ethics argument paper 1

AristotleBookIIINotes

Chapter 1 Virtue does not have to do with feelings qua feelings so much as the trained reaction to feelings, which are spontaneous. (1110a) Discussion of voluntary vs. involuntary and some fine distinctions. Note that the first principle must be in the agent for that agent to have executed a voluntary action. If the first principle is in something else (weather, tyrant) and the person has no choice, then the action is, of course involuntary. Sometimes, though, external forces can limit choices (i.e., jettisoning cargo in a storm at sea). People are praised or blamed relative to their degree of choice. (1110b) Sometimes we choose to put ourselves in a situation in which further choice is denied us. And some people would say that all actions are compelled by external forces, but Aristotle is having none of that because people might take credit for their good actions and blame the universe for their shameful ones. And that would be inconsistent. Interesting point about regret and free will in this part. (1111a) All that to say that what is voluntary would be from the first principle in the agent. Note, too, at the end that not all actions done through spirit or appetite are involuntary because animals and children (!) would then not be able to act voluntary even occasionally. (1111b) To miss the mark because of spirit or appetite is still to hold the person responsible. Chapter 2 If something is rational, then it is voluntary. But if something is voluntary, it might not be rational. In other words, all rational things are voluntary things. But some voluntary things are not rational things. Remind me to draw a 2-circle Euler diagram explaining this. Note the difference(s) between a wish and a rational choice. And remember that virtue comes from the latter. (1112a) Also, virtue (character) comes from rational choice rather than from belief or opinion. Choosing to do right or good thing is not the same as our belief of what is good or bad. Chapter 3 (1112a) People don't debate about eternal things? What's Aristotle's reason for saying that? (1112b) We deliberate about things that are brought about in different ways. The same end can be achieved by different means (health, for example). There's something of a summary just before 1113a: "It appears therefore, as has been said, that a man is the origin of his actions, and that the province of deliberation is to discover actions within one's own power to perform; and all our actions aim at ends other than themselves. 3. [16] It follows that we do not deliberate about ends, but about means. Nor yet do we deliberate about particular facts," (1113a) and a summary of the outline or definition of rational choice. Chapter 4 Brief explanation of how the idea of good or of health depends on the goodness or healthiness of the individual in question. (1113b) Note that the masses can't distinguish any ol' pleasure from the good because they are not rational. Your opinions on this claim? Chapter 5. (1113b) More here about people's responsibility for their actions and, ultimately, their character. Even legislators hold this opinion, so we're back to the idea that political science is the noblest discipline. (1114a) This section reinforces the idea that we become certain ways because of our freely chosen habits of acting. Then there's more restriction on us once we head down a certain path--like a stone, once thrown, that cannot then be retrieved. (1114b) Why can't be just aim for the good that appears good to us? A brief summary right before 1115a. Chapter 6 (1115a,b) Some good info on courage and why people have different means between extremes when it come to courage. And why not fear poverty and disease?

Chapter 7 (1115b) That's an important line about standing firm in the right way as reason requires. It illustrates Aristotle's views of ethics, in general, although using courage as one example. This thought continues in 1116a with the distinction between the courageous person with those at either extreme. Chapter 8 (1116b) We ought to be courageous not because we are compelled to be but because we have made that rational choice. It's the same with other virtues. Chapter 10 (1118a) Skipping a bit here to get us to temperance, which often is connected with the senses, and typically only one or two at a time rather than the entire body. Chapter 11 (1119a) The intemperate person is led by appetite, and not by reason, as would the temperate person. Chapter 12 (1119b) Again, the appetite needs to be in harmony with reason. Examples?