DB.
Tamratyare
ArticleAccountabilityLearningandResponseAmidFiscalCrisis.pdf
Administration & Society 2015, Vol. 47(8) 1015 –1037
© The Author(s) 2014 DOI: 10.1177/0095399714532270
aas.sagepub.com
Article
Accountability, Learning, and Response Amid Fiscal Crisis
M. Ernita Joaquin1 and Nathan G. Myers2
Abstract A national financial collapse can engender a heightened gubernatorial sense of accountability, leadership, and learning. An attempt at theory building on this theme uses governors’ 2009 speeches as an historical artifact and policy document recording the kind of rhetoric they employed during the “Great Recession.” A quantitative analysis reveals correlations between gubernatorial characteristics and rhetoric. A qualitative approach yields gubernatorial constructs of accountability, leadership, and learning at a time of crisis. The results offer a foundation for further theory building using cross-sectional and longitudinal data.
Keywords fiscal stress, gubernatorial rhetoric, accountability, learning, leadership, reform
Introduction
As the year 2009 began, 29 Democrats and 21 Republicans stood at the helm of state governments throughout the United States. Most had served more than one term; a higher percentage on their first term was Democrats. Most possessed prior experience in elective office or private management. Some
1San Francisco State University, CA, USA 2Indiana State University, Terre Haute, USA
Corresponding Author: M. Ernita Joaquin, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA. Email: [email protected]
532270AASXXX10.1177/0095399714532270Administration & SocietyJoaquin and Myers research-article2014
1016 Administration & Society 47(8)
were presiding over unified state assemblies; some had preceded governors of the opposing party. In the White House, the first African American President, a Democrat, had just been inaugurated. All of them were con- fronted with the longest, worst recession since the Great Depression (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities [CBPP], 2013). This is an exploratory study of gubernatorial accountability at a time of crisis, in particular, the extent to which accountability, learning, and policy response themes dominated their State of the State (SOS) addresses in 2009, and if these themes correlated with certain gubernatorial characteristics.
The 2009 speeches were chosen because they were given in the year when governors had acquired a full sense of the recession’s magnitude and had to publicly address it in a formal venue. Without aiming to generalize beyond this critical period, we assumed that 2009 could suggest some potential rela- tionships between gubernatorial attributes and leadership pronouncements as well as allow us to speculate how rhetoric might adapt in the face of extraor- dinary crisis. More a theory-building effort, this study does not examine gubernatorial rhetoric in a historical context, but we intend to carry this for- ward. The current study is limited in that it takes a snapshot rather than long- term analysis of state leadership, serving as our exploratory platform to refine future research.
The governors delivered SOS addresses to their legislative assemblies around January of that year. These annual speeches combine broad policy priorities and specific legislative goals and reflect a governor’s leadership style, strategy, or philosophy of governing, ideological stance, and approach to communicating with the public (see Coffey, 2005; Dileo, 1997; Ferguson, 2003; Jackson & Kingdon, 1992; Segal & Cover, 1989; Van Assendelft, 1997). For this article, the 2009 speeches are treated as artifacts that captured portraits of accountability and learning at a pivotal moment of fiscal leader- ship. “Words matter” (Crew & Lewis, 2011) and understanding political leadership also calls for looking at the way solutions are sought for the state’s problems (Crew, 1998). In this article we ask, how were accountability and learning expressed during fiscal stress? Were budget lessons imbibed, framed, communicated to the public, and/or applied as policy response? Were personal, political, and institutional variables associated with these pronouncements?
Accountability During a Fiscal Crisis
Our research framework inquires about gubernatorial claims of control over solutions for local budget or economic challenges. Accountability, however, presupposes powers or control over the factors that would allow one to
Joaquin and Myers 1017
account for performance. Scholars have noted the weak control that gover- nors wield over the economic conditions of their state (Forsythe, 2004; Rosenthal, 2013), which the Great Recession put on display. The National Council of State Legislatures found that the recession’s impact on revenue collections contributed to state deficits totaling $62.4 billion (Conant, 2010b).
States are often seen as surfing good or bad national (and increasingly global) economic waves (Forsythe, 2004). Phil Bredesen, Tennessee’s gover- nor, invoked this in his 2009 speech with the sailor’s adage, “You can’t con- trol the wind, but you can adjust your sails. We can’t control the national economy, but we can make the adjustments that let us ride it out.” Globalization has also weakened fiscal policies and reduced governmental actors’ control within their geographical boundaries (Brand, 1992). Past miscalculations by officials also do not help: the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities notes that economic problems tend to be magnified by structural weaknesses caused by poor decision making in the past (as cited in Conant, 2010b).
Accountability for righting the deep imbalances in the states’ budget posi- tions calls into review gubernatorial powers as described in the literature. Some argue that the institutional, organizational, and popular advantages of the governorship may exceed those of the U.S. President and that governors have amassed more power over time, due to devolution (Heidbreder, 2012). The work of Ferguson enjoins us to view gubernatorial action and efficacy within a larger framework of powers that the institution confers upon state leaders. Ferguson (2013) defines institutional power as
those powers given to the governor by the state constitution, state statutes, and the voters when they vote on constitutions and referenda . . . these powers are the structure into which the governor moves after being elected to office. (p. 220)
To Ferguson (2013), institutional power may be indexed by combining the tenure potential of the governor in office, appointment power, budget power, veto power, party control, and whether officials of the state government are separately elected. This framing later on helps in the design of our research. Each variable is important, and with the context of the Great Recession, we here focus on the fiscal or budgetary powers of the governor, and the role that rhetoric may play in this repertoire of powers, when times become more turbulent.
Traditionally, governors are viewed as “chief legislator” in political sci- ence literature (Bernick & Wiggins, 1991, as cited in Heidbreder, 2012). Governors are seen as having more authority in state fiscal policy than state legislators (Anton, 1966; Howard, 1973; Schick, 1971, as cited by Hale, 2013), in large part because they tend to be more visible and seen as being out
1018 Administration & Society 47(8)
front in the development of the legislative agenda (Bernick & Wiggins, 1991, as cited by Taylor, 2012).
Power can come from having the sole authority to produce revenue and expenditure estimates in the state (Lauth, 2010) compared to other places where governors must collaborate with legislatures (Wallin & Snow, 2010) to trim allotments to agencies in response to lower revenues or higher expen- ditures (Dautrich, Robbins, & Simonsen, 2010) and to make “course correc- tions” to the budget in the midst of the budget biennium (Conant, 2010a). The line-item veto power as well as gubernatorial potential to remain in office for longer periods of time were previously associated with a governor’s ability to accomplish outcomes (Sharkansky, 1968, as cited in Crew & Lewis, 2011). While gubernatorial leadership is important, fiscal responsibility can only be achieved in a bipartisan environment (Hale, 2013). Lacking such an environ- ment, governors may turn to tactics to dodge fiscal accountability (Krause & Melusky, 2012).
Rhetoric in the Repertoire of Gubernatorial Powers
In trying to improve the fiscal health of the state, governors can turn to another medium: the bully pulpit (Heidbreder, 2012), under which we can place the “SOS” speeches. For many citizens in a state, the governor is the face of the government (Gross, 1991; Herzik & Brown, 1991; Rosenthal, 1990, as cited in Carpenter & Hughes, 2011). Governors hold a number of advantages when it comes to using the pulpit: They can put issues on the agenda, mobilize media access, and create a shift in public awareness (Kunin, 1990; Mazzoni, 1995, as cited in Carpenter & Hughes, 2011).
SOS speeches, our focus on this article, often contain a combination of broad policy goals and specific legislative goals, and also reflect the gover- nor’s style of leadership, strategy or philosophy of governing, ideological position, and approach to communicating with the public (see Coffey, 2005; Ferguson, 2003; Jackson & Kingdon, 1992; Segal & Cover, 1989; Van Assendelft, 1997). They tend to be valid indicators of gubernatorial ideology on economic and social issues, within and across parties (Coffey, 2005).
Gubernatorial addresses have been found to forecast validly the type of policy later pursued (Carpenter & Hughes, 2011; Ferguson, 2003). Placement of agenda items on the speech also indicates what governors considered more important (Crew & Lewis, 2011). In addition, rhetoric that emphasizes enthu- siasm and activity increase gubernatorial potential for legislative support and overcoming political and institutional barriers (Crew & Lewis, 2011).
Joaquin and Myers 1019
One author who believes that SOS speeches are inadequate proxies for studying the real agenda of governors is Rosenthal (2013): In his view, some agenda items may not have been formulated by the time of the governor’s address, some items are included for strategic purposes, and, the long address lends itself to very general enunciation of policy initiatives. Some of those items serve as “political or symbolic weight” (Rosenthal, 2013, p. 91). Nonetheless, symbolism can be powerful in a time of crisis.
While governors continue to possess a number of advantages, a trend of erosion in gubernatorial powers over the last few decades has been observed (Abney & Lauth, 1998; Dometrius & Wright, 2010; Goodman, 2007; as cited in Krause & Melusky, 2012). Political and economic conditions constrain a governor’s ability to get something on the agenda or keep attention on it (Heidbreder, 2012). This can lead governors to increasingly rely upon politi- cal rhetoric to bolster the perception of their power, or avert blame during dire economic situations. The allure of demonstrating relevance is observed to be often behind actions engaging in symbolic politics, credit claiming, and position taking (Hansen, 1999). Governors routinely use SOS speeches to claim credit for positive developments or to distance themselves from mis- takes (Heidbreder, 2012). Reforms may be floated to provide political cover.
These prompt us to explore if symbolic or rhetorical accountability com- pensates for a perception of weak control during a time of recession and political polarization, if accountability leans outward, and if lessons learned are effectively expressed. Rosenthal (2013) seems to argue that budget addresses in and of themselves are an exercise in symbolism over substance. Our study is an attempt to determine to what degree the governor attempts to utilize the speeches to account for and/or propose actual goals.
The theme of learning is pursued here as well due to the dearth of empiri- cal studies that tell us how governors conceive of their jobs as they perform them and how they learn as they lead. In Rosenthal’s (2013) book, we see glimpses of formers governors recalling, in memoirs, that nothing really pre- pared them for the job; that they all “learned on the go.”
Ideally, leaders learn, over time, what fiscal measures work or do not work for the states, and their personal ways of finding solutions. That is in turn assumed to be communicated to the public to show that leaders cultivate wisdom in “laboratories” of innovation and democracy. Governors must edu- cate, especially when creating public understanding of the gubernatorial agenda could give them some political advantage over the legislature in negotiations over budget directions (Rosenthal, 2013, p. 156).
With this basis in literature, this study examines the rhetoric of U.S. gov- ernors in the year 2009 for references to accountability, leadership, and learn- ing, as they respond to an enormous crisis. If governors were ever in need of
1020 Administration & Society 47(8)
rhetorical strategies to bolster the perception of their power, it was during the Great Recession.
Research Data and Methodology
The analysis was conducted in two stages. The first involved the qualitative coding of the speeches (Stateline.org, 2009) based on themes and unique subject areas, to make sure we had a full understanding of our data and how it might be used for the purpose of content analysis. Once it was established whether and to what degree such themes were present, we were able to engage in a more quantitative analysis of rhetoric and gubernatorial charac- teristics. Establishing the presence of the coded themes and how we concep- tualized them will allow the reader to better evaluate the statistical findings once they are presented.
We loaded the 2009 SOS speeches from all 50 governors into the Provalis Research QDA Miner program and coded for the themes. Table 1 shows how the themes were defined, based not only on the literature but also how they emerged, in context, from the data, as qualitative research method requires (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). These were then elaborated into categories or sub- themes to code the sentences in the speech.
As an exploratory study, we incorporate our assumption, based on the lit- erature that some independent variables may be associated with the gover- nor’s speeches, but rather than testing causation and directions of influence, we are merely interested, within certain parameters, in finding what relation- ships would emerge. Considering the environment in which governors must exhibit leadership qualities, it is possible that some political variables are associated with their responses to the crisis. These variables are enumerated in Table 2.
This research utilized two qualitative analysis software programs—QDA Miner and Sim Stat. The QDA Miner program allows researchers to more easily explore texts to code the texts for particular themes. Variables can be computed based on the frequency with which a code appears in a document, the number of words used to discuss a particular code in the document, and the percentage of the total words in the document used to discuss a particular code. We focused on computing the frequencies with which the code seg- ments appeared in the document, and used them to further draw some insights on gubernatorial accountability and learning.
Statistical analysis on coded data was made possible through the Sim Stat program. While correlation is not indicative of causation and this study only measures the messages of U.S. governors at one particular moment, the two- pronged approach of qualitative analysis of the speeches and correlation
Joaquin and Myers 1021
analysis of coded segments with gubernatorial characteristics provides, in our view, a meaningful assessment of state leadership at a time of national crisis.
The results of the quantitative analyses are provided in Tables 3 and 4. Throughout the findings sections that follow, we will highlight the statistical results that have significance after discussing the broader context of the dif- ferent themes that emerged from the qualitative analysis.
Table 1. Code Segments Used in Content Analyzing the Speeches.
Variables Code segments
Accountability Blame avoidance; blaming Washington, the private sector, the market cycle, the public, bureaucracy/unions, previous governors, legislature, special interests, the media, the courts, partisanship, or the state revenue structure
Accountability is owning up to responsibility and/or attributing the blame to someone or something else for the state’s fiscal troubles
Leadership Defining leadership in crisis situations; calling for non-partisanship/ compromise; calling for private sector responsibility and citizen initiatives; framing proposals as bold
Leadership involves defining the job of leaders at a crucial moment, calling for bold initiatives, rising up to the challenge, and overcoming partisanship
Policy learning Acknowledging mistakes or failures; understanding gravity of the challenge; comparing previous challenges met; comparing solutions with other states; policy learning and education of constituents; reforming budgeting philosophy or culture
Learning involves acknowledging mistakes, understanding historical differences, searching for workable solutions, educating constituents, understanding and communicating cultural change and fiscal reform
Response Policy response includes identifying
specific solutions to address state government deficits and debts, and defining the role of government at a time of uncertainty
Defining the role of government; intergovernmental partnerships; better revenue collection and use; progressive tax reform; diversifying revenues; greater spending scrutiny; capping spending; various spending cuts; tapping rainy day funds; delaying projects; borrowing; reforming pension; reorganization; economic development incentives; stimulus grants/loans; passing responsibility to other governments; cutting local aids; privatization; loosening regulations; tax freeze/cuts/ credits
1022 Administration & Society 47(8)
The Anatomy of Blame and Accountability
Budgeting is conflict ridden; in this context, we attempt to find how world- views, leadership, and learning processes were expressed; what kind of con- trol and responsibility governors perceived they had; and whether they blamed forces outside themselves.
Blaming Other Governments, Sectors, and Actors
According to Rosenthal (2013, p. 73), “One reason that governors assume responsibility is that they cannot escape it,” and that “when it comes to fiscal policy, in particular, the governor will be blamed (not the legislators).” Yet in 2009, the White House and federal actions loomed large in the national politi- cal psyche. Many governors blamed Washington, D.C., or the federal
Table 2. Descriptions of Gubernatorial and State Variables.
Variable Description, coding, and source of data
Party Is the governor a Republican or a Democrat? 0 = Republican, 1 = Democrat National Governor’s Association, http://www.nga.org/cms/
governors Previous Term Has the governor served a previous term in office? 0 = no, 1 = yes National Governor’s Association, http://www.nga.org/cms/
governors Institutional
Power Index Measure of a governor’s official power in comparison to the
legislature (1 = lower level; 5 = higher level) Ferguson (2013) Tax Progressivity Does the state have a progressive income tax system? 0 = no, 1 = yes Ferguson (2013) Legislative
Experience Did the governor have previous experience in the state
legislature or Congress? (0 = No, 1 = Yes) National Governor’s Association, http://www.nga.org/cms/
governors Annual vs.
Biennial Budgeting
Does the state have an annual or biennial budgeting process? (0 = Annual, 1 = Biennial) Snell (2011)
Government Executive Experience
Did the governor have previous executive experience in state government? (i.e., Attorney General)
National Governor’s Association, http://www.nga.org/cms/ governors
1023
T a b
le 3
. C
o rr
el at
io ns
B et
w ee
n G
ub er
na to
ri al
V ar
ia bl
es a
nd A
cc o un
ta bi
lit y
T he
m es
.
Pa rt
y Pr
ev t
er m
In st
p o w
er T
ax p
ro gr
es s
Le g
ex pe
ri en
ce
B la
m e
A vo
id an
ce −
.3 1 6 8 *
(− .5
4 3 /−
.0 4 1 )
.0 34
9 (−
.2 44
/.3 07
6) .0
99 0
(− .1
83 /.3
64 1)
− .0
76 8
(− .3
45 /.2
04 2)
− .0
11 8
(− .2
87 /.2
65 1)
B la
m e
W as
h −
.3 7 1 6 **
( −
.5 8 5 /−
.1 0 3 )
.2 8 4 6 *
(. 0 0 6 4 /. 5 1 7 7 )
− .1
27 7
(− .3
89 /.1
54 9)
− .0
36 3
(− .3
09 /.2
42 5)
.2 26
7 (−
.0 55
/.4 71
3) B
la m
e Pr
iv S
ec −
.0 18
5 (−
.2 93
/.2 59
) −
.1 00
8 (−
.3 66
/.1 82
2) .3
5 6 8 *
(. 0 8 5 8 /. 5 7 3 6 )
− .2
9 4 3 *
(− .5
2 5 /−
.0 1 7 )
.1 08
2 (−
.1 74
/.3 72
0) B
la m
e B
ur −
.3 0 3 1 *
(− .5
32 /−
.0 26
) −
.0 88
8 (−
.3 55
/.1 92
8) −
.2 17
3 (−
.4 64
/.0 64
7) −
.1 81
9 (−
.4 34
/.1 01
0) −
.0 78
3 (−
.3 46
/.2 02
8) B
la m
e C
o ur
ts −
.1 61
2 (−
.4 17
/.1 21
8) .0
86 9
(− .1
95 /.3
53 6)
.0 10
8 (−
.2 66
/.2 85
8) .1
69 6
(− .1
13 /.4
24 2)
.1 54
8 (−
.1 28
/.4 11
8) B
la m
e Ec
o n
− .0
68 5
(− .3
37 /.2
12 1)
− .2
38 2
(− .4
81 /.0
43 0)
.1 16
3 (−
.1 66
/.3 79
0) −
.1 36
0 (−
.3 96
/.1 49
8) .1
44 4
(− .1
38 /.4
03 0)
B la
m e
Pr ev
G o v
.0 74
8 (−
.2 06
/.3 42
9) −
.1 15
0 (−
.3 78
/.1 67
4) .2
00 3
(− .0
82 /.4
49 7)
.0 56
1 (−
.2 24
/.3 26
5) −
.3 2 1 2 *
(− .5
4 6 /−
.0 4 6 )
B la
m e
R ev
S tr
− .1
07 4
(− .3
71 /.1
74 7)
− .3
6 0 4 *
(− .5
7 6 /−
.0 9 0 )
.1 50
8 (−
.1 32
/.4 08
4) .1
13 0
(− .1
69 /.3
76 2)
− .0
40 1
(− .3
12 /.2
38 8)
B la
m e
Sp
In te
re st
s −
.0 35
6 (−
.3 08
/.2 43
0) .1
79 3
(− .1
04 /.4
32 3)
− .3
9 4 5 **
( −
.6 0 2 /−
.1 2 9 )
.0 22
4 (−
.2 55
/.2 96
3) .0
23 7
(− .2
54 /.2
97 4)
*p <
0. 05
, * *p
< 0.
01 .
1024
T a b
le 4
. C
o rr
el at
io ns
B et
w ee
n G
ub er
na to
ri al
V ar
ia bl
es a
nd L
ea rn
in g
an d
R es
po ns
e T
he m
es .
Pa rt
y A
nn ua
l/B ie
nn ia
l B ud
Pr ev
T er
m T
ax P
ro gr
es s
Ex ec
E xp
er ie
nc e
C o m
pa ri
ng S
o lu
ti o ns
− .3
1 5 8 *
(− .5
4 2 /−
.0 4 0 )
− .0
22 0
(− .2
96 /.2
55 7)
— —
— C
al lin
g Pr
iv S
ec R
es po
ns b
.2 38
5 (−
.0 43
/.4 80
8) −
.3 3 5 6 *
(− .5
5 7 /−
.0 6 2 )
— —
— C
al lin
g C
it iz
en I ni
ti at
iv e
− .1
61 2
(− .4
17 /.1
21 8)
− .1
16 6
(− .3
79 /.1
65 8)
— —
— D
ef in
in g
Le ad
er sh
ip .1
70 3
(− .1
13 /.4
24 8
.0 13
9 (−
.2 63
/.2 88
6) —
— —
R ef
o rm
in g
C ul
tu re
− .1
60 6
(− .4
17 /.1
22 3)
− .3
6 9 0 **
( −
.5 8 3 /−
.1 0 0 )
— —
— G
o ve
rn m
en t
M at
te rs
− .0
10 4
(− .2
85 /.2
66 4)
− .1
58 1
(− .4
15 /.1
24 9)
− .2
9 6 6 *
(− .5
2 7 /−
.0 1 9 )
− .0
95 0
(− .3
61 /.1
86 8)
− .0
10 4
(− .2
85 /.2
66 4)
In te
ro rg
P ar
tn er
sp .1
46 6
(− .1
36 /.4
04 9)
.1 76
0 (−
.1 07
/.4 29
5) .0
71 2
(− .2
10 /.3
39 8)
− .3
8 3 5 **
( −
.5 9 4 /−
.1 1 6 )
− .1
42 8
(− .4
02 /.1
40 1)
R eo
rg an
iz at
io n/
C o ns
− .0
27 6
(− .3
01 /.2
50 5)
.1 24
4 (−
.1 58
/.3 86
0) .3
1 0 6 *
(. 0 3 4 6 /. 5 3 8 1 )
.0 76
8 (−
.2 04
/.3 44
8) −
.2 8 3 5 *
(− .5
1 7 /−
.0 0 5 )
R ai
ny D
ay U
se −
.2 14
7 (−
.4 61
/.0 67
4) −
.1 06
5 (−
.3 71
/.1 75
7) .1
36 0
(− .1
47 /.3
95 8)
.2 8 0 7 *
(. 0 0 2 1 /. 5 1 4 5 )
− .1
77 2
(− .4
31 /.1
05 7)
B o rr
o w
in g
− .0
35 6
(− .3
08 /.2
43 0)
− .0
90 3
(− .3
57 /.1
91 3)
.0 54
8 (−
.2 25
/.3 25
3) −
.0 83
5 (−
.3 51
/.1 97
9) −
.3 3 2 7 *
(− .5
5 5 /−
.0 5 9 )
Pe ns
io n
R ef
o rm
.0 64
7 (−
.2 16
/.3 34
1) −
.2 03
5 (−
.4 52
/.0 78
9) .0
95 4
(− .1
86 /.3
61 0)
− .2
00 6
(− .4
50 /.0
81 9)
− .3
2 5 8 *
(− .5
5 0 /−
.0 5 1 )
Ec o n
D I nc
en ti ve
s −
.1 46
3 (−
.4 05
/.1 36
7) .2
8 1 3 *
(. 0 1 9 8 /. 5 2 7 4 )
.0 54
5 (−
.2 25
/.3 25
1) −
.1 20
7 (−
.3 83
/.1 61
8) −
.0 44
7 (−
.3 16
/.2 34
6) Fi
sc al
S ti m
ul us
.1 25
4 (−
.1 57
/.3 86
8) −
.2 11
8 (−
.4 59
/.0 70
4) −
.3 3 8 9 *
(− .5
6 0 /−
.0 6 6 )
− .1
20 1
(− .3
82 /.1
62 4)
.2 41
5 (−
.0 39
/.4 83
3) Fr
ee ze
T ax
es −
.3 3 0 3 *
(− .5
5 3 /−
.0 5 6 )
.2 01
2 (−
.0 81
/.4 50
4) .0
62 9
(− .2
17 /.3
32 5)
− .1
05 0
(− .3
69 /.1
77 2)
− .2
20 0
(− .4
66 /.0
61 9)
Lo ca
l G o v
T ra
ns fe
rs −
.0 78
2 (−
.3 46
/.2 02
9) .2
9 7 0 *
(. 0 1 9 8 /. 5 2 7 4 )
.1 47
5 (−
.1 35
/.4 05
6) −
.1 10
1 (−
.3 74
/.1 72
2) −
.2 73
6 (−
.5 09
/.0 05
5)
*p <
0. 05
, * *p
< 0.
01 .
Joaquin and Myers 1025
government for their budget and economic difficulties. Some attributed the origins of the economic woes to Wall Street or private corporations and the boom and bust market cycle. Other entities that were linked to budget woes were employee unions/bureaucrats, and local governments, including school districts. The recession also provided some governors grounds to tie anti-tax sentiments to anti-bureaucratic sentiments. For example, some governors decried the growth of school administrators/staff count relative to student enrollment; the ratio of overhead budget to teaching budgets; the lack of accountability among school heads; and the un-sustainability of the benefits of unionized teachers and other public employees. Some governors linked the fiscal problems to previous sets of officials (governors and/or legislators). Some also blamed previous governors and previous legislators, confirming the partisan split in state houses and capitols across the nation.
Correlation analyses provide support for the notion that personal and insti- tutional variables were associated with the use of particular rhetoric. Political party was significantly correlated (negatively) with Blame Avoidance, Blaming Washington, and Blaming the Bureaucracy (indicating that Democrats used this rhetoric less than Republicans). Whether the governor was new or had served a previous term had a positive association with Blaming Washington, indicating that governors with more experience were more likely to hold the federal government accountable for economic condi- tions. The level of institutional power a governor possessed in his or her state relative to the legislature was positively associated with blaming budgetary problems on the private sector, indicating that possessing higher levels of constitutional and statutory power did not mean that some governors did not look for others to blame. However, a negative association showed between the institutional power and Blaming Special Interests. Previous legislative experience in the state legislature or Congress was negatively associated with Blaming the Previous Administration for the budget crisis.
Blaming the System
The use of the passive tone (blame avoidance) by the governors involved talking about this “system”—of uncontrollable mandates, external economic forces, uncontrollable debt and spending, service demands, and inflexible rules. Some spoke of government in the third person, extricating themselves, such as: “ . . . in these difficult times, they are skeptical of the ability of gov- ernment to solve the very real problems they read about and are living with every day” (OR).
Statistical analysis indicates that whether or not a state has a progressive income tax system was negatively associated with Blaming the Private Sector.
1026 Administration & Society 47(8)
This could be interpreted in a couple of ways. One interpretation could be that in states with more progressive systems, there is a greater perception that the wealthy do pay their fair share. Another interpretation would be that, in times of economic hardship, governors choose not to antagonize those that could potentially help spur the economy.
The theme of Blame Avoidance consists of some sub-categories of the justifications (Figure 1).
a. The state as a victim. Some conjured the image of hapless citizens swept by an economic tornado “through no fault of their own.” This rhetoric removes the role of the state government in creating or pre- venting the problem.
b. Path dependence and lack of ownership. The speeches were dominated by the passive voice blaming forces that were set early on, problems that had accumulated from the time of their predecessors, the public’s cultural stubbornness, or the insatiable demand for spending. This sug- gests that failure in budget stewardships either rests on everyone or on none at all; and the governor’s office is an obscure player in systemic problems.
c. Lack of control over the economy. Some emphasized the relative weak- ness of their state’s economy given the larger environment, telling their audience that “we are not immune from the global economic down- turn” (ID); “the bottom fell out of the national economy” (MI); and “we
THE STATE AS VICTIM
� through no fault of their own � this downturn was not caused by any of us � our people did not cause this meltdown, its causes are
beyond their control, and are na�onal, global in scope � our problems are largely not of our own making � our state didn’t make this economic crisis
PATH DEPENDENCE & STRUCTURAL REASONS
� in the last 20 years, only 4 budgets have been on �me
� corrup�on has damaged our poli�cal reputa�ons and deeply hurt our ci�zens
� Hoosiers have been resis�ng change since the first se�lers arrived
� the forest of debt and spending has Grown over the past 20 years
� an ins�tu�onal momentum that demands more resources regardless of taxpayers’ ability to support their growth
� even before the current financial crisis, we were already in a deep compe��ve hole
� the accumulated problems that arose during the last several decades when there was no money
� people believed State was recession-proof
LACK OF PREDICTION, OR CONTROL
� these are the worst financial �mes any of us can remember
� circumstances that even seasoned experts could not predict
� the strength of our state being tested in ways not seen in decades
� economic challenges as steep and stubborn as any in history
� the people are up against the worst we’ve seen in a long �me
� these budget problems are the result of an interna�onal, not just na�onal recession
� challenges our state has not seen since the Great Depression
Figure 1. Blaming the system: Three facets emerging from the speeches.
Joaquin and Myers 1027
were dealt a terrible hand by forces beyond our control” (WA). They highlighted the historical magnitude of the collapse as causing the defi- cits. Our correlation analysis found that an incumbent governor was less likely to blame the revenue system for budget troubles, perhaps because after a term they had come to accept the system as it is.
d. Other passive accounting. By saying that other states and business cor- porations were also struggling, governors further removed themselves and their previous actions from accountability. A few hid behind the letters of the law in explaining their budget deficits: They were made to do things by federal mandate, or by state constitutions or other budget process rules.
Lessons in Deliberative Democracy “Leadership and learning are indispensable to each other.”
—Arkansas Governor (2009)
Policy Learning: To Learn, Acknowledge. To Master, Teach
Governors are said to be good presidential material because they gain lessons from leading the “laboratories of democracy.” The 2009 speeches were replete with passive acknowledgment of leadership shortcomings and active admission that mistakes were made in certain areas (Figure 2). An important aspect of learning is being able to communicate the lessons. We found evi- dence of governors trying to educate citizens and elucidating their under- standing of budgeting. They appeared to want to impart three major lessons: on budgeting complexities in a democracy, adaptation challenges, and the intricacies of the budget rules themselves. Notably, only eight governors, with Wyoming’s being the most notable, included these kinds of lessons in their speeches. It would be interesting to see if future addresses come back to these themes as it would indicate whether governors really are internalizing lessons learned or if it is rhetoric for temporary political benefit.
Policy Learning: The Search for Policy Ideas
An important learning aspect is efficiency and resourcefulness in identifying where potentially vital information lies (Simon, 1947). Gubernatorial legisla- tive success has been linked to their information-gathering resources or “enabling resources” (Dilger, Krause, & Moffett, 1995). In 2009, governors provided clues to what they deemed as important sources of policy ideas (Table 5) and the reasons why governors might be open to certain ideas. We
1028 Administration & Society 47(8)
grouped the sources of ideas according to the entities and strategies involved. As an inspiration for gubernatorial policy, the most prominent in use were task forces and commissions, presumably created by executive order or with legislative participation. In comparison, scarcely mentioned were experi- ments (pilot programs) or initiatives that were borne out of the results of experiments. As evidence to back up some of the governors’ proposals to address their states’ problems, they hewed to reasoning such as the strategies had worked in the past, or they had received awards and media coverage, or other states had even borrowed their ideas (Table 6).
“MISTAKES”
• Having to cut back, or withhold promised spending
• Having a voter’s ini�a�ve pass that would constrain service capacity
• Le�ng investments deteriorate • Regressive taxa�on • The use of budget/ financial gimmickry • Overspending when �mes are good • “Incen�vizing the wrong care in the wrong
se�ng at the wrong price” in health care • Investment and economic development
programs that do not work • Losing jobs • Delaying reform • Financial mismanagement
SHORTCOMINGS/ FAILURES
• Inability to pass a balanced budget • Ranking low across the na�on in educa�onal
performance, health insurance • “Bi-par�san betrayal of the public trust” • “Out of control spending under both par�es” • “A shameful mountain of unpaid bills” • Bi�erness and fric�on • Sha�ering the “recession-proof” image of the
state; “false sense of immunity” • Failing rela�onship with other local
governments • Zero-sum poli�cs • Lack of poli�cal will, failing to take advantage of
favorable policies and matching funds • “Deficit of ethics” • Denial of state of affairs • Failure of fiscal restraint
AREAS WHERE LESSONS ARE LEARNED
Budge�ng in a democracy The budget document does not always reflect the conflict behind the scene – GA
How disclosure is vital – SC Budge�ng as the fundamental task of governing – PA
Adapta�on in budge�ng How state government can weather recession be�er – VT
The effect of economic cycle on state budge�ng – WI The state’s pa�ern of entering recession late and exi�ng late – WY
Ci�zens must be educated about expecta�ons during downturns – WY
Budget processes Pa�ence in decision making so that short-term needs are not met by long-term hardships - GA
Revenue forecas�ng is error-prone - IN How budget cuts are done historically – MO How budget balance is done historically – VT
It is not a failure if the legislature does not pass a law – WY
Figure 2. Mistakes and lessons in fiscal leadership.
Joaquin and Myers 1029
Table 5. Sources of Policy Ideas and Learning.
Sources of ideas Key phrases from the speeches
1. Elective Officials Other governors—PA South Carolina Policy Council group to advocate
for greater spending, income, and lobbying disclosure—SC
Analysis of the penal code 2. Administrators State employees—CO Research and development function within the
Education department—OH Green Jobs Cabinet to study clean energy—NM 3. Academic Scientists in the State University—KS, KY, VA Trusting education research even if not perfect—OH 4. Experts/Consulting
Organizations External organizations that studied the state
government’s operations—AK Economists around the world—PA Contracting with McKinsey and Company for data-
driven evaluation of state management—ME 5. Work Groups, Task
Forces, Commissions Work groups to examine local government
funding—DE Health and Human Services Task Force—GA Task Force on early childhood development—KY Task Force on access and affordability of education—
KY Sustainable Water Infrastructure Task Force—PA Tax Commission (SAGE) to study tax on tobacco—
MS Automotive Jobs Task Force—MS Upstate research consortium on hybrid electric
batteries—NY Energy Policy Institute to coordinate knowledge
base—NY Tax Policy Group—PA Vermont Blueprint for Health—VT Interagency Task Force for Energy Project
Recruitment—VA Public Service Commission and Environmental
Quality department to evaluate energy use and sources—MI
Legislative commission to right size school districts— PA
Commission on Strengthening Utah’s Democracy— to study
(continued)
1030 Administration & Society 47(8)
The correlation analysis indicates that Republican governors, in keeping with their party’s focus on state-level solutions, devoted significantly more rhetoric to Comparing State Solutions to the fiscal crisis than the Democrats. However, overall the focus on innovative and new approaches was limited. This may be indicative that a time of economic crisis was not the best time to talk about innovation, or results of innovations. Was it more critical to exam- ine mistakes, lessons, and accountability?
Sources of ideas Key phrases from the speeches
public participation Commonwealth Transportation Board to rewrite construction plan—VA
Tax Commission to track the sales of automobiles, tires, and autoparts—ID
Select Commission of health-care experts—ID Commission on Sentencing Reform—NY Commission on Education Improvement—ND 6. Citizens and
Stakeholders
Previous citizen’s initiatives—AL Listening to citizens, holding additional hearings—AL Listening to teachers and parents—DE Consulting stakeholders in developing natural gas
policy—CO Coalition of private groups to evaluate a state law—
WV 7. Pilot Programs Piloting programs for after-school and summer
learning—AR Piloting health-care reform—WY Testing the system with 15 medical practices—ME Embracing an evidence-based education approach—
OH 8. Personal Strategies Careful deliberation—NH Learning by doing, by leading by example—DE Reading the previous year’s speech—MS Asking for the best minds and ideas—VT Anywhere outside the halls of the government—MS 9. Audit Reports Government audit—SC, WV Insurance advocate report on auto insurance—MI Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation to
investigate health insurance—MS
Table 5. (continued)
Joaquin and Myers 1031
Table 6. Sources of Evidence to Support Policy Ideas.
Categories of evidence Sample phrases from the speeches
1. Proven Strategy in the Past
Revenue diversification pulled state out of previous recessions—NV
Strategy worked before in balancing budgets—AL, IN A good idea before the financial crisis could not be a
bad after—IN, NV 2. Media Coverage
Received Program was featured on Fox News Channel—AL
3. Award/Recognition Given
Governing Magazine honored the Public Official of the Year for the overhaul of the child welfare system
Pew Research Center cites decrease in correction population—MT
4. Dispersion of Innovation
Other states have borrowed their idea—KS Idea’s success in other states—ID
5. Outcomes Achieved State climbed in ranking of the most competitive states in the country—SC
Program bumped up the state’s ranking the Center for Public Integrity for legislative disclosure—LA
Statistics showed good outcomes—AR, LA, MI, WV Program contributed to broader community goals,
not just particular program goals—HI Careful budgeting alleviated the crunch—AR, CT,
VT, WV 6. Expert Analysis Bolsters
the Idea
Multi-year budget forecasting—WV Report by Atlanta Federal Reserve Group on effects
of high taxes—SC
Meta Learning and Process Learning
Learning is better when it involves process learning or meta learning (increased feedback/self-awareness of habits and strategies). This was evi- dent in California, when the governor explained the context and history of budget negotiations in the state as a clue to what was unfolding. In Connecticut, the governor explained to the audience the paradox of government’s role— more families need government during crises when the government is also strapped for funds, while in Delaware, the governor acknowledged uncer- tainty about some potential solutions. New Hampshire’s governor admitted that “the direction may or may not be right, but must be explored.”
1032 Administration & Society 47(8)
Learning and the Three Pillars of Crisis Response
The crisis prompted governors to pepper their speeches with immediate and long-range proposals. A three-pronged approach emerged from the gover- nors’ explanations of the government’s role and the reforms that they thought must take place (see Figure 3).
The Need for Government
The magnitude of the financial collapse brought on some soul-searching about government’s role in both causing the problem and in finding a solu- tion. Some governors carried the message that government can positively affect the lives of their citizens. Those passages mostly speak to key areas where government funding is needed, especially in critical times; the role of the bureaucracy; the role of the market and individuals versus government; and the federalist form’s contribution to successful government.
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN PROBLEM SOLVING
� The s�mulus bill will have a posi�ve impact – AL � Government policy can help – AK � Government is not the answer, but government can help – AK � The republic form of government and its ins�tu�ons have
held this country together for over 200 years – AR � Ins�tu�ons can restore faith in leaders and government – AR � States have a unique ability and a responsibility to
experiment – ID � State’s regulatory oversight kept the state out of the riskier
and more vola�le situa�ons – ID � Government has a posi�ve contribu�on to make – KS � Without resources and workers from government, massive
undertakings for the common good would likely fail – KS � To protect is the fundamental func�on of government – KY � Now more than ever, the role of government is cri�cal – KY � We have a President and Congress who, rather than looking
at government as the enemy – are commi�ed to moving us forward again as a na�on
� You can’t have growth and prosperity without security – MS � Government plays essen�al roles – MS � State foreclosure preven�on ini�a�ves are a model for the
na�on – MS � Government ma�ers, government can play a construc�ve
role in people’s lives – NJ � Government’s job is to help – PA � As with the economy, government ac�on is necessary to
protect the environment - VA
REFORMING GOVERNMENT IMAGE
• Building confidence in the state government • Restoring faith in state government • Restoring people’s faith in their government • The republic form of government can restore the faith in our leaders and in our government • Toward more than just the percep�on of bipar�sanship • Ins�lling a more customer-focused culture • We will restore our state’s financial integrity • State government can and should be a beacon of hope and tool for progress • I ordered reform to change the face of state government • We must restore trust. We must restore confidence. We must reach out…to reinvigorate the democracy they will inherit
REFORMING FISCAL ADMINISTRATION
• Budget decision making transparency • Avoiding inflated revenue projec�ons • Fiscal discipline – not viola�ng purposes of funds • Recurring revenues for recurring spending • More budget transparency • Be�er targe�ng of expenditures • Avoiding inter-fund transfers • Rejec�ng budget gimmickry • Extra spending to be met by extra cut or extra revenue • Reforming TABOR • Reforming state and local government structures • Greater budget flexibility • Zero base budge�ng process • More equitable budget cuts • Freeing up funds locked in by statute or cons�tu�on • Lump sum for greater managerial flexibility • Contrac�ng out to save on costs • Changing budget alloca�on formulas • Ci�zen’s voice on borrowing • Ending dependence on one shots • Reforming school aid • Consolida�ng health care benefits • Tax reform • Understanding & controlling budget drivers • Doing away with legisla�ve earmarks • Crea�ng the office of Comptroller • Pos�ng of expenditures on the internet • Pos�ng of contracts on the internet
Figure 3. Governmental reform: Three facets emerging from the speeches.
Joaquin and Myers 1033
The statistical analysis found that Term of Office was negatively associ- ated with the speech theme of Government Matters, indicating that governors that had held office for a longer period of time were less likely to actively defend the role of government.
The Need for Government Image Reform
Most governors expressed that government lost a lot of people’s trust during the recession. Of those who thought the image of government needed improv- ing, many were on their first term. In comparison, those who had been in office for a while must have learned what was broken in the budgeting sys- tem, so that an almost equal portion of them called for budget reforms. Incumbency was positively associated with Reorganization and Consolidation, suggesting that incumbent governors may turn to such strategies in the midst of a budgetary crisis, rather than souring on that strategy after a long time in office. The state’s tax progressivity correlated negatively with calls for Intergovernmental Partnership. Intergovernmental Partnership can represent a form of image reform, as such initiatives can serve to make the state appear more collaborative with other levels of government and increase the percep- tion that the state seeks to create efficiencies.
The Need for Fiscal Reforms
Whether or not governors expressed a positive role for government, many of them did call for reforming budgeting, some in connection to their response to fiscal shortfalls. Many of these proposals were about transparency and removal of budget gimmickry that subverts discipline, to project figures accurately, allocate wisely, and understand structural factors behind budgeting.
From a statistical standpoint, rhetoric regarding fiscal reform correlated with a number of variables. Whether a state has an annual or biennial budget- ing system was found to be negatively associated Calling for Private Sector Responsibility and Reforming Budgeting Philosophy and Culture. This could suggest that governors in states that budget for 2 years are more focused on setting a longer term strategy and making necessary adjustments to the bud- get than placing blame.
Governors with previous experience in the executive branch of state gov- ernment devoted less emphasis in their speeches to Reorganization/ Consolidation of government or Reforming the Pension System. They also devoted less discussion to the strategy of Borrowing to address the budget crisis. This may indicate that these governors’ other professional experiences
1034 Administration & Society 47(8)
in the executive branch led them to form negative opinions of these policy alternatives.
Because these proposals for change were advocated at a time of crisis, future research can examine if reform rhetoric has ebbed and flowed after the Great Recession.
We found other results from the correlation analyses: a negative asso- ciation between Party and Freezing Tax Rates supports the idea that Democratic policy makers more often want to leave open the possibility of additional revenue through tax rates. Term of Office was negatively associated with advocating for Economic Stimulus to address budget shortfalls: Incumbent governors appear to be more inclined toward belt- tightening as opposed to expenditure increases. Biennial budgeting was found to be positively correlated with references in the speeches to Economic Development Incentives and Local Government Transfers. Perhaps due to their need to budget over a longer time frame, governors wished to devote more attention to directly controllable areas (such as tax incentives to attract business or increasing cost sharing with local governments).
Conclusion and Future Directions
Policy or budget addresses create an opportunity for leaders to frame a crisis, outline a way through it, and rally the legislature, the public, and special interests to that path. Part of what may determine their success is the degree to which governors are willing to take responsibility, exercise leadership, communicate lessons that they have learned, and advocate for action. Studying the degrees that governors did this during the Great Recession and certain factors that related to those differences can offer us a window to understand why some states weathered the recession better than others. This can be gleaned in part by whether a governor focused on blame avoidance or accountability, leadership, and learning. An initial step, this study suggests the importance of such addresses to understand how the budgetary crises played out across the states, and the perspectives of the leaders who would steer the course.
This research aimed to show whether governors attempt to use their bud- get speeches at a pivotal time to open a learning conversation with legisla- tors and the public and exercise leadership, or as a political opportunity to distance themselves from public wrath. From hereon, a larger sample or a longitudinal study (for example, looking at the decade of 2001-2010, span- ning two huge recessions and contentious national elections) may answer questions that go back to the roots of the educative nature of public office:
Joaquin and Myers 1035
Considering today’s strong anti-government sentiments, how seriously do state leaders take their roles of communicating with the masses what lead- ers perceive to be the evolving work and processes of government? Are gubernatorial addresses forever locked into a legislative or political strat- egy, bereft of any educative role? What contexts enable this to change?
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi- cation of this article.
References
Abney, G., & Lauth, T. P. (1998). The end of executive dominance in state appropria- tions. Public Administration Review, 58, 338-394.
Anton, T. J. (1966). The politics of state expenditures in Illinois. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Bernick, E. L., & Wiggins, C. W. (1991). Executive-legislative relations: The gover- nor’s role as chief legislator. In E. B. Herzik & B. W. Brown (Eds.), Gubernatorial leadership and state policy (pp. 73-91). New York, NY: Greenwood Press.
Brand, H. (1992, December). The end of Keynesianism as employment policy. Monthly Labor Review, pp. 42-45.
Carpenter, D.M. & H. Hughes. (2011). Gubernatorial rhetoric and the purpose of education in the United States. International Journal of Education Policy and Leadership 6(6), 1-15.
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. (2013, July 9). The legacy of the Great Recession. Retrieved from http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3252
Coffey, D. (2005). Measuring gubernatorial ideology: A content analysis of State of the State speeches. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 5, 88-103.
Conant, J. K. (2010a). Budget deficits in the states: Virginia. Public Budgeting & Finance, 30(1), 33-57.
Conant, J. K. (2010b). Introduction: The “Great Recession,” state budgets, and state budget deficits. Public Budgeting & Finance, 30(1), 1-14.
Crew, R. E., Jr. (1998). Gubernatorial leadership: Testing a preliminary model. The Social Science Journal, 35, 15-27.
Crew, R. E., Jr., & Lewis, C. (2011). Verbal style, gubernatorial strategies, and legis- lative success. Political Psychology, 32, 623-642.
Dautrich, K., Robbins, M. D., & Simonsen, B. (2010). Budget deficits in the states: Connecticut. Public Budgeting & Finance, 30(1), 130-151.
Dileo, D. (1997). Dynamic representation in the American states. State and Local Government Review, 29, 98-109.
1036 Administration & Society 47(8)
Dilger, R. J., Krause, G., & Moffett, R. (1995). State legislative professionalism and gubernatorial effectiveness, 1978-1991. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20, 553-571.
Dometrius, N. C., & Wright, D. S. (2010). Governors, legislatures, and state budgets across time. Political Research Quarterly, 63, 783-795.
Ferguson, M. (2013). Governors and the executive branch. In V. Gray, R. Hanson, & T. Kousser (Eds.), Politics in the American states: A comparative analysis (pp. 208-250). Washington, DC: Sage.
Ferguson, M. R. (2003). Chief executive success in the legislative arena. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 3, 158-182.
Forsythe, D. (2004). Memos to the governor. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Goodman, D. (2007). Determinants of perceived gubernatorial influence among state executive budget analysts and legislative fiscal analysts. Political Research Quarterly, 60, 43-54.
Gross, D. A. (1991). The policy role of governors. In E. B. Herzik (Ed.), Gubernatorial leadership and state policy (pp. 1-24). Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Hale, G. E. (2013). State budgets, governors, and their influence on “big pic- ture” issues: A case study of Delaware Governor Pete du Pont 1977-1985. Administration & Society, 45, 127-144.
Hansen, S. B. (1999). “Life is not fair”: Governors’ job performance ratings and state economies. Political Research Quarterly, 51, 167-188.
Heidbreder, B. (2012). Agenda setting in the states: How politics and policy needs shape gubernatorial agendas. Politics & Policy, 40, 296-318.
Herzik, E. B., & Brown, B. W. (1991). Gubernatorial leadership and state policy. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Howard, S. K. (1973). Changing state budgeting. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments.
Jackson, J. E., & Kingdon, J. W. (1992). Ideology, interest group scores, and legisla- tive votes. American Journal of Political Science, 36, 805-823.
Krause, G. A., & Melusky, B. F. (2012). Concentrated powers: Unilateral executive authority and fiscal policymaking in the American states. The Journal of Politics, 74, 98-112.
Kunin, M. M. (1990). The rewards of public service. In R. D. Behn (Ed.), Governors on governing (pp. 49-56). Washington, DC: National Governors’ Association.
Lauth, T. P. (2010). Budget deficits in the states: Georgia. Public Budgeting & Finance, 30(1), 15-32.
Mazzoni, T. L. (1995). State policy-making and school reform: Influences and influ- entials. In J. D. Scribner & D. H. Layton (Eds.), The study of educational politics (pp. 53-73). London, England: Falmer.
Rosenthal, A. (1990). Governors and legislators: Contending powers. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Rosenthal, A. (2013). The best job in politics: How governors succeed as policy lead- ers. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Joaquin and Myers 1037
Rubin, H. J., & Rubin, I. S. (2011). Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Schick, A. (1971). Budget innovation in the states. Washington, DC: Brookings. Segal, J. A., & Cover, A. D. (1989). Ideological values and the votes of U.S. Supreme
Court justices. American Political Science Review, 83, 557-565. Sharkansky, I. (1968). Agency requests, gubernatorial support, and budget success in
state legislatures. American Political Science Review, 62, 1220-1231. Simon, H. A. (1947). Administrative behavior: A study of decision making processes
in administrative organization. New York, NY: Macmillan. Snell, R. (2011). State experiences with annual and biennial budgeting. Retrieved
from http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-experiences-with-annual- and-biennial-budgeti.aspx
Stateline.org. (2009). State of the State speeches archive. Retrieved from http://www. pewstates.org/projects/stateline
Taylor, C.D. (2012). Governors as economic problem solvers: A research commen- tary. Economic Development Quarterly. 26(3), 267-276.
Van Assendelft, L. A. (1997). Governors, agenda setting, and divided government. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Wallin, B. S., & Snow, D. (2010). Budget deficits in the states: Massachusetts. Public Budgeting & Finance, 30(1), 80-104.
Author Biographies
M. Ernita Joaquin is an assistant professor of public administration in San Francisco State University. Dr. Joaquin’s works on public management reform, bureaucratic politics, organizational adaptation, performance and accountability movement, and E-democracy have appeared in Administration & Society, Public Administration Review, The American Review of Public Administration, Public Performance and Management Review, International Review of Administrative Sciences, and in books on digital civic engagement.
Nathan G. Myers earned a PhD in Public Affairs at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas in 2009. His research interests include federal and state health policy, public health policy and administration, program evaluation, and bureaucratic politics and behavior. Dr. Myers has previously published research on the effectiveness of state health care programs in Policy Studies Journal, Politics and Policy, the California Journal of Politics and Policy, and the Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law. He is currently an assistant professor of political science and public administration at Indiana State University.
