From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Do we need the clipper for cheap security?
Organization: Partnership for an America Free Drug
Lines: 53

amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker) writes:
>> The answer seems obvious to me, they wouldn't.  There is other hardware 
>> out there not compromised.  DES as an example (triple DES as a better 
>> one.) 
>
>So, where can I buy a DES-encrypted cellular phone?  How much does it cost?
>Personally, Cylink stuff is out of my budget for personal use :)...

If the Clipper chip can do cheap crypto for the masses, obviously one
could do the same thing WITHOUT building in back doors.

Indeed, even without special engineering, you can construct a good
system right now. A standard codec chip, a chip to do vocoding, a DES
chip, a V32bis integrated modem module, and a small processor to do
glue work, are all you need to have a secure phone. You can dump one
or more of the above if you have a fast processor. With integration,
you could put all of them onto a single chip -- and in the future they
can be.

Yes, cheap crypto is good -- but we don't need it from the government.
You can do everything the clipper chip can do without needing it to be
compromised. When the White House releases stuff saying "this is good
because it gives people privacy", note that we didn't need them to
give us privacy, the capability is available using commercial hardware
right now.

Indeed, were it not for the government doing everything possible to
stop them, Qualcomm would have designed strong encryption right in to
the CDMA cellular phone system they are pioneering. Were it not for
the NSA and company, cheap encryption systems would be everywhere. As
it is, they try every trick in the book to stop it. Had it not been
for them, I'm sure cheap secure phones would be out right now.

They aren't the ones making cheap crypto available. They are the ones
keeping cheap crypto out of people's hands. When they hand you a
clipper chip, what you are getting is a mess of pottage -- your prize
for having traded in your birthright.

And what did we buy with our birthright? Did we get safety from
foreigners? No. They can read conference papers as well as anyone else
and are using strong cryptography. Did we get safety from professional
terrorists? I suspect that they can get cryptosystems themselves on
the open market that work just fine -- most of them can't be idiots
like the guys that bombed the trade center. Are we getting cheaper
crypto for ourselves? No, because the market would have provided that
on its own had they not deliberately sabotaged it.

Someone please tell me what exactly we get in our social contract in
exchange for giving up our right to strong cryptography?
--
Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
--
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.
