LITERATURE REVIEW

Received: 1 July 2016 Revised: 31 May 2017 Accepted: 5 June 2017

DO

I: 10.1002/job.2211

R E S E A R C H A R T I C L E

Two roads to effectiveness: CEO feedback seeking, vision articulation, and firm performance

Susan J. Ashford1 | Ned Wellman2 | Mary Sully de Luque3 | Katleen E.M. De Stobbeleir4 |

Melody Wollan5

1 Ross School of Business, University of

Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A.

2 W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State

University, Tempe, Arizona, U.S.A.

3 Thunderbird School of Global Management,

Glendale, Arizona, U.S.A.

4 Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School,

Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium

5 Lumpkin College of Business and Applied

Sciences, Charleston, Illinois, U.S.A.

Correspondence

Susan J. Ashford, Ross School of Business,

University of Michigan, 701 Tappan, Ann

Arbor, Michigan 48103, U.S.A.

Email: [email protected]

82 Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Lt

Summary Humble leadership is attracting increased scholarly attention, but little is known about its effects

when used in conjunction with less humble leadership behaviors that rely on a perception of the

leader as confident and charismatic. This study contrasts the effects on top management team

(TMT) potency and organizational performance of a more humble (feedback seeking) and a less

humble (vision) CEO leader behavior. We hypothesize that CEO feedback seeking increases

TMT potency and firm performance by communicating to TMT members that the organization

values their input and encouraging their own feedback seeking, whereas CEO vision articulation

influences these outcomes by fostering greater clarity about the firm's direction, and an enhanced

ability to coordinate efforts within theTMT. CEOs who have not developed a vision can achieve a

similar positive impact onTMT potency and firm performance by seeking feedback. In a sample of

CEOs and TMT members from 65 firms, both CEO feedback seeking and vision articulation

exhibit positive direct relationships with firm performance. However, only feedback seeking dis-

plays an indirect effect on performance via TMT potency. Finally, CEO feedback seeking has its

strongest effects on firm performance and TMT potency for CEOs who are not seen as having

a vision.

KEYWORDS

CEO, feedback seeking, humble leadership, vision

1 | INTRODUCTION

I seek feedback because that's the only way you can grow

as a CEO, which is a very isolating job. And so if you don't

create mechanisms to get authentic feedback, you won't.

Kevin W. Scharer, CEO, Amgen

Interactions between a CEO and his or her top management team

(TMT) are increasingly recognized as important determinants of a

firm's success (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason,

1984; Lin & Rababah, 2014; Ling, Wei, Klimoski, & Wu, 2015). In par-

ticular, CEO actions that encourage a sense of potency among TMT

members are viewed as critical for CEOs seeking to enhance firm per-

formance (Carmeli, Schaubroeck, & Tishler, 2011; Ensley, Hmieleski, &

Pearce, 2006). Defined as team members' “generalized beliefs about

the capabilities of the team across tasks and contexts” (Gully,

Incalcaterra, Joshi, & Beaubien, 2002, p. 820), potency captures a

group's confidence on the basis of their perception of its ability to

d. wileyonli

overcome challenges and perform its tasks (Pearce & Ensley, 2004).

If the group in question is a company's TMT, then that confidence

and those tasks are essential to the fulfillment of the organization's col-

lective mission (Barnard, 1938; Bass & Avolio, 1994).

There are multiple means through which CEOs might enhance

TMT potency and thus firm performance. Traditionally, scholars have

suggested that developing and articulating a clear and appealing vision

of where the firm is heading is one of the best ways for CEOs to foster

potency among their direct reports (Pearce & Ensley, 2004; Tosi,

Misangyi, Fanelli, Waldman, & Yammarino, 2004). CEO vision articula-

tion is thought to foster perceptions of value congruence between fol-

lowers, the CEO, and the organization and to motivate individual and

group performance (Bono & Judge, 2003; Jung & Avolio, 2000; Shamir,

House, & Arthur, 1993; Tosi et al., 2004). Scholars have noted that

vision articulation relies on followers' perception of the leader as a

capable, confident, or even larger‐than‐life entity able to lead the firm

to success (Conger & Kanungo, 1994; Grant, 2012; House & Shamir,

1993; Weber, 1968).

J Organ Behav. 2018;39:82–95.nelibrary.com/journal/job

FIGURE 1 Conceptual model of the relationship between CEO feedback seeking, CEO vision articulation, top management team (TMT) potency, and firm performance

ASHFORD ET AL. 83

Recently, however, scholars have proposed that, “leaders should

move beyond the hero myth or ‘great man’ perspectives on leadership

(Murrell, 1997), show their humanness by being open about their lim-

itations in knowledge and experience (Weick, 2011), and focus more

on … followers” (Owens & Hekman, 2012, p. 788). The approach

reflects a growing appreciation that modern organizations operate in

environments that are complex, uncertain, and fast changing, such that

they cannot be navigated by a single individual acting solely in a top‐

down fashion (Uhl‐Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007; Yammarino, Salas,

Serban, Shirreffs, & Shuffler, 2012). Research has shown that more

humble leader behaviors can also contribute to leadership effective-

ness (Ou, Waldman, & Peterson, 2015; Ou et al., 2014; Owens, John-

son, & Mitchell, 2013; Owens, Wallace, & Waldman, 2015) but based

on a different set of principles than more traditional (less humble

approaches). Indeed, Owens and Hekman (2012, p. 789) note that,

“leader humility involves a lack of charisma, a sense of calmness and

quietness.” Such an outlook stands in stark contrast to the dynamic

confidence projected by visionary leaders.

Despite the growing interest in humble forms of leader behavior,

at the moment, there is an incomplete understanding of the specific

leader behaviors that are considered to be humble, and whether and

how these specific humble behaviors affect collective outcomes. For

example, early research on humility characterizes seeking feedback as

one means through which leaders can increase the accuracy of their

self‐assessments. However, studies of humble leader behaviors have

generally not isolated the unique effects of seeking feedback, nor have

they incorporated many insights from the rich literature on feedback

seeking behavior (FSB). Defined as “the conscious devotion of effort

toward determining the correctness and adequacy of behavior for

attaining valued end states” (Ashford, 1986, p. 466), FSB captures

the frequency with which individuals seek feedback about their own

behavior and performance. The FSB literature has found that such

seeking adaptation to new settings (Nifadkar, Tsui, & Ashforth, 2012)

and enhances both perceived effectiveness (Ashford & Tsui, 1991)

and creativity (De Stobbeleir, Ashford, & Buyens, 2011). Although to

date FSB scholars have mainly focused on the personal benefits to

lower level individuals seeking feedback from their superiors, these

studies suggest that CEOs seeking feedback fromTMT members might

have positive implications, and not just for the seeker but also for the

CEO's TMT.

Currently, we have little theoretical understanding of the relative

importance of more and less humble leader behaviors, or their interac-

tion, in explaining collective performance (Avolio, 2007; DeRue,

Nahrgang, Wellman, & Humphrey, 2011). This is a critical theoretical

puzzle to address. For example, CEO vision relies on the perception

of the CEO as knowledgeable and confident about where the firm is

headed and what he or she is and should be doing. In contrast, CEO

FSB communicates a level of vulnerability, uncertainty, or curiosity

about the correctness or success of his or her current activities. As

such, although both more and less humble leader behaviors may

enhance collective outcomes when used separately, they may detract

from or even nullify one another when used together.

In this article, we develop and test a conceptual model exploring

the effects of more and less humble leader behaviors when they are

enacted at the very top of the organizational hierarchy. Specifically,

we propose that both CEO FSB and CEO vision may impact firm per-

formance through their effects on TMT potency. We focus on TMT

potency because it is thought to be an important antecedent of both

team and firm performance (Carmeli et al., 2011; Ensley et al., 2006;

Guzzo, Yost, Campbell, & Shea, 1993; Pearce, Gallagher, & Ensley,

2002), and one that has been tied to both more and less humble

approaches to leadership (e.g., Carmeli et al., 2011; Fletcher, 2004;

Hu & Liden, 2011; Ou, 2012; Ou et al., 2014; Owens & Hekman,

2012). Integrating across these paradigms in the leadership literature,

we explain how perceptions of both CEO FSB and vision will indepen-

dently improve firm performance through increasingTMT potency, but

in different ways. We further argue that because CEO FSB affectsTMT

potency by a path different from that of CEO vision, it is likely to have

particular payoff for CEOs who are not especially visionary. That is,

CEO vision moderates the positive relationship between CEO FSB

behavior and TMT potency. An overview of our conceptual model is

presented in Figure 1.

In exploring the relationship between CEO vision articulation,

CEO FSB, TMT potency, and firm performance, this paper extends

and redirects existing theory in several important ways. First, it con-

tributes to the literature on leadership humility by exploring how the

specific humble behavior of seeking feedback affects organizational

performance. Our results also advance our understanding of the con-

sequences for collectives when leaders simultaneously enact more

and less humble behaviors. Specifically, we find that leaders who are

not comfortable engaging in more traditional approaches to leadership

such as developing a vision can achieve similar outcomes via seeking

feedback. We also contribute to the FSB literature by shifting this liter-

ature's typical emphasis on the upward FSB of people in lower level

positions (Ashford, De Stobbeleir, & Nujella, 2016) to examine the

downward FSB of people in very high‐level positions and examining

individual outcomes for seekers (e.g., their performance, adjustment,

and motivation) to examining potential collective benefits, particularly

when seeking is undertaken by top‐level managers such as the CEO.

As such, our results complement recent research examining the conse-

quences of TMT members seeking feedback laterally from their peers

(Stoker, Grutterink, & Kolk, 2012). Finally, we contribute to the litera-

ture on TMTs by responding to calls to open up the black box through

which interpersonal dynamics within theTMT influence organizational

performance (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Certo, Lester,

Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009;

Hambrick, 2007).

84 ASHFORD ET AL.

2 | THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

2.1 | Perceived CEO behavior and firm performance

As noted, little research has examined the collective consequences of

CEO FSB behavior. Although the leadership literature has examined

the effects of other forms of leader opinion seeking (for instance, par-

ticipative leadership, which occurs when leaders involve others in col-

lective decision‐making processes), it has not examined the specific

effects of seeking feedback, which involves asking others to evaluate

one's individual, prior job behaviors. CEO FSB might involve, for

instance, asking TMT members to evaluate how a recent CEO policy

decision impacted their ability to fulfill their responsibilities. However,

if the CEO asked TMT members for their opinions about how to deal

with an upcoming client request, this would not be considered FSB,

because it does not involve evaluating the effectiveness of a prior

CEO behavior.

Although the FSB literature has identified several strategies that

CEOs might use to obtain feedback, two reasons motivate our focus

on the act of inquiry, defined as directly asking others for information

about one's own performance. Given that it involves a direct request

for a feedback message, inquiry is thought to yield better data for

the seeker than do other forms of FSB such as monitoring, where indi-

viduals infer a feedback message from others' actions, nonverbal, body

language, and so forth (Ashford & Cummings, 1983). Perhaps reflecting

this differential data quality, recent meta‐analytic results showed that

although FSB was not always/overall related to performance, inquiry

was positively related to job performance whereas monitoring was

unrelated (Anseel, Beatty, Shen, Lievens, & Sackett, 2013). Inquiry is

also a more public form of FSB than is monitoring and, as such, reveals

the seeker's interest in feedback information to anyone observing the

seeking act (Ashford, Blatt, & VandeWalle, 2003; Ashford & Cum-

mings, 1983). Although individuals worry that inquiry's public nature

may hurt their image (e.g., by conveying a lack of confidence), Morrison

and Bies (1991) proposed that such visible seeking may have impres-

sion‐management benefits as well. For leaders in particular, inquiry

may have significant symbolic benefits as it signals the seeker's consci-

entiousness, openness, and interest in bettering his or her work

(Ashford & Tsui, 1991).

We propose that when CEOs engage in inquiry by asking TMT

members to evaluate their prior job performance, it will have a direct

positive effect on firm performance. Prior research suggests that feed-

back helps performers develop an accurate self‐view (Ashford & Tsui,

1991), perform better in and adjust to settings (Nifadkar et al., 2012),

meet their instrumental goals (Morrison, 1993), become more creative

(De Stobbeleir et al., 2011), and maintain a positive image (Anseel et al.,

2013; Ashford & Northcraft, 1992; De Stobbeleir, Ashford, &

DeLuque, 2010; Lam, Huang, & Snape, 2007). The information

acquired from seeking feedback is thought to be particularly important

for people in complex, multiconstituency roles (Ashford & Tsui, 1991;

Tsui & Ashford, 1994) such as those held by CEOs. Indeed, if CEOs

do not actively seek feedback, they may be unlikely to obtain objective

evaluations of their performance, given individuals' reluctance to criti-

cize those in higher level positions (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). This

problem is so notable that Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee (2002)

labeled it “the CEO disease,” which they defined as the “informa-

tion vacuum around the leader created when people withhold

important (and usually unpleasant) information” (p. 92). As Goleman

et al. (p. 93) put it:

It may take a small act of courage to confront the boss

with the news about the company, but you have to be

even braver to let the boss know he's out of touch with

how people are feeling or that his “inspiring” talks fall flat.

If feedback is likely to improve CEO's performance and creativity,

but CEOs are relatively unlikely to receive feedback on their actions

spontaneously from others, then their efforts to seek it should play a

key role in surfacing information that would otherwise be kept private.

CEOs may be able to utilize this information to develop a more accu-

rate view of how the members of their TMT see them (Ashford & Tsui,

1991) and adjust their subsequent activities on the basis of this infor-

mation. Such learning is likely to improve the CEOs' performance

(Balzer, Doherty, & O'Connor, 1989; Becker, 1978; Matsui, Takashi,

& Onglatco, 1987), which in turn is likely to be reflected in the perfor-

mance of their organizations (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). This pro-

posal is consistent with recent suggestions that CEO information

gathering impacts firm performance (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010)

and research showing the benefits to CEOs who tap into advice net-

works outside the firm (McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 2008). Thus,

we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1. CEO FSB is positively associated with

firm performance.

We further propose that in addition to having a direct effect on

firm performance, CEO FSB may improve performance indirectly by

enhancing TMT members' collective sense of potency. The leaders of

organizations, and in particular CEO's, are often seen as embodying

the organization. In addition to its objective functions, CEO behavior

also has important symbolic value (Pfeffer, 1977; Podolny, Khurana,

& Hill‐Popper, 2005). Thus, when the members of the TMT observe

their CEO seeking their feedback, this symbolically communicates that

the organization as a whole values their opinion and is open to their

perspectives. Such affirmation is likely to increase the confidence of

TMT members in their abilities and contribute to TMT potency. Being

asked their opinion of the CEO's job performance may also enhance

TMT members' investment in the firm and its direction. TMT members

may generalize from the CEO's FSB to a more general sense of invita-

tion to contribute and invest. This suggestion echoes Lam, Huang, and

Chan (2015) who propose that leaders' specific behaviors (they studied

information sharing) serve as behavioral cues for triggering prototypes

of leadership. By FSB, leaders encourage TMT members to become

more invested in the group and firm direction because they believe

they had a role in co‐creating it.

Second, in keeping with social learning theory (Bandura, 1977;

Brown, Trevino, & Harrison, 2005), TMT members who witness their

CEO engaging in FSB are likely to modify their own behavior to include

more seeking. CEO FSB may also neutralize or reduce subordinates'

image concerns about this activity as it helps to set a norm for it within

the group (Ashford & Northcraft, 1992). Following the CEO's example,

the TMT will likely begin to seek and share ideas and feedback with

ASHFORD ET AL. 85

each other as well as with the CEO. Such seeking and sharing helps

TMT members identify ineffective behaviors and practices, allowing

them to take steps to address these behaviors resulting in higher levels

of team capability and potency by creating a sense that the TMT can

tackle the various issues that come their way (Gibson, 1999). The

recent finding by Stoker et al. (2012) that FSB among TMT members

was associated with team effectiveness is consistent with this

argument.

We further propose that the enhanced potency amongTMT mem-

bers engendered by CEO FSB is positively associated with firm perfor-

mance. Indeed, two separate meta‐analyses found a positive

correlation between team potency and team performance (Gully

et al., 2002; Stajkovic, Lee, & Nyberg, 2009), and team potency was

the strongest of 19 predictors of group effectiveness in a study by

Campion, Medsker, and Higgs (1993). Teams high in potency can bet-

ter withstand pressure (e.g., time pressure; Gevers, van Eerde, & Rutte,

2001), have more confidence that they can perform the tasks with

which they have been charged (Ensley et al., 2006), and are more com-

mitted to attaining their goals (Carmeli et al., 2011). If the team in ques-

tion is the firm's TMT, these positive outcomes should contribute to

firm performance. In support, Ensley and Hmieleski (2005) provide

empirical data linking TMT potency to firm performance in the form

of revenue growth and net cash flow for new ventures. Thus, we

hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between CEO

FSB and firm performance is mediated by TMT potency.

We consider the effects of perceived CEO FSB together with per-

ceptions that the CEO has articulated a vision for the firm. A vision is

an attempt by leaders to describe an appealing future state that the

leader views the organization as capable of achieving (Bass, 2008).

Scholars view vision behavior as a hallmark of the meaning making

associated with CEOs and other top‐level leaders (Gioia & Chittipeddi,

1991; Podolny et al., 2005), have identified it as a vital leadership func-

tion (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Carton, Murphy, & Clark, 2014; DeRue et al.,

2011; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990; Yukl, Gordon,

& Taber, 2002), and see it as a key means through which CEOs can

improve firm performance (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Burns, 1978; Fu, Tsui,

Liu, & Li, 2010; House, 1977). A leader's vision influences followers to

align their personal goals with those of the group or organization

(Podsakoff et al., 1990). Such alignment generates confidence in the

leader, the collective, and their ability to achieve the vision (Conger

& Kanungo, 1987; Wang, Law, Hackett, Wang, & Chen, 2005),

resulting in improved organizational performance (Eisenhardt, 1989;

Sully de Luque, Washburn, Waldman, & House, 2008). Thus, consistent

with prior research findings, we hypothesize a positive association

between CEO vision articulation behavior and firm performance.

Hypothesis 3. CEO vision articulation is positively asso-

ciated with firm performance.

As is the case with FSB, we propose that an increased sense of

potency within the TMT is an important pathway through which

CEO vision improves firm performance. When CEOs articulate a clear

vision, it fosters a sense of collective identification (Shamir et al., 1993)

and greater faith in the future (Sivasubramaniam, Murry, Avolio, &

Jung, 2002). This sense of purpose and positive mission can increase

TMT members' confidence that they can successfully meet the chal-

lenges facing the organization (Avolio, Zhu, Koh, & Bhatia, 2004; Bono

& Judge, 2003). A CEO's vision also reduces members' uncertainty

about goals, thereby allowing them to coordinate their joint activities

more closely, identify ineffective behaviors and practices, and take

steps to address them (Carton et al., 2014). Research suggests that

such clarity results in higher levels of team capability and potency

(Hu & Liden, 2011). Consistent with these arguments, research has

established that transformational leadership, which includes a vision-

ary component, is positively associated with TMT potency

(Sivasubramaniam et al., 2002) and TMT performance (Stoker et al.,

2012). These arguments support a mediation hypothesis linking CEO

vision articulation to firm performance through the creation of higher

levels of potency within the TMT:

Hypothesis 4. The positive relationship between CEO

vision articulation and firm performance is mediated by

TMT potency.

2.2 | The interaction of CEO feedback seeking and vision articulation

Although we expect both CEO vision articulation and FSB to indepen-

dently increaseTMT potency and organizational performance, it is also

important to consider how these two different forms of leader behav-

ior might interact. As noted, we propose that there are benefits to

CEOs of engaging in FSB or vision behaviors independently. However,

we further propose that there are both costs and benefits to

performing high levels of both behaviors. On the positive side, the

habitual tendency to seek feedback on their job performance is likely

to help visionary CEOs tailor or refine the content of their visions to

make them more consistent with TMT members' desires and prefer-

ences. However, the literature on leader vision suggests that showing

confidence in oneself and one's vision is key in persuading others to

adopt the vision (Burns, 1978; Conger & Kanungo, 1987; Newcombe

& Ashkanasy, 2002). Such perceptions may be unfavorably impacted

by CEO FSB, which conveys an implicit admission of uncertainty and

the desire for others' views that may be interpreted negatively (De

Stobbeleir et al., 2010; Lam et al., 2007). The implicit admission of vul-

nerability that accompanies FSB may be at odds with the confidence

and heroism that followers want/need to see in a leader with a vision-

ary style and may call into question the ability of the CEO to achieve

his or her vision. As such, we propose that the costs to visionary CEOs

of seeking feedback may offset the benefits, such that there is a null

relationship between FSB and TMT potency for CEOs who also engage

in high levels of vision.

In contrast, FSB should be an especially important behavior for

CEOs who are not particularly visionary. Discerning and articulating a

clear and compelling vision of a group or organization's future state

involves complex leadership behaviors, as reflected in the various

how to articles in extant leadership literature (Bass, 1990; Carton

et al., 2014; Frese, Beimel, & Schoenborn, 2003; Nutt & Backoff,

1997). Leaders are told that their visions must invoke values and con-

crete imagery in a particular ratio (Carton et al., 2014) and to be

86 ASHFORD ET AL.

inspirational (Bass, 1990) and also have consistent behavioral follow

though (Dineen, Lewicki, & Tomlinson, 2006). These tasks are difficult

for some individuals and, when performed poorly, may even do more

harm than good (Conger, 1990; Dineen et al., 2006). Given these

issues, we propose that FSB might be a particularly helpful alternative

for leaders who are not comfortable with or skilled in acting in a less

humble, visionary manner. For such leaders, FSB allows them to show

their concern for how things are going and for subordinate's views and

to engage them and build team potency in the absence of a vision. For

these reasons, we propose that CEO FSB exhibits a stronger positive

relationship with TMT potency and organizational performance when

the CEO is low in vision articulation than when the CEO is high in

vision articulation.

Hypothesis 5. CEO vision articulation moderates the

positive indirect relationship between CEO FSB frequency

and firm performance throughTMT potency such that the

relationship is stronger when vision articulation is low and

weaker then when vision articulation is high.

1In addition to the measures described above, we also collected a measure of

CEOs' self‐reported feedback seeking behavior. The self‐report measure was not identical to that completed by TMT members and consisted of seven items

measuring the monitoring, inquiry, and indirect inquiry dimensions of feedback

seeking developed by Ashford and Tsui (1991) and Sully de Luque et al.

(2008). A robustness check revealed that the pattern and significance levels of

the results do not change depending upon whether the TMT‐ or self‐reported measure of feedback seeking is used. However, given that socially desirable

responding is a serious concern in self‐reported measures of leadership behavior, we report the results on the basis of TMT‐reported feedback seeking in this article.

3 | METHODS

3.1 | Sample and procedure

The data used in the present study were collected as part of a larger

global research project. Survey data were gathered from 69 small‐ to

mid‐sized for‐profit organizations from 18 different industries located

in the United States and Belgium. We initially contacted 165 CEOs

about participating in the study (41% response rate). The U.S. CEOs

were identified and contacted individually by the research team,

whereas the Belgian CEOs were invited to participate as part of an

executive education program facilitated by one of the authors. The

most common reasons given by CEOs who declined to participate

were a reluctance to require TMT members to complete the surveys

and a reluctance to share performance and other sensitive information

without board approval. Once the CEO's agreed to participate, they

provided the names and contact information of the various members

of their firm's TMT, who were assigned surveys to complete as

described below. Due to substantial missing data, four firms were

excluded from the sample, leaving us with a final sample of 422 TMT

members from 65 firms. Forty‐seven firms were located in the United

States and 18 in Belgium. The most common industry was manufactur-

ing (24.6%), followed by professional services (9.2%) and finance

(7.7%). Other industries included construction, health care, retail, real

estate, and transportation. Participating firms ranged in age from 4 to

185 years (M age = 37.1 years, SD = 37.8). On average, the firms had

four levels of formal hierarchy (SD = 1.6), and CEOs are with relatively

lengthy tenures (M CEO tenure = 13 years, SD = 9.6).

For the majority of the firms in our sample, the entire TMT was

invited to participate. To minimize the risk of common method bias

(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), we used a multiple‐

survey, multiple respondent data collection approach (see House

et al., 2014). For each firm, TMT members were selected to complete

one of three different surveys (1–4 respondents per survey, M respon-

dents = 2.15). CEOs first identified up to four TMT members who had

a detailed knowledge of the firm's financial information. These TMT

members completed a survey reporting only the firm's organizational

performance and the organizational characteristics that we included

as potential control variables. The remaining TMT members were ran-

domly assigned to either complete questionnaires assessing their

CEO's vision articulation behavior as well as three leadership behaviors

that we used as control variables, or their CEO's FSB behavior within

the TMT. All TMT members rated TMT potency.

The TMT members in the U.S. firms responded to surveys in

English. TMT members from the Belgian firms were allowed to choose

either a Flemish or French version of the surveys. We used a three‐

step process on the basis of the recommendations of Harkness and

Schoua‐Glusberg (1998) to develop these surveys. The survey was

translated into Flemish and French by a professional translation

agency, back‐translated by one of the coauthors who is fluent in Flem-

ish, French, and English, as well as by two independent native speakers

(Flemish and French). We then ran a small pilot in a French‐ and Flem-

ish‐speaking TMTs to ensure conceptual equivalence across the

English, French, and Flemish versions of the survey.

3.2 | Measures

3.2.1 | Feedback seeking

We assessed perceptions of CEO FSB using the three‐item measure of

“inquiry” FSB behavior developed by Ashford and Tsui (1991). Selected

TMT members used a 7‐point, Likert‐type scale to assess the fre-

quency of their CEO's FSB from the TMT over the past 6 months

(1 = Never, 7 = Always). The coefficient α for this scale was .84, and

example items are “Directly ask for information concerning his or her

performance” and ‘Directly ask for an informal appraisal.” 1

3.2.2 | TMT potency

We measured team potency using three items developed by House

et al. (2014) to assess TMT members' beliefs about their team's effec-

tiveness (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). Example items are

“the top managers' work as an effective team” and “people at my level

work well together.” The coefficient α for this scale was .76.

3.2.3 | CEO vision articulation

Perceived CEO vision articulation was measured with two items devel-

oped by House et al. (2014). The items were specifically created to

capture TMT members' perceptions that their CEO has a vision for

the future and acts on the basis of future goals. The items are “the

CEO has a vision and imagination of the future” and “the CEO has a

clear sense of where he/she wants this organization to be in five years”

ASHFORD ET AL. 87

(1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). Though calculating a coeffi-

cient alpha for these items is inappropriate, the correlation between

the items is high (r = .73).

3.2.4 | Firm performance

We assessed firm performance using two perceptual items developed

by House et al. (2014) and Sully de Luque et al. (2008). Perceptual

measures are recommended when obtaining objective or reliable

financial performance data is problematic or is not possible (Wang,

Tsui, & Xin, 2011). The companies in our sample were primarily small‐

to mid‐sized, and as is common with such firms, they were not willing

to disclose objective performance data (Sapienza, Smith, & Gannon,

1988). Therefore, we adopted the alternative approach proposed by

Dess and Robinson (1984) and asked TMT members specifically

selected for their strategic planning and financial backgrounds to

assess organizational performance relative to their competitors on a

7‐point scale in terms of gross return on investment and sales growth

over the prior 3 years. There is a strong positive correlation (r = .51)

between TMT members ratings of these two forms of performance.

We used the average of participants' responses to these two items

as our measure of firm performance. Sully de Luque et al. (2008, p.

639) noted the benefits of this comparative approach to measuring

organizational performance:

Because close competitors may experience [industry and

environmental] exogenous influences in similar ways, if

we consider performance relative to that of close

competitors, then at least some of these exogenous

factors that may influence performance are controlled.

Moreover, Sully de Luque et al. found a similar performance mea-

sure to be significantly positively correlated (r = .41, p < .05) with an

objective performance measure collected for a subset of the firms in

their sample.

3.2.5 | Control variables

To better capture the true relationships between the variables in our

model and guard against potential alternative explanations for our

results, we included several statistical controls. We included a vari-

able for country (0 = United States, 1 = Belgium) to account for any

variability associated with extending our data collection into a second

country. We also considered CEO age, which is typically included in

upper echelons research given that CEO attributes can influence firm

performance (e.g., Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008; Kilduff, Angelmar, &

Mehra, 2000).

To further isolate the effects of TMT perceptions of the two

leader behaviors that are the focus of this research, we measured sev-

eral other commonly studied leader behaviors. Recent evidence sug-

gests that leader behaviors generally fall into one of three categories

of behaviors, those focused on directing task accomplishment, building

a strong social climate, and creating change (DeRue et al., 2011; Yukl

et al., 2002). As such, we supplemented CEO vision articulation (a

change‐focused leader behavior) with measures of CEO task‐focused

leadership (three items, α = .86, example item “clarifies who is respon-

sible for what”) and CEO social‐focused leadership (three items, α = .77,

example item “sees that the interests of subordinates are given due

consideration”) developed by House et al. (2014). We also included

House and colleagues' items developed to measure CEO participative

leadership behavior (five items, α = .87, example item “allows subordi-

nates to have influence on critical decisions”) as a control to empirically

differentiate the effects of CEO FSB from those of CEO participative

leadership.

3.3 | Measure validation

Given that top managers and CEOs react negatively to repetitious

questions and survey length (Stoker et al., 2012; Wanous, Reichers,

& Hudy, 1997), we utilized abbreviated scales developed by House

et al. (2014) to assess CEO vision articulation and TMT potency. This

approach likely enhanced our response rate, but it also raises questions

about the validity of these scales. In addition, our measure of CEO

vision articulation assumes (rather than specifically measures) that

the CEOs articulate their vision to TMT members, raising questions

about that scale's validity. To address these questions, we conducted

an additional validation study. We recruited 186 full‐time employees

living in the United States using Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online

marketplace for virtual work. Participants completed a brief survey in

which they were asked to recall a prior experience with a team that

had a formally designated leader. Participants responded to items rat-

ing that leader's vision articulation behavior using both the two‐item

scale included in the present study and the five‐item “articulates a

vision” subscale of the transformational leadership measure developed

by Podsakoff et al. (1990) (α = .88). Participants also rated the potency

of the team using the three‐item scale included in the present study as

well as the eight‐item potency measure developed by Guzzo et al.

(1993) (α = .88).

Additional information about the sample as well as the full results

of the validation study is available from the authors upon request. The

bivariate correlations between scales revealed that the two‐item vision

articulation measure were strongly positively correlated (r = .83,

p < .001) with the “articulates a vision” subscale developed by

Podsakoff et al. (1990), and the three‐item potency was strongly pos-

itively correlated with the Guzzo et al. eight‐item potency measure

(r = .79, p < .001). These results suggest that the abbreviated measures

we used in this study have similar psychometrical properties as longer,

previously validated measures of the same constructs.

3.4 | Aggregation issues

To account for the hierarchical structure of our data, we aggregated

individual responses to the organization level. To support the aggrega-

tion of our measures, we calculated intermember reliability coefficients

(ICC1, ICC2, mean rwg(j)) for each of our constructs and used the F tests

from a series of one‐way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to assess

whether TMT members' average ratings differed significantly across

organizations. In these analyses, we excluded 18 firms for which we

were only able to recruit oneTMT member to fill out each of the three

TMT surveys. These firms tended to be smaller and thus had fewer

TMT members. Our analyses of the responses from the remaining

firms revealed that approximately 40% of the variance in CEO FSB

88 ASHFORD ET AL.

(ICC1 = 0.40, M rwg(j) = 0.76, ICC2 = 0.51), F(44, 72) = 2.05, p < .01,

33% of the variance in CEO vision articulation (ICC1 = 0.33, M

rwg(j) = 0.81, ICC2 = 0.44), F(44, 74) = 1.79, p < .05, 16% of the variance

in TMT potency (ICC1 = 0.16, M rwg(j) = 0.83, ICC2 = 0.57), F(45,

311) = 4.69, p < .001, and 40% of the variance in firm performance

(ICC1 = 0.40, M rwg(j) = 0.70, ICC2 = 0.50), F(41, 64) = 2.00, p < .01,

is explained by organizational membership. The ICC1, ICC2, and

mean rwg(j) values, which exceeded conventional thresholds (Bliese,

2000), as well as the significant F test results, indicate substantial

consistency among survey responses from members of the same

organization and justify aggregating TMT members' responses to

the organization level.

3.5 | Analyses

We tested our hypotheses by using the PROCESS SPSS macro (Hayes,

2013) to conduct a series of path analyses with ordinary least squares

regression. For significance testing, we used 20,000 bootstrapped

samples to construct percentile‐based, bias‐corrected 95% confidence

intervals (95% CIs; see Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Preacher, Rucker, &

Hayes, 2007, for a more detailed description of moderated path anal-

ysis and the benefits of bootstrap‐based significance testing). To assist

in the interpretation of interaction terms, we grand mean‐centered all

continuous predictor variables before entering them into the regres-

sion models.

4 | RESULTS

We used confirmatory factor analysis to further assess the construct

validity and the distinctiveness of our measures. Because most of our

measures were collected from different sources, we were limited in

the variables we could include. That being said, the design of our study

was such that one subset of participants assessed both TMT potency

and CEO FSB, whereas another assessed TMT potency as well as

CEO vision articulation. We conducted confirmatory factor analyses

on both of these subsets of participants independently and evaluated

the results in light of the criteria for assessing model fit provided by

TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables

Variable M SD 1

1. Country 0.28 0.45 ―

2. CEO age 3.63 0.62 −.15

3. CEO participative leadership 5.59 0.83 .02

4. CEO task‐focused leadership 4.90 1.12 .06 −

5. CEO social‐focused leadership 5.12 1.05 −.06

6. CEO feedback seeking 2.67 1.18 .50* −

7. CEO vision articulation 5.98 1.05 −.13

8. TMT potency 5.74 0.85 −.20

9. Firm performance 4.13 1.23 −.32*

Note. n = 64–65 organizations due to missing data. Country dummy coded 0 =

TMT = top management team.

*p < .05, two‐tailed.

Hu and Bentler (1999). The results revealed that a two‐factor model

with CEO FSB and TMT potency loading on separate factors offered

an acceptable fit to the data (χ2(8) = 16.61, CFI = 0.96, NNFI = 0.93,

SRMR = 0.07) and a better fit than an alternative model with items

from both scales loading on the same factor (χ2(9) = 75.18, CFI = 0.73,

NNFI = 0.55 SRMR = 0.15, Δχ2(1) = 58.57, p < .001). Similarly, a two‐

factor model with CEO vision articulation and TMT potency loading on

separate factors fit the data well (χ2(4) = 14.99, CFI = 0.97, NNFI = 0.93

SRMR = 0.04) and better than an alternative model with items from

both scales loading on the same factor (χ2(5) = 37.00, CFI = 0.91,

NNFI = 0.83 SRMR = 0.06, Δχ2(1) = 22.01, p < .001). These results pro-

vide additional evidence that our measures of CEO FSB and TMT

potency are reliable and distinct from our measure of TMT potency.

Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and intercorrela-

tions among study variables. In keeping with the recommendations of

Becker (2005), as well as Bernerth and Aguinis (2015), before testing

our hypotheses, we examined the bivariate correlations between the

variables that we included as potential statistical controls and the var-

iables in our conceptual model. As shown inTable 1, country, CEO age,

and CEO task‐focused, social‐focused, and participative leadership are

significantly correlated with variables in our conceptual model. Thus,

we included these variables as statistical controls in all of our analyses

to help rule out alternative explanations and to assess the relationships

between our focal variables more accurately.

As shown in Table 1, the country dummy variable exhibits strong

positive correlations with both FSB and firm performance. Although

we controlled for country in all analyses, in light of these data, we also

conducted an additional robustness check in which we tested our

hypotheses on only the U.S. firms in our sample (n = 47). The results

were largely consistent with those we obtained from the combined

data. The most substantial departures from the reported results are

that in the United States‐only ,sample the direct effect of vision artic-

ulation on firm performance is not significant (b = 0.23, SE = 0.19, ns),

and the “index of moderated mediation” assessing the difference

between the indirect effect of CEO FSB on firm performance via

TMT potency at low and high levels of CEO vision articulation is fully

significant (Index = −0.09, bootstrapped SE = 0.08, 95% bootstrapped

CI [−0.32, −0.00]). Given that both sets of results are largely

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

―

.03 ―

.02 .58* ―

.03 .70* .60* ―

.11 .20 .21 .19 ―

.11 .57* .44* .44* .09 ―

.30* .32* .25* .42* .20 .43* ―

.09 .24 .13 .32* .11 .44* .51*

United States, 1 = Belgium.

ASHFORD ET AL. 89

consistent, we report the results from the combined (United States

and Belgium) sample below, as these results maximize our statistical

power and demonstrate the generalizability of our findings to multi-

ple countries.

Finally, to explore the potential for industry‐level effects on the

key constructs in our model, we conducted a one‐way ANOVA with

industry as the grouping variable. The resulting F tests were not signif-

icant (CEO FSB F(17, 42) = 0.69, ns, CEO Vision Articulation F(17,

43) = 0.59, ns, TMT Potency F(16, 43) = 0.79, ns, Firm Performance F

(17, 43) = 0.66, ns), suggesting that industry did not have an over-

whelming effect on our results. With these results, we elected not to

include industry as a statistical control in order to conserve statistical

power.

Table 2 presents the regression results. Hypotheses 1 and 3 pre-

dict that CEO FSB behavior and vision articulation are positively asso-

ciated with firm performance. We tested these hypotheses by

regressing firm performance on our control variables, CEO FSB behav-

ior, and CEO vision articulation. As shown in Table 2, Model 5, CEO

FSB (b = 0.30, SE = 0.14, p < .05) and CEO vision articulation

(b = 0.47, SE = 0.16, p < .01) have unique, positive direct effects on firm

performance. These results fully support Hypotheses 1 and 3.

Hypotheses 2 and 4 predict that TMT member potency medi-

ates the positive relationships between CEO FSB behavior and vision

articulation and firm performance. To determine the relative validity

of CEO FSB and vision articulation in predicting potency, we tested

these two predictors simultaneously. As shown in Table 2, Model 2,

both CEO FSB (b = 0.22, SE = 0.09, p < .05) and CEO vision articu-

lation (b = 0.23, SE = 0.11, p < .05) display independent positive rela-

tionships with TMT member potency. Moreover, as shown in Table 2,

Model 6, TMT member potency is positively associated with firm

performance (b = 0.42, SE = 0.20, p < .05). A path analysis using

Model 4 of the PROCESS macro revealed that the indirect effect

of CEO FSB on firm performance via TMT potency is positive and

TABLE 2 Summary of regression results

Variable

DV = TMT potency

Model 1 Model 2

b SE b SE

Constant 5.82** 0.11 5.88** 0.11

Country −0.26 0.22 −0.49* 0.25

CEO age 0.36* 0.16 0.34* 0.15

CEO participative leadership 0.05 0.17 −0.10 0.17

CEO task‐focused leadership 0.02 0.11 −0.05 0.11

CEO social‐focused leadership 0.29* 0.13 0.26* 0.13

CEO feedback seeking behavior (FSB) 0.22* 0.09

CEO vision articulation (VA) 0.23* 0.11

FSB × VA

TMT potency

R2 0.28 0.40

ΔR2 0.12**

Note. n = 63 organizations due to missing data.

DV = dependent variable; TMT = top management team. †p < .10, two‐tailed. *p < .05, two‐tailed. **p < .01, two‐tailed.

significant when CEO vision articulation is included as a control var-

iable (Indirect Effect = 0.09, bootstrapped SE = 0.05, bootstrapped

95% CI [0.02, 0.26]), fully supporting Hypothesis 2. The direct effect

of CEO FSB on firm performance becomes nonsignificant when TMT

potency is included as a mediator (Direct Effect = 0.21, SE = 0.14,

ns). The path analysis further revealed that the indirect effect of

CEO vision articulation on firm performance via TMT potency is

not significant when CEO FSB is included as a control variable (Indi-

rect Effect = 0.09, bootstrapped SE = 0.11, bootstrapped 95% CI

[−0.02, 0.43]), and the direct effect of CEO vision articulation on

performance remains significant when TMT potency is included as

a mediator (Direct Effect = 0.38, SE = 0.16, p < .05). Thus, Hypoth-

esis 4 was not supported.

Hypothesis 5 predicts that CEO vision articulation moderates the

positive indirect relationship between CEO FSB, TMT potency, and

firm performance, such that this relationship is most pronounced for

CEOs who do not frequently articulate a vision. As shown in Table 2,

Model 3, the regression results revealed that the interaction of CEO

FSB and CEO vision articulation has a significant relationship with

TMT potency (b = −0.17, SE = 0.07, p < .05). A plot of the simple slopes

of the relationship between CEO FSB and TMT potency at low (1 SD

below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) values of CEO vision

articulation (Aiken & West, 1991) is displayed in Figure 2. As shown in

the figure, the pattern of the interaction is such that FSB has a positive

association withTMT potency when CEO vision articulation is low, but

it is not significantly associated with TMT potency when CEO vision

articulation is high. A moderated path analysis conducted using Model

7 of the PROCESS macro revealed that CEO FSB has a significant, pos-

itive indirect effect on firm performance through TMT potency when

CEO vision articulation is low (Indirect Effect = 0.22, bootstrapped

SE = 0.14, bootstrapped 95% CI [0.01, 0.59]) or moderate (Indirect

Effect = 0.13, bootstrapped SE = 0.06, bootstrapped 95% CI [0.04,

0.34]), but not when CEO vision articulation is high (Indirect

DV = Firm performance

Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

b SE b SE b SE b SE

5.92** 0.11 4.36** 0.17 4.43** 0.17 4.37** 0.16

−0.54* 0.23 −0.85* 0.34 −1.11* 0.36 −0.91* 0.36

0.34* 0.14 0.05 0.24 −0.01 0.22 −0.15 0.22

−0.10 0.16 0.12 0.26 −0.18 0.25 −0.14 0.25

−0.04 0.11 −0.09 0.17 −0.21 0.16 −0.19 0.15

0.28* 0.12 0.33 0.21 0.29 0.19 0.18 0.19

0.24* 0.09 0.30* 0.14 0.21 0.14

0.21* 0.10 0.47** 0.16 0.38* 0.16

−0.17* 0.07

0.42* 0.20

0.46 0.20 0.37 0.42

0.06* 0.17** 0.05*

FIGURE 2 Interaction of CEO feedback seeking and CEO vision articulation predicting top management team (TMT) potency

90 ASHFORD ET AL.

Effect = 0.04, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [−0.06, 0.21]).2 However, the index of

moderated mediation provided by the PROCESS Macro was not signif-

icant (Index = −0.09, bootstrapped SE = 0.09, 95% bootstrapped CI

[−0.26, 0.06]), suggesting that the indirect effect of CEO FSB on firm

performance via TMT potency may not be a linear function of CEO

vision articulation (Hayes, 2013). These results partially support

Hypothesis 5.

5 | DISCUSSION

As firms' top leaders, CEOs are charged with enhancing firm perfor-

mance and can use a variety of strategies and tactics to do so. This

study builds on prior research on leader humility by comparing the

effects of a more humble (FSB) and less humble (CEO vision) means

through which CEOs might increase the potency of their TMT and

thereby improve firm performance. In a multisource study of the CEOs

and TMTs of 65 small‐ to mid‐sized firms in the United States and

Belgium, we found that both CEO FSB and vision articulation are asso-

ciated with improved TMT potency and firm performance. However,

although the indirect effect of FSB on performance via potency is sig-

nificant when controlling for vision, the indirect effect of vision on per-

formance via potency is not significant when controlling for FSB. Our

results are further qualified by a significant interaction between FSB

and vision articulation. Consistent with our predictions, we found that

CEOs who are not perceived as articulating a clear vision can create

the same level of TMT potency and head organizations with the same

level of firm performance as more visionary CEOs, so long as they are

seen as frequently seeking feedback from TMT members. In contrast,

the benefits of FSB are less pronounced for CEOs who are described

as articulating a vision.

5.1 | Theoretical contributions

Our findings make several theoretical contributions. We are the first

study to focus specifically on FSB as a form of humble leader behavior.

This allows us to enrich the leader humility literature by incorporating

21 SD above the mean value for CEO vision articulation is 7.03, which slightly

exceeds the maximum observed value in the data (7.00). As a result, we calcu-

lated the “low vision” conditional indirect effect at 1 SD below the mean but used the maximum observed value to calculate the conditional indirect effect

for “high vision.”

findings and insights from the rich literature on FSB, and by establish-

ing a positive relationship between CEO FSB and organizational per-

formance. Future research on humble forms of leadership might build

on our work by incorporating other insights from the FSB literature—

for instance, scholars could explore the benefits of FSB as a strategy

for gaining accurate self‐views (as invoked in the humility literature)

versus its symbolic role in communicating leader openness (as found

in the FSB literature).Additionally, few studies have considered the

effects of humble leader behaviors when used simultaneously with

the less humble forms of leadership traditionally explored by leader-

ship scholars. We address this gap by examining the effects of CEO

FSB together with those of CEO vision. The results of our mediation

analyses suggest that in our sample, seeking feedback was actually a

more powerful approach to fostering TMT collective potency and per-

formance than articulating a vision and may substitute for a vision.

However, our results also suggest that visionary CEOs may not receive

much additional benefit from also seeking feedback, perhaps because

the benefits to CEOs of engaging in high levels of both behaviors

(e.g., gaining information they can use to tailor their vision) are offset

by a costs (e.g., reducing in the TMT's perception the CEO). The right

combination of humble and nonhumble leader behaviors and any tip-

ping points involved in their enactment needs to be further examined.

Our findings also redirect and extend the FSB literature in two

ways. First, this is one of the first studies to identify and test the con-

sequences of downward FSB undertaken by people in positions of for-

mal authority (in this case, CEOs). We propose that such seeking has

the potential to be highly impactful, because little feedback naturally

flows upwards within organizations. Better understanding downward

FSB is interesting because the questions it suggests are different than

those involved in upward seeking. For example, in contrast to the feed-

back‐seeking literature that has focused largely on individual‐level out-

comes of FSB and primarily has studied outcomes accruing to

individual feedback seekers, this research opens up the possibility of

positive, collective outcomes of FSB. Indeed, our study's finding of a

positive relationship between an individual's FSB and a “bottom line”

organizational outcome suggests the value of further exploring the

potential for the downward FSB of individuals with various levels of

formal authority to create positive outcomes at the group, department,

or firm level. Such outcomes might include cultural attributes (e.g.,

teams' empowerment climate or psychological safety) as well as

team‐level learning. Future research might also examine whether

CEO FSB empowers subordinates in a ways that the CEO may not

desire, thereby lessening the CEO's control.

Our findings are particularly interesting in light of a recent article

assessing whether FSB within the TMT might serve as a substitute

for CEO transformational leadership in predicting TMT performance

(Stoker et al., 2012). Although our model is significantly different from

that developed by Stoker and colleagues (we focused on vision articu-

lation rather than the larger transformational leadership construct,

examined FSB enacted by CEOs rather than TMT members, examined

TMT potency as a mediator, and focused on firm performance rather

than TMT performance as an outcome), there are interesting parallels

between the two sets of findings. Similar to our interaction results,

Stoker et al. (2012) found that transformational leadership positively

influenced TMT effectiveness, but that the performance of TMTs

ASHFORD ET AL. 91

who lacked a transformational leader was equally high if they habitu-

ally sought feedback from each other. Future research might integrate

the findings from these two studies by exploring the relationship

between CEO FSB and the level of seeking by all members of the

TMT. It might be possible, for instance, that CEO FSB, in addition to

increasing TMT potency, also produces a climate of seeking within

the TMT, such that TMT members are also more likely to seek feed-

back from the CEO and from each other. These and other mediators

are worthy foci for future research.

Finally, this study contributes to the literature on upper echelons

in organizations. Prior research has tended to infer aspects of CEOs,

TMT members, and their interactions from their demographic charac-

teristics and relate these characteristics directly to firm performance.

Less attention has been given to behaviors of TMT members, including

CEOs, and their respective impact on psychological states within the

TMT (Hambrick, 2007; see Barrick, Bret, Kristof‐Brown, & Colbert,

2007, as an exception). In this study, we explain how TMT perceptions

of a particular CEO behavior, FSB, are associated with organizational

performance directly and also indirectly through its association with

greater organizational potency within theTMT. In so doing, we contrib-

ute to upper echelons theory by offering scholars an additional glimpse

inside the black box through which the actions of the CEO affect orga-

nizational performance (Hambrick, 2007), in this case through influenc-

ing the potency of the firm's top managers.

5.2 | Limitations and future research directions

Its theoretical contributions notwithstanding, this study is subject to

certain limitations, some of which suggest additional opportunities for

future research. First, recruiting and surveying CEOs and TMT mem-

bers is extremely labor intensive, and gaining access is difficult (Bednar

& Westphal, 2006). As such, although we surveyed a large number of

TMT members, our sample size at the organizational level was smaller

than would have been ideal. Our sample size compares favorably with

studies of CEO behavior and its impact onTMTs (e.g., Campbell, Ward,

Sonnenfeld, & Agle, 2008, n = 64 firms; Fu et al., 2010, n = 42 firms;

Peterson, Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003, n = 17 firms; Stoker et al.,

2012, n = 38 firms). Moreover, the bootstrapping‐based method we

used for significance testing offers the most favorable possible balance

between statistical power and Type 1 error and has been shown in sim-

ulation studies to be more robust to abnormal sampling distributions

than alternative methods (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986; Edwards & Lam-

bert, 2007; MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002).

Thus, our data analysis approach further mitigated some of the most

important problems commonly associated with a small sample size.

Second, although there is some precedent for our method of

assessing firm performance (see Sully de Luque et al., 2008) and we

collected these data from TMT members who had a detailed under-

standing of the various metrics of firm performance that we asked

them to report, we did not measure firm performance objectively.

Although prior validations efforts suggest that our participants' subjec-

tive performance assessments were likely positively correlated with

their firms' objective performance and we provided concrete standards

for TMT members to use when assessing performance, we cannot rule

out the possibility that discrepancies between subjective and objective

performance may have biased our results. For instance, it is possible that

being asked to provide feedback on their CEO's work activities caused

TMT members' perceptions of firm performance to improve, even if their

firm's actual performance was unchanged. Moreover, although the items

in our performance measure were positively correlated, they did not align

perfectly. As such, our study is only a useful first step in what we hope will

be an ongoing literature showing the effects of CEO FSB on objective firm

outcomes. It would be extremely valuable for future research to replicate

and extend our findings using an objective measure of firm performance

and controlling for prior performance while doing so.

Additionally, the cross‐sectional nature of our data means that we

cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causality and alternative

explanations for our dependent variable, firm performance. That is, it

may be that excellent firm performance causes TMT members to feel

more potent (as suggested by Pearce et al., 2002) at the employee level

and to view their CEO as a more frequent feedback seeker and more

visionary as a result. Although this concern is somewhat mitigated by

the fact that different TMT members assessed the firm's financial per-

formance from those who assessed the CEO's FSB and vision articula-

tion behavior, because all members assessed TMT member potency,

there is some potential for same‐source bias between our measure

of potency and the other constructs in our model (Podsakoff et al.,

2003). This issue is further complicated by the temporal scales we used

to measure FSB and firm performance. Specifically, TMT members

reported their CEO's level of FSB over the prior 6 months, whereas

firm performance was reported over the prior 3 years.

Similarly, although our results establishTMT potency as one impor-

tant pathway through which CEO FSB and vision articulation influence

firm performance, and we controlled for a number of potential alternative

explanations, we were unable to control for all the possible alternative

variables and processes that might be relevant to performance. More-

over, our arguments for the positive association between CEO FSB and

TMT potency, and between potency and firm performance invoked addi-

tional explanatory mechanisms (e.g., TMT members' feelings of engage-

ment and being valued by their organization, and their own FSB) that

we elected not to measure in an effort to manage survey length and limit

the potential for same‐source bias. It would be helpful for future research

to address this limitation by directly assessing the mechanisms we iden-

tified and determining their validity and relative importance.

It is important to emphasize, however, that there are numerous

points of evidence in favor of the relationships and causal ordering

we suggest in our conceptual model. First, the CEOs in this sample

had been employed by their firms for a rather long time (M CEO ten-

ure = 13 years). Thus, it seems plausible that their level of FSB in the

6 months prior to our data collection would have been similar to that

over the prior 3 years, reducing the likelihood that the different tempo-

ral scales were highly consequential to the level of FSB that TMT mem-

bers reported. We gain additional confidence from the fact that we are

able to replicate our results using a measure of CEO‐reported FSB that

did not specify a temporal scale. Second, our analyses testing the influ-

ence of CEO FSB and vision articulation on potency and performance

controlled for several forms of TMT‐reported CEO leadership behav-

iors. To the extent that TMT members tended to view their team and

the CEO more positively as a result of high performance, this effect

should be largely captured and accounted for by these control

92 ASHFORD ET AL.

variables, such that the resulting estimates of the effects of CEO FSB and

vision articulation are less contaminated by a “rosy glow” bias. Third, if a

rosy glow bias existed, then it would have made us less, not more, likely

to observe the interaction effects we did (Siemsen, Roth, & Oliveira,

2010). Fourth, the fact that different TMT members provided ratings of

the constructs in our model that might potentially be subject to a rosy

glow bias—CEO vision articulation, TMT member organizational potency,

and firm performance—further reduces the potential for reverse causality.

Fifth, a vast literature on the upper echelons of organizations has found

that the characteristics of a firm's top managers have a significant

relationship with firm performance (e.g., D'Aveni, 1990; Haleblian &

Finkelstein, 1993), which is consistent with our argument that CEO FSB

and vision articulation can influence performance. Nevertheless, future

research that employs experimental designs or controls for prior perfor-

mance and that uses consistent temporal scales would be very beneficial

in validating the causal chain we proposed in our model. Research could

also explore additional pathways beyond TMT potency through which

CEO leadership behaviors might influence firm performance.

Another limitation is that our two perceived CEO behaviors were

conceptualized and measured somewhat narrowly. For example, we

examined vision articulation as the extent to which the CEOs in our sam-

ple were perceived as having a clear vision, regardless of the content or

relevance of that vision. However, as mentioned above, an organization's

performance depends on not only the vision but also the relevance of

that vision to the organization's environment and the effectiveness of

the communication of that vision along with other antecedents. Given

the scope of this study and data collection limitations, we did not include

these other variables in this study. However, to fully understand the

impact of vision, FSB, and TMT potency on firm performance, future

research should also investigate the role of vision relevance. For example,

recent research suggests that visions that are more evocative and contain

more imagery about the future are associated with more positive out-

comes than visions that lack these features (Carton et al., 2014).

In the same vein, our results suggest that simply the act of CEOs

asking for feedback on their performance can have positive implica-

tions for TMT potency and firm performance. However, there is room

for future research to develop a more nuanced perspective on the

implications of CEO FSB. Studies could explore, for instance, whether

the results we found for inquiry generalize to other means of seeking

feedback, such as through monitoring and/or indirect inquiry (Sully

de Luque et al., 2008). There are also other important factors beyond

simply the frequency of FSB that might influence our findings. For exam-

ple, TMT members may react differently depending on what the CEO did

with the feedback sought at a previous period, how open he or she was

to the feedback, and/or whether he or she acted upon the feedback.

Although we cannot address this possibility in our data, we might specu-

late that the effects we document would not hold if the CEO responds in

a punitive manner to the feedback they receive or does not change his or

her behavior on the basis of the feedback. Finally, although we focus on

the benefits to dynamics within the TMT of CEO FSB, there is also the

possibility that in some cases such behavior might have drawbacks. For

instance, seeking feedback might at times empower TMT members to

ignore guidelines and policies provided by the CEO. Future research delv-

ing into how these more specific aspects of the general process that we

have supported here would be valuable.

5.3 | Practical implications

The findings from this study have clear and direct organizational implica-

tions. Most significantly, we provide the first evidence that seeking feed-

back from TMT members is an important avenue through which CEOs

can strengthen the team and improve firm performance. We demon-

strate that such seeking improves organizations' bottom lines both

directly (by surfacing information about the effectiveness of organiza-

tional activities that CEOs might not otherwise see) and indirectly (by

increasing the level of TMT potency). Our interaction results suggest that

leaders who have difficulty communicating a clear vision would benefit

from engaging in higher levels of FSB behavior (Awamleh & Gardner,

1999). As such, FSB is a strategy for leadership available to those who

feel less confident to determine and then articulate a vision for the firm.

Although more research is needed, this finding raises the possibility that

CEOs may be better served to employ either a more or less humble lead-

ership style, rather than blending elements of these styles.

6 | CONCLUSION

In the end, even the highest levels of organizations are populated by

people: people who are responsive to the behaviors of their supervisor

(in this case the CEO), who feel various levels of confidence about their

tasks (TMT potency), and whose contributions help determine the

organizations' performance. Our study suggests a new and important

means through which CEOs might lead these people—by asking them

for their feedback about their work behaviors and style. Importantly,

we found that seeking feedback from TMT members was especially

helpful to CEOs who engaged in lower levels of the vision articulation

that customarily has been associated with effective top‐level leader-

ship. Our findings highlight FSB as a humble means through which

CEOs might enhance firm performance.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank Scott DeRue and Jim Westphal for

their comments on a previous draft and the financial support of the

Vlerick Academic Research Fund, partially subsidized by the Flemish

government.

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Sue Ashford is the Michael and Susan Jandernoa Professor of

Management and Organization at the Stephen M. Ross School of

Business, University of Michigan. Her research explores the ways

in which individuals are proactive in achieving their own success

in organizations through feedback seeking, issue selling and indi-

vidual leadership.

Ned Wellman is an assistant professor in the W. P. Carey School of

Business at Arizona State University. He received his Ph.D. from

the University of Michigan. His research explores how formal hier-

archy interacts with psychological and interpersonal processes to

influence leadership emergence and effectiveness.

Mary Sully de Luque is an Associate Professor at the Thunderbird

School of Global Management. Her research interests include

global leadership, CSR and stakeholder decision‐making, as well

as micro and macro cultural influences in organizational effective-

ness. Also, she is academic co‐director of women entrepreneurs'

programs in developing markets.

Katleen De Stobbeleir is Associate Professor of Leadership at

Vlerick Business School and KU Leuven, Belgium. She received

her ICM funded PhD from Ghent University, and was a visiting

PhD student at the Ross School of Business, USA. Her research

focuses on proactivity, creativity, feedback seeking, and leader

identity.

Melody Wollan PhD University of Nebraska) is Professor, Associ-

ate Chair, and Graduate Coordinator at the Lumpkin College of

Business and Applied Sciences at Eastern Illinois University. Her

research addresses the management of employee behaviors

including coworker responses to organizational exits, feedback

seeking behavior, and strategies for addressing workplace bullying.

How to cite this article: Ashford SJ, Wellman N, Sully de

Luque M, De Stobbeleir KEM, Wollan M. Two roads to effec-

tiveness: CEO feedback seeking, vision articulation, and firm

performance. J Organ Behav. 2018;39:82–95. https://doi.org/

10.1002/job.2211