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NASA Disasters

Name

Institution

Introduction

“Columbia and Challenger: Organizational Failure at NASA” by Joseph Lorenzo Hall is an article that criticizes NASA’s organizational hierarchy for its responsibility in the failed missions that have time after time claimed the lives of various astronauts. The article claims that NASA is an organization that is breeding failure if at all they are not willing to make major organizational changes. The article uses the examples of the Columbia and Challenger missions that failed to highlight the failures of NASA.

Reasons for failed missions at NASA

After the two missions failed; Challenger and Columbia missions, commissions of inquiry were formed to investigate the causes of the failures. The commission found that the challenger mission failed just as it was about to take off; this happened when an O-ring froze several hours before so when the space shuttle ‘challenger' was lifted off it exploded killing seven people who were on board (Hall, 2003). These findings were contended by people who felt that the explosion was not caused by a technical error rather it happened even after low-level employees expressed safety concerns. This accident has been linked to the failed Columbia Mission that failed when the space shuttle disintegrated during re-entry; apparently, a portion of foam broke from the large wings of the Columbia space shuttle; this damaged the ship causing it to have an unsuccessful re-entry.

In both cases, low-level employees expressed their concerns but it wasn't taken seriously. Engineers working on the O-rings felt it was not safe to launch the space shuttle but management gave a go ahead anyway. This shows that both space shuttles failed because of the bureaucratic atmosphere at NASA (Mahler, 2009).

Conclusion

NASA’S disasters are significantly fewer than the successful ones. However, the calls made by the management in times of crisis can cause fatal mistakes. The erosion of the O-ring and failed re-entries were not new issues to NASA, but the decisions made by the management continue to cause loss of lives in spite of warnings from the technical teams. (Niewoehner & Steidle, 2009).

References

Hall, J. L. (2003). Columbia and Challenger: organizational failure at NASA. Space Policy,

19(4), 239-247.

Mahler, J. G. (2009). Organizational learning at NASA: the Challenger and Columbia accidents.

Georgetown University Press.

Niewoehner, R. J., & Steidle, C. E. (2009). The loss of the space shuttle Columbia: Portaging

leadership lessons with a critical thinking model. Engineering Management Journal,

21(1), 9-18.