2 Assignments due on separate days

MARTIN KLUNERS

Freud as a Philosopher of History1

1/philosophie de l'histoire, '' ''philosophy of history" ls the name Voltaire, in 17652 gave to a project, which dominated European-especially

German philosophy for the following three generations and was impor- tant until the Fall of Communism at the end of the 20th century. This ideology for decades functioned as a substitute for religion for a quarter of the world's population and also influenced the work of, probably the most influential philosopher of history, Karl Marx. Despite the great diversity of the many different approaches in a period of more than two hundred years, there are five main themes that theories of philosophers of history from different times treat again and again :

{l) Voltaire himself advised what philosophically enlightened llistorim1s slto11ld do with history: "In all nations," he wrote, history was "distorted by fables, until finally philosophy enlightened Man." 1 Histori,1ns should therefore untangle the deformed history by using their critical intellect. A hundred years later the protagonists of German hic;torism, Droysen and Dilthey, created the perhaps most important theories of historians' duties: Droysen interpreted Man as a being with two qualities-an acting subject on the one hand, and a subject of historical cognition on the other. Man can understand the reasons why people do or do not do certain things. So for Droysen the duty of the historian is the reconstruction of the intention of human action"*. Dilthey advanced Droysen's theory and called his science of "[tjhe rule-guided understanding of permanently fixed manifestations of life," of "exegesis or interpretation," lwrme11c11- tics:5 Historians should, among other things, reproduce coherences of memory.6 Still at the end of the 20th century-after the so-called linguis- tic turn-thinkers continue to formulate imperatives for the historian's work from a narrative point of view. Paul Ricoeur wrote an analysis of

The Journal of l'sychohlstory -12 (1) Su111m11r 201-1

56 Martin Kliiners

Time awl Narrati11e7 in three volumes that Hayden White called "the most important synthesis of literary and historical theory produced" in the 20th century.a

(2) Voltaire's main aim-as of most philosophers of history in the 18th century-was to show how Man was not the object of God's disposal, but made history himself, that he could understand the sense of history by his intellectual potency and that there had been a conlir111om progress in tl1e unfolding of intellect:ual capacities, of" rcaio11 11 or "e11lighte11ment." This pattern returns, in different forms, In the main works of the philosophy of history, from Voltaire to Condorcet, Schelling and Hegel. Even Weber's analysis of rationalisation is a kind of sociological philosophy of history

that examines the progress of enlightenment in occidental history. In its negation the pattern of growing enlightenment leads to the pessimistic Viale1.tic of {111/ight1m111ent9 of Horkheimer and Adorno. One could call it the main pattern, the centre of occidental philosophy of history; il is identical with the optimism of the age of enlightenment and, after hav. ing provoked its own negation in failed and bloody revolutions, with the delusion of this optimism (see also 5) .

(3) For some of the thinkers the ascent of enlightenment did not take place in a simple and linear development, but in a dialectic process. Fichte and especially Hegel created virtuoso dialectic systems, which influenced ?-.-farx.

(4) According to Arnold Gehlen it was also Fichte who invented the motif of Elltfri'md1111g, alienation, by defining liberty as regaining control over lost products of one's own acting. 10 Especially for Karl Marx £11tfrt!111dt111g became one of the most important concepts of his materialistic theory, as history for him was the history of growing alienation, caused by the contradiction between the means of production and the relations of production.

(5) After revolutions had ended in terror or failure, the ideas of the enlightenment, especially that Man made his own history, lost more and more their persuasive power. Later, Schelling even began to doubt the might of historical reason, which he had himself celebrated in his youth. 11 In the 19th century the conviction prevailed that human reason was unconscious and that one could not predict the aftermath of human acts-history had shown that human acts often resulted in effects totally different from those predicted or projected. This theme-in German often described as 11Ko11ti11ge11z11 (co11ti11ge11q) 12-is the reason why philos-

Freud as a Philosopher of History 57

ophy of history, which had been the paradigmatic philosophical disci- pline from the middle of the 18th to the 19th century, generally forfeited its importance am.I began to be critici1cd.-evcn leading, in some cases, to the complete refusal not only of the idea of growing enlightenment, but of any attempt to understand the sense of history. This was true espe- cially after the experience of the two world wars, genocide, and totalitar- iani,;m in the 20th century.

Philosophy of history in the late 20th century seemed to exist only in what German philosopher Odo Marquard (born 1928) called "Schwund- stu fen" IJ-shrinkagc levels.

Despite this crisis of philosophy of history and the many critiques that occurred since the 19th century, a renaissance of this concept can be observed in an increasingly globalizcd world, which seeks new kinds sig- nificance. Great work,; of universal history like those of Weber, Toynbee and others that do not share the classical motifs of philosophy of history, like increasing enlightenment and liberty, 14 have shown what a serious, scientific philosophy of history based on empirically gained data might look like. Apart from this, th ere ha~ been an epistemological debate on formal aspects and, as a result, a slight rehabilitation of philosophy of history since Arthur C. Dan to demomtrated the explaining functions of narrating sentences in his A1111lytical p/Ji/osophy o( history.15

So many of the questions posed by philosophers of history arc still rel- evant today. In particular, the unintentional consequences of human act~ arc a scientific problem that docs not lose its fascination or its interest.

I would like to show why another Sc/11vwulst11{e of philosophy of his- tory- psychoanalysis16-has lhc best answers to nearly all of these ques- tions: Psychoanalysis itself is, in the words of the German historian J-(,ms-Ulrich Wehler, a "historical science" as it uses the individual history of the patient as a basis for its diagnoses and therapy. 17 There arc some connecting lines between philosophy, philosopher~ of history, and the science Freud founded. Hi

HISTORIANS' DUTIES When Voltaire describes history-or better the image of history up to his time- as a biased, warped thing (and one would like to add: biased and warped by memory•), " 1" the solution he postulates for this problem mani- fests analogies to the psychoanalytic notion of working-through. The his- torian is, in p~ychoanalytic terms, a kind of representative of the sec- ondary process. Voltaire can be seen here as a precursor of Paul Ricoeur who in his connection of literary and historical theory compares the com-

58 Martin Kliiners

position of the plot to the psychoanalytic situation. Ricoeur calls the com- position of the plot "mimesis" and divides it into prefiguration, configu- ration and refiguration, or mimesis I, II and 111.20 Prefiguration or mimesis I is identical with the reader's ability to recognize acting by its structural characteristics; it is pre-narrative. The configuration (mimesis If) mediates between mimesis I and Ill, between the prior understanding and the final understanding of refiguration in which the reader compares the read story with his own life story. Ricoeur defines the history of the individual's life as based on untold stories; in order to get its narrative identity, these untold, repressed stories have to be told, using the fragments passed down by memory-similar to what Dilthey, one hundred years before, called the reproduction of coherences of memory. This working-through can be used not only for the reconstruction of the individual's story, but also for that of groups and society.21 There is a fundamental affinity between the work of the historian and that of the psychoanalyst.

Nietzsche, in contrast, saw the necessity of a "critical" history which should have the force to "break" and to clear away the past to make life possible.22 To the suffering individual liberation from history could be, according to Nietzsche, a boon. One could be curious about how Niet- zsche would have argued if he had gotten to know Freud's theory and therapy. He might have realized and even appreciated that liberation from history-is something that simply is not possible. A better under- standing and, In the best case, a reconciliation with history is the aim of psychoanalytic working-through. Not liberation from history, but libera- tion from the distortion of history, can cure the sufferer. The liberation Nietzsche postulated is more like what psychoanalysis calls repression and in fact is the opposite of a successful healing.

Another boundary line between historical theory and psychoanalysis is relakd to what Droysen considered the historian's main duty: The reconstruction of the intention of human action is a kind of ps)'c/10/ogy. But Droysen limits himself to conscious intention, and can give no real answer to the question of why human acts so often have other conse- quences than those consciously intended. Psychoanalysis is the "better" historism as it takes account of the unconscious.23 The integration of the unconscious also allows us to examine the meaning of the wish in his- tory-both the wish of the acting individuals or groups who "make" his· tory, as well as the wish of those who write history: One of the greatest problems of philosophical historiography is the dialectic of (unrealistic) wish and resulting delusion. The examination of what philosophers of history wanted to see in history and whr they wanted to see it would be an

Freud as a Philosopher of History 59

illuminating project and might be the basis for the historian's or histori- ographer's own self-reflection.24

RATIONALISATION Two philosophers writing at the end of the 18th century provide exam- ples of the idea of the co11li1111011s progress of l111ma11 rcnso11: Condorcet, ignoring the contemporary violent and inhuman aspects of the French revolution that will later kill him, is the a.uthor of a Sketch for a Historical Picture o{llw Pmsress oftlw Htmum J\tliml in which he argues for the neces- sity of the progress of reason. In its untroubled optimism Condorcet's work is considered the classical example of the idea of progress in the age of enlightenment.25 In Germany, the young Schelling writes at nearly the same time a chronology of the self-fulfilment of reason. In hi,; account the first stage in human history was the direct and unadulterated condi- tion of sense perception-paradise; the second was that of the fall of mankind, in which logos destroyed the unity of life in the sense percep- tion; and in the third stage efforts to undo the fall of mankind and the redemption of the world by the aid of reason lead to a new paradise on a higher level. Human history therefore is a "history of liberating human reason from the limits of sense perception to the existence of the unity of reason."2<, This is very similar to what Freud nearly 150 years later calls The l'rugreH i11 Spirihmlit)• in his analysis of Mose'i and Monotheism: One of the, according to Freud, most important "precepts of Mosaic religion," "the prohibition against making an image of God," signified subordinating sense perception to an abstract idea; it was a triumph of spirituality over the senses; more precisely an instinctual renunciation accompanied by its psychologically necessary consequencesF Progress in 5pirituality from the psychoanalytic point of view is instinctual renunciation and its ori- gins are assigned to a certain historic period , the development of Mosaic monotheism, which is not for from Ma:-. \Neber's definition of the origim of occidental rationalisation: The "disenchantment of the world" which began, according to Weber, with both Hellenistic scientific thought and ancient Jewish prophecy and led finally to the inner worldly asceticism of Protestantism. Inner worldly asceticism itself can be seen as a sort of sublimation am! would therefore also be related to the variouc; modalities of instinctual renunciation.28

The self-fulfilment of reason as described by Schelling is an idea that became very important in the philosophy of another exponent of Ger- man idealism whose work is regarded ac; the climax of philosophy of his- tory. Hegel interprets world history as tile history of reason; reason rules

60 Martin Kluners

the world.29 But "reason" for Hegel does not necessarily mean conscious- ness. Reason in fact uses human passions for its self-fulfilment: "This maybe called the c1mni11:,: of reason-that it sets the passiom to work for itself, while that which develops its existence through such impulsion pays the penalty, and suffers loss."30 The optimi)tic view of a cunning of reason, a heritage of the age of enlightenment, may alienate today's read- ers of Hegel's philosophy as well as all of the optimistic theories of the 18th and early 19th centuries, but the supposition that there has been a historic increase of knowledge and an increase in rationality is still con- sidered to be common sense in the present time.

I would like to connect the idea of lncre.ising rationality or cm1scicms- nesi; with that of the cultural or historic ego, a term that already appears in Schelling's writings.31 Increasing consciou,;ncss wa~ an expression of an extension of the ego.n The historic ego tends to its own extension, but the ego is not always in control of this process-it not only sets the passions to work for itself, but also is set by the passio,t\ lo work for them. The idea that the ego and the passions arc cmlagonim that often fight against each other allows us to see the ambivalence of rationality or enlightenment- which was a favourite theme of many 20th century thinkers, as formulated by Horkhcimer .ind Adorno in the Viafrctic of E11/ighte11111e11t. They reversed Hegel's optimistic teleoloh•y of the self-fulfil- ment of reason and wrote a negative teleolobry of reason, a history of the decline of enlightenment from emancipation to governance. But as a negative teleology is not less tendentious than a positive one, there has to be a more realistic and less ideological solution to explain the ambiva- lence of emancipation: emancipation is hmdamentally Oedipal. Oedipus aspires to emancipation from parental, or, in the patriarchal society, fatherly dominance. This struggle for independence however is not always successful as patriarchal dominance include~ the introjection of dominance structures into the son's psyche. So fatherly dominance in fact docs not get abolished, but substituted for by another dominance, the dominance of the son. If the history of the emancipatory process can be interpreted as an Oedipal individuation, the ambivalence of this dynamic psychological process is the cause for the ambivalence of enlightenment. This ambivalence results from the relationship of father and son-the father has the function of a role model for the son, but in truth is seen also as an enem}' to fight against. The~e hostile feelings of the ~on against the father evoke a deep sense of guilt that has to be ratio- nalic;ed. So "rationalisation" is not only a term for the rational attain- ment of an aim and the increasing assertion of this principle in history,

Freud as a Philosopher of History 61

but also has an important psychopathologica\ aspect as the psychoana- lytic use of this term already suggests: Introduced in 1908 by Ernest Jones into the psychoanalytic vocabulary, rationalisation de~cribes the ambi- tion to find coherent, "rational" reasons for non-identified real motives of acting, sentiments, thought~ etc. which is supported by ideologies, morality, religion, or political convictions-what Weber called ideas-as the activity of the superego reinforces the ego's mechanisms of dcfcncc.:n The a~sumption that ideologies, morality, religion, and political convic- tions could influence thinking would offer the possibility of using psy- choanalysis to help understand historically powerful ideas and to finally find an answer to the question of why history so often yields other devel- opments than those consciously intended.

DIALECTIC for the thinkers of German idealism rationalisation was a dialectic process. I would like to focus on the parallels between I legel's and Freud's dialectic as Paul Ricoeur analysed them in his Essar 011 lnterprctation.3"' Ricoeur seeks "to find in Freud an inverted image of Hegel":15 by comparing their respective dialectics: Freud links, in the words of Ricoeur, "a thema- tized arcl1aeology of the unconscious to an unthematized teleology of the process of becoming conscious," while "Hegel links an explicit teleology of mind or spirit to an implicit archaeology of life and desire."J6 Hegel does not develop a phcnomenologv of the consciousness, but of spirit, so spirit is more than con'iciousness. Between "the I legelian dialectic of m/11- pliwted consciousness" and ''the process of consciousness that develops in the analytic relation there is a remarkable structural homology," '' [t]he entire analytic relation can he reinterpreted as a dialectic of consciousness, rlsing from life to self-consciousness, from the satisfaction of desire to the recognition of the other consciousncss."37 According to Ricoeur, the rela- tion between the analyst and the patient is similar to, the Hegelian rela- tion between master and slave. The Hegelian terms of "satisfaction" and ''recognition" are of such great importance for psychoanalysis that "we can say that all the dramas psychoanalysis discovers are located on the path that leads from 'satisfaction' to ' recognition."'-18 Freud's thought is, like that of Hegel, fundamentally dialectical, especially in the second topogrnphy: ''The second topography is the dialeclic properly so-called in and through which arise the various instinctual dichotomies and the opposed pairs or instinctual vicissitudes l, .. ). The question of the superego lies at the origin of the dialectical situation [ ... ]. Furthermore, the series of pairs, ego-id, ego-superego, ego-world, which constitute these dependent

62 Martin Kliiners

relations, are all presented, as in the Hegelian dialectic, as master-slave relationships that must be overcome."39 For Freud world history, the rela- tionship of human nature, cultural development and religion-are seen as the mirroring of the dynamic conflicts between ego, id and superego40- this dialectic is the base of a potential synthesis of Hegelian philosophy of history and psychoanalytic cultural theory.

ALIENATION Karl Marx upended the Hegelian idealistic dialectic and interpreted the idea mentioned above, tracing it originally back to Fichte, that alienation is losing control over the products of one's own acting, in a materialist way: La/Juur is not only the quality that distinguishes man from animal, it is also the reason for the transformation of human nature and for human E11tfre111d1mg (alie11ation), the central term of Marxist theory. The dual char- acter of labour-as it involves the human relationship to nature as well as being a social phenomenon-causes the alienation not only of the individ- ual, hut also of his social situation. History is the story of increasing alien- ation and will end in the self-destruction of capitalism. Control over his- tory will finally be regained by means of the revolution of the proletariat:"

There lrnve been many attempts to link ~forxism with psychoanalysis such as those of the Critical Theory or E.xistentlalism,42 as well as Reich, Fromm, and much of what came to be called the Freudian Left, It is prob· ably the idea of alienation and the offer of solutions to undo it that makes psychoanalysis so attractive for Marxist thinkers. Also, Freud was very sceptical about Marxist theory, especially its method of explaining alienation only by materialistic criteria and the reduction of human his- tory to a socio-economic process.43 Especially in Ober ei11e Wclta11sclw11- 1mg+' Freud criticizes the complete absence of psychological arguments In Marxist theory, the similarity of Marxism and religion as producers of illusions, the intolerance of the "practical Marxism"-Bolshevism- toward critics, which reminds Freud of the former intolerance of the Church etc .... Freud compares the expectancc of a future paradise on earth to Jewish messianism- more than a decade before Lowith does the same in Mca11i11g in Hi.w,ry:H Furthermore, for Freud the transformation of human nature within a few generations as intended by Marxism is deeply unrealistic.

If one follows the German historian Heinz Dieter Kittsteiner who argued that Marx's term Nah1rwiichsigkcit is a synonym for the unconscious and communism nothing else than the abolishment of the unconscious his- tory,46 p~ychoanalysi~ for Marxist thinkers would have the function of sup- plementing a political-economic theory psychologically, of a ps,vchologirn/

Freud as a Philosopher of History 63

method to abolish the unconscious. But at the same time the differences between Marxist and psychoanalytic theory become clearer: Psychoanaly- sis does not aim to "abolish" the unconscious, but only to transform alien- ated parts of the ego, to get them back from the id. The psychoanalytic def- inition and interpretation of consciousness is much more complex than the philosophical one. For Psychoanalysis consciousness is influenced by many factors other than the material or social being.4 7

There might be an at least indirect parallel in their respective notions of ;i \ienation. Freud, in a letter to Romain Rolland in 1936,·18 says that alien- ation exlsts in two forms: either a part of reality seems to be alien or a part of the ego does. Alienation is a special kind of defence that wants to deny the existence of elements from the outside world or from the lnner world. In the concrete case that he tries to explain to his friend Rolland, a guilt feeling causes a disturbance of memory on the Acropolis. This guilt feeling is evoked by the encounter with the sphere of Greek antiquity- which for Freud is a symbol of having surpassed the father by having, in contrast to him, learned Greek at school and had a higher, humanistic education. Surpassing the father though is ;inalogous to violating an interdiction. Interpreted psychoanalytically, also historic alienation could result from the sense of guilt of the son who surpasses the father, which occurs in the course of the progress of civilization.

CONTINGENCY After the questions concerning the historians' duties, the process of ratio- nalisation, the dialectic and the nlienation in history, the last, and in the present time perhaps, the most important problem of philosophy of his- tory regards the unintended consequences of human action. Yet Droysen suggested that historical facts are not based on the conscious acts of voli- tion of few individuals, but on the interaction of many, that they are the result of a correlation of action. 4!1 In Droysen's time another concept becilme more and more important and was popular already before the rise of the psychoanalysis: Schelling had introduced the unconscious into the philosophical discourse (although Leibniz had had similar ideas hun- dred years earlier), but especially Eduard von Hartmann's book The Phi- losop/1,,1 o{llle Unconscious (1869) was very important in the second half of the 19th century . .so Freud claimed later that only hypnotism-which he considered a forerunner of psychoanalysis-had made the unconscious an object of scientific cxperiment.51 However, the unconscious finally found its way not only into psychology, but also into the theories of his- torians. Ernst Troeltsch describes, as the major problem of historical research, the tension between the common and the particular, between

64 Martin KWners

society and individuals, between objective and subjective spirit.52 To resolve this problem he proposes the unconscious as a "fundamental" term of history.-n His definition of the unconscious is close to that of psy- chology; Troeltsch though docs not refer to Freud or other depth psy- chologists. I le even suggests categories equivalent to what psychoanaly- sis calls "preconscious."·q Both the unconscious and the preconscious operate not only in the individual, but also in society. Troeltsch antici- pates to a certain extent the considerations about the supra-individual unconscious of psychoanalysts like Erich Fromm and Mario Erdheim.ss Fromm supposed a "filtcr"-consisting of language, logic, and morals- decide,; which experiences are allowed to become conscious and which have to remain unconscious. The whole cultural Jpparatus serves to uphold the supra-lndividual uncomciousnessY' A change in the status quo makes it pos,;ible for unconscious experiences to come to conscious- ness because they lose their dangerousness.57 Mario F.rdheim defines the supra-individual unconscious as the attributes of a society that do not get reflected in a ~ufficient Wa}' and therefore cause unexpected develop- ment,;. At the same time they are responsible for cultural change. The central problem of philosophy of history is the lack of regard for uncon- scious factors in history.1t8 Al,;o deeply influenced by psychoanalytic thought, the sociological theory of Norbert Elias tries to resolve the prob- lem of contingency by examining the process of human interaction: the analysis of "figurations"- networks of interdependent humans-allow us to reconstruct the structures of human action which seems at first unde- signed, but in reality arc the result of interdependent individual acts. The larger the figuration, the more intensive is the control of the affects, the might of tile superego. ~9 Due to figurational sociology the traditional confrontation of "individual" and "society" as antagonists loses its importance and seems more and more to be an artificial construct. Elias does not only give an answer to the question of Wh}' human acts often have unintended consequences, he also demonstrates how Freudian topography, the theory of superego, ego and id, and sociological theory can be .synthesized. With this approach there might also be a way to understand the mechanisms by which historic ideas have an effect on individuals and societ}'. Weber's sociology of religion was in fact a refor- mulated philosophy of history, an examination of the influence of the spirit and the ideas and their indirect, unconscious consequences.

CONCLUSION After describing what I consider the five main a!ipects of philosophy of history and their connections with psychoanalysis, I would like to bring

Freud as a Philosopher of History 65

four of them-rationalisation, dialectic, alienation and contingency- together in a short hypothetical reconstruction of their supposed original coherence, as in my opinion they are ,111 different parts of one great socio-psychological problem.

For a long time, alienation was the object of philosophic speculJtion that did not allow secure assertions because of our lack of knowledge about prehistoric societies. But cultural anthropology has made great progress since the 19th century, and what we know today about human prehistory enables us to evaluate philosophic terms by comparing their meaning to certain pre- and protohistoric phenomena. for 99% of his history Man lived as hunter and gatherer with very few cultural changes. The "big bang" of cultural development, took place in what is called Neolithisation toda}': sedentariness, farming, use of domesticated ani- mals, new forms of labour, the growth of human societies and the increasing number of wars60 had deep impacts on Man's relation to nature, with great psychological consequences.61 We have to imagine the alienation starting here as ii psrchic alienation, particularly because of the increase of violent conflicts and aggressiveness in Neolithic societies. Guilt is also a special form of c1ggression-an aggression directed not to the exterior, but to the· psychic interior.<•2 I would like to suggest that the increase in external aggresc;ion- as in wars, but a lso under growing pres- !>ttre from family conflicts- leilds tu an increase in internal aggression as well , iln increase in guilt. 1 he ego becomes weakened by the id and later by the superego, a development caused by. transgenerational transmis- sion of traumatic experiences . The ego tends, as mentioned ilbove, to its own extension-enllghtenment, rationalisation , progress in splrituality can all be seen as expressions of the ego-extension. According to cultural anthropologist Marvin Harris, the increase in violent conflicts can lead to another relationship of fa there; and sons. I !,mis believes that the sexually determined hostility between fathers and sons- the Oedipus complex- is not the origin, but the result of the increase in violent conflicts and in new ideals of virility in more ilnd more militant societies.6:i However, the intensification of Oedipal conflicts probably has strengthened the will of the sons to liberate themselves from their fatherc;' suppression, the will of emancipation. But as they lrnd internalised dominance structures them- .selve,;, their emancipation had to remain a very .imbivalent thing. The interior as well as the exterior conflicts were master-slave rcliltionships. Freud was right to regard the dynamic conflicts of ego, superego and id as the foundation of human history. The ad\'antilge of psychoanalytic "phi- losophy of history" over the traditional philosophy of history is based on the fact that it takes into consideration the unconscious aspects of

66 Martin Kli.iners

human acting-Psychoanalytic theory makes possible a more realistic image of Man and his history as both social and a natural being.

Martin Kliiners (bom 1979) studied History and Gen11m1 literature at Hum- boldt University in Berlin. His />/JD thesi~ defense was in Febmary 2012 at Ruhr University Rochum (Faculty of Social Science). He car1 be reached at 111.kl 11e11ers@gmx .tie.

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Freud as a Philosopher of History 67

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Freud, Sigmund. 1939. ,vfcm!S and Mo11othe'i.m1. Translateu from the German hy Katherine Jon,~. London: Hogarth Press.

Fromm, Eric.h. 1990. Die E11t,ieck1mx des .~cscli.fflwfUiclrr11 U11bew11{3ten. Lur N1'11bestim- 1111mx der l'syc/10a11alrsc. Edited b}' Rainer Funk, (Schriften aus dem Nat hlaB, 3). WeJnhelm: llclt1"

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l,i}ddc, <"iunter. 1999. Tmditio11sli11ir11 d1•s uU11/Jew11[1ten*, Schope11ha11er, Nietz.~ri,,•, Fn'lul. ·1 (!bingen: Ed. Diskord.

1 larris, Mal"'•in. 1989. K11/turm1t/1mpolosit•. Ei11 Lel1rh11cl1 . Translated hy Sylvia M. Schnm• hurg-~cherff. Frankfurt/M./New York: Campus (based on: Harris, Marvin. 1987. C11/t11ml m1thmpolog,-. Second edition. New York [ct al.) : 1-Iarper & Row).

Hegel, Georg W. F. 2001. Tire Plrilosoplly o{l1istor)'. With prefaces by Charles Hegel and tl1c tr:mslator, J. Sihrec. Tramlatcd by John Slhree. Kitchener: llatochc Bonk.~.

I iorkhcimcr, Max and Adorno, Theodor W. 2002. Dialectic of enligl1tc11111t:11t. Phi/osoplri• rnl {mg111e11ts. Edited by Gunzclin Schmid Noerr. Translated b}' Edmund Jephcoll . St~nford, Calif. : Stanford University Press.

Klttsteincr, llcln7 D. 2004. Wir iverdm gc•lebt- Ober t\11alo.'{il.'11 zwischer1 tlcm U11/,ew11/~1e11 i11 tier Gm·hichte 111111 /111 ~1c1r•. In: Zuckermann, Moshe (editor), 2004; Gcscl1/cl1tc um/ l~r)'ch1m11al)'~I!. (Tel Avivcr Jahrhuch Hlr deutsche Geschlchte, :i2). Giittingen: Walistein. pp. 56-84.

Kltincrs, Martin. 2013. Gcschicl11sphilosc,p/1ie 11111/ l's~hommlrsc. G~tllngim: V & R unipress. J.aplanche, Jean and Pontalls, Jean•llertrand, 1988. The la11g11age of psrclwcmalrsis.

Translated hy Donald Nlcholson-'imlth. With an introduction by Daniel l.agachc. London: Kamac .

UIJenthal, Markus. 200 I c. l\'orbcrt Elias: Ober dt!II l'roze/1 der Zii'i/isativ11 ( 1937-39). In: Gamm, Gcrhard/llctzcl, Andreas/1.lllenthal, Markus, 2001: /lllt•rprrtatio11cn. 1-Ia11pt- wcrk£' der ~ozialpllilo.mpllle. (Rcclam~ Unlversal-Jllblluthek, 18114). Stuttgart: Reclam, pp. 134-147.

Lu,\1th, Karl. 195 7. Meaning in history. Tl1e llwt1logical i111p/imtio11s of tlu• philnsoplly of IILs- tory. Chicago: University of Chlcagn Press.

Marquard, Odo. 1982. Sc/1wicrigkeite11111it derGescl1ic/1tsphilosophic. (Suhrkamp-Taschcn- bud1 Wisscnschaft, 394). l'rankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Marqu.ird, Odo. 1987. Tm11s7e111lc11111/t>r ld1·c,lis11111s, Rnm1111tiscl1e Narurpl1ilosoplrie, l'sr- cl10111111/_1'SI'. (Schriftenrelhe zur philmophlschen Praxis, 3). Kuln: !)Inter.

Nagl-Dor:ekal. I lcrta (editor). 1996. Der Si1111 rle.s Historlsche11. Ge.sclric/Uspl1ilosoplli.scl1c /Jd1rrtre11. (Flscher-Tasthenhilcher, 12776). Frankfurt/M.: l·ischer.

Nletl.!ichc, Friedrich. 1983. U11ti111r!lr meditations. F.<lltecl by Daniel Breazeale. Translated hy Reginald J. Holllngdalc. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nlet7.5che. ~ricdrich. 1988. Sdmtlic/11! Werkr. Vol. 5: /cmcirs nm Gut 1111d Biise. Z11r Gc11e,1- loslr lier Moral. (dtv, 222!l). Munich: dtv.

Rlcoeur, l',tul. 1970. Frew/ mul l'hilo.mph)'. All Essay m1 /11t,•rwetatio11. Translated by Denis Savage. New Haven: Yale University l're~s.

IUcoeur, l'.iul, 1984-88 ( 1981-85). Time am/ N,1m1tive (Temps £'t Recit). 3 vols. trnnslatcd by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pcli.iuer. Chicago: Univer~ity or Chicago Pre5S.

68 Martin Kliiners

Rohhcck, Johannes. 2004. G1°scl11chtsphilosoplrir. z11r Ei11fiUm111s. (Zur Elnfilhrung, 302). Hamburg: Junius.

Ril)en, Jorn ,Uld Straub, Jtirgen (editors). 1998. Die d1111kle Spur dcr \'e,sanJenheit. /\1'- r/romra/} ti~clle Z11gd11ge tum Gescl1iclrtsbew11{itst'i11, ('iuhrkamp. I aschcnbuch Wl~sen- schaft, 1403). Frankfurt/ M.: Suhrkamp.

Rusen, Jc\rn and Straub, J1irgen (L'llilors). 2010. Dark /raws of tlw f'"St. l'syclwmralysis a///l historical thi11k/11g. New York let al .]: Herghahn Books. (I his translation do~ not contain all the articles of the German original.)

Straub, Jurgen. 1998. Psych0<11111l>'$I', Geschichtc 1111</ Gesclricht.nl'lu e,,schaft. Eine Ei11fil/1 nms i11 s,1:5tematisc/1er ,\bsicht. In: Rusen, J(lrn and Straub, Jurgen fe<litor,;). 1998. Die tl1111klr .'ip11r dcr Verga11gc11IIL'it. l'~>·clwa11al>•lische Z11gii11.~c 111111 G,•sc/1iclrts/Je'11'11fltsei11, lSuhrl,.amp-TaschcnbuLl1 Wl\,cmL11art, 1403). i:r,mkfurt/1\'I. Suhrkamp, pp. 12-32.

·1 <.-ssar, Hans 2008. Die l'roc/11J..tic11 Jt~c/fschaftllchcr U11/x'll'llutl1eit. l.i11e 11,111e AlllhmpologiL' Spmd1plli/11so11lrie, Erkm11t11istlreorie mu/ Gesel/fc/m(nphilasoplrit·. I lamhurg: Dlplomlt.1

I roelt~cl1, Ernst. J 922. Gesmmm IIC! Schrif1111. Vol. 3: Der I fistorfm111s rmtl 11'i11e l'mblemr, Erst,•s (d,uigcs) B11clr. Dm luJisc Irr l'mhlmr tlrr GcS<l1iclrtsplrilosophic. Tiiblngen: ~ lol ,r.

Voltaire, I ran\ois-Marie. 196.t £rn1/ s11r le~ 1111c11rs et l 'c•s11rit ,It's 1111tiom ct .mr /i•s pri11ci- 1111m {crits ,ii! l'ilistoire ,lep11l~ C'harlewagm• imqu',i Louis XIII 1·.dited by Rene Pomeau. Vol. 2. l'aris: Garnier.

W~b,r, Max 1920. Ges(l111111c•ltt' Au(Jiitte z11r Rl!ligiomsotiologie. Vu/. 1: lJic protesta11tisc/1r Ethik 111111,h'r Geist ties K1111italism11s Ttibingcn: Mohr.

Wehler, I lan~-t:lrlch 1971. GeKhicl,tc 111ul l'syc/111111111/rsr. (Pocket, 25). Kmn: Kicpen- heuer & Witsch.

White, llayden. 19R7. Tire C<mtc11t of tlw {arm. Nam1ti1•r ,li.mmrsc mul lristorical reprcs1•11. tatimt. Baltimore, Md [1•1 al.] : Johns I lopkins University Press.

Zuckermann, Moshe (edltor), 2004: Grschiclrtc 11ml l'~,1\'/1omwfrse. ( lei ,\\·iver Jahrhuch fiir deutsche Leschilhte, 32). Gi>ttlngen: Wallstcin.

ENDNOTES 1. Tills article gives an outline or the main results or my PhD thesis that has hccn

published In 201.'l (Kitiners, Martin. 201:.i. Gescl1ichtfflhilosop/1ic' 1111d l'syrlwa1111l}'St'. GOttingen- \' & It unlpress). I tried to use original English texts or translations whcrcvu possible.

2. Angchm, Fmll. 1991. G1·.sd1ichts11/1/loso1•ltie.. (Gmndi..urs !'hilosophlc, 15). Stuttgart let al.) ; Koltlhamrncr, p. ulJ. One year before, In 176-1, Volt,1irc used the expression "philmopltie de l'hlstulre" for the first time ln a wcenslon ur Hume's Camplt•tc His- torr 11/ £11.~lmul (Nagl-Ducek,11, Herta (editor). 1996. Der Simi dt•s Historisclw11. C iC' ~cltic/11 .spltilo.~opltisrlte Dcb,1t tcn. (Fi sci ll.'r: ra\chcnlJ1lcher, 12 776). Frankf urt/"t>I.. Fischer, p. 7 ).

3. Voltaire, Fran\oi~-Marle. 196J Emu s11r J,s 1111t·11rs et l't'Sf'rit dc!s 11atium et .rnr Ir.\ pri11cipaw,: fait~ ,IL' l'lristaire depuls Clwrlemag11e j11sq11',i I.auir }(Ill. Edited hy Rene Pomcau. \lol. 2, Paci~. Garnier, p. 800.

-1. Rohbc<.k, Johannes. 200.J. Geschichtsplrilvsophie lllr Ei11fiiltn111g. (Zur t::lnfilhrung, J02). l·famburg: Junius, p. 77. See also Droysen, Johann G. 1977. Historik. cdltcd by Peter Leyh. Stuttgart Uad Cnnnstatt: l'ron11nann-Mol1boog, p. 424.

'i. Oihhc)', Wllhelm. 2002. Tire fvmwtio11 of the ltfatorirnl 1mr/1/ in thr h11111a11 .sci1•11cc•.s. Fdited, with Jn introduction, hy Rudolr ,, Mnkl.:rcel and Frft hJof Rodi. l'rlnceton, N.J.: Princeton University Prc\s, pp. 2]7-23!!.

6. At nearly the same time Nicttsche saw history .is a kind of iifi.>'~ servant whose v:iiuc resulted only In it, meaning for ltfo. l'rcoccupatlon with history should, according

Freud as a Philosopher of History 69

to Nietz.\chc, not he cxaggcrntcd as It might pwnmt the lmli,·iduum-that, hy con- cerning ltself with that what was, rcmaim:d mentally In the pnst- frnm life. (Untimclr Me1/itatim1s II, 011 tlrc Use~ ntul Disa1/m11t11ges of'Histnry (or Liff', chapter J)

7. Rlwcur, J'aul , 1984-88 ( l9H'i-H5). Time mu/ Nc1rmlil't' (Temps ft Ut?cit). 3 ml~. tr,1ml.ited by Kathleen MclAmghiin and D,l\·id Pcllaucr. Chlc:,1go: University of Chicago l'rL~~-

8. Whltc, llaydcn. 1987, 1'/w ccmtellt of the fbrm. Ncrrmtfrc 1/immrsc 1111d liistorirnl rrpre- St'lltalim1. llaltimore, Md (ct al.); Johns Hnpklns University Pres~. p. 170.

9. lforkhL•imcr, Max and ;\dorno, ·1 hcodor \\I. 2002. Diall'ctic o(r'1J/(~htenmc11t. l'/Jilo- roplliwl fmgml'11/s. Edikd by Gunzelin ~chmid Noerr. Translated hy Eumund Jcph- cott, <;tanford, Calif. : St,,nford University Press.

10. Gchlen, ,\mold. l 9S2/5.t U/ler tlie Gt•burt der Freiheit aus der £11tfre11ulr111g, In: Arclliv fiir Rccl!L',-111111 S0li11/pl1ilo.rn[1hie. -10, pp. 338-353 (here: pp. 3JH-3l9).

11. Kltt~tclncr, Helm~ D. 2004. Wir wmlrn gehN- Ober A11alogir11 Zll'ische11 dem U11bc- ll'Ufl,le11 ;,, der Gesc/Jic/1tl' 1111d im .. Tell~. In: Zw:kermann, Moshe (editor), 2004: Gt~chic/J/e 1111d Ps_1•c/rumwly.s1'. (I el ,\vlvcr Jahrhu<.h fiH dcut~chc lreschlchte, U). Guttingcn: \ValbteJn, pp. $6 !U (here; p. 66).

12. Angchrn 1991 , p. 123. 1:t Marquard, Odo. 1 '.l82. Sc/1wh•rigkdtc!11 mit der Gesch/chtspl1iiosc1phic. (Suhrkamp-

Tasd1cnhuch Wlsscnsclrnft, 39-1). l 'rankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, p. 25. 14. Angdun 1991, p. 162. 1 S. Dan to, Arthur C. 196S. ;1,wlrtica/ pltilosoplrr of l,isror)'. Cambridge: Camhridgc Uni-

vcrslty Press. Sec al~o RohhL>ck 2004, 105. 16. Psychuanalysis may he talh:cl a Schwundstufe of philosophy of history bcLause

according to ~larqu.ird psychoanalysi~ I~ a "disenchanted'' form of Germ.in "Naturphllmophie"-"Naturphilosophlc'' it~elf yet is a Sd1wumhtufc of philoso- phy of hi~tory (!\larqumd 1982, pp. 91 and un. !Ice al\n Marquard, Odo. 1987. Trnmu•11J1•11t11/c•r fllt-a/is11111.~, llm11,111tiscl1e N11turphilo.1opl,ie, l'srclwa11a/pc. (Schrlftcn- rclhc 111r philosophlschcn Praxis, 3). Kdin: 11intcr, p. 4).

17. Wchler, llans-Ulrich . 1971. Gr•sc/1/drt<• mu/ l'syclwmml>~<;e. (Pocket, 25). Kiiln: Kie· pcnhcucr « \Nitsc:h, p. 19.

18. It is true that l·rcud Look several philosophy coursL>s with Professor Brent.mo at the Uniwrsitv of Vienna from 1874 tlll 1876, that he read Ludwig l·cuerbac:h and that he also attended the l.cscvercin dcr dcutschcn Studenten (reading society of German stu• dents) \\here he probably had his first c:ontact with the thought~ of S<.hopcnhaucr and Nict,.schc. Bui, soon afWr that, he lost intcrc,;t in ph!losophy ;i,; ,m academic sub- ject and conLcntratcd on his study of medicine (sec Kl(mcrs 2013, pp. 187 -190).

19. Voltaire 1963, p 804. 20. Sec the first volume of Ricoeur'~ Timi· mu/ .Vmmti1•e. 21. Sec the third volume of Time ,111,I Nc1rr11til'I.'. 22. Sec almvc (Untimely Mc,lilati011<; II, On the Use'<; muJ Di.m,fra11111~cs o(Historr (or Lift•,

chapter J). 23. It ~hould be mentioned that the last important tlmJrM of German hlstorism, fanst

·1 roclts<.h ( 1 B6S- l 923), also took ,1crnu11t of the unconsdous which at his Lime had bt'<'ornc an important category in cultural science (sec below, chapter Contingern.-y).

24. J'or the imporl.incc of pS)'t..hoanalys!s .is hasLs for thl! historian's self-rcflcctlon see Straub, Jiirgm. 199R. l'\)'Clwmwlyse, Gcscl1ic/lre 11ml Ge.Khicl1t.rn'i.ue11scl1nft. Eine Ei/1. fiihnmg in sr~ti!111111ischcr A!lsic/11. In: Rtisen, J/im and Straub, J1irgcn (editors). 1998. Die d1111klt: Sp11r du 1'c,sw1smhl'il. Psycliummlytisclzc• Z11sii11_i:t: 1.11111 Grsc/1icl1tshe11·11flt· sei11. \SuhrkJmp-Taschcnhud1 Wissenschaft, 1403). Frankfurt / ~!. ; Suhrkamp, pp. 12·32 (here: pp. ]0-31 ). An l·nglish tramlatJon of thl\ artlclc t..an hL· found at

70 Martin Kluners

Rusen, Jorn and Straub, Jurgen (editors). 2010. Dark traces of the past. Psrrlwanalysis a111f historical thi11ki11s. New York [et al.): Uerghahn Hooks

2~. Angchrn 1991. p. 72.

26. Baumgartner, Hans M. 1996. Phllosophie clcr G,•schic/1te 1u,cl1 elem £111/e der Gcschid1tsphilosophic. I1emerk1mge11 zu111 grge11wifrtigc,1 Stand des gesc/1ichtsp/rilosophl· sclrm Denkens. In: Nagl-Docekal, Herta (editor). 1996. Der Si1111 ties Historiscl1c11. Gcsclrlchtsphllo.mphlsche Dcbatte,1. (Fischer-TaschenbOchcr, 12776). Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, pp. 151-172 (here: p. 154). My translation. i\lso Hchte wrote that the order of the world and so equally that of natural processes ls rational. Where reason can- not yet be effocllve by the aid of llbf!rt}, it is effectlvf! as natural law, as "dark instinct" (Fichte, Johann G. 1845. Siimt/iclU' Werkc. Vol. 7: L11r /'olitik, Moral mrd l'hilomplrlc ,/er Ge~c/1/clttc. hilted by Immanuel H Hchtc. LL!p,di;- ~foyer und Muel- ler, pp. 8-9).

27. l·reud, ~lgmund. 1939. Moses a11d Monotlrcism. 'Iramlated from the German by Katherine Jones. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 178· 179.

28. Weber, Max. 1920. Gcsnmmclte A11{siltzc z11r Religlo11ssuziologk. Vol. J: Die 1,rotcst1111· ti.~du: l:tilik wul tier Geist des Kapitnlis11111s. Tiihlngcn: Mohr, pp. 94,95.

29. "The only Thought which Philosophy brings with It to the contemplation of His- tory, is the simple conception of /lcason; that Reason Is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process." {liege!, Georg W. i:. 2001 . TI1c Pltllosophy <l{l1istol'}', With prefaces by Charles Hegel and the translator, J. 'iihree. Translated by John Slhree. Kitchener: llatoche nook.~, p. 22)

30. /hid., p. 47. Odo Marquard pulls together the Idea of cu1111i11g 11{n•aso11 and psycho- analytic ~ublirnatlon: Marquard 1987, p. 217.

31. l\larquard 1987, p. 16.

'\2. Munchener Vorlesungen (1827), according to Marquilrd 1987, p. 16.

33. For the characteristics of rationalisation see Laplanche, Jean and Pontalls, jf!an- Bcrtrand. 1988. TI1e la11x11ngc of" psyrlro111U1IJ:fis. Translat<.><l by Donald Nicholson- Smllh. With an introduction by Oanlel l.agache. London: Karnac, pp. 375-376.

:i.J. I do not treat the materialistic inversion of I legellan dial<.-ctlc here .is Marx will be discussed In the next chapter ahout alienation.

'i5. IUcocur, l'aul. 1970. Freud and Plrllosofllr)•, Arr Essay 011 I11terpretntion. Translated by Ocnis Savage. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 4bl.

J6. I/lid. '{7. llicoeur 1970, p. -1 7-l.

J8. //,id. :w. Ricocur 1970, p. -177 . • I(). Freud, Sigmund. 1935. Postscript. A11 , \11tohiogmpl1irnl .'itml,1 (1925). The Stamlard

Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Frcuc.J, Volume XX (1925-1926): An Autobiographical Study, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, The Question of Lay Analysis and Other Works . London: Hogarth l'ress, pp. 71-74.

-11. Rohheck 2004, pp. 66-67. Sec .ilso i\ngehrn 199 I, pp. 105-119. 42. Marquard 1987, p. 18.

43. Freud precedes the critic by Lowlth (!~with, Karl. 1957. Mc1111i11g i11 history. Tire thc- ,ilogical i111plicntio11s of tile plll/o.rnp/111 of' hlIWry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 33). Ulwlth's work w.is first puhlishcd In 1949.

-14 . Freud, Sigmund. 1932. TI1c Q11cstfo11 of a IVcltan(cha111111g. l he Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII (1932-1936): New Introductory lectures on psyclm.an.ilysls and other works, XXXV. London: Mog~rth Press, pp. 158·182.

Freud as a Philosopher of History 71

45. Uiwith 1957, p. 42. 46. Kittswiner 2004, p. 7S. '17. A good summary of the psychoanalytlc meaning of the t~rm consciousness can be

found In l.aplam:he/l'ontalis I 988, pp. 84,88. 48. Freud, 'iigmund. 1916. A DMurlm11c1' of Memory• 011 tire tlcropclis. The Standard Edi·

tlon of the Complete Psychological Works or Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII (1932- 1936): New Introductory Lectures on l'~ychu-t\nalysls and Otht:r Works. London: I logarth !'rc\S. pp. 2 j 7-248.

49. Rohhcc.:k 2004, p. 90. 50. Godde, Gunter. 1999. Tmditiomli11iw ,t,•s HU11bc11"11f.,1m-. Sclwpe11/ra11er, Nietzsclre,

Fm1d. Tublngen: Ed. Dlskord, pp. 25-28 . . 'i 1. Freud, Sigmund. 1924. A S/Jnrt Aammt o( Psrcho-A11alysis. The Standard Edition of

the Complete l'~ychologlcal Works or ~lgrnund Freud, Volume XIX (1923-1925): The Ego and the Id and Other Work.~. London: 1 logarth Press, pp. 189-210.

52. ·r mdtsch, F.mst. 1922. Gesmnmelte ~chri/lc11. Vol. 3: Der Histnri.m111s 11ml seine Pm- /,feme. Erstes (t'i11ziges) JJ11ch: Das logi~clic f'mblcm der Ge~chicf1tsJ1hilosophic. Tilhin- gen: Mohr, p. 44.

53. Troclt.s1.h 1922, p. 46. 54. Trm!ltsch uses the term ''halhbewul{t" imtead of "vorbewugl" (ibid., p. 46). ~5. !"or the psychoanalysts' theories of the supra·!nd!vldual unconsc.:lous see Tessar,

Ham. 2008. me l'rod11ktim1 .~csc/Jsclw{lfilfur U11hettusstht!it. Eine 11e11e i\111/rropo/ogie, SJrmrllp/11/osof'lrie, Erkemm,istlrcorie um/ G,•sc/lsclw{tsp/11/osoph/e. I laml>urg: Diplomlca .

.'i6. 1:romm, f.rlch 1990. Die £11td,·ck111rs 111!~ gese/lsclraftfiche11 U11/Jr11•11f<t,•11. Zur Ne11he- ~ti1111111111g tier l'syrlrocmalysc. Edited by Rainer Funk. (Schr!ften aus dem Nachlaft 3). Weinheim: Beltz, p. 81.

57. Fromm 1990, pp. 90-91. 58. Tessar, Hans. 2008. Die Pro,l11klio11 scsellsclwfl/iclrcr U11/Jew11sst/rt'it. Ei11e 11e//t! ,\11thro-

f1Ulogie, Spmchp/1ilosnphi,•, Erke1111/11istheor/c 11ml Gesellscha{L~pllllosopl,ic. Hamburg: Dlplomirn, pp. 65-69. See e.g. Erdheim, Mario. 1982. Die gt>sellsdra{tfiche l'rod11ktlo11 ,,011 U11bew11/W1elt. Eine Ei11fillm111g i11 ,Jen etl111ops)'Clwa1111l)'flsche11 /'rvze~. Frank· rurt/M: Suhrkamp.

59. Lllienthal, M.irkus. 2001c. Nnrhert Elias: 0/ler tlcn Proze/3 der :Lil'ilis11tio11 / 1937- :t9). In: Gamm, Gerhard/I lctzcl, Andrcas/L!llcnthal, Markus, 2001: Jmcrpret,1tlo111.'11. Hm1ptwerkc der Sozialphilosophic. (Rcciams Universal-Bl!Jllotlwk, 18114) . Stuttgart: R~>clam, pp. I:-14-147 (here: pp. 136 ant.I 145) and Elias, Norbert. 1969. TI1c Cil'ilizing J'rocess, \:of.I. Tile History of ,\.fmmcrs, Oxford: BJ:1ckwcll ,md, published in 1982, \ ·01.11. State For11111tio11 111111 Cil'i/i1.tlfic111.

60. 1 larris, Marl'in. 1989. K11/l11m11tlrropolosic. Ein Lehrlmc/1. Translated hy Sylvia 1\1. Schomburg-Scherff. Frankfurt/1\-1./Ncw York: Campus, p. 214 (translatlon based on; Harri~, t>.larvln. 1987. C11lt11rai m1thropologJ0• ~ecuml edition. New York (ct al.) ; Harper & How).

61. DcMau~c n:gan.ls a <.:hnngc of ch!ldrcn's education as the mll reason for cultural change ([)eMause, Lloyd. 1989. Gn1111Jla:se11 der l'srchol1istorlc. Ps,l't:hollistorlsclw St:ltriftl'II. Edited hy Aurel Ende. Translated by 1\urel Ende, Eva I.ohncr•l lorn and Peter Orban. Frnnkfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, p. 285).

62. Freud, Sigmund. 19'l0. Cil'ilizntio11 mu/ its disco11te11ts. rite Standard Edition of thl' Complete l'sychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXI ( 1927-1931 ): The Future of an Illusion, Ci\•i111.atlon and its Dlsc.:ontcnts, and Other Works, pp . .'i7- I..J6. London; I log.irlh Press, chapter VII.

61. Jlarrls 1989, p. 356.