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Viewing Brands in Multiple Dimensions

W I N T E R 2 0 0 7 V O L . 4 8 N O . 2

R E P R I N T N U M B E R 4 8 2 1 0

Pierre Berthon, Morris B. Holbrook, James M. Hulbert and Leyland F. Pitt

P l e a s e n o t e t h a t g ra y a re a s re f l e c t a r t w o rk t h a t h a s b e e n i n t e n t i o n a l l y re m o v e d . T h e s u b s t a n t i v e c o n t e n t o f t h e a r t i c l e a p p e a rs a s o ri g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d .

WINTER 2007 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 37

hen General Motors Corp. tried to revive its Daewoo

car division in the United Kingdom early in 2005 by

rebranding it with the Chevrolet badge, it ran into big

trouble. Car buyers had difficulty linking the iconic

American brand — immortalized in countless movies, celebrated in

numerous songs and enjoying more than 90% brand awareness —

with the low-priced Korean autos. The result was falling sales and

the resignation of the chief executive of GM’s operations in the

United Kingdom.1 Moreover, the Chevrolet brand itself deteriorated

significantly in the 2006 J.D. Powers & Associates annual satisfaction

survey in the United Kingdom, ending up ranked just ahead of

troubled automakers such as Fiat S.p.A. and far behind other Amer-

ican makes such as Ford Motor Co. or other Korean brands like

Hyundai Motor Co.

In another instance, marketers at Nestlé S.A.’s British operations

chose to capitalize on the brand equity of a much-loved confection, the

historic KitKat bar. In a bid to boost lackluster sales in 2003, the market-

ers launched brand extensions in multiple flavors such as Blood Orange, Lime

Crush and Christmas Pudding. Although there was temporary interest in the new

launches, the experiment failed spectacularly. KitKat’s overall U.K. sales fell by

18% in the two years prior to April 2006.2 Nestlé has since dropped almost all of

the unusual flavors.

These vignettes illustrate the actions of managers who fail to understand

all the dimensions of a brand. Specifically, few managers grasp the fact that

perceptions of a brand can and do change dramatically over time and from

one social or cultural setting to another. Indeed, companies cannot so much

manage a stable brand image as negotiate an evolving one — meaning that

their managers must redefine the brand discourse in more flexible language.

Viewing Brands in

Multiple Dimensions

Pierre Berthon is the Clifford F. Youse Professor of Marketing at Bentley College’s McCallum School of Business in Waltham, Massachusetts. Morris B. Holbrook is the William T. Dillard Professor of Marketing at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Business. James M. Hulbert is a visiting professor at the Henley Management College in Oxfordshire, England, and at the Guanghua School of Management at Peking University and the R.C. Kopf Professor Emeritus at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Busi- ness. Leyland F. Pitt is a professor of marketing at Simon Fraser’s Segal Graduate School of Business in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Contact them at pberthon@ bentley.edu, [email protected], [email protected] and [email protected].

The concept of

a “brand manifold”

helps managers

understand that

a brand’s impact

varies according to

who is valuing it,

in what context and

at what time.

Pierre Berthon,

Morris B. Holbrook,

James M. Hulbert and

Leyland F. Pitt

B R A N D I N G

W

B R A N D I N G

38 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW WINTER 2007

The Heart of the Problem At root, brands are symbols around which companies, suppliers,

supplementary organizations, the public and, indeed, customers

construct identities.3 It is a given that branding is a critical issue

for marketing and sales; strong brands facilitate the repeat pur-

chases on which sellers rely to enhance corporate financial

performance. Brands also ease the introduction of new products

and assist promotional efforts. And they enable premium pric-

ing as well as the market segmentation that makes it possible to

communicate coherent messages to specific target customer

groups. Marketers are rightfully obsessed with brand loyalty,

which is particularly important in categories such as food prod-

ucts or household cleaning products where repeat purchases

foster profitability.

Too often, though, brands have been seen solely as “instru-

ments” of management. This simplistic but prevalent view

assumes that marketing or brand managers own their brands and

that these brands are tools that, if managed properly, can help the

organization attain its objectives. Conversely, in some instances,

brands have become ends in themselves — or at least ends for the

people who manage them — overlooking the fact that their

critical role is as a means to an end.

Thus, what Theodore Levitt famously called marketing myopia

(a narrow definition of business focused on what the company

produces) has been augmented or replaced by branding myopia,

where the brand becomes an end in itself. As the Daewoo and

KitKat stories illustrate, such perspectives leave their proponents

exposed to the risks posed by changing aspects of consumption,

technology and competition.

Nevertheless, for all of their influence and contrary to popular

marketing rhetoric, the whole world is not in love with brands.

Today, a vigorous antibranding movement4 reflects powerful

antiglobalization activism and broader resistance to the offerings

of large corporations. The challenges posed to companies by such

changes in the business environment — an environment in

which brands are no longer solely the prerogative of marketing

— are likely to require refinement and extension of the ideas by

which brands are conceptualized and managed. The concept of

the “brand manifold,” which will be discussed later in this article,

takes a step in that direction.

Revisiting the Broader Implications of Brand During the 19th century and for much of the 20th, a company’s

value, notionally represented by the net book value of assets on

the balance sheet, was heavily dependent on tangible assets such

as plants and equipment. However, in recent years, the gap be-

tween market capitalization and net book value has increased to

enormous proportions, driven largely by the importance of intan-

gible assets. Key elements of these so-called “soft” assets are a

company’s brands — both for the company as a whole and for its

separate products — and the customer and other relationships

embedded therein. Indeed, research links both price premiums

and market share to brand equity.5 Observers of financial markets

are often intrigued to learn that the ratios of market capitalization

to revenues can range from as high as 20-to-one for companies

such as Microsoft, Nokia and Louis Vuitton, to as low as 0.6-to-

one for companies such as Ford, Volkswagen and Hertz.

Stakeholder assessments of a brand depend both on mediated

perceptions and on direct experience — that is, information about

a brand (brand communications) and direct interactions with a

brand (brand embodiments). Brand communications comprise

information from the company, customers and other stakeholders.

Brand embodiments constitute the brand as experienced through

products, employees, suppliers, channels, other third parties and

consumers — what some call customer touchpoints. If we distin-

guish between factors that are and are not directly under the

organization’s control — designated internal and external, respec-

tively — we see that stakeholder perceptions of the brand depend

on both internal and external communications and embodiments.

Managers must therefore understand and manage meanings of the

brand among both internal and external stakeholders.

In recent years, there has been vigorous debate on the role of

brands in the changing marketplace,6 giving vent to perspectives

that range from the radical7 to the refining.8 One aspect that has

been a hot topic for discussion concerns the extent to which

The three-worlds hypothesis of philosopher Karl Popper pro-

vides an excellent means of capturing all the dimensions of

the relationships among organizations, people, products

and brands.

The Relationship of Products, Brands and Culture

World 1

Collective knowledge, culture, images, language

Individual states of consciousness, individual perceptions, knowledge, emotions

Manifest objects, states and systems

World 2

World 3

WINTER 2007 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 39

branding efforts are aimed at current and future employees in an

attempt to deal with the consequences of permanent shortages of

knowledge workers. The topic has been particularly relevant to

industries such as energy and utilities, which are now threatened

with significant losses of skills and institutional memory as baby

boomers leave the work force.

Given such significant business factors and recognizing the es-

calation of competition worldwide, it is clear that the stewardship

of brands becomes a strategic issue that shapes the future of a

company as a whole rather than only being the work of marketing

decision makers. It becomes a strategic initiative and the collective,

collaborative work of the executive team. Indeed, branding may

already have become too important to be left to marketers for the

simple reason that brands are no longer just a marketing issue.

Relationships Among Organizations, Products, People and Brands To understand the evolving marketplace, it is essential to capture

the full dimensionality of the relationships among organizations,

people, products and brands. The three-worlds hypothesis9 of

philosopher of science Karl Popper10 — originally developed as a

conceptual tool to explore the mind-body problem in philosophy

— provides an excellent means of doing so. Popper’s World 1 is

defined as the realm of physical objects, states and systems; World

2 is the realm of subjective experiences involving thoughts, emo-

tions and perceptions; and World 3 is the world of “culture”

rooted in objective knowledge, science, language, literature, and

so on. (See “The Relationship of Products, Brands and Culture.”)

In the context of brands, the three realms of relevance are:

(World 1) manifest goods and services; (World 2) individual

thoughts, emotions, needs, wants and perceptions; and (World 3)

collective knowledge and images concerning brands.

Popper’s framework highlights the relationships among prod-

ucts, individuals and brands. It shows that the effect of a manifest

product or service in World 1 (for example, an Apple computer

with its familiar logo) on the collective knowledge of the brand

in World 3 (the brand name Apple, Apple Computer, Inc.’s share

price, its product specifications, its documented history etc.) is

always mediated by, and thus a function of, intervening responses

by individuals (World 2).

The framework also indicates that attempts to modify Worlds

1 and 3 — for example, by repositioning a brand — will always

implicate the subjective worlds of the individuals managing and

involved in the process, as well as the worlds of customers and

other stakeholders in World 2. Further, it reveals that these changes

can never entirely determine one individual’s World 2; that is, the

meaning attributed to the brand by a specific customer.

This implies that brands are always part manifest (World 1)

and part abstract (Worlds 2 and 3) and that the meanings that

individuals attach to brands can range from the primarily func-

tional (in the sense of what the branded offering can do in World

1) to the primarily enacted (what the branded offering can mean

in World 3). The meanings associated with a brand in World 3 are

always multiple and always equivocal because such meanings re-

flect individual differences in World 2. At the simplest level, what

the brand means to the organization and its members may differ

from what it means to its target customers or to other stakehold-

ers, including the public at large. As such, an individual’s brand

meaning and experience can never be entirely determined by the

conscious intention or volition of others.

Dr. Martens shoes illustrate the three-worlds model as well as

the fact that the same brand can have multiple meanings to dif-

ferent stakeholders. The ruggedly constructed, air-cushioned

product (World 1, the physical) made by R. Griggs Ltd. became a

brand (World 3, the abstract) with very different meanings to

different stakeholders (World 2, the individuals). To management

in the young British company in the early 1960s, the brand rep-

resented a sensible, durable shoe or boot, originally marketed to

police and postal workers. But the brand took off when it was

embraced by subculture groups, including punks and skinheads;

to them, it represented a jarring, attention-grabbing fashion

statement. And to the public at large, the brand soon came to

embody a nonconformist symbol of rebellion against authority.

Each constituency viewed the brand differently, and the brand

shifted over time from a singular emphasis on the footwear’s

physical qualities and performance to a complex image that

blended manifest qualities with abstract cultural interpretations.

Refining Brand Equity: Key Dimensions Popper’s three-worlds hypothesis highlights the fact that the role of

a brand involves overlaps among all three worlds. Thus, brands can

never be understood in and of themselves. They are not simply “cre-

ated,” “owned” or “used” by management. Rather, they have a life

and meaning beyond and, to some extent, independent of that in-

Brands have a life and meaning beyond and independent of that intended by their initiators. Apple’s Newton, abandoned by the company in the late 1990s, still sustains a lively grass-roots community.

B R A N D I N G

40 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW WINTER 2007

tended by their initiators. For example, Apple’s Newton digital

handheld device, abandoned by the company in the late 1990s, has

attracted and still sustains a lively grass-roots brand community.11

These considerations complicate our current conceptualiza-

tions of brand equity. At the simplest level, brand equity assesses

the value of a brand. Most managers understand the two current

perspectives: the financial and behavioral views. The former,

typically championed by consulting companies such as Inter-

brand Corp., often result in press reports claiming, for example,

that “Coke is the world’s most valuable brand, worth X billion

dollars.” The behavioral view typically uses surveys to determine

what a particular brand means to customers, how valuable it is to

them and how the answers compare to those for other brands.

These two perspectives are usually combined in a definition of

brand equity as “customers’ willingness to pay a differential for

one product over another when they are basically identical.”

The current preoccupation with brand equity is often traced

back to the takeover of the British chocolate company Rowntree

by Nestlé in the late 1980s.12 Many financial analysts and journal-

ists began to see that part of the motivation for many company

takeovers was the realization that the acquisition of brands was

more profitable than spending years and vast sums of money to

develop and nurture comparably successful brands. The shift in

emphasis from physical assets to brands — from Popper’s World

1 to his World 3 — was under way.

A more nuanced view of the value of a brand will distinguish

between brand equity, which pertains to the perceptions of a

brand, and value of the equity, which reflects the monetary value

of the brand to the company. We term these two aspects embod-

ied value and exchange value and combine them with a distinction

between value to whom and type of value. (See “A More Nuanced

View of Brand Equity.”)

The embodied value to the company describes the perceptions

and values that the company’s managers see in the brand. Of

course, even inside the company there is heterogeneity in these

perceptions. Employees’ perspectives on the brand may vary by

function and they’re unlikely to mesh with those of management,

much less those of the marketing department. Yet the contradic-

tion is this: Managers and employees alike are urged to manifest

or “live the brand” as if it were one unified, shared concept.

The management perspective may also not coincide with

those of external groups.

Customers will have their own take — witness the responses

to KitKat’s exotic flavors and to Apple’s Newton. Other external

audiences have their own sets of associations or embodied values:

The expectations of suppliers, workers or consumer activists may

differ significantly from those of brand-loyal customers, as

McDonald’s Corp., now challenged to pay higher wages to to-

mato pickers, can attest. The expectations of legislators or

regulators may well be influenced by such groups, as well as by

the company that owns the brand in question.

At the same time, the “exchange” value of the brand equity in

the product (or even in the company) depends on cash-flow

streams resulting from the company’s ability to use a brand to

acquire and retain customers — an outcome dependent not only

on the premium paid by a consumer for a branded good or ser-

vice above that for an unbranded version of the same product but

also on the number of customers willing to pay a particular price

and the number of units sold at that price (World 3).

For example, a bottle of fine French wine selling in the

United States for $100 can be said to have high customer ex-

change value for those willing to buy at that price, whereas the

company exchange value would be low because relatively few

customers are willing to pay such a price. Conversely, a mass-

market wine sold in high volumes at low cost, such as many of

those produced by E.&J. Gallo Winery, has low embodied value

and exchange value for customers and high company exchange

value for the producer.

We can develop this distinction further by mapping cus-

tomer equity against company equity. (See “A Typology of

Exchange Values.”) Gallo wines would clearly fall in the top

right-hand corner among the mass-market brands, along with

many well-known names such as Tide, Lipton and Heinz. By

contrast, Ferrari, Porsche, Perrier and Grolsch are solid bottom

left-hand specialty performers. Meanwhile, many brands that

have traditionally fallen in the top left-hand corner — with all

the disadvantages that parity status entails — have worked hard

to extricate themselves. Indeed, the revival of the Arm & Ham-

mer brand of the privately owned chemical company Church &

Dwight Co., Inc. demonstrates vividly that all is not lost even

It is possible to distinguish between brand equity, which

pertains to the perceptions of a brand, and value of the

equity, which reflects the monetary value of the brand to

the company.

A More Nuanced View of Brand Equity

Customer

Company

Exchange Value

Embodied Value

Type of Value

Value to Whom

Meaning of brand to customer

Meaning of brand to

organization

Premium customer is

willing to pay over unbranded

alternative

Brand's ability to attract customers less support costs

when your product is as unremarkable as baking soda. Until

Arm & Hammer seized the day, who knew that baking soda —

beyond its traditional service as tooth powder and antacid

— could also be used as carpet deodorant, swimming-pool

cleaner and kitty-litter freshener?

Of course, many companies seek the desirable bottom right-

hand “iconic” position exemplified by Microsoft, Coca-Cola,

Starbucks and Nike in recent years. There is the danger that as

former specialty brands attempt to become iconic, or are

deemed so by a significant number of stakeholders, their cus-

tomer-embodied value deteriorates and they become

mass-market brands. The once-coveted Halston and Pierre Car-

din fashion brands have suffered such a fate, while Martha

Stewart, Tommy Hilfiger and possibly even Tiffany appear to be

headed in the same direction.13

Introducing the Brand Manifold In mathematics and engineering, the term manifold refers to a

topological space or surface, and in physics it designates the

space-time continuum. Similarly, the notion of a brand manifold

suggests that brands have multiple dimensions: Their meaning

varies over time and according to a multiplicity of constituencies.

These two dimensions define a matrix of possibilities with which

managers must interact.

Temporal Factors Within a given cultural context, language and meaning are enmeshed in a continual process of evolution. The

significance of a brand will change continually: Pontiac and

Mercury mean something different to today’s car buyers than

they did to buyers in the 1950s, now that those models share the

roads with Nissans and Hyundais. The insight that brands are

rooted in a broader context, taking their embodied meanings

from discourses with their relevant stakeholders, carries impor-

tant implications. Brand signification is never unilaterally

created but always arises from dialogues in a wider linguistic

and cultural community composed of various participants. As

noted earlier, companies cannot so much manage a stable brand

image as negotiate an evolving one. This emphasis on commu-

nity, conversation and cultural change thereby assumes central

importance in the management of brand meanings. Such mean-

ings are temporal in two senses — the sense in which they

change over time and the sense in which their creation is a proc-

ess of longitudinal negotiation, with present meaning always

rooted in the past and future meaning always rooted in the

present. Thus, the stewardship of a brand focuses both on the

brand’s relationship with its past and on evolving new mean-

ings for the brand as it moves into its future.

To manage a brand’s evolution successfully requires that the

brand not lose its roots in the past. Rather, management must

find ways to reinterpret the past in terms of the future or, in a

complementary manner, to interpret the future in terms of the

past. In launching its new Maybach automobile, DaimlerChrysler

AG has attempted a similar approach: A lavish publication lauds

the history of Wilhelm Maybach, one of the original founders of

Daimler Motors, and his creations, using both German and

English on opposing pages, to strengthen the etiology of the

long-dormant brand.

That “everything old is new again” sentiment is just as visible

in BMW AG’s ad for its “grand touring tradition” from the 1980s.

Jaguar Cars Ltd. went even further with the introduction and

subsequent success of its XK models, using images of its famous

1960s E-Type model in the launch advertisements and incorpo-

rating many classic styling cues in the new car, right down to the

shape of its grille. Yet Ford Motor Co. recently failed to capitalize

on the retro appeal of the Thunderbird. Not only did the car’s

overall design not evolve in exciting directions, but the perfor-

mance of the overweight vehicle was mediocre at best. The point

is that it is crucial to emphasize ways in which a brand’s present

position draws on its past meanings.

Multiple Constituencies The second dimension of the brand mani- fold recognizes a company’s multiconstituency nature. It expands

upon the traditional distinction between company and customer

to encompass a variety of external and internal stakeholders.

Today, companies market almost as avidly to the investment

community, to government regulators and legislators, to suppli-

ers and to present and potential employees as they do to their

intermediary and final customers.

In expanding the concept of customers to embrace external

constituents and in thinking about the organization itself having

WINTER 2007 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 41

We can map customer equity against company equity. Gallo

wines, Tide detergent and Heinz ketchup would clearly fall

in the top right-hand corner while Ferrari, Perrier and

Grolsch are solid bottom left-hand specialty performers.

A Typology of Exchange Values

Low

High

HighLow Value of Company Equity

Value of Customer

Equity

Commodity

Specialty

Mass Market

Iconic

B R A N D I N G

internal constituents, we recognize the vastly more complicated

task of managing brands in the 21st century. These various stake-

holders have differing perceptions, values and expectations. Rather

than mediating a dialogue between company and customer, the

brands must be seen as pivotal in an expanded “multilogue.”

Putting the temporal and multiconstituency elements to-

gether, we can envision practical applications of the brand

manifold. (See “Exploring the Brand Manifold.”) As an example

of internal anchoring (lower left-hand corner), consider the case

of an offering whose designers consciously draw on relevant

brand-related meanings inherited from the past, as in the case of

the much-celebrated and recently resurrected MINI by BMW.

Where such meanings exemplify a more external anchoring

(lower right), we find associations with the past that thrive pri-

marily by virtue of the impression they make on customers, as

in the case of Chrysler Corp.’s retro-designed PT Cruiser and

Ford’s retro-styled Mustang. A more innovative form of internal

evolution (upper left) would occur, for example, when a brand

such as Porsche AG’s Cayenne sport utility vehicle offers ad-

vanced features that are perhaps best appreciated by the

company’s engineers, its skilled workers or other automotive

experts. If such features can be successfully communicated to

customers, the company also achieves external evolution of the

brand (upper right), as in the case of GM’s military-styled Hum-

mer vehicles. In effect, the companies just mentioned have used

brand-manifold principles in designing their products and

bringing them to market.

Managing Manifold Worlds So how best to manage with the brand manifold as much as any

brand can be managed? It is not easy. With the disappearance of

the distinction between products and brands, products have

become symbols in themselves. The signifier — the physical

product itself — has become the signified: A Bentley Continen-

tal car or a Coca-Cola drink or a Coach handbag is both a

product and a symbol.

Indeed, brands themselves have become product offerings. At

a store for aviation buffs in Carmel, California, one of the authors

found authentic first- and business-class Pan Am travel bags on

sale years after the airline’s demise. Apparently, the Pan Am brand

has survived Pan Am World Airways.

The boundaries between producer and consumer have also

44 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW WINTER 2007

The brand manifold reinforces the concept that brands have multiple dimensions — specifically, that they have multiple constitu-

encies and that their meanings evolve over time. BMW’s new MINI car exemplifies internal anchoring (lower left), where designers

consciously draw on relevant brand-related meanings from the past. Ford’s retro Mustang typifies external anchoring (lower right),

where echoes of the past thrive mostly because of the impression they make on customers.

Exploring the Brand Manifold

Innovate, evolve internal

embodiment and perceptions

Anchor, ground, contextualize

external embodiment

and perceptions

Innovate, evolve external

embodiment and perceptions

Anchor, ground, contextualize

internal embodiment

and perceptions

Past Brand Meanings • Anchor in history

• Continuity of meanings

Internal Brand Meanings • Manage internal

perceptions and embodiment

• Meaning as embodied by products and employees

Future Brand Meanings • Evolve new meanings

• Future brand meanings

External Brand Meanings • Manage external

perceptions and embodiment

• Meaning as perceived and embodied by customers

blurred. In many cases, managers who might have thought of

themselves as brand owners have become at best co-owners. In

fact, their customers now own the brand in a very tangible and

immediate sense. There is a powerful example in Harley-David-

son, Inc.’s14 brand, where Harley riders think of themselves as

co-producers of the brand with a strong say in the design of fu-

ture products, accessories and services. At another level, we find

open-source software brands such as JBoss, Inc. and Linux On-

Line, Inc.,15 where customers do actually co-produce both the

brand and the product.

There will continue to be challenges as long as branding re-

sides exclusively in the marketing department. At the

departmental level, strategic vision tends to vanish in the “brand

myopia” of day-to-day, short-term operational issues such as

brand-extension decisions, customer research, packaging design

and promotional tactics. Conversely, branding objectives drawn

from World 3 can have major tactical and strategic implications

for Worlds 1 & 2. A luxury image (World 3) may imply the use

of platinum or silk (World 1) or may entail the creation of a

prestige-oriented advertising theme (World 2). Think Cartier SA

or Hermès International.

The implications for marketing managers are evident. We are

certainly not the first to suggest that marketing executives need to

consider the strategic implications of branding decisions, but it is

news to many executives that customers and other constituencies

will change the meaning of a brand over time irrespective of how

it is perceived by the company. Thus, it is the responsibility of

every marketing executive to determine how to manage the

brand’s evolution. We believe that the brand manifold now gives

them a sharper tool that can help them implement this advice.

At the same time, senior managers in other functions such as

finance, human resources and operations must consider the

impact of their actions on their organizations’ brands. The be-

havior of senior managers can have a significant impact on the

brand perceptions of employees, customers, regulators, politi-

cians and others. Managers’ failures to understand a brand’s

embodied value can jeopardize shareholders’ interests and con-

ceivably their own jobs, as our Daewoo/Chevrolet example

illustrates. It is therefore incumbent on the chief executive offi-

cer, president and other top executives to acquire a deeper

understanding of branding issues and to see the quintessential

connections between those branding themes and the strategic

trajectories of the organizations.

In our experience, top corporate managers have embraced

the concept of brand equity. They also understand the desirabil-

ity of repeat buyers and of customer loyalty. But if they think

that equity and loyalty stem only from satisfaction (Popper’s

World 2), they neglect the necessary provisions (World 1) that

are essential to building a brand community based on trust and

customer value (World 3).

The brand manifold framework reflects the energetic ongoing

debate on the role of brands in the new millennium. It highlights

the fact that brands are very much alive and that they can change

rapidly, often in unpredictable ways. The framework also demon-

strates that brands are diverse, multidimensional entities

— co-creations of the groups they are targeted to as much as of

the producers themselves. Brands are embodied by products but

are enacted by customers and other participants in a process that

managers only partially control.

In short, a brand is protean and polyphonic, internal and ex-

ternal, past and future. Expressed through the instrument of a

brand manifold, a brand plays a potential symphony of meaning

for managers who are willing to listen.

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11. A.M. Muniz, Jr., and H.J. Schau, “Religiosity in the Abandoned Apple Newton Brand Community,” Journal of Consumer Research 31, no. 4 (2005): 737-747.

12. See for example, J.C. Ellert, D.G. Hyde and J.P. Killing, “Nestlé- Rowntree (A),” IMD Case 0111 (Lausanne, Switzerland: International Institute for Management Development, 2002).

13. T. Rozhon, “Men Ask: Who Needs to Buy Clothes,” New York Times, Sunday, June 8, 2003, sec. 3, p.1.

14. J.W. Schouten and J.H. McAlexander, “Subcultures of Consumption: An Ethnography of the New Bikers,” Journal of Consumer Research 22, no. 1 (1995): 43–62.

15. Y. Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm,” The Yale Law Journal 112, no. 3 (2002):369-446.

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