From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: Secret algorithm [Re: Clipper Chip and crypto key-escrow]
Keywords: encryption, wiretap, clipper, key-escrow, Mykotronx
Organization: DSI/USCRPAC
Lines: 57


Though some may argue about the nose of the camel, it's worth noting that
the government proposal is limited to scrambled telephony. If it is only
used for that purpose, and does not extend to electronic mail or file
encryption, then it IS an improvement over the current mass-produced
standard civilian technology which, with a few exceptions, is limited to
easy-to-break inverters.

Note that the big issue for the feds is the continued ability to wiretap.
Before we go off the deep end with long discusions about secure crypto for
e-mail and files, let's focus on this.

One question that was not asked in the release is whether this proposal is
limited to telephony, or if the government intends to expand it.

Though I share many of the concerns expressed by some, I find the proposal
less threatening than many others, since right now most Americans have no
secure telephony, and any jerk with a pair of clip leads and a "goat" can
eavesdrop. This would also plug up the security hole in cellular and
cordless phones.

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Reading between the lines, I infer that the system is highly secure
without access to the keys. This would meet the needs of U.S. businesses
confronted by rich and powerful adversaries, including French and Japanese
security services and rich Japanese companies. It allows the NSA to make
available some of its better stuff while protecting law enforcement needs.

Most legitimate U.S. corporations trust the NSA, and would be delighted to
have a high-security system certified by them, even at the price of
depositing keys in escrow. I see no difficulty in creating a reliable
escrow. Corporations entrust their secrets to attorneys every day of the
week, and that system has worked pretty well.

From my point of view this is a fair starting point. There are concerns that
need to be addressed, including the reliability of the escrows. But in
return we get access to high-security crypto. Many have suggested that DES
and other systems may be breakable by the NSA and hence others similarly
skilled and endowed. There is at least a good possibility (which should be
checked) that the proposed system is not so breakable. It doesn't have to
be, nor does it have to have trapdoors, if the government can get the keys
pursuant to a legitimate court order. Thus they can protect legitimate
communications against economic adversaries, while still being able to
eavesdrop on crooks pursuant to a court order.

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In discussing this, let's try to avoid the nastiness, personal attacks and
noise of some previous threads. This is a substantive and technical issue,
and personal remarks have no place in such a discussion.

-- 
David Sternlight         Great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of
                         our information, errors and omissions excepted.  


