GOVERNMENT 2306(II) ESSAY

Funding US higher education: policy making theories reviewed

Asya Cooley*

Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Mississippi State University, Starkville, MS, USA

Higher education policy and politics in the United States (US) has been an issue of studies for several decades. Since the 1960s, researchers have been attempting to understand, explain and extrapolate on the relationships between higher education funding and political institutions. This review attempts to assess recent studies con- cerned with US higher education funding policies. Specifically, research undertaken for this paper followed McLendon’s (2003) suggestion for organising research studies according to four areas of contemporary political science research lines: (a) principal– agent theory, (b) policy process theories, (c) policy innovation and diffusion theory, and (d) comparative perspectives on government political systems. The studies selected for this review advance our knowledge of the forces that drive policies as well as address the issues that higher education institutions are facing: accountability, afford- ability and access.

Keywords: higher education; higher education funding; policy research; policy theories

Introduction

Higher education in the United States (US) has a long history, starting with the establish- ment of Harvard College in the early seventeenth century. According to the US Department of Education, there is a total of 4,726 degree-granting institutions in the United States (as of May, 2014). US colleges and universities (community colleges, liberal arts colleges and universities) vary in terms of their goals. Private institutions and public institutions are the two types of the US higher education establishments, based on the source of funding. This analysis is concerned with public higher education institutions and their funding. Specifically, we are looking into how policies on higher education funding work.

Higher education policy and politics in the United States has been the subject of studies for several decades. Dating back to the 1960s, researchers attempted to under- stand, explain and extrapolate on the relationships between higher education institutions and political institutions (McLendon, 2003). Most notably, Bailey (1975) published a book reviewing education interest groups in the US capital; King (1975) analysed Washington lobbyists for higher education; and Gladieux and Wolanin (1976) examined relationships between members of Congress and the institutions, and characterised the higher education policy process as ‘incremental.’

Hannah (1996) produced an extensive analysis on the topic of the US Higher Education Act of 1992 and concluded that higher education community fragmentation, coupled with a convoluted and overlapping design of American government, led to a

*Email: [email protected]

Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 2015 Vol. 37, No. 6, 673–681, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1360080X.2015.1102819

© 2015 Association for Tertiary Education Management and the LH Martin Institute for Tertiary Education Leadership and Management

limited range of options for higher education policy makers. Adding to Hannah’s ideas, Parsons (1997) highlighted the obvious contradiction between the perceived limited powers of higher education associations and the growth of federal higher education financing programmes.

Some recent publications, such as a special issue of Education Policy, have revived an interest to examine political involvements in higher education policy formation at both national and state levels (McLendon, 2003). Within this special issue, McLendon pro- nounced the field of higher education policies and politics to be underdeveloped. Specifically, he calls for systematic and sustained scholarship that will address such needs as a wider range of issue coverage, a broadened and enriched theoretical perspective and improved analytical sophistication (McLendon, 2003).

According to Heller (2002), there have been critical changes in the past several decades in how individual US states finance higher education. Specifically, we observe rising public sector tuition prices, new types of student financial aid programmes and changes in state appropriations to institutions (Heller, 2002). Other factors, such as demographic shifts, increased accountability demands and transformational influence of technology, have also had an impact on the landscape of higher education institutions (Heller, 2002). Heller (2001) attempted to identify three major challenges that higher education will be facing in the upcoming decades: affordability, accountability and access. The issue of higher education funding can be attributed to all three of these challenges.

The aim of this research study is to identify policy formation theories that have been instrumental in reviewing and explaining US higher education funding in the past decade. In other words, researchers will provide a brief description of each theory, as well as a review of recent studies that have applied these policy formation theories to the topics of higher education funding.

Higher education funding research

This review provides an assessment of recent studies concerned with US higher education funding policies. Specifically, researchers followed McLendon’s (2003) suggestion for organising research studies according to four areas of contemporary political science research lines: (a) principal–agent theory, (b) policy process theories, (c) policy innovation and diffusion theory, and (d) comparative perspectives on state political systems. These research areas seem the most appropriate in the current analysis, because they reflect contemporary discourse in political science and they enhance higher education research- ers’ understanding of policy formation, implementation and outcomes. In addition, McLendon (2003) argues that these four areas focus on politics of policy (political dynamics, circumstances and context), compared with more traditional interest in policy effects.

(A) Principal-agent theory

Principal-agent theory was developed to explain how best to organise relationships between two involved parties. Two parties that are involved in this relationship are the principal (who determines the work) and the agent (who undertakes the work). The expectation in this relationship is that the agent will make the best decisions that are in the best interest of the principal, and, in return, the principal will provide the agent with sufficient resources and payments to accomplish the established tasks (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

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Since public institutions are formed and funded by governments, they are obliged to the government to fulfil the needs of society to create, preserve and transmit knowledge (Lane & Kivistö, 2008). This is a basis for principal–agent theory, when it comes to higher education funding.

Most US higher education policy research looked at state executives/legislators and state higher education boards dichotomy from a principal–agent theoretical framework (Kivistö, 2008; Liefner, 2003; Lowry, 2001; Toma, 1986, 1990). This is certainly a valuable approach for analysing higher education funding, but another dimension could be added by analysing the board (principal) and university (agent) relationship. In his recommendations for future research, McLendon (2003) called attention to just this particular topic.

In her dissertation, Macias (2012) filled this theory gap. Specifically, the researcher applied a principal–agent theory to observe funding patterns and relationships between the system office (principal) and one of its campuses (agent). The system office–campus relationship was found to be consistent with the principal–agent framework. This relationship implied implicit and explicit expectations for enrolment targets, budget request submissions, budget planning and legislative directives. In addition, Macias (2012) concluded that the principal (system office) was dependent on information provided by the agent (campus) through the budget request process and annual report preparations and submissions.

Agency relationships can vary from a single-principle–single-agent relationship to multifaceted relationships, such as single-agent–multiple-principal and single-principal– multiple-agent models (Mason & Slack, 2003). Applying the framework to higher educa- tion funding, a single principal (the public) might have several agents (legislature, system office, institution). In addition, one player (system office) could be considered a principal in relation to an agent (an institution), and at the same time, this player (system office) could be an agent in relation to a principal (legislature). Further research is needed to study these complex agent–principal relationships.

Another dimension of the principle–agent theory could be applied further to university employees. For example, Liefner (2003) looked at how the role of agent can be transferred to the president/vice-chancellor, dean or even a department chair. He found that that performance-based funding leads to higher activity and overall can bring positive changes (Liefner, 2003). In another study, the principle–agent theory was tested on university administrators (here as principles) and academics (here as agents). Researchers concluded that academic salaries were aligned with the outcomes of academics’ performance most closely related to the interests of administrators (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). In other words, researchers suggested that principal–agent theory is also useful to examining internal processes in the organisation, not just the organisation’s relationships with the outside players.

McLendon (2003) reviewed areas of potential future research for principle–agent theory in higher education. Specifically, he suggested looking at politics–bureaucracy relationship between monitoring costs and control. Some questions that he posed are as follows: ‘to what extent do different mechanisms of state control of higher education incur different monitor- ing costs?’, ‘from the principal’s perspective, what control mechanisms are most efficient?’ and ‘to what extent are principals aware of the costs?’ (McLendon, 2003).

(B) Policy process theories

Although many policy process theories have been developed in academic studies, the focus here is on the three that were identified by McLendon (2003) as important in

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expanding the research agenda in higher education: multiple-streams framework, punc- tuated-equilibrium framework and advocacy coalition framework. According to McLendon (2003), all three models are standard works in the area of policy making; they focus on both interests and ideas in policy making; and, most importantly, they combine elements of incrementalism and large-scale change (Rockman, 1994).

Multiple-streams/revised garbage can framework

Multiple-streams framework is designed to explain why and how certain issues move to the position of prominence on the government agenda and become instituted policies. This framework is largely based on Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) garbage can model of organisational choice, which views various establishments as ‘organised anarchies,’ or a collection of solutions looking for problems. Kingdon (2003) views the government through the prism of the ‘organised anarchy,’ because it contains problematic preferences, unclear means and fluid participation. According to this seminal work, three separate streams flow through the government systems: problems, policies and politics. When streams come in together at a fruitful time, called ‘a window of opportunity,’ policy entrepreneurs and policy makers have a good chance of passing a policy through legislature (Kingdon, 2003).

A recent study by Klein (2013) used Kingdon’s (2003) multiple-streams framework to understand the funding decisions of New Jersey public colleges and universities with American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). Specifically, the researcher discussed agenda-setting processes within a state government’s budget-making process. Klein (2013) argued that New Jersey’s higher education advocates (including interest groups, college and university presidents, advocacy organisations and union leaders) were ‘policy entrepreneurs,’ speaking with one voice. The repetition of these messages creates a consistent message and a ‘communication flow’ within the political streams, which resulted in a successful advocacy effort (Klein, 2013)

Venters, Hauptli, and Cohen-Vogel (2012) applied a multiple-streams framework to the development of the national sales tax plan for education during Nixon administration and identified the reasons for this failed attempt. Although this analysis looks at funding of K-12 schools and not higher education institutions, it is providing a good example where efforts outlined by the multiple-streams framework fail to come to fruition.

Punctuated-equilibrium framework

Punctuated-equilibrium framework in public administration is based on a similar concept adapted from evolutionary biology, where it is often used to explain certain sudden interruptions (referred to as punctuations) in a continuous fossil record (McLendon, 2003). Baumgartner and Jones (1991, 1993) applied the punctuated equilibrium concept to policy making to explain how policy formation process can incorporate both relative consistency and rapid change. This framework explains why and how certain issues are processed quietly within policy subsystems (that consist of issue networks, interest groups, congressional subcommittees and issue specialists) and how sometimes these issues come to front of political debate at macro level, involving most of congress and presidency (McLendon, 2003).

Punctuated-equilibrium framework (in its original, evolutionary biology standpoint) has been applied to higher education enrolment management (Bejou & Bejou, 2012), internalisation of higher education institutions (Parsons & Fidler, 2005) and even K-12

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education, as in public high schools (Murphy, 2006) and private/charter schools (Lacireno-Paquet & Holyoke, 2007).

Researchers found no studies applying punctuated-equilibrium framework to higher education funding policies. It is apparent that there is a need to apply this framework to higher education funding issues critically and to build knowledge about how higher education funding issues move on legislative agenda and develop into policies. It is possible that the lack of studies in this area applying punctuated-equilibrium theory suggests that higher education funding policy formulation and adoption move at an incremental rate, rather than in jumps.

Advocacy coalition framework

Advocacy coalition framework looks at the formation of political coalitions. It also analyses how different belief systems, political institutions and scientific information play a role in these coalitions, the process that ultimately results in policy changes (McLendon, 2003). At the heart of the advocacy coalition framework is the idea of a three-tiered belief system: deep core beliefs are the deeply seated normative beliefs; policy core beliefs consist of coalition’s normative values and casual perceptions; and secondary aspects relate to specific policy preferences and strategies (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999).

Coalitions form and adjust their strategies based on their belief systems, while ‘policy brokers’ serve as mediators in any conflicting situations within a subsystem, according to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999). McLendon (2003) argues that advocacy coalition framework has its limitations, specifically due to its disregard of external factors and conditions. However, he calls for future research applying this framework to higher education policy making.

Advocacy coalition framework has been applied in the area of higher education through analysis of policy processes behind legislation and regulation regarding charter schools (DeBray, Scott, Lubienski, & Jabbar, 2014), school sport partnerships (Phillpots, 2013), international students (Miyokawa, 2009) and undocumented immigrants (Dougherty, Nienhusser, & Vega, 2010).

Dougherty, Natow, Hare, and Vega (2010) applied the framework to examine the origins of government performance funding in six states. This comprehensive research project included semi-structured interviews with political actors, as well as examinations of public agency reports, academic books and articles, doctoral dissertations and news- paper articles. Researchers found support for the theory, demonstrating that upon encoun- tering new data that question its policy core or secondary beliefs, an advocacy coalition was able to force a policy change (Dougherty et al., 2010).

Another study applied the advocacy coalition framework to higher education while looking at the role of information in the policy-making process. Shakespeare (2008) found that coalitions were predictable and were most tightly aligned during the times of budget- ing. Interestingly, some sources of information were similar across coalitions, while others were unique to particular coalitions and often drew expertise from outside sources of the subsystem (Shakespeare, 2008). In addition, the researcher claimed that there is some- times an unclear role for information in the policy process: some actors use information to compel the change in the policy, while others use information to maintain the policy (Shakespeare, 2008).

Although the advocacy coalition framework has been useful in explaining the process of policy formation, researchers found several weaknesses in the model. Specifically, Dougherty, Natow, Bork, Jones, and Vega (2013) argued that the model lacks explanation

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of how advocacy coalitions emerge and how they form their policy stances. In addition, the model mainly accounts for internal influences on policy formation, but largely disregards external influences (Dougherty et al., 2013). These external influences are described at its best by the policy innovation and diffusion theory, described in the following section.

(C) Policy innovation and diffusion theory

The analysis now moves towards exploring a model of how policies can move and spread from one state to another. Specifically, policy innovation and diffusion theory outlines how social, economic and political features in one state (also referred to as ‘intrastate dynamics’) and influences from other states (also referred to as ‘interstate dynamics’) come into play to define new policies and programmes (McLendon, 2003). Hence, this model accounts for both internal and external factors in policy formulation and imple- mentation. In this review, we will look for research studies that applied policy innovation and diffusion theory to higher education funding.

A study by McLendon, Heller, and Young (2005) systematically applied policy innovation and diffusion model to higher education arena, while analysing state post- secondary policy adoption over a 20-year period. This analysis revealed critical insights regarding effects of political climate, interstate diffusion and governance structures on postsecondary policy adoption process (McLendon et al., 2005). Interestingly, researchers found that centralised governance arrangements were positively related to new financing policies, but no such relations were found in regard to accountability for these new policies (McLendon et al., 2005).

Policy innovation and diffusion theory has been applied in the area of performance higher education funding. In their recent study, Dougherty et al. (2013) examined the political forces that have facilitated performance funding policies in some states (e.g. Florida, Illinois, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee and Washington), but not others (California and Nevada). This qualitative-in-nature study reviewed documentary records and conducted extensive interviews with higher education officials, legislators, staff, governors, advisors, business leaders and other actors (Dougherty et al., 2013). Researchers frequently encountered references to the experiences of other states, which provided support for the powerful external factors under the policy diffusion theory. External sources, identified by the researchers, were other states, state policy organisations and outside experts (Dougherty et al., 2013).

Reviewing the policy innovation and diffusion theory further, it is worth mentioning that vertical transmission of policy ideas is just as important as horizontal transmission. So far, discussion has related only to horizontal transmission – the spread of policy ideas from one state to another. Some researchers have pointed at a need to study the vertical transmission of ideas – from state to federal and vice versa (Boeckelman, 1992; McLendon, 2003). As an example, one can point out a relatively recent vertical migration of higher education funding policy from state to federal level: Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship programme that inspired the federal Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. This is a clear demonstration of a vertical transmission, as outlined by the policy innovation and diffusion theory. Higher education funding research will benefit by applying this theory to other similar examples.

(D) Comparative perspectives on state political systems

McLendon (2003) pointed out the lack of research regarding comparative features of state political systems. He argued that most educational policy researchers take into

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account demographic variables, organisational variables and other higher-education- specific variables, while trying to explain why some policies get adopted, while others are never passed (McLendon, 2003). Although these are important variables to study, he argued that there is a missing opportunity to include the influence of state political and governmental attributes into analysis (McLendon, 2003). In other words, one should to take into account how a distinctive governmental context may affect higher education policy making.

McLendon (2003) identified several variables that are included in this governmental context: (a) legislative professionalism (Bibby & Holbrook, 1999); political ideology (Wright, Erikson, & McIver, 1987); interparty competition (Ranney, 1976); unified institutional control (Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler, 2001); election proximity (Berry & Berry, 1990) and institutional powers of governors. These variables have been tested on policy adoptions in various areas, not just higher education policies. There is a clear void in research literature that needs to incorporate these variables into cross-state studies of higher education funding policy adoption.

Conclusion

This paper surveyed recent research studies that pertain to US higher education funding policies and politics. The studies selected for this review highlight knowledge of the forces that drive policies and they address the issues, identified by Heller (2001), which higher education institutions are facing: accountability, affordability and access.

One could conclude that these theories converge to explain how US higher educa- tion funding policies are formed. It is not one theory, but rather a combination of the theories reviewed, that work best at explaining the processes behind higher education funding policies. For example, performance funding in higher education can be best explained through a combination of the advocacy coalition framework and policy diffusion theory.

The advocacy coalition framework explains the internal political forces: how coali- tions are formed within policy subsystems, how policy subsystems are shaped by state policies and how policy changes are instituted through policy learning and external shocks from other policy subsystems (Dougherty et al., 2013). Policy diffusion theory comple- ments the advocacy coalition framework because it explains the external factors that impact performance funding policy formations. Policy diffusion theory explains where ideas for policy solutions come from and demonstrates the profound role of cross-state policy organisations and policy networks (Dougherty et al., 2013).

There is a limitation to this review of literature on higher education policy forma- tion and implementation: it did not include any studies conducted outside the United States. Further research, testing these theories in other countries, is needed. To do so would add to our understanding and further refinement of these theories. Of special interest on the international arena is the policy innovation and diffusion theory. Several research questions could be posed: How do higher education funding policies transfer from one country to another? Under which circumstances do these transfers occur? What are the timeframes for these diffusions? And is there any feedback to the original policy-adopting country?

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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