S

139

IJCIS 10 (1+2) pp. 139–152 Intellect Limited 2016

International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies Volume 10 Numbers 1 & 2

© 2016 Intellect Ltd Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/ijcis.10.1-2.139_1

KEYWORDS

Iraq US global strategy Western Europe crises of capitalist

globalization Middle East Russian Federation China

IBRAHIM G. AOUDÉ University of Hawai‘i

The Iraq war in the context

of global capitalism

ABSTRACT

The 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 occupation of Iraq were central to US global strategy to dominate global capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. The United States dealt with perceived challenges to its domination through conquest. The Middle East has been central to US global strategy to maintain control of Western Europe and in its rivalry with its two main competitors, the Russian Federation and China. Developing crises in global capitalism exposed the United States to instabil- ity in its global position, which it countered by invading and destabilizing Middle Eastern states. The following questions present themselves: What is the relationship between the crises of capitalist globalization and US global strategy? In what way is the Middle East central to US global strategy and instrumental in meeting the challenges posed by its rivals and competitors, the Russian Federation, China, the European Union and Iran? What role has Iraq played in this strategy? Attempting to answer these questions would go a significant way in assessing the US role in Iraq and the Middle East.

INTRODUCTION

The current war in Iraq is part and parcel of a unified US strategy that began with Desert Storm in 1991 to re-establish its hegemony in the Middle East (Amin 2004). The Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) later to morph into the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which in this article will be referred to as Da’esh, has presented an existential threat to Iraq since the formal US withdrawal

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 139 5/18/16 10:29 AM

Ibrahim G. Aoudé

140

from Iraq in December 2011. The quick advance of Da’esh in June/July of 2014, beginning with its capture of Mosul in the North, suddenly changed the political equation not only for Iraq but also for Syria and Lebanon (Anderson 2015; Cartalucci 2015). For Iraq in particular, Da’esh advances brought back the US military into the equation so that there exists currently a few thousand US military personnel on the ground in Iraq in addition to a US-led interna- tional coalition engaged in an air campaign presumably against Da’esh and in support of the Iraqi ground forces (Stern 2015: 67–68). It is interesting to note that America’s terrorism in Iraq during its occupation of the country had produced those terrorists that it now purports to fight against (Whitney 2014d).

Da’esh quickly moved to threaten Erbil, the capital of the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq, and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which is supported by the United States. The Iranians, who have had influence on the Iraqi central government since the beginning of the US invasion, quickly entered the fight as advisers against Da’esh to protect Erbil. Iran subsequently increased its military role by providing military support to the central government.

Concurrently, Da’esh had almost complete control over the western prov- ince of al-Anbar, bordering Syria, allowing Da’esh to move troops between Syria and Iraq, thus connecting its combat operations in that geography. In the past several months, however, the Iraqi Army, local tribes and al-Hashd have been able to liberate most of al-Anbar province and cut Da’esh’s supply routes between Syria and Iraq. It is critical to note that Da’esh had control over roughly 60 per cent of the Syrian territory, making it the central player in combat operations in both countries. However, its control over the Syrian territory has shrunk considerably since the direct involvement of Russia in defence of the Syrian state.

Recalling the US plans to divide Iraq into three parts and the US aerial campaign in defending Erbil against Da’esh, but not against the latter’s threat to occupy Baghdad, makes any observer wonder whether the United States has been using Da’esh’s gains in ways that would bring into fruition its plan to divide Iraq (Ismael and Ismael 2015: 227–30). This suspicion is under- scored by the US threat to bomb al-Hashd al-Sha’bi in the event that those pro-government forces entered the fight to liberate al-Ramadi, in al-Anbar province, from Da’esh. Al-Hashd, it must be recalled, is overwhelmingly constituted of Shi’i fighters. The US plan, enunciated by, among others, Obama and Biden, calls for al-Anbar to be part of a ‘Sunni’ entity. In this way, Iraq would be divided into a Kurdish region in the north, a Sunni region in the west and a Shi’i region in the south. Despite the fact that al-Hashd and the central government have been allied with Sunni tribes in al-Anbar against Da’esh and their goal was to defeat Da’esh, the United States wanted to keep the struggle in a sectarian framework and achieve a sectarian division of Iraq (Ismael and Ismael 2015: 227–30).

The current disastrous state of affairs in Iraq was made possible by the destruction of the Iraqi state and society, first slowly through the sanctions imposed on Iraq under Saddam Hussein subsequent to the end of Desert Storm (Ismael and Ismael 2004, 2015: 17–20) and more dramatically in the invasion and occupation of Iraq where Bremmer dismantled the Iraqi state institutions (Ismael and Ismael 2015: 60) only to find that there were no forces other than Islamist Shi’i forces loyal to Iran from which to constitute a provi- sional government (Ismael and Ismael 2015: 77–109). The state that Bremmer built was sectarian. Iraq now has a failed state that heavily contributed to almost complete destruction of the Iraqi society. It laid the groundwork for

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 140 5/16/16 12:39 PM

The Iraq war in the context of global capitalism

141

corruption and sectarian violence in which it often participated (Ismael and Ismael 2015; Bouillon 2012). A reign of terror separately perpetrated by both US occupation and Shi‘i Islamist forces ensued that alienated Sunnis who, under the guise of fighting the old Baathist regime, had been the object of that terror (Ismael and Ismael 2015: 98–103).

The next section will discuss briefly the Iranian Saudi rivalry and the US regional policy.

THE IRANIAN SAUDI RIVALRY AND US REGIONAL

The Wahabi-based Saudi regime in the Arabian Peninsula and its stra- tegic alliance with the United States of necessity is threatened by an Iran that has pursued a foreign policy independent of US control and domina- tion as demonstrated by the recent nuclear deal between Iran, on the one hand, and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) (Amin 2004: 30; Arnove 2000: 19; Lynch 2015: 21–22). The 1980 Iraq–Iran war, which Saddam Hussein initiated against Iran with the full financial and military support of the Saudi regime, Egypt and the Arab Gulf states and the United States, is proof that those states’ intentions were to defeat the anti-US Iranian regime (Whitney 2014a). The Research Unit for Political Economy (2003: 29–32) argues that the Iran–Iraq war had served US interests. It weakened both Iran and Iraq and devastated their economies. Iraq came out of that wrong-headed adventure with mountains of debt, which compelled Saddam Hussein to embark on a more devastating adventure in August 1990, when Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait (Tripp 2000: 247–58). The devastation wrought by Desert Storm, which began on 16 January 1991, paled in comparison with the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, which ultimately led to Saddam’s own demise and the destruction of the Iraqi state and soci- ety (Ismael 2007; Abd el-Razeq 2009; Ismael and Ismael 2015). The crimes perpetrated by the US occupation against the Iraqi ‘people in the quagmire of power politics’ (Ismael and Ismael 2004) had been countless and rose to the level of crimes against humanity (Adriaensens and Baker 2012).

The United States sought to isolate Iran from its allies in the region. Syria had been one that the United States had worked hard on to separate it from Iran and to have it relinquish its solid stance against peace with Israel on Israeli and US terms (Whitney 2014a, 2014b). On another level, the United States had given the green light for an Israeli attack on Hizbollah, an ally of Iran and Syria, in July 2006. The purpose of that war was to demolish Hizbollah, thus severely damaging Iran’s influence in Lebanon. Furthermore, the United States wanted to make sure that a US-Israeli attack on Iran would not be disrupted by Hizbollah attacks on Israel. Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, Egypt and US allies in Lebanon had supported the attack that destroyed much of Lebanon, but failed to defeat Hizbollah. In fact, the latter had triumphed militarily over Israel to the dismay of all those forces arrayed against it (Alagha 2008). Syria and Iran had stood firm with Hizbollah and supplied it with weapons before and during the 33-day war.

It is significant to note that Iran has increased its influence in the region, primarily through its support of the Palestinian cause and Palestinian organi- zations that have defended their territories from Israeli aggression. More recently, Iran increased its influence and elevated its prestige by the nuclear deal with the P5+1 (Lynch 2015: 20–21). For their part, the Saudis have been supporting the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which has been

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 141 5/16/16 12:39 PM

Ibrahim G. Aoudé

142

collaborating with the Israeli occupation in the West Bank. More recently and on multiple occasions, the Saudis have had direct contact with the Israelis to arrive at some type of rapprochement with the Zionist entity. Other Gulf states, too, have had dealings with the Israelis. Qatar, for example, already has a trade office in the Zionist state, which constitutes a diplomatic opening on the state occupying Palestine.

Fearing Iran’s rising strategic stature in the region, the Saudis sought to cut Iran down to size. This stance corresponded nicely with the US-Israeli strategy to destroy Iran. This strategy can be seen from both countries’ policies towards Iran (Whitney 2014a). Multiple times Israel threatened to bomb Iran. The United States often declared that all options were on the table to stop Iran from building a nuclear bomb. The crux of those stances was to remove Iran as an opposing power to US strategy in the region (Whitney 2014a).

The United States and its regional and western allies have subjected Syria to an all-out attack, beginning in March 2011. In this attack, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Qatar and Turkey have been the primary regional allies, while the UK, France and NATO have been the western ones (Anderson 2015; Cartalucci 2015; Whitney 2015).

Before the direct Russian involvement in the war, the Syrian state controlled roughly 25 per cent of the country’s territory, but out of a popula- tion of about 25 million, about fifteen to seventeen million resided in the terri- tories under its control. The rest of the population is divided as follows: about six million have taken refuge in other countries and the remaining reside in areas controlled by Da’esh, an-Nusra (al-Q’eda in Syria) and other Islamist terrorist organizations. However, the Syrian state has gained much territory since 30 September 2015, when the Russian air force entered the fight.

The Saudis and Qataris have been supporting the Islamist terrorists, who have been arriving in Syria from many countries around the world, financially and militarily (Anderson 2015). Turkey, too, has been supporting them and facilitating their entry into Syria (Anderson 2015; Whitney 2015).

A question arises: what is the US strategy in the region and how might it relate to US global strategy? Before attempting to answer this question it would be critical to contextualize it within the contemporary global capitalist development.

CONTEMPORARY CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

The English industrial revolution brought about historical capitalism to its final form by the end of the eighteenth century. Pre-monopoly capitalism then reached maturity in the nineteenth century. Throughout, between 1500 and 1900, the West and later Japan had been the main movers and shakers of capitalism (Amin 2011: 2–4).

Monopoly capitalism arrived on the scene at the end of the nineteenth century in response to the 1875 long structural capitalist crisis, which occurred after the defeat of the 1870 Paris Commune (Amin 2011: 3, 2015: 26). This crisis lasted till 1945 (Amin 2015: 26). In the United States, however, the ruling class established monopoly capitalism in the 1920s. Under monopoly capi- talism, prices were no longer set by individual capitalist owners of produc- tion, based on a ‘recognized market price which imposed itself as an external datum’ (Amin 2015: 27). Instead, monopolies ‘set their prices simultaneously with the nature and volume of their outputs’ (Amin 2015), which put an end to the ‘free market’.

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 142 5/16/16 12:39 PM

The Iraq war in the context of global capitalism

143

The 1975 long structural crisis of capitalism occurred 100 years after the first (Amin 2011: 5). Just as capitalists reacted to the 1875 crisis by concen- tration and centralization of capital through the construction of monopo- lies, so did they in the 1975 crisis that is still continuing (Amin 2015: 26). The response to the 1975 crisis manifested itself in ‘generalized monopoly capital- ism’ (Amin 2011: 4, 2015: 28–29), which had been completed between 1975 and 2000 (Amin 2015: 28). Two additional responses to the 1975 crisis beyond the concentration and centralization of capital had been more globalization and outsourcing manufacturing to the peripheries, and the financialization of the economy. Each of those two responses to the crises transformed capital- ism qualitatively (Amin 2011: 4). Gowan (2003: 36–42) approaches the finan- cialization of the capitalist economy through what he terms the ‘Dollar Wall Street Regime’ (DWSR). He discusses the development of the global econ- omy and the centrality of the US dollar to world trade, including its use for payment for oil and other commodities. He uses this discussion as a basis to show how the transformation in the main capitalist economies, especially the United States, had occurred from industrial production to financializa- tion. Financialization brought about domination of the monopolies ‘through global integration of the monetary and financial market, based henceforth on the principle of flexible exchange rates, and giving up national controls over the flow of capital’ (Amin 2015: 30). Generalized monopoly capital involves the power to manage the globally dispersed property (Amin 2015: 29). Foster (2015) demonstrates the relationship between outsourcing manufacturing to the peripheries and financialization and agrees with Amin regarding the destabilization that this financialization has engendered. Financialization of capital has occurred through foreign direct investment (FDI), which speaks to the direct management of enterprise, and foreign portfolio equity invest- ment (FPEI), which is merely interested in making profits without having any responsibilities in the managing enterprise. Those two types of investment are central to ‘the dramatic and growing integration of world capital markets through the commodification of financial instruments’ (Burbach and Robinson 1999: 21). Burbach and Robinson agree with Amin and Foster regarding what caused the financialization of capital.

This new global capitalist order is deficient in a major way, as it moves from one condition of disequilibrium into another. In the absence of a global bourgeoisie with its own (global) state, the United States assumed that role, which resulted in an incoherent globalized production system (Amin 2015: 31). Consequently, the multiple imperialisms that existed prior to the second long structural crisis had given way to the ‘collective imperialism of the triad [the United States, Western Europe and Japan]’ (Amin 2015) with the United States being the first among equals. It is critical to note that while transna- tional capitalists exhibit solidarity with the members of the triad and support the globalization of neo-liberal policies, the United States, as the main defender (militarily when necessary) of capitalist globalization, has sought to take the lion’s share of the spoils and compel its allies to acquiesce to its will. Incidentally, the central defining processes of globalization revolve around the transnationalization of production and capital, which, in turn, promotes global trade (Burbach and Robinson 1999).

However, right after each of the two crises of 1875 and 1975, respectively, the peoples of the world have attempted to oppose imperial hegemonies. In the first crisis they opposed the respective empires (the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Germany, etc.), and, in the second crisis, they opposed

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 143 5/16/16 12:39 PM

Ibrahim G. Aoudé

144

the collective empire of the triad (Burbach and Robinson 1999). Amin enumer- ates multiple revolutions: Russia in 1905, Iran in 1907, Mexico 1910–1920, China in 1911, Russia in 1917 and Egypt in 1919. While those have failed in the end, the fact of the matter is that the peoples of the world resisted the imperial powers of the day.

Similarly, resistance against colonialism and imperialism occurred across Africa, Asia and Latin America. The 1952 overthrow of the monarchy in Egypt and the 1958 overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq are but two exam- ples of this resistance. More recently and as (in)direct responses to general- ized monopoly capitalism, resistance occurred in Venezuela, with the rise of Chavez, in Ecuador, Bolivia and Brazil. These examples of resistance are part of what Amin (2011: 13) calls ‘[t]he second wave of independent initiatives’. Further, the South is ‘the “storm zone”, one of permanent uprisings and revolts’ (Amin 2011). In the Arab world, resistance took the form of popular uprisings, for example, in Tunisia and Egypt. In Lebanon and Palestine, war against Israel’s occupation showed that the peoples of the south reject settler- colonialism and imperialist domination. Resistance manifested itself again in the fight against the 2003 occupation of Iraq and the 2006 July war against Israel in Lebanon.

This resistance thwarted much of the plans of and weakened the impe- rialist triad. It added to the significant vulnerabilities inherent in the current imperial order.

In this regard, Europe has the option to develop independently of the United States by investing its surplus of capital, most of which is currently invested in the United States, to develop its own economies and societies. Such an eventuality would threaten the well being of the US economy and further expose it to a collapse. But that trajectory would require Europe to abandon neo-liberal development strategies, something that Europe has opted against (Amin 2003: 19–20). Gowan (2003: 42–47) discusses in some detail why Europe has not been able to break away from the United States and establish its own capitalist centre in competition with that of the United States. He agrees with Foster and Amin insofar as the potential threat that Europe presented for the United States and the multiple machinations that the United States has used to thwart that threat.

Be that as it may, a more likely scenario than Amin’s might be that, as the economies of Europe weaken further and mass movements develop on both the right and the left, it would fracture the imperial order of the triad and render a similar result. In this event, however, Europe might slide into fascism unless it opts for building a cooperative society in which the people own the means of production. But such an option is unlikely as matters currently stand.

Be that as it may, the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 devastated the financialized global system. The GFC has ushered a new phase in the ongo- ing long crisis of capitalism (Amin 2011: 15). Consequently, ‘the world finan- cial system is collapsing and, in its place, autonomous regional systems are in the process of being set up’ (Amin 2011: 13). Foster (2015: 17–18) argues that financialization had the following major effects. First, the major capital- ist economies amassed so much wealth beyond the growth of their respec- tive underlying economies that it further destabilized the capitalist centre so much so that the increase in the share of debt to GDP had been dramatic. Second, the main capitalist economies increasingly gave up industrial produc- tion in favour of financial control and asset accumulation. Third, this qualita- tive change in economic activity rendered the global economy more fragile,

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 144 5/16/16 12:39 PM

The Iraq war in the context of global capitalism

145

which ultimately led to the GFC of 2007–2009. Observing the same phenom- enon, Wallerstein concludes that ‘[w]e have entered a chaotic world’ and that chaos will last for twenty to 30 years (2003: 29). Amin (2015: 29) agrees, ‘This is the empire of chaos…in fact international political violence takes the place of economic competition’.

Given the continual crises of the US-led global capitalism and the multiple sources of opposition to its leadership of the system, it would be instructive to discuss US global strategy to counter those threats. This discussion would concretize the US imperatives that ultimately led to the 1991 Desert Storm and the subsequent 2003 invasion and devastation of Iraq and much of the Middle East in the ensuing years.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF US GLOBAL STRATEGY IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD

The United States emerged from World War II triumphant militarily and with excess industrial capacity, which it used to undercut competitors in their respec- tive domestic markets. That was possible because of the devastation in Europe and Japan, requiring much capital for reconstruction in both regions. United States’ unequalled military prowess allowed it to form alliances, such as NATO, to counter Soviet influence after the war. Those factors constituted the elements of US hegemony in the post-war period (Wallerstein 2003: 23). Through the Yalta agreement, the United States had been able to keep the Soviets at bay within their own sphere of influence that constituted about one third of the globe while it controlled the other two thirds, making sure that its sphere of influence was economically separate from that of the Soviet Union (Wallerstein 2003). However, that did not last beyond 1967 when the United States had to deal with a changing political economic environment. First, Western Europe and Japan had been able to gather enough economic clout to control much of their respective markets and penetrate the US market itself. Consequently, that development had been a setback for US economic power. Second, the 1968 world revolution that essentially was against US hegemony and the Soviet collusion with it. That stance undermined the ‘ideological basis’ of the Yalta agreement. Third, the peoples of the world beyond Western Europe and the United States opposed Yalta. China’s revolution triumphed because the Chinese communists attacked the Kuomintang against the will of the Soviets. In addi- tion, the Algerian revolution, the Cuban revolution and the war in Vietnam, all had been disastrous for US imperialism (not to mention the defeat of French imperialism in both Algeria and Vietnam) in its bid to control the periphery (Wallerstein 2003: 24–25). Those three developments signalled ‘the beginning of the decline of the United States’ (Wallerstein 2003: 25).

The United States tried to recover from this decline by essentially talking softly while carrying a big stick. It attempted to convince Western Europe and Japan primarily to have the United States as the first among equals in and the leader of the alliance against the Soviets. Furthermore, the ‘Washington Consensus’ of the late 1980s sought to move US global strategy away from the goal of ‘developmentalism’, which had failed miserably in having the United States dominate those who did not agree with its goals to the new tune of ‘globalization’ (Wallerstein 2003: 25–26). To the United States, globalization meant the opening up of the entire world to the ‘free’ movement of goods and capital, but not of labour power. Finally, the United States erected the Davos forum to help it establish ‘an ideological consensus-building process’ where

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 145 5/16/16 12:39 PM

Ibrahim G. Aoudé

146

world elites, including those from the periphery, come together and coordi- nate their political activities.

The United States paid much attention to Europe after the demise of the Soviet Union, just as it did right after World War II. Its main goal was to maintain its control over Western Europe. The United States succeeded in its goal as was mentioned above. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States could no longer point to the bogeyman to keep Western Europe under wraps (Gowan 2003: 43). Initially, the United States perceived the European Union (EU) and the Eurozone as real threats to its domination. Europeans had been opposed to have the United States extend its hegemony, after the fall of the Soviet Union, from Western Europe to the entire global system. The United States had been able to thwart those threats by extending NATO to Eastern Europe and challenging the Russian Federation in Kosovo (Gowan 2003: 47–48). The manoeuvring continued after September 11, 2001 with the US invasion of Afghanistan under the cover of NATO.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq further corroborated the US position vis-à- vis Western Europe through its control of the Iraqi oil (Gowan 2003: 48). A central objective of the US occupation of Iraq, insofar as Western Europe was concerned, had been to end its ‘growing cohesion and influence’ (Gowan 2003). Wallerstein (2003) agrees with Amin (2004) regarding the strate- gic objectives of invading Iraq and he differs somewhat with Gowan in this matter. Wallerstein writes that the United States did not go to war because Saddam Hussein was a dictator and nor did it need the war to control the oil. ‘They needed it to show the United States could do it, and they needed that demonstration in order to intimidate two groups of people: (1) anybody in the third world who thinks they should engage in nuclear proliferation; and (2) Europe. This was an attack on Europe, and that is why Europe responded the way it did’ (2003: 27). Feffer (2003), Mahajan (2003) and Rogers (2004) are of the opinion that the US unilateralism seeking world domination and control of resources led to the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. That domination, by implication, would include Europe. Ismael and Ismael (2015: 44, 60–65) discuss the US militarism that has driven the neo-conservatives to adventures that sought to install neo-liberalism in the saddle of globalization and allow the United States to counter the challenges to its geopolitical domination and control as much of the world’s resources as possible. Ismael and Ismael (2015: 46–50) discuss how the United States was bent on regime change in Iraq for the benefits of hegemony. The co-authors essentially agree with Wallerstein (2003: 27) in his first point regarding why the United States invaded Iraq. They further discuss the document Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces and Resources, published by the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) in 2000, which reveals the imperative for US dominance and the denial of any credible challenge by any rival (Wallerstein 2003).

In this regard, US strategic goals did not change under different presidents. Both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush sought domination through globaliza- tion and geopolitical consideration, both of which have governed US foreign policy. However, under Clinton, globalization had been the primary method, whereas under Bush geopolitics had been primary; hence, the Bush adminis- tration decided to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq (Foster 2006: 11). Barack Obama, it ought to be remembered, has been following a smarter strategy by using smart power (a mix of diplomacy, public diplomacy, international coalitions, limited military incursions and special operations) to achieve US strategic goals. It is significant to note that neither Clinton nor Bush had been

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 146 5/16/16 12:39 PM

The Iraq war in the context of global capitalism

147

completely successful in achieving their strategic goals. Barack Obama so far has not been successful either, as events in Syria and Iraq clearly demonstrate.

It would be useful to briefly describe the main features of the global situ- ation since 1991, the date that essentially marked the fall of the Soviet Union, which, in turn, ushered a new period in global politics.

THE GLOBAL SITUATION SINCE 1991

The following are some of the main features of the objective global situation extant that show the instability in the global political economy.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc changed geopolitical and economic realities across the globe. First, the United States emerged as a unipolar power both economically and militarily and tried to turn the Russian Federation into a third-rate economic power, useful only for the extraction of natural resources for US-dominated global capitalism (Amin 2015: 34–35; Barry 2003: 31–35; Hartung 2003: 63–66). Second, while all that was taking place, China was steadily building its economic power and by the beginning of the twenty-first century it loomed on the horizon as a main challenger of the US-led capitalist globalization (Foster 2009: 18; Mahajan 2003: 48; Li 2008: 25–33). China’s rise prompted the United States to devise a strategy to surround and vanquish it. Third, since the early 1990s the United States has tightened its grip on world trade through the World Trade Organization (WTO), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and, more recently, Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) (Tabb 2000; Vogel 2006; Weisbrot 2003: 85–96). Fourth, in the financial sphere, the United States had already a tight grip on both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank since the end of World War II (Weisbrot 2003). Its main private banks and financial institutions have become global giants dominating an international financial system, in which currency trading is a main feature. Fifth, US oil companies have dominated much of the global oil production and markets. Sixth, the US military has tight- ened its grip around the globe by establishing AFRICOM (Africa Command) under EUCOM in October 2007 (and as a separate command on 30 September 2008), bringing the number of U.S. Unified Combatant Commands to ten (Network of Concerned Anthropologists 2015). Seventh, instead of becoming a third-rate country, the Russian Federation under Putin has dealt a huge blow to the United States by rebuilding its economy contrary to the initial US grand designs for it. Eighth, the economic and financial crisis of 2008 that began in the United States and moved like a tsunami to the rest of the world has weak- ened the US economy at a time when it has been wallowing in the mire in both Afghanistan and Iraq (Amin 2011: 15; Foster 2015: 17–18). Ninth, as a conse- quence of US global practices in all spheres to achieve its interests, blowback against US policy had occurred as witnessed initially in the Arab uprisings in 2011 in which seemingly stable pro-US regimes were quickly brought down (Aoudé 2012). Tenth, the US-created chaos in the Middle East and the rise and expansion of Islamist armies across the Middle East and beyond, aided and abetted by the United States and its regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Israel, present a main feature of global politics (Foster 2015: 19). It is interesting to note that Islamists, such as al-Qaeda, which the United States has branded as ‘terrorist’, constitute the Islamist armies, such as al-Nussra and Da’esh, which the United States is currently using as instruments of its geopo- litical strategy. The United States is currently interested in merely contain- ing Da’esh (Stern 2015: 67–68). Eleventh, the war in Ukraine has shifted the

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 147 5/16/16 12:39 PM

Ibrahim G. Aoudé

148

pressure onto the Russian Federation with more intensity than it experienced during the 2008 US-fomented crisis in Georgia (Amin 2015: 33–35; Mankoff 2014: 63; Stent 2016: 106–13; Whitney 2014c). Twelfth, the financial and politi- cal crisis engulfing the European Union centred in Greece’s financial default is wreaking havoc in world markets (Amin 2012).

Western capitalist powers led by the United States build their strategy on the basis of the objective situation that they have created in large meas- ure. To dominate the world, the United States has to eliminate all rivals. Clearly, the United States perceives China as the main threat to its domina- tion. China has the second largest economy in the world and has extended its economic activities and political influence across all continents in one form or another (Nathan and Scobell 2012). The Australian economy, for instance, relies significantly on Chinese investments and markets. The Chinese are after resources in the far reaches of the earth from Africa to Papua New Guniea in the Western Pacific. The US will have to deny China access to resources to prevent it from continuing to develop its economic power (Mahajan 2003: 175; Foster 2009: 18–19; Shambaugh 2015).

Concomitant with that denial, the United States will have to cut China from current and prospective allies. Severing those relations would deny China political, military and economic manoeuvrability (Friedberg 2012). Once weakened, the United States would then be able to dominate China and the world. This might seem a tall order to any rational thinker, but the United States is the main player on the world stage and it is compelled to pursue its strategic goal because it is driven to that goal by the objective global situation.

It would be significant at this stage to discuss the relationship between the US global strategy and US machinations in the Middle East.

THE CENTRALITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST TO US GLOBAL STRATEGY

Here, the Russian Federation, Central Asia and the Middle East are the main areas from which to isolate China. Once those are vanquished, it would be easy to deal with the rest of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries, the Shanghai Group and their allies. However, the main link in the chain in this strategy is the Middle East (Amin 2004; Wallerstein 2003). US domination of the Middle East would be a huge chunk gobbled up from the Russian influence and would make it easier for the United States to deal a knockout blow for the Russian Federation. The Syrian port of Tartous consti- tutes the only warm-water port for the Russian fleet and serves as the forward defence of the Black Sea fleet. Among other reasons, Putin moved quickly to annex the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federation to remove a direct threat to the Russian Fleet. Putin would not sacrifice losing a warm-water port. More importantly, should the United States succeed in dominating the entire region, it would present a more serious threat to the Russian Federation that already is dealing with the threat that US machinations present in the Ukraine.

ISLAMISTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF US STRATEGY

One of the main instruments that the United States is currently using to affect its regional goal are the multiple Islamist armies receiving support from US regional allies (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Israel) and often directly from the United States itself (Kaplan 2016: 55; Lynch 2015: 26). The Honolulu Star- Advertiser (24 January 2016: A3) carried a story previously published in the

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 148 5/16/16 12:39 PM

The Iraq war in the context of global capitalism

149

New York Times that reported how the United States has trained ‘rebels’ while Saudi Arabia funded them to fight the Syrian state. Should the United States succeed in the region, it could then strike within the Russian Federation using those Islamists. The Russian Federation has already experienced terror by Islamists in the 1990s. Many Chechen Islamist fighters, for instance, are currently fighting in Syria and Iraq.

In addition to the resources that are being exploited in the Middle East, recent discoveries of huge oil and gas fields in the Mediterranean add to the prize of domination that the United States covets. But before it could secure the entire Middle East for itself, the United States will have to defeat the forces that have resisted its grand design. Internal contradictions among regional powers help the US goal. The United States relies heavily upon Israel in effecting its policies. That was most evident when Israel launched devas- tating air attacks against Lebanon on 12 July 2006. The goal was to destroy Hizbollah, a Muslim Shi’ite-based party that had liberated most of the south of Lebanon from Israeli occupation in 2000. Even the US-supported Lebanese government blamed Hizbollah for the devastation instead of condemning Israeli aggression. Israel’s defeat after 33 days was a defeat for the United States that unleashed Israel on Lebanon in the first place to bring it directly and permanently under its sphere of influence and to weaken Syria’s influ- ence in Lebanon (Whitney 2014b).

Since the late 1990s the United States had been working to convince Arab states to adopt the so-called ‘Turkish Model’ as the best way to govern most Arab states. The focus was primarily on Egypt as it was the most populated Arab state commanding a most important strategic location (El-Said 2009). In fact, the United States held talks with the international leadership of the Muslim Brothers, an Islamist organization the British helped establish in 1928 to counter both nationalist and communist forces that had been a threat to British occupation of Egypt (El-Said 2009). United States’ thinking had been that if the Muslim Brothers would govern Arab states they would develop positive relations with it, which would allow the United States to dominate the region through them. That dream came to naught, especially after the Egyptian military ousted Egyptian president Morsi, a Muslim Brother, on 3 July 2013 in response to popular demand when 30 million Egyptians took to the streets demanding an end to Muslim Brothers’ rule (Aoudé 2012).

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: US TENACITY IN PURSUING WORLD DOMINATION

It is critical to recognize that the United States has not relented in its failed attempts, so far, to achieve its strategic regional goal. The plan has for decades called for the disintegration of the Middle East to form entities based on sectarian and national loyalties. This is the lens through which the invasion of Iraq can be seen. So is the case with Syria, which has been fighting a war against Islamist armies recruited from around the globe by regional regimes with US support.

President Obama has portrayed the war in Syria, for instance, as a matter of Sunni and Alawite (an offshoot sect of Shi’a Islam) Muslims fighting against each other (Kaplan 2016: 50), when, in fact, the so-called Alawite-controlled state’s population is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim and so is the Syrian Arab Army loyal to the state. Similarly, US policy-makers have advanced plans to divide Iraq into three states (Sunni, Shi’i and Kurdish). The point behind

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 149 5/16/16 12:39 PM

Ibrahim G. Aoudé

150

these moves is to weaken the Arab world and maintain Israeli superiority in the region as a bulwark against forces that resist US domination.

Iran has been in the cross hairs of the United States since the 1979 revo- lution, which ousted the Shah, a main US ally in the Persian Gulf. Failing to topple the Iranian regime established in February 1979 through the Iran–Iraq war that Saddam Hussein of Iraq had launched in 1980, the United States continued to do so through instituting sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The latest episode of those plans to vanquish Iran is represented by the nuclear negotiations between Iran, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany. Try as they might, the United States and its western allies could not prevent Iran from developing its scientific base and resisting western aggression in the region. More importantly, the recent nuclear deal has bolstered Iran’s regional (and global) stature. But the fact remains that Iran has much influence in Iraq through sectarian groups that have steered Iraqi state development along a religious trajectory instead of a secular one.

Thus far, the United States has succeeded in creating chaos, producing refugees, destroying human beings and infrastructure, but it has been unable to fully achieve its regional or overall goal of domination: witness the 2011 United States’ withdrawal from Iraq, the quagmire it has fallen into in Afghanistan and the support of terrorist groups either directly or through its regional allies.

It is clear from the historical record that the United States has integrated the instrument of war in its expansionist policy, as evidenced by its expansion of global commands in the Middle East, Africa, etc., and by its far-flung military bases and installations. This is evident when Obama, for instance, utters some- thing like ‘all options are still on the table’. It appears that the United States is relentless and tenacious in its quest for world domination. It would stop at noth- ing to achieve its strategic goals. But that behaviour would eventually increase the probability of an all-out regional war, which might get out of hand to engulf the earth. We are living in dangerous times. The struggle may be characterized as one between humanity and barbarism (Foster and Clark 2004), exemplified by the United States and its western allies in control of global capitalism.

REFERENCES

Abd el-Razeq, H. (2009), Al-Iraq Bayn Sira’at ad-Dakhel wal-Kharej/Iraq Between Interior and Exterior Conflicts, Cairo: Dar ath-thaqafa al-Jadida.

Alagha, J. (2008), ‘The Israeli-Hizbullah 34-Day war: causes and consequen- ces’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 30: 2.

Adriaensens, D. and Baker, R. (2012), ‘Madeleine’s medals: Ulimited impe- rialism, unspeakable crimes’, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, 6: 3, pp. 259–80.

Amin, S. (2003), ‘Confronting the empire’, Monthly Review, 55: 3, pp. 15–22. —— (2004), ‘U.S. imperialism, Europe, and the Middle East’, Monthly Review,

56: 6, pp. 13–33. —— (2011), ‘The trajectory of historical capitalism and Marxism’s tricontinen-

tal vocation’, Monthly Review, 62: 9, pp. 1–18. —— (2012), ‘Implosion of the European system’, Monthly Review, 64: 4,

pp. 1–14. —— (2015), ‘Contemporary imperialism’, Monthly Review, 67: 3, pp. 23–36. Anderson, T. (2015), ‘The insidious relationship between Washington

and ISIS: The evidence’, 3 September, http://www.globalresearch.

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 150 5/16/16 12:39 PM

The Iraq war in the context of global capitalism

151

ca/the-relationship-between-washington-and-isis-the-evidence/5435405. Accessed 10 February 2016.

Aoudé, I. G. (2012), ‘The Egyptian uprising and the global capitalist system’, International Studies, 49: 3 and 4, pp. 315–30.

Arnove, A. (2000), ‘Iraq under siege: Ten years on’, Monthly Review, 52: 7, pp. 14–25.

Barry, T. (2003), ‘How things have changed’, in J. Feffer (ed.), Power Trip: U.S. Unilateralism and Global Strategy after September 11, New York: Seven Stories Press, pp. 28–38.

Bouillon, M. E. (2012), ‘Iraq’s state-building enterprise: State fragility, state failure and a new social contract’, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, 6: 3, pp. 281–97.

Burbach, R. and Robinson, W. I. (1999), ‘The fin de siècle debate: Globalization as epochal shift’, Science and Society, 63: 1, pp. 10–39.

Cartalucci, T. (2014), ‘ISIS is America’s dream rebel army’, 10 November, http://landdestroyer.blogspot.com/2014/11/isis-is-americas-dream-rebel- army.html. Accessed 10 February 2016.

—— (2015), ‘Confirmed: US “operations room” backing Al Qaeda in Syria’, 11 May, http://www.activistpost.com/2015/05/confirmed-us-operation- rooms-backing-al.html. Accessed 10 February 2016.

El-Said, R. (2009), Interview with the General Secretary of the Egyptian Tagamo’ Party, Cairo, 14 May.

Foster, J. B. (2006), ‘The new geopolitics of empire’, Monthly Review, 57: 8, pp. 1–18.

—— (2009), ‘A failed system: The world crisis of capitalist globalization and its impact on China’, Monthly Review, 60: 10, pp. 1–23.

—— (2015), ‘The new imperialism of globalized monopoly-finance capital’, Monthly Review, 67: 3, pp. 1–22.

Foster, J. B. and Clark, B. (2004), ‘Empire of barbarism’, Monthly Review, 56: 7, pp. 1–15.

Friedberg, A. L. (2012), ‘Bucking Beijing’, Foreign Affairs, 91: 5, pp. 48–58. Gowan, P. (2003), ‘U.S. Hegemony today’, Monthly Review, 55: 3, pp. 30–50. Hartung, W. D. (2003), ‘Military’, in J. Feffer (ed.), Power Trip: U.S. Unilateralism

and Global Strategy after September 11, New York: Seven Stories Press, pp. 60–74.

Ismael, T. (2007), ‘Democratization by occupation: The Iraqi quandary’, in J. S. Ismael and W. W. Haddad (eds), Barriers to Reconciliation: Case Studies on Iraq and the Palestine-Israel Conflict, Lanham: University Press of America Inc., pp. 19–62.

Ismael, T. and Ismael, J. S. (2004), The Iraqi Predicament: People in the Quagmire of Power Politics, London: Pluto.

—— (2015), Iraq in the Twenty-First Century: Regime Change and the Making of a Failed State, Abingdon: Routledge.

Kaplan, F. (2016), ‘Obama’s way: The president in practice’, Foreign Affairs, 95: 1, pp. 46–63.

Li, M. (2008), ‘An age of transition: the United States, China, peak oil and the demise of neoliberalism’, Monthly Review, 59: 11, pp. 20–34.

Lynch, M. (2015), ‘Obama and the Middle East: Rightsizing the U.S. role’, Foreign Affairs, 94: 5, pp. 18–27.

Mahajan, R. (2003), Fullspectrum Dominance: U.S. Power in Iraq and Beyond, New York: Seven Stories Press.

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 151 5/16/16 12:39 PM

Ibrahim G. Aoudé

152

Mankoff, J. (2014), ‘Russia’s latest land grab: How Putin won Crimea and lost Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs, 93: 3, pp. 60–68.

Nathan, A. J. and Scobell, A. (2012), ‘How China sees America: The sum of Beijing’s fears’, Foreign Affairs, 91: 5, pp. 32–47.

Research Unit for Political Economy (2003), ‘Behind the war on Iraq’, Monthly Review, 55: 1, pp. 20–49.

Rogers, P. (2004), A War on Terror: Afghanistan and After, London: Pluto Press. Shambaugh, D. (2015), ‘China’s soft power push’, Foreign Affairs, 94: 5,

pp. 99–107. Stent, A. (2016), ‘Putin’s power play in Syria: How to respond to Russia’s

intervention’, Foreign Affairs, 95: 1, pp. 106–13. Stern, J. (2015), ‘Obama on terrorism: Like it or not, war goes on’, Foreign

Affairs, 94: 5, pp. 62–70. Tabb, W. K. (2000), ‘The World trade organization? Stop world takeover’,

51: 8, pp. 1–12. Tripp, C. (2000), A History of Iraq, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vogel, R. D. (2006), ‘The NAFTA corridors: Offshoring U.S. jobs to Mexico’,

Monthly Review, 57: 9, pp. 16–29. Wallerstein, I. (2003), ‘U.S. weakness and the struggle for hegemony’, Monthly

Review, 55: 3, pp. 23–29. Whitney, M. (2014a), ‘The ISIS fiasco: It’s really an attack on Iran’, 18 June,

http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/06/18/the-isis-fiasco-its-really-an- attack-on-iran/. Accessed 10 February 2016.

—— (2014b), ‘It’s all for Israel’, 20 June, http://www.counterpunch. org/2014/06/20/its-all-for-israel/. Accessed 10 February 2016.

—— (2014c), ‘My money’s on Putin’, 12 August, http://www.counterpunch. org/2014/08/12/my-moneys-on-putin/. Accessed 10 February 2016.

—— (2014d), ‘America’s terrorist academy in Iraq produced ISIS leaders’, 6 October, http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/10/06/americas-terrorist- academy-in-iraq-produced-isis-leaders/. Accessed 10 February 2016.

—— (2015), ‘Ankara: The new capital of jihad’, http://www.counterpunch. org/2015/08/20/ankara-the-new-capital-of-jihad/. Accessed 10 February 2016.

SUGGESTED CITATION

Aoudé, I. G. (2016), ‘The Iraq war in the context of global capitalism’, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, 10: 1+2, pp. 139–152, doi: 10.1386/jcis.10.1-2.139_1

CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS

Ibrahim G. Aoudé is Professor of ethnic studies at the University of Hawai‘i– Mānoa. He is also the editor of Arab Studies Quarterly.

Contact: Department of Ethnic Studies, 2560 Campus Road, George Hall 301, University of Hawai‘i, Honolulu, Hawai‘i 96822, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

Ibrahim G. Aoudé has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work in the format that was submitted to Intellect Ltd.

JCIS_10.1&2_Aoudé_139-152.indd 152 5/18/16 10:29 AM

Copyright of International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies is the property of Intellect Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.