Government policy paper (US foreign military aid to Israel)

Israel affaIrs, 2016 VOl. 22, NO. 1, 69–95 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2015.1111636

© 2016 Taylor & francis

Military power and foreign policy inaction: Israel, 1967‒1973

Moshe Gat

History and Political studies, Bar Ilan University, ramat Gan, Israel

keywords Israel; Egypt; peace process; Rogers Plan; Anwar Sadat; Meir Golda

On 5 June 1967, the war that subsequently came to be known as the Six Day War broke out between Israel and three of its Arab neighbours: Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Unlike the Suez campaign of 1956, in which British and French forces played a part alongside Israel, the Israeli army fought this war alone, and succeeded not only in defeating the Arabs, but also in winning the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Between the end of the 1967 war and the onset of the October 1973 war successive Israeli governments, first Levi Eshkol’s and then Golda Meir’s, lacked a clear and consistent policy on the fate of the territories occupied during the war. No specific objectives were set nor were any possible alternatives consid- ered. In fact, no Israeli plan existed at all as to if and how a territorial settlement might be reached. Moreover, due to the nature of its governing coalition, the Israeli government spoke in several diverse voices. Each party in the coalition advocated a different ideological solution, rendering it impossible to make a

ABSTRACT Between 1967 and 1973, Israeli governments took no initiative to set a peace process in motion. Instead, they simply responded to proposals that were raised from time to time, and, for the most part, rejected all of them – the Rogers Plan, Sadat’s willingness to sign a peace agreement and his initiative for an interim settlement – with the sole exception being the ceasefire agreement reached in August 1970. While Israeli policy lacked initiative on the political front, it dedicated much effort to convincing the United States that the greater Israel’s military power, the better its deterrence capabilities would be, which in turn would increase the likelihood of achieving peace. Hence, Israeli leaders’ repeated requests to be supplied with advanced aircraft.

CONTACT Moshe Gat [email protected]

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unified strategic decision that would guide policy in the future. The result was that the sole solution proposed to resolve the conflict was merely to enter into direct negotiations with the Arabs, free of preconditions. But ironically, the Israeli government itself had set preconditions before the negotiations had even begun.

It unilaterally decided to unite East Jerusalem, which was conquered during the war, with the western side of the city, and declared that it would not with- draw to the pre-war borders. Direct negotiation had become a magic formula that the Israeli government clung to stubbornly, despite the fact that it led to political stagnation, to further military encounters, and ultimately to another war.

The opinion held by the Israeli governments during those years was that the Israel Defence Force’s (IDF) military power would compel the Arabs, in this case the leading Arab power, Egypt, to recognize that there was no other alternative: if they were interested in reclaiming the land occupied during the war, they had to sit down at the negotiating table. Otherwise, time need not play the role of an accelerator. This policy of relying on military power alone, and the absence of a strategy to set a peace process in motion ultimately led to the October 1973 war.

Historians and other writers have discussed the circumstances that led the region into war. Gazit maintains that Egyptian President Sadat was unwilling to reach a compromise. He remained true to the collective Arab stance whereby a partial agreement with Israel was one step in a series of scheduled Israeli withdrawals from all the territories it had occupied during the 1967 war. This position did not, in his opinion, allow for any diplomatic steps taken by the Israeli government or US administration to be in any way successful.1

By contrast, Goldstein, the author of Golda Meir’s biography, notes that Meir did not believe that peace would be gained by returning the occupied territories since the Arab nations had a fundamentally negative approach to the existence of the State of Israel. She maintained that the armistice lines could only be changed to secured, recognized, and agreed borders established in a peace agreement, and that Israel would not withdraw to the 4 June borders. She had no faith whatsoever in the notion that, by returning the territories, Israel would indeed be rewarded with the peace it yearns for. Political stagnation was the ‘name of the game’ Golda Meir preferred to play since being elected as Israel’s prime minister.2

For his part, Avi Shlaim thinks that maintaining the status quo and avoiding political risk-taking was indeed Meir’s policy of choice. In fact, it was a standstill approach whereby the armistice lines were to be insisted on until the Arabs were willing to make peace on her terms. International initiatives of peace to resolve the Arab‒Israeli conflict were all perceived as undermining Israel’s security.3

Kipnis argues that the Israeli decision-makers were wrong to think that military supremacy and deterrence, coupled with the United States’ political

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support, would prevent an undesirable peace process. They were delusional in thinking that Sadat would refrain from going to war for political reasons, and found it convenient to base this delusion on the military officials’ statement that any potential attack could be curbed.4

Venetik and Shalom put the blame on the White House. They maintain that the US administration’s course of action, and particularly that of President Nixon’s exceedingly influential advisor, Henry Kissinger, in the Middle Eastern arena in 1973, certainly did nothing to prevent the war, and, on the contrary, had in fact served as its catalyst. Kissinger had adopted a policy of stagnation that meant any peace initiative that did not align with Israel’s position on a future agreement was torpedoed.5

Quandt too acknowledges the role played by the US administration. He argues that the White House believed Israeli military supremacy could ensure stability in the Middle East. Sadat was seriously interested in peace with Israel. The situation in the region caused concern, but not anxiety. Diplomatic initia- tives were reviewed, but with no sense of urgency or hope of success.6

Daigle strikingly blames the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, for the war that broke out in October 1973, stating that it was largely a product of Soviet‒American relations and decision-making during the 4.5 years that preceded it. For although the detente had enabled the two superpowers to reach agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, preventing the proliferation of nuclear warfare, as well as exchanges in culture, science, and trade, they had both rejected any attempt to pressure their respective clients into reaching an agreement in the Middle East. In fact, the policies they had adopted led to the conflict.7

Lebow and Stein place the blame for the war not being avoided on both Israel and the superpowers. Israel’s reliance on its power of deterrence blinded it to the intense pressure on Sadat and his growing desperation. It failed to use its deterrence to promote a peace process, and turned it instead into a substitute for diplomacy. Moreover, both the United States and the Soviet Union failed to prevent the crisis due to the detente policy they had adopted: ‘Neither set of leaders was willing to forgo immediate political loss or sacrifice benefit in the Middle East to reduce risk of war in the region and serious crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States.’8

According to Neff, no one doubted Israeli Prime Minister Meir’s intention to hold on to the territories occupied since 1967 as long as possible; Israel demonstrated a military supremacy and enjoyed American support, and if it were to return any territory, it would do so on its own terms. He claimed the United States regarded the Arab‒Israeli conflict as part of a global, rather than a local, struggle, and therefore interpreted a display of support for Israel as supportive of the campaign against communism. If President Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, regarded the regional conflict as a reflection of superpower competition, then the Americans’ main goal was to

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drive the Soviets out of the Middle East – a goal easily attained by taking a back seat and letting the Arabs stew in their own frustration.9

Patrick Tyler’s study examines the Israeli military elite and its impact on the state. He concludes that the October 1973 war was a product of both Israeli and American policies. The local military elite and defence establishment had an impact on life in Israel. The military elite influenced the political system, the budget, economy, censorship etc., and both the military and defence estab- lishments remained extremely reluctant to place their trust in peace or in the process of engagement or accommodation with the Arab and Muslim worlds. Moreover, the United States viewed the Middle East conflict as an extension of the Cold War. Thus Israel was regarded as an ally against the Soviets, and its military power must be boosted. But enhancing Israel’s military strength directly resulted in avoiding diplomatic strategy as a means to resolve the con- flict. It therefore comes as no surprise that, under these circumstances, Golda Meir was also keen to jeopardize any attempt to compromise that could prevent the war from breaking out.10

The purpose of the present article, which is based on primary sources retrieved from the Israel State Archive, the National Archives in London, and the National Archives in College Park, MD, as well as numerous other sources, is to examine post-war Israeli policy, whose essential premise was to rely on military power rather than seeking some sort of political solution.

Israel’s toughened stance

Israel assumed that its stunning victory in the Six Day War would begin a new chapter in the bloody history with its neighbours. It understood that the Arab states would have to acknowledge their inability to defeat the Jewish state, and that realization was bound to bring them to the negotiating table if they wanted to recover the territories occupied during the war. This viewpoint was reflected in Defence Minister Moshe Dayan’s assertion that he was ‘waiting for a tele- phone call from the Arabs’.11 Dayan’s response typified Israel’s sense of power and intoxication with its victory, as well as its utter lack of understanding of the mood of the defeated party.

Israel viewed the occupied territories as a bargaining chip. It based its views on existential security and national defence, and did not link them to Jewish history, religion or any other basis. It is therefore understandable that on 19 June the Israeli cabinet resolved to willingly withdraw to the international bor- der it shared with Egypt on 4 June 1967, in exchange for peaceful and neigh- bourly relations, demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula, and free navigation in the Straits of Tiran and Suez Canal. Israel similarly resolved to withdraw to the international border with Syria if it agreed to demilitarize the Golan Heights and ensure the free flow of water sources to the River Jordan. As for the Gaza Strip and West Bank – the Israeli cabinet decided that these areas would

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be negotiated separately. Jerusalem, on the other hand, was non-negotiable. Therefore, on 26 June the Israeli government annexed the eastern part of the city and united it with its western side. Israeli policy maintained that direct negotiation between the parties was the only way by which to agree upon a complete settlement regarding boundaries, refugees and other issues that would arise in time. The passage of time was not a concern; Israel’s security needs would dictate its course of action instead.12

Both the American and British administrations also believed that the Arabs’ crushing defeat had created the right conditions under which the Arab‒Israeli conflict would be brought to an end. It would also serve as leverage for estab- lishing a permanent arrangement to solve the refugee problem.13 The US administration was thus not interested in repeating the strategy, defined by President Johnson as ‘temporary and hasty’, which followed the Suez campaign of 1956.14 At the time, the US demanded that Israel fully withdraw from the Sinai regardless of any political concessions made by the Arabs, and accordingly exerted pressure on Israel to do so. In an address made on 19 June, the very same day on which the Israeli resolution was concluded, US President Lyndon Johnson stated that an Israeli withdrawal from Arab soil should be predicated on achieving a peace agreement, to include, inter alia, honouring the political independence of neighbouring countries, free navigation, and a just solution to the refugee problem. The president did not rule out the possibility of the parties making minor border modifications as well. These principles have since served as the basis of the United States’ policy in all negotiations between Israel and its neighbouring states.15

The Arab world’s leader adopted a different position. Egypt demanded that Israel withdraw completely and unconditionally from the territories. Its presi- dent, Gamal Abdel Nasser, believed that the outcome of the war should not have an impact on the return to the pre-war armistice lines. For Egypt, negotiating directly with the enemy while it occupied Arab land meant approaching the table as the weaker party, and, in this case, under humiliating terms.16 This position was expressed explicitly in the statements made by the leaders of the Arab world at the Khartoum Summit held in late August and early September of that year. While agreeing to take diplomatic action at the international level to secure an Israeli withdrawal, they also proclaimed the three No’s – ‘no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it’ – and promised to safeguard the rights of the Palestinian people.17

In the absence of a positive Arab reaction to its call to join them at the negotiating table, Israel became frustrated, and subsequently adopted a stricter line, reluctant to compromise and unwilling to take any pragmatic initiative. It refused to use its power to attempt to offer a conciliatory gesture or any other face-saving formula. Israel was convinced that it could successfully maintain the status quo, since its military situation was far more secure than it had been prior to the war. Thus the passage of time was not a problem, for all that

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was left to do was remain true to this policy and wait until the Arabs finally faced reality.18 Not only did the Israelis demonstrate an uncompromising pol- icy regarding negotiations, but, as time went on, they began to demand that the borders established in the 1949 armistice agreements be altered. Defence Minister Moshe Dayan claimed that the Gaza Strip was part of Israel and that Israel must never return to its pre-war borders.19 Foreign Minister Abba Eban spoke of revised borders which would include a united Jerusalem, with Syria no longer occupying the hills overlooking Israeli territory, and refusing to accept an Egyptian presence in Gaza.20 The prime minister even spoke of moving the border between Israel and Syria by 30km.21 The Khartoum Summit resolutions further hardened Israel’s tough and uncompromising policy, as it symbolized Arab radicalization and a diversionary tactic which would allow Egyptian forces to regroup in preparation for another military campaign. The effect of the summit’s resolutions on Israeli policymakers was clear: they gave their blessing and removed all obstacles to establishing Israeli settlements on the West Bank and Golan Heights.22

The US administration, while supportive of Israel’s demand for direct nego- tiations, objected to any significant territorial changes, and believed that Israel’s rigidity might destroy any chance of future settlement, since at the same time, the Arab position was becoming more moderate.23 The Americans feared that continued stagnation would make matters deteriorate even further and ulti- mately lead to another war, potentially bringing about a confrontation between the great superpowers. They actively sought to obtain a UN resolution that would serve as the basis for initiating the peace process. And indeed, on 22 November, UN Resolution 242 was passed, stipulating the establishment of a just and sustainable peace, including a withdrawal from territories occupied during the war, agreed borders between Israel and its neighbours, an end to the state of war, an international effort to settle the refugee problem, and free navigation in international waterways. According to the resolution, a special envoy was to be appointed by the UN secretary general, who would head for the region at once to meet with the parties and assist in the efforts to achieve a peace agreement.24

The US administration had hoped that this resolution would serve as a good starting point for the process. Indeed, Gunnar Jarring, the special envoy, worked ceaselessly during 1968 to formulate an appropriate agreement between Egypt and Israel. However, it soon became apparent that both parties – Israel as well as Egypt – were adamant in maintaining their positions. Each state interpreted the resolution in its own way. Egypt rightly argued that Resolution 242 did not include any obligation to engage in direct negotiations or sign a peace agreement, but only required a commitment to its implementation once com- pleted. It was therefore Israel’s duty, first and foremost, to withdraw completely from the territories occupied during the war, without which there could be no discussion of a future settlement.25 Israel’s understanding, on the other hand,

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was that the resolution represented a declaration of principles and a basis for discussion through which the parties were to reach a settlement. Therefore, no change could be made to the status quo except through direct negotiations. The Israelis were in no rush to reach an agreement. They believed that the status quo would safeguard the country’s strength, and thus there was no need for urgency.26 Consequently, the mission of the special envoy produced no results and was dropped from the agenda.

Military power and political settlement

Washington viewed Israel’s attitude as intentionally sabotaging and thus pre- venting any political progress. Furthermore, Israel’s actions in the territories were regarded as indicative of their unwillingness to resolve the conflict. President Johnson clearly stated to Prime Minister Eshkol during their meeting on 8 January that the further Israel distances itself from the armistice lines, the further it is distancing itself from peace. He argued that the Israeli government must be true to its principles and be guided by security requirements rather than territorial changes.27 The political stalemate combined with Israel’s policy in the territories, including Jerusalem, constituted the backdrop against which the USSR increased its influence in the region at the US’s expense, silencing the moderate voices in the Arab world while at the same time empowering the extremists.

Eshkol proposed no formula to promote the peace process. He believed that Egypt’s real goal was to regain its military strength so that its armed forces would be sufficiently prepared to renew the conflict, and thus no political pro- cess could ever be initiated. The unlimited flow of Soviet weapons to Egypt supported Eshkol’s belief.28 As a consequence, Israel asked the US, in addition to supplying it with Skyhawk aircraft, to allow Israel to purchase the more advanced Phantom aircraft, and to do so immediately. Eshkol thought that a shipment of Phantoms would deter Egypt from waging war. Moreover, from his perspective, power guaranteed deterrence, and such a step would ultimately promote peace.29 On the other hand, Johnson expressed his disappointment to Eshkol for thinking that weapons would always be the answer. To be sure, the United States could always supply Israel with arms, but the pressing question on the table was the territorial dispute.30 He therefore believed that a way had to be found to reach a settlement with the Arabs, and, at that stage, he denied Israel’s request for Phantom fighters.31

But Israel remained steadfast in its demands. Eban told US officials that Israel would by no means rule out the option of conducting indirect talks through a third party which might then lead to direct negotiations. It was therefore useless to exert pressure on Israel by delaying the sale of Phantom aircraft. In the absence of such a sale, Egypt was deluding itself both psychologically and politically in thinking that the military option was the answer.32 Eshkol wrote

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to the president that Nasser remained entrenched in his three No’s: no nego- tiation, no recognition and no peace. As long as there was no hope for peace, he contended, they needed to avoid giving Nasser the impression that Israel would not be able to defend itself.33 In his meeting with President Johnson in late September, Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Alon stated that the significance of sending Phantoms was simply to show the Arabs that they would not be able to defeat Israel should they opt for yet another round of war.34 The Israeli request for Phantom fighters was eventually granted by the US administration under the influence of the upcoming US presidential elections.35 Thus Israel successfully preserved its military advantage over the Arabs, but did not utilize it in order to initiate political progress. In this context, the comment of Egypt’s representative to the British Foreign Ministry that ‘Israel need only make a first move and the Arabs would respond immediately’36 was extremely revealing.

In January 1969, a new American administration, headed by President Nixon, took office. Much like its predecessor, this administration was unwill- ing to accept a continuing political stalemate. Israel’s occupation of the Arab territories was antagonizing the Arabs and further turning them against the United States, thereby enabling Moscow to expand its influence. This stalemate also created tension between Israel and the Arabs, which had the potential to escalate into acts of hostility and pull in the superpowers. The US president called the situation ‘a powder keg’.37 The Americans had decided, without con- sulting with the Israeli government, that a solution must be sought on two separate tracks: holding talks with the Soviets while at the same time holding talks with representatives of the four superpowers: Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Israel felt that the American decision to hold dual-channel talks would pro- vide the Arabs with confidence that an arrangement to their liking could be enforced. Golda Meir, who succeeded Eshkol as prime minister upon the latter’s sudden demise in February, tried to convince Nixon not to fall into the ‘talk trap’. She asked for patience and determination, which, in her opinion, ‘could help bring the Arab and Soviet governments to the realization that the only way out of their dilemma lies in the conclusion … of peace treaties with the relationship normally associated with them’.38 But aside from her suggestion that the Americans stand their ground, Meir offered no other alternative to reverse the ongoing stalemate. She continued to advocate that Israel’s role was to wait patiently for the Arabs to accept its demand to engage in direct negotiations. The administration refused to accept this position, and felt that there was a vital need to make the effort required to set the peace process in motion.39

However, before talks between the superpowers could commence, whether in a four-way format or in the form of bilateral talks between Washington and Moscow, the Egyptian president launched a war of attrition against Israel on 8 March. Nasser assumed that diplomatic steps would lead to a dead end, which resulted in his decision to set the Israeli‒Egyptian front ablaze, in order to

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show the superpowers just how delicate and explosive the situation really was. It supported Nixon’s perception of the hazardous state of affairs, and that the entire region was sitting on a powder keg. The War of Attrition saw dozens of Israeli soldiers wounded and killed each month, with many more casualties on the Egyptian side.40

Yitzhak Rabin, chief of the general staff during the Six Day War and Israel’s ambassador to Washington at the time, believed that Egypt and the Soviets had shared goals in the conflict: to undermine the United States and weaken its abil- ity to oppose the Soviet demands. He therefore assumed that a decisive blow to Egypt would leave it reluctant to continue the War of Attrition.41 At that stage Rabin’s recommendation to deliver a decisive blow to Egypt was not accepted. However, it grew popular with Israeli policymakers, who argued that the correct way to end the war was not to show restraint, which would be interpreted as weakness, but rather to escalate the military response. Chief of General Staff Haim Bar Lev used the expression that the war ‘should be escalated in order to de-escalate it’.42 During the second half of July 1969, the Israeli air force began intense and continuous sorties along the Suez Canal, aimed at achieving aerial control. But the escalation initiated by Israel did not slow the war down. On the contrary, it intensified it, as Egypt remained as belligerent as ever.43

The Israeli government continued to rely on military solutions instead of political ones, and therefore, not surprisingly, it asked for 100 more Skyhawk aircraft and 25 more Phantoms.44 In early September the first Phantom jets were delivered as part of the deal signed with the Americans during President Johnson’s term in office. These advanced aircraft were to be prepared to par- ticipate in operations on the canal front.

The future, as perceived by the State Department, held nothing but sustained and even more aggressive conflict. Rabin left no doubt in their minds that this was indeed the direction in which they were headed. Israel intended to con- tinue with the operation until it wore Nasser out, believing that his exhaustion would surely end the war and perhaps even his term of office. In fact, Rabin thought that the fact that the US administration agreed to supply Israel with weapons demonstrated that it was in favour of Israel’s strategy of stepped-up attacks against Egypt with the aim of ending the war.45 However, this was not the intention of American policy. The US Secretary of State claimed that the United States would have to take the initiative to advance the peace process more rapidly, in order to stem the inevitable erosion of US status in the region.46

On 25 September Meir paid an official visit to Washington. Any hopes the Americans may have had that the prime minister would take steps on the political front soon evaporated. Meir, in her meetings with high officials in the administration, preferred to talk of arms acquisitions and matters related to Israel’s defence. Peace was nowhere near the top of her list of priorities. She asked for 25 Phantom aircraft and 100 Skyhawk – a request she had submit- ted two months earlier – as well as a billion dollars of aid over five years to

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finance the acquisition. As for the peace process, Meir noted that a unilateral withdrawal was impossible in the absence of an agreement with the Arabs, and insisted that no foreign entities intervene in the negotiations. The road to peace would not go through a weak Israel, and the idea that military strength alone could bring the other party to the negotiating table still dominated her thinking.47

Following Meir’s visit, Nixon approved a proposal for a settlement between Egypt and Israel that was submitted by Secretary of State William Rogers. This proposal was aptly named the Rogers Plan, and it proposed that Israel would withdraw to the international border with Egypt as of 4 June 1967. It also included clauses on the establishment of demilitarized zones, securing the right of free navigation through the Straits of Tiran and Suez Canal, acknowledge- ment of the sovereignty and political independence of all the states in the region, as well as advancing a solution to the refugee problem. According to the plan, the withdrawal to the June lines was only to take place once all the arrangements required in a signed peace treaty had been fulfilled by the parties. The plan, in the view of to the US Secretary of State, was fair and balanced because it met the needs and concerns of both sides.48

The Secretary of State’s proposed settlement was submitted to Israel and Egypt on 28 October. Rogers publicly announced it on 9 December, and 10 days later published a further proposed settlement with Jordan. According to this plan, Jerusalem would remain united, with the city’s civil, religious and economic administration being a joint Israeli‒Jordanian venture. A solution was also proposed for the refugee issue. Much like the total withdrawal from Egyptian territory, Israel was to withdraw entirely from the West Bank, with the exception of some insubstantial border changes. These conditions would be reciprocated in a contractual arrangement which would include the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s recognition of Israel.49

The Israeli government regarded both parts of the Rogers Plan as dangerous to Israel’s survival.50 Meir called it a disaster, claiming that any Israeli govern- ment that supported it would be betraying the country.51 It is no wonder, there- fore, that the government rejected the plan, as did the Egyptian government, and it was subsequently withdrawn.

Israel then once again turned to military force to resolve the untenable situation presented by the War of Attrition, and initiated penetration bomb- ing deep in Egypt. This decision was made possible by the arrival of the Phantom aircraft in early September. The Phantoms could fly long distances at great speeds, carry a large payload and were equipped with electronic counter-measures for their protection. It was exceptionally well-suited for long-range bombing.52 According to Rabin, deep penetration bombing was the preferred means to overwhelm Egypt and convince it to hold its fire. In his view, this strategy would save Israel from the serious implications of the erosion of American policy.53

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The commencement of deep air penetration, or strategic bombing, on 7 January marked the beginning of a new chapter in the War of Attrition. It con- tinued until 13 April, targeting military sites only, especially bases, HQs and missile batteries. The Egyptian army was powerless to stop the Israeli strikes.54 Israel hoped this would result in a de-escalation of hostilities, or even a renewed ceasefire, but the deep penetration bombings had other objectives too. They were intended to leave the Egyptian forces too weak for Nasser to even con- sider waging another war.55 Nevertheless, it seemed that its chief aim was to undermine the Egyptian president’s standing, and perhaps even end his political career.56 Israel believed that if Nasser was removed from the political arena there would be a better chance to succeed with negotiations, and in any event, things could not get much worse.57

But all these considerations were mistaken. The prevalent assumption in Israel, held by both the military and political leadership, was that the polit- ical crisis could be resolved by military means. All efforts were concentrated on military power rather than on finding a political solution to the conflict. Contrary to Israel’s hopes, not only did the deep penetration bombings fail to weaken the Egyptian president, they strengthened him. Nasser, the symbol of steadfastness, united the entire Egyptian nation around him.58 Nevertheless, the deep penetration bombings did have a detrimental effect on the morale of the Egypt’s army. War had now reached the outskirts of the capital, Cairo. To respond to Israel’s barrage, Nasser demanded that the Soviets provide Egypt with effective weapon systems to challenge Israel’s air supremacy, particularly in order to defend Egypt’s strike-exposed cities.59 The Soviets were reluctant to supply Egypt with advanced arms systems for fear of escalation between the superpowers; however, their refusal would have been interpreted as an inability to defend their ally. They therefore decided to provide Egypt with the necessary systems, including SA-3 missiles and MiG-21 aircraft to match Israel’s Phantoms, and advanced radar systems to support their aerial defence. Since the Egyptian army was not trained to operate this advanced weaponry, the Soviets sent an operating team and advisors from the USSR to accompany the new armaments.60 In late February SA-3 missile batteries were deployed around Cairo, Alexandria and Aswan. In addition to these missile units, Soviet- manned fighter squadrons were sent to defend inner Egyptian airspace. The troops and equipment greatly inhibited the deep penetration bombings.61 In fact, for the first time since the Second World War ended, Soviet combat forces were committed to the defence of a non-socialist country.62 While the flow of advanced weaponry systems worried Israel, it was more concerned with the presence of the Soviet forces manning the systems. These steps taken by the Soviets severely limited the Israeli Air Force (IAF)’s freedom of action, and on 13 April deep penetration bombings ceased entirely.63 In light of the grave situation that presented itself, Israel once again asked the Americans to grant their request for advanced aircraft. They argued that the Soviet actions constituted a serious

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escalation. Combat actions along the Suez Canal intensified, and resulted in a growing number of Israeli casualties.64

The US Secretary of State had a different opinion regarding Israel’s requests for advanced aircraft and their use. He blamed Israel’s bombing strategy as the cause of the Soviet decision to supply Egypt with sophisticated weapons and operating teams. Therefore, if the United States were to provide Israel with more aircraft, he argued, it would toughen Israel, accelerate the arms race in the region and induce further violence. Rogers asserted, as did the president, that an American announcement to withhold the delivery of aircraft to Israel would give the Soviets no reason to counter by sending large quantities of weapons to Egypt. It would also serve as basis for dialogue between the two superpowers, signalling to Egypt, with which contact and talks had been attempted since early in 1970, that the US administration was taking the appropriate steps to reach a political settlement.65

On 23 March Rogers announced that Israel had sufficient air power to meet its current and future needs, and therefore the president had decided to suspend the delivery of additional aircraft. However, he added, should the need indeed arise; the United States would supply the fighter jets without delay.66 The Israelis regarded Nixon’s decision to delay the delivery of the aircraft as a serious blow to their military power. Meir brought up the same familiar Israeli argument yet again: Israeli military strength alone would bring about the resolution of the conflict. By refraining from supplying Israel with fighter jets, the United States was simply encouraging Nasser to continue the war. This decision would give Egypt the confidence that it could defeat Israel, and only a powerful military would be able to deter its enemy from acting on such a hope.67

American policy did not align with Israel’s. Joseph Sisco, the assistant Secretary of State, told Israel that no settlement could be reached as long as the Israeli government insisted on annexing significant territories. He asked that Israel formulate a political policy to work in tandem with its military strategy. Consequently, in a meeting held with Eban and Rabin, the president asked that the Israeli government show some political flexibility, in order to diminish the risk of a Soviet‒Israeli conflict, which would undoubtedly force the United States to intervene.68

Under the impact of direct Soviet involvement, which raised grave doubts about the future, and in the absence of a positive American response to its demands, the Israeli government reluctantly began to exhibit some political flexibility. There were additional factors at play as well. No end to the war with Egypt was in sight, and despite the escalation undertaken by Israel, the desired de-escalation had not occurred. On the contrary, the active Soviet involvement in the campaign made the Egyptian army more aggressive and they took bolder actions against the IDF. As a result, the number of fatalities suffered by Israel grew steadily.69 Against this backdrop one can understand the Israeli govern- ment’s willingness to agree, as Egypt did before it, to the US Secretary of State’s

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proposed three-month ceasefire, which came into force on 7 August. For Israel, agreeing to a ceasefire meant acknowledging that it had failed to bring about de-escalation through military force, and that its aggressive policy failed to push the Arabs to the negotiating table.

Preserving military power

Gamal Abdul Nasser, the charismatic and powerful ruler who dominated the Arab political arena, died suddenly in September 1970 and Anwar Sadat was elected as his successor. The latter was regarded as a weak and dull political time-server, who was not expected to last long in the game.70 Nasser’s demise had a calming effect on the region, adding to the peace on the canal front. But it was Sadat, a supposedly dreary character, who actually took the first steps that marked the beginning of a shift in the entire region. Ultimately, his most significant decision would be his willingness to sign a peace agreement with Israel, which he did in 1979. On 15 February, in a letter addressed to the special envoy, Egypt announced that if Israel was willing to commit to an absolute with- drawal not only from the Sinai Peninsula, but from all the occupied territories, to resolve the refugee problem in accordance with UN resolutions, and to reach an arrangement in which the demilitarized zones on both sides of the border would be the same size, then Egypt would be willing to sign a peace accord.71 Peace, as defined by the Egyptian president, was an arrangement that did not include the establishment of practical peaceful relations consisting of open borders, free passage for tourists or cultural and economic ties.72 Egypt did not make an expressed policy shift with regard to the occupied territories or alter its unwillingness to hold direct negotiations. However, its willingness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel was a sea change in Egyptian policy. For the very first time, an Egyptian president declared in writing that his government would be willing to sign a contractual peace with Israel.73

The Israelis were greatly surprised by Egypt’s willingness to sign a peace agreement, albeit being conditioned upon a withdrawal to the 4 June lines.74 According to Eban, Egypt’s readiness was a new phenomenon. However, he believed that ‘if Egypt has come to the realization that a peace agreement is nec- essary, it is – at least in part – due to Israel’s determination to stand firm’.75 This opinion was shared by Defence Minister Dayan who claimed that it was Israel’s military resolve that had convinced Sadat to sign a peace treaty.76 Members of the Israeli government, however, while welcoming Egypt’s show of willingness, maintained their insistence on not agreeing to withdraw to the 4 June bounda- ries and demanding negotiations in order to determine secure and recognized borders, as well as finding a solution to the refugee problem. Israel’s response on 26 February did not stray from its long-expressed view.77

Sadat viewed the Israeli response as further proof that the Israeli govern- ment had no real interest in peace and was intent on maintaining a policy of

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expansion.78 In his view, being drunk with victory and buttressed by a steady supply of US arms, Israel was convinced that it could dictate its own terms for peace. Despite Israel’s noncompliance, the Egyptian president deemed it appropriate to continue to promote the peace process and therefore proposed a partial arrangement to open the Suez Canal, which had been closed since the June 1967 war. In an address before the Egyptian People’s Assembly on 4 February, he proposed that during the ceasefire Israeli forces would partially withdraw from the east bank of the canal. This would be the first phase in a scheduled implementation of all the other sections of UN Resolution 242. If this were indeed to take place, Egypt would be willing to clean up the Suez Canal immediately thereafter and reopen it to international navigation.79

The Israeli government feared that an open canal was not the main objec- tive of the interim agreement, but rather that Egypt’s primary goal was to gain a strategic advantage which it could not otherwise gain by using military force, and that the opening of the Suez Canal was merely a means to that end. Prime Minister Meir was worried lest, in time, the Egyptians would violate the agreement just as they had violated the ceasefire agreement in August 1970 by advancing their missiles towards the canal.80 The Israeli government therefore demanded a set of exceedingly strict conditions for reopening the canal. The Israeli response included the following terms: the interim agreement would be conditioned upon Egypt’s consent to an unlimited ceasefire and a com- plete avoidance of renewed acts of hostility; Egyptian military forces would be prohibited from crossing the canal through the zone evacuated by the IDF; the withdrawal of the IDF forces from the east bank of the canal would not constitute the first phase in a comprehensive withdrawal; and the interim agree- ment would be regarded as a standalone agreement and not the beginning of a comprehensive arrangement.81

The attempts made by the US Secretary of State upon his arrival in the region in May to convince the Israelis to accept the interim agreement were unsuccessful. The Israelis saw no significant difference between Nasser and Sadat.82 Although the latter’s tactics were different, they believed his strategy remained the same, namely preparing Egypt for war against Israel. In their opinion, to accept Egypt’s position as it stood would mean gam- bling with Israel’s security. Meir refused to compromise on the crossing of Egyptian forces, symbolic as it might be. Although Israel’s military strength could have allowed its government to take a risk, as Rogers had noted, Meir remained unwilling to do so. The administration continued to use the threat of postponing delivery of aircraft as the means to persuade Israel to take a more pragmatic stance, and induce a breakthrough which would enable the signing of the agreement for reopening the canal . Nixon stated that if Israel wanted to receive aid, it must be reasonable about the interim agreement.83 But in fact, the very opposite reaction occurred. Not delivering the aircraft made it more difficult to set the peace process in motion. Israel sent out a

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clear message to the United States claiming that in the absence of a com- mitment to provide the aircraft as promised, the Israeli government would not take the risk of withdrawing from the canal line in the framework of any partial settlement.84

However, the United States believed that any announcement relating to the supply of Phantom jets to Israel could jeopardize the signing of a partial agreement.85 Meir felt this American policy was punishing Israel.86 In a letter to President Nixon on 17 September, she argued that while Moscow was con- stantly supplying Egypt with MiG-23 and Sukhoi aircraft, as well as advanced missile systems, Washington discontinued all weapon deliveries to Jerusalem. The fact that the aircraft were not being shipped to Israel was no secret, as the Egyptians and Soviets were well aware of it, and this had a weakening effect on Israel’s power of deterrence, and was likely to contribute to Egypt renewing its acts of hostility. Meir therefore repeated her request to restart the supply of Phantom aircraft to Israel, and extend the supply agreement for 1971–1972.87 Rabin complained to Kissinger that the administration was holding Israel by the throat as its political position could not be separated from its need for arms.88 Israel had clearly notified the State Department that in the absence of a commitment to deliver the aircraft, the Israeli government had no desire to make progress on the peace front.89

In December 1971 Meir came to Washington on a visit that resulted in achievements far and beyond any she could have hoped for. Some even termed this visit a turning point in the relations between the two countries.90 Naturally one cannot disassociate the US administration’s policy from its domestic pol- itics at the time. Being an election year it was important for the president to demonstrate his pro-Israeli views. In an attempt to avoid disputes and disa- greements, the administration approved the regular supply of Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft over the course of the next three years. It also agreed to refrain from consolidating any new initiatives without consulting the Israeli govern- ment, or to reach any form of arrangement without informing Israel. The US administration further announced it would focus its efforts on obtaining an interim agreement and, for the time being, would forgo the idea of a compre- hensive one. Thus, should an interim agreement indeed be achieved, it would not limit Israel’s freedom of action.91 The most significant decision made by the president was that negotiations toward the partial agreement would take place under Kissinger’s auspices through secret channels, and that the national security advisor would be in charge of steering the diplomatic steps.92 The latter’s opinion was that Israel was sufficiently confident and powerful to show more flexibility and make concessions. At the same time he believed it was important to convince the Arabs, and especially Egypt, that they would not be able to achieve their diplomatic goals through the use of Soviet weapons, and should turn instead to the United States, as the guarantor of Israel’s strength and power.93

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The administration’s willingness to meet Meir’s demands for the supply of aircraft and rejection of the Rogers Plan contributed to a degree of flexibility on the part of Israel. On 10 December Meir was prepared to propose some concessions that might even promote the signing of an agreement to reopen the canal. According to the proposal, the ceasefire agreement would be limited to 18‒24 months; the Israeli withdrawal would be extended to the vicinity of the Gidi and Mitla passes in Sinai; and Egyptian technicians and a number of uniformed officers would be allowed to cross over the canal as part of the par- tial accord. Meir reiterated her stance whereby there would be no connection between the arrangement to reopen the Suez Canal and a future comprehensive agreement.94 The Israeli prime minister’s flexibility was still a long way off from Egypt’s expectation that an interim accord would constitute the first phase of a comprehensive agreement.

Belief in power

While the Israelis were aware of the possibility that Sadat might renew the fighting, they doubted that he actually would do so. Israel’s belief in its own military power led it to disdain Egypt’s capabilities. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Alon claimed that if the Egyptians were to cross the canal, their losses would amount to 75% of the attacking force, and the remaining troops would run right back to where they had come from. In a television interview, Dayan noted that Sadat would not open fire because he knew that the Israel’s might was founded upon its presence on the canal, the Sinai expanse which served as a buffer, and a strong air force. He knew he could gain nothing by waging war.95

In a meeting with the British prime minister in December 1971, Eban stated that Israel was not intimidated by Sadat’s war threats, and was certain that the Egyptians could not gain a military victory. Therefore it would not be in President Sadat’s political interest to attack. Meir said the Egyptians would not engage in acts of hostility because they knew how they would end.96 Israel also had its doubts about Sadat’s ability and willingness to assume a more flex- ible position on the interim settlement. Moreover, Meir did not trust Egypt to refrain from breaching the agreement, for she could find no other reason for their insistence on having their forces cross to the eastern bank of the canal.97

The Egyptian president threatened that in the absence of progress made towards peace, he would initiate a war. In mid-January he noted that peace would not come by waving olive branches, and that sometimes there was no other choice but to build peace with blood.98 Despite his threats not to wait forever in his struggle to eliminate all traces of the Six Day War, the state of affairs remained unchanged. Both Americans and Israelis treated his war threats with disdain. Sadat was reluctant to renew hostilities and his reluctance under- standably increased following the aircraft deal between the US and Israel in late December 1971. The agreement to supply Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft

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boosted Israel’s confidence, and strengthened its perseverance with respect to reaching a settlement.

The year 1972 did not bring about a breakthrough in the political pro- cess. The US was busy preparing for the presidential elections in November. Moreover, both the Americans and the Soviets were far more preoccupied with detente than with being dragged into the Middle Eastern battle, and ultimately into a superpower conflict.99 In fact, the USSR, which was far more rigid in its attitude towards reaching a settlement in the Middle East,100 was willing to agree to a remarkably comprehensive formula at the end of the summit convention between Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on 29 May. In a published declara- tion, both parties clearly stated their position on the matter and confirmed their support for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. They also declared their willingness to do their part in promoting an interim agreement, and declared that achieving such an arrangement would open the door to normalization in the Middle East. It would also enable further steps to secure a cessation of hostilities in the region.101

Foreign Minister Eban mentioned to his British counterpart that the Moscow Convention was a success because it achieved nothing pertaining to a settlement in the Middle East. The Israeli foreign minister assumed that all options were now closed to Egypt, and that it had no other choice but to agree to hold direct talks with Israel. Israel’s confidence was further bolstered by Sadat’s decision in July 1972 to expel the Soviet experts and advisors from Egypt. Sadat regarded Soviet presence on Egyptian soil as an obstacle in the path of preparing for war. A decision to initiate a military campaign could not possibly be taken with advanced weapon systems still under the supervision of Soviet experts and instructors, and with operational units from the USSR still present.102

As far as Israel was concerned, expelling the Russians was the best possible move Sadat could make. No wonder Dayan was quoted as saying to the US ambassador in Tel Aviv that the ‘Israeli government was very, very happy with events in Egypt’.103 Israel believed the expulsion had a detrimental effect on the Egyptian army’s combat capabilities, so that it would soon be beyond its ability to initiate a military move such as crossing the canal, let alone waging a war, despite Sadat’s repeated threats.104 Eban assumed that the best possible policy under the circumstances would be to allow the Egyptian president to ‘stew in his own juice’, so that ultimately he would be left with no alternative but to negotiate with Israel.105

In March 1973 Meir visited the United States again in order to guarantee the ongoing supply of aircraft and the preservation of Israel’s strength.106 She told President Nixon that by strengthening Israel, he was insuring that the ceasefire would be extended. In her view, America’s policy of supplying Israel not only ensured Israel’s might, but had in fact prevented war from breaking out.107 The president raised the issue of the energy crisis that had become a global concern. The prices of oil had been rising steadily since 1971, and a

86 M. GAt

gasoline and oil shortage was expected towards the end of 1973. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia began speaking about using oil as a financial weapon to pressure Israel into withdrawing from the territories.108 But all Meir had to offer was a partial accord which she perceived to be the most practical proposal.109 In the accord, Israel would be willing to withdraw its forces to the passes and allow an Egyptian police force to cross over to the eastern side. Meir left with a US promise to continue providing her country with aircraft,110 even though the political process remained in limbo.

Nixon refused to accept the situation, but did little to pull the region out of the stalemate. He was heavily engaged in one of the most scandalous affairs in American history – Watergate – which would eventually lead to his resig- nation. One can only assume that these events left him little time to delve deeply into the conflict.111 In addition, Nixon left all diplomatic steps to his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, who saw no urgency to resolve the conflict.112 Meir returned from Washington DC with the arms deals concluded, while the stalemate continued, much to Israel’s satisfaction. Israel’s working assumption remained that in the face of its military strength and for fear of yet another defeat, the Arabs would eventually realize that they had no choice but to negotiate for peace.

The status quo of neither peace nor war may not have been ideal for Israel, but nevertheless it served its interests. It believed the solution to the conflict lay in direct negotiations by and between the parties and not in coercion by outside parties, and as long as the Arabs failed to recognize this fact, the status quo would continue. The US administration was in no hurry to reach a polit- ical agreement, and continued to exert no pressure on the Israeli government.

Israel’s confidence in its military power was sky-high, even to the point of underestimating its enemy. When interviewed, the defence minister expressed his certainty that war was not expected for the next decade, and that the situation on the fronts could remain as it was for a long time.113 The IDF’s head of intelligence further supported this popular opinion when he spoke of the improbability of the Egyptian president waging war, because Sadat knew he would fail and feared for his own downfall.114 An example of the IDF’s power, and what it was capable of, came on 13 September when it intercepted and downed 13 Syrian MiG aircraft in an aerial battle with Syria. This impressive display of military power supported Kissinger’s contention that there was no reason to rush to consider proposals for an interim arrangement. Following this incident, the Israeli army assumed that the Arabs refrained from initiating a war in light of Israel’s deterrent capabilities, the main component of which was the IAF. The 13 September battle contributed greatly to the enhancement of these capabilities. A sur- prise attack on Israel was out of the question. Israel’s chief of general staff, David Elazar, said to Dayan that he did not anticipate the possibility of a surprise attack on Israel without the army knowing in advance.115

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The idea that there was no chance of an Arab attack on Israel dominated Israeli public opinion. Kissinger himself shared this view. On 30 September the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a guideline circular which indicated that the strategic balance between Israel and the Arab countries was to the lat- ter’s disadvantage. If they were to wage a war, they would lose it, and no Arab leader would initiate a war only to be defeated. Nearly everyone was convinced that the threat of Israel’s military power had averted the danger of war.116

A week later, on 6 October, 1400, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a surprise attack on Israel that stunned the entire world. Their joint campaign dispelled the predominant perception of Egyptian President Sadat as a weak leader, a perception staunchly held by both Israeli and American policymakers. Another perception which fell by the wayside was that of the Egyptian army’s inferior military capabilities, and indeed, the inferior capabilities of the entire Arab world. It showed Israel that military strength did not guarantee continued calm on all fronts, nor would it necessarily serve as means by which to convince the Arabs to approach the negotiating table.

In summary, during one of his conversations with the Israeli leadership, Joseph Sisco mentioned that Israel possessed exceptional military capabili- ties but had gone bankrupt politically. He urged Israel to display the political capabilities to match its military strategy. Sisco’s advice highlighted the Israeli way of thinking at the time, which fully focused on military power and argued that the resolution of the conflict could be induced by the barrel of a gun. Between 1967 and 1973 the Israeli governments took no initiative to set the peace process in motion. Their policy was to respond to proposals raised and, for the most part, reject all of them – the Rogers Plan, Sadat’s willingness to sign a peace agreement and his initiative for an interim settlement – with the exception of the ceasefire.

Israeli policy was and remained one of direct negotiations without precondi- tions, despite the fact that Israel itself had set specific prerequisites. Policymakers shared the view that time was not a factor since the Arab countries, and par- ticularly Egypt, would not be tempted to wage a new war for fear of another defeat. While Israeli policy continued to lack initiative on the political front, it dedicated much effort to convincing the United States that the greater Israel’s military power, the better its deterrence capabilities would be, and the more likely it would be to achieve peace. Hence the Israeli leaders’ repeated requests for the delivery of advanced aircraft. The war that broke out on 6 October 1973 – the Jewish Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur) – clearly showed how accurate Sisco’s words were and how miserably Israel had failed politically.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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Notes

1. Gazit, “Egypt and Israel”; Gazit, Peace Process, 122‒7. It should be noted that Gazit served as director general during Golda Meir’s term as prime minister. See also Meir, My Life, 289‒91; “Meir, Menachem, Sadat Rejected Golda’s Outreach to Peace, a letter to the editor,” Ha’aretz, July 5, 2001.

2. Goldstein, Golda, 89, 544. 3. Shlaim, Iron Wall, 282–4; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 52. See also, Bar-Joseph, “Last Chance,” 545–6; Weits, “Golda Meir,” 54; Bably,

Dreams, 89. 4. Kipnis, 1973, 9–10, 31. 5. Venetik and Shalom, “U.S. Middle Eastern Policy,” 208. 6. Quandt, Peace Process, 24; Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 163–4. 7. Daigle, Limits of Détente, 4. 8. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost, 150–51, 181. According to Gad Ya’acobi, an Israeli politician who was close to Defence

Minister Moshe Dayan, the Israeli‒Egyptian interim agreement was missed first and foremost because all parties involved – Israel, Egypt and the United States – lacked the imagination and determination needed to prevent this tragic oversight. With a more focused American effort and Israeli flexibility an agreement might have been reached, or not, depending on Egypt’s demands. See Ya’acobi, Razor’s Edge, 174.

9. Neff, Warriors, 19, 25–8, 30. 10. Tyler, Fortress Israel, 8–10, 199–200, 240. 11. Raz, Bride, 4; Haber, War Will Break Out, 258‒9; Pedatzur, Triumph of

Embarrassment, 28. 12. Israeli State Archives, Jerusalem (ISA), A-10/6304, Prime Minister’s Files, June

9, 1967; Eban, Memoirs, 430; Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 1, 226‒7. The 19 June resolution was brought only to the US administration’s knowledge.

It never reached Cairo and Damascus. Concerning the policy behind the resolution see, Raz, Bride, 45‒7; Raz, “Generous Peace,” 91‒5, 98, 85–102.

13. The National Archives, Kew, London (TNA), Foreign Office (FO), 17/522, Wilson to Johnson, June 15, 1967; Prime Minister Office (PREM), 13/1620, Record of a Telephone Conversation, June 7, 1967, and FO to Certain Missions, June 16, 1967; Rostow, Peace in Balance, 250‒55.

14. Johnson, Vantage Point, 303. 15. Rafael, Destination Peace, 159; Shannon, Balancing Act, 64. 16. Bably, Dreams, 39‒40; Meital, “Khartoum Conference.” 17. Heikal, Road to Ramadan, 53‒4; Riad, Struggle, 54; Sela, Unity within Conflict,

75‒8. 18. TNA, PREM13/1623, FO to Tel Aviv, August 17, 1967, and PREM13/1627, Record

of Meeting, November 6, 1967; United States National Archives, College Park, MD (USNA), RG59/18, Hughes to Acting Secretary, September 22, 1967.

19. Dayan, New Map, 55; Ha’aretz, August 10, 1967; Ma’ariv, August 10, 1967. 20. TNA, PREM13/1624, Record of a Meeting, November 6, 1967. 21. Knesset Debates, Israeli Parliamentary Debates, vol. 50, October 30, 1967. 22. ISA, A9/8161, Meeting of Foreign and Defense Committee, November 14, 1967. 23. ISA, Hez4/1391, Record of Conversation, October 15, 1967; Foreign Relation

of the United States (FRUS), 1964‒1968, Arab‒Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, vol. 19, 930, 940‒43.

24. For the full text of Resolution 242 see Moore, Arab‒Israeli Conflict, 802‒3.

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25. Riad, Struggle, 78‒9; Korn, Stalemate, 142; Touval, Peace Brokers, 143‒4. 26. USNA, RG59/1805, Rusk to Tel Aviv, February 2, 1968; Brenchley, Britain, 108. 27. USNA, RG59/1806, Rusk to Tel Aviv, March 5, 1967: FRUS, Arab‒Israeli Dispute,

1967‒1968, vol. 20, 211‒12. 28. FRUS, Arab‒Israeli Dispute, 1967‒1968, vol. 20, 80‒86, 311‒12. 29. Ibid., 85‒6. It should be noted that from the early 1960s the US administration

was already supplying Israel with advanced arms. In 1962 President Kennedy agreed to sell Israel Hawk missiles. By the end of 1964 the US was supplying Israel with modern tanks, and in 1966 Israel acquired advanced US aircraft. Having first agreed to sell Israel missiles, tanks and finally aircraft, the US was quickly becoming Israel’s chief weapons supplier. The Americans’ readiness to provide arms to Israel aimed, among other things, to curb Israel’s development of nuclear weapons.

Aronson, Nuclear Weapons, 20; Gazit, President Kennedy, 131; Yaniv, Politics and Strategy, 171; Nadelmann, “Setting the Stage,” 439; Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 1, 130.

30. Little, “Making of a Special Relationship,” 579; Bard, Water’s Edge, 95‒6. 31. ISA, A10/8161, Meeting of Foreign and Defence Committee, January 23, 1968:

FRUS, Arab‒Israeli Dispute, 1967‒1968, vol. 20, 487; Ben Zvi, Lyndon B. Johnson, 311.

32. Touval, “Mediators,” 356; FRUS, Arab‒Israeli Dispute, 1967‒1968, vol. 20, 416; ISA, A12/7043, Talk Between Eshkol and Ball and Sisco, July 15, 1968.

33. ISA, A1/7058, Eshkol to Johnson, August 4 and 29, 1968. 34. FRUS, Arab‒Israeli Dispute, 1967‒1968, vol. 20, 481‒5. 35. During the presidential elections both candidates – the Republican Richard

Nixon and Democrat Hubert Humphrey – declared themselves in favour of selling US military aircraft to Israel. As Election Day drew near, Johnson, in a bid to help his fellow Democrat Hubert Humphrey, authorized the sale of US jets to Israel, issuing a statement to this effect on 9 October. The deal itself was signed on 7 November. See FRUS, Arab‒Israeli Dispute, 1967‒1968, vol. 20, 548‒9; Bard, Water’s Edge, 201‒4; Ben Zvi, Lyndon B. Johnson, 119; Spiegal, The Other Arab‒Israeli Conflict, 164.

36. TNA, FCO17/43, Minute by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), January 15, 1968.

37. Tschrigi, American Search, 57; Yaqub, “Politics of Stalemate,” 17‒18, 24. 38. USNA, Nixon, Files/756, Prime Minister Meir to President, May 15, 1969. 39. USNA, Nixon Files/756, June 17, 1969; Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 175. 40. Morris, Righteous Victims, 350; Schueftan, Attrition, 195; Dayan, Story, 516. 41. USNA, RG59/1820, Rogers to Tel Aviv, May 5, 1969; Rabin, Service Notebook,

vol. 1, 248. 42. Ha’aretz, September 8, 1969. Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel, 154. 43. Dayan, Story, 516; James, “Military Political,” 499. 44. Rafael, Destination Peace, 191; Quandt, Peace Process, 66. 45. TNA, FCO17/749, Record of Conversation, September 18, 1969; Rabin, Service

Notebook, vol. 1, 253. 46. ISA, Hez1/5969, Rabin to Jerusalem, April 26, 1969; Kissinger, White House Years,

vol. 1, 392; TNA, FCO17/749, Record of Conversation, July 10, 1969. 47. ISA, A7/7064, Meir’s Visit, October 8, 1969; Medzini, Proud Jewess, 365; Kissinger, White House Years, vol. 1, 395. 48. Rostow, Peace in the Balance, 273; Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 1, 252.

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49. USNA, RG59/1840, State Department (SD) to Tel Aviv, December 19, 1969; Quandt, Peace Process, 68.

50. Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 1, 263; Rafael, Destination Peace, 192. 51. Kissinger, White House Years, vol. 1, 401; Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 1, 263;

Daigle, Limits of Détente, 49, 68, 74‒7. On the Kissinger role regarding the Rogers Plan see Quandt, Peace Process, 69, 92‒3 and note 414.

52. Gawrych, Albatross, 144. 53. Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 1, 248, 254. 54. Bar-Siman-Tov, “Myth of Strategic Bombing,” 555‒6; Meital, Egypt’s Struggle, 68. 55. TNA, FCO17/1199, Minute by Tripp, February 5, 1970; USNA, RG59/2050,

Memorandum of Conversation, January 7, 1970; Parker, Politics of Miscalculations, 145.

56. Korn, Stalemate, 184. 57. TNA, FCO17/769, Tel Aviv to FCO, January 19, 1970; USNA, RG/2050, Sisco to

Rogers, January 7, 1970, and Middle East Situation, January 19, 1970; See also Le Monde, January 15 and 20, 1970.

58. Korn, Stalemate, 181; Ayubi, Nasser and Sadat, 66; The Times, February 10, 1970. 59. Heikal, Road to Ramadan, 83‒7; Riad, Struggle, 119. 60. Heikal, Secret Channels, 153; Daigle, Limits of Détente, 99‒100. 61. Heikal, Secret Channels, 152; Korn, Stalemate, 190‒91. 62. Wehling, Irresolute Princes, 69; Ayubi, Nasser and Sadat, 57. 63. Bar-Siman-Tov, “Myth of Strategic Bombing,” 559. 64. USNA, RG59/2052, Tel Aviv to SD, April 29, 1970. 65. Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel, 172. Nixon, Memoirs, 480. 66. Rafael, Destination Peace, 199; Rubenstein, Red Star, 115. 67. Rafael, Destination Peace, 200; USNA, RG59/2051, Tel Aviv to SD, March 23,

1970. 68. Quandt, Peace Process, 273; Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 1, 290‒91. 69. Korn, Stalemate, 202‒3, see also, Gazit, Israeli Diplomacy, 79; Ya’acobi, Grace of

Time, 87. 70. Kissinger, White House Years, vol. 3, 1312‒13. 71. Gazit, Peace Process, 65; USNA, Nixon Files, H-31, Memorandum for the

President, February 25, 1971. 72. Newsweek, February 22, 1971. 73. USNA, RG59/2073, Cairo to SD, February 16, 1971. 74. Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 2, 330. 75. For a summary of Eban’s television and radio interviews, see ISA, Hez2/7024,

February 21, 1971. 76. Ma’ariv, March 12, 1971. 77. Rafael, Destination Peace, 230; Waldheim, “Search for Peace,” 204‒5. 78. It should be noted that the view of King Hussein, who secretly met the Israelis

several time, did not differ. The King believed that the Israeli government was not sincere in reaching a peace settlement, but only wanted to annex territories. Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 255‒6, 258‒61.

79. ISA, Hez 7/7024, Jerusalem to Washington, February 4, 1971; Riad, Struggle, 177‒8. The Sadat initiative to reopen the canal was raised by Dayan three months before. Looking for a way to stabilize the ceasefire, Dayan raised the prospect of a partial Israeli withdrawal, with Egypt, in return, reopening the Suez Canal for shipping and reconstructing the devastated towns along the Canal’s bonks. USNA/RG59, Nixon, File 494, Memorandum for Kissinger, January 26, 1971; Heikal, Secret Channels, 164.

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80. USNA, RG50/2068, Sisco to Rogers, August 15, 1970. See also a conversation between Meir and Harold Wilson, British Prime Minister, NA, FCO17/1345, Record of Conversation, November 4, 1970.

81. ISA, Hez4/5987, Jerusalem to Washington, April 19, 1971; Heikal, Secret Channels, 167‒8; Quandt, Peace Process, 90; Kissinger, White House Years, vol. 3, 1318.

82. ISA, Hez2/7024, Jerusalem to Ottawa, May 2, 1971; Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 2, 348; Daigle, The Limits of Détente, 172‒3.

83. USNA, Lot Files59/25, Nixon to Rogers, May 26, 1971. 84. USNA, RG59/2076, Sisco to Rogers, July 14, 1971; ISA, Hez7/7301, Second

Meeting, May 7, 1971. 85. USNA, RG59/2058, Memorandum of Conversation, October 14, 1971. 86. USNA, RG59/2078, Secretary‒Prime Minister Meir Meeting, December 2, 1971. 87. USNA, Nixon Files/756, Meir to Nixon, September 17, 1971. 88. Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 2, 354. See also conversation between Rabin and

Sisco, USNA, RG59/2076, SD to Tel Aviv, September 15, 1971. 89. USNA, RG59/2058, Rogers to New York, October 14, 1971. 90. Spiegel, The Other Arab‒Israeli Conflict, 211. 91. TNA, FCO17/1650, Tel Aviv, to FCO, February 7, 1972; Quandt, Peace Process,

94; Kissinger, White House Years, vol. 3, 1325; Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 2, 367; Yaqub, “Politics of Stalemate,” 48.

92. See Interview with Haig on Israeli Cable Television, Channel 8, May 10, 2009; Kissinger, White House Years, vol. 3, 1325.

93. Miller, Much Promised Land, 141; Quandt, Peace Process, 93; Kipnis, 1973, 64. 94. Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 2, 364, 367; Gazit, Israeli Diplomacy, 97. 95. TNA, FCOq17/1581, FCO to Tel Aviv, December 3, 1971; Ma’ariv, December 3,

1971; Israeli TV, January 14, 1972. 96. TNA, FCO17/1581, FCO to Tel Aviv, December 3, 1971; Ha’aretz, September

3, 1971. 97. USNA, RG59/2076, Sisco‒Meir Meeting, July 31, 1971; ISA, Hez2/7301, Meir‒

Sisco Meeting, July 30, 1971. 98. Gawrych, Albatross, 131‒2; Ma’ariv, January 14, 1972. 99. Daigle, Limits of Détente, 200, 213, 234, 244. 100. ISA, Hez9/5294, Nixon to Meir, June 21, 1972; Kissinger, White House Years,

vol. 3, 1327‒8. 101. Quandt, Peace Process, 95; Gawrych, Albatross, 132. In this context see also

Kissinger, White House Years, vol. 3, 1333. 102. Gamasy, October War, 149; Kissinger, White House Years, vol. 3, 1332; Sadat,

Search of Identity, 230. Sadat raised the issue of expelling the Russians in a meeting with Rogers in May

1971. He promised that should the Americans manage to negotiate an interim agreement along the lines he proposed, he would expel the Soviets from Egypt. See, Daigle, “Russians are Going,” 6‒7.

103. USNA, RG59/2060, Tel Aviv to SD, August 21, 1972. 104. ISA, Hez9/5294, Washington to Jerusalem, July 27, 1972; Rabin, Service

Notebook, vol. 2, 379. 105. Eban, Memoirs, 473‒4. 106. USNA, RG59/2082, Memorandum of Conversation, March 21 and 23, 1973;

Rafael, Destination Peace, 250. 107. ISA, A12/7038, Nixon‒Meir Meeting, March 1, 1973; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan,

312‒13. 108. Quandt, Peace Process, 99; Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 2, 386, 390‒91.

92 M. GAt

109. Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 2, 391; Yaqub, “Politics of Stalemate,” 52. 110. USNA, RG59/2080, Tel Aviv to SD, February 15, 1973. 111. For the Watergate Affair see Olson, Watergate, 43‒102. 112. USNA, RG/2079, Memorandum for the President, March 20, 1973; Daigle,

Limits of Détente, 356. 113. ISA, A4/8163, Meeting of Foreign and Defence Committee, March 27, 1973;

Eban, Memoirs, 482‒3; Kipnis, 1973, 31‒3, 144; Ma’ariv, June 1 and July 24, 1973; Time Magazine, July 30, 1973.

114. ISA, A5/8163, Meeting of Foreign and Defence Committee, May 16, 1973; Nadel, Between Two Wars, 110, 126.

115. Nadel, Between Two Wars, 119, 123. 116. Rafael, Destination Peace, 260.

Notes on contributor

Moshe Gat is professor emeritus of history and political studies at Bar Ilan University.

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