

able; hence the action of one part is against nature for the other nature in us, and when they are equally balanced, the action seems neither pleasant nor painful. For if something has a simple nature the same action will always be the most pleasant. 1154b
25

That is why the god always enjoys one simple pleasure [without change].* For activity belongs not only to change but also to unchangingness, and indeed there is pleasure in rest more than in change. 'Variation in everything is sweet'* (as the poet says) because of some inferiority; for just as it is the inferior human being who is prone to variation, so also the nature that needs variation is inferior, since it is not simple or decent. 30

§9 So much, then, for continence and incontinence and for pleasure and pain, what each of them is, and in what ways some [aspects] of them are good and others bad. It remains for us to discuss friendship as well.*

BOOK VIII

[FRIENDSHIP]

1

[Common Beliefs and Questions]

After that, the next topic is friendship; for it is a virtue, or involves virtue. 1155a

Further, it is most necessary for our life.* For no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods.* Indeed rich people and holders of powerful positions, even more than other people, seem to need friends. For how would one benefit from such prosperity if one had no opportunity for beneficence, which is most often displayed, and most highly praised, in relation to friends? And how would one guard and protect prosperity without friends, when it is all the more precarious the greater it is? 5
10

§2 But in poverty also, and in the other misfortunes, people think friends are the only refuge.* Moreover, the young need friends to keep them from error. The old need friends to care for them and support the actions that fail because of weakness. And those in their prime need friends to do fine actions; for 'when two go together . . .',* they are more capable of understanding and acting. 15

§3 Further, a parent would seem to have a natural friendship for a child, and a child for a parent, not only among human beings but also among birds and most kinds of animals. Members of the same species,* and human beings most of all, have a natural friendship for each other; that is why we praise friends of humanity.* And in our travels we can see how every human being is akin and beloved to a human being. 20

§4 Moreover, friendship would seem to hold cities together, and legislators would seem to be more concerned about it than about justice. For 25

1155a concord would seem to be similar to friendship, and they aim at concord among all, while they try above all to expel civil conflict, which is enmity.* Further, if people are friends, they have no need of justice, but if they are just they need friendship in addition; and the justice that is most just seems to belong to friendship.*

30 §5 But friendship is not only necessary, but also fine.* For we praise lovers of friends, and having many friends seems to be a fine thing. Moreover, people think that the same people are good and also friends.

§6 Still, there are quite a few disputed points about friendship.*

For some hold it is a sort of similarity and that similar people are
35 friends. Hence the sayings, 'similar to similar', and 'birds of a feather', and so on. On the other side, it is said that similar people are all like the proverbial potters, quarreling with each other.*

1155b On these questions some people inquire at a higher level, more proper to natural science.* Euripides says that when earth gets dry it longs passionately for rain, and the holy heaven when filled with rain longs passionately to fall into the earth;* and Heracleitus says that the opponent
5 cooperates, the finest harmony arises from discordant elements, and all things come to be in struggle.* Others, such as Empedocles, oppose this view, and say that similar aims for similar.*

§7 Let us, then, leave aside the puzzles proper to natural science, since they are not proper to the present examination, and let us examine the
10 puzzles that concern human [nature], and bear on characters and feelings.* For instance, does friendship arise among all sorts of people, or can people not be friends if they are vicious? And is there one species of friendship, or are there more? Some people think there is only one species because friendship allows more and less. But here their confidence rests
15 on an inadequate sign; for things of different species also allow more and less. We have spoken about these earlier.*

2

[The Object of Friendship]

Perhaps these questions will become clear once we find out what it is that is lovable.* For, it seems, not everything is loved, but [only] the lovable, and this is either good or pleasant or useful. However, it seems that the
20 useful is the source of some good or some pleasure; hence the good and the pleasant are lovable as ends.

§2 Now do people love the good, or the good for themselves? For sometimes these conflict; and the same is true of the pleasant. Each one, it seems, loves the good for himself; and while the good is lovable without
25 qualification, the lovable for each one is the good for himself. In fact, each one loves not what *is* good for him, but what *appears* good for him; but

this will not matter, since [what appears good for him] will be what appears lovable.* 1155b

§3 There are these three causes, then, of love.* Now love for an inanimate thing is not called friendship, since there is no mutual loving, and no wishing of good to it. For it would presumably be ridiculous to wish good things to wine; the most you wish is its preservation so that you can have it. To a friend, however, it is said, you must wish goods for his own sake.* If you wish good things in this way, but the same wish is not returned by the other, you would be said to have [only] goodwill for the other. For friendship is said to be *reciprocated* goodwill. 30

§4 But perhaps we should add that friends are aware of the reciprocated goodwill. For many a one has goodwill to people whom he has not seen but supposes to be decent or useful, and one of these might have the same goodwill toward him. These people, then, apparently have goodwill to each other, but how could we call them friends, given that they are unaware of their attitude to each other? [If they are to be friends], then, they must* have goodwill to each other, wish goods and be aware of it, from one of the causes mentioned above.* 35 1156a 5

3

[The Three Types of Friendship]

Since these causes differ in species, so do the types of loving and types of friendship.* Hence friendship has three species, corresponding to the three objects of love. For each object of love has a corresponding type of mutual loving, combined with awareness of it.*

But those who love each other wish goods to each other [only] insofar as they love each other.* Those who love each other for utility love the other not in his own right, but insofar as they gain some good for themselves from him. The same is true of those who love for pleasure; for they like a witty person not because of his character, but because he is pleasant to them. 10

§2 Those who love for utility or pleasure, then, are fond of a friend because of what is good or pleasant for themselves, not insofar as the beloved is who he is,* but insofar as he is useful or pleasant. Hence these friendships as well [as the friends] are coincidental, since the beloved is loved not insofar as he is who he is, but insofar as he provides some good or pleasure. 15

§3 And so these sorts of friendships are easily dissolved, when the friends do not remain similar [to what they were]; for if someone is no longer pleasant or useful, the other stops loving him. 20

What is useful does not remain the same, but is different at different times.* Hence, when the cause of their being friends is removed, the friendship is dissolved too, on the assumption that the friendship aims at

1156a these [useful results]. §4 This sort of friendship seems to arise especially among older people, since at that age they pursue the advantageous, not the pleasant, and also among those in their prime or youth who pursue the expedient.*

25 Nor do such people live together very much. For sometimes they do not even find each other pleasant. Hence they have no further need to meet in this way if they are not advantageous [to each other]; for each finds the other pleasant [only] to the extent that he expects some good from him. 30 The friendship of hosts and guests is taken to be of this type too.*

§5 The cause of friendship between young people seems to be pleasure. For their lives are guided by their feelings, and they pursue above all what is pleasant for themselves and what is at hand. But as they grow 35 up [what they find] pleasant changes too. Hence they are quick to become friends, and quick to stop; for their friendship shifts with [what they find] 1156b pleasant, and the change in such pleasure is quick. Young people are prone to erotic passion, since this mostly accords with feelings, and is caused by pleasure; that is why they love and quickly stop, often changing in a single day.

5 These people wish to spend their days together and to live together; for this is how they gain [the good things] corresponding to their friendship.

§6 But complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue; for they wish goods in the same way to each other insofar as they are good, and they are good in their own right.* [Hence they wish goods 10 to each other for each other's own sake.] Now those who wish goods to their friend for the friend's own sake are friends most of all; for they have this attitude because of the friend himself, not coincidentally.* Hence these people's friendship lasts as long as they are good; and virtue is enduring.*

Each of them is both good without qualification and good for his friend, since good people are both good without qualification and advantageous for each other.* They are pleasant in the same ways too, since 15 good people are pleasant both without qualification and for each other.* [They are pleasant for each other] because each person finds his own actions and actions of that kind pleasant, and the actions of good people are the same or similar.

§7 It is reasonable that this sort of friendship is enduring, since it 20 embraces in itself all the features that friends must have. For the cause of every friendship is good or pleasure, either unqualified or for the lover; and every friendship accords with some similarity. And all the features we have mentioned are found in this friendship because of [the nature of] the friends themselves. For they are similar in this way [i.e., in being good].* Moreover, their friendship also has the other things—what is good without qualification and what is pleasant without qualification;

and these are lovable most of all. Hence loving and friendship are found most of all and at their best in these friends. 1156b

§8 These kinds of friendships are likely to be rare, since such people are few. Further, they need time as well, to grow accustomed to each other;* for, as the proverb says, they cannot know each other before they have shared their salt as often as it says,* and they cannot accept each other or be friends until each appears lovable to the other and gains the other's confidence. 25

§9 Those who are quick to treat each other in friendly ways wish to be friends, but are not friends, unless they are also lovable, and know this. For though the wish for friendship comes quickly, friendship does not. 30

4

[Comparison between the Types of Friendship]

This sort of friendship, then, is complete both in time and in the other ways. In every way each friend gets the same things and similar things from each, and this is what must be true of friends. Friendship for pleasure bears some resemblance to this complete sort, since good people are also pleasant to each other. And friendship for utility also resembles it, since good people are also useful to each other.* 35 1157a

With these [incomplete friends] also, the friendships are most enduring whenever they get the same thing—pleasure, for instance—from each other, and, moreover, get it from the same source, as witty people do, in contrast to the erotic lover and the boy he loves. 5

For the erotic lover and his beloved do not take pleasure in the same things; the lover takes pleasure in seeing his beloved, but the beloved takes pleasure in being courted by his lover.* When the beloved's bloom is fading,* sometimes the friendship fades too; for the lover no longer finds pleasure in seeing his beloved, and the beloved is no longer courted by the lover. Many, however, remain friends if they have similar characters and come to be fond of each other's characters from being accustomed to them.* §2 Those who exchange utility rather than pleasure in their erotic relations are friends to a lesser extent and less enduring friends.* 10

Those who are friends for utility dissolve the friendship as soon as the advantage is removed; for they were never friends of each other, but of what was expedient for them.* 15

Now it is possible for bad people as well [as good] to be friends to each other for pleasure or utility, for decent people to be friends to base people, and for someone with neither character to be a friend to someone with any character. Clearly, however, only good people can be friends to each other because of the other person himself;* for bad people find no enjoyment in one another if they get no benefit. 20

1157a §3 Moreover, the friendship of good people is the only one that is immune to slander. For it is not easy to trust anyone speaking against someone whom we ourselves have found reliable for a long time; and among good people there is trust, the belief that he would never do injustice, and all the other things expected in a true friendship. But in the other
25 types of friendship [distrust] may easily arise.

§4 [These must be counted as types of friendship.] For people include among friends [not only the best type, but] also those who are friends for utility, as cities are—since alliances between cities seem to aim at expediency—and those who are fond of each other, as children are, for pleasure.
30 Hence we must presumably also say that such people are friends, but say that there are more species of friendship than one.*

On this view, the friendship of good people insofar as they are good is friendship primarily and fully, but the other friendships are friendships by similarity.* For insofar as there is something good, and [hence] something similar to [what one finds in the best kind], people [in the incomplete friendships] are friends; for what is pleasant is good to lovers of pleasure. §5 But these [incomplete] types of friendship are not very regularly combined, and the same people do not become friends for both
35 utility and pleasure. For things that [merely] coincide with each other are not very regularly combined.

1157b §6 Friendship has been assigned, then, to these species.* Base people will be friends for pleasure or utility, since they are similar in that way. But good people will be friends because of themselves, since they are friends insofar as they are good. These, then, are friends without qualification; the others are friends coincidentally and by being similar to these.*
5

5

[State and Activity in Friendship]

Just as, in the case of the virtues, some people are called good in their state of character, others good in their activity, the same is true of friendship.* For some people find enjoyment in each other by living together, and provide each other with good things. Others, however, are asleep or separated by distance, and so are not active in these ways, but are in the
10 state that would result in the friendly activities; for distance does not dissolve the friendship without qualification, but only its activity. But if the absence is long, it also seems to cause the friendship to be forgotten; hence the saying, 'Lack of conversation has dissolved many a friendship'.

15 §2 Older people and sour people do not appear to be prone to friendship. For there is little pleasure to be found in them, and no one can spend his days with what is painful or not pleasant, since nature appears to avoid above all what is painful and to aim at what is pleasant.

§3 Those who welcome each other but do not live together would seem to have goodwill rather than friendship. For nothing is as proper to friends as living together; for while those who are in want desire benefit, blessedly happy people [who want for nothing], no less than the others, desire to spend their days together, since a solitary life fits them least of all.* But people cannot spend their time with each other if they are not pleasant and do not enjoy the same things, as they seem to in the friendship of companions. 1157b 20

§4 Now the friendship of good people is friendship most of all, as we have often said. For what is lovable and choiceworthy seems to be what is good or pleasant without qualification, and what is lovable and choiceworthy to each person seems to be what is good or pleasant to himself;* and both of these make one good person lovable and choiceworthy to another good person. 25

§5 Loving would seem to be a feeling, but friendship a state. For loving is directed no less toward inanimate things, but reciprocal loving requires decision, and decision comes from a state; and [good people] wish good to the beloved for his own sake in accord with their state, not their feeling.* 30

Moreover, in loving their friend they love what is good for themselves; for when a good person becomes a friend he becomes a good for his friend. Each of them loves what is good for himself, and repays in equal measure the wish and the pleasantness of his friend; for friendship is said to be equality. And this is true above all in the friendship of good people. 35 1158a

6

[Activities Characteristic of the Different Types of Friendship]

Among sour people and older people, friendship is found less often, since they are worse-tempered and find less enjoyment in meeting people, so that they lack the features that seem most typical and most productive of friendship.* That is why young people become friends quickly, but older people do not, since they do not become friends with people in whom they find no enjoyment—nor do sour people. These people have goodwill to each other, since they wish goods and give help in time of need; but they scarcely count as friends, since they do not spend their days together or find enjoyment in each other, and these things seem to be above all typical of friendship. 5 10

§2 No one can have complete friendship for many people, just as no one can have an erotic passion for many at the same time; for [complete friendship, like erotic passion,] is like an excess, and an excess is naturally directed at a single individual.* And just as it is difficult for many people

1158a to please the same person intensely at the same time, it is also difficult, presumably, for many to be good. §3 [To find out whether someone is really good], one must both have experience of him and be on familiar terms with him, which is extremely difficult.* If, however, the friendship is for utility or pleasure, it is possible for many people to please;* for there are many people of the right sort, and the services take little time.*

§4 Of these other two types of friendship, the friendship for pleasure is more like [real] friendship; for they get the same thing from each other, and they find enjoyment in each other, or [rather] in the same things. This is what friendships are like among young people; for a generous [attitude] is found here more [than among older people], whereas it is mercenary people who form friendships for utility.

Moreover, blessedly happy people have no need of anything useful, but do need sources of pleasure.* For they want to spend their lives with companions, and though what is painful is borne for a short time, no one could continuously endure even the Good Itself if it were painful to him.* That is why they seek friends who are pleasant. But, presumably, they must also seek friends who are good as well [as pleasant], and good for them too; for then they will have everything that friends must have.

§5 Someone in a position of power appears to have separate groups of friends; for some are useful to him, others pleasant, but the same ones are not often both.* For he does not seek friends who are both pleasant and virtuous, or useful for fine actions, but seeks one group to be witty, when he pursues pleasure, and the other group to be clever in carrying out instructions; and the same person rarely has both features.*

§6 Though admittedly, as we have said, an excellent person is both pleasant and useful, he does not become a friend to a superior [in power and position] unless the superior is also superior in virtue; otherwise he does not reach [proportionate] equality by having a proportionate superior. And this superiority both in power and in virtue is not often found.

1158b §7 The friendships we have mentioned involve equality, since both friends get the same and wish the same to each other, or exchange one thing for another—for instance, pleasure for benefit.* But, as we have said, they are friendships to a lesser extent, and less enduring.

They seem both to be and not to be friendships, because of their similarity and dissimilarity to the same thing. For, on the one hand, insofar as they are similar to the friendship of virtue, they are apparently friendships; for that type of friendship includes both utility and pleasure, and one of these types includes utility, the other pleasure. On the other hand, the friendship of virtue is enduring and immune to slander, whereas these change quickly, and differ from it in many other ways as well; to that extent they are apparently not friendships, because of their dissimilarity to that best type.

7

[Friendship between Unequals]

A different species of friendship is the one that rests on superiority*—of a father toward his son, for instance, and in general of an older person toward a younger, of a man toward a woman, and of any sort of ruler toward the one he rules. These friendships also differ from each other. For friendship of parents to children is not the same as that of rulers to ruled; nor is friendship of father to son the same as that of son to father, or of man to woman as that of woman to man. For each of these friends has a different virtue and a different function, and there are different causes of love. Hence the ways of loving are different, and so are the friendships. 1158b

§2 Now each does not get the same thing from the other, and must not seek it; but whenever children accord to their parents what they must accord to those who gave them birth, and parents accord what they must do to their children, their friendship is enduring and decent. 15 20

In all the friendships that rest on superiority, the loving must also be proportional; for instance, the better person, and the more beneficial, and each of the others likewise, must be loved more than he loves; for when the loving accords with the comparative worth of the friends, equality is achieved in a way, and this seems to be proper to friendship. 25

§3 Equality, however, does not appear to be the same in friendship as in justice.* For in justice equality is equality primarily in worth and secondarily in quantity; but in friendship it is equality primarily in quantity and secondarily in worth. 30

§4 This is clear if friends come to be separated by some wide gap in virtue, vice, wealth, or something else; for then they are friends no more, and do not even expect to be. This is most evident with gods, since they have the greatest superiority in all goods. But it is also clear with kings, since far inferior people do not expect to be their friends; nor do worthless people expect to be friends to the best or wisest. 35 1159a

§5 Now in these cases there is no exact definition of how long people are friends. For even if one of them loses a lot, the friendship still endures; but if one is widely separated [from the other], as a god is [from a human being], it no longer endures. 5

§6 This raises a puzzle: Do friends really wish their friend to have the greatest good, to be a god, for instance?* For [if he becomes a god], *he* will no longer have friends, and hence no longer have goods,* since friends are goods. If, then, we have been right to say that one friend wishes good things to the other for the sake of the other *himself*, the other must remain whatever sort of being he is. Hence it is to the other as a human being that a friend will wish the greatest goods—though presumably not all of them, since each person wishes goods most of all to himself.* 10

8

[Giving and Receiving in Friendship]

1159a15 Because the many love honor they seem to prefer being loved to loving.* That is why they love flatterers. For the flatterer is a friend in an inferior position, or [rather] pretends to be one, and pretends to love more than he is loved; and being loved seems close to being honored, which the many certainly pursue.*

§2 It would seem, however, that they choose honor coincidentally, not 20 in its own right. For the many enjoy being honored by powerful people because they expect to get whatever they need from them, and so enjoy the honor as a sign of this good treatment. Those who want honor from decent people with knowledge are seeking to confirm their own view of themselves, and so they are pleased because the judgment of those who say 25 they are good makes them confident that they are good.* Being loved, on the contrary, they enjoy in its own right. That is why it seems to be better than being honored, and friendship seems choiceworthy in its own right.*

§3 But friendship seems to consist more in loving than in being loved.* A sign of this is the enjoyment a mother finds in loving.* For sometimes 30 she gives her child away to be brought up, and loves him as long as she knows about him; but she does not seek the child's love, if she cannot both [love and be loved]. She would seem to be satisfied if she sees the child doing well, and she loves the child even if ignorance prevents him from returning to her what is due to a mother.

§4 Friendship, then, consists more in loving; and people who love 35 their friends are praised; hence, it would seem, loving is the virtue of friends.* And so friends whose love accords with the worth of their 1159b friends are enduring friends and have an enduring friendship. §5 This above all is how unequals as well as equals can be friends, since this is how they can be equalized.*

Equality and similarity, and above all the similarity of those who are similar in being virtuous, is friendship.* For virtuous people are enduringly [virtuous] in their own right, and enduring [friends] to each other. 5 They neither request nor provide assistance that requires base actions, but, you might even say, prevent this. For it is proper to good people to avoid error themselves and not to permit it in their friends.

Vicious people, by contrast, have no firmness, since they do not even 10 remain similar to what they were. They become friends for a short time, enjoying each other's vice.* §6 Useful or pleasant friends, however, last longer, for as long as they supply each other with pleasures or benefits.*

The friendship that seems to arise most from contraries is friendship for utility, of poor to rich, for instance, or ignorant to knowledgeable; for 15 we aim at whatever we find we lack, and give something else in return.* Here we might also include the erotic lover and his beloved, and the

beautiful and the ugly. That is why an erotic lover also sometimes 1159b
 appears ridiculous, when he expects to be loved in the same way as he
 loves; that would presumably be a proper expectation if he were lovable
 in the same way, but it is ridiculous when he is not.*

§7 Presumably, however, contrary seeks contrary coincidentally, not in 20
 its own right, and desire is for the intermediate.* For what is good for the
 dry, for instance, is to reach the intermediate, not to become wet, and the
 same is true for the hot, and so on. Let us, then, dismiss these questions,
 since they are rather extraneous to our concern.

9

[Friendship in Communities]

As we said at the beginning,* friendship and justice would seem to be 25
 about the same things and to be found in the same people. For in every
 community there seems to be some sort of justice, and some type of
 friendship also. At any rate, fellow voyagers and fellow soldiers are
 called friends, and so are members of other communities. And the extent
 of their community is the extent of their friendship, since it is also the 30
 extent of the justice found there. The proverb 'What friends have is com-
 mon' is correct, since friendship involves community.*

§2 But, whereas brothers and companions have everything in com- 35
 mon, what people have in common in other types of community is lim-
 ited, more in some communities and less in others, since some
 friendships are also closer than others, some less close.*

§3 What is just is also different, since it is not the same for parents 1160a
 toward children as for one brother toward another, and not the same for
 companions as for fellow citizens, and similarly with the other types of
 friendship. Similarly, what is unjust toward each of these is also different,
 and becomes more unjust as it is practiced on closer friends.* It is more
 shocking, for instance, to rob a companion of money than to rob a fellow 5
 citizen, to fail to help a brother than a stranger, and to strike one's father
 than anyone else. Justice also naturally increases with friendship, since it
 involves the same people and extends over an equal area.

§4 All the communities [mentioned], however, would seem to be parts 10
 of the political community.* For people keep company for some advan-
 tage and to supply something contributing to their life. And the political
 community as well [as the others] seems both to have been originally
 formed and to endure for advantage;* for legislators also aim at advan-
 tage, and the common advantage is said to be just.*

§5 Now the other types of community aim at partial advantage.* Sea 15
 travellers, for instance, seek the advantage proper to a journey, in making
 money or something like that, while fellow soldiers seek the advantage
 proper to war, desiring either money or victory or a city; and the same is

1160a true of fellow members of a tribe or deme.* Some communities—religious
 20 societies and dining clubs—seem to arise for pleasure, since these are, respectively, for religious sacrifices and for companionship.*

But all these communities would seem to be subordinate to the political community, since it aims not at some advantage close at hand, but at advantage for the whole of life.* . . . [We can see this in the arrangements that cities make for religious festivals. For] in performing sacrifices and
 25 arranging gatherings for these, people both accord honors to the gods and provide themselves with pleasant relaxations.* For the long-established sacrifices and gatherings appear to take place after the harvesting of the crops, as a sort of first-fruits, since this was the time when people used to be most at leisure [and the time when relaxation would be most advantageous for the whole of life].*

30 §6 All the types of community, then, appear to be parts of the political community, and these sorts of communities imply the appropriate sorts of friendships.

10

[Political Systems]

There are three species of political system (*politeia*), and an equal number of deviations, which are a sort of corruption of them.* The first political system is kingship; the second aristocracy; and since the third rests on property (*timēma*), it appears proper to call it a timocratic system, though
 35 most people usually call it a polity.* §2 The best of these is kingship and the worst timocracy.

1160b The deviation from kingship is tyranny. For, though both are monarchies, they show the widest difference, since the tyrant considers his own advantage, but the king considers the advantage of his subjects. For
 5 someone is a king only if he is self-sufficient and superior in all goods; and since such a person needs nothing more, he will consider the subjects' benefit, not his own. For a king who is not like this would be only some sort of titular king. Tyranny is contrary to this; for the tyrant pursues his own good. It is more evident that [tyranny] is the worst [deviation than that timocracy is the worst political system]; but the worst is contrary to the best; [hence kingship is the best].

10 §3 The transition from kingship is to tyranny. For tyranny is the degenerate condition of monarchy, and the vicious king becomes a tyrant.

The transition from aristocracy [rule of the best people] is to oligarchy [rule of the few], resulting from the badness of the rulers. They distribute the city's goods contrary to people's worth, so that they distribute all or
 15 most of the goods to themselves, and always assign ruling offices to the same people, counting wealth for most. Hence the rulers are few, and they are vicious people instead of the most decent.

The transition from timocracy is to democracy [rule by the people], 1160b
 since these border on each other. For timocracy is also meant to be rule by
 the majority, and all those with the property-qualification are equal; [and
 majority rule and equality are the marks of democracy]. Democracy is the
 least vicious [of the deviations]; for it deviates only slightly from the form 20
 of a [genuine] political system.

These, then, are the most frequent transitions from one political system
 to another, since they are the smallest and easiest.

§4 Resemblances to these—indeed, a sort of pattern of them—can also
 be found in households.* For the community of a father and his sons has 25
 the structure of kingship, since the father is concerned for his children.
 Indeed that is why Homer also calls Zeus father,* since kingship is meant
 to be paternal rule.

Among the Persians, however, the father's rule is tyrannical, since he
 treats his sons as slaves.* The rule of a master over his slaves is also tyrannical, 30
 since it is the master's advantage that is achieved in it. This, then,
 appears a correct form of rule, whereas the Persian form appears erroneous,
 since the different types of rule suit different subjects.

§5 The community of man and woman appears aristocratic. For the
 man's rule in the area where it is right accords with the worth [of each],
 and he commits* to the woman what is fitting for her. If, however, the 35
 man controls everything, he changes it into an oligarchy; for then his
 action does not accord with the worth [of each], or with the respect in 1161a
 which [each] is better. Sometimes, indeed, women rule because they are
 heiresses; these cases of rule do not accord with virtue, but result from
 wealth and power, as is true in oligarchies.

§6 The community of brothers is like a timocratic [system], since they 5
 are equal except insofar as they differ in age. That is why, if they differ
 very much in age, the friendship is no longer brotherly.

Democracy is found most of all in dwellings without a master, since
 everyone there is on equal terms; and also in those where the ruler is
 weak and everyone is free [to do what he likes].*

11

[Friendships in Political Systems]

Friendship appears in each of the political systems, to the extent that justice 10
 appears also.* A king's friendship to his subjects involves superior
 beneficence. For he benefits his subjects, since he is good and attends to
 them to ensure that they do well, as a shepherd attends to his sheep;
 hence Homer also called Agamemnon shepherd of the peoples.* 15

§2 A father's friendship resembles this, but differs in conferring a
 greater benefit, since the father is the cause of his children's being, which
 seems to be the greatest benefit, and of their nurture and education. These

1161a benefits are also ascribed to ancestors; and by nature a father is ruler over sons, ancestors over descendants, and a king over subjects.

20 §3 All these are friendships of superiority. That is why parents are also honored. And what is just is not the same in each of these friendships, but it accords with worth; for so does the friendship.

§4 The friendship of man to woman is the same as in an aristocracy.
25 For it accords with virtue, in assigning more good to the better, and assigning what is fitting to each. The same is true of what is just here.

§5 The friendship of brothers is similar to that of companions, since they are equal and of an age, and such people usually have the same feelings and characters. Friendship in a timocracy is similar to this. For there the citizens are meant to be equal and decent, and so rule in turn and on
30 equal terms. The same is true, then, of their friendship.

§6 In the deviations, however, justice is found only to a slight degree; and hence the same is true of friendship.* There is least of it in the worst deviation; for in a tyranny there is little or no friendship.

For where ruler and ruled have nothing in common, they have no
35 friendship, since they have no justice either.* This is true for a craftsman
1161b in relation to his tool, and for the soul in relation to the body.* For in all these cases the user benefits what he uses, but there is neither friendship nor justice toward inanimate things.* Nor is there any toward a horse or cow, or toward a slave, insofar as he is a slave. For master and slave have
5 nothing in common, since a slave is a tool with a soul, while a tool is a slave without a soul.*

§7 Insofar as he is a slave, then, there is no friendship with him. But there is friendship with him insofar as he is a human being.* For every human being seems to have some relation of justice with everyone who is capable of community in law and agreement;* hence [every human being seems] also [to have] friendship [with every human being], to the extent that [every human being] is a human being.*

§8 Hence there are friendships and justice to only a slight degree in
10 tyrannies also, but to a much larger degree in democracies; for there people are equal, and so have much in common.

12

[Friendships in Families]

As we have said, then, every friendship is found in a community. But we should set apart the friendship of families and that of companions.* The friendship of citizens, tribesmen, voyagers, and suchlike are more like
15 friendships in a community, since they appear to reflect some sort of agreement;* and among these we may include the friendship of host and guest.

§2 Friendship in families also seems to have many species, but they all seem to depend on paternal friendship. For a parent is fond of his chil-

dren because he regards them as something of himself; and children are fond of a parent because they regard themselves as coming from him.* 1161b

A parent knows better what has come from him than the children know that they are from the parent; and the parent regards his children as his own more than the product regards the maker as its own. For a person regards what comes from him as his own, as the owner regards his tooth or hair or anything; but what has come from him regards its owner as its own not at all, or to a lesser degree.* The length of time also matters. For a parent becomes fond of his children as soon as they are born, but children become fond of the parent when time has passed and they have acquired some comprehension or [at least] perception. And this also makes it clear why mothers love their children more [than fathers do].* 20 25

§3 A parent, then, loves his children as [he loves] himself. For what has come from him is a sort of other himself; [it is other because] it is separate.* Children love a parent because they regard themselves as having come from him. Brothers love each other because they have come from the same [parents]. For the same relation to the parents makes the same thing for both of them;* hence we speak of the same blood, the same stock, and so on. Hence they are the same thing in a way, in different [subjects]. 30

§4 Being brought up together and being of an age contributes largely to friendship; for 'two of an age' [get on well], and those with the same character are companions. That is why the friendship of brothers and that of companions are similar. Cousins and other relatives are akin by being related to brothers, since that makes them descendants of the same parents [i.e., the parents of these brothers]. Some are more akin, others less, by the ancestor's being near to or far from them. 35 1162a

§5 The friendship of children to a parent, like the friendship of human beings to a god, is friendship toward what is good and superior.* For the parent conferred the greatest benefits on his children, since he is the cause of their being and nurture and of their education once they have been born. §6 This sort of friendship also includes pleasure and utility, more than the friendship of unrelated people does, to the extent that [parents and children] have more of a life in common.* 5

Friendship between brothers has the features of friendship between companions, especially when [the companions] are decent, or in general similar.* For brothers are that much more akin to each other [than ordinary companions], and are fond of each other from birth; they are that much more similar in character when they are from the same parents, nurtured together and educated similarly; and the proof of their reliability over time is fullest and firmest. §7 Among other relatives too the features of friendship are proportional [to the relation]. 10 15

The friendship of man and woman also seems to be natural. For human beings form couples more naturally than they form cities, to the extent that the household is prior to the city, and more necessary, and

1162a20 childbearing is shared more widely among the animals.* For the other animals, the community goes only as far as childbearing. Human beings, however, share a household not only for childbearing, but also for the benefits in their life.* For the difference between them implies that* their functions are divided, with different ones for the man and the woman; hence each supplies the other's needs by contributing a special function to the common good. For this reason their friendship seems to include both utility and pleasure.

25 And it may also be friendship for virtue, if they are decent. For each has a proper virtue, and this will be a source of enjoyment for them.* Children seem to be another bond, and that is why childless unions are more quickly dissolved; for children are a common good for both, and what is common holds them together.

30 §8 How should a man conduct his life toward his wife, or, in general, toward a friend? That appears to be the same as asking how they are to conduct their lives justly. For what is just is not the same for a friend toward a friend as toward a stranger, or the same toward a companion as toward a classmate.*

13

[Disputes in Friendships between Equals]

35 There are three types of friendship, as we said at the beginning, and within each type some friendships rest on equality, while others are in
1162b accord with superiority.* For equally good people can be friends, but also a better and a worse person; and the same is true of friends for pleasure or utility, since they may be either equal or unequal in their benefits. Hence equals must equalize in loving and in the other things, because of their equality; and unequals must make the return that is proportionate to the types of superiority.

5 §2 Accusations and reproaches arise only or most often in friendship for utility.* And this is reasonable. For friends for virtue are eager to benefit each other, since this is proper to virtue and to friendship; and if this is what they strain to achieve, there are no accusations or fights.* For no one
10 objects if the other loves and benefits him; if he is gracious, he retaliates by benefiting the other. And if the superior gets what he aims at, he will not accuse his friend of anything, since each of them desires what is good.

15 §3 Nor are there many accusations among friends for pleasure. For both of them get what they want at the same time if they enjoy spending their time together; and someone who accused his friend of not pleasing him would appear ridiculous, since he is free to spend his days without the friend's company.

§4 Friendship for utility, however, is liable to accusations. For these friends deal with each other in the expectation of gaining benefits. Hence

they always require more, thinking they have got less than is fitting; and they reproach the other because they get less than they require and deserve. And those who confer benefits cannot supply as much as the recipients require. 1162b
20

§5 There are two ways of being just, one unwritten, and one governed by rules of law. And similarly one type of friendship of utility would seem to depend on character, and the other on rules.* Accusations arise most readily if it is not the same sort of friendship when they dissolve it as it was when they formed it. 25

§6 Friendship dependent on rules is the type that is on explicit conditions.* One type of this is entirely mercenary and requires immediate payment. The other is more generous and postpones the time [of repayment], but in accordance with an agreement [requiring] one thing in return for another. In this sort of friendship it is clear and unambiguous what is owed, but the postponement is a friendly aspect of it. That is why some cities do not allow legal actions in these cases, but think that people who have formed an arrangement on the basis of trust must put up with the outcome. 30

§7 Friendship [for utility] that depends on character is not on explicit conditions. Someone makes a present or whatever it is, as to a friend, but expects to get back as much or more, since he assumes that it is not a free gift, but a loan.

§8 If one party does not dissolve the friendship on the terms on which he formed it, he will accuse the other.* This happens because all or most people wish for what is fine, but decide to do what is beneficial;* and while it is fine to do someone a good turn without aiming to receive one in return, it is beneficial to receive a good turn. 35
1163a

§9 We should, if we can, make a return worthy of what we have received, [if the other has undertaken the friendship] willingly.* For we should never make a friend of someone who is unwilling, but must suppose that we were in error at the beginning, and received a benefit from the wrong person; for since it was not from a friend, and this was not why he was doing it, we must dissolve the arrangement as though we had received a good turn on explicit conditions. And we will agree to repay if we can. If we cannot repay, the giver would not even expect it. Hence we should repay if we can. We should consider at the beginning who is doing us a good turn, and on what conditions, so that we can put up with it on these conditions, or else decline it. 15

§10 It is disputable whether we must measure [the return] by the benefit accruing to the recipient, and make the return proportional to that, or instead by the good turn done by the benefactor. For a recipient says that what he got was a small matter for the benefactor, and that he could have gotten it from someone else instead, and so he belittles it. But the benefactor says it was the biggest thing he had, that it could not be gotten from anyone else, and that he gave it when he was in danger or similar need. 10
15

1163a §11 Since the friendship is for utility, surely the benefit to the recipient must be the measure [of the return]. For he was the one who required it, and the benefactor supplies him on the assumption that he will get an equal return. Hence the aid has been as great as the benefit received, and the recipient should return as much as he gained, or still more, since that is finer.

But in friendships in accord with virtue, there are no accusations. Rather, the decision of the benefactor would seem to be the measure, since the controlling element in virtue and character lies in decision.*

14

[Disputes in Friendships between Unequals]

25 There are also disputes in friendships in accord with superiority, since each friend expects to have more than the other, but whenever this happens the friendship is dissolved.

For the better person thinks it is fitting for him to have more, on the ground that more is fittingly allotted to the good person. And the more beneficial person thinks the same. For it is wrong, they say, for someone to have an equal share if he is useless; the result is a public service, not a friendship, if the benefits from the friendship do not accord with the worth of the actions. [The superior party says this] because he notices that in a financial community the larger contributors gain more, and he thinks the same thing is right in a friendship.*

But the needy person, the inferior party in the friendship, takes the opposite view, saying it is proper to a virtuous friend to supply his needy [friends]. For what use is it, as they say, to be an excellent or powerful person's friend if you are not going to gain anything by it?

1163b §2 Well, each of them would seem to be correct in what he expects, and it is right for each of them to get more from the friendship—but not more of the same thing. Rather, the superior person should get more honor, and the needy person more profit, since honor is the reward of virtue and beneficence, while profit is what supplies need.*

5 §3 This also appears to be true in political systems. For someone who provides nothing for the community receives no honor, since what is common is given to someone who benefits the community, and honor is something common. For it is impossible both to make money off the community and to receive honor from it at the same time; for no one endures the smaller share of everything. Hence someone who suffers a monetary loss [by holding office] receives honor in return, while someone who accepts gifts [in office] receives money [but not honor]; for distribution that accords with worth equalizes and preserves the friendship, as we have said.*

This, then, is how we should treat unequals. If we benefit from them in

money or virtue,* we should return honor, and thereby make what return we can. §4 For friendship seeks what is possible, not what accords with worth, since that is impossible in some cases, as it is with honor to gods and parents. For no one could ever make a return in accord with their worth, but someone who attends to them as far as he is able seems to be a decent person. 1163b15

That is why it might seem* that a son is not free to disown his father, but a father is free to disown his son. For a debtor should return what he owes, and since, no matter what a son has done, he has not made a worthy return for what his father has done for him, he is always the debtor. But the creditor is free to remit the debt, and hence the father is free to remit. 20

At the same time, however, it presumably seems that no one would ever withdraw from a son, except from one who was far gone in vice. For, quite apart from their natural friendship, it is human not to repel aid. The son, however, if he is vicious, will want to avoid helping his father, or will not be keen on it. For the many wish to receive benefits, but they avoid doing them because they suppose it is unprofitable. So much, then, for these things. 25

BOOK IX

[FRIENDSHIP]

1

[Friends with Dissimilar Aims]

In all friendships of friends with dissimilar aims, proportion equalizes and preserves the friendship, as we said; in political friendship, for instance, the cobbler receives a worthy exchange for his shoes, and so do the weaver and the others.* §2 Here money is supplied as a common measure; everything is related to this and measured by it. 35 1164a

In erotic friendships, however, sometimes the lover charges that he loves the beloved deeply and is not loved in return; and in fact perhaps he has nothing lovable in him. The beloved, however, often charges that previously the lover was promising him everything, and now fulfills none of his promises. 5

§3 These sorts of charges arise whenever the lover loves his beloved for pleasure while the beloved loves his lover for utility, and they do not both provide these. For if the friendship has these causes, it is dissolved whenever they do not get what they were friends for; for each was not fond of the other himself, but only of what the other had, which was unstable.* That is why the friendships are also unstable. Friendship of character, however, is friendship in itself,* and endures, as we have said. 10