Module/Week 6 -- Financial Management
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American Review of Public Administration 2017, Vol. 47(5) 550 –573
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sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0275074016629008
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Article
Introduction
E-government facilitates interaction between the govern- ments and the public, providing information and equipping citizens to take an active role in public affairs (Flyverbom, 2015). Strategic plans for the implementation of e-govern- ment are intended to generalize the use of new technologies in the field of public administration and to create an environ- ment enabling citizens to communicate their views or com- plaints regarding public issues to influence the development or implementation of public policy (Birchall, 2015).
The importance attributed to e-government regarding improved accountability and information transparency in the framework of New Public Management (NPM) reforms has motivated various studies seeking to identify factors that determine a greater level of disclosure of public financial information, using two communication channels, hard copy (paper-based documents; Evans & Patton, 1987) and through the use of information and communication technologies (ICT), fundamentally the Internet (Caba, Rodríguez, & López, 2008).
Nevertheless, despite the best endeavors of previous research, there exists considerable heterogeneity in the results, and conclusive evidence has yet to be obtained regarding the influence of the above-mentioned factors.
Possibly, inconsistency in study design could account for the uneven results (Pomeroy & Thornton, 2008). Whatever the reason, there is as yet insufficient empirical evidence of the validity and generality of these results to clearly establish the influence of the above-mentioned factors, in quantitative terms, on the disclosure of public financial information in both modes of information disclosure.
This article addresses this issue by means of an objective analysis of two aspects: (a) the communication channel used to disclose public financial information and (b) the influence that studies’ characteristics could have had on the conclu- sions obtained (i.e., the moderating effects) when the public financial disclosure was analyzed in those studies. This anal- ysis was conducted by testing the statistical validity of the empirical results of 51 articles (see Table 1) in a meta- analysis to determine the underlying causes of the variations and contradictions identified.
1University of Granada, Granada, Spain
Corresponding Author: Laura Alcaide Muñoz, Faculty of Business and Administration, University of Granada, Campus La Cartuja s/n, Granada 18071, Spain. Email: [email protected]
Transparency in Governments: A Meta-Analytic Review of Incentives for Digital Versus Hard-Copy Public Financial Disclosures
Laura Alcaide Muñoz1, Manuel Pedro Rodríguez Bolívar1, and Antonio Manuel López Hernández1
Abstract Prior research has indicated that information transparency in governments depends on institutional and environmental factors. Nonetheless, previous studies show heterogeneity in the results, and the academic researchers cannot make consistent conclusions. It makes it difficult to know the behavior of governments regarding their information policies. Therefore, making use of meta-analysis techniques, we integrate the empirical results reported by studies to determine the factors favoring the disclosure of public financial information via two modes of information disclosure—online versus hard-copy format. Several moderating effects—administrative culture, accounting regime, impact of measure used on determining variables, and level of government—have been considered and analyzed for their influence on the degree of correlation between the determinants and the disclosure of public financial information in both modes of information disclosure. Our study does not only show that the variables analyzed are positively associated with the disclosure of public financial information, but also that this depends on the context in which the research is conducted. The administrative style and the level of government are the main moderating effects that influence the results of analyzed studies.
Keywords public administration (generally), budgeting/financial management, e-government, information and communication technology
551
T a b
le 1
. M
ai n
C ha
ra ct
er is
ti cs
o f th
e St
ud ie
s A
na ly
ze d.
A ut
ho rs
/s tu
di es
C o un
tr ie
s O
nl in
e vs
. h ar
d co
py Le
ve l o
f go
ve rn
m en
t Fi
na nc
ia l c
o nd
it io
n (s
ig n;
s ig
ni fic
an ce
)
In te
rg o ve
rn m
en ta
l tr
an sf
er s
(s
ig n;
s ig
ni fic
an ce
)
Po lit
ic al
co
m pe
ti ti o n
(s
ig n;
s ig
ni fic
an ce
) Si
ze
(s ig
n; s
ig ni
fic an
ce )
M un
ic ip
al w
ea lt h
(s ig
n; s
ig ni
fic an
ce )
B ab
er (
19 83
) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py St
at e
+ ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
+ ; N
o ns
ig n.
/s ig
n. +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— Ev
an s
an d
Pa tt
o n
(1 98
3) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
M ix
ed r
es ul
ts —
— +
; N o ns
ig n.
/s ig
n. —
In gr
am (
19 84
) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py St
at e
+ ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
B ab
er a
nd S
en (
19 84
) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py St
at e
− ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
+ ; N
o ns
ig n.
/s ig
n. —
— R
o bb
in s
an d
A us
ti n
(1 98
6) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t −
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t −
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t In
gr am
a nd
D eJ
o ng
( 19
87 )
U ni
te d
St at
es H
ar d
co py
St at
e +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t —
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t —
Ev an
s an
d Pa
tt o n
(1 98
7) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t —
M ix
ed r
es ul
ts M
ix ed
r es
ul ts
— G
ir o ux
( 19
89 )
U ni
te d
St at
es H
ar d
co py
Lo ca
l —
— −
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
M ix
ed r
es ul
ts D
w ye
r an
d W
ils o n
(1 98
9) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
− ; N
o ns
ig n.
/s ig
n. —
— +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
B an
ke r,
B un
ch , a
nd S
tr au
ss (
19 89
) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
— M
ix ed
r es
ul ts
C o pl
ey (
19 91
) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t −
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— C
ar pe
nt er
( 19
91 )
U ni
te d
St at
es H
ar d
co py
St at
e +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— −
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— Fe
ro z
an d
W ils
o n
(1 99
2) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
— —
— +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
C he
ng (
19 92
) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py St
at e
− ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t −
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t M
ix ed
r es
ul ts
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t G
ir o ux
a nd
D ei
s (1
99 3)
U ni
te d
St at
es H
ar d
co py
Lo ca
l M
ix ed
r es
ul ts
− ; N
o ns
ig n.
/S ig
n. —
— —
Li m
a nd
M cK
in no
n (1
99 3)
U ni
te d
St at
es H
ar d
co py
Lo ca
l —
— —
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t —
A lle
n an
d Sa
nd er
( 19
94 )
U ni
te d
St at
es H
ar d
co py
Lo ca
l —
— —
+ ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
C hr
is ti ae
ns (
19 99
) N
et he
rl an
ds H
ar d
co py
Lo ca
l +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
+ ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t M
cL el
la nd
a nd
G ir
o ux
( 20
00 )
U ni
te d
St at
es O
nl in
e Lo
ca l
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— T
ay lo
r an
d R
o sa
ir (
20 00
) A
us tr
al ia
H ar
d co
py St
at e
— —
— M
ix ed
r es
ul ts
R
ya n,
S ta
nl ey
, a nd
N el
so n
(2 00
2) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
— —
— +
; N o ns
ig n.
/s ig
n. —
G ir
o ux
a nd
M cL
el la
nd (
20 03
) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
+ ; N
o ns
ig n.
/s ig
n. M
ix ed
r es
ul ts
— M
ix ed
r es
ul ts
+ ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t G
o re
( 20
04 )
U ni
te d
St at
es H
ar d
co py
Lo ca
l +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— —
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t —
G o re
, S ac
hs , a
nd T
rz ci
nk a
(2 00
4) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t —
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— Sm
it h
(2 00
4) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
M ix
ed r
es ul
ts —
M ix
ed r
es ul
ts +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t M
ix ed
r es
ul ts
La sw
ad , F
is he
r, a
nd O
ye le
re (
20 05
) N
ew Z
ea la
nd H
ar d
co py
/o nl
in e
Lo ca
l +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
− ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t M
al o ne
( 20
06 )
U ni
te d
St at
es H
ar d
co py
Lo ca
l M
ix ed
r es
ul ts
— —
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
Ju st
ic e,
M el
it sk
i, an
d Sm
it h
(2 00
6) U
ni te
d St
at es
O nl
in e
St at
e/ Lo
ca l
— —
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— St
yl es
a nd
T en
ny so
n (2
00 7)
U ni
te d
St at
es O
nl in
e Lo
ca l
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t —
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t M
ill s,
C ar
sl aw
, a nd
M as
o n
(2 00
7) U
ni te
d St
at es
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— —
— da
C o st
a C
ar va
lh o , J
o rg
e, a
nd F
er na
nd ez
( 20
07 )
Po rt
ug al
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
M ix
ed r
es ul
ts +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— M
ix ed
r es
ul ts
— Pi
na , T
o rr
es , a
nd R
o yo
( 20
07 )
EU O
nl in
e Lo
ca l
— —
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— St
ec co
lin i,
A ne
ss i- Pe
ss in
a, a
nd N
as i (
20 08
) It
al y
H ar
d co
py Lo
ca l
— —
— +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
G an
dí a
an d
A rc
hi do
na (
20 08
) Sp
ai n
O nl
in e
Lo ca
l —
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
C ab
a, R
o dr
íg ue
z, a
nd L
ó pe
z (2
00 8)
Sp ai
n O
nl in
e Lo
ca l
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t −
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t −
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
C ár
ca ba
a nd
G ar
cí a
(2 00
8) Sp
ai n
O nl
in e
Lo ca
l M
ix ed
r es
ul ts
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t —
Se rr
an o , R
ue da
, a nd
P o rt
ill o (
20 09
) Sp
ai n
O nl
in e
Lo ca
l +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t Pi
na , T
o rr
es , a
nd R
o yo
( 20
09 )
EU O
nl in
e Lo
ca l
— —
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— Pi
na , T
o rr
es , a
nd R
o yo
( 20
10 )
EU O
nl in
e Lo
ca l
— —
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— C
ár ca
ba a
nd G
ar cí
a (2
01 0)
Sp ai
n O
nl in
e Lo
ca l
M ix
ed r
es ul
ts —
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— G
ui lla
m ó n,
B as
ti da
, a nd
B en
it o (
20 11
) Sp
ai n
O nl
in e
Lo ca
l +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
M ix
ed r
es ul
ts M
ar ta
ni a
nd L
es ti an
i ( 20
12 )
In do
ne si
a O
nl in
e Lo
ca l
— +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
A lb
al at
e (2
01 3)
Sp ai
n O
nl in
e Lo
ca l
+ ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
— +
:S ig
ni fic
an t
— C
aa m
añ o -A
le gr
e, L
ag o -P
eñ as
, R ey
es -S
an ti as
, a nd
S an
ti ag
o -
B o ub
et a
(2 01
3) Sp
ai n
O nl
in e
Lo ca
l +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t — (c
on tin
ue d)
552
A ut
ho rs
/s tu
di es
C o un
tr ie
s O
nl in
e vs
. h ar
d co
py Le
ve l o
f go
ve rn
m en
t Fi
na nc
ia l c
o nd
it io
n (s
ig n;
s ig
ni fic
an ce
)
In te
rg o ve
rn m
en ta
l tr
an sf
er s
(s
ig n;
s ig
ni fic
an ce
)
Po lit
ic al
co
m pe
ti ti o n
(s
ig n;
s ig
ni fic
an ce
) Si
ze
(s ig
n; s
ig ni
fic an
ce )
M un
ic ip
al w
ea lt h
(s ig
n; s
ig ni
fic an
ce )
R io
s, B
en it o , a
nd B
as ti da
( 20
13 )
In te
rn at
io na
l O
nl in
e St
at e
+ ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
− ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— W
eh ne
r an
d R
en zi
o (
20 13
) In
te rn
at io
na l
O nl
in e
St at
e —
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
— —
C ab
a Pé
re z,
R o dr
íg ue
z B
o lív
ar , a
nd L
ó pe
z H
er ná
nd ez
( 20
14 )
O EC
D c
o un
tr ie
s O
nl in
e St
at e
− ; N
o ns
ig n.
/S ig
n. —
+ ; S
ig ni
fic an
t +
/− ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t +
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t K
ee ra
su nt
o np
o ng
, D un
st an
, a nd
K ha
nn a
(2 01
5) N
ew Z
ea la
nd O
nl in
e Lo
ca l
— —
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
+ ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t D
a C
o st
a B ai
rr al
, C o ut
in ho
e S
ilv a,
a nd
D o s
Sa nt
o s
A lv
es (
20 15
) B
ra zi
l O
nl in
e St
at e
— +
/− ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
− ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
Lo w
at ch
ar in
a nd
M en
ifi el
d (2
01 5)
U ni
te d
St at
es O
nl in
e Lo
ca l
— —
— +
; S ig
ni fic
an t
+ ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t G
ar ci
a- T
ab uy
o , S
áe z-
M ar
tí n,
a nd
C ab
a- Pé
re z
(2 01
5) C
en tr
al A
m er
ic a
O nl
in e
Lo ca
l —
— —
+ ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t —
N ot
e. T
he s
tu di
es c
o nt
ri bu
te m
o re
t ha
n o ne
o bs
er va
ti o n
to t
he s
am pl
e be
ca us
e th
ey in
cl ud
e di
ffe re
nt e
st im
at io
ns w
it h
di ffe
re nt
d at
a se
ts , d
iff er
en t
ex pl
an at
o ry
v ar
ia bl
es , o
r di
ffe re
nt m
o de
ls . “
+ ; N
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t” =
t he
v ar
ia bl
e o ffe
rs
a po
si ti ve
r el
at io
ns hi
p an
d is
s ta
ti st
ic al
ly n
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t. “
+ ; N
o ns
ig n.
/S ig
n. ”
= t
he v
ar ia
bl e
o ffe
rs a
p o si
ti ve
s ta
ti st
ic al
ly s
ig ni
fic an
t re
la ti o ns
hi p
an d
a po
si ti ve
s ta
ti st
ic al
ly n
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t re
la ti o ns
hi p.
“ +
; S ig
ni fic
an t”
= t
he v
ar ia
bl e
o ffe
rs a
po
si ti ve
r el
at io
ns hi
p an
d is
s ta
ti st
ic al
ly s
ig ni
fic an
t. “
− ; N
o ns
ig n.
/S ig
n. ”
= t
he v
ar ia
bl e
o ffe
rs a
n eg
at iv
e st
at is
ti ca
lly s
ig ni
fic an
t re
la ti o ns
hi p
an d
a ne
ga ti ve
s ta
ti st
ic al
ly n
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t re
la ti o ns
hi p.
“ −
; N o ns
ig ni
fic an
t” =
t he
v ar
ia bl
e o ffe
rs a
ne
ga ti ve
r el
at io
ns hi
p an
d is
s ta
ti st
ic al
ly n
o ns
ig ni
fic an
t. “
− ; S
ig ni
fic an
t” =
t he
v ar
ia bl
e o ffe
rs a
n eg
at iv
e re
la ti o ns
hi p
an d
is s
ta ti st
ic al
ly s
ig ni
fic an
t. “
M ix
ed r
es ul
ts ”
= t
he v
ar ia
bl e
o ffe
rs a
ll o pt
io ns
w he
n di
ffe re
nt s
tu di
es a
re a
na ly
ze d,
t ha
t is
, t he
v ar
ia bl
e ha
s a
po si
ti ve
, s ta
ti st
ic al
ly s
ig ni
fic an
t an
d no
ns ig
ni fic
an t
re la
ti o ns
hi p,
a nd
it h
as a
n eg
at iv
e st
at is
ti ca
lly s
ig ni
fic an
t an
d no
ns ig
ni fic
an t
re la
ti o ns
hi p.
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In short, the use of the meta-analysis technique in this article seeks to investigate the effectiveness of previously identified factors for public financial disclosure via hard- copy format and compares it with the effectiveness of these factors through the Internet, regardless of the conditions under which the prior studies were carried out. The meta- analysis was conducted in a sample of individual quantita- tive studies. We incorporate different models and variables to explain the relationships between different levels of informa- tion disclosure and incentives of financial reporting, consid- ering the two different communication channels used for information disclosure (online via the Internet or hard copy).
Financial Transparency in Governmental Entities and Forms of Information Disclosure: Hard Copy Versus Online
This study addresses two scenarios for the disclosure of financial information: via the Internet or as hard copy (paper- based documentation). Many studies focusing on the latter question have analyzed the factors underlying the decision by the U.S. Government to comply with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in preparing its financial reports (Baber & Sen, 1984; Evans & Patton, 1987) or con- solidated financial statements (Cheng, 1992; Giroux, 1989).
In contrast, recent studies of public-sector financial infor- mation disclosure via the Internet have examined administra- tive reforms conducted under the NPM framework and concluded that the adoption and implementation of ICTs tends to favor innovation within public organizations, improving their transparency and accountability (Caba et al., 2008; Cárcaba & García, 2008). Indeed, Internet-based reporting has produced a shift from “push” to “pull” com- munications in relations between government and citizens (Mergel, 2013). The former “push” paradigm was character- ized by the provision of batch-processed, producer-driven
information, whereas in the “pull” system, information is tailored and citizen-driven (Mergel, 2013). These changes are consistent with those taking place elsewhere under NPM frameworks, with general-purpose information giving way to made-to-measure data (see Figure 1).
The Internet has the potential to revolutionize information disclosure due to its global reach, versatility, interactive capac- ity, and speed (Jensen & Xiao, 2001), and the web is currently perceived as providing the best available platform for informa- tion stewardship and disclosure for both financial and nonfi- nancial information (see Figure 1). Indeed, as opposed to hard-copy format, the Internet is a good channel of communi- cation to make information accessible to a great number of users at a low cost as well as to centralize users’ demands for information, allowing them to satisfy their need for information when they must make financial decisions. The Internet can dis- close continuous financial data and improve the flexibility of information provided by financial statements by introducing figures or elements that make the information more attractive and comprehensible for users (see Figure 1). So, the disclosure of financial information through the Internet could help public administrators be publicly accountable and promote dialogue regarding the use of public financial resources.
Nonetheless, despite the importance of online reporting for improving transparency and accountability in the area of public-sector financial information (see Figure 1), to date, the volume of information disclosed online appears to be about the same as that provided in hard-copy format (Rodríguez Bolívar, Caba, & López, 2015). Indeed, as in the private sector (Ziek, 2009), little progress seems to have been made in online reporting, and online public financial information consists mainly of the display of hard-copy annual reports in an electronic format (Rodríguez Bolívar, Caba, & López, 2007). Thus, the level of technology and the disclosure environment are associated with the presentation format, but not with information content.
Thus, despite the potential benefits of online reporting, doubts have been expressed about whether it is designed or
Figure 1. Trends in governmental financial information reporting. Source. Adapted from Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW; 1998).
554 American Review of Public Administration 47(5)
used to effectively disseminate information. For example, as investigation has found in the private sector (Unerman & Bennett, 2004), online information may not be accessible to some of the user groups most strongly affected by govern- ment activity due to the lack of technology, infrastructure, education, or language skills needed to use the government’s official websites. In this regard, it has been observed that the level of Internet pervasiveness is a major determinant of Internet-based information disclosure; where general levels of Internet use are higher, users will expect the government to provide more information online (Caba et al., 2008; Gandía & Archidona, 2008).
As researchers have found in the area of private business (Debreceny, Gray, & Rahman, 2002), the environment regarding the disclosure of financial information may favor such disclosure or may hinder it. Thus, Rodríguez Bolívar et al. (2015) and Pina et al. (2010) concluded that differences in cultural variables could produce differing patterns of accounting and would show varying levels of disclosure from one country to another. In addition, expectations of online reporting in developed countries may not be identical to those in developing countries because of the “digital divide” arising from populations’ ability to access the Internet.
Finally, the Internet could generate higher quality finan- cial reporting if better technical use were made of the poten- tial to disclose information online. Thus, the technical use of the Internet could be a significant factor to improve hard- copy disclosure (Litan & Wilson, 2000). In this regard, empirical research on the private business sector (Beattie & Pratt, 2003) has indicated that various user groups, such as auditors, demand Internet-based disclosure because of the additional information that can be provided electronically, the value of navigation and search aids, and the portability of information in different formats.
According to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC; 1999) and the Business Reporting Research Project (BRRP; 2002), websites differ considerably from traditional media. With this in mind and together with the above consid- erations, we sought to inquire whether the results obtained by individual studies might be influenced by the modes of disclosure through which their information was accessed. Empirical evidence of this heterogeneity can be observed when the variables analyzed are income per capita (see the conclusions of Christiaens, 1999 and Giroux & McLelland, 2003 in contrast to those of Caba et al., 2008 and Gandía & Archidona, 2008) or the transfers received from other gov- ernments (see Ingram & DeJong, 1987 and Robbins & Austin, 1986, on one hand, and Laswad, Fisher, & Oyelere, 2005 and Caba et al., 2008, on the other).
In many cases, earlier studies have provided little theo- retical underpinning for their analysis, and problems can arise when interpreting and integrating the findings. In the present article, the mode of disclosure is the main attribute to analyze regarding governments’ incentives for financial
reporting, and we have tested this assumption using meta- analysis techniques.
Meta-Analysis Techniques to Identify the Incentives for Financial Transparency
Incentives for Financial Transparency in Information Disclosure by Governments
Since the mid-1970s, many studies have analyzed the factors conducive to more and better disclosure of public financial information. These studies have mainly been based on agency theory, neoinstitutional theory, and legitimacy theory (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Feroz, Carpenter, & Cheng, 2007). The key idea underpinning agency theory is that differences exist between the interest of policymakers and public manag- ers, on one hand, and the interests of ordinary citizens, on the other. These differences force public representatives to be held accountable for their actions and to demonstrate that they have acted according to their responsibilities (Thompson, 1998). This theory has been influential in public-sector reforms based on the NPM tenets and promotes the use of government financial statements as instruments for external users (citizens) to inform themselves of the actions taken by policymakers and public managers (Mack & Ryan, 2006).
In contrast, neoinstitutional theory has been applied to explain the adoption of innovations in management account- ing (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). According to this theory, organizations seek to adopt structures and practices that are considered legitimate and socially acceptable, thus produc- ing homogeneous practices and structures (Feroz et al., 2007; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Information disclosure becomes a symbol of trust and modernity, constituting a trend adopted by governments with the aim to project an image of good governance and transparency (Hoffman, 1999).
Finally, legitimacy theory (Suchman, 1995) argues that the legitimacy of the organization’s actions is influenced by dissemination of information to stakeholders (Archel, Husillos, Larrinaga, & Spence, 2009). In particular, the greater the chance of negative impacts of a public policy, the greater the need to try to influence the process through infor- mation disclosure (Patten, 1992).
Regarding the determining factors of public-sector report- ing, there are different incentives to disclose public financial information, such as internal-external, political-economic, managerial, and social factors. In this article, we group these factors into two main categories: (a) institutional—financial condition, intergovernmental transfers, and political compe- tition, and (b) environmental—organization size and munici- pal wealth (see Figure 2). Institutional factors are linked to the assumptions of the agency and neoinstitutional theories because they are related to the need of governments in per- forming structures and practices with the aim of demonstrat- ing that they are accomplishing their duty of transparency and accountability on the use of the public financial resources.
Alcaide Muñoz et al. 555
The implementation of ICTs is being promoted by interna- tional organizations as fundamental pillars of the innovations in the public-sector management driven to improve transpar- ency and trust on the use of public finances. By contrast, environmental factors are strongly linked to the assumptions proposed by agency and legitimacy theories, because they are centered on the pressures and demands for financial information made on government agencies by citizens. Also, public managers could use the disclosure of public informa- tion with the aim of influencing the negative opinions of the public-sector management in the municipality.
This difference between institutional and environmental factors is relevant because it enables us to determine whether information transparency and accountability policies are applied by public organizations through the greater disclo- sure of public financial information that depends mainly on an organizational decision or whether, on the contrary, the environment affecting these government organizations has greater significance. These factors will be analyzed in both modes of information disclosure examined in this article.
Financial condition. One of the variables most commonly ana- lyzed in this field is the government’s financial condition, which is positively related to the motivation of public man- agers to provide information transparency (Baber, 1983; Ingram, 1984). This variable is included in our analysis of financial information disclosure because it is an integral component of the financial credibility of governmental agen- cies vis-à-vis external agents (Baber, 1983; Ingram, 1984), as well as the government’s capacity to meet its payment com- mitments (Giroux & Deis, 1993). Taking into account the agency theory approach, public managers must respond to greater demands for information disclosure to minimize con- flicts of interest (Baber & Sen, 1986; Gore, 2004; Zimmer- man, 1977).
Previous research has defined financial condition as the capacity of governments to finance the provision of public services and programs, and it is measured in relation to the
level of public borrowing (Caba et al., 2008; Guillamón, Bastida, & Benito, 2013). In fact, higher levels of debt may represent a burden of future interest costs and principal repayments that would reduce a governmental agency’s abil- ity to meet demand for services and thus increase the fiscal pressure on future generations of taxpayers (Rodríguez Bolívar, Navarro Galera, Alcaide Muñoz, & López Subirés, 2016). For this reason, the evaluation of debt burden has become an integral component of public managers’ responsi- bility (Styles & Tennyson, 2007), and investors and creditors are more interested in determining the ability of the govern- ment to repay its debt (Daniels & Daniels, 1991). Besides, given asymmetric information whereby investors are unable to fully determine the default risk characteristics of issuers, public managers could use increased disclosure to reduce the cost of capital (Gore, 2004). Therefore, in accordance with agency theory (Zimmerman, 1977), to generate positive sig- nals about their performance with the aim of attracting finan- cial funds from investors and creditors, public managers are encouraged to disclose public financial information as a mechanism to allow their actions to be monitored (Cárcaba & García, 2008).
In addition, several authors argue that one cause for a lack of trust in government is that citizens are not often provided with enough factual documentation about government pro- cesses and performance (Cook, Jacobs, & Kim, 2010). Perhaps, it is produced because when government perfor- mance is fully revealed, no state is fully successful in the eyes of its citizens (Schick, 2003). Nonetheless, giving citi- zens the possibility to monitor policymaking and scrutinize its results will enhance the legitimacy of the institutional structures—neoinstitutional theory approach (Curtin & Meijer, 2006). To achieve this aim, previous studies have highlighted that citizens are likely to want more accountabil- ity from government and more information about where their money is spent (Ipsos MORI, 2010).
This demand for information has intensified as a result of the recent global financial crises in which many governments
Figure 2. Incentives for the disclosure of public financial information and moderating effects of empirical investigations. Note. ME = moderating effects.
556 American Review of Public Administration 47(5)
have increased public expenditure to stimulate the economy (Rodríguez Bolívar et al., 2016). They want reports to con- tain information that would help them develop their own evaluations of financial position (Hary & Antonio, 1999), which could improve the credibility and integrity of public finance and contribute to effective management of public resources—neoinstitutional theory approach. In this sense, Brusca and Montesinos (2006) affirmed that citizens could control public management at election time, as the informa- tion can reflect the results of public policies and, conse- quently, serve as a vehicle for communicating the economic effect of political management.
However, no conclusive evidence of this relationship has been reported. The results show that if debt levels rise, politi- cians make use of diverse channels of information disclosure as a way to demonstrate a government’s ability to meet its obligations to creditors. Thus, the Internet provides an effec- tive mode of disseminating information and enables creditors to readily monitor government activities (Debreceny et al., 2002). In contrast, however, other studies have found no sig- nificant association between these two variables (Guillamon, Bastida, & Benito, 2011; Serrano, Rueda, & Portillo, 2009). Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive relationship between financial condition and the disclosure of public financial information
Intergovernmental transfers. Intergovernmental transfers is another variable that previous research has considered a pos- sible determinant of financial information disclosure, as these transfers are subject to control by the central or supra- national institutions that disburse the funds (Copley, 1991; Ingram, 1984; Ingram & DeJong, 1987). According to previ- ous research in the field of the agency theory, the receipt of such funds by central or supranational governments requires the recipient to disclose information to account for the use of the funds received, seeking to demonstrate that public man- agers have acted according to their responsibilities (Ingram & DeJong, 1987). Thus, governments in need of this funding are obliged to provide high quality public financial reports because their fund providers demand to see how the trans- ferred funds are used, thus achieving more and better accountability (Ingram, 1984; Ingram & DeJong, 1987).
With respect to the hard-copy disclosure of financial statements, Giroux and Deis (1993) found a negative rela- tionship with intergovernmental funding, which suggests that cities receiving intergovernmental transfers have less incentive to disclose financial information. However, Copley (1991) concluded that resources obtained from other public bodies must be accountable to the providing authority, to demonstrate that the assigned funds have been used in accor- dance with the objectives of the program for which they were granted. In the case of online information disclosure, a variety of results have been reported; Caba et al. (2008) do not consider intergovernmental revenues to be a significant
variable regarding the disclosure of financial information, but in this respect, Guillamon et al. (2011) found a positive and statistically significant relationship. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between transfers and funds received from other public organizations and the disclosure of public financial information.
Political competition. Political competition is a variable that has been widely analyzed with respect to the disclosure of financial information. After taking office, politicians often ignore their preelection promises, giving priority to their own interests rather than the public good, fully aware of the difficulty for citizens to exercise imminent, effective control (Cárcaba & García, 2008). However, the existence of politi- cal rivals presenting strong opposition to the party in power can increase the long-term costs of this opportunistic behav- ior (Baber, 1983; Evans & Patton, 1987), and the public managers are forced to justify their actions. Opposition par- ties in this situation will call on the ruling political party to exercise responsible management and will advise the public of any divergences from its election program (Giroux, 1989; Serrano et al., 2009). Therefore, the existence of alternative officeholders and the corresponding risk of defeat in future elections will reduce the deviation from the interests of vot- ers and other political agents (Zimmerman, 1977). Accord- ingly, the governing party will closely observe the degree of implementation of its preelection promises to remain in office for several terms and the greater the political competi- tion, the more incentive it will have to do so (Baber, 1983; Caba et al., 2008; Gandía & Archidona, 2008). In conse- quence, taking into account the legitimacy theory approach, the government has an interest in voluntarily demonstrating its commitment to efficient management and will make use of different modes of information disclosure (Cárcaba & García, 2010; Laswad et al., 2005).
Nevertheless, previous studies of the hard-copy disclo- sure of financial statements and its relationship to political competition have reported conflicting evidence (Carpenter, 1991); some have obtained mixed results (Cheng, 1992; Smith, 2004), and another found a relationship with a non- significant negative sign (Giroux, 1989). However, all the evidence points in a single direction in the studies that have examined online information transparency. All are agreed that political competition within governments encourages public managers to be more responsive to the needs of the electorate, who then offer a greater amount of information (Caamaño-Alegre, Lago-Peñas, Reyes-Santias, & Santiago- Boubeta, 2013; Cárcaba & García, 2008, 2010). Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a positive relationship between political competition and the disclosure of public financial information.
Alcaide Muñoz et al. 557
Size. From the standpoint of agency theory (Zimmerman, 1977), large governments have a high degree of information asymmetry, and thus high agency costs and a great conflict of interest with citizens. Thus, to reduce agency costs, govern- ments should disclose more information (Baber, 1983; Serrano et al., 2009). In addition, large cities must provide services to a greater number of citizens, and have more resources at their dis- posal to do so. Accordingly, citizens will demand a greater vol- ume of information to discover how well the government fulfills its duties (Giroux & McLelland, 2003).
From the empirical point of view, although Christiaens (1999) and Ingram and Robbins (1988) reported significant positive relationships between disclosure levels in hard-copy format and the size of government, other authors (Robbins & Austin, 1986) found no significant association. In any case and in general, empirical evidence shows that large munici- palities are more likely to disclose financial information in hard copy and to facilitate public access to this information (Copley, 1991; Giroux & McLelland, 2003; Gore, 2004). For the online disclosure of financial information, the empirical evidence is overwhelming; most empirical studies conclude that cities with large populations make greater use of the Internet than smaller cities to provide financial information (Gandía & Archidona, 2008; Guillamón et al., 2011). In this respect, Moon and Norris (2005) argued that governments of large cities are more likely to adopt e-government, because they are under great pressure to find the most effective and efficient way of providing services and information. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): There is a positive relationship between the size of public organizations and the disclo- sure of public financial information.
Municipal wealth. Finally, decisions regarding information disclosure may be affected by circumstances external to the local government, such as income per capita. It has been shown that with increasing local income, the population expects better service and more information to confirm that their taxes are being spent effectively (Cheng, 1992; Giroux, 1989; Giroux & McLelland, 2003; Ingram, 1984). Under this milieu, legitimacy theory could support the interest of public managers and policymakers to disclose financial statements with the aim of confirming citizens the management of pub- lic finances and of influencing citizens’ opinions regarding the negative impacts of public policies.
In the case of the hard-copy disclosure of financial infor- mation, opinions are divided (Evans & Patton, 1987; Smith, 2004). Thus, Giroux and McLelland (2003) reported a signifi- cant relationship with municipal income levels for a study conducted in 1996 but not for one conducted in 1983; Ingram (1984) found this variable was significantly related to munici- pal wealth, but the relationship was nonsignificant for Robbins and Austin (1986) and Giroux (1989). In contrast, the empiri- cal evidence reported in studies of online information
disclosure leads us to conclude that in cities where income per capita is high, residents are motivated to demand information (Caamaño-Alegre et al., 2013; Serrano et al., 2009; Styles & Tennyson, 2007). In this regard, too, Ho (2002) argued that cities with a low income per capita are not likely to adopt a progressive web design, due to low demand for online ser- vices. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 5 (H5): There is a positive relationship between municipal income levels and the disclosure of public financial information.
Moderating Effects Identified in Previous Research on Financial Transparency
The conditions under which empirical investigations are implemented, for example sample size, country analyzed, year of publication, theoretical basis, and so on, must be taken into account, because these moderating effects may prove inconsistent results (see Table 1). Therefore, a method- ology is needed to identify the statistically significant factors that are independent of the underlying considerations of the studies in which they were examined, and determine possible incentives to the disclosure of public financial information that influence public managers in their design of information transparency strategies. Thus, designing public policies to take such incentives into account will enable public manag- ers to comply with their duty to be accountable.
Accounting for our analysis of the literature review, we conclude that there are five essential modulating effects under which different investigations have been implemented and that could have influenced the results. The first is the one analyzed in section “Meta-Analysis Techniques to Identify the Incentives for Financial Transparency,” namely, the hypothesis that the modes employed for the disclosure of financial information (hard copy versus digital) may have influenced the findings of previous empirical studies (ME
1 —
see Figure 2). In addition to this moderating effect, another four were also considered: the administrative culture of the countries from which we obtained the study data, the accounting regimes adopted by the countries studied, the measurement unit utilized to quantify determinants analyzed, and the level of government constituting the research focus.
Administrative culture. The tenets of NPM have been imple- mented worldwide, but in widely varying forms (Pina et al., 2010). These differences are due to divergent concepts of state and of the doctrine of separation that underlies adminis- trative thinking. Thus, implementation of NPM models con- forms to common patterns in countries that share certain cultural values and are in accord with the national context, which influences the role played by the state and its relation- ship with its citizens. This, in turn, contributes to the impor- tance granted to transparency and a government’s duty to be publicly accountable (Kickert, 1997).
558 American Review of Public Administration 47(5)
Prior research has highlighted differences in govern- ments’ degree of involvement with the citizenry, the empha- sis on the implementation of NPM reforms, and the bureaucratic structures and legal systems as well as differ- ences in administrative culture that affect the evolution of e-government (Rodríguez Domínguez, García, & Gallego, 2011), both to provide online public services (Torres, Pina, & Acerete, 2006) and to publicly disclose financial information (Pina et al., 2009, 2010; Rodríguez Bolívar et al., 2015).
Based on Hofstede (2001), administrative cultures are considered as patterns of behavior acquired and transmitted by human groups in the public sector; such patterns under- line cultural values, beliefs, and principles, resulting in shared understandings, and legitimize the function of their acts. Indeed, national culture is an important driver for the way people think and act in any given society (Hofstede, 2001) and also for the e-government diffusion (Zhao, Shen, & Collier, 2014). In addition, studies on transparency over- look the effect of cultural differences between countries on how transparency is viewed and related to citizen attitudes (Bouckaert & van de Walle, 2003). The administrative cul- ture affects government transparency (Rodríguez Bolívar et al., 2015), and it has been demonstrated that government transparency fits less in countries with national cultures that possess higher power distances and long-term orientation (Grimmelikhuijsen, Porumbescu, Hong, & Im, 2013). In fact, in contexts of high power distance, relations between leaders and citizens can be viewed as paternalistic in the sense that citizens are said to perceive themselves as largely dependent upon (and by extension vulnerable to) their gov- ernment (Park & Shin, 2005). Therefore, we would expect a meta-analysis to reveal discrepancies in the disclosure of public financial information between different countries, in accordance with the corresponding administrative culture (ME
2 —see Figure 2).
Four major styles of management culture in governmental entities have been distinguished: Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Southern European, and Nordic countries, the latter is regarded as a mixed form of the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic administrative cultures (Kickert, 1997). The term Anglo- Saxon is applied to countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. South American countries considered include Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Paraguay. The term Continental European is used to refer to Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and the Nordic category also includes Denmark and the Netherlands (Pina et al., 2010).
In the present study, after analyzing all the articles in the sample (see Table 1), two main groups were differentiated: (a) articles focusing on the Anglo-Saxon style of administrative culture and (b) all other articles. This differentiation makes sense if we consider that sample studies in our research come mainly from the Anglo-Saxon countries (31 studies) and from Continental European countries (10 studies). In addition, three sample studies come from other different cultures, and five of
them analyze the governments of the European Union (EU) and others worldwide. These last studies are not considered in our analysis of the moderating effect of administrative culture, as they address diverse administrative cultures together.
Accounting regime. Although, we have accounted for the differ- ent practices about disclosing public financial information and have emphasized the implementation of NPM reforms with the moderating effect of administrative culture, we think that countries with similar cultures do exist, but have different accounting requirements; for example, the United States has adopted the Governmental Accounting Standard Board (GASB), and Australia has implemented the Australian Accounting Standard Board (AASB)—both of them have an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture.
In previous research, empirical evidence shows these con- tradictions. In this sense, Gore (2004) analyzed the hard- copy disclosure of public financial information in the United States, and the results showed that large municipalities are likely to disclose financial information by hard copy and to facilitate public access to this information. However, Taylor and Rosair (2000) did not find clear evidence about the influ- ence of organizational size on disclosure of public financial information in Australian local governments. However, Styles and Tennyson (2007) affirmed that policymakers were motivated to disclose public financial information to demon- strate to creditors in the United States of local governments’ ability to meet their obligations; however, Laswad et al. (2005) found no significant association between the financial condition and disclosure of public financial information in New Zealand’s local governments.
Taking into account these contradictory results, we con- sidered the accounting regime was a moderating effect, as legal requirement and accounting practices could influence hard copy versus digital financial reporting. In this sense, after analyzing all the articles in the sample, two main groups were differentiated: (a) articles that analyzed U.S. govern- ments with the GASB accounting regime and (b) articles that analyzed countries with their own accounting system. In this regard, Keerasuntonpong, Dunstan, and Khanna (2015) has presented the exception, analyzing New Zealand local gov- ernments, which have adopted International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) at the time of research (ME
3 —see Figure 2).
Impact of measure used on determining variables. In the litera- ture, the use of different measurement to define the variables can produce conflicting findings (Pomeroy & Thornton, 2008). In this regard, studies have highlighted the problems of multidimensionality of accounting and reporting choice— an aspect not easily described using specific quantitative indices—as well as problems regarding the measurement of data (Carpenter, 1991; Cheng, 1992). Thus, and in agreement with Carpenter (1991) and Serrano et al. (2009), we found measurement of the variable “political competition” led to
Alcaide Muñoz et al. 559
heterogeneous results regarding its association with financial information disclosure. While Baber (1983) and Ingram (1984) suggested that the effect of parliamentary political competition on disclosure of financial information was posi- tive, the obtained results were not statistically significant when political competition was measured in terms of lobby groups (Baber & Sen, 1984). In addition, greater divergence of results is obtained when the incentive being analyzed is a financial condition expressed as municipal indebtedness (Baber & Sen, 1984; ME
4 —see Figure 2).
Level of government. Another of the moderating effects that could produce the heterogeneity observed among different studies is the level of government under analysis (statewide or municipal). At the local level, citizens are increasingly interested in being informed of the actions taken by munici- pal governments, as these actions and reforms have direct impact on their daily lives (Piotrowski & Van Ryzin, 2007). Accordingly, a study of the situation in the United States reported widespread interest in having access to information to understand the realities of municipal management (Thomas & Streib, 2003).
In addition, local governments offer a large number of public-sector services, which must often be adapted to citi- zens’ needs, to make public-sector services more efficient and effective (Zafra, López, & Hernández, 2009). In addi- tion, these governments undertake management reforms to introduce technological changes (Connolly, Bannister, & Keamey, 2010). Therefore, assuming the relations between government and citizens can be of different degrees of inten- sity (Edmiston, 2003), the empirical results obtained and the relations observed among the variables analyzed may vary accordingly (ME
5 —see Figure 2).
In brief, Figure 2 shows a scheme of the theoretical founda- tion of the hypotheses contained in previous research by sort- ing determinants according to institutional factors and environmental factors. In this sense for our study, we tested the influence of these determining factors on the disclosure of pub- lic financial information by proposing five hypotheses. Nonetheless, to account for variability within the results and in findings of previous research regarding the influence of these factors, in this study, we analyze whether they are affected by the five considered moderating effects.
Sample Selection
In this study, we first conducted a comprehensive analysis of all publications listed in the categories of Public Administration, Information Science, Computer Science and Information Systems, and Business and Finance, indexed by the Institute for Scientific Information for the period 1980 to 2015. To do this, we examined the title, the abstract, the keywords, and the introduction of each article to ensure that the stated research goals were relevant to our investigation. In the few cases in which application of these
discrimination criteria was not decisive, we read the entire article.
A systematic search was then made of the ABI/INFORM, EJS Ebsco, Blackwell, Scopus, Emerald/Insight, SpringerLink, ScienceDirect, Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Econlit, Ecopapers, and Business Source Premier databases, using descriptors and keywords, such as “public financial reporting practices,” “voluntary disclosure,” “government accounting,” “local government,” and “accounting disclosure.” Then, to avoid the non-inclusion of relevant research, even after carrying out these two steps, we selected the most signifi- cant articles identified in the first and second searches and per- formed an exhaustive analysis of the references they cited.
To be included in our sample, studies had to provide the information needed to perform the meta-analysis technique, namely the Pearson or Spearman (r) correlations for the relations between the different variables and the disclosure of public financial or public economic-financial informa- tion. When r statistics were not reported, but other statistics were transformable into r statistics, we applied formulas given by Lipsey and Wilson (2001).
Some of the articles extracted did not provide the statisti- cal information needed for the meta-analysis technique, and so the authors in question (Cárcaba & García, 2008, 2010; Pina et al., 2009, 2010) were contacted and requested to sup- ply the missing information. Thus, all 51 of the articles ini- tially identified were included in the sample for final analysis. It should be noted that the meta-analysis technique does not require a large number of studies to produce useful results (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001), and so our review of previous research highlighted some meta-analytical studies based on a smaller sample than our own (Bel, Fageda, & Warner, 2010; García & Sánchez, 2010; Pomeroy & Thornton, 2008).
Research Method
According to Hunter and Schmidt (2004), meta-analysis is a robust statistical technique that is used to accumulate and integrate results obtained from previous statistical analyses to draw overall conclusions. This technique enables the researcher to achieve clear, coherent conclusions, systemati- cally extracted from previous research and highlighting points common to all that would be difficult to identify by descriptive analysis alone (Rosenthal, 1979). Hence, through the use of appropriate statistical procedures, we can identify the moderator variables explaining the heterogeneity of ear- lier results (Stanley, 2005). In this regard, the moderator vari- ables are factors inherent to the study design, such as sample size, data of publication, country in which the study was car- ried out, and so on, which may influence the findings of these individual studies and, therefore, explain variation in the results (Stanley, 2005).
We used the meta-analytic technique developed by Hunter and Schmidt (2004), calculating, first, three magnitudes: (a) the weighted mean correlation coefficient, ρ = ΣN
i r
i / ΣN
i ;
560 American Review of Public Administration 47(5)
(b) the total observed variance, Sr 2 = ΣNi (ri − ρ)
2 / ΣN i ; and
(c) the sampling error variance, Sr 2 = (1 − ρ2)2 k / ΣN
i , where
N i is the number of observations in each sample, r is the
effect size for the sample, and i and k are the numbers of effect sizes. Larger sample sizes are given more weight to reduce sampling error, which declines as the sample size increases (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). In this sense, the mean correlation is the weighted average of each of the correla- tions provided in the studies. In our study, it is showing the relationship between the variable analyzed and the disclo- sure of public financial information. In addition, the total observed variance and the sampling error variance are two intermediate magnitudes that are used to evaluate whether empirical correlations are homogeneous.
The correlations were examined taking into account the content of the variables and not the names used for them, as there are similar variables that frequently appear under dif- ferent denominations, such as the size of public organiza- tions for which the population size can be used (Gore, 2004; Ingram, 1984) or the level of assets and revenue (Serrano et al., 2009) or the financial condition of public organiza- tions, which are valued using diverse measures (Laswad et al., 2005; Serrano et al., 2009). In the same way, consider- ing the measurement units for the different variables, we used the definitions provided by the authors as a reference. In addition, the dependent variable—disclosure of public infor- mation—is measured through the list of items as performed by researchers in prior studies (Gandía & Archidona, 2008; Pina et al., 2010).
To evaluate whether empirical correlations are homoge- neous, two tests were used: (a) the 75% rule, according to which if 75% of the observed variance across studies can be explained by sampling errors: (100) Se
2 / Sr 2 ≥ 75, there is no
true variance in the studies, and thus, the association is non- modulated and homogeneous (i.e., if this statistic is less than 75%, it would mean that the association is not homogeneous and variability does exist, which is influenced by other factors such as moderating effects); and (b) the Q statistic: (k) ( Sr
2 ) / ( Se
2 ) = (N Sr 2 ) / (1 − ρ2)2, where k is the number of effect
sizes included in the analysis, Sr 2 is the total observed vari-
ance, Se 2 is the sampling error variance, N is the total sample
size of the effect sizes, and ρ is the mean correlation coeffi- cient. This statistical function has a chi-square distribution with (k −1) degrees of freedom, and a significant Q would indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of homogeneity. In other words, if this statistic were statistically significant, it would mean that the association is not homogeneous, so we have to search the moderating effects that cause variability within the results.
The hypothesis of homogeneity is rejected in many cases, and so to limit the Type I error rate, we utilized a random effect model (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990), using ( / )Sr k
2 as the standard error to create a 95% confidence interval (CI) around the mean effect size and to assess the significance of the null hypothesis, H
0 : ρ = 0.
In our analysis, no correction is made for statistical arte- facts other than sampling error, such as range restriction and measurement unreliability, because this information was not provided in the analyzed studies. This is a characteristic limi- tation of research studies in the financial accounting field, which, however, are not usually subject to the problems of reliability that affect other areas, such as psychology or busi- ness management (García & Sánchez, 2010). Moreover, some researchers do not believe this type of correction should be applied (Rosenthal, 1979).
However, we do analyze the existence of possible publi- cation bias. The meta-analysis may be subject to the implicit existence of these biases, and editors and reviewers may be attracted by the publication of studies showing a significant relationship between the variable of interest. This outcome is more likely to occur in large sample studies, which would distort any analysis based on the empirical observation of the variables (Stanley, 2005). The lack of nonsignificant pub- lished studies has been termed the “file-drawer problem” (Rosenthal, 1979), and publication bias would tend to over- estimate the number of significant results on a given topic.
To analyze publication bias in our sample selection and to assess the stability of the results, we followed Rosenthal’s (1979) technique to determine the fail-safe number N. A fail- safe N indicates the number of nonsignificant, unpublished (or missing) studies that would need to be added to a meta- analysis to reduce an overall statistically significant observed result to nonsignificance (Rosenberg, 2005). If this number is large relative to the number of observed studies, one can feel fairly confident in the summary conclusions. Thus, the fail-safe N can indicate stability of the relationship.
We also wish to determine whether the time factor influ- ences the moderating effects considered in this empirical study. Therefore, the studies in the sample are divided into those published between 1983 and 1999 (when all the articles in question analyzed the disclosure of economic and financial information in hard-copy format) and studies published between 2000 and 2015. In the latter case, we differentiated between studies considering the disclosure of financial infor- mation in hard-copy format versus empirical studies that ana- lyzed the online disclosure of this information.
Analysis of Results
Institutional Factors
Financial condition. As can be seen in Table 2, the question of financial condition has been widely considered in this field; thus, a total of 111 observations present an average correla- tion of .087 and a CI = [.073, .103], which indicates a posi- tive and statistically significant relation, confirmed by z value (z = 11.04, ρ < .001), to the level of disclosure of finan- cial information in the public sector irrespective of the mode of information disclosure. Moreover, as reflected in the N (fail-safe) value, the stability of the data is confirmed; thus,
Alcaide Muñoz et al. 561
publication bias does not exist. Therefore, these results con- firm the relationship expressed in H1 (see Figure 2). How- ever, the explanatory power of the error variance (59.76%) is limited, and it means that the relationship is nonhomoge- neous and influenced by the existence of moderating effects—chi-square statistic (Q = 185.736, ρ < .001). Thus, we have to search which of the considered moderating effects could modulate the analyzed relationship (see Figure 2).
Table 2 also shows that this relationship is greater when financial disclosure is made in hard-copy format than when it is provided online (ρ = .098 vs. ρ = .040); in both cases, the relationship is positive and statistically significant. Therefore, when the financial condition is healthy, that is, the debt is reduced and its costs do not besiege the public organization, the public managers are interested in informing citizens about the public good management and accountability. However, the level of variability has increased, although the heterogeneity has not disappeared as shown by the chi- square statistic (Q = 134.662, ρ < .05). In other words, we cannot affirm that the modes of dissemination (ME
2 ) are a
moderating effect in the relationship between financial con- dition and the disclosure of public financial information.
These differences are even more apparent in Table 3. In this sense, the influence is stronger in countries with an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture (ρ = .100 vs. ρ = .067) than in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, and a comparable result is obtained for online information disclosure (ρ = .104 vs. ρ = .032). In both cases, the heterogeneity disappears (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant). Accordingly, the administrative culture modulates the relationship between financial condi- tion and the disclosure of public financial information (ME
2 ).
In addition, we can see that the use of different accounting requirements also influences the analyzed relationship,
although the heterogeneity has not disappeared. So, as the degree of variability persists and the statistical tools do not show clear evidences of this influence, we could affirm that the accounting regimes do not show evidence of modulation in the analyzed relationships (ME
3 ).
Taking into account the measurement unit used to quan- tify the financial condition, we can see that the total debt ratio and leverage offers the most statistically significant positive association, followed closely by financial viability, when hard-copy information disclosure was analyzed. In this case, all of them show statistically significant positive asso- ciation, and the variability within the results has disappeared. In the case of online information disclosure, the financial condition does not have much influence. This relationship is not significant in the case of measured leverage, but the het- erogeneity has disappeared. Therefore, we could affirm that the measure used to quantify the financial condition modu- lates the analyzed relationship (ME
4 ).
Furthermore, in the case of hard-copy information disclo- sure, financial condition is an incentive that exerts a stronger influence on state governments (ρ = .116 vs. ρ = .096) than on local ones. In the former case, the variability within the data has disappeared (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant), so the level of government analyzed (ME
4 ) in the studies
could have influenced the relationship of the financial condi- tion. Moreover, in local governments, this incentive exerts a stronger influence in countries with an Anglo-Saxon admin- istrative culture (ρ = .099 vs. ρ = .067) than in those with other types of administrative cultures.
With respect to online financial information, our review cannot be as detailed as in the case of hard-copy information disclosure because there is no representative sample found in studies examining this question for countries with an
Table 2. Meta-Analytic Data on the Determinant Factors of the Disclosure of Public Financial Information.
Independent variable K M correlation (ρ) % S 2
e/ S 2
r
Confidence interval (95%)
χ 2
k-1 Fail-safe NMinimum Maximum
Financial condition 111 .087*** 59.76 .071 .103 185.736*** 6,236* Hard copy 89 .098† 66.09 .080 .115 134.662** Online 22 .040*** 50.52 .002 .077 43.547** Intergovernmental transfers 47 .115*** 37.01 .105 .124 126.982*** 12,504* Hard copy 36 .118*** 32.60 .108 .127 110.426*** Online 11 .010 100 −.047 .066 2.598 Political competition 68 .091*** 21.64 .069 .113 314.259*** 2,174* Hard copy 44 .034† 58.54 .007 .061 75.166** Online 24 .201*** 12.09 .163 .239 198.541*** Size 116 .166*** 19.09 .152 .180 607.701*** 28,900* Hard copy 75 .154*** 18.51 .136 .173 405.247*** Online 41 .184*** 20.74 .162 .207 197.700*** Municipal wealth 46 .087*** 67.27 .062 .112 68.380** 1,019* Hard copy 28 .094*** 65.55 .053 .134 42.713*** Online 18 .083*** 70.73 .052 .115 25.449***
†p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
562
T a b
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04 2
0. 20
6 10
.3 55
10 .1
24 **
* 77
.2 6
0. 04
2 0.
20 6
10 .3
55
Le ve
l o f go
ve rn
m en
t
St
at e
go ve
rn m
en t
9 .2
70 **
* 10
0 0.
18 2
0. 35
7 2.
43 8
— —
— —
— —
Lo ca
l g o ve
rn m
en t
19 .0
52 *
81 .4
0 0.
00 7
0. 09
8 23
.3 42
16 .0
81 **
* 66
.9 5
0. 05
0 0.
11 2
23 .8
97 **
*
Lo ca
l g o ve
rn m
en t
A ng
lo -S
ax o n
18 .0
55 *
77 .0
7 0.
00 9
0. 10
1 23
.3 54
11 .0
69 **
* 10
0 0.
03 5
0. 10
3 7.
07 1
N o n-
A ng
lo -S
ax o n
— —
— —
— —
5 .1
58 **
* 53
.0 4
0. 07
6 0.
24 1
9. 42
6*
N ot
e. G
A SB
= G
o ve
rn m
en ta
l A cc
o un
ti ng
S ta
nd ar
d B
o ar
d; I PS
A S
= I nt
er na
ti o na
l P ub
lic S
ec to
r A
cc o un
ti ng
S ta
nd ar
ds ; E
U =
E co
no m
ic U
ni o n;
O EC
D =
O rg
an is
at io
n fo
r Ec
o no
m ic
C o -O
pe ra
ti o n
an d
D ev
el o pm
en t.
a T he
s tu
dy o
f R
io s
et a
l. (2
01 3)
w as
n o t
in cl
ud ed
w he
n w
e an
al yz
ed “
A dm
in is
tr at
iv e
C ul
tu re
,” b
ec au
se t
hi s
ar ti cl
e an
al yz
ed t
he b
ud ge
t tr
an sp
ar en
cy o
f st
at e
pu bl
ic a
dm in
is tr
at io
n ar
o un
d th
e w
o rl
d, a
nd t
he re
a re
d iff
er en
t st
yl es
o f
pu bl
ic a
dm in
is tr
at io
n in
t hi
s sa
m pl
e. b R
io s
et a
l. (2
01 3)
w as
t he
o nl
y st
ud y
ab o ut
b ud
ge t
tr an
sp ar
en cy
o f st
at e
pu bl
ic a
dm in
is tr
at io
n. c T
he o
nl in
e st
ud ie
s ab
o ut
f in
an ci
al c
o nd
it io
n an
d si
ze a
na ly
ze d
lo ca
l g o ve
rn m
en ts
, a nd
s o t
he r
es ul
ts a
re t
he s
am e
as in
t he
c as
e o f “L
o ca
l A dm
in is
tr at
io n.
” d T
he h
ar d-
co py
s tu
di es
a bo
ut p
o lit
ic al
c o m
pe ti ti o n
an al
yz ed
lo ca
l g o ve
rn m
en ts
in A
ng lo
-S ax
o n
“A dm
in is
tr at
iv e
C ul
tu re
,” a
nd s
o t
he r
es ul
ts a
re t
he s
am e
as in
t he
c as
e o f “L
o ca
l A dm
in is
tr at
io n.
” e P
in a
et a
l. (2
00 7,
2 00
9 , 2
01 0)
; C ab
a Pé
re z
et a
l. (2
01 4)
; R io
s et
a l.
(2 01
3) ; a
nd W
eh ne
r an
d R
en zi
o (
20 13
) ha
ve n
o t
be en
in cl
ud ed
w he
n w
e an
al yz
ed “
A dm
in is
tr at
iv e
C ul
tu re
” an
d
“A cc
o un
ti ng
R eg
im es
,” b
ec au
se t
he y
an al
yz ed
t he
t ra
ns pa
re nc
y in
E U
c o un
tr ie
s, O
EC D
c o un
tr ie
s, a
nd f ro
m t
he in
te rn
at io
na l p
er sp
ec ti ve
. f T
he m
o de
ra ti ng
e ffe
ct o
f “A
dm in
is tr
at iv
e C
ul tu
re ”
w he
n it is
a na
ly ze
d in
t he
d is
cl o su
re o
f pu
bl ic
f in
an ci
al in
fo rm
at io
n in
h ar
d co
py is
s ig
ni fic
an t
at t
he 1
2% le
ve l.
† p <
.1 . *
p <
.0 5.
* *p
< .0
1. *
** p
< .0
01 .
T a b
le 3
. (c
o n
ti n
u e d
)
564 American Review of Public Administration 47(5)
Anglo-Saxon administrative culture and for state governments. However, the data available seem to indicate that public man- agers in local governments are motivated to disclose informa- tion in hard-copy format, rather than online.
Upon analyzing the data and taking into account the year of publication of each study (see Table 4), we see that in more recent years, financial condition has come to exert a strong influence on public managers to disseminate informa- tion in hard-copy format, especially in countries with an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture. However, no such change in influence is apparent with respect to the online disclosure of public information, although here, too, the influence is strong in countries with an Anglo-Saxon admin- istrative culture. Nevertheless, managers in local govern- ments are more likely to represent the financial condition of their organizations in hard-copy format, rather than online (ρ = .149 vs. ρ = .040).
Intergovernmental transfers. The funds and grants received by governments is a factor that has been studied in detail by many researchers; we found an average correlation of .115 and a CI = [.105, .124] (see Table 2). Although some authors conclude that the receipt of funds from other public agencies may discourage public managers from disclosing economic and financial information (Giroux & Deis, 1993), our results indicate that public managers are motivated to disclose information when public administrators receive funds and grants irrespective of the mode of information disclosure. In addition, the file-drawer test shows that this association is robust and not influenced by publication bias, which con- firms H2. However, as the previous variable showed, the limited explanatory power of the error variance (37.01%) suggests a high degree of heterogeneity (Q = 115.609; ρ < .01) and the existence of factors moderating the relationship in question (see Figure 2).
Table 2 shows that although intergovernmental funds are an incentive for public managers when economic and finan- cial information is published as hard copy, this is not the same when the mode of disclosure is online. In this sense, the heterogeneity has disappeared (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant); so, with such empirical evidence, we could affirm that the environment in which financial information is disclosed does exert a moderating effect and influences the relationship between transfers and funds received and the disclosure of public financial information (ME
1 ).
Table 3 shows that the receipt of funds from another pub- lic body is an incentive that influences public managers to disclose information in hard-copy format, and its influence is greater in countries with an Anglo-Saxon administrative cul- ture (ρ = .118 vs. ρ = .102). The results also indicate that public managers of municipal governments disclose more financial information in hard copy to justify the use of received funds (ρ = .118 vs. ρ = .072). In both cases, the vari- ability within the data has disappeared (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant). Therefore, with this empirical evidence, we
can affirm that the administrative culture and the level of government are moderating effects and have influence in the analyzed relationship (ME
2 and ME
5 ).
In contrast, taking into account the accounting regimes, the results are very similar to those of the administrative cul- ture variable. Results show that the public managers of coun- tries that have their own accounting systems have little motivation to disclose financial information online. However, the results are very different when the information is released as hard copy. Public managers are more inclined to disclose managerial information in countries using GASB’s accounting regime. So, we could affirm that the countries’ accounting requirements and practices is a moder- ating effect on the analyzed relationship (ME
3 ).
Regarding the measurement unit used, the association between grants received and the disclosure of public finan- cial information is stronger when quantified through current and capital transfers rather than through ratio intergovern- mental receipts. Also, we can observe that the variability within the data has disappeared (chi-square statistic is non- significant); so, the measure used to quantify the intergov- ernmental transfers modulates the analyzed relationship (ME
4 ).
In Table 4, we observe that the receipt of funds from other government agencies and the justification for their use is an incentive to disclose financial information in hard-copy for- mat and that this accountability requirement has increased over time; hence, the relationship is stronger in recently pub- lished articles than articles published between 1983 and 1999 (ρ = .126 vs. ρ = .009). Few studies have been pub- lished regarding the disclosure of information through the Internet, but the results available in this respect seem to show that there is no statistically significant relationship.
Political competition. Regarding political competition (see Table 2), the average correlation presented is .091, CI = [.069, .113], although this positive association is statistically significant and stable (fail-safe, as shown by the N value), and so there is a positive relationship between political com- petition and the disclosure of public financial information irrespective of the mode of information disclosure (H3 should be accepted). However, the observed variance (21.64%) reveals a high degree of heterogeneity in the stud- ies analyzed (Q = 314.259; ρ < .001). Therefore, we believe it is necessary to search for the moderating effects that this variability may have produced within the reported findings.
In this sense, Table 2 shows that the public managers have more motivation when financial information is disclosed online (ρ = .201 vs. ρ = .034), than when it is provided in hard-copy format; in both cases, the relationship is statisti- cally significant. In addition, for the particular case of online disclosure of financial information, the heterogeneity has not disappeared. So, with these empirical tests, we could not affirm that the format chosen for information disclosure has a moderating effect on the reported results (ME
1 ).
565
T a b
le 4
. M
et a-
A na
ly ti c
D at
a o n
th e
R el
at io
n B
et w
ee n
A na
ly ze
d V
ar ia
bl es
a nd
t he
D is
cl o su
re o
f Pu
bl ic
F in
an ci
al I nf
o rm
at io
n (P
ub lis
he d
St ud
ie s
19 83
-1 99
9 vs
. 20
00 -2
01 5)
.
In de
pe nd
en t
va ri
ab le
Pu bl
is he
d st
ud ie
s
19 83
-1 99
9 (H
ar d
co py
)
Pu bl
is he
d st
ud ie
s 20
00 -2
01 5
H ar
d co
py O
nl in
e
K
M
co rr
el at
io n
(ρ )
% S
2 e /
S2 r
C o nf
id en
ce
in te
rv al
( 95
% )
χ2 k-
1 K
M
co rr
el at
io n
(ρ
)
% S
2 e /
S2 r
C o nf
id en
ce in
te rv
al
(9 5%
)
χ2 k-
1 K
M ea
n
co rr
el at
io n
(ρ
)
% S
2 e /
S2 r
C o nf
id en
ce in
te rv
al
(9 5%
)
χ2 k-
1 M
in im
um M
ax im
um M
in im
um M
ax im
um M
in im
um M
ax im
um
Fi na
nc ia
l c o nd
it io
n 63
.0 84
** *
80 .7
4 .0
64 .1
04 78
.0 27
26 .1
49 **
* 53
.4 4
0. 11
1 0.
18 6
48 .6
51 *
22 .0
40 **
* 50
.5 2
.0 02
.0 77
43 .5
47 **
A
dm in
is tr
at iv
e cu
lt ur
ea
A ng
lo -S
ax o n
62 .0
84 **
* 78
.9 4
.0 64
.1 04
78 .5
38 21
.1 91
** *
73 .6
2 0.
14 7
0. 23
5 28
.5 26
5 .1
04 *
10 0
.0 07
.2 00
1. 15
1
N
o n-
A ng
lo -S
ax o n
— —
— —
— —
5 .0
64 44
.3 9
− 0.
00 2
0. 13
0 11
.2 63
* 12
.0 42
† 37
.9 1
− .0
01 .0
86 31
.6 56
** *
A
cc o un
ti ng
r eg
im es
G A
SB 62
.0 84
** *
78 .9
4 .0
64 .1
04 78
.5 38
21 .1
91 **
* 73
.6 2
0. 14
7 0.
23 5
28 .5
26 —
— —
— —
—
O
th er
s —
— —
— —
— 5
.0 64
44 .6
5 −
0. 00
2 0.
13 0
11 .1
99 **
* 19
.0 40
59 .4
4 −
.1 30
.2 11
31 .9
65 **
M
ea su
re u
se d
Fi na
nc ia
l v ia
bi lit
y 7
.0 29
41 .9
8 −
.0 40
.0 99
16 .6
76 *
7 .1
36 **
* 10
0 0.
07 4
0. 19
9 2.
30 2
— —
— —
— —
R at
io t
o ta
l d eb
t 52
.0 82
** *
10 0
.0 60
.1 03
49 .8
70 17
.2 12
** *
69 .0
0 0.
16 3
0. 26
1 24
.6 39
* 15
.0 43
39 .4
7 −
.0 04
.0 90
38 .0
07 **
Le ve
ra ge
4 .2
21 **
* 10
0 .1
37 .3
04 0.
16 4
— —
— —
— —
6 .0
14 10
0 −
.0 51
.0 79
1. 50
4
Le ve
l o f go
ve rn
m en
t
St
at e
go ve
rn m
en t
11 .0
96 10
0 .0
11 .1
82 3.
02 6
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
Lo ca
l g o ve
rn m
en t
52 .0
83 **
* 68
.9 4
.0 63
.1 03
74 .4
23 *
26 .1
49 **
* 53
.4 4
0. 11
1 0.
18 6
48 .6
51 *
17 .0
53 **
49 .8
4 .0
13 .0
93 34
.1 00
** In
te rg
o ve
rn m
en ta
l t ra
ns fe
r 23
.0 09
37 .4
3 −
.0 28
.0 47
61 .4
46 **
* 13
.1 26
** *
10 0
0. 11
6 0.
13 6
11 .4
74 11
.0 10
10 0
− .0
47 .0
66 2.
59 8
A
dm in
is tr
at iv
e cu
lt ur
e
A
ng lo
-S ax
o n
23 .0
09 37
.4 3
− .0
28 .0
47 61
.4 46
** *
9 .1
26 **
* 10
0 0.
11 6
0. 13
6 8.
88 7
— —
— —
— —
N o n-
A ng
lo -S
ax o n
— —
— —
— —
4 .1
02 **
10 0
0. 03
0 0.
17 5
2. 16
0 10
.0 02
10 0
− .0
59 .0
63 2.
07 9
A
cc o un
ti ng
r eg
im es
G A
SB 23
.0 09
37 .4
3 −
.0 28
.0 47
61 .4
46 **
* 9
.1 26
** *
10 0
0. 11
6 0.
13 6
8. 88
7 —
— —
— —
—
O
th er
s —
— —
— —
— 4
.1 02
** 10
0 0.
03 0
0. 17
5 2.
16 0
10 .0
02 10
0 −
.0 59
.0 63
0. 30
3
M
ea su
re u
se d
C ur
re nt
a nd
c ap
it al
t ra
ns fe
rs —
— —
— —
— 9
.1 26
** *
10 0
0. 11
6 0.
13 6
8. 88
5
R at
io in
te rg
o ve
rn m
en ta
l r ec
ei pt
s 23
.0 09
37 .4
3 −
.0 28
.0 47
61 .4
46 **
* 4
.1 02
** 10
0 0.
03 0
0. 17
5 2.
16 0
11 .0
10 10
0 −
.0 47
.0 66
2. 59
8
Le ve
l o f go
ve rn
m en
t
St
at e
go ve
rn m
en t
6 .0
72 10
0 −
.0 42
.1 86
2. 04
8 —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
—
Lo
ca l g
o ve
rn m
en t
17 .0
02 29
.0 0
− .0
38 .0
42 58
.6 18
** *
13 .1
26 **
* 10
0 0.
11 6
0. 13
6 11
.4 74
10 .0
02 10
0 −
.0 59
.0 63
2. 07
9 Po
lit ic
al c
o m
pe ti ti o n
40 .0
30 †
55 .1
1 .0
01 .0
58 72
.5 81
** *
4 .0
89 a
10 0
− 0.
00 6
0. 18
3 0.
04 8
24 .2
01 **
* 12
.0 9
.1 63
.2 39
19 8.
54 1*
**
A dm
in is
tr at
iv e
cu lt ur
ea
A ng
lo -S
ax o n
40 .0
30 †
55 .1
1 .0
01 .0
58 72
.5 81
** *
4 .0
89 a
10 0
− 0.
00 6
0. 18
3 0.
04 8
— —
— —
— —
N o n-
A ng
lo -S
ax o n
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
15 .1
16 **
* 90
.9 1
.0 74
.1 58
16 .4
99
A cc
o un
ti ng
r eg
im es
G A
SB 40
.0 30
† 55
.1 1
.0 01
.0 58
72 .5
81 **
* 4
.0 89
a 10
0 −
0. 00
6 0.
18 3
0. 04
8 —
— —
— —
—
O
th er
s —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— 22
.1 96
** *
11 .3
1 .1
58 .2
34 19
4. 47
1* **
M
ea su
re u
se d
R at
io c
an di
da te
s/ av
ai la
bl e
po si
ti o n
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
18 .2
91 **
* 9.
18 .2
42 .2
29 19
6. 11
7* **
Pe rc
en ta
ge s
o f vi
ct o ri
es 10
.0 75
* 58
.4 3
− .0
02 .1
53 17
.1 15
* —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
—
D
ic ho
to m
o us
v ar
ia bl
e 17
− .0
15 10
0 −
.0 48
.0 18
12 .3
93 4
.0 89
* 10
0 −
0. 00
5 0.
18 3
1. 79
2 2
.1 92
** 95
.2 8
.0 70
.3 15
2. 09
9
In
di ce
s o f po
lit ic
al c
o m
pe ti ti o n
5 .2
48 **
* 10
0 .1
32 .3
64 1.
28 1
— —
— —
— —
4 .1
37 **
* 10
0 .0
85 .1
88 0.
85 4
% s
ea ts
h el
d by
m in
o ri
ty p
ar ty
6 .2
19 **
* 10
0 .1
13 .3
25 3.
18 5
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
(c on
tin ue
d)
566
In de
pe nd
en t
va ri
ab le
Pu bl
is he
d st
ud ie
s
19 83
-1 99
9 (H
ar d
co py
)
Pu bl
is he
d st
ud ie
s 20
00 -2
01 5
H ar
d co
py O
nl in
e
K
M
co rr
el at
io n
(ρ )
% S
2 e /
S2 r
C o nf
id en
ce
in te
rv al
( 95
% )
χ2 k-
1 K
M
co rr
el at
io n
(ρ
)
% S
2 e /
S2 r
C o nf
id en
ce in
te rv
al
(9 5%
)
χ2 k-
1 K
M ea
n
co rr
el at
io n
(ρ
)
% S
2 e /
S2 r
C o nf
id en
ce in
te rv
al
(9 5%
)
χ2 k-
1 M
in im
um M
ax im
um M
in im
um M
ax im
um M
in im
um M
ax im
um
Le
ve l o
f go
ve rn
m en
t
St
at e
go ve
rn m
en t
21 .2
19 **
* 10
0 .1
62 .2
75 17
.1 02
— —
— —
— —
9 .4
70 **
* 5.
13 .4
24 .5
17 17
5. 35
1* **
Lo ca
l g o ve
rn m
en t
19 −
.0 20
10 0
− .0
52 .0
12 1.
07 2
4 .0
89 a
10 0
− 0.
00 6
0. 18
3 0.
04 8
15 .1
16 **
* 90
.9 1
.0 74
.1 58
16 .4
99 Si
ze 48
.1 64
** *
18 .0
1 .1
43 .1
86 26
6. 45
1* **
29 .1
24 **
* 21
.5 2
0. 08
9 0.
16 0
13 4.
72 8*
** 41
.1 84
** *
20 .7
4 .1
62 .2
07 19
7. 70
0* **
A
dm in
is tr
at iv
e cu
lt ur
ea
A ng
lo -S
ax o n
45 .1
66 **
* 17
.0 1
.1 45
.1 87
26 4.
57 2*
** 24
.2 39
** *
80 .7
9 0.
20 0
0. 27
8 29
.7 08
11 .1
00 **
* 25
.5 6
.0 67
.1 33
43 .0
29 **
*
N
o n-
A ng
lo -S
ax o n
— —
— —
— —
5 −
.1 09
** *
20 .3
2 −
0. 10
7 −
0. 10
3 24
.6 05
** *
14 .3
01 **
* 36
.3 4
.2 64
.3 39
38 .5
20 **
*
A
cc o un
ti ng
r eg
im es
G A
SB 45
.1 66
** *
17 .0
1 .1
45 .1
87 26
4. 57
2* **
22 .2
55 **
* 3.
42 0.
21 2
0. 29
7 64
3. 71
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Alcaide Muñoz et al. 567
The results described in Table 3 show that political com- petition is an incentive for state governments to disclose financial information in hard copy and online; in both cases, the relationship observed is positive and statistically signifi- cant. However, this relationship is stronger when the infor- mation is disclosed via Internet than via hard-copy format (ρ = .470 vs. ρ = .219). In summary, these empirical results show that the administrative culture and the level of govern- ment both constitute moderating effects on the results reported in the studies of this question (ME
2 and ME
5 ).
In the case of accounting regimes, there are no studies regarding the disclosure through hard-copy format with their own accounting regimes and studies about the disclosure through the Internet with GASB’s accounting regimes, although the results available in this respect seem to show conclusive evidence that the accounting requirements is a moderating effect.
However, when we focus on the measurement unit used, we can see that the indices of political competition and per- centage of seats held by the minority party offer the most statistically significant positive association, followed dis- tantly by percentages of victories, when hard-copy informa- tion is analyzed. When the online information disclosure is analyzed, the ratio of candidates and dichotomous variable offer the most statistically significant positive associations, followed closely by indices of political competition. In most cases, the variability within the data has disappeared (chi- square statistic is nonsignificant), so we affirm that the mea- sure used to quantify the political competition modulates the analyzed relationship (ME
4 ).
In Table 4, we see that over time, political competition has come to exert a great influence on public managers to dis- close information, in any format, although this influence is strongest with respect to online disclosure.
Environmental Factors
Size. The variable “size of the government” presents an average correlation of .166 and CI of [.152, .180], and the relation is positive and statistically significant (z = 9.53, ρ < .001). Moreover, the N fail-safe value reflects the stability of the relationship (see Table 2). These findings lead us to affirm that there is a positive relation between the size of government and the disclosure of public financial informa- tion irrespective of the mode of information disclosure (H4). However, the significance of the chi-square statistic (Q = 607.701, ρ < .001) suggests other factors might modulate this association, thus, we have to search for moderating effects that influence the analyzed relationship (see Figure 2).
The above table also shows that the relationship is stron- ger when information is disclosed via the Internet than when it is provided as hard copy (ρ = .184 vs. ρ = .154; ρ = .001). However, the data variability persists (chi-square statistic is significant), so we cannot conclude that the channel used for disclosing financial information affects the results (ME
1 ).
Table 3 shows that when the information is provided in hard-copy format, the size of the government affects posi- tively to the disclosure of financial information in countries that act under an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture (ρ = .182 vs. ρ = .096). However, in the case of online information disclosure, the size of the population addressed by govern- ment action positively influences information transparency; this ratio is higher among governments where the administra- tive culture is non-Anglo-Saxon (ρ = .307 vs. ρ = .100). In contrast, when we focus on the level of government, we see that state administrators are more motivated to disclose infor- mation as hard copy, while local government officials seem to be more motivated to disclose online. Due to the persistence of variability (chi-square statistic is significant), the mode of information disclosure and the level of government cannot be considered moderating effects (ME
2 and ME
5 ).
Taking into account the accounting regimes (see Table 3), we can see that the relationship is strongest when the infor- mation is disclosed via the Internet and, especially, when the country has adopted the IPSAS, followed closely by the case in which the country has adopted its own accounting stan- dard (ρ = .299 vs. ρ = .264). Also, when the information is disclosed in hard copy, a negative significant relationship exists in cases of the country adopting its own accounting standards. In this sense, we can see that the heterogeneity has disappeared, so the accounting regimes adopted by the coun- tries influence the analyzed relationship (ME
3 ).
Regarding the measurement used to quantify the size of government, we can see that the relationship is stronger when this variable is quantified by the total revenue and the total assets than when this variable is quantified by the regis- tered inhabitants and the population logarithm, and, in the case of hard-copy information, is statistically significant and positive in all cases. Meanwhile, in the case of online infor- mation, this relationship is stronger when the academic researcher used registered inhabitants and a population loga- rithm to quantify the size of government than when this vari- able is quantified by the total revenue, the total assets, and the number of public employees, which is statistically sig- nificant and positive in all cases. Also, Table 3 shows that there is no variability within the data, so we can affirm that the measurement modulates the analyzed relationship (ME
4 ).
In Table 4, we can see that in governments where the Anglo-Saxon administrative culture prevails, a greater popu- lation size encourages information disclosure, and this influ- ence has increased over time. In addition, we confirm that in countries with a non-Anglo-Saxon administrative culture, this relation is negative and statistically significant for the hard-copy provision of information, but is positive and sta- tistically significant for online disclosure.
Municipal wealth. The “municipal wealth” variable pres- ents a positive and statistically significant relationship (z = 8.13, ρ < .001, as shown by the CI of [.062, .112]), and there- fore we can affirm that there is a positive relation between
568 American Review of Public Administration 47(5)
municipal wealth and the disclosure of public financial information irrespective of the mode of information disclo- sure (H5—Table 2). Furthermore, the fail-safe test confirms the stability of this relationship. Thus, we conclude that the economic status of the population has a positive and statisti- cally significant influence (ρ = .087, ρ < .001), moderating the disclosure of economic and financial information in the public sector, although the Q value (68.360; ρ < .05) suggests the existence of other factors that could modulate this asso- ciation—see Figure 2.
The results presented in Table 2 show that municipal wealth is an incentive that exerts a stronger influence in the case of hard-copy information disclosure (r = .094 vs. r = .083) than in online format. In this case, the explanatory power of the error variance has no increase and the level of heterogeneity is the same, and so we cannot affirm that the mode employed for the disclosure of public financial infor- mation is not a moderating effect, because it has no influence on the data (ME
1 ).
Table 3 shows that municipal wealth is a determinant fac- tor in government information disclosure in non-Anglo- Saxon administrative cultures, and that it exerts a stronger influence with respect to online information disclosure (ρ = .158 vs. ρ = .069). In turn, public managers in countries with an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture are more motivated to disclose information in hard-copy format (ρ = .098 vs. r = .069). Moreover, this variable has a stronger influence in state administrations with respect to the provision of information as hard copy (ρ = .270 vs. ρ = .052) than in local governments, although the latter are more motivated to disclose information online (ρ = .081). In these cases, the variability on the data has disappeared, so the format in which the information is pro- vided and the level of government are both moderating effects on the findings reported (ME
2 and ME
5 ).
However, the accounting regime adopted by the country shows a stronger relationship when the information is dis- closed by the Internet, and this relationship is greater when the country adopted its own accounting requirement, fol- lowed closely by the countries that adopted the IPSAS. In this case, the heterogeneity has disappeared (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant), so the accounting regimes adopted by the countries have influence on the analyzed relationship (ME
3 ).
When we focus on the measurement used to quantify the municipal wealth, the relationship is stronger when this vari- able is measured by countries’ own revenue per capita than when it is measured by per capita citizens’ income irrespec- tive of whether the information is disclosed via the Internet or in hard-copy format. In this sense, the variability has dis- appeared (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant), so we can affirm that the measurement modulates the analyzed rela- tionship (ME
4 ).
In Table 4, it can be seen that municipal wealth has had a stronger influence in more recent studies, and especially so regarding the online disclosure of information. Thus, gov- ernments with an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture have
been shown to be more motivated than non-Anglo-Saxon governments to disclose hard-copy information according to more recent studies and are also more strongly motivated when the disclosure is made online.
Discussion and Conclusion
With respect to financial condition, public managers are moti- vated to disclose and justify their management role by report- ing financial information and to reduce the cost of debt to increase resources available for other programs (Zimmerman, 1977); that is, they will have an interest in disclosing informa- tion voluntarily to reduce information asymmetries and, thus, the risk perceived by external agents, which in turn will reduce the cost of borrowing (Gore, 2004). This result sup- ports the view that agency theory is relevant for explaining disclosure of public-sector financial reporting, because gov- ernment financial statements are used by external users to inform themselves of the financial condition of public agen- cies (Mack & Ryan, 2006).
Moreover, recent studies have shown that public managers face increasing demands from citizens for financial informa- tion, especially in view of rapid changes taking place in the technological innovations that have led to alternative mecha- nisms of accountability (Schillemans, Van Twist, & Vanhommerig, 2013). Taking into account the assumptions of neoinstitutional theory and legitimacy theory, policymakers and public managers have adopted innovations in management and accounting and have implemented the new technologies that have favored the transparency and accountability, as a result of the global tendencies in adopting homogeneous prac- tices and structures. Also, they try to inform about management of governmental organizations and their financial health in order to the possible influence in citizenry’s opinion.
In our study, this influence is exerted more strongly in countries where the administrative culture is Anglo-Saxon, and this factor motivates public managers to disclose finan- cial information both online and as hard copy. This associa- tion is modulated by the administrative culture, a finding that is consistent with previous studies (Rodríguez Bolívar et al., 2015) and is according to the height of the level of informa- tion disclosure by public bodies where Anglo-Saxon tradition prevails; in common law countries, the government relies heavily on markets as sources of capital (La Porte, Demchak, & De Jong, 2002), and so there is a highly developed tradition of public financial accountability and transparency. Therefore, public managers, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, should establish financial transparency policies to reduce the pres- sure to which they are exposed.
In addition, in countries where governmental accounting standards have been professionalized, the direction and extent of changes to the standards will depend on the number of orga- nizations involved and the strength of support for the financial standard bodies within these organizations (Cheng, 1992). These financial standard bodies have a notable influence on
Alcaide Muñoz et al. 569
the public-sector accounting reform implemented to improve public financial accountability and transparency (Cheng, 1992). In this regard, according to the ideas of neoinstitutional theory, public-sector organizations have had to face external pressures and adopt these standards and practices issued by these financial standard bodies that are considered legitimate and socially acceptable.
Furthermore, the results obtained show that financial con- dition has a more positive influence on the public managers of state rather than local governments. This evidence leads us to believe that either the contextual and environmental fac- tors or the pressure exerted by stakeholders in state office- holders provides greater accountability when debt levels are high and prompts these officials to release financial state- ments. Indeed, according to the neoinstitutional theory, orga- nizations must respond to external pressure or innovative trends, and, as information disclosure is a symbol of trust and modernity, this constitutes a trend that governments should adopt in response to those factors (Hoffman, 1999). For this reason, state government administrators are more motivated to minimize government debt and the costs arising from it, as this will reduce the pressure on them to disclose information and, at the same time, reduce the tax burden on the popula- tion—a situation that would probably be favorably viewed at election time (Laswad et al., 2005) and maintain the coun- try’s credit rating (legitimacy theory approach).
Also, our results indicate that, over time, the govern- ment’s financial condition is increasingly a factor that influ- ences public managers to disclose financial information to defend the policies adopted and show that the government’s situation is financially sustainable (Rodríguez et al., 2014). This result may be a consequence of the economic and finan- cial crisis that has severely impacted governments and soci- ety in recent years. In fact, from the point of view of the legitimacy theory, public managers could disclose public information with the aim of showing the management and financial situation of governments, seeking to change the possible negative impact of management cuts. These find- ings underline the need to create transparency policies and portals to communicate financial information effectively.
With respect to intergovernmental transfers, meta-ana- lytic data show that intergovernmental grants have a great influence on public financial information disclosed by local authorities, who are obliged to account for transfers received from state or supranational administrations, usually in hard- copy format. In fact, these entities are particularly motivated to disclose public economic and financial information and to demonstrate that the funds received have been used in accor- dance with the requirements of the program for which they were assigned (Copley, 1991), thus corroborating the effi- ciency of their management and the good use of resources (Robbins & Austin, 1986). In brief, the principal–agent rela- tionship discussed in agency theory is also seen here; local government agents need to justify the use of financial resources to demonstrate they have acted according to their
responsibilities. Moreover, this pressure has increased over time, perhaps as a result of the greater control exercised over public finances in response to the present economic and financial crises.
In addition, public-sector financial transparency and accountability are greater when the government has no abso- lute majority, and opposition political parties demand the full disclosure of public financial information to exercise their role of financial control and present effective opposition. Moreover, highly competitive political environments are conducive to the adoption of communication strategies via websites and technological reforms and to the provision of high levels of information transparency (Tolbert, Mossberger, & McNeal, 2008), thus allowing the continuous monitoring of governance, which in turn can benefit from the use of new technologies, as shown by our findings.
Currently, this is especially relevant at the central govern- ment level, perhaps due to economic crisis and fiscal distress experienced by central governments in many countries, which put politicians under more pressure to disclose infor- mation. According to the neoinstitutional theory, politicians in central government play a leading role in this question, which constitutes models for municipal politicians regarding transparent management and the performance of their finan- cial duties (Rodríguez Domínguez et al., 2011).
Regarding the size of the government and taking into account the pronouncements of agency theory, public man- agers are pressured by the population to disclose information on their performance (Moon & Norris, 2005) and to accept a high level of control (Evans & Patton, 1987; Serrano et al., 2009). In addition, the preparation and disclosure of finan- cial information is costly (Herian, Hamm, Tomkins, & Pytlik, 2012) and represents a fixed cost for the organization. In comparison to small- and medium-sized cities, larger ones can afford to invest financial and technical resources that are necessary to prepare and disclose financial information and, consequently, are more likely to provide such information. Therefore, expenditure by large governments can and should be devoted to adopting needed measures for offering appro- priate financial transparency.
Finally, the results obtained confirm that municipal wealth is a variable that is positively associated with the level of dis- closure of public information, and so municipalities with a higher per capita income disclose a greater volume of public financial information (Giroux & McLelland, 2003; Ingram, 1984). In addition, previous investigations have shown that wealthier governments have greater access to this informa- tion through the implementation of new technologies; thus, there is a relationship between per capita income and access to new technologies (Ho, 2002). Hence, the associations found in our meta-analytic study are strongest with respect to information disclosed online. Therefore, access to the Internet and the public financial information disclosed via this mode depend to a large extent on municipal wealth and on the per capita income of the population (Serrano et al., 2009). This
570 American Review of Public Administration 47(5)
result could be explained by the legitimacy theory, since pub- lic managers seek to transmit the perception that their actions meet stakeholders’ expectations through the dissemination of information (Archel et al., 2009), and they, therefore, improve citizens’ access to information and acquire legitimacy before a well-informed and educated citizenry.
In regard to the findings made in this study, future research could usefully identify the main stakeholders who influence information disclosure and make use of surveys to directly examine the need for public-sector financial information. Nevertheless, the present article represents a first step toward achieving a framework to design the complex econometric model previously mentioned, and our findings show that the five variables analyzed should be included in any future econometric model in this area.
All these considerations lead us to inquire whether it is possible to construct a single model of incentives for the dis- closure of public financial information, one that is valid for all environments. Nonetheless, it appears that the disclosure of state information consistently disappoints: There is never enough of it (Fenster, 2015). Open Data projects could help to solve this problem, especially for the disclosure of public financial information. In this regard, the English Open Data experiment has especially targeted financial information and would be a useful place to start to examine behavioral and institutional factors that are important to the research ques- tions proposed in this article. Therefore, future studies should further investigate such aspects by adding new variables and seeking effects that might modulate the relations we have examined and subsequently develop a framework enabling public managers and citizens to obtain a useful instrument that will facilitate government accountability.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was carried out with financial support from the Regional Government of Andalusia (Spain), Department of Innovation, Science and Enterprise with Research Project (number PII-SEJ-7700).
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Author Biographies
Laura Alcaide Muñoz is an associate professor in Accounting at the University of Granada. She is interested in how E-government has favoured the process of reform and modernization of Public Administrations, giving rise to greater accessibility to public infor- mation and services, and information transparency.
Manuel Pedro Rodríguez Bolívar is a professor in Accounting at the University of Granada. He has authored numerous articles in international journals, and is a member of the Editorial Board of Government Information Quarterly.
Antonio M. López Hernández is a professor of Accounting at the University of Granada. He teaches public sector management and control. His research interests are center of management systems and financial information in federal and local government.
