Review 4 articles attached and

ARTICLES

Whose Turf, whose Town? Race, Status, and Attitudes

of Washington DC Residents toward Gentrification

Carley M. Shinault1 & Richard Seltzer2

Published online: 19 March 2019

# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Abstract

Once coined BChocolate City^ by residents of the majority black capital city, Wash- ington, DC, has more recently been referred to as BChocolate Swirl.^ Since the early 2000s, Washington has experienced marked shifts in its racial and socioeconomic composition. Census data indicates that from 2000 to 2012, the district’s black popu- lation decreased from 60% to 50% while the white population increased from 30 to 48%. Homes that then sold for $200,000 are now selling for over $800,000. While arguments of the advantages and disadvantages of gentrification are prevalent, this research explores a frequently overlooked perspective. Using 2014 Washington Post Poll data, we explore the perspectives of current DC residents and examine the impact of race and class on attitudes toward the costs and benefits of gentrification. Results indicate that, while race is a significant indicator, class position is a more salient determinant of resident attitudes toward gentrification in Washington, DC.

Keywords Gentrification . Washington . DC . Race and class . Attitudes . Public opinion

Introduction

Since the late 1960s, many African Americans proudly referred to Washington as the BChocolate City.^ After large numbers of white residents fled the city for more

Journal of African American Studies (2019) 23:72–91 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12111-019-09427-9

* Carley M. Shinault [email protected]

Richard Seltzer [email protected]

1 Department of Political Science, Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, 400 East Second Street, 214 Bakeless Center, Bloomsburg, PA 17975, USA

2 Department of Political Science, Howard University, 2441 Sixth Street NW, Douglass Hall, Room 102, Washington, DC 20059, USA

homogenous suburban and exurban areas in Virginia and Maryland, a higher concen- tration of African Americans remained in the city (Gilbert 1969). The reference was due not only to the city’s composition, but also the thriving black business base and broad representation in city government (Merica 2013). Those days, however, are fading away and the era of white flight is over. In the 1990s, concerted efforts were made by City Hall to attract and increase Washington’s employed resident population as the city faced crippling deficits and its tax coffers were stifled by federal restrictions (Comey 2006; Turner et al. 2006). Efforts to stimulate residential growth resulted in a steady shift in Washington’s racial and socioeconomic composition.

Today, the District of Columbia is considered one of the fastest gentrifying cities in the country (Wogan 2015). Since 2000, Washington’s white population jumped 31% while the black population declined by 11%. The loss of nearly 40,000 black residents has been attributed to inability to afford skyrocketing rents fueled by an influx of mostly white professionals flocking to increasingly gentrified neighborhoods (Khalek 2014). Anderson (1990) contends, BAs young, primarily white middle- to upper-middle income professionals invade areas inhabited by the poor and marginally employed, the phrase ‘inner city’ takes on a new meaning^ (p. 158). Recently, Washington has been referred to as BMocha City,^ and by former mayor Vincent Gray as BChocolate Swirl^ (Merica 2013).

With the change in racial and socioeconomic composition has come a dramatic overhaul in the city’s landscape and amenities. New grocery options have improved in the past year, with the opening of a Trader Joe’s at 14th and U streets NW and a new Giant at Citymarket at O Street (Cooper 2015). In Columbia Heights (ward 1), improvements that began as a metro station in 1999 have led to a retail and entertainment complex with over 1600 retail jobs. The neighborhood also witnessed the revitalization of the Tivoli Theater along with the building of a 55,000 square foot Giant grocery store, and many newly built condominiums. These developments coincide with visible demographic change. Within the ward, the black population decreased from 66% to 38% while the white non-Hispanic population increased from 11% to 31% between 1990 and 2010 (Kerr 2012). Between 2000 and 2010, Columbia Heights-Mt. Pleasant gained 8300 white residents and lost about 6700 African Americans (Wogan 2015).

The process of gentrification described above for Columbia Heights has occurred across the city, ranging from the U Street corridor to H Street Northeast and even into areas that did not have neighborhood names until recently (i.e., ‘NOMA’–North of Massachusetts). Much of the capital’s growth has been concentrated in a few areas like Columbia Heights, Shaw, Logan Circle, the Waterfront, and Capitol Hill, which is driving up home prices. BOnce-neglected neighborhoods, scarred by riots, are now recovering and even thriving^ (Our Changing City). Petworth–Brightwood Park and Union Station–Stanton Park each lost between 5000 and 6000 black residents, while gaining approximately 6500 whites in the Union Station area.

The presence and anticipated presence of middle- and upper-income residents have an important effect on real estate values in the District. While the rental market has grown (approximately 12,500 more apartments and homes since 2005), the number of affordable housing options has fallen steadily (Urban Institute 2014). In 2005, over 65,000 rentals were available for under $800 a month. By 2012, that number dropped to roughly 34,000 units. Meanwhile, the number of rentals for

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$1000 or more shot up from about 51,000 units in 2005 to nearly 98,000 in 2012. Since 2000, at least nine public housing properties have been demolished, coincid- ing with the city losing more than half of its low-cost housing units in the past decade (Khalek 2014). Over time, these neighborhoods become increasingly homog- enous in race and class (Anderson 1990).

The margins of working class and low-income areas can be scenes of tension as they become gentrified and slowly absorbed by a wider community made up primarily of white, middle-, and upper-income residents (Anderson 1990; Hwang and Sampson 2014; Khalek 2014). Gentrifiers’ choice of neighborhood does not imply their social integration with existing neighbors of a different race, ethnicity, or class. Zukin (1987) attests that Bin no way but proximity does gentrification counteract the economic and racial polarization of most urban populations^. Despite being attracted to urban neigh- borhoods in part for their social and ethnic diversity, that attraction does not translate into frequent or meaningful interaction (Jackson and Butler 2015; Van Gent et al. 2016). Social segregation, typified as a process of Bsocial tectonics,^ reflects symbolic boundaries between residents that so often occur at the intersections of race and class (Jackson and Butler 2015; Lacy 2007). In neighborhoods undergoing racial, ethnic, and/or class transition, studies have found only limited interaction between residents and newcomers in neighborhoods (Anderson 1990; Minnery et al. 2009; Wilson and Taub 2006; Van Gent et al. 2016; Zukin 1987). Anderson (1990) noted, Bcomity and civility generally prevail, but true racial integration and social equality are often illusory. Only where class is constant does there exist a real opportunity for primary relations between blacks and whites^ (p. 159).

The apparent costs and benefits of gentrification also vary by source. Even among the same general population there is diversity of opinion. Long-time residents, for example, can be on both sides of the coin—largely dependent on social class. For some, revitalization offers the potential rise in property values, decreases in crime, the integration of shops, eateries, recreation, the elimination of urban decay, the opening of new charter schools, and the abolishment of abandoned buildings and vacant lots. While the spoils of gentrification incentivize the support of some, for others, gentrifi- cation creates fear of displacement. Fair housing advocates challenge the movement by highlighting the dislocation of long-term and lower-income residents, and the elimina- tion of cultures once associated with the area.

In 2011, the first American city to have an African American majority lost its status after over half a century. Many DC residents who appreciate the image of black control are worried that political influence will be lost along with their dispossessed black residents (Tavernise 2011). Given the vast implications of gentrification for Washington residents new and old, black and white, rich and poor, an examination of the percep- tions of costs and benefits for those directly impacted by the process is long overdue. This study examines attitudes of Washington DC residents toward gentrification and their beliefs about who wins and who loses in the competition for space as the city continues its revitalization efforts. Utilizing data from a 2014 Washington post poll, we examine eight survey questions on attitudes toward gentrification and incorporate a range of resident vantage points to consider their effect on public sentiment toward community transformation. Given the significance of race and class in the urban landscape, we are particularly interested in exploring the degree to which race and socioeconomic status influence attitudes toward gentrification.

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Winners and Losers in Gentrification

From the moment English sociologist Ruth Glass (1964) coined the term Bgentrification^ to describe the residential movement of the middle-class into low- income areas of London, the word has suggested more than a simple change of scene. For some, it conjures images of a motivation of gentrifiers for historic and cultural preservation (Jager 1986; Patillo 2007; Zukin 1987); for others, it is due to the economic resurgence of corporate businesses in central business districts (Smith 1996); and for others, it represents the forced removal and/or displacement of low- income communities and ethnic groups (Anderson 1990; Freeman 2006; Goetz 2003). To many, the increased presence of whites is the very definition of gentrification (Freeman 2006). While examinations of gentrification have a tendency to consider these factors finitely, in reality, all factors intersect in the complex process of gentrification.

According to Smith (1996), the social meaning of gentrification is increasingly constructed through the vocabulary of the frontier, as gentrifiers are extolled as courageous urban pioneers. Particularly concerned about the imminent displacement of low-income residents, he likens the process and rhetoric of gentrification to the violent dispossessions of Native Americans and the espoused manifest destiny of pioneers of the Old West. Similarly asserted by Zukin (1987), BJust as the frontier thesis in U.S. history legitimized an economic push through ‘uncivilized’ lands, so the urban frontier thesis legitimizes the corporate reclamation of the inner city from racial ghettos and marginal business uses.^

The stories of the American frontier, however, frequently glaze over the reality of the native experience. Today, the Burban frontier^ is largely comprised of low-income minorities, in neighborhoods long-stigmatized for crime, social deviance, and unpre- dictability. These characteristics have been etched into the national psyche. According to Freeman (2006), when whites move into predominantly black neighborhoods, they upset the prevailing notions of who belongs in particular areas. The process of nine- teenth century migration across the western frontier is quite similar to the experience in today’s Burban frontier,^ and the full story of revitalization in Washington, DC, paints an image of marked rewards for the pioneers and of forced removals of native residents.

Given the significant implications of urban revitalization, national, state, and local responses have been the site of significant research across disciplines. Substantial scholarly debate has centered on the winners and losers in the urban battles of gentrification. On one side of the aisle, scholars have heralded the middle class for exploiting the emancipatory potential of the inner city (Caulfield 1994; Duany 2001; Jager 1986). Duany (2001) promoted the widespread benefits of gentrification and argued, BFor every San Francisco and Manhattan where real estate has become uniformly too expensive, there are many more cities like Detroit, Trenton, Syracuse, Milwaukee, Houston, and Philadelphia that could use all the gentrification they can get^ (p. 36). The other side, however, portrays a revanchist perspective that focuses on the resulting displacement of long-time residents and minorities, and the loss of the city’s historical and cultural authenticity (Smith 2002). According to Slater (2006), BThe inner city is not an emancipatory space but a combat zone in which capital, embodied by middle-class gentrifiers, battles it out, block by block, house by house, to retake the city^ (p. 399).

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Depending on individuals’ class and ethno-racial position, the gains or losses of gentrification are perceived and experienced differently. The following review includes important findings from scholarship on both the winners and losers in urban gentrifi- cation based on relevant demographic characteristics, drawing connections to current trends in Washington, DC.

Socio-economic Status

The process of gentrification often pits low- and working class residents against middle- and upper-income newcomers. While in some cases, the battle to remain in one’s community is formidable, the efforts of current dwellers are most often futile in defending against the forces of change. Literature indicates that the poor and those with fixed incomes are the most vulnerable in gentrification (Anderson 1990; Ross and Levine 2001; Smith 1996). Low- and middle-income residents facing rising rents and property values worry about being driven out by gentrification. As Zukin (1987) notes, when pre-gentrification residents mobilize to defend their neighborhood against devel- opment, they are confronting a set of economic and social processes that make for an uneven social contest.

Gentrifying neighborhoods attract technologically competent residents who make the city a more competitive site for firms in the high-tech, legal, and financial sectors. As a result, downtowns become centers of businesses connected to a new economy centered on trade and commerce, telecommunications, politics, and corporate services. These new jobs are connected to city amenities designed to cater to middle and upper class residents. Judd and Swanstrom (2002) caution that if the current trend continues the BAmerican urban pattern will begin to resemble the experience in other countries, where affluent people have long claimed the most valuable real estate in the center of the historic city^ (p. 347).

As affluent newcomers flood into urban centers, the frequent result is the substantial displacement of existing residents to make room for the newcomers (Ross and Levine 2001). Minority, low-income, and public housing residents are among the most vul- nerable. Lynn Cunningham’s (2001) investigation of the effect of HUD’s HOPE VI program in DC found that Ward 8, a predominantly low income and African American section of the city, experienced a 15% decrease in population during the first decade of the program. Population densities for all public housing properties were reduced and those who could not return were relocated to other public housing units or to private housing with Section 8 voucher subsidies (subsequently renamed Housing Choice Voucher). According to Anderson (1990), low-income and working class minority residents are Bimpelled to sell their homes and move away, and the area becomes even more upper income and white^ (p. 23). Smith (1996) adds that minorities and the poorest of the working class are destined for large-scale displacement as urban centers are quickly transformed into bourgeois playgrounds.

Falcon (2013) contends that the rapid changes taking place in the city have made DC a harder place to live for the poor. Since 2010, Washington lost half of its low-cost housing and its cost of homeownership has risen dramatically. BAt the same time, services for low income people have been pushed out of easy-to-access-areas^ (Falcon 2013). Washington’s black residents, residents without a high school diploma, single- parent families, and residents with disabilities are most likely to be low-income (Reed

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2010). Nearly one-third of the black residents and almost half of residents without a high school diploma live at or below 150% of poverty. Almost half of Washington residents in single-parent families (most of which are headed by a single woman) have incomes below 150% of poverty. Forty-three percent of disabled residents have incomes below 150% of poverty.

In contrast to arguments that low-income and working class residents are the most vulnerable in the process of gentrification, research conducted by Freeman and Braconi (2002, 2004) strengthened arguments that the benefits of gentrification outweigh the negative consequences. The authors examined New York City housing and vacancy survey data and found that between 1996 and 1999, lower-income and lesser-educated households were 19% less likely to move out of gentrifying neighborhoods; concluding that displacement was therefore limited. They suggest that these households stay put because they appreciate the new public service improvements taking place and thus find ways to remain in their homes even in the face of higher rent burdens. It’s important to note, however, that the authors confess the Bgradually shrinking pool of low-rent housing^ indirectly harms the interests of the poor (2002).

Around the same time, Peter Byrne, a self-confessed gentrifier living in Washington, DC, provided comprehensive support for gentrification, contending that the process is Bgood on balance for the poor and ethnic minorities^ (Byrne 2003 p. 406). Byrne argued that gentrification benefits low-income residents economically, by Bexpanding more employment opportunities in providing locally the goods and services that more affluent residents can afford^ (2003, p. 419), politically, by creating Burban political fora in which affluent and poor citizens must deal with each other’s priorities in a democratic process^ (p. 421), and socially, as Bnew more affluent residents will rub shoulders with poorer existing residents on the streets, in shops, and within local institutions, such as public schools^ (p. 422).

Race

According to Ross and Levine (2001), gentrification denotes a process of class and racial succession in a neighborhood, where the poor are displaced by more upscale home seekers (p. 76). Research by Zeitz (1979) demonstrated that revitalization creates neighborhood turnover of race and socioeconomic status. Her long-term longitudinal study documents the process by which almost all previous residents were displaced from four formerly black DC neighborhoods during a process the author terms Breinvasion.^ Anderson (1990) contends, with the exclusion of so many black resi- dents, the neighborhoods become Bwealthier, whiter, and thus more attractive to middle-income whites in search of decent housing close to local institutions and the center of the city…Thus, the removal of the blacks helps pave the way for the present- day development and gentrification^ (p. 23). In later work on urban transformation, Anderson (2004, 2011) documents the growth of dynamic multicultural centers where- in diverse ethnic groups overlap and interact comfortably enough to relax, let down their guards. Despite imagery of an idyllic, cross-cultural metropolis, the Bcosmopolitan canopy,^ he admits that race continues to inhibit social relations as, Bskin color becomes a social border^ that complicates social interactions in public spaces.

In exploring the racial implications of gentrification, Hwang and Sampson (2014) evaluate the degree to which racial hierarchy governs residential selection and the

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social pathways of gentrification in Chicago. They consider gentrification as embedded in processes of neighborhood selection, which are shaped by racial composition and shared evaluations of a neighborhood’s disorder. Through the use of systematic social observation with BGoogle Street View,^ the authors found that gentrification is racially ordered, however in surprising ways. Contrary to much of the literature that asserts that poor, minority neighborhoods are among the first targeted in redevelopment and reinvestment, the authors found that gentrification tended to favor neighborhoods with a substantial share of white residents already (approximately 35%). They conclude, BAlthough gentrifiers may have preferences for racial or ethnic diversity or a greater tolerance for minority neighbors, the durability of race-based residential stratification suggests that gentrifiers’ preferred level of diversity is limited^ (p. 730). Whiter neighborhoods that gentrify often continue on upward trajectories of reinvestment and renewal while both percent Hispanic and percent black weakened neighborhood trajectories.

Contrary to Hwang and Sampson’s (2014) findings, census data reveals that today whites are moving back despite the presence of lower-income blacks. They are acknowledging the advantages of living close to the center of the city and the university campuses, the quality of the houses, and the quaintness of the community; but most significantly, they anticipate an imminent rise in the status of the general area. Hence, property there has attained a value that depends not simply on the racial makeup of the present residents, but on the racial and class attributes of potential residents (Anderson 1990, p. 29). Minority residents fear the increasingly white and affluent population will seize political power and neglect their interests (O’Cleireacain and Rivlin 2001, 3).

Age and Gender

One important cause of the influx of new residents is the desire of many millennials to live in fun urban areas where they have ready access to entertainment and can easily commute to work without a car. Despite Washington’s efforts to preserve affordable housing, low-income residents are continually displaced by the influx of young, well- educated, affluent newcomers. Research indicates that younger adults, in particular, tend to disproportionately benefit from gentrification. While the country is aging, DC is getting younger. According to the Urban Institute, from 2000 to 2010, the city’s 18- to 34-year-old population grew by roughly 37,000, and now makes up 35% of the population.1 In 2011, nearly 67% of people who moved into DC within the past year were ages 18–34, up from 57% in 2005. White residents largely avoided neighbor- hoods east of the Anacostia River; however, the percentage of young adults is rising in nearly every part of the city. Mt. Vernon Square, Shaw, and Logan Circle are among the most popular neighborhoods (Ward 1), as are Ivy City, Trinidad, Congress Heights, and LeDroit Park (Wards 5 and 6).

According to the Urban Institute, while young adults are driving DC’s population growth, elderly populations have been dropping. Today, there are approximately 1000 fewer elderly residents than in the preceding decade. LeGates and Hartman’s (1981) nationwide survey of sixteen studies of gentrification-caused displacement found that most displaced are older residents (over 40).

1 Millenials make up only 23% of the US population as a whole.

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Due to higher rates of poverty among female householders, gentrification results in the disproportionate displacement of women and female-headed families (Ross and Levine 2001). According to Neary (2011), urban revitalization disproportionately affects poor African American, female-headed households. BThe concentration of poor, black women and their families in public housing projects constitutes one concrete example of [a] structural arrangement^ of unequal citizen status and residential segre- gation (Neary 2011, p. 524). Studies of gender in residential contexts also reveal that women are likely to be the most resistant to and have the most difficulty coping with having to move. South and Dean (1993) compared the levels and determinants of residential mobility among blacks and non-blacks in the US. Using a sample of 25,819 respondents, they found that black and non-black females are less likely to move than males. This may be due to greater kinship ties among women with community members than males. Campbell and Lee (1992) research found that women tend to establish closer relationships with neighbors than men do.

The available literature on the impacts of gentrification is limited in scope. Slater (2006) points out that there is an absence of publications on the experiences of non- gentrifying groups who live in the neighborhoods into which the much-researched middle classes are arriving en masse (p. 743). This is in part due to the difficulty of researchers to locate the vulnerable and the victims of gentrification. Newman and Wyly (2006) contend, BIt is difficult to find people who have been displaced, partic- ularly if those people are poor…By definition, displaced residents have disappeared from the very places where researchers and census-takers go to look for them^ (2006, p. 27). However, in order to fully understand the process and implications of gentrifi- cation, it is critical that the perspectives of all affected are incorporated into the discourse. The purpose of this article is to begin to fill this gap by exploring the opinions of current residents of Washington, DC, and how they believe they and their communities are affected by gentrification.

Theoretical Framework: Linked Fate

Our expectations of the influence of race and class on resident attitudes toward gentrification are informed by theories of group consciousness, specifically linked fate. First coined by political scientist Dawson (1994), the theoretical construct of linked fate espouses that African Americans’ common history of slavery and post-slavery oppres- sion, and their continuing experience of racism and discrimination contribute to a collective identity (Patillo 2007). McClain and colleagues (McClain et al. 2009a, b) attest that BAfrican Americans have historically been treated as members of a group, rather than as individuals, and consequently individual black Americans see their own fate as inextricably linked to the fate of their racial group^ (McClain et al. 2009a, b, p. 477–478). The sense of collective fate ultimately translates into social and political action that aligns one’s individual interest with those of the racial group, and is a necessary form of resistance (Dawson 1994; Patillo 2007; Simien 2005). Conceived as a Bblack utility heuristic^, linked fate is associated with a set of interests that are organized within the political arena and operates similarly to other political heuristics, such as Republican, Democrat, socialist (Gay and Hochschild 2010). BIn parallel fashion, cultivating or recognizing the fact that one’s own life chances are likely to

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rise and fall as Blacks gain or lose political and social standing enables one to use a few strong cues to make sense of the complex American racial arena^ (Gay and Hochschild 2010, p. 6–7).

Although originally conceived to address African Americans’ enduring group solidarity, literature has begun to apply linked fate to other ethnic groups (Lien et al. 2003; McClain et al. 2009a), across gender groups (Dawson 2001; Simien 2005), and levels of socioeconomic status (Chong and Rogers 2004; Gay and Hochschild 2010). Simien (2005) demonstrates the utility of notions of linked fate beyond race to include gender in her work BRace, Gender, and Linked Fate^. Patillo’s (2007) study of black residential behaviors revealed that many middle and upper class black gentrifiers entered areas comprised of predominantly poor blacks out of a sense of duty and recognition that their presence would benefit the race as a whole. She attests, Bboth the feelings and realities of connectedness translate into a sense of responsibility on the part of middle-class blacks not only to share their success with the less fortunate of the race, but, as Du Bois admonished them, to ‘become leaders in order to guide and conduct them out of their condition of semi-slavery’^ (p. 104).

Not all research, however, demonstrates associations between racial linked fate and socio-political attitudes and behaviors. The seminal works of Frazier (1957), Landry (1987), and Wilson 1987 heavily document and illuminate class-based fractures within the black community. Within residential contexts, particularly, a desire to protect one’s material interests (i.e., property value) often conflicts with a sense of linked fate. According to Haynes (2001), Dawson’s concept overgeneralizes the effect of racial solidarity and overlooks the ways group interests are shaped by pressures from the local community. He concludes, after his case study of a black middle class suburb in New York, Bwhether race or class interests prevail at any one time depends on how residents assess the impact of a particular local or national issue on their community^ (p. xxvii). Wilson and Taub’s (2006) examination of racial and class tensions in Chicago neigh- borhoods found that black residents’ concerns about racial identity did not obscure the significance of class distinctions within their community. Patillo’s (2007) and Lacy’s (2007) ethnographic research both found black middle class makes deliberate efforts to create physical and social distance from lower class racial peers. According to Weise (2006), locational distance has historically served as a means for class members to express and reinforce their newly won social position. BFor the urban black middle class, in particular, physical separation from poor and working-class blacks was an important emblem of class status^ (Weise 2006, 116). Martin (2010) adds that blacks in the middle class may not perceive their destinies as tied to other blacks with lower socioeconomic status. BCollaborations amongst the black middle class and others, especially as it relates to community development efforts, is more likely the result of public policies than the desire of middle class blacks to maintain ties with other members of their racial group^ (Martin 2010, p. 237).

Literature indicates that gentrification affects segments of the urban population differently—across racial, political, gender, and socioeconomic lines. To current city dwellers witnessing the rapid transformation, the status or change in circumstances of similarly situated neighbors can be used as a signal of one’s own situation or future. Gay and Hochschild’s (2010) comparison of perceptions of linked fate across race, ethnicity, class, gender, and religion found that class-based linked fate is particularly salient across all racial and ethnic groups (white, black, Asian, Hispanic). African

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Americans expressed, on average, equal amounts of racial- and class-based linked fate, while whites and Hispanics were substantially more likely to express perceptions of class-based linked fate than any other type of linked fate.

Hochschild’s findings add to a body of work asserting the inseparability of race and class as determinants of life chances, attitudes, and behavior (Feagin 1991; Hall 1996; Landry 1987; Patillo-McCoy 1999). Durant and Sparrow (1997) found that lower class blacks emphasize race more than class as a form of self-identification; suggesting that less advantaged African Americans see race as a more decisive factor in their social and economic lives than social class. In contrast, although upper-middle-class blacks are not insensitive to race prejudice, they are more likely to identify with their class position (Rothman 2015).

In testing the contention that class had grown in importance to blacks more than race, Martin (2010) examined whether middle class blacks negotiate their racial identity in ways that reflect strategic assimilation or multi-class racial formation. Multi-class identity is defined as a racialized class identity that allows blacks in the middle class to feel a sense of connectedness to others in their racial group who do not have member- ship in their social class (Moore 2005). After analyzing 1990 and 2000 census data, Martin (2010) concluded that due to forcible exclusion from mainstream society, middle class blacks are not engaging in strategic assimilation. Instead, they are establishing their own, separate, institutions where they can engage with class peers. The current study endeavors to further clarify the strength of race-based linked fate and class-based linked fate in the perceptions of urban residents toward gentrification in Washington, DC.

Methodology

This research utilizes a Washington Post Washington, DC, Poll to evaluate the salience of race and class in determining resident support of DC gentrification and redevelop- ment.2 The poll was conducted using telephone interviews from January 9–12, 2014, and reports findings from a random sample of 1000 residents of Washington, DC, across over forty questions. For the purposes of our study, we extracted and analyzed responses to eight questions related to attitudes toward gentrification and redevelop- ment, in addition to demographic data. The eight questions selected are as follows:

BAs you may know, ‘gentrification’ (jen-truh-fi-KAY-shun) is the process in which developers or higher income families buy and fix up homes or apartments buildings in working class city neighborhoods. Some say this type of redevelop- ment is good because it may draw new businesses to the area, increase home values and encourage higher income residents to move into the neighborhood. Others say this type of redevelopment is bad because it may cause rents and property taxes to increase, and force lower income residents to move out of the neighborhood. In general, would you say this kind of redevelopment is mainlya good thing or mainly a bad thing?^

2 A special thanks to the Washington Post for providing access to the underlying data.

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BAs you may know, the district government is trying to redevelop parts of the city to attract new businesses and residents. Do you think this process of redevelop- ment is mainly good or mainly bad for (people like you), (long-time city resi- dents), (newer cityresidents), (whites in the district), (blacks in the district), (rich residents), (poor residents)?^

DC’s black majority status has been steadily shrinking since the 1980s—in 1980, DC was 70% black but that share fell to 61% in 2000 and 51% by 2010. In addition to blacks moving out, whites and others are now moving in and are more likely to stay. With the rapid decline in the black population and increasing scarcity of affordable housing options, we expect race to be a strong indicator of attitudes toward gentrification. More specifically, we expect that black respondents will be least likely to believe that gentrification is a good thing, particularly for people like themselves, for blacks, and for the poor.

Literature indicates that gentrification and redevelopment have different impacts on socioeconomic groups (Hwang and Sampson 2014). Better-employed and -educated residents fare better in the changing environment. Given these trends, we expect socioeconomic status to have a significant impact on resident attitudes toward gentri- fication and redevelopment. Specifically, we expect residents with high socioeconomic status (greater levels of income and education) to be more likely than those with lower socioeconomic status to believe gentrification and redevelopment are good for DC, and across all groups. These expectations lead our research to test two hypotheses:

H1: Race significantly influences perceptions of gentrification and redevelopment, such that black residents will be more opposed to gentrification and redevelopment than white counterparts

H2: Socio-economic status (education and income) will significantly influence per- ceptions of redevelopment, such that residents with higher education and income levels will have more favorable perceptions of gentrification and redevelopment.

Finally, because there are a variety of groups who are impacted differently by the changes taking place in the District, we include important predictor variables that we expect will impact the strength of the relationships between race and SES with attitudes toward gentrification and redevelopment. These variables include party identification, political ideology, ward, gender, age, length of time in DC, belief about the direction DC is headed, and assessment of neighborhood conditions. Due to the significant growth of newcomers and young adults and the clustering in specific wards in the District, we expect age, ward, and length of time in the district to have the greatest impact. Specifically, we expect younger residents, those who live outside of transforming wards, and newer residents to have more positive attitudes toward gentrification, across racial groups.

Findings

To test the hypothesis that race influences perceptions toward gentrification and redevelopment, such that black residents are more opposed than whites, we began by

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using cross tabulations and log-linear analysis to examine responses to eight survey questions regarding whether gentrification was a good or a bad thing, and for whom. Statistical significance on the cross tabulations was first calculated using chi-square (p < .05).3 Log-linear analysis determined whether the relationship between predictor variables and the eight questions differed according to race (interaction effect). We included the following predictor variables: race, party identification, political ideology, ward of residence, gender, age,4 education, income,5 length of time in DC, whether they felt DC was headed in the right direction, and rating of neighborhood condition.

Table 1 illustrates the significant findings to the question: BIn general, would you say this kind of redevelopment is mainly a good thing or mainly a bad thing?^ The data reports the percentage of respondents who believe that gentrification is a good thing.

Table 2 presents the significant findings for a seven-part question: BDo you think this process of redevelopment is mainly good or mainly bad for (people like you), (long- time city residents), (newer city residents), (whites in the district), (blacks in the district), (rich residents), (poor residents)?^ The table reports the percentage of respon- dents who believe that redevelopment is mainly good for the identified population.

According to the results of our analyses, race is a significant determinant of perceptions toward gentrification and redevelopment in all eight (8) questions (p < .05). White residents are consistently more likely to believe gentrification was a good thing than blacks. The largest gaps occurred across four questions, where differences between whites and blacks were greater than 20% where gentrification is good, good for Bpeople like you, for Blong-time residents^, and for Bblacks in the District.^ The overwhelming majorities of black and white residents agree that rede- velopment is mainly good for the rich, for whites, and for those new to the District.

Party identification and gender were not strong predictors for either racial group. Level of income and education will be discussed in the following section on socioeco- nomic status. Interesting findings, however, are present on the impact of ward location for whites and blacks. Particularly in wards 1 (94% v 57%), 2 (92% v 33%), 4 (67% v 46%), and 6 (89% v 30%), whites are substantially more likely to believe gentrification is a good thing than blacks. Each of these wards can be characterized as currently undergoing gentrification and redevelopment and have seen a slow but steady reversal of demographic composition. Ward 1 for example, demonstrated a 37% difference between whites and blacks. This ward is located in Northwest DC6 and has transitioned from being 60% black in 1990 to 47% in 2000 and 33% in 2010. Whites on the other hand have increased from 20% in 1990 to 24% in 2000 to 40% of the ward in 2010. Between 1990 and 2010, homeownership in ward 1 increased from 24% to 35% and median home sales rose from $169,000–$576,000. Among blacks, lowest support for gentrification was found in wards 6, 7, and 8 (30%, 31%, 38%). In ward 6,7

3 In the tables, we report all results that are statistically significant. Empty cells reflect findings that were not statistically significant. However, we do not believe that differences of less than ten percentage points are substantively significant and are often ignored in our discussion. 4 Age is measured in three groups ranging from 18 to over 50 years as 18–29, 30–49, and 50+. 5 Income is measured in 3 groups for whites and 5 groups for blacks ranging from $0 to over $100,000 due to a skewed income distribution by race in the district. 6 Ward 1 incorporates communities such as Columbia Heights and U Street Corridor. These areas are well known for suffering severe damage during the 1968 riots, and were not rebuilt for decades. 7 Ward 6 includes communities such as Capitol Hill and NOMA (North of Massachusetts Ave.)

Journal of African American Studies (2019) 23:72–91 83

demographic shifts are similarly dramatic. Between 1990 and 2010, the black popula- tion decreased from 66% to 43%, and white presence has increased from 30% to 47%. Since 1980, homeownership has risen from 35% to 46% and median home sales increased from $161,000 in 1995 to $621,000 in 2012.

Table 1 In general, would you say this kind of redevelopment is mainly a good thing or mainly a bad thing?

Good thing

Race White 85

Black 42

White Black

Party ID Dem Repub

Pol. Ideology Cons. 50*

Mod. 42

Lib. 35

Ward 1 94 57

2 92 58

3 89

4 67 46

5 70 53

6 89 30

7 31

8 38

Gender Male

Female

Age 18–29 26

30–49 54

50+ 42

Education HS Gr 39

Some C 34

Coll+ 55

Income Low 74 35

Med. 71 50

High 91 26

89 43

52

66

How Long in DC 0–10 yrs.

11+ yrs.

DC Direction Right dir. 55

Wrong dir. 30

Neigh. Conditions Better

Worse

Same

*Indicates significant likelihood ratio at p≤ .05 level

84 Journal of African American Studies (2019) 23:72–91

T a b l e 2

D o yo u th in k th is pr oc es s of

re de ve lo pm

en t is m ai nl y go od

or m ai nl y ba d fo r

P eo pl e

lik e yo u

L on g- tim

e ci ty

re si de nt s

N ew

er ci ty

re si de nt s

W hi te s in

th e di st ri ct

B la ck s in

th e di st ri ct

R ic h re si de nt s

P oo r re si de nt s

R ac e

W hi te

93 80

96 96

71 97

55

B la ck

59 50

84 88

44 87

24

W hi te

B la ck

W hi te

B la ck

W hi te

B la ck

W hi te

B la ck

W hi te

B la ck

W hi te

B la ck

W hi te

B la ck

P ar ty

ID D em

47 86

50 *

R ep ub

60 94

70

P ol .

C on s.

52 73 *

61 *

93 44

Id eo lo gy

M od .

75 91

87 90

71

L ib .

54 85

74 71

69

W ar d

1 98 *

57 79 *

63 63

2 95

48 87

42 86

3 98

83

4 85

68 66

53 88

5 84

65 74

59 85

6 94

58 90

34 95

7 61

57 90

8 55

45 92

G en de r

M al e

96 *

86 *

45 79

91

F em

al e

89 75

53 64

84

A ge

18 –2 9

39 *

91 86 *

95

30 –4 9

59 84

94 91

50 +

52 79

84 79

E du ca ti on

H S G r

51 88

83 81

S om

e C

63 90

94 91

Journal of African American Studies (2019) 23:72–91 85

T a b l e 2

(c on ti nu ed )

C ol l+

70 97

92 96

In co m e

L ow

51 58 *

89 77

54 89

81 41 *

27

M ed .

81 81

10 0

89 58

10 0

80 64

27

H ig h

81 81

95 95

69 10 0

86 56

21

86 86

98 95

78 98

98 58

29

88 91

23

93 97

16

H ow

L on g in

D C

0– 10

yr s.

88 *

36 77 *

67 *

72 52

65 42

11 + yr s.

D C D ir ec ti on

R ig ht

D ir.

67 90

93 54

W ro ng

D ir.

43 77

78 32

N ei gh . C on di ti on s

B et te r

51 84

88 22

W or se

76 80

70 40

S am

e 44

93 89

22

*I nd ic at es

si gn if ic an t lik el ih oo d ra tio

at p ≤ .0 5 le ve l

86 Journal of African American Studies (2019) 23:72–91

Age, perception of the direction DC is headed, and rating of neighborhood condition were all good indicators of attitudes toward gentrification and/or redevelopment for blacks, but not for whites. Black residents under 30 were the least likely to believe gentrification was a good thing (26%), and particularly for long-time residents (39%). Middle-aged and older blacks were more likely to believe it was good (59%, 52% and 84%, 79% respectively). Age was not a significant indicator for whites across all eight questions. Not surprisingly, blacks who believe that DC is headed in the right direction are more likely to feel gentrification is a good thing (55%), particularly for people like themselves (67%), newer residents (90%), and other blacks in the district (54%). The effect of neighborhood conditions produced interesting results. Blacks who felt their neighborhoods have gotten worse over time were not the least likely to believe redevelopment was a good thing. In fact, they were most likely to believe it was a good thing for long-time city residents (76%) and for the poor (40%). Appraisal of neighborhood conditions was not a significant indicator for whites across all eight questions.

The data in the tables above illustrate that education is a strong indicator for attitudes about gentrification and redevelopment for blacks, but not so much among whites. Black college graduates are more likely to believe gentrification is a good thing (55%) and that it benefits others like themselves (70%). For blacks and whites, income has similar effects, but is a stronger indicator among whites. Across all questions, low- income whites were least likely to believe redevelopment was a good thing for DC while upper income whites were the most likely to believe it benefitted people like themselves (70%), newer residents (97%), and whites in the district (92%). Overall, gentrification and redevelopment were seen as good among upper income residents across racial groups.

Our analysis was followed up with factor analysis, from which emerged two factors: (1) that gentrification and redevelopment are bad for people who are poor, black, and long-time residents, and (2) that gentrification and redevelopment are good for the rich, whites, and newer residents. We then created two indices that captured these two factors (Badpoor [range 0–5] and Goodrich [range 0–3]). These indices were used as dependent variables in two regression equations. We include as independent variables (mostly dummy variables) those discussed in the crosstabs: race, education, gender, age, income, length of time living in DC, political party identification, whether the respondent identified them self as liberal or conservative, ward, and whether they believed DC was moving in the right direction. We tested whether these variables affected blacks and whites differently by including interaction terms with race.

Our first index represents the likelihood that people believe that gentrification is bad for the poor, for blacks, and for long-time residents. Basic descriptive statistics and regression coefficients for BadPoor are shown in Table 3. In this table, we only include predictor variables that had a significant relationship (p < .05) with BadPoor. The model was able to account for 31% of the variance in BadPoor, F(20, 869) = 18.482, MSE = 43.440, p < .05, R2 = .310.

None of the predictors are particularly strong, however income was the most important predictor. People who think gentrification and redevelopment are bad for the poor, for blacks, and for long-time residents are more likely to be black, under the age of 29, liberal, and residents in Ward 4. As this sentiment increases, the likelihood that residents are upper class, white, support the direction of the city, and are high

Journal of African American Studies (2019) 23:72–91 87

school graduates decreases. The variable Blackrich was not found to be statistically significant, indicating that income has the same effect on whites and blacks in regard to their attitudes toward gentrification and redevelopment.

Our second index represents the likelihood that respondents believe gentrification is good for the rich, for whites, and for newer residents. Basic descriptive statistics and regression coefficients are shown in Table 4. Each of the reported predictor variables had a significant relationship (p < .05) with Goodrich. The model was able to account for 19% of the variance in Goodrich, F(20, 178) = 9.651, MSE = 8.905, p < .05, R2 = .190.

Again, none of the predictors are particularly strong, however income was the strongest predictor. People who think gentrification and redevelopment are good for the rich are more likely to be upper income, believe the city is headed in the right direction, and have lived in the district more than ten years. Moreover, people are more likely to believe the changes are good if they are black residents in ward 1 and high school graduates. The variable Blackrich was found to be statistically significant, indicating that the attitudes of whites and blacks are impacted differently by their income. Upper class blacks are less likely than similarly situated whites to believe gentrification and redevelopment are good for the rich.

Table 3 Multiple regression re- sults for BadPoor

R2 = .310

Variables Beta coefficients Standard error

Income −0.327 0.048 Right direction −0.205 0.115 Race (Black) 0.180 0.199

Ward 4 0.165 0.258

Political ideology (Liberal) 0.157 0.125

How long in DC (< 10) −0.112 0.130 HS graduate −0.107 0.212 Ward4Blacki −0.103 0.336 Age (< 29) 0.082 0.133

Ward1Blacki −0.082 0.386

Table 4 Multiple regression re- sults for GoodRich

R2 = .190

Variables Beta coefficients Standard error

Income 0.336 0.300

Right direction 0.188 0.072

Blackrichi −0.179 0.135 Political ideology (Liberal) −0.148 0.078 How long in DC (< 10) 0.106 0.082

Ward1Blacki 0.089 0.242 Ward1 −0.084 0.137 HS graduate 0.076 0.133

88 Journal of African American Studies (2019) 23:72–91

Conclusion

Urban centers throughout the country are experiencing rapid transformation as affluent residents migrate from other areas or return from the suburbs. In the District of Columbia, the energy of urban renewal is palpable, with the sites and sounds of demolition and construction on almost every street. Former DC Mayor Vincent Gray noted, BOn any given day, you will have sixty or more cranes that are operating^ (Merica 2013). Multi-phase revitalization and construction projects will continue into the next decade to include new housing, retail and office space, and new attractions throughout the District. At pace with the city’s rapid physical transformation has been its racial and socioeconomic composition.

Given the racial turnover taking place in our nation’s capital, and the contentious debates around the costs and benefits of gentrification, the authors sought to examine the attitudes and beliefs of those directly impacted by the processes of urban renewal. Our analysis of a 2014 Washington Post poll revealed interesting findings, confirming both of our hypotheses. Race is a significant indicator in determining the views of DC residents but class was more salient. Age, perception, rating of neighborhood and education were strong indicators for blacks but not whites. Surprisingly, low-income whites were least likely to support redevelopment, affirming class and income as the most potent variables.

Affirming Michael Dawson’s black utility heuristic, which posits educated blacks as believing in Blinked fate,^ upper income blacks believed less in the positive aspects of gentrification than white class peers. While the black middle class shares a sense of loyalty and connection to their poorer racial peers (Dawson 1994; Patillo 2007), these sentiments are complicated by boundaries erected to protect social status and class identities (Lacy 2007; Weise 2006). If, as Wilson (1987) states, Bit is difficult to speak of a uniform black experience when the black population can be meaningfully stratified into groups whose members range from those who are affluent to those who are impoverished^ (x), it is unlikely that their attitudes and beliefs about racial unity, responsibility, gentrification, and displacement will be uniform.

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