Response papers

Council on Foreign Relations

Report Part Title: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S ROLES IN TERRORISM

Report Title: Women and Terrorism

Report Subtitle: Hidden Threats, Forgotten Partners

Report Author(s): Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein

Council on Foreign Relations (2019)

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep21428.4

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3Understanding Women’s Roles in Terrorism

Understanding and addressing women’s paths to radicalization and the roles they play in violent extremism is crucial to disrupting terror- ists’ abilities to recruit, deploy, and abuse them. To reduce the evolving terrorist threat at home and abroad, U.S. counterterrorism strategy should recognize and address the roles of women as perpetrators, miti- gators, and targets of violent extremism.

PERPETRATORS

Throughout history, women have joined and supported violent extrem- ist groups, serving as combatants, recruiters, and fundraisers and in numerous other roles critical to operational success. Although women are often ignored in conventional depictions of violent political actors, they have been active participants in 60 percent of armed rebel groups over the past several decades.1 In Algeria, for instance, female National Liberation Front fighters evaded checkpoints in the 1950s to deploy bombs at strategic urban targets. In Sri Lanka in the 1990s, all-female battalions earned a reputation for their fierce discipline and ruthless combat. Women represented nearly 40 percent of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), serving in all operational roles, including as combat unit leaders, allowing the group to vastly expand its military capacity.2

Women have also helped found militant groups, from Germany’s Baader-Meinhof gang to the Japanese Red Army. Even in cases where women’s leadership was invisible, they frequently provided operation- ally critical support, ranging from weapons transport to combatant recruitment. Women have also contributed to the normalization of vio- lence: between 1921 and 1931, for example, the women’s wing of the Ku

UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S ROLES IN TERRORISM

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Women and Terrorism4

Klux Klan attracted a membership of more than half a million, and their participation in widespread lynching campaigns made targeted political violence more acceptable and even respectable in some communities.3

Violence

Today, women-led attacks are on the rise. Several all-female extremist cells have been disrupted in recent years, from a group of ten women in Morocco found obtaining chemicals used to make explosives, to a woman and her two daughters in London plotting to attack tourists at the British Museum.4 Female members of Boko Haram have been so effective—killing more than 1,200 people between 2014 and 2018—that women now comprise close to two-thirds of the group’s suicide attack- ers.5 Attacks by women have been growing not only in number but also in severity. In Nigeria, the most deadly incident in 2018 involved three women bombers who killed twenty people in a crowded market- place.6 In Indonesia, the deadliest attacks in decades were carried out by two family units that included both women and children.7 Female suicide attacks are more lethal on average than those conducted by men: according to one study of five different terrorist groups, attacks carried out by women had an average of 8.4 victims—compared to 5.3 for attacks carried out by men—and were less likely to fail.8

While some women are kidnapped and forcibly conscripted into violence, many voluntarily join extremist groups for reasons similar to those of male recruits, including ideological commitment or social ties.9 Others join in hopes of gaining freedom and access to resources; in Nigeria, for example, some women joined Boko Haram to receive Koranic education in a region where only 4 percent of girls have the opportunity to finish secondary school.10

Recruitment and Operational Support

Women also participate in recruitment, fundraising, propaganda dis- semination, and other forms of material support for violent extrem- ism. In 2014, a network of fifteen women across the United States was charged for transferring thousands of dollars to al-Shabab militants in Somalia, using small transactions and coded language to avoid detection.11 Palestinian women have been arrested for running fraud- ulent charitable organizations that funneled money to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In Indonesia, police identified a pattern of women mar- rying foreign Islamic State fighters and then remaining in the country

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5Understanding Women’s Roles in Terrorism

to fundraise. And in Pakistan, wives of Jemaah Islamiyah leaders served as the group’s bookkeepers and managed significant fundrais- ing efforts.12

Women also play a wide variety of auxiliary roles that can be inte- gral to the operational success of extremist groups. Armed insurgencies abetted by women control more territory and are more likely to achieve victory over government forces, in part because women’s participation signals greater community support, increases perceived legitimacy, and contributes to tactical effectiveness.13 Radical white nationalist leaders across multiple groups in the United States have commented that wom- en’s participation stabilizes membership, and that women are more likely to remain as members than men.14 For insurgencies or terrorist groups focused on state-building, such as the Islamic State, women carry out essential tasks that bolster capacity, like feeding and clothing combatants, transporting weapons, and educating new recruits. Across ideologies, women play a crucial role in indoctrinating their families, facilitating both radicalization and terrorist recruitment.15 In Islamic State–held territory, for example, women raised the children they had brought with them and gave birth to over seven hundred more as part of a strategy to grow the caliphate.16

Modern extremist groups use social media to actively enlist women into supportive roles, reaching unprecedented numbers through nar- rowcasting—creating a targeted message for a specific subgroup.17 For instance, the Islamic State’s concerted campaign to recruit Western women emphasized camaraderie, sisterhood, and opportunities to enjoy freedom and adventure as state-builders.18 Nearly 20 percent of Western recruits to the Islamic State are female, a markedly higher rate than in other Islamist jihadi groups.19

Once enlisted, women are also especially effective as recruiters: one study of online pro–Islamic State groups found that female recruiters had higher network connectivity than men, making them more effective at spreading the Islamic State’s message than their male counterparts— an important finding given that an increasing number of extremists are radicalized online. Women’s participation also improved the survival rate of online pro–Islamic State groups, extending the time before tech- nology companies shut them down.20

Accountability and Reintegration

Criminal justice responses often fail to address the diverse roles that female members of extremist groups hold. Many female members of

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Women and Terrorism6

the Islamic State joined voluntarily and played active roles in recruit- ing tens of thousands of foreign fighters to the cause. However, after women voluntarily join, some are required to remain against their will and coerced into continued service.21 Local women in Iraq and Syria, for instance, often found themselves coerced into service for the Islamic State in order to survive when their homes were overtaken by militias.

Other women are targeted and trafficked into extremist groups and forced to perpetrate crimes. Boko Haram strategically kidnapped young girls and teenagers and forced many into suicide missions, rais- ing questions about their agency and accountability.22 Other trafficking victims, however, become sympathetic to the group after exposure to its ideology.23 Some female members of Boko Haram who had initially been forced into service decided to stay in the group voluntarily after finding they had access to resources and power unavailable to them in their home communities.24

Despite the complexities of women’s roles in violence, officials in criminal justice systems around the world often assume that women who commit violence are either naive victims of circumstance or dan- gerous deviants from the natural order. Correspondingly, approaches to women’s repatriation and reintegration vary significantly with respect to their criminal and civil accountability.25

Criminal justice leaders sometimes view women as casualties of terrorism regardless of their motivation, resulting in fewer arrests for terrorism-related crimes and shorter-than-average sentences.26 This phenomenon has occurred across the United States and Europe; in the Balkans, governments do not account for noncombatant support pro- vided by female affiliates of the Islamic State, and most female return- ees avoid prosecution altogether.27

In other cases, officials in criminal justice systems have imposed overly harsh consequences for female returnees as compared to their male counterparts. German courts have charged women returning from Syria with war crimes while indicting men under domestic terror- ism legislation.28 Although the United States and the United Kingdom have permitted many male foreign fighters to return and face trial, both governments refused reentry of female Islamic State affiliates—includ- ing Shamima Begum and Hoda Muthana—and revoked their citizen- ship. In Iraq, female Islamic State affiliates face the harshest possible punishments—death or life in prison—even when the women have not been involved in violent acts and argued they had been coerced into traveling to Islamic State territory.29

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7Understanding Women’s Roles in Terrorism

Once female extremists are identified, prison and rehabilitation programs designed for men fail to address the underlying causes of women’s radicalization.30 Women who joined violent political groups such as the FARC in Colombia and the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam reported that membership provided greater freedom than could be found in traditional society.31 When female fighters return to communities where social norms remain unchanged, they some- times rejoin extremist groups, a trend observed with female members of Boko Haram in Nigeria and FARC women in Colombia (who were less likely to demobilize than male members between 2003 and 2012).32 Furthermore, programs often fail to provide training in livelihood skills that could help women support themselves and their children, instead offering training in stereotypically feminine, low-wage activities such as hairstyling and sewing.33 And few programs provide adequate ser- vices for women’s specific needs, such as appropriate support for vic- tims of trauma or sexual violence.34

Children also complicate the reintegration of female returnees. In some cases, communities that are willing to embrace returnees refuse to accept descendants of terrorists.35 For children born in war zones, issues of citizenship present a serious challenge for social services, and states have not reached consensus about responsibility for and repatri- ation of this population.36 And as their parents await judgment, many children languish in dire conditions. Some children, including Sham- ima Begum’s infant son, have died in custody.37

As governments determine their approaches toward repatriating and holding accountable Islamic State–affiliated women, thousands wait in Iraqi displacement camps.38 Without either a comprehensive criminal justice response or sufficient resources for rehabilitation, returning women are likely to fall through the cracks.

MITIGATORS

Women are already on the front lines when it comes to preventing and countering violent extremism in their communities. Yet their voices remain sidelined from mainstream counterterrorism debates. Incorporating women’s distinctive perspectives can lead to better intelligence gathering and more targeted responses to potential secu- rity threats. Women-led civil society groups are particularly critical partners in mitigating violence, though counterterrorism efforts too often fail to enlist them.

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Women and Terrorism8

Predictors

Women are well positioned to recognize early signs of radicalization because attacks on their rights and physical autonomy are often the first indication of a rise in fundamentalism. Women are substantially more likely than men to be early victims of extremism, through harassment in public spaces, forced segregation, dress requirements, attacks on girls’ schooling, and other violations.39

Women’s central roles in many families and communities also afford them a unique vantage point from which to recognize unusual patterns of behavior and forecast impending conflict. In Afghanistan, women observed that young men were being recruited at weddings; after their concerns went unheeded, these recruits killed thirty-two civilians on a bus.40 In Libya, local women warned of rising radicalism after observ- ing an increased flow of Western female recruits, signaling a growing market for wives as the Islamic State expanded its stronghold. They also reported rising attacks on their own rights, including harassment for driving without a male guardian.41 As in Afghanistan, these warnings were disregarded, providing the Islamic State leaders additional time to establish a headquarters before counterterrorism efforts ramped up.

Security Actors

Female security officials provide distinct insights and information that can be mission critical. Women serving as security leaders are able to conduct searches of female fighters in ways that men often cannot; stra- tegically deploying women can thereby prevent extremists from evad- ing screening. Female security officials also have access to populations and sites that men do not, allowing them to gather critical intelligence about potential security threats.42 Furthermore, women’s participation in the military and police has been shown to improve how a local com- munity perceives law enforcement, which, in turn, improves their abil- ity to provide security.43

The underrepresentation of women in security roles, however, creates a vulnerability that terrorist groups exploit to their advantage. Women comprise just 15 percent of police forces globally; in South Asia, women make up less than 2 percent of the force in Pakistan, less than 7 percent in Bangladesh, and less than 8 percent in India.44 Female combatants can hide suicide devices under their clothing knowing that they are unlikely to encounter a female security official and therefore will not be searched. Without efforts to improve gender gaps in national

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9Understanding Women’s Roles in Terrorism

security roles, female extremists will retain an advantage in eluding sus- picion and arrest.

Preventers

Traditional efforts by governments and nongovernmental organiza- tions to combat radicalization typically focus on outreach to predom- inantly male political and religious leaders. However, the prominent role that many women play in their families and communities ren- ders them especially effective in diminishing the ability of extremist groups to recruit and mobilize.45 Women are well positioned to chal- lenge extremist narratives in homes, schools, and social environments. Women have particular influence among youth populations, a frequent target of extremists. In more conservative societies—where communi- cating with women is limited to other women or their male relatives— women have unique access to intervene with women and girls at risk of radicalization.46

Small-scale efforts to involve women show promise. A program in Morocco deploys women religious scholars around the country to counter radical interpretations of Islam—they were better able to reach community members than their male counterparts because of their social ties and ability to build trust.47 In Nigeria, an interfaith group of Muslim and Christian women came together in the wake of an extrem- ist attack and successfully supported community policing efforts in regions with high levels of intercommunity violence.48 An Indonesian program provided wives of incarcerated jihadis with psychological and economic support, which helped them rehabilitate and reintegrate for- merly violent combatants into their community, breaking the cycle of extremism.49

Despite the important role women can play as preventers of terror- ism, women’s groups are rarely considered relevant partners in coun- terterrorism efforts, and their work remains chronically underfunded. Furthermore, when counterterrorism officials develop policy without input from local women, they risk entrenching harmful social norms about women’s place in society that undermine women’s rights.50 In addition, regulations intended to cut down on terrorist financing are making it harder for women’s groups—including those that work against radicalization—to function.51 Women’s civil society organiza- tions are typically smaller and less financially resilient, making it difficult for many of them to meet the compliance requirements associated with counterterrorist financing regimes. In some instances, governments

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Women and Terrorism10

from Egypt to Russia have criminalized feminist activity in the name of counterterrorism, targeting women’s civil society organizations that challenge the status quo in their countries.52 Ensuring that women’s groups can receive funding without falling afoul of antiterrorism laws would increase their contributions to counterterrorism efforts, while also fulfilling the state’s obligations under international law to ensure nondiscrimination and equality.

TARGETS

Many extremist groups benefit both strategically and financially from the subjugation of women. A number of terrorist groups use human trafficking as a means to recruit new members and finance their oper- ations.53 The Islamic State systematically bought and sold women and girls through sales contracts notarized by Islamic State–run courts.54 The group attracted thousands of male recruits by offering kidnapped women and girls as “wives,” and generated significant revenue through sex trafficking, sexual slavery, and extortion through ransom.55 The United Nations estimated that ransom payments extracted by the Islamic State amounted to between $35 million and $45 million in 2013 alone.56 This practice is deployed by other terrorist groups as well: in northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, Boko Haram abducts women and girls as a deliberate tactic to generate payments through ransom, exchange prisoners, or lure security forces to an ambush.57 Some of these kidnapped girls are then coerced into suicide attacks; in fact, one in three of Boko Haram’s female suicide bombers is a minor.58 Sexual violence is also a tactical tool to enforce population compliance, socialize combatants and encourage unit cohesion, displace civilians from strategic areas, and drive instability.59

Not only is violence against women and girls a tactic of violent extremists, but it is also a potential warning sign for mass killings. A third of individuals associated with jihadi-inspired attacks inside the United States had a record of domestic abuse or other sexual violence.60 In the United States, a study of FBI data on mass shootings between 2009 and 2015 found that 57 percent of victims included a spouse, former spouse, or family member, and that in 16 percent of cases, the attackers had a history of perpetrating domestic violence.61

The stigma associated with sexual violence waged by extremists remains a potent force that marginalizes women in the economic sphere and can result in isolation and a loss of marriage prospects, leading to a lifetime of poverty.62 Children born of rape frequently experience

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11Understanding Women’s Roles in Terrorism

discrimination and exclusion from services: offspring of girls captured by Boko Haram are stigmatized as having “bad blood” and are signifi- cantly more likely to be abused and uneducated.63 Survivors of physical and psychological trauma often struggle to recover, and the ramifica- tions compound across generations.64

The use of sexual violence and subjugation of women serves an additional tactical purpose of manipulating perceptions of masculinity to recruit men. Extremist groups whose ideologies subjugate women reinforce oppressive gender roles and promise men supremacy, respect, and sexual partners.65 Such groups promise an alternative path to man- hood when social or economic markers of masculinity are not avail- able.66 For example, these groups can provide wives for men in societies where economic barriers, including high bride price, put marriage out of reach, a phenomenon that is linked to broader social instability and susceptibility to radicalization.67

COUNTRY PROFILES

Evaluating how women perpetrate and prevent terrorism in different countries demonstrates their centrality to counterterrorism programs and policy. Efforts to increase women’s participation in police forces in Afghanistan illustrate how they improve operational effectiveness, as well as the social and cultural barriers they face. Terrorist activity in Nigeria demonstrates the varied roles women play—including as per- petrators, mitigators, and targets—and how ignoring their contribu- tions undermines security efforts. Women’s experiences in Northern Ireland exemplify the long history of women’s involvement in perpe- trating political violence and countering extremism. And in the United States, women’s radicalization and participation in violent extremism at home and abroad is on the rise, paralleled by women’s leadership in the intelligence community and security sectors.

Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, efforts to recruit and train more female police officers have highlighted the ways in which women can strengthen counterter- rorism efforts—as well as the challenges they face. Female officers are tasked with searching women and children during raids and at check- points, filling a critical security gap.68 In neighboring Pakistan, police- women are often seconded to the army to help with counterinsurgency operations, because security forces’ entering private homes without a

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Women and Terrorism12

female officer would alienate the local community and undermine their capacity to understand and anticipate extremist threats.69

Recognizing this, in 2013, the U.S. Congress designated a minimum of $25 million in the National Defense Authorization Act to support women in the Afghan security forces.70 At the time, women comprised only 1 percent of the Afghan National Police. Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–led mission to train and assist Afghan security forces aims to increase women’s representation to 10 percent by 2021.71 However, increasing the proportion of women demands more than recruitment, as women who join the police force face seri- ous challenges, including social stigma from their communities, sexual harassment from colleagues, and targeted violence because of their easily recognized uniforms.72 There are also few opportunities for women’s advancement in the police force, which the Afghan govern- ment is addressing through creating women-only positions and elim- inating limitations on the types of jobs women can hold.73 Recruiting and retaining female security officers will require significant efforts to improve educational and training opportunities, address internal harassment and discrimination, and shift social and cultural norms.

Nigeria

In 2014, Boko Haram, a jihadi group allied with the Islamic State, made global headlines after kidnapping 276 Chibok schoolgirls, resulting in an international effort to attain their release. Following the abduc- tion, Boko Haram began a widespread campaign using female suicide bombers, including several girls they had forcibly recruited. Between 2014 and 2018, more than 450 women and girls were deployed in sui- cide attacks; at least a third of them were teenagers or young children.74 These female suicide bombers have been so effective—killing more than 1,200 people over just four years—that today women comprise close to two-thirds of the group’s suicide attackers.75 Their success is due in part to their exploiting the gender gap in the Nigerian security forces, which lack female security officials to search women.

Efforts to deradicalize and rehabilitate female Boko Haram combat- ants reveal the complexity of women’s roles in terrorist groups. Women who were initially abducted sometimes shift their roles to better their situation, because of personal relationships, or because of indoctrina- tion of radical ideas. Other women report voluntarily joining the ter- rorist group because of social or political pressures, or for economic opportunities offered by Boko Haram that were not available in their

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13Understanding Women’s Roles in Terrorism

conservative communities.76 In parts of Nigeria that have been dev- astated by government and militia violence, women who return from Boko Haram receive little socioeconomic support and often face stigma, sexual violence, and poverty.77 Their families and communities some- times view them with suspicion, and their children born of militants are more likely to be abused or remain uneducated.78 These factors fuel an intergenerational cycle of extremism, leading some women to rejoin Boko Haram and leaving their children vulnerable to radicalization.

To address this complexity, female civil society leaders have launched grassroots initiatives, partnering with local leaders, gov- ernments, and security officials to combat radicalization and build community resilience. The Allamin Foundation for Peace and Devel- opment provides comprehensive support to former wives, abductees, and combatants affiliated with Boko Haram. In concert with Islamic scholars, the foundation developed counter-narratives that have been deployed through radio programs and resulted in a 40 percent increase in children’s enrollment in public schools.79 Psychologist Fatima Akilu’s Neem Foundation builds community management teams comprising security officials, faith leaders, and women’s organizations, offering tools and networks to help identify and deter radicalization. Mobile counseling units provide psychological services for displaced commu- nities, addressing the isolation on which recruiters prey.80

Northern Ireland

From the 1960s to the 1990s, Northern Ireland was immersed in a polit- ical conflict known as the Troubles, which resulted in more than 1,800 civilian deaths from cross fire between British security forces and para- military groups.81 Women were active participants in supporting and sustaining terrorist violence on both the nationalist and unionist sides. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) celebrated women’s participation by featuring prominent martyrs such as Maire Drumm and Mairead Farrell in group propaganda.82 Some of these women deployed gender- specific tactics: in 1990, a young IRA militant concealed explosives under the guise of a late-term pregnancy. Although she was caught on her way to place the bomb at the Belfast airport, the tactic was copied by others in Northern Ireland and around the world.83 Women also actively disrupted counterinsurgency efforts: in response to arbitrary raids and arrests, women in Catholic neighborhoods established reg- ular patrols and banged pots and pans to warn nationalist militants of approaching security forces.84 Though women were less visible in

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Women and Terrorism14

unionist paramilitaries, the Ulster Defence Association included up to two dozen women’s units.85

Northern Irish women also laid cross-community foundations for a successful peace agreement in 1998. Notable women-led groups, including Derry Peace Women, Peace People, and Women Together, mobilized thousands of men and women in public protest demanding an end to paramilitary violence.86 Their pressure was a critical factor in bringing parties to the table for serious negotiations. The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition played an important role in the successful Good Friday process, ensuring that potential deal breakers were incor- porated into the talks and advocating for human rights provisions to prevent future extremist violence.87

United States

Domestically, violent political organizations across the ideological spectrum rely on female recruitment.88 Women extremists have perpe- trated deadly attacks in the homeland, notably Islamist Tashfeen Malik, the attacker in the 2015 San Bernardino, California, attack.89 Over the last twenty years, the number of female supporters of far-right groups has grown drastically; women have played a particularly important role in spreading extremist ideas online.90 Women also have a critical pres- ence among American jihadis, especially in developing recruitment networks.91 One of the first American jihadi travelers—and the first known American to have been killed in Syria—was Nicole Lynn Mans- field, a woman from Flint, Michigan.92

Radicalized American women tend to commit the same types of crimes and have about the same success rate as radicalized men.93 Yet they are less likely to be arrested and convicted, and they ultimately serve shorter-than-average sentences for terrorism-related crimes, highlighting a discrepancy in treatment and leaving a security threat unaddressed.94 The phenomenon of American women who have become Islamic State affiliates now hoping to return to the United States raises significant questions about accountability and reintegra- tion into American society.

U.S. women have also ascended to leadership roles in the counter- terrorism field across administrations, including service as secretaries of homeland security, White House homeland security advisors, CIA directors, and senior intelligence officials. Women currently hold many top CIA positions and comprise about a third of the Senior Intelligence Service.95 Some of the intelligence community’s most critical missions

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15Understanding Women’s Roles in Terrorism

have been led by women; more than half the analysts in Alec Station, the team charged with finding Osama bin Laden, were women.96 And many have lost their lives on the job, such as Jennifer Matthews, one of the CIA’s top al-Qaeda experts, who was killed in a bombing in Afghan- istan, and Shannon Kent, who served alongside special operations forces to target Islamic State leaders until her death in Syria in 2019.97

At the community level, American women are leading prevention and intervention programs, bringing a gender lens to domestic reinte- gration work. Angela King, cofounder of Life After Hate, is a former far-right extremist leader who created woman-centric propaganda before her arrest in 1998. Since her release from prison, she has worked to counter extremism through public awareness campaigns and indi- vidual support for those exiting white nationalist movements.98

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