South korea

THREE

South Korea: A Suspicious Power Resistant to Charm

This chapter examines China and Japan's efforts to woo South Korea. Though geographically a small country, South Korea is a global economic powerhouse, boasting the fifteenth-biggest GDP in the world in 2oro. The country is an immediate neighbor and a major trading partner with both . Japan and China. Cultural exchanges among the three are also vibrant. Lo- cated on the Thirty-Eighth Parallel, South Korea bears vital security im- portance to the whole region. Wooing this vital neighbor, however, turns out to be exceedingly difficult for China and Japan.

One factor distinguishes South Korea as a recipient context: A history of combined ancient superiority and recent humiliation has created a high level of South Korean sensitivity to dominance by a bigger power. This factor has limited the effectiveness of any charm offensive by its neigh- bors. Neither China nor Japan has much credibility in striking a common value chord with the South Korean public, which remains intuitively sus- picious of any hint at being dwarfed. Pride, sensitivity, and ambition join together to create an emotionally closed South Korea, with bigger powers persistently suspected and frequently bashed. Indeed, the South Korean case may reveal the limits of charm offensives when recipients instinctively reject the wooing for the sake of protecting national character.

China and Japan do not share the same starting line on developing rela- tions with South Korea. As North Korea's most important ally, China did not normalize relations with South Korea until 1992, long after Japan did so in r965. This chapter thus offers a more detailed treatment ofJapan- South Korea relations. An immediate impression is that a longer history

86

South Korea 87

of formal relations has not greatly helped Japan. Despite security and for- mal political connections, postwar Korea's rejection of Japan was compre- hensive. Denied access to the Korean society, Japan could not construct its own image but remained at the mercy of the South Korean governing elites. These elites, authoritarian or democratic, often found incentives to heed rather than to transcend popular hatred ofJapan.ln such a context, Japanese government mistakes (often stemming from the elites' neglect of Korean sensitivities) would justify their country's lack of repentance, whereas Japan's improvements were dismissed or rendered irrelevant. The consequence is that Japan was being modeled in substantive terms with- out receiving acknowledgment. This is the opposite of soft power, leading Japanese observers to lament that the country became a sheep wearing wolf's clothing.'

Recent cultural exchanges between Japan and South Korea have cre- ated much media sensation but have done little to enhance Japan's political capital. Taking one step beyond the colorful world of cuisine, fashion, and TV dramas, there is scant evidence that either the "Korean wave" or the "Japanese wind" has led to mutual support for key issues like Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or how to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons. These exchanges have also done surprisingly little to improve Japan's image among Korean citizens, a situ- ation Tokyo finds frustrating: Neither a "cool]apan" nor a shared demo- cratic identity has pulled South Korea significantly closer. In fact, as one Korean scholar suggests, the lowering of Korean hostility toward Japan has resulted partly from Japan's relative decline. 2 The trend from "Japan- bashing" to "Japan-passing" can hardly be called a victory of soft power.

China also has not effectively wooed South Korea and has succeeded largely in material terms alone. Like Japan, China has yet to win Korean hearts and minds. Three reasons explain the lack of success of Beijing's charm offensive. First, China is far from innocent in the Korean collec- tive memory. As China's leaders attempt to use history as a bond to build a Japan-targeted "grievance alliance" with South Korea, they soon realize that history can backfire and that Korean anger will soon turn to China. In other words, China has simply been another Other on which the Korean nation relies to stress its heroic quest for independence. Second, Beijing has been squeezed by a conflict between domestic and diplomatic agen- das. Driven by a persistent fear of ethnic tension, China has sacrificed soft diplomatic gestures to maintain stability in the domestic realm, as in the Goguryeo dispute with South Korea. Third, stereotyping remains ram- pant on both the Chinese and Korean sides. In particular, signs indicate

88 JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

that South Korea may have surpassed Japan as a prime target of Chinese

popular ridicule. This chapter concludes with an assessment of the consequences o~ ~-e

lack of soft power among China, Japan, and South Korea. With sensltlVI- ties repeatedly poked, leaders of these three countries remain haunted by abstract yet tangible "national feeling," and they are often reluctant to lend support to each other's diplomatic priorities. Furthermore, a zero-sum mentality embedded in a trilateral setting creates a tendency for go~ern­ ments to perceive that hostility in one set of relations ofte~ presents Itself as a good opportunity to boost cordiality elsewhere. Wo~mg has become a confrontational mechanism, since it aims to create discord elsewhere and gaining benefits. Overall, high emotional barrie~s hav~ rende~ed these three Northeast Asian powers underachievers in reg10nalmtegratron.

Historical Context: Korea as the Absolute Good and

Japan as the Other

Korea is much closer to China than is either Southeast Asia or Japan. Lack of daunting physical barriers also made the country an_ideall_and bridg~ for passing on Chinese culture and advanced knowledge, ~c~udmg Budd~Is~, Chinese characters medicines, and architecture. Proxmnty to the reg10n s

' 0 ' civilization center and its role as a messenger helped the rise of Koreas "little China mentality [xiao zhong hua yi shz]"-a sense of superiority to

the world beyond China. 3

This mentality clearly influenced Korean perceptions of Japan, a ~a- jor recipient of Chinese knowledge through the Korean ~hannel. As ~m Young-jak points out, whereas historical documents and h~era~e wntten in] apan frequently refer to the Korean Peninsula, Korean histoncal ~ecords offer scant references to Japan.4 Underneath this low level of attention was condescension. The few Korean writings that mentioned Japan generally used the term wo, which carried connotation of dwarfs. Other derogatory terms included do'i (barbarian islanders) and i'teki (barbarian aliens),

5 As a

result of damage caused by seaborne Japanese marauders, people living in Japan were also called waegu (dwarf bandits), a derogat?ry term that ap- peared in Chinese historical records (wokou) as well. Ancient Korea shared China's view of] a pan as backwater inhabited by uncultured people.

Japan's image worsened after Toyotomi Hideyoshi's two in~asions_ of Korea in the 1 59os. Both incursions eventually failed after Ming Chi~a sent in troops to fight on the Korean side. Yet during the war, Toyotorm's army occupied large parts of Korea, including Seoul and Pyongyang, and

South Korea

crushed the Korean economy. Official Korean documents claimed that arable land dropped to two-thirds of its prewar levels.6 Famines ensued, along with losses of cultural assets such as archives and skilled artisans.7 Paradoxically, Korea's weak response justified the impression of Japanese barbarism. If anything,Japan now acquired a new layer of wickedness, as it was not only uncivilized but also hostile. Korea's contacts with the Japanese Bakufu government resumed a decade later, but a mixture of condescen- sion and humiliation still haunted Korean perceptions ofJapan. 8

The little China mentality did not affect only Korean's perception of lesser powers such as Japan. In fact, this superiority complex later turned on China, particularly after it was conquered by the Manchus. Mainstream scholarship contends that consecutive Korean dynasties regarded Confu- cianism, especially Song scholar Zhu Xi's interpretation of it, as the es- sence of Chinese civilization.9 Under this assumption, a delinking of Chi- neseness (a cultural concept) from China (a physical concept) occurred, thereby guaranteeing that China's decline would not hurt Korean faith in the superiority of the Chinese civilization. In fact, China's domination by a non-Chinese ethnic group and consequent weakening only strengthened a sense that Korea had become the genuine embodiment of the Chinese civilization. Where this civilization first emerged no longer mattered as much as who had become its savior. Japanese scholar Ogura Kizo neatly SUll1Illarizes this transformation as a series of equivalences: Korea = Zhu Xi's strand of Confucianism = Chineseness = Civilization.'0

This faith in Korea as the protector of a more advanced civilization helped the country's governing conservatives weather the storm of the late nineteenth century. Neither China's humiliating defeat by Britain nor Ja- pan's opening fundamentally toppled Korea's conviction of the superiority ofKorean culture-cum-civilization. Although in 1881 the Korean govern- ment sent a high-ranking delegation to the newly opened Japan to study its modernizing experiences, some members were apparently unimpressed, waving aside Japan's changes and questioning the necessity of exchanges with such an inferior country. 11

An even bigger frustration came from those who initially viewed Japan with awe and inspiration but later felt betrayed by the country's policies. The contrast between Meiji Japan and Qing China-the former success- fully confronting challenges from the West and the latter in hopeless de- dine-convinced some Korean intellectuals that a new model was on the rise to their east and that Japan would assist Korea on its quest for modern- ization. Kim Okgyun, a leading Korean intellectual, envisioned Asia's future unfolding with Japan as Asia's Britain and Korea as the region's FranceY

JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

It was a one-sided love. Mainstream Japanese intellectuals such as Fu- kuzawa viewed Korea, along with China, as Japan's akuyu (bad friends) and believed that "nothing could be more stupid than to expect anything from China and Korea."13 Jiji Shimpo, Fukuzawa's newspaper, was even blunter: "For the sake of the Korean people, we are wishing for the death of their country."i4 Although such Japanese disparagement seemed to target the inept Korean government, such editorial comments backed a larger plan for a superior Japan to lead the way in modernizing the rest of inferior Asia in accordance with a Western model. In practice, the 1876 Treaty of Gang- hwa, whose first clause read, "Korea, as an independent country, enjoys the same rights as Japan does," proved only the first step toward Japan's eventual domination over Korea.

As Korea became a Japanese colony in 1910, the betrayal became com- plete. Brutal Japanization policies sought to eliminate every trace of the Korean culture, including the language and national costumes. One un-

f h . ( " 1 1 "d ") 15 • intended consequence o sue suppressions or cu tura genoci e IS

that Korean conservatives' outdated conviction in Korean superiority was vindicated rather than nullified, and the country remained the "absolute good."l6 Modern Korean nationalism hence sought to "restore" the coun- try's superior uniqueness that had been ruthlessly trounced by Japanese colonizers. Japan became the Other against which Korea's tragic yet heroic

nationalist myth was constructed.

Japan's Image during the Rhee Years: Deepening of Suspicion

and Disregard

The first generation of South Korean leaders was staunchly nationalistic. President Syngman Rhee gained a reputation as a patriot for his long strug- gle against Japanese rule. Rhee saw little sense in embracing a country that had just traumatized his homeland for nearly half a century. Indeed, Rhee tried his best to avoid talking to Japan in a bilateral setting. Only when the United States turned down his request to have South Korea become a sig- natory of the San Francisco Treaty did bilateral contact with Japan become unavoidableP Yet with the shadow of suspicion looming large, Koreans would have great difficulty finding the postwar Japanese state attractive.

The Japanese did not ease the situation, devoting little attention to Korean sensitivities. On the contrary, leading Japanese politicians repeat- edly made remarks that exacerbated Korean suspicions. During the Korean War, for example, the Yoshida administration dispatched Japanese marines to assist the United States in naval minesweeping operations. When ques-

South Korea

tioned about whether this act would violate Japan's pacifist constitution, Yoshida argued that waters surrounding Korea constituted Japan's "tradi- tional maritime jurisdiction," so dispatching troops there was a domestic rather than international issue, a stance the Rhee government vehemently protested. 18 Yoshida again hit a Korean nerve when it responded to a Ko- rean request for Japanese reparations for colonialism by proposing that any payments should be mutual, since Japan also deserved compensation for assisting Korea's modernization. 19

Japan's dismissiveness and Korea's suspicion fed on each other and sent bilateral relations to the bottom. Three months after Japan made its "re- versed reparation request [gyaku seikyuken]," on January 18, 1952, Rhee abruptly announced South Korea's sovereign control over between fifty and sixty nautical miles of nearby waters, declaring that Korean boats would have exclusive fishing right in this area. After the statement, com- monly referred to as the Syngman Rhee Line, Korean troops opened fire on Japanese ships and arrested Japanese fishermen. According to Japanese estimates, by the time the two countries normalized relations in 1965, the statement and its ensuing policies had led to the arrests of nearly 4,000 Japanese, seizures of 328 Japanese boats, and 44 casualties. Financial losses totaled nearly nine billion yen. 20 While avoiding a direct military show- down, Japanese politicians continued to disregard Korean sensitivities. Kubota Kan'ichiro, chief negotiator for normalization talks, stated that "Japan's colonial control benefited Korea," leading the furious Koreans to cancel the talks.2 1

In short, a string of acrimonious incidents attested to the low level of trust between the two countries. The lack of Japanese efforts to redress past grievances aggravated Koreans' existing suspicions.A U.S.-led alliance was the lone factor binding Korea and Japan, and virtually no wooing took place during this period.

Japan, Made in Korea

Japan-South Korea relations improved significantly following Rhee's forced departure in 1960. Chang Myon, the prime minister and South Ko- rea's de facto leader, set resuming normalization talks with Japan as his top diplomatic priority. Resisting popular protests, Chang liberated Park Heung-sik, an influential entrepreneur purged by Rhee as a consequence of his ties with the Japanese during colonial years, and used him as a per- sonal messenger with Tokyo. On the Japanese side, the pro-South Korea faction (chinkan ha) was also on the rise within the ruling Liberal Demo-

JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

cratic Party. The faction's leader, Yagi Nobuo, was a ~o~mer colonial a~­ ministrator and had extensive connections with key pohncal and economic

figures on both sides.ZZ . , . . Such personal pipelines were undisturbed by South Korea s JO~t I~ to

a military dictatorship. In fact, Park Chung-hee, the new authontanan leader was known for his deep roots in Japan. A graduate of a Japanese milita~ academy, Park achieved the rank of lieutenant whil~ fighting wi~ the Japanese military and adopted the Japanese name Takaki Masao. Parks familiarity with Japan was further reinforced by his selection of pro-Japan figures most notably Professor Yi Yong-hui from Seoul University and law- maker Park Cheol-on, to continue the tradition of personal diplomacy.

23

In spite of the visible improvements, normalization had its limits: The process did not involve the two sides reaching a con~ensus on the past. The Japanese chose to evade rather than to tackle an Is.sue that was tremen- dously emotionally charged for many Koreans. For Its part, the Park gov- ernment driven by the desire to speed up economic development and by

' MQ U.S. pressure, agreed to bypass history rather than to confront Japan. . n the most contentious topic-whether the 1910 Japan-Korea Annexatlon Treaty was legitimate at the time of its signing-the final wording of. the normalization statement could not have been more vague: The two sides "confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of]apan and the Empire ofKorea on or before August 22, ~910, ar~ already null and void." The ambivalence of already allowed both sides to mterpret the meaning as they saw fit: Whereas the Japanese insisted that already meant that the treaty was legitimate at the time, the Korean government

th l d "fr d ,zs told its discontented people at a rea ry meant om ay one. These bifurcated explanations attest to the hasty nature of the normal-

ization talks. Expediency might help the two sides officially reco~ize each other, but it carried a political price. Japan set up an embassy m Seoul and poured in capital, but the effort did little to alleviate Korean popular disdain for Japan. With no attempt to redress Korean grievances, Japan gained little political capital in return. In fact, its reputation deficit deep- ened because it normalized ties with a military regime. The South Ko- rean public did not believe that history had finally been put t? rest; on the contrary, a new grievance was hom, as many Koreans perceived the Park government as treasonously reaching out to a former enemy at the cost of burying history.26 With emotional wounds left untreated, the past would

inevitably boomerang back to disrupt the present. . Furthermore, Japan remained generally blocked from Korean society.

Japan's image remained at the mercy of the Korean governing elites, who

South Korea 93

would winnow or frame certain aspects of]apan to fit their own agendas. Park's Japanese roots ran deep, yet even he could not remain totally deaf to the public disgruntlement regarding normalization, and he still needed to speak like a staunch nationalist. In justifying the need to reach out to J a- pan, Park admitted his purely utilitarian purpose of preventing the spread of communism. Right after the normalization treaty was signed, Park told the nation that he realized that the negotiating process with South Korea's "hatred-filled" enemy had caused much pain and that he understood the suffering of the six hundred thousand Koreans still residing in Japan. Nev- ertheless, Park argued, he must let go of the bitter emotions of the past to best serve Korea's future. 27

The Chang-Park era saw a slight loosening of cultural exchanges be- tween Japan and South Korea. The Seoul University of Foreign Languages began offering a Japanese language major in 1961, and book exchanges among schools commenced from 1965. However, Park largely sustained Rhee's closure of South Korea to Japanese cultural influences, rejecting or postponing a number of Japanese soft initiatives, including proposals to open a cultural office and to establish a joint cultural exchange commit- tee.28 Park took a heavy-handed approach to limiting the inflow of Japa- nese cultural products, launching nationwide campaigns to ban and confis- cate Japanese records and movies. Japanese popular books and magazines were rejected on the grounds that they were being violent, sexist, and in poor taste.29

South Korea, however, faced a dilemma: Modernizing would render inevitable some kinds of! earning from Japan. As Nam Ki-jeong points out, whereas the double quests for autonomy and modernization work in syn- ergy for many newly industrializing countries, the two were on a collision course in the Korean context, as modernization evoked painful memories of the loss of Korea's independence to Japan. 30 To keep both endeavors on track would thus require some balancing mechanisms.

South Korean students were dispatched to Japan, where most of them would major in natural sciences and engineering. But attention to such substantive learning was more than offset by denunciations of the pur- ported low quality of]apan's popular culture. Moreover, interest in Japan's social sciences was low, as mainstream Korean intellectuals continued to disregard Japanese achievements in these areas as nothing more than trans- lating Western knowledge and thus not "genuine," an attitude that consti- tuted a natural extension of Korea's deeply entrenched sense of cultural superiority vis-a-vis Japan. 31

All these trends worked to the detriment of Japan's goal of enhancing

94 JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

its political capital. Japan became a model in actual terms without being acknowledged, let alone embraced. Even in the censored realm of popular culture, learning was happening, as large numbers of Japanese songs were readapted into the Korean language and became quite popular. Novels and animations were also translated informally or re-created as Korean works. The Korean public obviously found little tension between concealed learn- ing from and open rejection of]apan. The Japanese showed little interest in wooing South Korea, in partly because the Korean regime blocked mas- sive anti-Japan protests like those Tanaka Kakuei experienced in Thailand and Indonesia. Trade and investment proceeded largely undisturbed in

spite of political antipathy. . In addition, Japan's left-leaning forces were never btg fans of South

Korea. Even for the public in the middle, discrimination against Koreans as "third-ranking nationals [santo kokumin]" remained deeply entrenched. The stereotype of Koreans as unlawful and violent was somehow "justified" by a series of violent incidents in the I 97os, most notably the kidna~ping of Kim Dae-jung in 1973 and the assassination ofYuk Young-sao, wtfe of Park Chung-hee, in 1974. Kim's kidnapping was carried out by South Ko- rean secret agents on Japanese soil, a blatant breach of]apan's sovereignty. And although Yuk was killed in Seoul, the assassin, Mun Seg-wang, was a Japan-born Korean. Media coverage of these incidents caused Japanese perceptions of both South Korea as a state and its people plummeted.

32

Unlike the "China frenzy'' during roughly the same period, popular enthu- siasm for warming up to South Korea was scant.

The "Japan made in Korea" phenomenon continued into the final phase of authoritarian rule by Chun Doo-hwan in the 198os. Unlike Pa~k, Chun and his supporting military officers belonged to the postcolomal Hangeul generation. Though they lacked personal grievances caused by Japanese colonial control, patriotic upbringing and a :rul~tary back~ound made Chun and his army cohort firm nationalists. To JUstify the legtttmacy of his coup, Chun purged people with close connections with the Park re- gime, including those personal pipelines between South Korea and Japan. Japanese prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro attempted to build a personal rapport with Chun much as he did with China's Hu Yaobang. ~akasone chose South Korea for his first official visit, and in 1984, Chun m return became the first South Korean head of state to set foot on Japanese soil. During Chun's visit, Emperor Hirohito expressed his "genuine regret" over the "unfortunate past" and vowed not to repeat it, a remark that Ko- rea interpreted as a major attitudinal improvement. 33 Interactions between Nakasone and Chun, along with U.S. president Ronald Reagan's staunch

South Korea 95

support for both, led to a popular perception of a Reagan-Nakasone-Chun triangle. 34

However, Japan's reputational recovery was hardly noticeable. Un- like Hu in China, Chun was deeply unpopular inside South Korea. Any personal courting thus ended up doing little to improve Japan's popular image among ordinary Koreans. Furthermore, South Korea under Chun remained closed to Japanese cultural penetration. Into the early 199os, in- tellectuals continued to bash pop culture as an "invasion waged by Japanese cultural imperialism" and an "intentional act to exert a bad influence on the Korean youth."35 Two rounds of disputes regarding history textbooks in the 198os led South Korea to form a protest alliance with China, a country South Korea had not officially recognized, to denounce Japan's alleged at- tempts to revive militarism. Though no longer bound by the humiliation complex, Chun also brought up the reparation issue, not in the name of putting history to rest but in the name of South Korea acting as a defensive shield for a pacifist Japan: Japan should pay for that service. 36

Thus, during South Korea's authoritarian years, material connections with Japan strengthened markedly in terms of politics, security, and eco- nomics. However, Japan made little progress in winning acceptance from the Korean public. Being emulated without being credited is the precise opposite of soft power. By gliding over history in the normalization treaty, Japan seemed to offer only a lukewarm response to many Koreans' deepest grievance.

Japan also seemed to care little about Korean perceptions. In fact, as long as economic activities remained undisturbed, consecutive Japanese governments remained quiet about South Korea's discriminating policies against Japanese cultural influence. In retrospect, neither this "image sub- contracting" nor Tokyo's tolerance helped Japan gain appreciation from the Korean public. As South Korea became democratic, many Koreans be- gan to take Japan's cozy relations with the dictators as one more piece of evidence of the country's exploitative nature. Protesting against Japan now became a way to celebrate the hard-won democracy.

Democratization without a Democratic Bond

Until South Korea's democratization, Japan added to rather than shed its heavy political capital deficit. At that point, all the problems that the mili- tary regimes had suppressed resurfaced. Instead of becoming a bonding factor, South Korea's democratic identity has become a new channel for releasing anger at Japan. On the Japanese side, despite the sensation that

JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

the cultural Korean wave has stirred up, the public remained tepid overall toward South Korea.

Poll numbers reflect this absence of charm. Japanese hostility toward South Korea lessened, but the majority of the Japanese respondents were willing to be neutral toward South Korea when surveys offered that option. In three polls jointly sponsored by two national newspapers in Japan and South Korea in zooo, 2ooi, and zoos (thus covering the high-profile 2002 Soccer World Cup, co-hosted by Japan and Korea, as well as the Korean wave),37 6o percent of the Japanese said they neither liked nor disliked South Korea, a number that fluctuated by only I percentage point over the three polls. However, the percentage of those who disliked South Korea kept rising, topping the percentage of those who liked South Korea in zoos (figure 9).

South Korean respondents consistently ranked Japan as the country they disliked the most. Even in I 999 and zooo, when hostility toward Japan dropped to its nadir, the percentages of those who disliked Japan remained markedly higher than those who liked Japan. In the 2ooi and zoos polls, six in ten respondents disliked Japan. An affection gap has apparently ex- isted as the South Korean public invariably dislikes Japan much more than the Japanese public dislikes South Korea.

A long-term perspective is even more revealing. As figure 9 illustrates, between I984 (the first year such data were available) and zoos, the per- centage of South Koreans saying they liked Japan never topped 23 percent and declined from its I984 high. And even when that number was at its peak, the number who disliked Japan was I6 points higher. By zoos, only 8 percent of the Koreans polled liked Japan, while 63 percent disliked Japan. Nearly 90 percent opposed Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and 93 percent expected relations with Japan to worsen. The two countries could at least agree in their pessimism: 6I percent of Japanese respondents said they expected relations with Korea to worsen.

With such numbers, it would be hard to claim that either country has done an impressive job of winning the other's hearts and minds, though Japan's failure was more pronounced. Such failures to woo can hardly be explained as a result of leaders or governments unaware of their counter- parts' sensitivities: Japan and South Korea have dealt with each other long and known each other well. These numbers, therefore, offer powerful hints that leaders were constrained by domestic sentiments and that the need to appeal to such emotions compelled them to poke each other in the eye. This argument directly speaks to the causal chain laid out in the introduc-

South Korea

Percentage

80 --I like Japan --- I dislike Japan

-I like South Korea --- I dislike South Korea ____ ................... , ... , , \ ,. , \ ,, , \ ,, ,' \ ,

~ \ , , \ , , \ ,' , \.. , ,' ___ _, ,

70

60

50

40

30

1984 1988 1990 1995 1996 1999 2000 2001 2005

Fig. g. South Korea and Japan's gap in mutual affection (1984-2005). (Data from Asahi Shimbun, "Miraishikoh to kakokaifuku yureru nikkan kokkoh 40nen" [Fortieth anniversary of Japan-South Korea relations: Shaken by collision between future and past], June 20, 2005.)

97

tion chapter-that is, a decision about whether to woo or to respond to wooing is often conditioned by domestic agendas. But of course, leaders are not mere prisoners: When they loudly echo popular appeals, they of- ten intensify such views and make diplomatic compromises even harder to achieve.

Softening to Hardening: A Presidential Wooing Pattern

A closer examination of South Korean presidencies during the democratic era can shed some insight into the country's shifting between soft and hard diplomatic gestures toward Japan. Behind the ups and downs revealed by figure 9, there is a recurring pattern: Prior to Lee Myung-bak, all the presi- dents initially took a soft approach toward Japan. This pattern fits even Kim Young-sam (I993-98) and Roh Moo-hyun (zoo3-8), who are remem- bered for their assertiveness toward Japan. But each president eventually hardened, sometimes abruptly.

Kim Young-sam, South Korea's first democratically elected civilian president, was no stranger to Japan. Born in I 92 7, he is fluent in Japanese

JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

and, like many Koreans of his generation, was forced to acquire a Japanese name during the colonial period. But when Kim assumed the presidency, he made some wooing gestures toward Japan. One month prior to his in- auguration, Kim gave his first postvictory foreign interview to a group of Japanese journalists, pointing out that such preferential treatment symbol- ized the importance his administration would attach to Japan-South Korea

relations. 38

Some cordiality seemed to develop at the personal level between Kim and Japanese prime minister Hosokawa Morihiro. During his trip to South Korea in November 1993, Hosokawa apologized up-front for such colo- nial-era policies as depriving Koreans of their right to learn their own lan- guage, forcing them to bear Japanese names, and drafting Korean women to serve as sex slaves for the Japanese military. Hosokawa also expressed his goal of elevating bilateral relations to a level where "leaders could phone each other in a relaxed manner." 39 Kim in return highly praised Hoso- kawa's remarks on history.40 On his trip to Japan in the following year, Kim further impressed the Japanese audience with his forward-looking stance, expressing on multiple occasions the idea that the two countries should no

longer be haunted by the past.41

But Kim reserved another face for domestic consumption. Six months into his presidency, he announced a decision to tear down the national cen- tral museum, which was housed in a building that had originally served as the Japanese governor's mansion and hence symbolized humiliation for many Koreans. He explained that the destruction would "eliminate a sym- bol of Japanese imperialism and restore national self-pride."42 As long as Kim hid this face from the Japanese, relations between the two countries remained tranquil. But in late 1994, Kim showed his more assertive vis- age to Japanese audiences. The trigger was a "problematic remark [mondai hatsugen]" by Eto Takami, a minister in the Murayama Tomiichi administra- tion: Takami suggested that "not everything Japan did in Korea during the colonial era was bad. Japan also did some good things."43 Such comments by Japanese government officials could be counted on to provoke condemna- tion from China and South Korea, and like his predecessors who made such statements, Eto was forced to resign shortly thereafter. To quiet the storm, Murayama also wrote to Kim to admit the "imperialist nature" of the 1910 annexation treaty.44 But Korean and Chinese feathers were ruffled again in the summer of 1995 when the Japanese Diet passed a vaguely worded reso- lution on history. The document did more harm than good, as both China and South Korea viewed it as glossing over Japan's historical sins.

Kim struck back with at least four hardening measures: In March 1995,

South Korea 99

he indeed tore down the old governor's mansion, proclaiming that he did so to take care of the "national feeling." He also ordered the removal of huge iron sticks that the Japanese had planted in mountains. Although Japanese military documents show that the sticks had mining and measur- ing purposes, many Koreans subscribed to a conspiracy theory that the sticks blocked pungsu ifeng shui in Chinese) and thus sapped Korean spirit. Furthermore, Kim launched campaigns to eliminate Japanese-style place- names and Japanese words in everyday language. All these measures sought to achieve hanpuri, or the venting of national hatred of Japan.45 Kim saw his diplomatic offensive as justified, arguing that "a democratically elected civilian government must righteously highlight its moral superiority to that of previous military dictatorships."46

Even more worryingly to Japan, a grievance alliance was in the making between China and South Korea. During Kim's November 1995 summit with Jiang Zemin, both leaders voiced their displeasure with Tokyo's lack of repentance. Kim used the term borujammori, a colloquialism often used by adults to scold children for being idiotic, to describe Japan's attitude toward the past.47

History was not the only war zone. In February 1996,Japan and South Korea also quarreled loudly over the border of their two-hundred-nautical- mile exclusive economic zone and thus possession of Dokto/Takeshima. Kim promised his people that he would not negotiate with the Japanese on this issue, a stance that earned him a reputation for being "ultra-harsh" in dealing withJapan.48 His fervency in echoing populism also made some Koreans feel that their president was behaving more like an opposition party leader and that he was diverting public attention from his scandal- ridden cabinet.49 The same Asahi Shimbun journalists who had just hailed the arrival of a promising era in Japan-South Korea relations thanks to the open-minded Kim, now described the status of the relations as "the worst ever" and complained that Japan had become Kim's campaign tactic. 5°

The softening-to-hardening trajectory also was replicated under Presi- dent Roh Moo-hyun. Like Kim, Roh met with the Japanese press prior to his inauguration, just one week after KoizumiJun'ichiro paid his third an- nual visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Yet Roh sounded relaxed, telling Japanese journalists, "I like Mr. Koizumi's straightforwardness-He's just like me."51

Less than five months into his presidency, Roh paid a state visit to Ja- pan. Roh reassured members of the Diet, "I am here to talk not about the past but about the future." 52 Even cordiality at the personal level seemed to be repeating itself, as Koizumi and Roh staged two no-tie summits in Korean and Japanese resort towns. At the summit in Ibusukishi, Koizumi

roo JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

was in such a good mood that he invited Roh for a sand bath; however, the Korean president worried that the image of him in a Japanese bathrobe bathing with a Japanese prime minister would be too much for_ the ~o­ rean public. Ban Ki-moon, who was then serving as Ko~ean foreign rn.:n- ister, explained to his Japanese counterpart that the pre~Ident had nothmg against the bath itself and happily took it alone. 53 Despite such sore_ spots, the overall picture of]apan-South Korea relations looked encouragmg. In September 2003, Roh lifted the ban on Japanese movies, completely open- ing the Korean market to Japanese cultural products. At a_July 2004 su~­ mit, he pledged "not to raise history in the official realm wtthJapan durmg

"d . 1 "54 my presi entia tenure. But softening came to a sudden halt in March 2005. In an open letter

posted on his home page, Roh announced that he would bid farewell to his "quiet diplomacy" toward Japan and replace it with a "diplomatic war." Japan's Shimane prefectural government appeared to set off Roh's fur~r, as it announced to set February 22 as Takeshima Day to commemorate Its jurisdiction over the disputed island (which re~ained ~der South Korea's control). But Roh's declaration of a diplomatic war wtth Japan was n?t based solely on this incident. Rather, ~oh, who was riding ,?n a popu~Ist agenda, eventually caved in to domestic pressure, ~nd the Three-Pomt Package" (Yasukuni Shrine, territorial dispute, and history textbooks) boo- meranged back to disturb bilateral relations. · . . ..

Indeed, as a pioneering politician known for mastermg onhne mobiliza- tion Roh was even more prone to sentiments of younger voters, who were una;ologetically nationalistic. 55 In the initial phase of his p~esidency, R?h seemed to demonstrate courage to contain this virulent sentiment. Despite Korean press concerns that Roh was busy "bowing to Jap~~ after bowing to America" he went ahead with his summer 2003 state VISit to Japan, an act Koizuri praised.56 But Roh eventually had to take theyres:ure into consideration. According to Chi Myong-gwan, former presidential coun- selor on Korea-Japan cultural exchanges, Roh had wanted to_lift ~e. ban on Japanese movies even earlier than September 2003, yet pubhc opmion had held him back for another few months. 57

Nationalist sentiment was not Roh's only trouble, Externally, his tol- erance toward Japan hit a wall, as Koizumi was busy burnishing his own populist image by attacking not only the Chinese and Sou~ Korean gov- ernments but also Japan's diplomats for "joining the wro~g side" when ~ey tried to persuade him to stop visiting the Yasukuni Sh~me. 5~ By standm_g up to foreign governments and Japan's bureaucracy, Kmzurm added to h~s defiant, antiestablishment image. But as Roh was squeezed by domestic

South Korea IOI

stresses and foreign provocations, a hardening became inevitable. Once the route was chosen, antagonism and confrontation further fed on each other. The Roh who had promised not to put history on the table now said he had "no interest" in meeting again with Koizumi. 59 To counter Takeshima Day, Gyeongsangnam-do, the South Korean province that administered the disputed Dokto/Takeshima, announced Dokto Month. For Roh as for Kim Young-sam, bilateral relations chilled.

However, if there has ever been a honeymoon in bilateral]apan-South Korea relations, it occurred during Kim Dae-jung's presidency, which followed that of Kim Young-sam. The most crucial achievement was the r998 Kim-Obuchi joint statement. The document was unprecedented, not only because the two countries vowed to establish a partnership but also because of the remarkable progress reached on recognizing history: The Japanese government offered a formal apology for colonial control while the Korean side praised Japan's democracy and pacifist postwar path: Photographs of Kim visiting his frail]apanese teacher, published widely in Japanese newspapers, also conveyed a heartwarming image. In addition, C?ina i~advertently helped: Kim Dae-jung showed little interest in joining With Chmese leaders to shame Japan. Jiang's November r 998 visit to Tokyo was a disaster. His incessant bashings of]apan on history and his refusal to sign the partnership statement contrasted sharply with Kim's behavior as a gracious guest.

Despite this positive episode, the general soft-hard trajectory held firm. Even Kim Dae-jung followed this patter to at least some extent. With Koizumi going to Yasukuni each year, Kim~ frustration mounted, and his responses escalated from a mild "it's difficult for me to understand" the visits to "I feel indignant and strongly protest."60 After Koizumi's third visit, with only a few weeks remaining in Kim's presidency, the moderate Korean president sent an "enough-is-enough" signal by refusing to meet with Japanese foreign minister KawaguchiJunko to hear her explanation.6I

Kim Dae-jung tried to lessen Korean popular disdain for Japan, but his efforts accomplished little. Even at the height of bilateral relations, leading up to the 2002 World Cup, the percentage of Koreans who disliked Japan still far outstripped those who felt otherwise (figure 9). Despite the outside world's high regard for Kim, as evidenced by his receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, the Korean public's views of him remained divided along regional and ideologicallines.

62 The only area on which the Korean people reached

consensus was precisely the one that Kim worked hard yet failed to tran- scend: widespread hatred of Japan.

Lee Myung-bak's presidency has thus far not followed the softening-

102 JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

to-hardening path insofar as relations with Japan are concerned. Indeed, the Japanese-born Lee has offered the best hope to Japan in recent years, repeatedly stating that he would prefer to put history aside. Lee al~o ben- efited from good timing, as his tenure has coincided with the ascensiOn of a less revisionist administration under the Democratic Party ofJapan, which has avoided blatant insults to Korean sensibilities. Most important, North Korea's rising belligerence and attacks on the south have commanded Lee's attention. History-based quarrels with Japan became trivial, whereas a security-based alliance became imperative. The recent harmony between Japan and South Korea thus has resulted not from Japan's wo~ing suc- cess but from diminished Korean concerns: Koreans have somethmg more urgent to worry about. Furthermore, Lee's departure from the previous presidential paths may not be as complete as popularly perceived. He is not the first president to say that he would prefer to let history rest. Korean popular perceptions of Japan remain hostile, and whatever .Lee's ~laims about looking to the future, he must remain mindful of public sentiment. His attempts to do so sometimes bear a striking resemblance to the efforts of hawkish Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing: Both love to bring up Germany as a "good example" to shame Japan. 63 In August zoo8, Lee also repeated one ofhis predecessors' drastic diplomatic measures, recalling.his ambassador to Japan to protest the publication of history textbooks stating that Doktotrakeshima is Japanese territory.

It is not yet certain that Lee's presidency will ultimately not follow the same hardening pattern evidenced by the tenures of previous South Ko- rean leaders, and any improvements are not certain to persist into subse- quent administrations. Cordiality between Japan and South Korea cannot rely permanently on a menacing third party but will require effective woo- ing so that any decline in Korean suspicion of]apan should not come as a by-product of rising Korean suspicion of another country. In the abs~nce of wooing, emotionally charged issues will inevitably return to upset bilat- eral relations.

Cultural Exchanges: Increasingly Vibrant, Increasingly Irrelevant

The past two decades have witnessed a significant loosening of cultural exchanges and an explosive growth in human connections between South Korea and Japan (figure 10). But even in this realm, Korean leaders have carefully balanced between opening their market to Japan and addressing national sensitivities.

In 1988, the two governments founded the Committee on Japan-Korea

South Korea 103

Unit: 1,000 Persons

3,000

2,500 ,... -...

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1,500

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500

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, , ,

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-south Korea to Japan

-- Japan to South Korea

or-~--~~--~~--,-~--~~--~~~~~~-r- 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Fig. 10. Human exchanges between Japan and South Korea (1978-2006). (Data fong78 to 2003 from Japanese Embassy in Korea, http:/ /www.kr.emb -jpan.go.jp/rel/r _ 2002/r _ 20030607_ 01.htm; data from 2004 to 2006 from

Council of Local Authorities for International Relations, http:/ /www.clair.or.kr/ info/info.asp?np=407.)

Relations for the Twenty-First Century, an organization charged with the responsibility of promoting mutual understanding. Cultural exhibitions were also regularly sponsored in major cities throughout the 1990s. Yet South Korea's opening to Japan during this period remained timid and inconsistent. Domestic resistance remained high. Two cultural ministers in the Roh Tae-woo administration entertained the possibility of lifting the ban on importing Japanese popular cultural products (music and mov- ies), but others within the government voiced objections, with the oppo- sition sticking to the arguments that Japan's "low-quality" culture could spoil Korean youth and that the South Korean cultural industry might be overwhelmed by its Japanese rival. Even the two committees set up by Kim Yong-sam to study the feasibility of cultural opening offered contradic- tory conclusions: One headed by Seoul University in 1998 claimed that the country was ready for a comprehensive opening, while one under the In-

104 JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

stitute of Policy Studies contended that the opening should be postponed indefinitely to protect the Korean cultural industry.64 In addition, a string of acrimonious historical disputes and the 1997 Asian financial crisis put Kim's plan of phased opening on the shelf.

South Korea was meaningfully opened to Japanese popular culture dur- ing Kim Dae-jung's presidency, with the process completed by his succes- sor, Roh Moo-hyun. From 1998 to 2004, the South Korean government completed a four-phase opening of its market to most Japanese cultural products: music CDs, movies (including animations), computer games, and television programs. Korean popular culture made significant inroads into Japan. As part of the Korean wave, sitcoms and celebrities swept across the Asian market, including Japan. Fans poured into South Korea, often seek- ing to visit sites where highly popular sitcoms were made. Joint produ.ction of movies and songs commenced. The Japan-South Korea partnership re- ceived global attention during this time as the two countries cohosted the

2oo2 Soccer World Cup, the world's most watched sports event. Such cultural exchanges have attracted huge publicity and have

prompted politicians and media pundits to proclaim tha~ recon~iliati~n between the two nations is blossoming.65 Yet as the recurrmg presidential pattern of softening to hardening suggests, the wide availability of] a~anese movies and songs may not really have softened the Korean perception of

Japan. . . In his insightful study of the power of]apanese popular culture m Asia,

Nassim Kadosh Ot1nazgin reveals that as late as 2004-5, 81 of the II9 Korean respondents in one survey associated Japan's image with its war responsibilities, whereas only 7 of the I zo respondents in Hong Kong and Bangkok did so. Several of the South Koreans claimed to love Japan's cul- ture but to dislike its "right-wing government" or "the way they [Japan]

treat history."66

Accessibility to the Japanese culture is unlikely to have transformed Ko- rean condescension toward it. When asked to compare Japanese and Ko- rean animation, the South Korean public offered a mixture of positive and negative remarks, with "Japanese animation is more violent" generating the most responses. And 48.6 percent of respondents described Japanese animation as "in poor taste," while only 20 percent thought otherwiseP

Popular culture increasingly operates in a self-contained commercial- ized universe. The Japanese ways of spotting potential artists and trans- forming them into celebrities have been emulated throughoutAsia.

68 With

Korea's opening, such learning has become more efficient and increasingly mutual. Yet the identification has remained commercial rather than politi-

South Korea 105

cal. Consumers in South Korea, just like their Chinese counterparts, see no problems enjoying Japanese food and fashion while remaining suspicious of the country's politics. A lot of misreading of Japan's soft power probably has occurred as unrealistic expectations have been placed on the shoulders of]apanese cartoons. Cuteness (kawaiz), a much-worshipped term in Japa- nese culture, may have a global market, yet as long as the past continues to haunt the Japanese government, the linkage between kawaii and power remains absent.

Moreover, soft exchanges may be distorted for harder usage. A few dar- ing Korean nationalists took advantage of a new visa-waiver policy and staged a protest before the Shiname city government of its claim of ju- risdiction over Dokto/Takeshima.69 Furthermore, beyond the bilateral context, there is scant evidence that South Korea has supported Japan's diplomatic priorities elsewhere. No Korean presidents, including Lee, have offered support to Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, a prime diplomatic goal that enjoys widespread support in Japan. Before North Korea's strikes in November 2010 South Korea had shown little interest in solidarity with Japan. Furthermore, although South Korean citizens were kidnapped by North Korean agents, it did little to respond to similar Japanese grievances, offering only infrequent rhetori- cal support. As late as zoos, far more South Koreans saw Japan as a bigger threat than North Korea.7°

Softer exchanges have been unable to exert much influence on high- politics disputes. Furthermore, such exchanges are often among the first victims when the political atlnosphere worsens. In the wake of the territo- rial dispute, for example, large numbers of Korean nongovernmental or- ganizations cancelled exchange programs with their Japanese counterparts in the name of solidarity with their government.71 Such disruptions have primarily occurred in the realm of people-to-people exchange programs rat..~er than cultural penetration, and the former are often transient and ceremonial, with limited utility in fostering better understanding.72 The best achievement for cultural exchanges in Japan-Korea relations may be commercialized independence. Such relations have yet to move diplomacy.

One more worrying trend for Japan is China's swift rise. China has al- ready become South Korea's biggest trading partner and has passed the United States as the top destination for Korean students. Japan's demo- cratic identity has never been a major theme in Korean popular percep- tions of it, and Japan's role as an economic model, seldom openly acknowl- edged, has lost much aura. As Chang Dae-joong puts it, the lessening of Korean hostility toward Japan has resulted partly from the fact that the

I06 JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

Korean public no longer takes Japan as seriously. Japan-bashing is less fre-

1 J . . th . 73

quent on y because apan-passmg IS on e nse. What does the trajectory of]apan's wooing efforts toward South Korea

imply? Recipient contexts not only condition the effectiveness of wooing but can become decisive. In the case of South Korea, Japanese colonial control, coupled with the Korean superiority complex stemming from an- cient times, left a deeper emotional wound than Southeast Asia suffered. Not surprisingly, Korean sensitivity to the Japanese handling of histori- cal issues is much higher. From the perspective of diplomatic engineering, it makes little sense to debate the rationale behind such high sensitivity. Rather, effective wooing means accepting this fact and working with it. However, a series of]apanese governments has demonstrated little interest in accommodating such Korean sentiments. Efforts at fostering mutual un- derstanding have increased yet are often interrupted by domestic agendas. Paradoxically, this phenomenon justifies the importance of leadership and political wisdom, without which mass-based exchanges may be numerous yet irrelevant or may reinforce stereotypes.

China: Ample Power, Scant Charm

China's rise has probably contributed to the Japan-passing thesis. But South Korea is not necessarily coming closer to China, at least not in emo- tional terms. Rather, the Korean appreciation of China's importance is al- most entirely based on security and material considerations, thus reflecting China's hard power rather than its soft cousin.

South Koreans are indeed taking China seriously, and for good reason. In dealing with unpredictable North Korea, China has unparallel weight. China is the world's third-largest donor of food aid, and 90 percent of that aid goes to North Korea. In zoos, China and South Korea jointly provided one million tons of food aid to the north.74 In addition, China reportedly provides an estimated So to 90 percent of North Korea's oil imports at "friendly prices" that are substantially lower than the world market price.7

5

Beijing's willingness to use this leverage is debatable, but few observers would dispute China's pivotal role on the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese government has served as the host for the Six-Party Talks, at one time the main coordinating mechanism for addressing security concerns triggered

by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. China's significance to South Korea also lies in the economic area. What

the two countries have achieved since I992 is truly remarkable. Trade tells the most illuminating story (figure I I). From I99I to zooS, the total value

South Korea !07

of South Korea's exports to Japan more than doubled, from $ r 2. 3 billion to $zS.3 billion. Yet such gains look almost negligible compared to the growth in South Korean exports to China, which mushroomed from a little more than $I billion in I99I to $91.4 billion in zooS.76 Since the begirming of the new century, the gap between China and Japan as export markets for South Korea has further widened. For Korean businesses, the Chi- nese market carried only one-quarter the weight of the Japanese market in I 992. But with an annual growth rate of more than 20 percent, by zooS, the Chinese market had expanded to more than three times the size of the Japanese market. In 2003, China alone accounted for nearly a quarter of the value of South Korea's total exports.77 China has also become the top recipient of Korean businesses' international investment, receiving $2 5 bil- lion, nearly half of the global total. 78

Human exchanges are also vibrant. In zoio, 2.S4 million South Ko- reans visited China, making China the most popular foreign destination for South Korean tourists; that year, 2.14 million Koreans visited Japan.79

More South Koreans now choose to study overseas in China than in any other country. According to the China Association for International Edu- cation, 64,2 32 South Koreans studied in China in 2009. As figure I 2 indi- cates, the number of South Korean students in China markedly outpaced those from other countries. The Confucius Institute, China's state-spon- sored organization to promote Chinese language and culture, set up its first overseas branch in Seoul in November 2004, with twelve others fol- lowing in South Korea by zoi r.

With more and more Koreans living in China on a long-term basis, Han Guo Cun (Koreatowns) have sprung up in Beijing, Shanghai, Guang- zhou, Chong Qing, and other major Chinese cities. China's popular enter- tainment has also been swept by the Han liu (Korean wave). TV dramas and films from South Korea have become immensely popular among the Chinese audience. The term Ha han (Koreaphiles) was coined to capture the obsessiveness with which some Chinese have devoted themselves to Korean clothing, music, and sitcoms. Some Chinese have even undergone cosmetic surgery to make them look more like Korean celebrities. Ko- reans have also taken key positions in China's booming sports industry, particularly in soccer, tae kwon do, handball, and field hockey. A Korean- born coach led the Chinese national team to the 2002 Asian Games field hockey championship, winning the gold medal by beating the Korean team in South Korea, a feat that made the coach appear selfless and heroic.8° Cultural exchanges are not just one-way traffic, as such Chinese idols as Zhang Yimou, Jackie Chan, Zhang Ziyi, and Tang Wei are widely known

Unit: US$ 1 ,000

100,000,000

90,000,000

80,000,000

70,000,000

60,000,000

50,000,000

40,000,000

30,000,000

20,000,000

10,000,000

-china

-~Japan

0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

Fig. 11 . "Japan passing"-South Korea's trade with China and Japan compared

(1991-2008}. {Data on South Korea-Japan trade from Korea International Trade Association [KIT A] online statistics bulletin, http:/ /www.kita.org/ [ac- cessed April 1, 2009]; data on South Korea-china trade from Embassy of the Republic of Korea in China, "Statistics of Korea-China Exchanges" [Hanzhong jiaoliu tongji], http:/ /china.koreanembassy.cn/politics/politics _ 01 b.aspx?bm

=2&sm=1&fm=1 [accessed April s. 2009].)

64232

Fig. 12. Top ten sources of international students in China (2009). {D~ta from Chinese Association for International Education, "2009 nian laihua lluxue- sheng tongjijiankuang [Brief statistics of international students in China],"

http:/ /www.cafsa.org.cn/index.ph p ?m id=6.

South Korea

in South Korea. In early 2009, the epic Chinese movie Red Cliff was the most popular film in Korea, earning more revenue than the Hollywood blockbuster Valkyrie, starring Tom Cruise.

Despite vast material and human linkages, Beijing's efforts to woo South Korea have been haunted by the same factor obstructing Tokyo's wooing: South Korea offers a hostile atmosphere for China as well as Japan. In the Korean collective memory, China is far from innocent. Historical griev- ances and a mixture of condescension and humiliation impede South Ko- rea-China relations, too. South Korea and China's shared suffering as a result of Japanese invasions has not led to any enduring victim alliance. Rather, Koreans see themselves as the sole victim and China as an Other that contributes to the tale of Korea's heroic quest for independence. As a result, China, like Japan, is permanently suspected and resented by their neighbor in the middle.

Prior to Normalization: All That Softens Is Not Wooing

Little English-language scholarship exists on Sino-South Korea relations prior to their normalization in 1992.81 A series of conciliatory gestures re- duced the level of mutual hostility prior to formal normalization, but the stunning subsequent development of Sino-South Korean relations has ren- dered this softening aspect underappreciated. The first sign of thawing of relations came in 1973. In the wake of Nixon's visit to China, Park Chung- hee announced that South Korea would open its door to "nonhostile" com- munist countries.82 Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Open policy eliminated yet another contact barrier on the Chinese side. But what jump-started official contact between the two governments was an emergency situation rather than a premeditated plan. On May 5, 1983, a group of Chinese hi- jackers took control of a Chinese commercial flight and landed the plane in Seoul. A Chinese delegation headed by Shen Tu, director of the Civic Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), was granted entry to South Ko- rea, accompanied by officials from China's National Security Bureau, for- eign ministry, and Xinhua News Agency (all of whom bore nominal CAAC titles).83 As a result ofTaiwanese pressure, South Korea did not return the hijackers to China. Instead, they were tried and received relatively light sentences before being pardoned and sent to Taiwan. But South Korea re- turned the aircraft, its crew, and all the Chinese passengers to China in five days. As one member of the Chinese delegation recalled, the negotiating atmosphere could be described as cordial. Given the nature of the incident, South Korea's first deputy foreign minister welcomed the Chinese team by quoting Confucius: "Isn't it a delight to have friends coming from afar?"84

IIO JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

A crisis thus became an opportunity. Three months after the negotia- tion, China began to allow its citizens to attend conferences and sporting events in South Korea as long as these events were sponsored by inter- national organizations. Another sign of lowered hostility occurred when two disgruntled Chinese soldiers hijacked a motor torpedo boat to South Korea in March I985: The two governments agreed to frame the incident as an "accidental entry." China offered an apology. In exchange, despite protests from Taiwan, South Korea quickly returned the boat and its entire crew to China, where the two defectors were tried on charges of treason and swiftly executed. 85

Beijing indicated its goodwill by sending large delegations to the I986 Asian Games and the I988 Olympic Games, both held in Seoul. China's official radio station began to refer to South Korea by its official title, Han Guo (Republic of Korea). rather than Nan Chao Xian (South Korea) even in domestic broadcasts. Such an adjustment should not be read as depoliti- cizing sports, which have always been highly political in China. During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese ping-pong team refused to play against a Cambodian team sent by the "antirevolutionary" Lon Nol government. Hence the decision to use Han Guo to refer to a country China had not yet recognized was not random. Also in I 988, direct trade between the two countries commenced.86

All of these quieter developments indicated the thawing of relations between two officially hostile countries but did not constitute wooing to enhance soft power, for they had little to do with projecting positive state characters or improving an image among the target audience. To be sure, as J ae Ho Chong points out, popular Korean perceptions of China had an "af- fection" element as a consequence ofKorean familiarity with Chinese civi- lization.87 Chong may well be right in sensing this sentiment in the I98os: At a time when South Korea was rapidly ascending to become "Asia's next giant,"88 its people had little reason for anxiety about poor, weak China. Instead, they could safely feel romantic about ancient Chinese civilization and ponder the commercial opportunities a vast China could offer, match- ing Japanese feelings at the time. Hence, this affection had more to do with South Korean ambition than with Chinese reality. In retrospect, the current Korean sensitivity toward China did not spring out of nowhere but was a persistent undercurrent that surfaced as a result of China's rapid ascendance and Korea's economic blues. Affection and suspicion are, after all, simply two sides of the same emotional coin.

Both Beijing's and Seoul's softer stances were simply signaling devices, much in the same way as Mao stood beside Edgar Snow, a left-wing Ameri-

South Korea III

can writer, on the Tiananmen Gate to inform Washington of China's will- ingness to talk. 89 Both China's and South Korea's moves were utilitarian, either security- or trade-driven, with little value-based resonance. Chinese leaders might have held internal discussions about learning from the South Korean modernizing experience, but South Korea as a legitimate state was still largely blocked in media coverage. There was little popular-based adu- lation of South Korea as an example. Japan was much more attractive as well as politically safe to admire.

In the mutual approaching process, both China and South Korea had to be careful to avoid triggering suspicion from their junior yet official al- lies, North Korea and Taiwan, respectively. Normalization meetings were conducted in secret, while official envoys were dispatched to the allies to quell nerves.90 Beijing's and Seoul's mutual approach hence was hesitant, two steps forward and one step back, leading to an inconsistent and time- consuming normalizing process.

Finally, as China stepped out of its self-imposed isolation, it came tore- alize that interaction with South Korea was unavoidable. As China began to bid to host a series of international events, including the I 990 Asian Games, the Chinese government found that regulations required that South Korea be treated as a legitimate state. A rigid alliance with North Korea became increasingly detrimental to China's Open Door policy. Moreover, normal- izing relations with South Korea would deliver a decisive blow to Taipei, which would lose its last ally in the region.

In short, a series of conciliatory measures was quietly yet unmistakably lessening the hostility between China and South Korea, laying ground for the eventual normalization of relations. Yet all that softens is not wooing. Moves by both sides were employed largely to send signals of readiness rather than to create value-based bonding. Without that goal, the concept of soft power lost its relevance in this context.

China as Another Other

As the goal of normalization was achieved, deepening relations became a natural goal. This effort, however, made China's failure to woo South Ko- rea glaring: Despite the two countries' expanding material and human con- nections, China has made little progress in winning the hearts and minds of the South Korean public-that is, in increasing South Koreans' voluntary acceptance of China's prestige and consequent willingness to jump on the Beijing bandwagon. Instead, the two countries' interactions have demon- strated some worrisome features that resemble those in Japan-South Ko-

II2 JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

rea relations. One Chinese scholar has lamented that China-South Korea relations are "walking the same path as South Korea-Japan relations, only

one decade later."91

Value-based bonding is still absent, as the natures of China's and South Korea's political regimes diverged more than two decades ago. In additi~n, Korea's rising appreciation of China's importance has been accomparued by Korean suspicions. In the same polls that surveyed a~tu?es toward Japan, rising numbers of South Korean respondents als,?. md~~ate~ th~y "disliked" China, passing the percentage of those who hked Chma m

2005 (though China registered much warmer than Japan on the Kor~an emotional thermometer). The importance of the Chmese market notwith- standing, nearly 6o percent of the South Korean public viewed the Chinese

economy as a threat.92 • These numbers hardly indicate that Sino-South Korean relations have

reached a new level. China certainly matters to South Koreans, but they do not see it as a model for emulation. The recognition of China's importance drove Seoul to approach Beijing in the 198os, and the country's rise has only vindicated this view. So what is new to their relations: .

Chinese leaders should not be blamed for a lack of trymg. The realts- sue is why their attempted wooing has failed. As a nondemocracy, China would find it impossible to bond politically with South Korea. However, it has an alternative in history, which would seem to be an ideal bonding factor. Chinese leaders have indeed adopted the habit of praising the "two- millennium" history of exchanges between the two countries.

93 For exam-

ple, when China's propaganda chief, Li Changchun, visited South Korea in April 20o9, he highlighted the positive role of histo~ through speeches and his choice of venues. Li visited J eju's Xufu Park, which commemorates a Chinese envoy, sent by Emperor Qin, who stopped in Korea, en route to the eastern seas. (Never mind that Xu Fu was seeking the elixir of life for the Chinese emperor, so his mission had little to do with Korean locals, or that Xu is believed to have landed in] a pan.) Li's speech hailed Xu's journey as "a magnificent event in the long history of friendly exchanges betw~en the Chinese and Korean peoples." Moreover, "through mutual learnmg, mutual borrowing, and mutual assimilating, our two peoples have jointly made a mighty contribution to the Oriental civilization."

94

Recent history may be even more helpful. From the mid -nineteenth cen- tury to the mid-twentieth, both countries were traumatized by their com- mon enemy,] a pan. By colonizing Korea and invading China,] a pan wreaked more damage on its two immediate neighbors than did any ~estern cmu~­ try, at least in China's and South Korea's collective memones. From thts

South Korea II3

perspective, bonding with South Korea by evoking the recent past would seem an enticing strategy for Beijing: If successful, such a grievance alliance would pull South Korea further from the Japanese sphere of influence, sat- isfying China's entrenched desire to drive a wedge into the U.S.-led security alliance along China's coast.95 1n keeping with this approach, Jiang Zemin reached out to Kim Young-sam and bashed Japan for its lack of repentance, a practice Hu Jintao carried on when he became China's leader. Speaking before the Korean Parliament in zoos, Hu pointed out that "in recent his- tory, people of our two countries mutually supported and aided each other in our respective great struggles to resist foreign invasions and to fight for national independence. These are chapters of friendship jointly written by our people. They are worthy of praise and tears."96

But history is a risky card. Leaders in Beijing can evoke the past but cannot define how far back South Koreans can remember and the terms on which they interpret those memories. And Koreans would not need to travel far before their anger would turn toward China. Just a little more than half a century before South Korea's independence, China's history becomes just as messy as Japan's. China fought the 1894 Sino-Japanese War not to protect Korea's independence from Japan but because China wanted to continue its control of Korea. China was the suzerain by default, while Japan was the challenger. In fact, when the Japanese troops set foot in Korea, they did so in the name of offering the country meaningful inde- pendence. At least initially, their stated goal fooled some aspiring Korean nationalists.

China has a much longer history of dominating Korea than does Japan. On several occasions, the Chinese imperial courts assimilated almost the entire Korean Peninsula. Chinese history textbooks always portray their country as the selfless outsider rushing to the scene to save Korea, typically from Japanese invaders. The I 598 Battle of Noryang (Luliang Haizhan), for example, is touted as a joint Chinese-Korean campaign against Japa- nese troops led by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, This interpretation caters to do- mestic tastes: By evoking a historical linkage to the Chinese intervention in the Korean War nearly four hundred years later, the Chinese govern- ment has sought to convince its youth that China has historically acted as a heroic and selfless protector of a weaker neighbor. Yet given the nature of the event-the Ming suzerain sent troops to its Korean protectorate at Korea's request-Korea would be expected to offer little contemporary appreciation for China's "valiant" deed. In the much more recent Korean War, widely perceived as a proxy war orchestrated by the two Cold War superpowers, South Korea went into a direct conflict with China.

JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

Consequently, after invoking history, China soon found it a dou~le­ edged sword, and Korean anger turned not just to Japan but als_o to China. Indeed China-South Korea relations deteriorated markedly m the later years ~f the Roh presidency by a chain of bitter. clashes, p~marily over history but also including territorial issues and Chmese hoohgans who at- tacked Korean protesters during the Olympic Torch Relay in Seoul. At one point, an angry Roh openly bashed China to the visiting George W ~ush, telling the U.S. president that China had "invaded us hundreds of times,

h . . .._,97

and how could we forget these bone-ac mg pams. In short, Korean collective memory has seen a consistent pattern: Big-

ger powers have always tussled over Korea, while its peopl~ have coura- geously if not tragically rejected this fate. China was not Innocent and certainly was not a victim on the same scale as Korea. The past becomes a haunting rather than facilitating factor, as Beijing has found itself refl.~cted in the Korean memory simply as another domineering Other hermcally

resisted by the Korean people.

To Woo or Not to Woo: Tension between Domestic and

Diplomatic Agendas

China and Korea's long, shared history has produced one more layer of sensitivity: Nearly two million ethnic Koreans live in China as Chi~ese citizens.9s Their presence is particularly strong in the northeast provmce of Jilin, with nearly nine hundred thousand ethnic Koreans residing in ~e border town ofYanbian alone. Unlike Tibetans and Uighurs, most ethnic Koreans have embraced their Chinese identity. Quite a few have climbed to political, military, and cultural prominence in the Han-dominated China, including General Zhao Nanqi of the Chinese People's Lib~ration Army; Zheng Liicheng, who composed military anthems for both China and No~ Korea; Li Dezhu, chair of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission; :md Cm Jian, a pioneering figure in Chinese rock music. Nevertheless, ethnic Kore- ans are also proud of their Korean roots. Many can still speak the language and wear traditional Korean attire. Further complicating the situation, they live in a region close to Baekdu Mountain (Chinese name, Changbai Moun- tain), a site sacred to many Koreans as their ancestral. origin.

Any sort of Korean independence movemen: IS almost. u~eard of inside China. But for a Beijing wary of the ongomg unrest m Tibet and Xinjiang, the strong ethnic identity that ~any ethnic ~oreans carry and the fact that they live in a strategically VItal border regwn warrant extra

South Korea

caution. The Chinese government's priority of maintaining stability and territorial integrity renders any compromise with South Korea on history exceedingly difficult.

The case that best reveals how Beijing has been caught in the middle between diplomatic wooing and domestic concern is the Goguryeo dispute with South Korea. On the surface, it is a scholarly debate about whether Goguryeo, an ancient kingdom with a history that can be traced back to 3 7 B.c., should be seen as a regional power of China (as the Chinese side con- tends) or an independent state in its own right (as the South Korean side argues).99 The Chinese argument was part of a bigger $2.4 million North- east Project (Dongbei Gongcheng) undertaken by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences from 2001 to 2oo6.

Once published, the Chinese argument triggered strong protests from both politicians and academics in South Korea. Korean bloggers set up "Defend Goguryeo" websites to refute what they perceived as Chinese fabrications, and Korean activists called for a boycott of Chinese goods. Korean prime minister Lee Hai-chan convened an urgent cabinet meet- ing and announced funding for a state committee to study Goguryeo history. 100

Such angry responses should not have surprised Beijing. As Peter H. Gries points out, the Chinese claim of Goguryeo as a regional kingdom was an effort to apply "Chineseness to the border, hence striking at the very heart of what it meant to be Korean today."101 The Chinese move was, therefore, an irritant-precisely the opposite of wooing.

Has the Chinese government, driven by identity politics, stepped on a land mine by underestimating the intensity of the South Korean re- sponse?102 The answer is probably more nuanced. Identity politics has yet to acquire a life in Chinese diplomacy; rather, Chinese identity is impor- tant because it connects closely to security, China's most sensitive nerve. According to the Chinese Social Science Academy's mission statement, the Northeast Project was defensive in nature, so an attitudinal showdown with Korea on the Goguryeo issue was undesirable yet unavoidable:

Our country's northeast border region is located at the center of East Asia, hence carrying extremely important strategic significance. In such a situation, some countries' research projects and scholars, driven by their secretive agendas, distort historical facts in their so-called research on history-related topics. A small number of politicians, for political purposes, publicly propagate various ridiculous viewpoints to create chaos. [The Northeast Project is launched] to further promote the

II6 JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

founding and development of scholarship on the history and the cur- rent situation of the northeast border region and to further protect sta- bility in the northeast border region.103

The message is clear: Concerns about ethnic tensions and border stabil- ity compelled Beijing to launch the Northeast Project, ":hatever South Korea's response might be. However, Beijing obviously drd not want to push its relations with Seoul into an emotional corner. Once South ~o­ rea's storm of protest started, Li Sheng, director of the Northeast ProJ_ect, stressed its "academic" and "nonpolitical" nature. Yet he may have sard a bit more than he was supposed to to quell the Korean anger. Li admit- ted that the provincial Chinese Communist Party propaganda ministers served on the project's advisory board, though they were only doing "some coordinating work." In another blow to the project's credibility, Li said that Chinese researchers "will definitely not get into any debate with Korean

. . I I ,104 scholars. Instead, we will proceed according to our own ongma p an.

These answers hardly convinced non-Chinese listeners, particularly the Koreans. What sort of"coordinating work" would demand the presence of highly political propaganda ministers? And if the nature of the project were academic, as Li insisted, why would the Chinese team not allow debate, the essence of scholarship? Li's answers were nonetheless illuminating be- cause their inconsistency inadvertently revealed an anxious Beijing caught between its "peaceful rise" charm offensive and its everlasting paranoia re- garding ethnic unrest. Hence, the Goguryeo dispute did not necessarily backfire, though Li's words could be seen as an awkward effort to control

damage. . Overall, Beijing's conflicted handling of the Goguryeo drspute ~xposed

a Chinese government caught between wooing the world and ~eanng do- mestic stability. Even knowing that the area concealed a land mme, a para- noid Beijing would have stepped there anyway, calculating that any diplo- matic pain would be manageable whereas inaction would be much more risky. The Northeast Project may allow Chinese leaders to slee? better, but it also added some new bad blood to Sino-South Korean relanons, further dimming China's hopes of selling charm to the Korean public.

Contemporary Stereotypes and Mutual Condescension

Quarrels over history and territory are further exacerbated by contempo- rary stereotypes. In recent years, Chinese media's often sensational cov-

South Korea

erage of the acrimonious historical disputes with South Korea has given rise to a new form of online entertainment-ridiculing South Korea and Koreans as an ethnic group. This shaming game even has a name, Hanguo Qiyuanlun (the Born in Korea Thesis). In fact, signs indicate that Korea may surpass Japan as the most popular target for ridicule by Chinese In- ternet users.

The Born in Korea game started with finding and publicizing claims that the Korean nation was the creator or inventor of certain technolo- gies or products later adopted elsewhere (for example, the magnetic com- pass, paper-making, the Go game, and soy sauce) or that famous historical figures (such as Confucius and Genghis Khan) were actually of Korean ethnicity.105 Chinese participants soon began to fabricate similar Korean claims, apparently to deride the perceived Korean obsession with national pride. The list of figures Koreans purportedly were attempting to claim as their own quickly became absurd-modern Chinese founding father Sun Yat-sen, basketball player Yao Ming, Chairman Mao, and American swim- mer Michael Phelps.I06

South Korea is not the first victim of such popular exaggerations, if not fabrications. Zhong Lisi, a Chinese writer based in Paris, wrote an account of how she and a Taiwanese student refuted a certain "French professor" who believed that Taiwan and China were two different countries. Accord- ing to Zhong, after hearing passionate speeches arguing that Taiwan and the mainland belong to "one China," the professor took off his hat and an- nounced, "I salute the Chinese. The class is adjourned."107 Zhong's account was so vivid that the China Central Television later adapted it into a short drama and broadcast it nationwide during prime time. Yet Zhong never named the professor or anyone else who could verify her version of events.

Zhong is not the only self-propagated hero, as other Chinese have de- picted themselves as vigorously defending their country while on foreign soil. In 2003, a report, "Japan's New Blueprint for Conquering China," began circulating on various Chinese websites. The author, who claimed to be a Japanese military officer, vows to "wipe China off the map" by 2015 .108 Yet the very different grammatical patterns of the Chinese and Japanese languages would make any Chinese translation of a Japanese work easily detectable to trained eyes. This article bears no linguistic connection with the Japanese language, and no original]apanese version has ever surfaced. Indeed, the tone of the article is so amateurish and its expression so Chi- nese that the author is probably one of China's fenqing (angry nationalist youths).

uS JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

Online Chinese fabrications have victimized many other countries in addition to France, Japan, and South Korea. Linked together, these in- cidents may reveal Chinese sensitivities regarding national pride. Confu- cius's famous saying, ''Ji suo bu yu, wu shi yu ren [Do not unto others as you would not have others do unto you]," apparently does not apply to these

Chinese patriots. It is not clear whether Chinese readers have taken seriously the anti-

Korean fabrications. Yet as genuine and fictitious reports converge, few readers would have the interest or take the time to differentiate true from false. Such stories have strengthened Chinese stereotypes of Koreans as supersensitive to issues related to national prestige, while a few highly pub- licized events have offered a facade of vindication to the Chinese ridicule. A group of female South Korean skaters held up a sign in Korean that read "Baekdu Mountain Is Our Territory" during the awards ceremony for the 2007 Asian Winter Games, held in China. The Chinese crowd, most of whom did not understand the Korean language, initially assumed that the sign was offering friendship or appreciation and cheered. They became

angry when they learned the truth.l09

Condescension is also embedded in the daily use of language. Online commentators frequently use the term gao li bang zi (literally "Korean sticks") to describe Koreans, particularly males, as ill-mannered and stub- born. Koreans also are occasionally referred to as bang zi (sticks). Despite the Korean community's dislike for such terms, they have shown no sign of retreating from the Chinese colloquial vocabulary.

Sensitivity and stereotyping run both ways, of course. In January zoos, the mayor of Seoul, Lee Myung-bak, announced that his city's Chinese name would be changed from Han Cheng (Han City) to Shou'er (a neutral term that mimics the sound of Seoul). In the summer of zoo8, a Korean pet shop used the image ofTiananmen in an advertisement, changing the famous Chinese slogan, "Long Live the People's Republic of China," into the Korean "White Dog Village" and replacing Mao's portrait with an im- age of a dog.110 In March 2009, Chinese bloggers again became indignant about what they perceived as condescending portrayals of China in a Ko- rean TV drama. Although the drama was set in contemporary Shanghai, netizens complained, there were no scenes of the city's modern skyline, only dark and narrow alleys. Chinese police and officials were portrayed as greedy and corrupt, and the male protagonist whined, "There are too many thieves here in China.'>111 Such incidents have invariably drawn the anger of China's growing army of nationalists, who perceive these episodes as new evidence of Korean condescension toward China and the Chinese nation.

South Korea 119

A New Obstacle to Wooing: Are We Still in the Same League?

Lee Myung-bak assumed South Korea's presidency at a time of escalating hostility toward both China and Japan. Lee reduced tensions with Tokyo, but has he improved emotional relations with China? His tenure in office did not get off to a promising start, as Beijing saw him as a much less wel- coming figure as a consequence of his more explicit pro-U.S. stance and his eagerness to reach out to Japan based on "common values.'' But Lee has since made some unprecedented wooing gestures to lower Chinese hostil- ity: Lee became the first head of a foreign state to visit the Sichuan earth- quake site, hugging and crying with local residents. He also surprised Chi- nese college students by disclosing his love affair with a Chinese woman in an otherwise serious diplomatic speech. The two countries have signed a declaration elevating their relations to "strategic comprehensive partner- ship," a status Japan and South Korea have yet to achieve.

There is, however, a rising fear that may justify and strengthen histori- cally based suspicions: Is China looking beyond Japan and South Korea for diplomatic partners (table 6)? With little affection present, both the Ko- rean and the Japanese publics may be concerned whether China continues its regional chauvinism.

In short, combining the Chinese experience with that of Japan reveals a clear pattern: In spite of expanding material exchanges, a value-based embrace between South Korea and either country is largely missing. In late 2007, a Chinese newspaper polled twelve thousand Chinese and found that 40. I percent selected South Korea as the country they disliked the most, with Japan receiving 30.2 percent of the votes. The result compelled the editors to call for "stopping the cold current at the people-to-people level in Sino-Korean relations.''112 Japan remained at the top of the list of coun-

TABLE 6. Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean Respondents' Answers to the Question "Choose ONE Country that you want your own country to develop good relations with" (2005)

China Japan South Korea

(I) Russia: 32% (29%)' (2) USA: 28% (31%) (3) Japan: 11% (8%)

USA: 37% (41%) China: 24% (21%) South Korea: 10% (9%)

North Korea: 36% (38%) USA: 29% (26%) China: 22% (15%)

Source: Asahi Shimbun, "Rekishi ninshiki ohkina mizo kyohzonkyoh'ei nao mosaku" (Huge gap on facing history; testing waters on coexistence and coprosperity),April27, 2005; and "Growing China and Depress- ing Japan: Contrast between Optimism and Pessimism (Seicho chiigoku to teimei nihon: Rakkan to hikan kukkiri), September 27,2002.

'Numbers in parentheses are results from the same poll in 2002.

!20 JAPAN AND CHINA AS CHARM RIVALS

tries South Koreans dislike the most (57 percent), followed by China (far behind at r 3 percent). Both were more disliked than even North Korea,

0 0 1 ° 113 with a nearly bankrupt mternatrona reputation. . Recipient context not only matters but matters decisively. The meamng

of being Korean was substantially built on differentiating the country from its immediate neighbors China and Japan. The fact that South Korea has been the weakest of the three, coupled with a long history of being bullied by the two bigger powers, has contributed to a tragic yet heroic construc- tion of Korean nationalism. Against this background, to expect South Ko- reans to undertake a value-based emotional embrace of either China or Japan would be unrealistic. In other words, the case of South Korea reveals why wooing cannot go very far in certain scenarios. . . .

On the superficial level, lack of charm does not seem ternbly sigmfi- cant. The ever-tightening connections among China, Japan, and South Korea imply that people can still do business without affinity for one an- other. Under popular pressure, governments may occasionally ratchet up their critical tone toward each another. But overall, no one seems to want to disrupt the bigger picture of economic and security interdependence.~ one Japanese diplomat explained, he traveled to South Korea when K01- zumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine triggered vociferous protests in Seoul. At official meetings, the Japanese delegation had to listen to the Korean government's protests about Japan's "wrong views on history." Yet at the evening cocktail session, after a few rounds of drinks, the diplomat's Ko- rean friend put aside his official identity, patted the diplomat on the b_ack, and said, "Don't worry. Everything will be fine." 114 The pattern rermnds me of a popular Chinese saying, "Mensheng fa dacai [Make money by be- ing quiet]." More often than not, governments of South Korea, Japan, and China adroitly seem to be following this wisdom.

If material relations continue to deepen among Japan, China, and South Korea, why should wooing matter? First, emotional acceptance is impor- tant because leaders in these three countries, particularly in China and South Korea, are still haunted by the abstract, intangible, yet very po~ent factor of national feeling, the bettering of which is a prime goal for woomg. National feeling may have little to do with reality (for example, ~e be~ief that Japan is revitalizing militarism and again dreaming about mvad1~g China and/or Korea), but it has real diplomatic consequences: Matenal and human exchanges may prevent antagonism from exploding but with sensitivities poked externally by former victimizers and utilized internally by votes- or legitimacy-seeking politicians, a long ro~d remains t? be trav- eled before the three powers can coordinate on secunty threats (hke North

South Korea !2!

Korea) and to support each other's diplomatic priorities. Political scientist Ming Wan characterizes Sino-Japanese relations, caught in the middle of vast connections and tense feelings, as "dispute-prone" but "confrontation- averse."115 Another framing commonly used by politicians or media pundits is "dose-yet-distant relations." Both framings also apply to the bigger tri- angular setting as well. And such a "cold accommodation" is largely a result of trilateral emotional barriers.

I am not suggesting that wooing has totally failed. Rather, it may suc- ceed in a bilateral setting; when it does so, it however, it dims the prospect of trilateral reconciliation. Governments have a tendency to perceive hos- tility in one pair of bilateral relations as a good opportunity for cordiality in another pair, a darker side of bilateral wooing. A zero-sum mentality still shadows the three powers' interactions, and governments often find incen- tives to utilize tensions in their counterpart's relations with the third coun- try, as manifested by Beijing's urge to draw South Korea closer through the bond of historical grievance. Coming closer to one country inevitably entails moving further from another. In this sense, wooing seeks to create discordances elsewhere and gaining perks from them, thus attesting to the Othering theme that repeatedly appears in this book.

These two factors have rendered the three countries underachievers in regional integration. There is no shortage of aspiring slogans: "East Asia: Our Home," "East Asian Community," a "lover-like quasi-alliance."116 But it is highly doubtful that citizens and the three governments are ready to accept the others as "lovers." If anything, quasi only adds a positive spin to a much less inspiring reality of keeping discontent at bay in order to do business, even when they realize the potential of achieving more if emo- tional barriers could be transcended. There is also the concern that the tri- angle may become structurally imbalanced in both material and perceptive terms. The Chinese public has shown a clear tendency to look beyond Ja- pan and South Korea in searching for diplomatic partners of equal weights. The Japanese and Koreans suspect that China's rise out of the Northeast Asian minor league will only become stronger.