM helps the staff recommend the appropriate MOP,

MOE, and indicators for assessing the operation. It also helps the commander and staff determine if they

need to reframe the problem if assumptions prove false or the logic behind the plan appears flawed as

operations progress. (See FM 6-0 for details in building an assessment plan.)

ASSESSMENT WORKING GROUPS

6-22. All staff sections assess progress. It is not the responsibility of any one staff section or command post cell. Each staff section assesses the operation from its area of expertise. However, these staff sections

coordinate and integrate their individual assessments and associated recommendations across the warfighting

functions to produce a comprehensive assessment for the commander. A technique to develop a

comprehensive assessment is to form an assessment working group.

6-23. The assessment working group is cross-functional by design and includes membership from across the staff, liaison personnel, and other unified action partners outside the headquarters. Commanders direct the

chief of staff, executive officer, or a staff section leader to run the assessment working group. Selected

personnel that participated in developing the environment frame, problem frame, and operational approach

are a part of the assessment working group.

REFRAMING INDICATORS

6-24. It is helpful to think in advance about what circumstance, events, or changes require the command to reframe. As such, the commander and planning team develop reframing indicators. A reframing indicator

helps identify a condition in the operational environment that has changed or that could cause a shift in the

problem such that the current operational approach may no longer be valid. Although many reframing

indicators will not meet the requirement for the commander’s critical information requirement, some

reframing indicators could be included in the commander’s critical information requirements if they represent

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 6-5

information that would cause the commander to consider near-term reframing and potential redesign. An

example of such information could be the impending alliance of a regional nation with the enemy that shifts

the balance of power in spite of an earlier assumption that this alliance would not occur. Reframing indicators

support the commander’s ability to understand, learn, adapt, and reframe as necessary. Examples of such

information include the following:

 Changes in the original problem statement.

 Significant changes in the enemy composition.

 Significant changes in the expected enemy approach.

 Significant changes in friendly capability.

 Higher headquarters policy changes or directives that change the desired end state.

 Unexpected lack of friendly progress toward objectives.

 Shifts in international support and/or domestic will.

 Key assumptions prove to be invalid.

PERIODIC DESIGN SESSIONS

6-25. One of the most important questions when assessing an operation is whether the plan is still relevant. Assessment entails measuring progress according to the plan. It includes periodically reexamining the logic

and assumptions of the original plan to determine if it is still relevant. It is difficult to get outside pre-existing

mindsets associated with the current plan—especially when involved in protracted operations. It is helpful

for the commander and planners to step back from formal assessment and reexamine the situation free of

existing mindsets. As such, the commander directs a periodic design session to look at the environmental and

problem frames and to examine if the current operational approach is still valid.

PREMORTEM ANALYSIS

6-26. Premortem analysis is a thinking tool to help leaders examine the premises behind a proposed course of action, assumption, or a specified task. This tool breaks ownership to a particular plan of action through a

series of questions that focus on what may cause the plan to fail. The premise for premortem analysis is that

during planning, the commander and planners may have become too confident in the plan itself. By imagining

ways the plan could fail and discerning why, commanders and staffs improve the plan and develop reframing

indicators to consider during education. In a group setting, the following steps help perform a premortem

analysis of a plan.

 All members of the group become completely familiar with the plan.

 As a group, imagine a fiasco or set of circumstances that could cause the plan to fail.

 Individually develop the reasons for failure.

 As a group, discuss each reason and record all ideas.

 Revisit the plan to determine what to revise in the plan including recommending concepts for

potential branch plans.

 Refine the list of reasons the plan may fail and develop reframing indicators.

 Periodically review the list of reasons the plan could fail and reframing indicators during

execution.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 A-1

Appendix A

Thinking Challenges

Critical thinking and creative thinking are essential leader skills and key components

of Army design methodology (ADM). This appendix describes how humans think,

discusses influences on thought, and addresses challenges to good thinking. These

challenges are biases and logic fallacies. Commanders and staffs are aware of and

guard against these biases and fallacies to improve the quality of their thinking and

decisionmaking.

COGNITION

Everyone thinks; it is our nature to do so. But much of our thinking, left to itself, is biased,

distorted, partial, uninformed or downright prejudice. (See source note 3.)

Richard Paul and Linda Elder

A-1. Cognition is thinking—it is the mental process of knowing that includes awareness, perception, reasoning, and intuition. Research points to the existence of two systems at work simultaneously in

individuals’ minds as they think. One system the individual controls consciously. The other system operates

without the individual being aware of it most of the time. These are referred to as the conscious and the

subconscious systems. Individuals use the conscious system when they study, analyze information, weigh

evidence, argue, and make choices. The subconscious system operates independently and enables a kind of

thinking commonly known as intuition. (See source note 4.)

A-2. Instead of exerting explicit mental energy to make a decision, the subconscious system relies on information from experience. For example, when individuals drive to an unfamiliar location guided by map,

they use their conscious system. When they seek the same destination six months later, even without

directions, they may be able to find the way by relying on information recorded by the subconscious system.

The subconscious system recorded information such as the time between landmarks, the sensations of sharp

or gradual curves; climbs and descents; smells and sounds encountered along the way. It aids navigation

without the individuals being consciously aware of it. Those cues form a pattern in the individuals’ memory,

which they recognize subconsciously when they travel that route again. The more experience individuals

have, the more detailed and enduring their store of subconscious knowledge becomes. Collectively, these

experiences shape something known as mindset.

A-3. A mindset is a set of assumptions and core beliefs (mental models) that form a lens through which individuals perceive the world. A mindset can be so engrained that individuals subconsciously and

consciously resist information that does not conform to that mindset. When information is lacking, as often

the case when framing an operational environment and problems, individuals rely on prior beliefs and

assumptions about how and why events came to be and would normally transpire. In essence, these mindsets

are a distillation of all that planners think they know about a subject.

A-4. As planners evaluate information they need to be aware that mindset, along with other cognitive biases, influences all their thinking. Planners guard against fallacious reasoning often used, sometimes intentionally

and sometimes out of ignorance, to support an argument. Paragraphs A-5–A-16 discuss cognitive biases and

logic fallacies. (See source note 5.)

COGNITIVE BIASES

A-5. A cognitive bias is an unconscious belief that conditions governs or compels human behavior. Just as planners must know their own mindset and its influence on conscious thought, they must also know other

cognitive biases that influence their thinking. Some of the more common cognitive biases include:

Appendix A

A-2 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

 Confirmation bias.

 Status quo bias.

 Sunk cost bias.

 Sample size bias.

 Anchoring bias.

CONFIRMATION BIAS

A-6. Confirmation bias is when individuals seek confirmatory information for conclusions they have made prematurely, not realizing that the evidence supports several hypotheses. As a result, individuals fail to search

for or discard inconsistent and disconfirming evidence. This bias emphasizes the need for the commander to

establish a culture of collaboration and dialogue in the organization.

STATUS QUO BIAS

A-7. Many humans find the status quo comfortable and avoid changing it. A status quo bias may be present when individuals display the inclination to keep their circumstances stable. When individuals avoid change,

they assign unwarranted weight to information that justifies maintaining the current conditions. This bias is

more prevalent under conditions of stress where stability and predictability are a source of comfort.

SUNK COST BIAS

A-8. Sunk cost bias is a powerful tendency to recover unrecoverable costs of an earlier decision. An individual may justify a previous decision by persisting in it even when the evidence indicates it was wrong

or a change is in order. One reason for the power of this bias is that it is hard for people to face-up to their

mistakes. After investing time and effort in planning—even though time and effort cannot be recovered—a

leader may stick to the plan long after its assumptions have been refuted. In extreme instances, continuation

of a very costly endeavor may seem preferable to an unfavorable outcome. To avoid this bias, the planning

team may seek advice from people with no stake in earlier decisions.

SAMPLE SIZE BIAS

A-9. Sample size bias occurs when individuals make generalizations based on small sample sizes. Instead of considering how truly representative the information is to the particular situation, individuals

unconsciously treat the small sample as a large sample. Large samples are accepted to be highly

representative of the situation or populations from which they are drawn.

ANCHORING BIAS

A-10. Anchoring bias is a tendency for humans to use initial estimates or information as a starting point for adjustment. Even though additional information invalidates the initial estimate, humans unconsciously use

the initial estimate as a starting point when making subsequent adjustments. They are anchored to the initial

estimate. As a result, any adjustments will be closer to the initial estimates than they ought to be.

LOGIC FALLACIES

A-11. A logic fallacy is an error in logic. When analyzing information, the goal of analysis is to ascribe and validate meaning. When individuals make an argument, they offer reasons why others should accept their

view(s) or judgment. These reasons are premises (sometimes evidence) and the assertion that they allegedly

support is called the conclusion. A sound argument meets the following conditions: the premises are

acceptable and consistent; the premises are relevant to the conclusion and provide sufficient support for the

conclusion, and; missing components have been considered and are judged consistent with the conclusion. If

the premises are dubious or if they do not warrant the conclusion, then the argument is fallacious.

A-12. Logic fallacies improperly influence decisionmakers because they are psychologically compelling and there is some degree of truth to the conclusion. Common logic fallacies include:

Thinking Challenges

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 A-3

 Arguments against the person.

 Appeal to unqualified authority.

 Red herring.

 Weak analogy.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PERSON

A-13. This fallacy occurs when someone tries to attack a person and not a position or argument. Instead of assessing the argument or position based on the premises or conclusion, the argument is ignored and the

arguer is attacked. Awareness of this fallacy should cause the planning team to know their biases and

prejudices to ensure they do not fall victim to a seemingly convincing argument based on an unsupported

attack on a person or group advancing the information.

APPEAL TO UNQUALIFIED AUTHORITY

A-14. A valid technique to support a premise is to cite a trusted authority on the topic. A logic fallacy occurs when the authority cited does not have strong credentials for the matter at hand. To avoid this fallacy, planners

verify the qualifications of the source of information gathered during research. In other words, the researcher

assesses the qualifications of the individuals providing information to the planning team. This is true when

using open-source documents or if the planning team has asked for subject matter expertise from outside the

organization. If these qualifications are not verified, the planning team may be misled by an appeal to

unqualified authority and convinced of the validity of what is, in fact, a fallacious argument.

RED HERRING

A-15. The red herring fallacy is committed when an individual’s attention is diverted with distracting information that is flashy, eye-catching, or not relevant to the topic at hand. A red herring may be used

intentionally to divert the attention of the rest of the team from a flawed argument or it may be used

inadvertently because of poor logic. A way to avoid the red herring fallacy is to ensure members of the team

stay focused on the premises of the argument and the conclusion they support.

WEAK ANALOGY

A-16. Analogies are an effective way to communicate concepts, especially complex ones. An analogy occurs when one situation side-by-side with another and there are similarities. Analogies may be history or

individual or group experience. Quite often, these analogies are strong and are useful in illustrating a valid

point. The fallacy of weak analogy is committed when the analogy used is not strong enough to support the

conclusion drawn.

ADDITIONAL THINKING CHALLENGES

A-17. There are additional traps and errors the planning team must consider that do not neatly fit into either the bias or the logic fallacy category. Nonetheless, they have an impact on how the planning team determines

what to believe.

 Groupthink.

 Mirror imaging.

 Cultural contempt.

GROUPTHINK

A-18. ADM relies on critical and creative thinking by a group. While working in a group is advantageous to both critical and creative thinking, group problem solving has potential pitfalls. One of these pitfalls is

“groupthink.” Groupthink refers to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved

in a cohesive group. It occurs when members, striving for agreement, override their motivation to evaluate

evidence or alternative options. The group makes a collective decision and feels good about it because all

members favor the same decision. In the interest of unity, there is limited debate or challenge to the selected

Appendix A

A-4 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

solution. Group pressures towards consensus leads to concurrence-seeking tendencies by individual group

members.

A-19. Being aware of the existence of groupthink is the most important factor in avoiding it. There are several ways to help avoid groupthink:

 Encourage group members to express objections or doubts.

 Refrain from expressing preferences about potential solutions.

 Assign two independent subgroups to work on the problem.

 Discuss the group’s ideas with people outside the group.

 Invite subject matter experts from outside the group to discuss the issues at hand.

 Employ the unit’s red team to challenge the team thinking and provide alternative perspectives.

MIRROR IMAGING

A-20. Mirror imaging means planners fill in gaps of understanding and knowledge by assuming that the other side or another party acts in a certain way because that is how they would do it under similar circumstances.

Failure to appreciate that others perceive their interests differently leads to faulty assumptions. Perception on

how others act is often irrelevant. Judgments must be made on how others perceive their interests. If planners

cannot gain insight in what others are thinking, mirror imaging may be the only alternative. Planners

recognize this and do not place a lot of confidence in that kind of judgment. See chapter 3 for a discussion

on four ways of seeing as a way to guard against mirror imaging.

CULTURAL CONTEMPT

A-21. Unlike mirror imaging, commanders and staffs recognize the existence of cultural differences with other actors in an operational environment. The error occurs when commanders and staffs discount those

differences, hold them in contempt, or misunderstand these differences. Cultural contempt and

misunderstanding is revealed in arrogance. Individuals underestimate the capabilities and motivations of

others. The challenge for commanders and staffs is to understand the culture of adversaries, enemies, and

unified action partners.

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 B-1

Appendix B

Vignette

This appendix provides an example of framing an operational environment from a

systems perspective during an operation. It uses a series of network analysis diagrams

to visualize and describe an operational environment. The appendix concludes by

describing an operational approach using the diplomatic, information, military, and

economic (DIME) construct. The intent of this appendix is to show just one approach

employed during Army design methodology (ADM). There are numerous other tools

and models available to the commander and planning team for framing operational

environments, framing problems, and developing approaches to solve those problems.

INTRODUCTION

B-1. Army forces conduct operations as part of a joint, interdependent team. The joint force commander typically assigns the Army forces an area of operations (AO) large enough for the force to accomplish tasks

and protect the force. While responsible for the conduct of operations in their AO, the commander’s area of

interest expands beyond their area of operation. An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander,

including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also

includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0).

B-2. An operational environment is not constrained by physical geography. Army commanders, especially at higher echelons (division and above), understand their operational environment from a regional

perspective. In operations such as counterdrug, combating terrorism, and counterinsurgency, the enemy acts

in ways and in networks that cross nation-state borders. In fact, these networks have a significant influence

on the traditional, established nation-state and regional systems. For example, a terrorist network commits

terrorist acts in three countries, has a safe haven and base of operations in a fourth country, and receives

supplies and other aid from a fifth country.

B-3. In addition to understanding an operational environment, it is important that commanders and staffs consider the capabilities and resources available outside of the command including the capabilities and

resources in the joint force and unified action partners. Through collaboration and dialogue, Army forces

request support from the joint force commander to help them with accomplishing their mission and

recommend actions that help achieve overarching campaign objectives for the joint operation.

FRAMING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

B-4. In this vignette, a division commander directed the G-5 to form a planning team to examine the relationships between the drug trade and the insurgents and to develop options that could disrupt these

relationships. While the majority of the insurgent group is located in the division’s AO, insurgent elements

are located throughout the joint operational area. The insurgents have a strong support base outside the joint

operational area in neighboring country X. As such, the commander directed that the planning team expand

their analysis beyond the division’s AO and take a regional look at the problem. In addition, the commander

issued guidance not to restrict options to those that only the division has the ability to execute. The division

commander wanted to propose several options to the joint force commander on ways the joint force and

interagency organizations help disrupt funding to the insurgents.

B-5. The G-5 assigned a lead planner for this project with members from the G-2, G-3, and G-9 forming the core of the planning team. In addition the G-4 volunteered a captain (a former agent in the Drug

Enforcement Agency) to help plan. The hypothetical examples provided in Figures B-1–B-4 on pages B-2–

B-4 demonstrate how a planning team can think about actors (individual and organizations), nodes (facilities,

Appendix B

B-2 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

areas, material), and relationships among actors and nodes to help identify potential actions to create a desired

end state conditions.

B-6. Figure B-1 represents initial work of the planning team. The team identifies that opium is used as a form of micro finance throughout the AO. Often, farmers (1) take loans, occasionally of goods-in-kind, based

on the promise to grow opium and repay the loan with the produced opium. This allows a farmer to get

through a particularly harsh winter or obtain particularly expensive things (car, house, wife, etc.). Socially,

there is a clear prohibition against the production of illicit narcotics and almost all farmers recognize and

agree with the prohibition. However, most opium farmers simply cannot ignore the economic realities of

opium farming. In many cases, the opium broker also will run a legitimate business that also deals in opium

in the local bazaar (2).

Figure B-1. Network analysis 1

B-7. Figure B-2 on page B-3 represents an expansion of the environmental frame. The former DEA agent explains that the real moneymaking step in the narcotics system is the conversion of opium to heroin and

explains the process to the rest of group as he draws on the white board. Opium is valuable as an ingredient

of heroin. The opium is converted to heroin in labs (3). The term “lab” means any place the precursors,

opium, and chemists are. No sophisticated tools are required. A lab may be a simple hut. Precursor chemicals

must be smuggled into country and can be obtained either directly from the smuggling networks (4) or often

at local bazaars (2). While there are legitimate uses for many precursor chemicals worldwide, none exists in

country. Chemists (5) are the people with the knowledge of how to convert opium into heroin. Another

member of the group adds that these are not chemists in any Western sense. Many have no idea about

chemistry at all, and may even be illiterate. They do know the recipe to convert opium to heroin, which is a

limited skill in the region.

Vignette

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 B-3

Figure B-2. Network analysis 2

B-8. Based on detailed research from the division’s all-source intelligence element, the team further expands their understanding of the operational environment depicted in Figure B-3. The team agrees that there is little

narcotics use in country (given the extreme poverty, there would be little profit in that market). Therefore,

heroin has to be smuggled to overseas markets (6). Narco-barons (7), typically based in-country, are key

individuals who control vast segments of the country’s narcotics trade and have access to massive wealth

(probably hundreds of millions to billions of U.S. dollars). Many have sizable personal militias. They are the

primary profit makers from the sale of narcotics overseas. Haji Bashir Noorzai (currently in U.S. custody

awaiting trial in U.S. District Court) was a showcase example of a narco-baron. Their primary means of

getting money from the overseas’ markets is through banks (8) and the use of the hawala (an informal value

transfer system) (9). Narco-barons may also exert direct control over the smuggling networks (4), certain

“chemists” (5), the labs (3), and opium brokers (2). Additionally, by using their immense wealth, narco-

barons obtain political protection from local and national politicians (10).

Figure B-3. Network analysis 3

B-9. Figure B-4 represents the teams work in establishing the relationships among the insurgents and the drug trade. Current intelligence supports the conclusion that the Taliban [the insurgents (11)] benefits

indirectly from the narcotics trade. The Taliban almost certainly obtains funds by “taxing” farmers (1) and

Appendix B

B-4 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

opium brokers (2) in areas where it has a strong presence. The Taliban also probably receives sizeable

contributions from narco-barons (7). This may be a form of protection payments, but narco-barons may also

seek to perpetuate the lack of enforcement enabled by the continuing instability created by Taliban

operations. Also, the same smuggling networks (4) responsible for moving narcotics out of country also are

likely responsible for the “backflow” movement of arms and personnel into country, directly benefiting the

Taliban.

Figure B-4. Network analysis 4

IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS

B-10. As the planning team refines its understanding of the narcotics network, it shifts its efforts to understanding the problem and developing options to considering how to disrupt the relationship among the

insurgents and the drug trade. During a discussion, the team concludes that the nodes and links directly related

to the conversion of opium to heroin are important, and that the labs and their chemists are key to the entire

system. Perhaps opium could be smuggled out of country and the conversion could occur at labs in other

countries. This is much more difficult for the opium brokers, and severely reduces the profitability of

narcotics in country. Since the conversion occurs in the labs, attacking them directly could affect the entire

system. These makeshift labs are transient (where the right people and material are present for brief periods),

and may be too difficult to identify and interdict.

B-11. Figure B-5 represents areas friendly actions can affect the ability of the labs to convert opium to heroin. The team identifies three factors that could limit lab operations. First, the division works with host nation

security forces to interdict the supply of opium (1) and (2) to the labs. Second, interdict the opium farms and

brokers impacts labs. Third, the knowledge of how to convert opium to heroin is limited to the chemists, so

identifying, locating, and confining a sufficient number of chemists (5) should have a huge impact on labs.

Success in these three areas should limit heroin production and movement overseas, reduce the amount

available in overseas markets, and reduce or eliminate the flow of money to the Taliban from the sale of

narcotics. The G-2 planner also assessed that the given the wide-ranging influence the narco-barons (7) exert

on the narcotics trade, interdicting them directly also is likely to have a significant impact on the system.

Since the labs and the chemists are commonly co-located and vital to the production of heroin, the team

designates them as key nodes in the network.

Vignette

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 B-5

Figure B-5. Network analysis 5

B-12. Based on their environmental frame, the team realizes that while the division takes action on parts of the narcotics network, many areas require the capabilities of the joint force, interagency organizations, and

the host nation. As such, the team decides to develop broad options by considering potential DIME actions

that influence the narcotics network. Figure B-6 represents recommend action by DIME.

 Diplomatic. Apply pressure against political leaders (10) to cease their political protection of

narco-barons and share information with international banks (8).

 Informational. Target opium farmers (1) with messages to influence them to accept alternative

income for the opium crop.

 Military. Capture and arrest narco-barons (7); capture chemists (5) and destroy labs (3); interdict

smuggling networks (4) to cut flow of precursors.

 Economic. Freeze narco-barons’ assets at international banks (8) and work with host country to

provide economic alternatives for opium farmers (1).

Appendix B

B-6 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

Figure B-6. Network analysis 6

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 Source Notes-1

Source Notes

These are the sources used, quoted, or paraphrased in this publication. They are listed by source note number.

Source note 1 The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable: Nassim Nicholas Taleb.

Random House, New York, 2007, 63-64.

Source note 2 Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective: Chris Argyris and

Donald Schon. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA 1978. 8-9.

Source note 3 Thinker’s Guide Library. Critical Thinking Concepts & Tools: Richard Paul and

Linda Elder. The Foundation for Critical Thinking Press, Tomales, CA. 2009, 2. Source note 4 Thinking, Fast and Slow: Daniel Kahneman. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York,

2011, 11-30.

Source note 5 Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking: A Fundamental Guide for Strategic

Leaders. Colonel (Retired) Stephen J. Gerras, Ph.D. Professor of Behavioral

Sciences. Department of Command, Leadership, & Management, U.S. Army War

College, August 2008, 14-24.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 Glossary-1

Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADM Army design methodology

ADRP Army doctrine reference publication

ADP Army doctrine publication

ATP Army technical publication

AO area of operations

DIME diplomatic, information, military, and economic

FM field manual

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield

JP joint publication

MDMP military decisionmaking process

MOE measures of effectiveness

MOP measures of performance

PMESII-PT political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical

environment, and time

SECTION II – TERMS

area of interest

That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and

extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could

jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 3-0)

assessment

Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an

objective. (JP 3-0)

assumption

A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both

assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process

of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. (JP 5-

0)

center of gravity

The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 5-0)

course of action

A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. (JP 5-0)

culminating point

That point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses the capability to continue its current

form of operations. (ADRP 3-0)

decisive point

A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows

commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving

success. (JP 5-0)

defeat mechanism

The method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition.

(ADRP 3-0)

Glossary

Glossary-2 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

evaluating

Using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of

progress exists. (ADRP 5-0)

line of effort

A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus

efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. (ADRP 3-0)

line of operations

A line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and

that links the force with its base of operations and objectives. (ADRP 3-0)

mission command

The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined

initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of

unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)

monitoring

Continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation. (ADRP 5-0)

operational approach

A description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those

desired at end state. (JP 5-0)

operational art

The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience,

creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ

military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of

capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operations process

The major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing,

and continuously assessing the operation. (ADP 5-0)

phase

A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. (ADRP 3-0)

planning

The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective

ways of bringing that future about. (ADP 5-0)

stability mechanism

The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that

support establishing a lasting, stable peace. (ADRP 3-0)

tempo

The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. (ADRP 3-0)

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 References-1

References

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 2 February 2015.

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm/

JP 2-01.3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 21 May 2014.

JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.

JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning. 11 August 2011.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: http://www.apd.army.mil/

ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.

ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-22. Army Leadership. 1 August 2012.

ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 10 November 2014.

ATP 2-22.9. Open-Source Intelligence. 10 July 2012.

ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.

ATP 6-01.1. Techniques for Effective Knowledge Management. 6 March 2015.

FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.

FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS Argyris, Chris and Schon, Donald. Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective. Reading,

MA 1978.

Gerras, Colonel (Retired) Stephen J.. Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking: A Fundamental

Guide for Strategic Leaders. August 2008.

Kahneman, Daniel. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. Thinking, Fast and Slow. 2011.

Paul, Richard and Elder, Linda. Thinker’s Guide Library. Critical Thinking Concepts & Tools.

Tomales, CA. 2009.

Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable: New York, 2007.

PRESCRIBED FORMS None.

REFERENCED FORMS Forms are available online: www.apd.army.mil

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 Index-1

Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless indicated otherwise.

A

Army design methodology, 1- 14–1-21 commander involvement, 2-

9–2-13 defined, 1-14 key concepts, 1-22–1-50 when to employ, 2-1–2-8

assessment, 1-20, 6-4–6-10 defined, 6-4 evaluating, 6-8 MOE, 6-5 monitoring, 6-7 MOP, 6-5 plan, 6-21 premortem analysis, 6-26 working groups, 6-22–6-23

B

brainstorming, 3-23–3-27

C

cognititve biases, A-1–A-4 anchoring, A-10 confirmation, A-6 sample size A-9 status quo, A-7 sunk cost, A-8

collaboration, 1-31–1-35

creative thinking, 1-25, 1-29–1- 30

critical thinking, 1-25, 1-26–1- 28

cultural contempt, A-21

D

defeat mechanisms, 5-13–5-19

detailed planning, 5-44–5-45

dialogue, 1-31–1-35

E

elements of operational art, 1- 24 basing, 5-31–5-34 center of gravity, 5-7 culmination, 5-34 decisive point, 5-9–5-11 end state, 3-18–3-20 line of effort, 5-28 line of operations, 5-27

phasing and transition, 5- 37–5-39

risk, 5-40 tempo, 5-35–5-36

F

framing, 1-42–1-43

framing operational environments, 1-16–1-17 current state, 3-11–3-15 end state, 3-18–3-20 example, 3-14–3-15 framing questions, 3-6 reviewing, 4-9, 5-4 techniques, 3-21–3-51

framing problems, 1-18 example, 4-14–4-15 framing questions, 4-6 nature of, 4-1–4-2 problem types, 4-2–4-5 reviewing, 5-5 techniques, 4-16–4-18

framing solutions, 1-19 example, 5-43 framing questions, 5-3 operational approach, 5-1–

5-3 techniques, 5-4–5-43

G

group think, A-18

L

logic fallacies, A-11–A-16

M

meta-questioning, 3-42–3-43

military decisionmaking process, 1-13–1-15, 2-1–2- 8, 5-44–5-45

mind mapping, 3-40–3-41

mirror imaging, A-20

mission command, 1-1–1-3 defined, 1-3

N

narrative construction, 1-47–1- 50

network analysis, B-5

O

operational approach, 5-1–5-3, 5-30–5-34 defined, 5-1

operational art, 1-23–1-24 defined, 1-23 elements of, 1-24

operational environment, 3-1– 3-4 defined, 3-1

operations process, 1-4–1-6 defined, 1-4 role of commander, 1-6

P

planning, 1-7–1-13 defined, 1-7 integrated planning, 1-11–1-

13, 2-1–2-8, 5-44–5-45

planning team, 2-14–2-30 commander evolvement, 2-

9–2-13 diversity, 2-18–2-19 graphic artist, 2-31 leading, 2-32–2-35 note takers, 2-28–2-30 red team members, 2-26–2-

27 resources, 2-37–2-39 skills and characteristics, 2-

17 subject matter experts, 2-

24–2-25

problem restatement, 4-17–4- 18 reframing, 1-20–1-21 assessment, 6-4–6-10 organizational learning, 6-

1–6-3 refreaming indicators, 6-24 techniques, 6-20–6-26 triggers, 6-12

R

researching, 3-28—3-39

resources, 2-37–2-39

S

stability mechanisms, 5-20–5- 24

systems thinking, 1-36–1-41

Index

Index-2 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

T

thinking challenges, A-17

V

visual modeling, 1-44–1-46

By Order of the Secretary of the Army

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 1516803

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).

ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

PIN: 105348-000