From: amolitor@nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor)
Subject: Re: Once tapped, your code is no good any more.
Organization: Department of Mathematical Sciences
Lines: 38
Distribution: na
NNTP-Posting-Host: moink.nmsu.edu

In article <tcmayC5M2xv.JEx@netcom.com>
	tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:
>
>But is it any worse than the current unsecure system? It becomes much
>worse, of course, if the government then uses this "Clinton Clipper"
>to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption. (This is the main
>concern of most of us, I think. The camel's nose in the tent, etc.)
>

	Not to pick on Mr. May in particular, of course, but isn't this
kind of the domino theory? When one little country falls, its neighbor
will surely follow, and before you know it, we're all mining salt
in Siberia for not turning in our Captain Crunch Secret Decoder Rings.

	Surely the hypothesis relying on the least wild assumptions is
to take this at face value. Our lads at the fort were asked to cook up
something that's pretty secure, with a key that can be escrowed neatly,
and they did. The government plans to sell this thing, for the reasons
they state. Yes, those evil guys in the FBI can probably, with some
effort, abuse the system. I got news for you, if the evil guys in
the FBI decide they want to persecute you, they're gonna, and you're
gonna hate it. Fact is, the FBI doesn't want to listen to your phone
calls, and if they do, and if you're using triple-DES, they'll just
get a parabolic microphone and point it at your head.

	This is pretty clearly an effort by the government to do exactly
what they're saying they're doing. As is typical with governments,
it's mismanaged, and full of holes and compromises. As is typical
with our government, it's not too bad, could be worse.

	My interpretation.

	Andrew

>-Tim May, whose sig block may get him busted in the New Regime
                           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

	Isn't this just a little melodramatic?
