Discussion History

ARISTOTLE

AND XENOPHON ON

DEMOCRACY AND

OLIGARCHY

ARISTOTLE’S THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS

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THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ATHENIANS

Ascribed to XENOPHON THE ORATOR

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XENOPHON’S

THE POLITEIA OF THE SPARTANS

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THE BOEOTIAN CONSTITUTION

From the OXYRHYNCHUS HISTORIAN

TRANSLATIONS WITH INTRODUCTIONS

AND COMMENTARY BY

J. M. MOORE RADLEY COLLEGE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS BERKELEY AND LOS ANGELES

For

NICHOLAS In the hope that he also may one day enjoy

the history of Greece

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California

OJ. M. Moore 1975

ISBN: 0-520-02863-5 cloth-bound 0-520-02909-7 paper-bound

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 74-16713

Printed in the United States of America

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his policy consistently makes one suspect that, before the outbreak of the war, the idea was considered more amongst a relatively small circle -than accepted by the common people as a whole, as is implied in 11,16.

CONCLUSION

Here, then, we have a contrast to the eulogistic, idealised picture of Athens at her height painted by Thucydides in the relevant speeches in Books 1 and 11. The author is thoroughly disillusioned, and not prepared to work within the system.

study is valuable because he does succeed in some meas- ure in his stated aim of showing why the democracy was successful and wherein a contemporary opponent thought its strength lay. Thus we get a partial and prejudiced but highly illuminating picture of Athens.

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I Now, in discussing the Athenian constitution, I cannot commend their present method of running the state, because in choosing it they preferred that the masses should do better than the respectable citizens; this, then, is my reason for not commending it. Since, however, they have made this choice, I will demonstrate how well they preserve their constitution and handle the other affairs for which the rest of the Greeks criticise them.

2 My first point is that it is right that the poor and the ordinary people there should have more power than the noble and the rich, because it is the ordinary people who man the fleet and bring the city her power; they provide the helmsmen, the boatswains, the junior officers, the look-outs and the shipwrights; it is these people who make the city powerful much more than the hoplites and the noble and respectable citizens. This being so, it seems just that all should share in public office by lot and by election, and that any citizen who wishes should be able

3 to speak in the Assembly. On the other hand, there are offices which bring safety to the whole people if they are in the hands of the right people, and danger if they are not; the people demand no share in these—they do not suppose that they ought to be able to cast lots for the post of strategos or commander of the cavalry, for they realise that they gain greater advantage from not holding these office themselves but allowing the most capable to hold them. However, they are eager to hold any public office which brings pay or private profit.

4 Again, some people are surprised at the fact that in all fields they give more power to the masses, the poor and the common people than they do to the respectable

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elements of society, but it will become clear that they preserve the democracy by doing precisely this. When the poor, the ordinary people and the lower classes flourish and increase in numbers, then the power of the democracy will be increased; if, however, the rich and the respectable flourish, the democrats increase the

5 strength of their opponents. Throughout the world the aristocracy are opposed to democracy, for they are naturally least liable to loss of self control and injustice and most meticulous in their regard for what is respect- able, whereas the masses display extreme ignorance, indiscipline and wickedness, for poverty gives them a tendency towards the ignoble, and in some cases lack of money leads to their being uneducated and ignorant.

6 It may be objected that they ought not to grant each and every man the right of speaking in the Ekklesia and serving on the Boule, but only the ablest and best of them; however, in this also they are acting in their own best interests by allowing the mob also a voice. If none but the respectable spoke in the Ekklesia and the Boule, the result would benefit that class and harm the masses; as it is, anyone who wishes rises and speaks, and as a member of the mob he discovers what is to his own advantage and that of those like him.

7 But someone may say: ‘How could such a man find out what was advantageous to himself and the common people?’ The Athenians realise that this man, despite his ignorance and badness, brings them more advantage because he is well disposed to them than the ill-disposed respectable man would, despite his virtue and wisdom.

8 Such practices do not produce the best city, but they are the best way of preserving democracy. For the common people do not wish to be deprived of their rights in an admirably governed city, but to be free and to rule the city; they are not disturbed by inferior laws, for the common people get their strength and freedom from

9 what you define as inferior laws. If you are looking for an admirable code of laws, first you will find that the ablest draw them up in their own interest; secondly, the respectable will punish the masses, and will plan the

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city’s affairs and will not allow men who are mad to take part in planning or discussion or even sit in the Ekklesia. As a result of this excellent system the common people would very soon lose all their political rights.

10 Slaves and metics at Athens lead a singularly un- disciplined life; one may not strike them there, nor will a slave step aside for you. Let me explain the reason for this situation: if it were legal for a free man to strike a slave, a metic or a freedman, an Athenian would often have been struck under the mistaken impression that he was a slave, for the clothing of the common people there is in no way superior to that of the slaves and metics, nor is

11 their appearance. There is also good sense behind the apparently suprising fact that they allow slaves there to live in luxury, and some of them in considerable magni- ficence. In a state relying on naval power it is inevitable that slaves must work for hire so that we may take profits from what they earn, and they must be allowed to go free.* Where there are rich slaves it is no longer profitable for my slave to be afraid of you ; in Sparta my slave would be afraid of you, but there, if your slave is afraid of me, he will probably spend some of his own money to free

12 himself from the danger. This, then, is why in the matter

of free speech we have put slaves and free men on equal terms; we have also done the same for metics and citizens because the city needs metics because of the multiplicity of her industries and for her fleet; that is why we were right to establish freedom of speech for metics as well.

13 The practice of physical exercises and the pursuit of culture has been brought into disrepute by the common people as being undesirable because they realise that these accomplishments are beyond them. * However, for the staging of dramatic and choral festivals, the super- intending of the gymnasia and the games and the provision of triremes, they realise that it is the rich who pay, and the common people for whom such things are arranged and who serve in the triremes. At all events,

* Corruption of the text makes it impossible to be sure of the exact meaning

of this sentence.

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They think it right to receive pay for singing, running and dancing, and for sailing in the fleet so that they may have money and the rich may become poor. In the courts too, they are as much interested in their own advantage as they are in justice.

14 As to their relation with their allies, it is clear that they sail out and bring charges against the respectable elements among them, as they seem to do,* and hate them. They realise that it is inevitable that an imperial power will be hated by its subjects, but that if the rich and respectable elements in the subject states are strong, the rule of the Athenian people will only last for a very brief period; that is why they disfranchise the respectable elements, and fine, exile and kill them, but support the masses. Respectable Athenians, however, protect the interest of the respectable people in the allied cities, realising that

15 It is always in their interests to do so. Some might main- tain that the strength of Athens lies in the allies being wealthy enough to pay tax, but to the common people it seems more advantageous for individual Athenians to possess the wealth of their allies and for them to retain enough to live on, and to work without being in a position to plot.

16 There is a feeling that the Athenians are ill advised to compel their allies to sail to Athens for legal proceedings. In reply, the Athenians enumerate the resulting benefits for the Athenian people: first, the legal deposits finance state pay for the year; secondly, they control the allied cities while staying at home without the necessity of going on voyages, and in the lawcourts they support the democrats and destroy their opponents, while if each state held its trials in its own city, because of their hostility towards Athens they would ruin those of their own citizens who appeared to be particularly in favour

17 with the ordinary people of Athens. There are also other benefits which the Athenian people reap from the fact that cases involving the allies are heard at Athens: first, the 1% tax levied in the Peiraeus brings in a greater

* This phrase is probably corrupt.

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revenue; then, individuals who own rooms to let, a carriage, or have a slave for hire make a greater profit; thirdly, the heralds make more because of the visits of

18 the allies. In addition to this, if the allies did not come for trials, they would only respect those Athenians who go abroad – the strategoi, the trierarchs and the ambas- sadors; but as it is, each individual ally is compelled to flatter the common people of Athens, realising that, having come to Athens, the penalty or satisfaction that he receives at law depends solely upon the common people; such is the law at Athens. Therefore he is com- pelled to plead humbly in the courts and to seize people’s hands as supplicant as they enter. This situation has increased the subjection of the allies to the people of Athens.

19 Moreover, because the Athenians own property abroad and public duties take them abroad, they and their attendants have learnt to row almost without realising it; for it is inevitable that a man who goes on frequent voyages will take an oar, and learn nautical

20 Terminology, and the same is true of his servant. Experi- ence of voyages and practice makes them good helmsmen, some learning in smaller boats, others in merchantmen,

and others graduating to triremes; the majority are competent rowers as soon as they board their ships be- cause of previous practice throughout their lives.

II Their hoplite force, which seems to be the least effective arm at Athens, is based on the following principle: they realise that they are inferior to their enemies in skill and numbers, but compared with their tribute-paying allies they are the strongest by land as well as by sea, and they think that their hoplite force is

2 Sufficient if they maintain this superiority. There is a further factor which happens to affect them: it is possible for small subject cities on the mainland to unite and form a single army, but in a sea empire it is not possible for those who are islanders to combine their forces, for the sea divides them, and their rulers control the sea. Even if it is possible for islanders to assemble unnoticed on one

3 island, they will die of starvation. Of the mainland 41

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cities which Athens controls, the large ones are ruled by fear, the small by sheer necessity; there is no city which does not need to import or export something, but this will not be possible unless they submit to those who control the sea.

4 Further, it is possible for the rulers of the sea to do what land powers cannot always do; they can ravage the land of more powerful states. They can sail along the coast to an area where the enemy forces are few or non-existent, and if the enemy approach they can embark and sail away; in this way they get into less difficulty than those

5 operating on land. Then again, the rulers of the sea can sail as far as you ‘like from their own land, but land powers cannot make lengthy expeditions from their own territory, for marching’ is slow, and it is not possible to take provisions for a long period when travelling on foot. Also, a land force must march through friendly territory or win a passage by force, but a naval force can disembark where it is stronger and not do so where it is not, but sail on until it reaches friendly territory or a less

6 powerful state. Further, the strongest land powers are badly affected when disease strikes their crops, but sea powers are not troubled, for the whole world is not affected simultaneously, and they can import from a prosperous area.

7 To turn to less important matters, because of their control of the sea, the Athenians have mingled with peoples in different areas and discovered various gastro- nomic luxuries; the specialities of Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, Pontus, the Peloponnese or any other area have all been brought back to Athens because of their

8 control of the sea. They hear all dialects, and pick one thing from one, another from another; the other Greeks tend to adhere to their own dialect and way of life and dress, but the Athenians have mingled elements from all Greeks and foreigners.

9 The common people realise that it is not possible for each of the poor to sacrifice, hold feasts and build shrines and to run a beautiful and great city, but they have found a way of having sacrifices, rites, festivals and

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sanctuaries: they make frequent public sacrifices as a city, but it is the people who enjoy the feasts and to whom

10 the victims are allotted. There are some private gym- nasia, baths and changing-rooms belonging to the rich, but the people have built many wrestling-places, changing-rooms and public baths for their own use, and the rabble get more benefit from them than the few who are well off.

11 They alone of Greeks and foreigners can be wealthy: where will a city rich in timber for ship-building dispose of its goods without the agreement of the rulers of the sea? If a city is wealthy in iron, copper or flax, where will it dispose of its goods without the consent of the rulers of the sea? But these are just what I need for ships— wood from one, iron from another, and copper, flax and

12 wax from others. In addition, exports to any city hostile to us will be forbidden on pain of being barred from the sea. Although I do nothing, I have all these products of the land because of the sea, while no other city has two of them; no city has both timber and flax, but where there is an abundance of flax the ground is level and treeless, nor do copper and iron come from the same city, nor any two or three of the other products from one place but one from one city, another from another.

13 In addition to this, every mainland state has either a projecting headland or an offshore island or a narrow strait where it is possible for those who control the sea to put in and harm those who dwell there.

14 There is one weakness in the Athenian position: as rulers of the sea, if they lived on an island, it would be open to them to harm their enemies if they wished while remaining themselves immune from devastation of their land or invasion as long as they controlled the sea; in the present situation the farmers and the wealthy Athenians are more inclined to make up to the enemy, but the common people live without fear and do no such thing because they know that none of their property will be

15 burnt or destroyed. In addition to this, if they lived on an island, they would also be freed from the fear of the city being betrayed by oligarchs, or the gates opened,

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or the enemy being let in; for how could this happen if they lived on an island? Again, there would be no chance of anyone’s staging a coup against the common people; in the present situation, if anyone planned a coup, he would do so in the hope of bringing in the city’s enemies by land; if Athens were an island, this fear also

16 would be removed. Since it happens that the city was not founded on an island, they handle the situation as follows: they deposit all their property on islands, relying on their control of the sea, and they disregard any devastation of Attica, realising that if they allow them- selves to be moved by this, they will be deprived of other greater benefits

17 Further, it is essential for oligarchic cities to observe treaties and oaths; if they do not abide by agreements, or if injustice is committed, the names of those respon- sible are available in a small body. But when the whole people makes an agreement, it is possible for them to lay the blame on the man who spoke and the man who put it to the vote, and for the others to deny that they were present or approved of an agreement which they discover was made by the whole citizen body;* if it seems in- advisable for a decision to be followed, there are a thousand excuses available for not doing what they do not want to do. If a decision of the people turns out badly, they blame a few men acting against their interests, but if things go well, they take the credit for themselves

18 They do not allow comedians to attack the people so that they may not be abused themselves; they encourage personal attacks if anyone wishes, knowing that the butts of comedy are not for the most part of the com- mon people nor from the masses, but rich or noble or powerful; only a few of the poor, ordinary citizens are attacked in comedy, and they only because they meddle in everything or try to become too influential; therefore the people do not object even to the ridiculing of such men.

19 Therefore it is my view that the common people at * Corruption of the text makes it impossible to be sure of the exact meaning

of this sentence.

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Athens know which citizens are respectable and which are wicked; realising that the latter are useful to them and help them, they like them despite their wickedness, but they tend to hate their respectable citizens. They do not think that their virtue exists for the common people’s advantage but the opposite. On the other hand, there are some who are truly of the common people, but are

20 not by nature on the side of the common people. I do not blame the common people for their democracy, for anyone is to be pardoned for looking after his own interests; but a man who is not of the common people and chooses to live in a city that is ruled by a democracy rather than one with an oligarchy is preparing to do wrong, and realises that it is easier to get away with being wicked

III under a democracy than under an oligarchy. As far as the Athenian constitution is concerned, I do not com- mend its type; since they chose a democratic form of government, it seems to me that they preserve their democracy well in the manner which I have described. I notice that people also find fault with the Athenians because there are occasions when it is impossible to get a matter dealt with by the Boule or the Ekklesia although one waits for a year. This happens at Athens solely because there is such pressure of business that it is not

2 possible to deal with everyone who raises a point. How could they do so when they have so many obligations? They celebrate more festivals than any other Greek city, during which there is even less possibility of transacting public business; they handle more public and private lawsuits and judicial investigations than the whole of the rest of mankind; the Boule has multifarious business to deal with concerning war, revenue, legislation, the day-to-day affairs of the city and matters affecting their allies, and has to receive the tribute and look after the dockyards and shrines. Is it remotely surprising if, with so many matters to deal with, they cannot settle every-

3 one’s business? Some say that if you approach the Boule or the people with money, then things get considered. Now I would agree that money plays a considerable part in getting things done in Athens, and it would be even

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more influential if more people employed it; however, I am absolutely sure that the city could not deal with all the requests that come before it, however much gold and

4 silver were offered. The courts are also involved if some- one does not refit a ship or builds on public land; in addition, every year they have to settle disputes about the provision of choruses at the Dionysia, the Thargelia, the Panathenaia, the Promethia and the Hephaestia. Four hundred trierarchs are appointed every year, and they must judge any appeals which arise. Further, they must examine magistrates and decide on their conduct,

5 examine orphans, and appoint guards for prisoners. This, then, happens every year. They also have to decide cases of avoidance of military service when they arise, and any other crime which suddenly occurs, such as unusual violence or impiety. I am omitting a great deal of public business, but I have listed the most important items apart from the assessments of the tribute, which

6 generally occur every four years. Well then, ought one to suppose that all these cases ought not to be dealt with? If so, let someone suggest what ought to be omitted. If then, one must agree that all these matters have to be decided, the courts must sit throughout the year, since even now when they do sit throughout the year they cannot prevent crime because of the numbers involved.

7 Well then, someone will suggest that the courts ought to sit, but the juries ought to be smaller; however, it is inevitable that, unless they have only a few courts, there will then only be a few jurors in each, with the result that it will be easy to prepare oneself to handle a small jury and bribe them; the decision will be much less just.

8 In addition to this, one must consider the fact that the Athenians have to hold festivals, during which no trials can take place, and they have twice as many as other states. However, even if one were to assume for the sake of argument that they only held as many as the state which holds fewest, even then it would be impossible in my view for affairs at Athens to be arranged other than they are now, except for minor changes here and there; significant alterations cannot be made without taking

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9 away something from the democracy. Many suggestions can be made for improving the constitution, but it is not easy to find satisfactory ways of improving it while preserving the democracy intact, except, as I have just said, for minor changes.

10 There seems to be a further way in which the Athen- ians are ill advised, in that they support the lower classes in cities involved in civil strife. There is, however, a reason for what they do: if they supported the more reputable citizens, they would not be supporting those with the same views as their own, for there is no city where the aristocrats are well disposed to the common people, but in each city the lowest element is well disposed to them. After all, like favours like; therefore the Athenians support those sympathetic to themselves.

11 Whenever they tried to support the aristocrats it was not to their advantage; it was not long before the people were enslaved in Boeotia, and when they supported the aristocrats in Miletus, within a short time they revolted and massacred the common people; again, when they supported the Spartans instead of the Messenians, with- in a short time the Spartans had overcome the Mess- enians and were at war with the Athenians.

12 It might be suggested that nobody has in fact been unjustly deprived of his citizenship at Athens; it is my view that there have been some cases, but not many. However, it would need a considerable number ‘to launch an attack on the democracy at Athens; since this is so, one must not consider those who have been justly disfranchised, but any who have lost their rights unjustly. How could anyone suppose that the majority had been unjustly disfranchised in Athens where it is the common people who hold the magistracies ? People lose their rights for offences during their tenure of magistracies or for saying or doing what is not just. From these considera- tions one must conclude that those who have been disfranchised at Athens pose no threat.

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