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CONTENTS

Introduction by Max Lerner s

BOOK I

CIIAPTER

Chapters 1, 2. D efinition and struct 11re of the State.

1 . The state is the highest form of community and aims at the highest good. How it differs from other communi- ties will appear if we examine the parts of which it is composed.

z. It consists of villages which consist of households. The household is founded upon the two relations of male and female, of master and slave; it exists to satisfy man's daily needs. The village, a wider community, satisfies a wider range of needs. The state aims at satis- fying all the needs of men. Men form states to secure a bare subsistence; but the ultimate object of the state is the good life. The naturalness of the state is p roved by the faculty of speech in man. In the order of Natu re the state precedes the household and the individual. It is founded on a natural impulse, that towards political association.

Chapters J·IJ.llousehold economy. The Slave. Property. Childre" a11d Wives.

3· Let us discuss the household , since the state is composed of households.

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4· First as to slavery. The slave is a piece of property which is animate, and useful for action rather than for pro- duction.

5· Slavery is natural ; in every department of the natural universe 've find the relation of ruler and su bject. There are human beings who, without possessing reason, un- derstand it. These are natural slaves.

6. But we find persons in slavery who are not natural slaves. Hence slavery itself is condemned by some; but they are wrong. The natural slave benefits by subjection to a master.

7. The art of ruling s laves differs from that of ruling free men but calls for no detailed description; any one who is a natural master can acquire it for himself.

8. As to property and the modes of acquiring it. This s ub- ject concerns us in so far as property is an indispensable substratum to the household.

9· But we do not need that fo rm of finance which accumu- lates wealth for its own sake. This is unnatural finance . ll has been made possible by the invention of coined money. It accumulates money by means of exchange. Natural and unnatural finance are often treated as though they were the same, but differ in their aims;

10. Also in their subject-matter; for natural finance is only concerned with the fruits of the earth and animals.

I 1. Natural f111ance is necessary to the householder; be must therefore know about live stock, agriculture, possibly about the exchange of the products of the earth, such as wood and minerals , for money. Special treatises on finance exist, and the subject should be specially stud- ied by s tatesmen.

12. Lastly, we must discuss and distinguish the relations of husband to wife, of father to child.

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CllAPTER

13. In household management persons call for more attention than things; free persons for more than slaves. Slaves are only capable of an inferior kind of virtue. Socrates was wrong in denying that there are several kinds of virtue. Still the slave must be trained in virtue. The education of the free man will be subsequenUy dis- cussed.

BOOK II

Chapters x-8. Ideal Commonwealths-Plato, Phaleas, Rippodamus.

1. To ascertain the nature of the ideal state we shou ld start by examining both the best states of history and the best that theorists have imagined . Otherwise we might waste our lime over problems which others have al- ready solved.

Among theorists, Plato in the R epublic raises the most fundamental questions. He desires to abolish private property and the family.

2. But the end which be bas in view is wrong. He wishes to make all his citizens absolutely alike; but the differ- entiation of functions is a law of nature. There can be too much unity in a state.

3· And the means by which he would promote unity are wrong.

The abolition of property will produce, not remove, dis- sension.

Communism of wive." and children will destroy natural affection.

4. Other objections can be raised; but this is the fatal one.

S· To descend to details. The advantages to be expected from communism of property would be better secu red if private property were used in a liberal spi rit to relieve

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CHAPTEB

the wants of others. Private property makes men hap- pier, and enables them to cultivate. such virtues as generosity. The Republic makes umty the resu lt of uniformity among the citizens, which is not the case. The good sense of mankind has always been against Plato, and experiment would s how that his idea is im- practicable.

6. Plato sketched another ideal state in the Laws; it was meant to be more practicable than the other. I n the lAws be abandoned communism, but otherwise upheld the leading ideas of the earlier t reatise, except that he made the new state larger and too large. He fo rgot to discuss foreign relations, and to fix a limit of private property, and to restrict the increase of population, and to distinguish between ruler and subject. T he form of government which be proposed was bad.

1· P haleas of Chalcedon made equal distribution of prop- erty the maio feature of his scheme. This would be difficult to effect, and would not meet the evils which Phaleas had in mind. Dissensions arise from deeper causes than inequality of wealth. His state would be weak against foreign foes. His reforms would anger the rich and not satisfy the poor.

8. Hippodamus, who was not a practical politician, aimed at symmetry. I n his slate there were to be three classes, three kinds of landed property, three sorts of laws. He also proposed to ( t) create a Court of Appeal, ( 2) let juries qualify their verdicts, (3) reward those who made discoveries of public utility. H is classes and his property system were badly devised. Qualified verd icts are impossible since jurymen may not confer together. The law about discoveries would encourage men to tamper with the Constitution. Now Jaws when obsolete and absurd s hould be changed; but needless changes diminish the respect for law.

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cHAPTER

Chapters 9-12. The best existent states-Sparta, Crete, and Carthage-Greek lawgivers.

9· The Spartans cannot manage their serf population. Their women are too influential and too luxurious. Their property system has concentrated all wealth in a few bands. lienee the citizen body bas decreased. There are points to criticize in the Epborate, the Senate, the Kingship, tho common meals, the Admiralty. The Spartan and his state are only fit for war. Yet even in war Sparta is hampered by the want of a financial system.

1o. The Cretan cities resemble Sparta in their constitutions, but are more primitive. Their common meals are better managed. :Gut the Cosmi are worse t~an the Ephors. The Cretan constitution is a narrow and factious oli- garchy; the cities are saved from destruction only by their inaccessibility.

u. The Carthaginian polity is highly praised, and not with- out reason. It may be compared with the Sa>a rtan; it is an oligarchy with some democratic features. It Jays stress upon wealth; in Carthage a!l ofi1ces are bought and sold. Also, one mao may hold several offices to- gether. These are bad features. But the discontent of the people is soothed by schemes of emigration.

1 2. Of lawgivers, Solon was the best; conservative when pos- sible, and a moderate democrat. About Philolaus, Charondas, Phaleas, Draco, Pittacus, and Androdamas there is little to be said.

BOOK III

Chapters r-s. Tlte Citizen, civic virtue, and the civic body. 1. How are we to define a citizen? He is more than a mere

denizen; private rights do not make a citizen. He i-.

36 Contetlts

CHAPTER

ordinarily one who possesses political power; who sits on juries and in the assembly. But it is bard to find a definition which applies to all so-called citizens. To define him as the son of citizen parents is futile.

2. Some say that his civic rights must have been justly ac- quired. But be is a citizen who bas political power, however acquired.

3· Similarly the state is defined by reference to the distribu- tion of political power; when the mode of distribution is changed a new state comes into existence.

4· The good citizen may not be a good man; the good citizen is one who does good service to his state, and this state may be bad in principle. In a constitutional state the good citizen knows both how to rule and bow to obey. The good man is one who is fitted to rule. But the citizen in a constitutional state learns to rule by obeying orders. Therefore citizenship in such a state is a moral training.

5· Mechanics will not be citizens in the best state. Extreme democracies, and some oligarchies, neglect this rule. But circumstances oblige them to do this. They have no choice.

Chapters 6-13. The Classificatio" of Constitutions; Democracy and Oligarchy; Kingship.

6. The aims of the state are two: to satisfy man's social in- stinct, and to fit him for the good life. Political rule differs from that over slaves in aiming primarily at the good of those who are ruled.

7. Constitutions are bad or good according as the common welfare is, or is not, their aim. Of good Constitutions there are three: Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity.

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cJiAPTER Of bad there are also three: Tyranny, Oligarchy, Ex- treme Democracy. The bad are perversions of the good.

8. Democracies and Oligarchies are not made by the nu- merical proportion of the rulers to the ruled. Democ- racy is the rule of the poor; oligarchy is that of the rich.

9. D emocrats take Equality for their motto; oligarchs be- lieve that political rights should be unequal and pro- portionate to wealth. But both sides miss the true object of the state, which is virtue. Those who do most to promote virtue deserve the greatest share of power.

1 0 . On the same principle, Justice is not the will of the majority or of the wealthier, but that course of action which the moral aim of the state requires.

1 1. But are the Many or the Few likely to be the better rulers? It would be unreasonable to give the highest offices to the Many. But they have a faculty of criti- cism which fits them for deliberative and judicial power. The good critic need not be an expert; experts are sometimes bad judges. Moreover, the Many have a greater stake in the city than the Few. But the gov- erning body, whether Few or Many, must be held in check by the laws.

12. On what principle should political power be distributed? Granted that equals deserve equal shares; who are these equals? Obviously those wh o are equally able to be of service to the state.

13. Hence there is something in the claims advanced by the wealthy, the free born, the noble , the highly gifted. But no one of these classes should be allowed to rule the rest. A state should consist of men who a re equal, or nearly so, in wealth, in birth, in moral and intellec- tual excellence. The principle which underlies Ostra- cism is plausible. But in the ideal stale, if a pre-eminent individual be found, he should be made a king.

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C HAPTER

Chapters 14-18. The Forms of Monarchy.

14 . Of Monarchy. there a re five kinds, (1) the Spartan, ( 2 ) the ~arbanan, (3) the electiv~ a;ctatorship, (4) the Hero1c, (s) Absolu te Kingship.

rs. The last of these forms might appear the best poli ty to some; that is, if the king acts as the embodiment of law. For be will dispense from the law in the spirit of the law. But this power would be less abused if reserved for tile Many. Monarchy arose to meet the needs of primitive society; it is now obsolete and on various grounds objectionable.

16. It tends to become hereditary; it subjects equals to the rul e of an equal. The individual monarch may be misled by his passions, and no single man can attend to all the dutie:1 of government.

J7. One case alone can be imagined in which Absolute King- ship would be just.

r8. Let us consider the origin and nature of the best polity, now that we have agreed not to call Absolute Kingship the best.

BOOK IV (VI)

Chapters I-Io. Variations of tlse main t ypes of Constitutions.

1. Political science s?ould study (r) the ideal state, ( 2) those states wh1cb may be the best obtainable under special circumstances, and even (3) those which are essentially bad. For the statesman must sometimes make the best of a bad Constitution.

2. Of our six main types of state, Kingship and Aristocracy have been discussed ( cf. Bk. III, c. 14 fol.). Let us begin by dealing with the other four and their divisions inquiring a lso when and why they may be desirable. '

Corxtents 39

CIJAPTER

3 . First as to Democracy and Oligarchy. The common view

that Democracy and Oligarchy should be taken as the main types of Constitution is at variance with our own view and wrong. So is the view that the numerical pro- portion of rulers to ruled makes the difference between these two types; in a Democracy the Many are also the poor, in an Oligarchy the Few are also the wealthy. In every state the distinction between rich and poor is the most fundamental of class-divisions. Still Oli- garchy and Democracy are important types; and their variations arise from differences in the character of the rich and the poor by whom they are ruled.

4· Of D emocracies there are four kinds. The worst, extreme Democracy, is that in which all offices are open to all, and the will of the people overrides a:I law.

5· Of Oligarchies too there are four kinds; the worst is that in which offices are hereditary and the magistrates un· controlled by law.

6. These variations arise under circu,mstances wh:ch may be briefly described.

7. Of Aristocracy in the strict sense there is but one form, that in which the best men alone a re citizens.

8. Polity is a compromise between Democracy and Oli- garchy, but inclines to the Democratic side. Many so- called Aristocracies are really Polities.

9· There are different ways of effecting the compromise which makes a Polity. The Laconian Constitution is an example of a successful compromise.

10. Tyranny is of three kinds: ( 1) the barbarian despotism, and ( 2) the elective dictatorship have already bee n dis- cussed; in both there is rule according to law over willin~ subjects. But in (3) the strict form of tyranny, there IS the lawless rule of one man over unwilling sub· jects.

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Chapters II-I J. Of the Best State both in gen eral and under special circumstances.

1 1 . For the average city-state the best constitution will be a mean between the rule of rich and poor; the midd le- class will be supreme. No state will be well administered unless the middle-class holds sway. The middle-class is stronger in large than in small states. H ence in Greece it has rarely attained to powe r ; especially as democracy and oligarchy were aided by the influence of the leading states.

12 . No constitution can dispense with the support of the strongest class in the state. H ence Democra cy and Oligarchy are the o nly cons titutions possible in some states. But in these cases the legislator should concili- ate the midd le-class.

13. Whatever form of constitution be adopted there are ex- pedients to be noted which may help in preservi ng it.

Chapters 14-I6.l/ow to proceed in framing a Constitution.

14. The legislator must pay attention to three subjects in particular: (a) The D eliberative Assembly which is different in each form of constitution.

•S· (b) The Executive. H ere be must know what oflices are indispensable and which of them may be conveniently combined in the person of one magistrate; also whether the same offtces should be supreme in every state; also

which of the twelve or more methods of making ap- pointments should be adopted in each case.

16. (c) The Courts of Law. Here he must consider the kinds of law-courts, their spheres of action, their methods of procedure.

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BOOK V ( VIII)

CHAPTER

Chapters 1-4. Of Revolutions, and their causes in general.

1 • Ordinary states are founded on erroneous ideas of j ustice, which lead to discontent and revolution. Of revolutions some are made to introduce a new Constitution, others to modify the old, others to pu t the working of the Constitution in new hands. Both D emocracy and Oli- garchy contain inheren t flaws which lead to revolution, but Democracy is the more stable of the two types.

2 • We may distinguish between the frame of mind which fosters revolution, the objects for which it is s tarted , and the provocative causes.

3. The latter deserve a more detai led account.

4 • T rifl es may be the occasion but are never the true cause of a sedition. One common cause is the aggrandizemen t of a particular class; another is a feud between rich and poor when they are evenly balanced and there is no middle-class to mediate. As to the manner of effect- ing a revolution: it may be carried through by force o r fraud.

Chapters 5-12. R evolutions in particular States, and how revolutions may be avoided.

S· (a) In Democracies revolutions may a rise from a perse- cution of the r ich; o r when a demagogue becomes a general , or when politicians compete for the favour of the mob.

6. (b) In Oligarchies the people may rebel against oppres- sion; ambitious oligarchs may conspire, o r appeal to tht people, or set up a tyrant. Oligarchies are seldom destroyed except by the feuds of their own members; unless they employ a mercena ry captain, who may be- come a tyrant.

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1· (c) In Aristocracies and Polities the injustice of the rul- ing class may lead to revolution, but less often in Polities. Aristocracies may also be ruined by a n un- privileged class, or an ambitious man of talent. Aris- tocracies tend to become oligarchies. Also they a re liable to gradual dissolution; which is true of Polities

as well. 8. The best precau tions agains t sedition are these: to avoid

illegality and frauds upon the unprivileged; to main- tain good feeling between rulers and ruled ; to watch destructive agencies; to alter property qualifications from time to time; t o let no individual or class become too powerful; not to let magistracies be a source of gain; to beware of class-oppression.

9· I n all magistrates we should require loyalty, ability, and justice; we should not carry the principle of the con- stitution to extremes; we should educate the citizens in the spirit of a constitution.

to . (d) The causes which destroy and the means which pre- serve a Monarchy must be considered separately. Let us first distinguish between Tyranny and Kingship. Tyranny combines the vices of Democracy and Oli· garchy. Kingship is exposed to the same defects as Aristocracy. But both these kinds of Monarchy are . especially endangered by the insolence of their repre- sentatives and by the fear or contempt which they in· spire in others. Tyranny is weak against both external and domestic foes; Kingship is sttong against invasion,

weak against sedition. 1 1. Moderatio n is the best preservative of Kingship. T yranny

tnay rely on the traditional expedients of demoralizing and dividing i ts s ubjects, o r it may imitate Kingship by showing moderation in expenditure, and courtesy and temperance in social relations, by the wise use o f ministers, by holding the balance evenly between the

rich and poor.

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CHAPTER

u. But the Tyrannies of the past have been short-lived . Plato's discussion of revolutions in the R epublic is in-

adequate; e. g. be does not explain the results of a revolution against a tyranny, and could not do so on his theory ; nor is he correct about the cause of revolu- tion in an Oligarchy; nor does be distinguish between the different varieties of Oligarchy and Democracy.

BOOK VI (VII)

Chapters I-8. Concerning the proper orgat~ization of Democracies and Oligarchies.

I . (A) Democracies differ int er se ( 1) according to the character of the citizen body, (2) according to the mode in which the characteristic features of democracy are combined.

2 . Liberty is the first principle of democ racy. The results of liberty are that the numerical majority is supreme and that each man lives as he likes. From these chara~ter­ istics we may easily infer the other features of democ- racy.

3· In oligar~hies it is not the numerical majority, but the wealth~er m.en, who are sup reme. Both these principles are UOJUSt 1f the supreme authority is to be absolute a nd above the law. Both numbers and wealth should have their share of influence. But it is hard to find the true prin ciples of political justice, and harder s till to make men act upon them.

4 · D~mocracy has.four species (cf. Bk. IV, c. 4 ) . The best lS (I) an Agncultural D emocracy, in which the magis- trates are elected by, and responsible to the citizen

bod~, while ~ch.office bas a property quaH,fication pro- porllonate to 1ts •mportance. These democracies should encourage agriculture by legislation. The next best

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is ( 2) the Pastoral Democracy. Next comes (3) the Commercial Democracy. Worst of all is (4) the Ex- treme Democracy with manhood suffrage.

5· It is harder to preserve than to found a Democracy. To preserve it we must prevent the po 1r from plundering the rich; we must not exhaust the ,mblic revenues by giving pay for the performance of public duties; we must prevent the growth of a pauper class.

6. (B) The modes of founding Oligarchi"s call for little ex- planation. Careful organization is tue best way of pre- serving these governments.

7. Much depends on the military arrangements; oliga rchs must not make their subjects too powerful an element in the army. Admission to the governing body should be granted on easy conditions. Office should be made a burden, not a source of profit.

8. Both in oligarchies and democracies the right arrange- ment of offices is important. Some kinds of office are necessary in every state; others are peculiar to special types of state.

BOOK VII (IV)

C lzapters I -3. The Summum BotJum for individuals and stat es .

r. Before constructing the ideal state we must know what is the most desirable life for states and individuals. True happiness flows from the possession of wisdom and virtue, and not from the possession of external goods. But a virtuous life must be equipped with external goods as instruments. These laws hold good of both states and individuals.

2. But does the highest virtue consist in contemplation or in action? The states of the past have Jived for action in

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CHAPTER

the shape of war and conquest. But war cannot be regarded as a reasonable object for a state.

3 . A virtuous life implies activity, but activity may be speculative as well as practical. Those are wrong who regard the life of a practical politician as degrading. But again they are wrong who treat political power as the highest good.

Chapters 4-12. A picture of the I deal State.

4· We must begin by considering the population and the territory. The former should be as small as we can make it without sacrificing independence and the ca- pacity for a moral life. The smaller the population the more manageable it will be.

5· The territory must be large enough to supply the citizens with the means of living liberally and temperately, with an abundance of leisure. The city should be in a central position.

6. Communication with the sea is desirable for economic and military reasons; but the moral effects of ~ea-trade are bad. If the state has a marine, the port town should be at some distance from the city.

7. The character of the citizens should be a mean between that of Asiatics and that of the northern races; intelli- gence and high spirit should be harmoniously blended as they are in some Greek races.

8. We must distinguish the members of the state from those who are necessary as its servants, but no part of it. There must be men who are able to provide food, to practise the arts, to bear arms, to carry on the work of exchange, to supervise the state religion, to exercise political and judicial functions.

9· But of these classes we should exclude from the citizen body ( r) tbe mechanics, ( 2) the traders, (3) the

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CRAPTER

husbandmen. Warriors, rulers, priests remain as eli- gible for citizenship. The same ~rsons sho~ld exer~ise these three professions, but at d1fferent penods of hfe. Ownership of land should be confined to them.

to. Such a distinction between a ruling and a subject class, based on a differen ce of occupation, is nothing new. It still exists in Egypt, and the custom of common meals in Crete and Italy proves that it formerly existed there. Most of the valuable rules of politics have been dis- covered over and over again in the course of history.

In dealing with the land of the state we must distinguish between public demesnes and private estates. Both kinds of land should be tilled by slaves or barbarians of a servile disposition.

II . The site of the city should be chosen with regard (x) to public health, (2) to politi ca l convenience, (3) .to strategic requirements. The ground-plan of the City should be regular enough for beauty, not so regular as to make defensive warfare difficult. Walls are a p rac- tical necessity.

12 . It i~ well that the arrangement of the buildings in the city should be carefully thought out.

Chapters 13-17. Tlte Educational System of the Ideal State, its aim, and early stages.

13. The nature and character of the citizens must be deter- mined with reference to the kind of happiness which we desire them to pursue. Happiness was defined in the Ethics as the perfect exercise of virtue, the latter term being understood not in the conditi?nal, but .in ~e absolute sense. Now a man acquires vutue of th1s kind by the help of nature , habit, and reason.

Habit and reason are the fr uits of education, which must therefore be discussed .

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cHAPTER

14. The citizens should be educated to obey when young and to rule when they are older . Rule is their ultimate and highest function. Since the good ruler is the same as the good man, our education must be so framed as to produce the good man. I t should develop all man 's powers and fit him for all the activities of life; bu t the highest powers and the highest activities must be the supreme care of education. An education which is purely military, like the Laconian, neglects this prin- ciple.

xs . The virtues of peace (intellectual culture, tempe rance, justice) are the most necessary for states and indi- viduals; war is nothing but a means towards securing peace. But education must follow the natural order of human development, beginning with the body, dealing next with the appetites, and training the intellect last of all.

x6. T o produce a healthy physique the legislator must fix the age of marriage, regulate the physical condition o f the parents, provide for the e..xposure of infa nts, and settle the duration of marriage.

I1· He must also prescribe a physical training fo r infants and young children. For thei r moral education the very young should be committed to overseers; these should select the tales which they are told, their asso- ciates, the pictures, plays, and statues which they see. From five to seven years of age should be the period of preparation for intellectual training.

BOOK VIII (V). Chapters 1-7. The Ideal Education continued. its Music

and Gymnastic.

x. Education should be under state-control and the same for all the citizens.

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2. It should comprise those user ul studies which every one must master, but none which degrade the mind or body .

3· Reading, writing, and drawing have always been taught on the score of their utility; gymnastic as producing valour. Music is taught as a recreation, but it serves a higher purpose. The noble employment of leisu re is the highest ajm which a man can pursue; and music is valuable for this purpose. The same may be said of drawing, and other s ubjects of education have the same kind of value.

4 · Gymnastic is the fi rst stage of education; but we must not develop the valour and physique of ou r chi ldren at the expense of the mind , as they do in Sparta. Until puberty, and for three years after, bod ily exercise shou ld be light.

5· M usic, if it were a mere amusemen t, should not be taught to children; they would do better by listening to pro- fessionals. But music is a moral d iscipline and a ra- tional enjoymen t.

6. By learning music children become bette r cri tics and are given a suitable occupation. When o f riper age they should abandon music; professional skill is not for them ; nor should they be taught difficult instruments.

1· The various musical harmonies should be used for dif- ferent pu rposes. Some inspire virtue, others valour, others enthusiasm. The ethical harmonies are those which children should learn . The others may be left to professionals. The Dorian harmony is the best fo r education. The Phrygian is bad; but the Lydian may be beneficial to children .

Cetera desunt.

POLIT ICS

BOOK I

1 Every state is a community of some kind, an d every 12Sr community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, a ims at good in a 1 greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.

Some people think 1 that the qualifications of a states- man, king, householder, and master a re the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the rul er over a few is called 10 a master; over more, the manager of a household; ove r a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great hou sehold an d a small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the governmen t is personal, the ru ler is a king ; when, according to the ts rules of the political scie nce, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.

But aH this is a mista ke ; for governm ents differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the mat- ter according to the method 2 which bas hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the 20

1 Cp. Plato, Politicus, 258 E-259 D.

5 1

58 Politics [BK. 1: CH. 5

only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but

lS another's man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another's man who, being a human being, is also a possession. And a possession may be defined as an in- strument of action, sepa rable from the possessor.

5 But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient a nd right, or rather is not a11 slavery a violation of natu re?

20 There is no difficu lty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some s hould r ule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.

And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects 2s (and that rule is the better which is exercised over better

subjects-for example, to rule over men is better than to rul e over wild beasts ; for the work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work); for in all things which form a composite whole and which

JO are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to light. Such a duality exists in Jiving c reatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things which have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But we are wan- dering from the s ubjP.ct. We wiJJ therefore restrict our- selves to the living creature, whkb, in the first place,

JS consists of soul and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler , and the other the subject. But then

BK. 1: Ca. 5] Politics 59

we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two; although in bad or cor- rupted natures the body will often appear to rule over 1254~ the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condi- tion. At all events we may firstly observe in living crea- tures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas fhe intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over s the body, a nd of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, 10 and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the fem.ale ~fe.rior; and the ?ne rules and the othe r is ruled; this prmCJple, of necess1ty, exte~ds to all mankind. Where then there is such a dif- lS ference as that between soul and !:>ody, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another's, 2o and he who participates ill_!!llional principle enough to apprehend, but not to havel such a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even appre- hend a principle; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of s laves and of tame animals is not very different; for botl1 with their bodies minister to the needs

60 lBK. 1: CH. 6

25 of life. Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and s laves, making the one strong for se rvile labour, the other upright, and although useless

JO for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But the opposite often happens-that some have the soul s and others have the bodies of free- men. And doubtless if men differed from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of

JS the Gods do from me n, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should be sla ves of the supe rior. And if this is true of the body, how much more just that a similar distinction should ex ist in the soul ? but the beauty of the

1255• body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, a nd others slaves, and that for these latter slave ry is both expedient and right.

6 But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way righ t on their s ide, may be easily seen. For the words s lavery and slave are used in two senses. There

s is a s lave or slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sor t of convention-the la w by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orato r who brought forward an unconstitu- tional measure: they detest the notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence and is superior in brute s trength, a nother shall be his slave and subject.

10 Even among philosophers there is a difference of opin- ion. The origin of the di spute, and what makes the views invade each other's terri tory, is as follows: in some sense vi r tue, when furnished with means, has actually the greatest power of exercising force: and as superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of

BK. I: Cu. 6J Politics 6l

some kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply one about justice (for it is due to one party tS identifying justice with goodwiU/ 0 while the other iden- tifies it with the mere rule of the stronger). If these views are thus set out sepa rately, the other views 11 have no force or plausibility against the view that the superior in virtue ought to rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as 20 they think, simply to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that s lavery in accordance with the custom of war is justified by law, but at the same moment they deny this. For what if the cause of the war be unjust? And again, no one would eve r 25 say that he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were thi s the case, men of the highest rank would be slaves and the child re n of slaves if they or their parents chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore H ellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they rea lly mea n JO the natural slave of whom we spoke at firs t ; 12 for it must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others no- where. The same principle applies to nobiJity. H ellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, but they deem the barbarians noble JS only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility a nd freedom, the one absolute, the other relative. The Helen of Theodectes says :

'Who would p resume to call me serva nt who am on both sides sprung from the stem of the Gods?'

10 i. e. mutual goodwill, which is held to be incompatible with the relntion of master nnd slave.

ll i. e. those stated in U. 5-12, that the stronger always has, and that he never has, a right to enslave lhe weaker. Aristotle finds that these views cannot maintain themselves against his intermediate view, that the ~upcrior in virtue should rule.

12 Chap. s.

62 Politics [BK. 1: Ca. 7

What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom 40 and slavery, noble and humble birth, by the two princi-

125Sb pies of good and evil? They think that as men and ani- mals beget men and animals, so from good men a good man sp rings. But this is what nature, though she may intend it, cannot always accomplish.

We see then that there is some foundation for this dif- 5 ference of opinion, and that all are not either slaves by

nature or freemen by nature, and also th:lt there is in some cases a marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practising obedi- ence, the others exercising the authority and lordship which nature intended them to have. The abuse of this authority is injurious to both; for the inte rests of part

, 0 and whole,t 3 of body and soul, are the same, an d the

slave is a part of the master, a living but sepa rated part of bis bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and slave between them is natural they are friends a nd have a common interes t , but where it rests merely on

t5 law and force the reverse is true.

7 The previous remarks are quite enough to show that th e rul e of a master is not a constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of rule are not, as some affi r m, the same with each other. 14 For there is one rule exercised over subjects who a re by nature free, anotbe r over s Ub- jects who a re by nature s laves. The ruJe of a household is a monarchy, for every hou se is unde r one head: whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen

20 a nd equals. The master is not called a master because

IS Cp. 12548 8. II H Plato, Polit. 258 s-259 D, referred to already in 1252• 7-16, 121/

18-20.

BK. I: CH. 8) Politics 63

be has science/ 0 but because he is of a certain character, nd the same remark applies to the slave and the free- ~an. Still there may be a science for the master and a science for the slave. The science of the s lave would be such as the man of Syracuse taught, who made money by instructing slaves in their ordinary duties. And such zs a knowledge may be carried further, so as t~ include cookery and similar menial arts. For some duttes are of the more necessary, others of the more honourable sort ; as the proverb says, 'slave before s lave, maste r before master'. But all such branches of knowledge are se rvile. JO There is likewise a science of the master, which teaches the use of slaves; for the master as such is concerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use of them. Yet this so-called science is not anything great or wonderful ; for the master need only know how to order that which the slave must know how to execute. H ence those who are 35 in a position which places them above toil have s tewa rds who attend to their households while they occupy them- selves with philosophy or with politics. But the art of ac- quiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs both from the art of the master and the art of the slave, bei ng a species of hunting or war.18 Enough of the dis- tinction between master and slave. 40

8 Let us now inquire into~erty generally, and into 1256• the art of getting wealth, in accordance with our usual method 17 fo r a slave has been shown 18 to be a part of propert~. The first question is whether ~e art of getting wealth is the same with the art of managmg a household or a part of it, or inst rumental to it; and if the last,

u Polit. 259 c, 293 c . 10 Cp. vii. 1333b 38. 17 Of understanding the whole by the part, Cp. USla 17. 18 Chap. 4·

64 Politics [BK. I: CH. 8

whether in the way that the art of making shuttles is in- strumental to the art of weaving, or in the way that the

s casting of bronze is instrumental to the a rt of the statu - ary, for they are not instrumental in the same way, but the o~e provides tools and the other material; and by matenal I mean the substratum out of which any work

10 is made; thus wool is the material of the weaver, bronze of the statuary. Now it is easy to see that the a r t of household management is not identical with the art of getting wealth, for the one uses the material which the other provides. For the art which uses household stores can be no other than the ar t of household management. There i~, however, a doubt whether the art of getting wealth •s a part of hou sehold management or a distinct

ts art. If the getter of wealth has to consider whence wealth and property can be procured, but there are many sorts of property and riches, then are husba ndry, and the ca re and p rovision o f food in gene ral, parts of the wealth- getting art or di stinct ar ts? Again, there are many sorts of food, and therefore there are many kinds of lives both

20 of an imals and men; they must all have food, and the differences in their food have made differences in thei r ways of life. For o f beasts, some are gregarious, others are solitary; they live in the way which is best adapted to sustain them, accordingly as they are carnivorous or

25 herbivorous or om nivorous: and their habits a re deter- mined for them by nature in such a manner that they may obtain with greater facility the food of their choice. But, as different species have different tastes, the same things are not naturally pleasant to all of them; and therefore the lives of carnivorous or herbivorous animals further

JO differ among themselves. In the lives of men too the re is a great diffe rence. The laz iest are sbe_@erds, who lead an idle life, and get their s ubsi stence without t rouble

BK. 1: CH. 8) Politics 65

from tame animals; their flocks having to wander from place to place in search of pasture, they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a sort of living farm. Others 35 support themselves by bunting, which is of different kinds. Some, for example, are brigands, others, who dwell near Jakes or marshes or rivers or a sea in which there are fish, are fishermen, and others live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The greater number obtain a living from the cultivated fruits of the soil. Such are the modes of 40 subsistence which prevail among those whose indus try springs up of itself, and whose food is not acquired by exchange and retail trade--there is the shepherd, the 1256b husbandman, the brigand, the fisherman, the bunter. Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two em- ployments, eki ng out the deficiencies of one of them by another : thus the life of a shepherd may be combined with that of a brigand, the life of a farmer with that of a s hun ter. Other modes of life are similarly combined in any way whic h the needs of men may require. Property, in the sense of a bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both when they are first born, and when they are grown up. For some anima ls bring forth, to t ogether with their offspring, so much food as will last until they are able to supply themselves; of this the vermiparous or ovipa rous animals are an instance; and the viviparous animals have up to a certain time a sup- ply of food for their young in themselves, which is called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of IS animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for usc an d food, the wild, if not all, at least the greate r part of them, for food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, 20 and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she h as

66 Politics [BK. I: Cn . 9

made all animals for the sake of man. And so, in one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisi- tion, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, a n art which we ought to practise against wild beasts, and

zs against men who, though intended by nature to be gov- erned, will not submit ; for war of such a kind is natu- rally just.10

Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is a part of the management of a household, in so far as the art of household management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things neces-

ao sary to life, and useful for the community of the family or state, as can be s tored. They are the elements of true riches; for the amount of property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that

'No bound to riches has been fixed for man'.

But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other iS arts; for the instruments of any a rt are never unlimited,

either in number or size, and riches may be defined as a number of instr uments to be used in a household or in a state. And so we see that there is a natural art of acquisi- tion which is practised by managers of households a nd by statesmen, and what is the reason of this.

40 9 There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly and rightly called an a r t of wealth- getting, and bas in fact suggested the notion that riches

1257• and property have no limit. Being nearly connected with the preceding, it is often identified with it. But though they are not very different, neither are they the samE".

to Cp. ussb 38, t333b 38.

BK. I: CH. 9) Politics CJ7

The kind already described is given by nature, the other is gained by experienc~ and ~rt . . .

Let us begin our discussiOn of the questton wtth the s following considerations:

Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the thing as such, but not in the same ma n- ner for one is the proper, and the other the improper or sec~ndary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him to who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its Qroper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for the art of exchange extends to all of tS them, and it arises at first from what is natural, from the circumstance that some have too little, others too much. Hence we may infer that retail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting wealth; bad it been so, men would have ceased to exchange when they had enough. In the first community, indeed, which is the fam ily, this art is obviously of no use, but it begins to be useful when th e 20 society increases. For the members of the family origi- nally bad all things in common; later, when the family divided into parts, the parts shared in many things, and different parts in different things, which they bad to give in exchange for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still practised among barbarous nations who exchange 2s with one another the necessaries of life and nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for example, in ex- change for corn , and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the wealth-getting art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed for the satisfaction of men's natu- .10 ral wants. The other or more complex form of exchange grew, as might have been infe rred, out of the s impler.

68 Politics (BK. I: Cn. 9

When the inhabitants of one country became more de- pendent on those of another, and they imported what they needed, and exported what they had too much of,

JS money necessarily came into use. For the various neces- saries of life are not easily carried about, and hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with each other some- thing which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this the value was at first measured simply by

40 size and weight, but in process of time they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and to mark the value.

1257b When the use of coin had once been discovered, ou t of the barter of necessary articles arose the other art of wealth-getting, namely, retail trade; which was at ftrst probably a simple matter, but became more complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the greatest profit might be made. Origi-

s nating in ~e use of coin, the art of getting wealth is gen- erally thought to be chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which produces riches and wealth; having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, riches is assumed by many to be only a quantity of coi n, be-

10 cause the arts of getti ng wealth and retail trade a re con- cerned with coin. Others maintain that coined money is a mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, because, if the users s ubstitute another commodity fo r it, it is worthless, and because it is not useful as a means to any of the necessities of life, and, indeed, be who is rich in coin may often be in want of necessary food. But how can that be wealth of which a man may have a great

IS abundance and yet perish with hunger, like MiJas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer t urned everythi ng that was set before him into gold?

BK· I: Cn. 9} Politics 69

Hence men seek after a better notion of rich~~ ~nd of th art of getting wealth than the mere acqu1s1tion of

~ and they arc right. For natural riches and the natu- com, . h' · th · ral art of wealth-getting are a different t mg; m etr

e form they arc part of the management of a house- 2o ~~d · whereas retail t rade is the art of producing wealth, 0

t i~ every way, but by exchange. And it is thought to ~~concerned with coin; for coi n is the un.it of exchange

d the measure or limit of it. And there tS no bound to an . . lh . 20 the riches which spnng from t~1s ar~ o~ wea t -getll~g.

A · the art of medicine there lS no hm1t to the pu rsUit of 25 s 10 . 1' . th health, and as in the othe r arts there ~s no 1m1t to. e pursuit of their several ends, for they atm at accomphsh- ing their ends to the uttermost (bu~ o! the means. the~e is a limit, for the end is always the h mtt), so, too, ~~ tb~s art of wealth-getting there is no li mit o f ~.e .end, whtch ts 'ches of the spurious kind, and the acqu 1S1llon of. wealth. 30 ~ut the art of wealth-getting which consi.st~ in houseb?ld management, on the other. b and ,, has a. .hmtt; the unlim- ited acquisition of wealth IS not 1ts bus mess. And, t~e~e­ fore, in one point of view, all riches must have a l~rrut ; nevertheless as a matter of fact , we find the oppos1te to be the case;

1

for all getters of wealth increase th~ir ~oard of coin without limit. T he sou rce of the conf usiOn 1s. the near connection between the two kinds of wellth-gettm~ ; in either, the instrument is tbe same, althou gh the use ~s 3S different and so they pass in to one another; for each IS a use of ~he same proper ty, but with a difference: accu- mulation is the end in the one case, but there is a further end in the other. Hence some persons are led to believe that getting wealth is the object of hou se hold manage- men t and the whole idea of their lives is that they ought eithe; to increase their money without limit, or at any 40

:w Cp. ns6b 3'·

70 Politics ( BK. I : Cu . 10

rate not to lose it. The origin o f th is disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only, a nd not upon

1258• living well; and , as th eir des ires are unlimited, they also desire that the means of grati fying them should be wi th- out limit. T hos e who do aim a t a good life s eek the means

s of obtaining bodily p leasures; a nd, s ince the e njoyment of these appea rs to depe nd on property, they a re a b- sorbed in getting wealth: and so there a rises the seco nd species of wealth-getting. F or, as thei\· enjoyment is in excess, they seek a n a r t wh ich p roduces the excess of enjoyment; and, if they a re not able to s upply t heir p leas ures by th e art o f getti ng wealth, they try othe r a r ts, us ing in turn every faculty in a ma nner contra ry to na-

to ture. T he quality of courage, fo r exa mple, is not intended to make wea lth, but to inspi re co nftdence ; neither is this t he ai m of the genera l's or of the p hysician's art ; but the one a ims at v ictory and th e other a t h ealth. Neve rthe- less, some men tu rn every quality or ar t into a means of get ti ng wealth ; this they conceive to be the e nd , a nd to the promotion of the end they th ink all things must co ntribute.

T hus, then, we ha ve consid ered the art of wea lth-get- IS t ing which is unnecessa ry, a nd why men want it ; ami

a lso the necessary art of wealth-getting, which we have seen to be different from the oth er, a nd to be a natu ral pa rt of the a r t of ma naging a household, concerned with t he p rovision of food, not, howeve r, li ke the for me r kind , un limited, but ha ving a l imit.

10 And we have found the a nswe r to our original ques- tion,21 Whethe r the a r t o f gett ing wealth is the business o f t he ma nager of a house hold a nd of the sta tesma n or

20 not their bus iness?- viz. tha t wealth is pres uppos ed by 21 u s6• J.

BK. I: CH. 11] Politics 73

earth which, although they bear no fruit, are neverthe-

less profitable; for example, the cutting of timber and all mining. The art of mining, by which minerals are

obtained, itself bas many branches, for there are various

kinds of things dug out of the earth. Of the several divi-

sions of wealth-getting I now speak generally; a minute

consideration of them might be useful in practice, but it

would be tiresome to dwell upon them at greater length

now. Those occupations are most truly arts in which there 3S

is the least element of chance; they are the meanest in

which the body is most deteriorated, the most servile in

which there is the greatest use of the body, and the most

illiberal in which there is the least need of excellence. Works have been written upon these subjects by vari-

ous persons; for example, by Chares the P arian, and 40

Apollodorus the Lemnian, who have treated of Till-

age and Planting, while others have treated of other 1259•

branches; any one who cares for such matters may refer

to their writings. It would be well also to collect the scat-

tered stories of the ways in which individuals have suc-

ceeded in amassing a fortune; for all this is use ful to persons who value the art of getting wealth. There is the s anecdote of Thales the Milesian and his nnancial device,

whi ch involves a principle of universa l application, but

is attributed to him on account of his reputation for wis- dom. He was reproached for his poverty, which was s up-

posed to show that philosopl1y was of no use. According to

to the story, he knew by his skill in the sta rs while it was yet winter that there would be a great harvest of olives

in the coming year; so, having a little money, he gave

deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and

Miletus, which he hired at a low price because•no one bid

against him. When the harvest-time c:ame, and many

74 Politics ( BK. 1: Cu. 12

1s were wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if they like, but that their ambition is of another so rt. He is supposed to have given a striki ng p roof of his wisdom, but, as I was saying, his device fo r

20 getti ng wealth is of universal application, and is nothing but the creation of a monopoly. It is an art often p rac- tised by cities when they are in want of money ; they make a monopoly o f provisions.

There was a ma n of Sicily, who, having money depos- ited with him , bought up al l the iron from the iron mines;

25 afterwards, when the merchants from their various mar- kets came to buy, he was the only seller, and without much increasing the price he gained 200 pe r cent. Which when D ionysius heard, h e to ld him that be might take away his money, but that be must not remain at Syra- cuse, for he thought that the man had discovered a way

JO of making money which was inju rious to h is ow n inter- ests. He made the same discovery as T hales; they both contrived to create a monopoly for themselves. And statesmen as well ought to know these things; for a s tate is often as much in want of money and of such devices for obtaining it as a household, or even more so; hence

JS some public men devote themselves entirely to finance.

12 Of household management we have seen :1:~ that there are three parts--one is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been di scussed already/ 6 another of a father, and the third of a hus band. A husban d and

40 fa ther, we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs, the r ule over his children being a

1259b royal, over his wife a constitutional r ule. For although

BI<. 1: Ca. 13) Politics 75

there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male ·s by natu re fitter for command than the female , just as ~he elder and full-grown is supe rior to the you nger and more immature. But in most constitutional s tates the s citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea o! !1 constitutional state implies that the natures of the Citi- zens are equal, and do not differ at all.:!T eve rtheless. when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavour t.o create a difference of outward forms and names an~ titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saymg of Amasis about his foot-pan. 28 The relation o~ the m~e ~o the female is of this kind, but there the mequahty IS permanent. The rule of a father over his children is 10 royal, for be rules by virtue both of love and of U1e re- spect due to age, exercising a kind of roya l powe r. And U1erefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus 'father of Gods and men', because be is the king of them all. F or a king is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, and s uch 15 is U1e relation of elder and younger, of father and so n.

13 Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men than to the acquisition of ina nimate things, and to human excellence more than to the excellence of property which we calJ wealth, and to the virtue of free- 20 men more than to the virtue of slaves. A q ues tion may indeed be raised, whether tht:re is any excellence at an in a slave beyond a nd higher than merely instrumental and ministerial qualities-whether be ca n h ave the vir- tu es of temperance, cou rage, justice, and lhe like; or wheth er slaves possess only bodily and ministerial quali- 25 ties. And, whichever way we answer the question, a dif- ficulty arises; for , if they have virtue, in what will they

27 Cp. ii. T26I• 39. iii. uss• 11. 28 Herod. ii. r? l.

76 Politics [BK. 1: CH. 13

differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they a re

men and share in rational principle, it seems absu rd to

sa?' that they have no virtue. A similar question may be

30 r~1sed about women and children, whether they too have

~Irtues: ~ught ~ woman to be temperate and brave an d

Just, and Is a child to be called temperate, and intemper-

ate, or not? So in general we may ask about the natural

ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the

same or different virtues. For if a noble nature is equally

35 required in both, why should one of them always rule

~nd the o~cr always be ruled? Nor can we say that thi~

JS a quc~t10n. of d~gree, for the difference between r uler

and subject IS a difference of kind, which the difference

o_f more and less never is. Yet how strange is the supposi-

tiOn tb~t the one ~ught, and that the other ought not, to 40 have virtue! For If the ruler is in temperate and unjust

126C>- how can he rule well? if the subject, how can he obe '

well? If ~e be licentious and cowardly, he will certain!; not do Ius duty. It is evident, therefore, that both of

the'? must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural

su_bJe~ts also vary among themselves. Here the very con- s stitutlon of the soul has shown us the way; in it one pa rt

naturally rules, an? the other is subject, and the virtue

of ~e ruler we mamtain to be different from that o f the su bject;-the one being the virtue of the rational and

the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious' that

the same principle applies generally, and therefore al-

most all ~bings rule and a re r uled according to nature.

But the kind of rule differs;-the freeman rules over the

s lave after another manner from that in which the male

10 rules over the female, or the man over the child; although

the parts•of the soul are present in all of them they are

~resent in different degrees. For the slave has nd delibera- tive faculty at all; the woman has, but it i s without a u-

BK. I: Ca. 13] Politics 77

thority, and the child h as, bu t it is immature. So it must

necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues 15

also; all should partake of them, but only in such man-

ner and degree as is required by each for the fulfilment

of his duly. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue

in perfection, for his function, taken absolutely, demands

a master artificer, and rational principle is such an artifi-

cer; the subjects, on the other ha nd, require only that

measure of virtue which is proper to each of them. 20

Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but

the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage

and justice of a man and of a woman, arc not, as Socrates

maintained/'& the same; the courage of a man is shown in

com manding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds of

all other virtues, as will be more clearly seen if we look 2s

at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue

consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing

rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. Far better

than such dcfmitions is their mode of speaking, who, like

Gorgias,30 enumerate the virtues. All classes must be

deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says

of women,

'Silence is a woman's glory',

but th is is not equally the glory of man. The child is im-

perfect, and therefore obviously his vi rtue is not relative

to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his

teacher, and in like manner the virtue of the s lave is

relative to a master. Now we determined 31 that a slave

JO

is useful for the wants of life, and therefore be will ob-

viously require only so much virtue as wi ll prevent him JS

from failing in his duty through cowardice or lack of

29 Plato, Mtno, 72 A-7J c. 80 JJ.Itno, 71 E, 72 A

31 1254b 16-39, cr. 1259b 2s sq.

78 Politics [ BK. 1: CH. 13

self-control. Some one will ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be required also in the artisans, for they often fail in their work through the lack of self-control? But is there not a great difference in th e t wo cases? For the slave shares in his master's life ·

' .w the artisa n is less closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave.

1260b The meaner so rt of mechanic has a special and sepa rate s lavery; and whereas the s lave exists by ilature, not so the shoema ker or other a rtisa n. It is manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of such excellence in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the a rt of mas-

s tership which tra ins the s lave in his dut ies.32 Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we should employ command only,33 for s laves stand even more in need of admonition than children.

So much for thi s s ubject; the relations of husba nd and wife, parent and child, thei r several virtues, wh at in their intercourse with one another is good, and what is

10 evil, and how we may pursue the good and escape t he evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of the dif- ferent forms of government.3 ' For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a s tate, and these relatio nships are the parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to th e vi r tue of the whole, women and children

15 must be t rained by education with an eye to the consti- tution/111 if the virtues of either of them are s upposed to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a differe nce: for the chi ld ren grow up to be

32 Cp. nssb 23, 31-35. 88 Plato, Laws, vi. 777 F. :1-1 The question is not actually discussed in the Politics. 3r. Cp. \', 131o& \2- J6, viii. 1337• 11-18.

BK. I: CH. 13) Politics 79

citizens, a nd half the free persons in a state are women. 88

20

Of these matters, enough has been said ; of what re- mains, let us speak at a nother time. Regarding, then, ou r present inquiry as complete, we will make a new begin- ning. And, first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect s tate.

88 Plato, Lc.ws, vi. 781 A.

100 Politics [BK. II: CH. 7

s But want is not the sole incentive to crime; men also wish to enjoy themselves and not to be in a state of desi re -they wish to cure some desire, going beyond the neces- sities of life, which preys upon them; nay, this is not the ooJy reason-they may desire superfluiti es in order to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied with pain, and therefore they commit crimes.

Now what is the cure of these three disorders? Of the first, moderate possessions and occupation; of the sec-

to ond, habits of temperauce; as to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves, they will fmd the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in philosophy; for all other pleasures we are dependent on others. The iact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold; and hence great is the

1 honour bestowed, not on biro who kills a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that the institutions of Pbaleas avail only against petty crimes.

There is another objection to them. They are chiefly designed to promote the internal welfare of the state. But the legislator should consider also its relation to neighbou ring nations, and to all who are outside of it.83

zo Tbe government must be organized with a view to mili- tary strength ; and of this be has said not a word. And so with respect to property: there should not only be enough to supply the internal wants of the state, but also to meet dangers coming from without. The property of the state

zs should not be so large that more powerful neighbou rs may be tempted by it, while the owners arc unable to repel the invaders; nor yet so small that the state is un- able to maintain a war even against states of equal power, and of the same character. Pbaleas bas not laid down any

aa Cp. n6s• 20.

BK. III : CH. 2] Politics 127

another second, another third, have, when regarded in this relation, nothing, or hardly anything, worth men- tioning in common. Now we see that governments differ in kind, and that some of them are prior and that others are posterior; those which are faulty or perverted are 12 7 Sb necessarily posterior to those which a re perfect. (What we mean by perversioil will be hereafter explained. 3 ) The citizen then of necessity differs under each form of gov- ernment; and ou r definition is best adapted to the citizen s of a democracy; but not necessarily to other states. For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary ones; and suits are distributed by sections among the magis- trates. At Lacedaemon, for instance, the Epbors deter- mine suits about contracts, which they distr ibute among 10 themselves, wbiJe the elde rs are judges of homicide, and other causes a re decided by other magistrates. A similar principle prevails at Carthage; ~ there certain magis- trates decide all causes. We may, indeed, modify ou r defi nition of the citizen so as to include these states. I n them it is the bolder of a definite, not of an indefinite 1 5 office, who legislates and judges, and to some or all such holders of definite offices is reserved the right of delib- erating or judging about some things or about all things. T be conception of the citizen now begins t o clear up.

He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a citizen of that state; and, speaking generally, a state is 20 a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life. _..

2 But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents are citizens; others insist on going fur- ther back; say to two or three or more ancestors. This i~s

3 Cp. 1279. 1Q. • Cp. ii. 1273° 19.

3

10

Il- ly

1e s- et fi- !y :r. ti- or

10

or ld ut ill is is ild g, he bo on ns lS.

on ar-

BK. III: CH. 3] Politics 129 allel ques tion is rai sed respecting the state, whether a certain ac t is or is not a n act of the state; for example, in the trans ition from an oligarchy or a tyranny to a democracy. In such cases persons refuse to fulfil their 10 contracts or a ny other obligations, on t he ground U1at the tyrant, and not the state, contracted them ; they argue that some co nsti tutions are esta blished by force, and not for the sake of the commo n good. But this would apply equally to democracies, fo r they too may be founded on violence, a nd then the acts of the democracy will be t S neither mo re nor less acts of the state in qu estio n tha n those of an ol igarchy or of a tyranny. This ques tion r uns up into anotber:-on wh at principle s ha ll we ever say that the state is the same, or different ? It would be a very superficial view which conside red only the place and the inhabitants ( for the soil and the population may be sepa- rated, and some of the inha bitants may live in one place ~o and some in another). This, however, is not a very seli- ous difficulty; we need only remark that the word 's tate' is ambiguous.8

It is further asked: Wh en are men, living in the s ame 25 place, to be regarded as a s ingle city- wha t is the limit ? Certainly not the wall of the city, for you might surround all Peloponnesus with a wall. Like this, we may s ay, is Babyl.m,8 and every city that has the compass of a nation rathe r than a city; Babylon, they say, had been taken for three days before some part of the inha bi tants became 30 aware of the fact. ·1'his di fficu lty may, howeve r, with ad- vantage be deferred 10 to a nother occas ion ; the states- man has to consider the s ize of the state, a nd whether it should consist of more than one nation or not.

8 i. e. Polis means botb 'stale' and 'city'. v Cp. li. r26s• 14. tns lOThe size of the state is discus_o;ed in vii. 1326• 8- 13278 3; the ques-

tion whether it should consist of more than one nation is barely touched upon, in v. I JOJ8 25J> 3·

130 Politics [BK. III: CH. 4

.'5 Again, shall we say that while the race of inhabitants, as well as their place of abode, remain the same, the city is aiso the same, although tbe citizens are always dying and being born, as we call rivers and •ountains the same, although the water is always flowing away and coming agai n ? Or sha ll we say that th e generations of men, like

40 the rivers, are the sa me, but that the s tate cha nges? For, I276b since the s tate is a part nership, a nd is a partners hip of

citizens in a. constitution, when the form of the govern- ment changes, and becomes different, then it may be supposed tha t the state is no longer the same, jus t as a

s tragic differs from a comic chorus, although the members of both may be identical. And in this manner we speak of every union or composition of elements as different when the form of their composition alters; for example, a scale containing the same sounds is said to be different,

10 accordingly as the Dorian or the Phrygian mode is em- ployed. And if this is true it is evident that the sameness of the s tate consists chiefly in the sameness of the con- stitution, and it may be called or not called by the same name, whether the inhabitants are the same or entirely different. It is quite another question, whether a state

1s ought or ought not to ful fil engagements when the form of government changes.

4 There is a point nearly a11ied to the preceding: Whether the virtue of a good man and a good citizen is the same or not. 11 But, before entering on thi s di scus- sion, we must cer tainly firs t obtain some gene ral notion

20 of the virtue of the citizen. Like the sailo r, the citizen is a member of a community. Now, sailors have diffe rent functions, for one of them is a rower, a nother a pilot, and a th ird a look-out man , a fourth is described by some

n Cp. !l'ic. I?.th. v. IIJ ol> 28.

4

1e :o ly

a lt is :n se te ;e lt .d ~r

tg a if :b ,d .y •e Jt n te

BK. III: CH. 4J Polit;cs 133

rule of a master, which is concerned with menial offices 1 ~ -the master need not know how to perform these, but may employ others in the execution of them: the other JS would be degrading; and by the other I mean the power actually to do menial duties, which vary much in cha r- acter and are executed by various classes of slaves, such, for example, as handicraftsmen, who, as their name sig- nifies, live by the labour of their hands :- under these 1277 the mechanic is included. Hence in ancient times, and among some nations, the working classes had no share in the government-a privilege which they only acquired under the extreme democracy. Certainly the good man and the statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts of inferiors except for their own occasional use; 13 if they habitually practice them, there will cease s to be a distinction between master and slave.

This is not the rule of which we are speaking; but there is a rule of another kind, which is exercised over freemen and equals by birth- a constitutional rule, which the ruler must learn by obeying, as be would learn to the duties of a general of cavalry by being under the orders of a general of cavalry, or the duties of a general of infantry by being under the orders of a general of infantry, and by having bad the command of a regiment and of a company. It has been well said that 'he who bas never learned to obey cannot be a good commander'. The two are not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable of both; be should know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman-these are the 1 ~ virtues of a citizen. And, altLough the temperance a nd justice of a rul er are distinct from those of a subject, the virtu.e of a good man will include botb; for the virtue of the good man who is free and also a subject, e. g. his jus-

12 Cp. i. ussb 2o-37· 13 Cp. viii. 133 7b t5.

5

e ·- n j

J

e :1 s f

f

BK. III: CH. 5] Politics 135

those to be citizens who are necessary to the existence of the state; for example, children are not citizens equally

with grown-up men, who arc cilizens absolutely, but chil-

dren , not being grown up, are only citizens on a certain s assumption}8 Nay, in ancient times, and among some

nations, the artisan class were slaves or foreigners, and therefore the majority of them are so now. The best form

of state will not admit them to citizenship; but if they

are admitted, then our definition of the virtue of a citizen wiJl not apply to every citizen, nor to every free man as

such, but only to those who are freed from necessa ry to

services. The necessary people are either slaves who min-

ister to the wants of individuals, or mechanics and la-

bourers who are the servants of the community. These reflections carried a little further will explain their pos i-

tion; and indeed what has been said already 10 is of itself,

when understood, explanation enough. Since there are many forms of government t here must IS

be many varieties of citizens, and especially of citizens

who are subjects; so that under some governments the

mechanic and the labourer will be citizens, but not in

others, as, for example, in aristocracy or the so-called government of the best ( if there be such an one), in which

honours are given according to virtue and merit ; for no 20

man can practise virtue who is living the life of a me-

chanic or labourer. In oligarchies the qualification for

office is high, and therefore no labourer can ever be a

citizen ; but a mechanic may, for an actual majority of

them a re rich. At Thebes :!0 there was a law that no man zs

could hold office who had not retired from bus iness for

ten years. But in many states the law goes to the length of

admitting aliens; for in some democracies a man is a citi-

18 sc. that they grow up to be men . 20 Cp. vi. 1321a 28.

10 1275" 38 sqq.

136 Politics [ BK. III: CH. 6 zen though his mothe r only be a citizen; and a simila r principle is applied to iUegitimate children; the law is

30 relaxed when there is a dearth of population. But when the number of citizens increases, first the children of a male or a female slave are excluded; then those whose mothers only are citizens; and at last the right of citizen- ship is confined to those whose fathers and mothers are both citizens.

35 H ence, as is evident, there are di(ferent kinds of ci ti- zens; and he is a citizen in the highest sense who shares in the honours of the state. Compare Homer's words ' like some dishonoured stranger'; 21 he who is excluded from the h onours of the state is no better than an alien. But when thi s exclusion is concealed, then the object is that the privileged class may deceive their fellow inhabitants.

40 As to the question whether the vi rtu e of the good ma o l 278b is the same as that of the good citizen, the consideratio ns

already adduced prove that in some states the good ma n and the good citizen are the same, and in others different. When they are the same it is not every citizen who is a good ma n, but only the s tatesman and those who have or

s may have, alone or in conjunction with others, the con- duct of public affairs.

6 H aving determined these questions, we have next to consider whether there is only one form of government or many, and if many, what they are, and how many, and what a re the differences between them.

10 A cons ti tution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state,22 especially of the highest of all. The gove rn- ment is everywhere sovereign in the state, and the con- _ s titution is .in.Ja<;t the gov.ernmenj. For example, \n de-

~~ Achilles complains of Agamemnon's so treating him, II. ix. 648, wi. 59. 22 Cp. 1274b 38, iv. 1289" 15.

BJ<.. III: Ca. 6] Politics 13 7

mocracies the people are s upreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore, we say that these two forms of gov- ernment also a re different: and so in other cases.

First, let us consider what is the pu rpose of a state, and l S bow many forms of government there are by which hu- man society is regulated. We have al ready said , in the first part of th is treatise,28 when discussing household management and the rule of a master, that mao is by nature a political animal. And therefore, men, eve n when 20 they do not requi re one another's help, desire to live to- ether; not but that they a re also brought together by

-fheir common interests in proportion as they severally attain to any measure o f well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both o f indi vidual s and o f states. And also for the sake of mere life ( in which there is possibly some 25 noble elemen t so long as the evils of existence do not greatly ove rbalance the good) manki nd meet together and maintain the poli t ical community. And we all see that men cling to life even a t the cost of enduring great misfor- tune, seeming to find in life a natural sweetness an d happiness.

There is no difficulty in dis tinguishing the various JO kinds of authority ; they have been often defined already in discussions outside the school. The rule of a master, although the slave by nature and the master by nature have in reali ty the same interests, is never theless exer- cised primarily with a view to the interest of the master, JS bu t accidentally considers the slave, s ince, if the slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him. On the other band, the govern ment of a wife and children and of a household, which we have called household manage- ment, is exercised in the first insta nce for the good of the governed or for the com mon good of both parties, but

:1.3 Cp. L USJ1 1 .

138 Politics [ BK. III: CH. 7

40 essentially for the good of the governed, as we see to be 1279• the case in medicine, gymnastic, and the arts in ge neral,

which are only accidentally concerned with the good of the artists themselves.:!' For there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practise gymnastics, a nd the helmsman is always one of the crew. The trainer or the helmsman considers the good of those committed to

5 his care. But, when be is one of the persons taken care of, he accidentally participates in the advantage, for the helmsman is also a sailor, and the trainer becomes one of those in training. And so in politics: when the s tate is framed upon the principle of equality a nd likeness, the

10 citizens think that they ought to hold office by turns. Fo r merly, as is natural, every one would take his turn of se rvice; and then agai n, somebody else would look after his interest, just as he, willie in office, h ad looked after theirs.20 But nowadays, fo r the sake of the advan- tage which is to be gained from the public reven ues and from office, men want to be always in office. One might

15 imagine that the rul ers, being s ickly, were only kept in health while they continued in office; in that case we may be su re that they would be hunting after p laces. The con- clusion is evident: that governments which have a regard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with st rict principles of justice, a nd are there fore true forms; but those which regard only the interest o~ the

20 rulers are all d efective and perverted forms , for they are despotic, whereas a state is a commu ni ty of freemen.

7 Having determ ined these points, we have next to consider how many form s of government there are, and what they are; and in the first place what are the true forms, for when they are determined the perversions of

24 Cp. Pl. Rrp. i. 341 o. 25 Cp. ii. 1261• 37-b 6.

BK. Ill: CH. 7] Politics 139

them will at once be apparent. The words constitution 25 and government have the same meaning, and the govern- ment, which is the supreme authority in states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of the many. The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the co~mon interest; but governments which r ule with a 30 view to the private interest, whether of the one, or o f the few, or of the many, are perversions.:!a For the mem- bers of a state, if they are truly citizens, ought to partici- pate in its advantages. Of forms of gove.rnment in which one rules, we call that which regards the comr.1on inter- ests kingship or royalty; that in which more than one, 35 but ~ot many, rule, aristocracy; and it is so called, either because the rul ers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best in terests of the sta te a nd of the citizens. But when the citizens at large administer the s tate for the common interest, the government is called by the generic name-a constitution. And there is a reaso n for this use of language. One man or a few may excel in virtue; but 40 as the number increases it becomes more difficult for 1279' them to attain perfection in every kind of virtue, though they may in military virtue, for this is found in the masses. Hence in a constitutional government the fight- ing-men have the supreme power, and those who possess arms are the citizens.

Of the above-mentioned forms, the per\'ersions are as follows :-of royally, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; s of constitutional government, democracy. Fot tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy bas in view the interest of the wealthy; democrac}', of the needy: none of them the common good of all. - 10

26 Cp. Nic. Etlr. viii 10.

BK. III: CH. 9] Politics 14 1

the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, is an accident due

to the fact that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor

numerous. But if so, there is a misapprehension of the

causes of the difference between them. For the real differ- 40

ence between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and 1280•

wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth,

whether they be few or many, that is a n oligarchy, and

where the poor rule, that is a democracy. But as a fact the

rich are few and the poor many; for few are well-to-do,

whereas freedom is enjoyed by all, and wealth and free- 5

dam are the grounds on which the oligarchical and dem-

ocratical parties respectively claim power in the state. - 9 Let us b egin by considering the common defi nitio ns

of oligarchy and democracy, and what is justice oli-

garchical and democratical. For all men cling to justice

of some kind, but their conceptions are imperfect an d to they do not express the whole idea. For example, justice

is thought by them to be, and is, equality, not, however,

for all, but only for equals. And inequality is thought to be, and is, justice; neither is this for a ll, but only for

unequals. When the persons are omitted, then men judge

erroneously. The reason is that they are passing judge-

ment on themselves, and most people are bad j udges in 15

their own case. And whereas justice implies a relation to

persons as well as to things, and a just distribution, as I

have already said in the Etlzics,~ 1 implies the same ratio

between the persons and between the things, they ag ree

abou t the equality of the things, but di spute abou t the

equality of the persons, chiefly for the reason which I zo

have just given-because they are bad judges in their

own affairs; and secondly, because both the parties t o

the argument are speaking of a li mited a nd pa rtial jus-

'

BK. III: Cn. 9) Politics 143

be further inferred that virtue must be the care of a state

which is truly so called, and not merely enjoys the name:

for without this end the community becomes a mere all i-

ance which differs only in place from alliances of which

the members live apart; and law is only a convention,

'a surety to one another of justice,' as the sophist Ly- 10

cophron says, and bas no real power to make the citizens

good and just. This is obvious; for suppose distinct places, s uch as

Corinth and Megara, to be brought together so that their

walls touched, still they would not be one city, not even

if the citizens had the right to intermarry, which is one IS

of the rights peculiarly characteristic of states . Again, if

men dwelt at a distance from one another, but not so far

off as to have no intercourse, and there were laws among

them that they should not wrong each other in their ex-

changes, neither would this be a state. Let us suppose 20

that one man is a carpenter, another a husbandman, an-

other a shoemaker, and so on, and that their number is

ten thousand: nevertheless, if they have no tiling in com-

mon but exchange, alliance, and the like, that would not

constitute a state. Wby is this? Surely not because they 25

are at a distance from one another: for even supposing

that such a community were to meet in one place, but that

each man had a house of his own, which was in a manner

hi s state, and that they made alliance with one another,

but only against evil-doers; stiJI an accurate thinker

would not deem this to be a state, if their intercourse

with one another was of the same character after as be- 30

fore their union. It is clear then that a state is not a mere

society, having a common place, established for the pre- ,

vcntion of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. 20

These are conditions without which a state cannot exist;

29 Cp. Protog. 322 u.

144 Politics [BK. III : CH. 10 but aU of them together do not constitute a state, which is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-suffici ng

JS life. Such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place and intermar ry. Hence arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created by f riendship, for the will to li ve t o- gether is friendship. T he end of the state is the good life,

40 and these are the means towards it. And the state is the 128 1• union of famil ies and villages i n a pe rfect and self-suffic-

ing life, by which we mean a happy and honourable life .30 Ou r conclusio n, then, is that political society exists for

the sake of noble actions, and not of mere compa nionship. s H ence they who contribute most to such a society have

a greater sha re in it th an those who have the same or a greater f reedom or nobility of birth but are inferior to th em in poli tical virtue; or than those who exceed them in wealth but a re surpassed by them in vi rtue.

F rom what has been said it will be clearly seen that all the pa r tisa ns of different forms o f govern ment speak of

to a part of justice only.

10 T here is also a doubt as to what is to be t he s upreme p ower in thestate:-Is it the multitude? Or the weal thy? Or the good? Or the one best man? Or a tyrant? Any of these alternatives seems to involve disagreeable conse- que nces. If the poor, for example, because they are m ore in number, divide among themselves the property o f the

ts rich-is not this unjust? No, by heaven (will be the re- ply), for the supreme autho rity justly willed it. But if thi s is not injustice, p ray what is? Again, when in the fi rst divisio n al l bas been taken, a nd the majority divide

ao Cp. i. ns2b 27; Nic. E th. i. 1097b 6.

154 Politics [BK. II I : CH. 13

God among men. Hence we see that legislation is neces- sarily concerned only with those who a re equal in birth and in capacity; and that for men of pre-eminent virtue there is no law- they are themselves a law. Any one would be ridiculous who attempted to make laws fo r

ts them: they would probably retort what, in the fable o f Antisthenes, th e lions said to the hares,~1 when in the council of the beasts th e latter bega n harangui ng and claiming equality for all. And for thi s reaso n democratic states have ins tituted ost racism; equality is above all

zo things their aim, and therefore they ostracized and ban- ished from the city for a time those who seemed to pre- dominate too much through their wealth, or the num ber of their fri ends, or through any other poli t ical inOuence. Mythology tells us th at the Argonauts left Heracles be- bind for a s imilar reason; th e ship Argo would not t ake

zs hi m because she fea red that he would have bee n too much for the rest of the crew. Wherefore those who de- nounce tyranny and blame the counsel which Peria nder gave to Thrasy bulus cannot be held altogether just in their censu re. T he story is that Periander, whe n the herald was se nt to ask counsel of him, said nothing, but

JO only cut off the tallest ears of corn till he bad brought the 1 fi eld to a level. The herald did not know the meaning of

the action, but came and reported what be had see n to Th rasybul us, who understood that he was to cut off the principal men in the state; G:! and this is a policy not only

JS eJ>:p edient for tyrants or in practice confined to them, but equally necessary in oligarchies and democraci es. Ostra- cism c;s is a measure of the same ki nd, which acts by disabling and banishing the mos t prominent citizens. Great powers do the same to whole cities and nations, as

151 i. e. 'where are your claws and teeth?' 153 Cp. v. 13o2b t 8.

Ci2 Cp. v. I J II· 20.

156 Politics [BK. III: CH. 14

there would be great doubts about the use of it, not when applied to excess in strength, wealth, popularity, or the like, but when used against some one who is pre-eminent in virtue-what is to be done with him? Mankind will not say that such an one is to be expelJed and exiled; on

30 the other hand, he ought not to be a subject-that woul d be as if mankind should claim to rule over Zeus, dividi ng his offices among them. The only alternative is that all should joyfully obey such a ruler, according to what seems to be the order of nature, and that men like him should be kings in their state for life.

35 14 The preceding discussion, by a natural transition, leads to the consideration of royalty, which we admit to be one of the true forms of government. Let us see whether in order to be well governed a state or count ry should be under the rule of a king or under some other form of government; and whether monarchy, althrJgh good for some, may not be bad for others. But firs t we

40 must determine whether there is one species of royalty 1285• or many. It is easy to see that there are many, and that

the manner of government is not the same in a ll of the m. Of roya lties according to law, (I) the Lacedaemo nian

is thought to answer best to the true pattern; but there 5 the royal power is not absolute, except when the kings

go on an expedition, and then they take the command. Matters of religion are likewise committed to them. The kingly offsce is in truth a ki nd of generalship, irrespo n- sible and perpetual. The king has not the power of life and death, except in a specified case, as for instance, in ancient times, be bad it when upon a campaign, by right

10 of force. This custom is d escribed in Homer. For Aga- memnon is patient when he is attacked in the assem bly, bu t when the army goes 'lut to battle be has the power

BK. III: Cll. 14] Politics 157

even of life and death. Does be not say?-'\Vben I find a man skulking apart from the battle, nothing shall save him from the dogs and vultu res, for in my hands is death.' 66

This, then, is one form of royalty~neralship ior 15 life: and of such royalties some are hereditary and others elective.

( 2) T here is another sort of mona rchy not uncom- mon among the barbarians, which nearly resembles tyranny. But this is both legal and hereditary. For bar- 20 barians, being more servile in character than Hellenes, and Asiatics than Europeans, do not rebel against a des- potic government. Such royalties have the nature of tyrannies because the people a re by nature slaves; 66 but there is no danger of their being over thrown, for they are hereditary and legal. Wherefore also their guards are such as a king and not such as a tyrant wou ld employ, ;!5 that is to say, they are composed of citizens, whereas the guards of tyrants are mercenaries. 07 For kings rule ac- cording to law over volunta ry subjects, but tyrants ove r involuntary; and the one are guarded by thei r fellow- citizens, the others are guarded against them.

These are two forms of monarchy, and there was a 30 third (3) which existed in ancient H ellas, called an Aesymnetia or (lictatorsbip. This may be defined gen- erally as an elective tyranny, which, li ke the barbarian monarchy, is legal, but differs from it in not being hered- itary. Sometimes the office was held for life, sometimes £or a term of years, or unti l certain duties had been per- 35 formed. For example, the Mytilenaeans elected Pittacus leader against the exiles, who were beaded by Anti- menides and Alcaeus the poet. And Alcaeus himself

50 ll. ii. 391- 393. The last clause is not found in our Homer. 66 Cp. i. J252b '· 67 Cp. v. IJI ,. 7-

158 Politics [BK. Ill: CH. 14

shows in one of his banquet odes that they chose Pittacus tyrant, for he reproaches his fellow-citizens for 'having made the low-born Pittacus tyrant of the spiritless and

128Sb ill-fated city, with one voice shouting his praises'. These forms of government have always had the cha r-

acter of tyrannies, because they possess despotic power; but inasmuch as they are elective and acquiesced in by their subjects, they are kingly.

(4) There is a fourth species of kingly rule-that of the heroic times-which was hereditary and legal, a nd

s was exercised over willing subjects. For the first chiefs were benefacto rs of the people 68 in arts or arms; they either gathered them into a community, or procured land for them; and thus they became kings of voluntary sub- jects, and th eir power was inherited by their descend-

to ants. They took the command in war and presided over the sacrifices, except those which requi red a priest. They also decided causes either with or without an oath; and when they swore, the form of the oath was the stretching out of their sceptre. In ancient times their powe r ex- tended conliouously to all things whatsoever, in city and

1s country, as well as in foreign parts; but at a later datt they relinquished several of these privileges, and others the people took from them, until in some states nothing was left to them but the sac rifices; and where they re- tained more of the reality they bad only the right of leadership in wa r beyond the border.

ko These, then, are the four kinds of royalty. First the monarchy of the heroic ages; this was exercised over voluntary s ubjects, but limited to certain functions; the king was a general and a judge, and had the control of religion. The second is that of the barbarians, wh ich is an hereditary d espotic government in accordance with

GS Cp. v. I JIOb 10.

DK. III: Cu. 15] Politics 159

Jaw. A third is the power of the so-called Aesymnete or zs Dictator; this is an elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedaemonian, which is in fact a generalship, heredi- tary a nd perpetual. These four forms differ from one anoth er in the manner which I have described.

(5) There is a fifth form of kingly rule in which one has the dispo:.al of all, jus t as each nation or each state JO has the disposal of public matters; this form corre- sponds to the control of a household. For as household management is the kingly rule of a house, so kingly rule is the househol? management of a city, or of a nation, or of many nat10ns.

( 15 Of these forms we need only consider two the Lacedaemonian..and the absolute rQYalLy; for mo~t of JS Tile othe rs lie in a region between tl1 em, having less power than the last, and more than the first. Thus t11e inquiry is reduced to two points: first, is it advantageous to the s tate tl1at there should be a perpetual genera l and if so, sh?~ld tb~ office be confined to one family, or ~pen 1286' to the C1t1zens m turn? Secondly, is it well tl1at a s ingle man should have the s upreme power in all things? The ftrst ques tion falls under the head of laws rather than of co~1stitutions; for perpetual generalship might equally CXJ~t under any form of government, so that tl1is matter may be dismissed for the preseot.59 The othe r kind of s royalty is~ort of CQnstitution; this we have now to con- sider, an d brieny to run over-the difficulties invol ved in it. \Ve will begin by inquiring whether it is more advan- tageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws.oo Th~ advocates of royalty maintain that the laws s peak 10

only m general terms, and cannot provide for circum- stances; and that for any science to abide by written

GO It is not discussed later. 6° Cp. Plato, Polit. 294 A- 295 c.

160 Politics [BK. III : Cu. 15

rules is a bsurd. In Egypt the physician is allowed to alter his treatment a fter the fourth day, but if sooner, he takes

ts the risk. H ence it is clear that a government acting ac- cording to written laws is plainly not the best. Yet surely the rule r cannot dispense with the general principle which exists in law; and that is a better rul er which is free from passion than that in which it is innate. Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway the heart

20 of man. Yes, it may be replied, but then on the other h and an individual w iU be better able to deliberate in particular cases.

The best man, then, must legislate, and laws must be passed, but these laws will have no author ity when they

zs mi ss the mark, though in all other cases retaining their author ity. But when the la w cannot determine a point at a ll, or not well, should the one best man or shoul d all decide? According to ou r present practice assemblies meet, sit in judgment, deliberate, and decide, and their judgements all r ela te to individual cases. Now any mem- ber of the assembly, taken sepa rately, is certainly in- ferior to th e wise mao. But the state is made up of many indi viduals. And as a feast to which all the guests con- tribute is better th a n a banquet furnished by a s ingle

tJO man/ 11 so a mult itude is a better judge of many things than any individual .

Agai n, the many a re more incorruptible than the few; they are like the greater quantity of water which is less easily corrupted than a little. The individual is lia ble to be overcome by anger or by some other p ass ion, and then

as his judgement is necessa rily perverted; but it is ha rdly to be supposed that a great number of persons woul d all get into a passion and go wrong at the same moment. Let us assume tha t they are the freemen, and that they never

II Cp. 12818 4~·

BK. III: CH. 15] Politics l ol

act in violation of the law, but fill up the gaps which the law is obliged to leave. Or, if s uch virtue is sca rcely at- tainable by the multitude, we need only suppose that the majority are good men and good citizens, and ask which will be the more incorruptible, the one good ruler, or the 40 many who a rc a ll good? Will not the many? But, you 1286b will say, there may be parties among them, whereas the one man is not divided agains t himself. To which we may answer t hat their character is as good as rus. If we call the rule of many men, who are all of them good, aristoc- s racy, and the rule of one man royalty, then aristocracy will be bette r for s tates than royalty, whether the gov- ernment is supported by force or not,6!l provided only that a number of men equal in virtue ca n be found.

The firs t gove rnments were kingships, probably for this r~ason, because of old, whe n ci ties were small, men of emine nt vi r tue were few. Further , they were made 10 kings because they were benefactors,63 a nd benefits can only be bestowed by good men. But when many persons equal in merit arose, no longer enduring the pre-emi- nen ce of one, they desired to have a commo nwealth, and set up a consti tution. The ruling class soon dete riorated and en riched themselves out of the p ublic treasu ry; riches became the pa th to honour , and so ol igarchi es ls naturally grew up. These passed into tyrannies a nd tyran nies into democ racies; for love of gain in the ruling classes was always tending to diminish their number, and so to strengthen the masses, who in the end set upon their maste rs and established democ raci es. Since cities 120 have increased in s ize, no other form of governm ent ap- pea rs to be a ny longe r even easy to establisb.6 t -~

Even suppos ing the principle to be maintained that kingly power is the best thing for states , how about the

62 Cp. I. 27. 63 Cp. uSsb 6. Ot Cp. iv. 1293" 1, u97b H.

162 Politics [BK. Ill: CH. 16

family of the king ? Are his children to s ucceed him? If they are no better t han anybody else, that ':ill be 'mis-

Z5 chievous. But, says the love r of royalty, the k_mg, ~ougb he might, will not hand on his power to h~s chtldren. That however, is hardly to be ex-pected, and IS too much to ask of human nature. There is also a difficulty about the force which he is to employ; should a king have guards about him by whose ai~ he may ~e _able t~ coc:rce

3o the refractory? If not, how wtH he adrmmster h1s kmg- dom ? Even if he be the lawful sovereign who doe~ noth- ing a rbitra rily or contrary to law, still he must have some force wherewith to maintain the law. In the case of a limited mona rchy there is not much difficulty in aoswer-

3s ing thi s questi on ; the king must have s~ch .r~rce as will be more than a match for one or more mdtvtduals, but. not so great as that of the people. The ancients observe this principle when they have guards to a ny on.e wh?m they appointed dicta tor or tyrant. Thus, when D10nys1us

40 asked the Syracusans to allow him gua rds, somebody advised that they s hould give him only such a number.

!2874 16 At this place in the discussion there impe nds ~e inquiry respecting the king who acts s?lely accordmg to his own will; he bas now to be cons1dered. The so- called limited monarchy, or kings hip according to law, as I have already remarked ,a.' is not a distinct form of

5 government, for under all governments, as, for example, in a democracy or aristocracy, there may be a general holding office for life, a nd one person is o ften m~de su- preme over the administration of a state. A mag1stracy of this kind exists at Epidamnus,00 a nd also at Opus, but

10 in the latte r city has a more limited power. No~v, abso- lute mon:uchy, or the arbitra ry rule of a s overe1gn over

66 Cp. V. 1301" 2 1.

BK. Ill : CH. 16] Politics 163

all the citizens, in a city which consists of equals, is thought by some to be quite contra ry to nature; it is argued that those who are by natu re equals must have the same natura l right and worth, and that for unequals to bave an equal share , or for equals to have an un even share, in the offices of s tate, is as bad as for different t 5 bodily constitutions to have the same food and clothing. Wherefore it is thought to be jus t that among equals every one be ruled as well as rule, an d therefore th at all should have their turn. We thus arrive at law; for an order of succession implies law. And the rule of the Jaw, it is argued, is preferable to that of any individual. On 20 the same principle, even if it be better for ce rta in indi- viduals to govern, they sho uld be mad e only gua rdi ans and ministers of the law. F or magistrates there must be - this is adm itted; but then men say that to give a u- thority to any one man when all are equal is unjus t. Nay, there may indeed be cases which the law seems un able to deter mine, but in such cases can a man ? Nay, it will 25 be replied, the Jaw trains officers for this express purpose, and appoints them to determine matte rs which a re le ft undecided by it, to the best of their judgement.. Further, it permits them to make any amendment of the existing laws whi ch expe rience s uggests. T he refore he who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason a lone rule, but he who bids ma n rule adds an eleme nt of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, a nd passion perve r ts the Jo minds of rul ers, even when they a re the bes t of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire. We a re told 67 that a patient should call in a physician; he will not get better if he is doctored out of a book. But the parallel of the arts is clearly not in point; for the phys ician does noth- 35 ing contrary to rule from motives of friendship ; he only

67 Cp. 1286° 12 -1 4 , Polit. 296 u.

BK. III: CH. 17) Politics 165

rigin of the vexed question whether the best law or the ~est man should rule. For matters of detail about which men deliberate cannot be included in legislation. Nor docs any one deny that the decision of such matte rs must be lef t to man, but it is argued that there should be many judges, and not one only. For every r uler who has been 2s trained by the law judges well; and it would s urely seem strange that a person should see better with two eyes, or hear better with two ears, or act better with two hands or feet, than many with many; indeed, it is already the practice of kings to make to themselves many eyes and ears and hands and feet. For they make colleagues of 30 those who are the friends of themselves and their govern- ments. They must be friends of the monarch and of his govern ment; if not his friends, they will not do what he wants; but friendship implies likeness and equality; and , therefore, if he thinks that his friends ought to rule, he must think that those who are equal to himself and like 35 himself ought to rule equally with himself. These are the principal controversies relating to monarchy.

17 But may not all this be true in some cases and not in others? for there is by nature both a justice and an advantage appropriate to the rule of a master, another to kingly rule, another to constitutional rule; but there is none naturally appropriate to tyranny, or to any other perverted form of government; for these come into b e- ing contrary to nature. Now, to judge at least from what 4o has been said, it is manifest that, where men are alike and eq ual, it is neither expedient nor just that one man 1288• should be lord of all, whether there are laws, or whether there are no laws, but be himself is in the place of law. Neither should a good man be lord over good men, nor a bad man over bad; nor, even if he excels in virtue,

166 Politics [BK. III : CH. 17

should he have a right to r ule , unless in a particular case, at which I have already hinted, and to which I will once

? more recu r.72 But first of all, I must determine what natures are s uited for government by a king, and what fo r an aristocracy, and what fo r a constitutional gove rn- ment.

A people who are by natu re capable of producing a race s uperior in the virtue needed fo r political rule a re fitted for kingly government; and a people s ubmitti ng

10 to be rul ed as freemen by men whose virtue re nders them capable of political command are adapted for a n aristocracy ; while the people who are s uited for consti- tutional freedom a re those amo ng whom there naturally exists a war like multitude 73 able to rule and to obey in turn by a law which gives office to the well-to-do acco rd -

I S ing to the ir desert. But when a whole fam ily, or some individual, happens to be so m:_e-eminent in virtue as to s urpass all ot hers, then it is just that they should be the royal family a nd s upreme over all, or that this one citize n s hould be king of the whole nation. For, as I said be-

zo fore,74 t o give them a uthority is not only agreeable to that ground of right which the founders of all states, whether aristocratical, or oliga rchical, or again demo- c ratical, are accustomed to put forward ( for these all recognize tht,claim of excellence, although not the same

25 excellence), but accords with the principle already laid down. F or surely it would not be right to kill , or ostra- cize, or exil e such a person, or require that he should take his turn in being governed. The whole is naturally su- perior to the part, a nd he who has this pre-emine nce is in the relation of a whole to a part. But if so, the onl y al t ern a ti ve is that he should have the supreme power ,

72 1284" 3, and 1288• IS. 11 1283b 20, 1284• 3- 17, b2s .

BJ<. III: CH. 18) Politics 167

and that mankind should obey him, not in tu r n, but JO always. These are the conclusions at which we arrive respecting royalty and its various forms, and this is th e answer to the question, whether it is or is not advan - tageous to states, and to which, and how.

18 've maintain 76 that the true forms of gove rnment are three, an d that the best must be tha t which is ad- JS ministered by the best, and in which there is one man, or a whole family, or ma ny persons, excell ing all th e others together in virtue, and both rule rs and subjects are fitted, the one to rul e, the othe rs to be rul ed , in such a ma nner as to attai n the mos t eligible life. We showed at the commencement of our inquiry 76 that the virtue of the good man is necessarily the same as th~ virtue of the citizen of the perfect state. Clearly t hen in the same manner , and by the same means through which a man 40 becomes truly good, he will frame a state th a t is to be 1288b ruled by an a ri stocracy or by a king, and the same edu- cation and the sa me habits will be found to make a good man and a man fit to be a s tatesman or ki ng.

Having ar ri ved at these conclusions, we mu st proceed to speak of the perfect state , and desc ribe how it comes s into being and is established.

70 cc. "· s.

BOOK IV

10 1 In all arts and s ciences which embrace the whole of any subject, and do not come into being in a fragmentary way, it is the province of a s ingle art or science to con- s ider all that appertains to a single subject. For ex- ample, the a r t of gymnastic considers not only the s uit- ableness of different modes of training to different bod ies ( 2), but what sort is absolutely the best ( I ); (for the absolutely best must suit that which is by nat ure best and best furn ished with the means of life), and also

1S what common form of training is adapted to the g reat majority of men (4) . And if a man does not desire the bes t habit of body, or the g reatest ski ll in gymnastics which might be attained by him, still the trainer or th~ teacher of gymnastic should be able to impart a ny lower degree of either (3). The same principle equally holds in medicine a nd ship-bui lding, and the making of clothes

zo and in the arts general ly.1 ' Hence it is obvious that government too is the s ubject

of a single science, which has to consider what govern- ment is best and of what sort it must be, to be most in accordance with our aspirations, if there were no ex- ternal impediment, and also what ki nd of gove rnment

zs is adapted to particular s tates. For the best is ofte n un- 1 The numbers in this paragraph are made to correspond with the

numbers in the next. 168

BK. IV: Ca. 1] Politics 169

attainable, and therefore the true legislator and states- man ought to be acquainted, not only with (I) that which is best in the abstract, but also with ( 2) that which is best relatively to circumstances. We should be able fur- the;r to say. ~ow a slate may be constituted under any E;iven conditions (3); both bow it is originally formed and, when formed, how it may be longest preserved· the supposed state being so far from having the bes t co'asti- y tution that it is unprovided even with the cond itions necessary fo r the best; neither is it the best under the circumstances, but of a n inferior type.

He ought, moreover, to know (4) the form of gove rn- ment ~hich is best s uited to ~tates in general; for politi- JS cal wnters, although they have e.."<celle nt ideas a re often unpractical. We s hould consider, not only wh~l fo rm of government is bes t, but also what is possible and what is easily attain ab le by a ll. T here are some who woul d have non e but the most perfect; for thi s many natura l advan- 40 tages a re requi red. Others, again, speak of a more at- taina ble form, and, although they reject the constitutio n und er which they are living, they extol s ome o ne in par- ticul ar, for example the Lacedaemonian .2 Any change of government which has to be introduced should be one 1289" which men, starting from their existing constitutions will be both willing and able to adopt , si nce there is quit~ as much trouble in the reformation of an old constitu- tio n as in the establishme nt of a new one, just as to un- learn is as hard as to learn. And therefore in addition s to the qualifications of the statesman alread~ mentioned, he should be able to find remedies for the defects of existi ng constitutions, as has been said bcfore.a This he cannot do unless he knows how many forms of govern- ment there are. It is often supposed that there is only

~ Cp. ii. l26Sb 35· a Cp. I288b 29.

170 Politics [BK. I V: Cu. 2

10 one kind of democracy and one o f oligarchy. But this is a mistake; and, in order to avoid such mistakes, we must ascertain what differences there are in the constitutions of states, and in how many ways they are combined. The same political insight will enable a man to know which laws are the best, and which are suited to different con- stitutions; for the laws are, and ought to be, relative to the constitution, and not the constitution to the laws. A

1s constitution is the organization of offices in a state, and determines what is to be the governing body, and what is the end of each community. But laws are not to be con- founded with the principles of the constitution; they are the r ules according to which the magistrates should ad- minister the s tate, and proceed against offenders. So that

20 we must know the varieties, and the number of vari eties, of each for m of government, if only with a view to ma k- ing laws. For the same laws ca nnot be equa ll y suited to al l oligarchies or to all democracies, since there is cer- tainly more than one form both of democracy and of oli-

2S ga rchy'J

2 In ou r original discussion" about governments we di vided them into three true forms: kingly rule, ari s- tocracy, and constitutional government, and th ree corresponding per versions-tyranny, oligarchy, and de-

30 mocracy. Of kingly rule and of aristocracy we have al- ready spoken,5 for the inquiry into the perfect state is the same thing with the discussion of the two forms thus named, since both imply a principle o f virtue provided with external means. We have already determined in what aristocracy and kingly rule differ from one another,

35 and when the latter should be establisbed.11 I n wha t 4 iii. 7; Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. 6 iii. 14-18. oW. 12;9• 32 ·37, 1286b 3 s, 12S4• 3-b34, cb. 17.

- - -------

BK. IV: CH. 2] P olitics 171

follows we have to describe the so-called constitutional government, which bears the common name of all consti- tutions, and the other forms, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy.

It is obvious which of the three pervers ions is the worst, and which is the next in badness. That which is 40 the perversion of the first and most divine is necessa rily the worst. And just as a royal rule, if not a mere name, 1289b must exist by virtue of some great personal superiority in the king/ so tyran ny, which is the worst of govern- ments, is necessa rily the far thes t removed from a well- constituted form; oligarchy is little better, for it is a long J way from aristocracy, and democracy is the most tol- erable of the three.

A writer 8 who preceded me has al ready made these s distinctions, but his point of view is not the same as mine. For he lays down the principle that when a ll the constitutions are good (the oligarchy and the rest being virtuous), democracy is the wors t, but the best when aiJ are bad. Whereas we maintain that they are in any case defective, and that one oligarchy is not to be accounted 10 better than another, but only less bad.

Not to pursue this ques tion further at p resent, let us begin by determini ng ( r) 0 how many varieties of con- stitution there a re (since of democracy and oligarchy there are several ): ( 2) 10 what constitution is the most ts generally acceptable, and what is eligible in the next de- gree after the perfect state; and besides this what other there is which is aristocratical and well-constituted, an d at the same time adapted to slates in general; (3) 11 of the other forms of government to whom each is suitM.

1 Cp. iii. 12s4n 3.J>34, chs. 17, 18, v. 131ob 10 sq., vii. 13~5b to-u. s Plato, Polit. 30z £, 303 A. 11 C. 3-10. 10 C. 1 1. 11 c. 12.

178 lBK. IV: CB. 4

that there are two kinds of government--democracy a nd oligarchy.

I have already ex-plained 21 that the re are many forms of cons titution, and to what causes the variety is due.

15 Let me now show that there are different forms both of democracy and oligarchy, as will indeed be evident from what bas p receded. Fo r both in the common people and in the notables various classes are incl ud ed; of the com- mon people, one class are hus bandmen, another artisans;

20 another traders, who are employed in buying and selling; another are the seafaring class, whether engaged in war or in trade, as ferrymen or as fi she rmen. ( In many places any one of these classes forms quite a large popu- lation; for example, fishermen at T a rentum and Byzan- tium, crews of triremes at Athens, merchant seamen at

25 Aegina and Cbios, ferrym en at T enedos.) To the classes already mentioned may be added d ay-labourers, and those who, owing to their needy circumstances, have no leisure, or those who are not of free birth on both sides; · and there may be other classes as well. T he notables again may b e divided acco rding to their wealth, birth, virtue, education, and similar differences.

Jr:Jf forms of democracy first comes that which is said to be based strictly on equality. In such a democracy the law says that It 1s just f0r1Iie poor to have no more advantage than the rich; and that neither should be masters, but both equal. For if liberty a nd equal ity, as

35 is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democ- racy, they will be b est attai ned when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost. And since the people are the ma jority, and the opinion of the majority is decisive, s uch a government must necessarily be a de- mocracy. H ere then is one so rt of democracy. There is

21 Cp. iii. c. 6.

BI<. IV: CH. 4 ] Politics 179

another, in which the magistrates are elected according to a certain ..£!:2Eerty qualification~ but a low one; he who 4o bas the required amount of p roperty has a sha re in the government, but be who loses his property loses his rights. Another kind is that in whi ch all the citizens who are 1292• under no disqualification share in the government, but still the law..is.su~eme. In anothe r, everybody, if be be only a citizen, is admitted to the government, but the law is supreme as before. A fifth form of democracy, in othe r respects, the same, is that in which, not the law, but the ~ multitude, have the supreme power, and supersede the Jaw by thei r decrees. T his is a state of affai rs brought abou t by the demagogues. Fo r in democracies which a re subject to the law the best citize ns bold th e first place, and there a re no demagogues; but where the laws are not o supreme, there demagogues spring up. For the people be- com~s a monarch, and is many in one; and the many have the power in thei r bands, not as indiv iduals, but collec- tively. Homer says that 'it is not good to have a rule of many'/2 but whether be means this corporate r ule, or the rule of many individuals, is uncertain. At all eve nts this sort of democracy , which is now a monarch, and no longer 15 under the cont rol of law, see ks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows in to a despo t ; the flattere r is held in honour ; thi s so rt of democracy being relati vely to othe r democracies what tyra nny is to other for·ms of monarchy. The spirit of both is the same, and they alike exe rci se a despotic rule over the bet ter ci tizens. The decrees of the demos co rrespond to the edicts of the tyrant; and the 20 dem agogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the othe r. Both have great powe r ;-the flatterer with the ty ra nt, the demagogue with democracies of the kind which we are describing. T he demagogues make the decrees of the

~2 II. ii. 204.

[

180 Politics (BK. IV: Cn. 5 zs people override the laws, by referring all things to the

popular assembly. And there.fore they grow great, be- cause the people have all things in their hands, and they h old in their hands the votes of the people, who are too ready to liste n to them. Further, those who have a ny complaint to bring against the magistrates say, 'let the peop!e be judges'; the people are too happy to accept the invitation; and so the authority of every office is under-

JO mined. Such a democracy is fairly open to the ob;ection that it is not a constitution at all; for where the laws have no authority, there is no constitution. The law ought to be supreme over all, and the magistracies should judge of par ticulars, and only this should be considered a consti- tution. So that if democracy be a rea l form of gove rn-

JS meot, the sort of system in which all things are regulated by decrees is clearly not even a democracy in the t rue sense of the word, for decrees r elate only to particula rs.21

These then are the different kinds of democracy.

5 Of oligarchies, too, there are different kinds:-one 40 where the property qualification for office is such that the

poor, although they form the majority, have no share in the government, yet he who acquires a qu a lification may

1292b obtain a share. Another sort is when there is a qualifi ca- tion for offtce, but a high one, and the vacancies in the governing body are filled by co-optation. If the election is made out of all the qualified persons, a constitution of this kind inclines to an aristocracy, if out of a privileged class, to an oligarchy. Another sort of oligarchy is when

s the son succeeds the father. There is a fourth form, like- wise hereditary, in which the magistrates are supreme and not the law. Among oligarchies this is what tyranny is among mona rchies, and the last-mentioned form of

23 Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 1137b 27.

182 Polit ics (BK. IV : Cu. 6 are revenues to support them. This is one sort of de- mocracy, and these are the causes which give birth to it. Another kind is based on the dis tinction which natu rally

JS comes next in order; in this, every one to whose birth there is no objection is eligible, but actually shares in the government only if he can find leisure. H ence in such a democracy the s upreme power is vested in the laws, be- cause the s tate has no means of paying the citizens. A

• third kind is when all freemen have a right to s hare in the government, but do not actua lly share, for· the reason

40 which has been al ready given ; so that in this form again the law must rule. A fourth kind of democracy is that

1293• which comes latest in the history of s tates. In our own day, when cities have far outgrown their origi nal size, and their revenues have increased, all the citize ns h ave a place in the gover nment, through the great preponder- ance of the multitude; and they all, including the poor

s who receive pay, and therefore have leis ure to exercise their rights, share in the adminis tration. Indeed, when they a re paid, the common people have the mos t leisure for they are not hindered by thf. :are of their prope rty' which often fetters the rich , who are thereby prevented from tak~ng part in the assembly or in the courts, and so the s tate 1s governed by the poor, who are a majority, and

10 not by the laws. So many kind s of democracies there a re, and they grow out of these necessary causes.

Of oliga rch ies, one form is that in which the majority of the citizens have some property, but not very much· and this is the firs t form, which allows to any one wh~ obtains the required amount the right of sharing in the

t S government. The sharers in the government bei ng a numerous body, it follows that the law mus t gove rn, and not individuals. For in proportion as they are fu r ther re- moved from a monarchical form of government, a nd in

B~'"· IV: CH. 7] Politics 183

respect of property b~ve neithe~ so much as ~o be able to Jive without attendmg to busmess, nor so little as to need s tate support, they mus t admit the rule of law and 20 not claim to rule themselves. But if the men of property in the s tate are fewer than in the former case, and own 010re property, there arises a second form of oligarchy. For the stronger they are, the more power they claim, and having this object in view, they themselves select those of the other classes who are to be aclmHted to the government ; but, not being as yet s trong enough to rule 25 without the law, they make the law represent their wisbes.26 When this power is intensified by a further dim inution of their numbers and increase of their prop- erty, there arises a third and further stage o f oligarchy, in which the govern ing class keep the offices in their own hands, and the law ord ai ns that the son shall succeed the 30 father. When, again, the rulers have great wealth and numerous friends, this sort of family despotism ap- proaches a monarchy ; individuals rule and not the law. This is the fourth sor t of oligarchy, and is analogous to the las t sort of democracy.

7 There are still two forms besides democracy and oli- 35 garcby ; one of them is universally recognized and in- cluded among the four principal fo rms of government, which are said to be ( 1) mon archy, (2) oligarchy, (3) democracy , and ( 4) th e s o-caJled ari stocracy or gover n- ment of the bes t. But there is also a fifth , which retains the generic name of polity or constitutional government; this is not common, and there fore has not been noticed 40 by wri ters who atlempt to enumera te the different kinds

!!tl i. e. Lhey make a law Lhal the governing class shaU have tbe power of co-optation from other classes.

184 Politics

of government; like Plato,27 in their books abo ut the 1293b state, they recognize four only. The term 'aristocracy' is

rightly applied to the form of government which is de. scribed in the first part of our treatise; 28 for that only can be rightly called aristocracy which is a government formed of the bes t men absolutely, and not merely of men who are good when tric.J by any given standard. In

s the perfect state the good ma n is absolutely the same as the good citizen ; whereas in other states the good citizen is only good relatively to his own form of government. But t here are some states differing from oligarchies and also differing from the so-called polity or constitutional government; these are termed aris tocracies, an d in thern magistrates are certainly chosen, both according to their

10 wea!tb and according to their merit. Such a form of gov. ernmcnt differs from each of the two just now men. tioned, and is termed an aristocracy. For indeed in states which do not make virtue the a im of the commu nity, men of merit and reputation for virtue may be found. And so where a government bas regard to wealth, virtue, and

IS numbers, as at Carthage,211 that is aristocracy; and also where it has regard only to two out of the th ree, as at Lacedaemon, to virtue and numbers, and the two prin- ciples of democracy and virtue temper each other. There are th ese two forms of aristocracy in add ition to the first

zo and perfect state, and there is a third form , viz. the con- stitutions which incline more than the so-called polity towards oligarchy.

8 I have yet to speak of the so-called polity and of tyranny. I put them in this order, not because a polity or constitutional gove rnment is to be rega rded as a perver-

27 Rep. viii, iJC. :!8 iii 1779" 3 4, n86b 3, Cp. vii. 1318b 37 • • _., Cp. ii. n7J• H-30.

:BK· IV: Cu. 9) Politics 18 7

f ent characteristics, and taking a portion from each, ert the two together, like the parts of an indenture. Now

p:ere are three modes in which fusions of government 35 t ay be affected. In the first mode we must combine the :ws made by b~th ?overnm~nts, s~y conce~ning the ad- ministration of JUStlce. I n oligarchies they Impose a fine on the rich if they do not serve as judges, and to the poor they give no pay; but in democracies they give pay to the poor and do not fine the rich. Now (I) the union of these 40 two modes 31 is a common or middle term between them, and is therefore characteristic of a constitutional govern- 1294b ment, for it is a combination of both. This is~ oe mode of uniting the two elements. Or ( 2) a mean may be taken between the enactments of the two : thus democracies require no property qualification, or only a small one, from members of the assembly, oligarchies a high one;

ld- here neither of these is the common term, but a mean be- s icb tween them. (3) There is a third mode, in which some- rn- thing is borrowed from the ol igarchical and something >c- from the democratical principle. For example, the ny appointment of magistrates by lot is thought to be demo-

cratical, and the election of them oligarchical ; demo- cratical again when there is no property qualification, oligarchical when there is. In the a ristocratical or consti- 10 tutional state, one element will be taken from each- from oligarchy the principle of electing to offices, from democracy the disregard of CJ.!::al ification . Such are the various modes of combination. )

There is a true union of 01fgarchy and democracy when the same state may be termed either a democracy or l S an oligarchy; those who use both names evidently feel that the fusion is complete. Such a fusion there is also in the mean ; for both extremes appear in it. The L acedae-

st Cp. 1297• 38.

10

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s. 1-

te :o d ,g I·

n ·e 'r e d d ,_

i- ll

·- t

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.B J<. IV: CH. 11 ) Politics 189

tyranny is reckoned by us to be a form of government), although there is not much to be said about it. I have al- ready in the former part of this treatise 83 discussed royalty or kingship according to the most usual meaning s of the term, and considered whether it is or is not advan- tageous to states, and what kind of royalty should be established, and from what sou rce, and bow.

When speaking of royalty we also spoke 84 of two forms of tyranny, which are both according to law, and 10 therefore easily pass into royalty. Among Barbaria ns there are elected monarchs wh o exercise a despotic power; despotic rulers were also elected' in a ncient H el- Ias, called Aesymnetes or d ictators. T hese monarchies, when compared with one another, exhibit cer tain differ- 1 ~ ences. And they are, as I said before,85 royal, in so far as I the monarch ru les according to Jaw over willing subjects; but they are tyrannical in so far as he is despo tic and rules according to his own fancy. T here is also a third kind of tyranny, which is the most typical for m, and is the counterpart of the perfec t monarchy. This tyra nny is just that a rb itrary powe r of a n individual which is re- 20 sponsible to no one, and governs all alike, whether equals or better, with a view to its own advantage, not to that of its subjects, and therefore against thei r will. No freeman , if he can escape from it, will endure such a governme nt.

The kinds of ty ranny a re such and so many, and for the reasons which I have given.

11 ._ We have now to inquire what is the best constitution zs for most states, and the best life for most men, neither as- suming a standard of virtue which is a bove ordinary per- sons, nor an education wh ich is exceptionally favoured by nature and circumstances, nor yet an ideal state

38 iii. 14-17.

190 Politics [ BK. IV : Ca. lt which is an a spira tion only, but h a ving regard to the life

30 in which the majority are able to s ha re, and to the form of governme nt wbk h s tates in general can attai n. As to those aristocracies, as they are called, of which we were just now speaking,36 they either lie beyond the possi. bilities of the greater number o f s tates, or they a pproxj. mate to th e so-called constitutional gove rnment, and therefore n eed no separate disc ussion. And in fact the

35 conclusio n a t which we arri ve respecting all these forms rests upon the same grounds . For if what was said in the Ethics 37 is true, that the happy life is the life according to virtue lived without impediment, and that vi rtue is a mean, then the life which is in a mean, and in a mean attainable by every one, must b e the bes t. And the same

40 principles of virtue and vice are characteri stic of cities and of constitutions; for the constitution is in a figure the

129Sb life of the city. Kow in all states there are three elements : one class is

very rich , another very poor, and a third in a mean. It is admitted tha t moderation and the mean are best, aDd therefore it will clearly be best to possess the g ifts of for-

s tune in moderation; for in that condition of life men are mos t ready to follow rational principle. But he who greatly excels in beauty, strength, birth, or wealth, or on the other h a nd who is very poor, ?r very weak, or very much disg raced, finds it diffic ult to follow rational priu- ciple .38 Of these two the one sort grow into violent aod

10 great criminals, the others into rog ues and petty rascals. And two sorts of offences correspond to them, the ooe committed from violence, the other from roguery. Again, the middle class is least likely to sh rink from rule, or to

86 1293b 7-21, Cp. 1293b 36-1294• 25 . 37 Nic. Eth. i. 1098• 16 vii. 1153 b 10, ~. 1177• 12. 38 Cp. Pl. Rep. iv. 4 2 1 off .

~ e e s e

l

s

r

BK. IV: CH. 11] Politics 193

them, and whichever party, whether the rich or the com- mon people, transgresses the mean and predominates, 25 draws the constitution its own way, and thus arises either oligarchy or democracy. There is another reason-the poor and the rich quarrel with one another, and which- ever side gets the better, instead of establishi ng a just or popular government, regards political supremacy as the Jo pri ze of victory, and the one party sets up a democracy and the other an oligarchy. FurU1er, both the parties which had the sup remacy in Hellas looked only to the interest of their own form of government, and established in states, the one, democracies, and the other, oligarchies; they thought of their own advantage, of the public not J5 at all. For these reasons the middle form of government bas rarely, if ever, existed, and among a very few only. One man alone of all who ever ruled in Hellas was in- duced to give this middle constitution to states. But it has 40 now become a habit among the citizens of states, not even 1 296~> to care about equality; all men are seeking fo r dominion, // or, if conque red, are willing to submit. I

What then is the best form of government, and what makes it the best, is evident; and of other constitutions, since we say •3 that there are many kinds of democracy and many of oligarchy, it is not difficult to see which has the first and which the second or any other place in the 5 order of excellence, now that we have determined wh ich is the best. For that which is nearest to the best must of necessity be better, and that which is fu r thest from it worse, if we are judging absolutely and not relatively to given conditions: I say 1relatively to given conditions', 10 since a particular government may be preferable, but another form may be better for some people.

7

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BK. IV: CH . 13] Politics 195

look for some form of government more suitable to both, they will find none better than this, for the rich and the poor will never consent to rule in turn, because they mis- 5 trust one another. The arbiter is always the one trusted, and he who is in the middle is an arbiter. The more per- fect tbe admixture of the political elements, the more lasting wid be the constitution. Many even of those who desire to form aristocratical governments make a mis- take, not only in giving too much power to the rich, but in attempting to overreach the people. There comes a 10 time when out of a fa lse good there arises a true evil, since the encroachments of the rich are more destr uctive to the constitution than those of the people.

13 The devices by which oligarchies deceive the people arefiveinnumber ; they relateto (r) the assembly; (2) 15 the magistracies; (3) the cou r ts of law; (4) the use of arms; ( 5) gymnastic exercises. ( 1) T he assemblies are thrown open to all, but either the rich only are fined for non-attendance, or a much larger fine is inflicted upon them. ( 2) As to the magistracies, those who a re q uali fied by property cannot decline office upon oath, but the poo r zo may. (3) In the law-courts the rich, and the rich only, are fined if they do not serve, the poor are le t off with impunity, or, as in the Jaws of Charondas, a larger fine is inflicted on the rich, and a smaller one on the poor. I r, some states all citizens who have registe red themselves are allowed to attend the assembly and to try causes; but if after registration they do not attend either in the as- sembly or at the courts, heavy fines are imposed upon 2s them. The i ntention is that through fear of the fines they may avoid registering themselves, and then they cannot sit in the law-courts or in the assembly. Concerning ( 4 ) the possession of a rms, a nd (5) gymn astic exercises, they

238 Politics ( BK. V: CH. 10 ( 10 I have still to speak of monarchy, and the causes of .w its destruction and preservation. \Vhat I have said aJ.

13 10b ready respecting forms of constitutional government ap. plies almost equally to royal and to tyrannical rule. For royal rule is of the nature of an aristocracy, and a ~ran~ is a compound of oligarchy and democracy in their most

s extreme forms; it is therefore most mjurious to its sub. jects, being made up of two evil forms of governme nt, and having the pervers ions and errors of both. These two forms of monarchy are contrary in their very origin.

J The appointment of a king is the resource of the better

t classes against the people, and he is elected by them out of thei r own number, because either he himself or his family excel in virtue and virtuous actions; whereas a tyrant is chosen from the people to be their protector against the notables, and in order to prevent them fro m being injured. History shows that almost all tyrants have been demagogues who -gained the favour of the

1S people by their accusation of the notables .49 At any rate this was the manner in which the tyrannies arose in the days when cities had increased in power. Others which were older originated in the ambition of kings wanting to overstep the limits of their hereditary power and be. come de~ots. Others again grew out of the class wh ich

zo were chosen to be chief magistrates; for in ancien t times the people who elected them gave the magistrates, whether civil or religious, a long tenure. Others arose out of the custom which oligarchjes had of making some individual supreme over the highest offices. In any of these ways an ambitious man had no difficulty, if he de-

25 s ired, in creating a tyranny, since be had the powe r in his hands already, either as king or as one of the officers of state.w Thus Pbeidon at Argos and seve ral others

10 Cp. IJos• 8; Plato, Rep. vili. 565 o. 60 Cp. IJOS• I~.

BK· V: Ca. 10] Politics 239 were originally kings, and ended by bec?ming tyrants; Phalaris on the other band, and the loman tyrants, ac-

. d the tyranny by holding great offices. Whereas qutre · th p · · t panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corm , etststra us JO at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and several others \ who afterwards became tyrants, were at first d ema- gogues. · h · t And so, as I was saying,111 royalty ranks wt~ ~n.s oc-

y fo r it is based upon merit, whether of the mdtVJdual rae , f d oz lh or of bis family, or on benefits con erre , or on esc 1 ·ms with power added to them. For all who have ob-

~afned this honour have benefited, or h~d in their power 35 benefit states and nations; some, hke Codrus, have to ' 1 d · th s revented the state from being ens ave m war; o er ,

~ke Cyrus, have given their country freedom, or h.ave settled or gained a territory, like the L~cedaemom~n, Macedonian and Molossian kjngs. The td ea of a king 40 · to be a pr~tector of the rich against unjus t treatment, 13 11• IS · Wh r the people agajnst insult and oppressiOn. ereas a ~yrant, as has often been repeated,c;3 .bas no :ega~d to any public interest, except as co?ductve t~ bts pnvate ends· his aim is pleasure, the rum of a kmg , honou~. Wlie~efore also in their desires they di~er; the tyranlts s desirous of riches, the king , of what bnngs honour. And the guards of a king are citizens, but of a tyr::mt mer- cenaries.~>4

That tyran ny has all the vices both of democracy a nd oligarchy is evident. As of oligarchy so of tyranny, ~e JO end is wealth; (for by wealth only can the ty~ant mam- , tain either his guard or his luxury). Both mtstrust the people, and therefore deprive them of _tl~eir arms. Both agree too in injuring the people and dnvmg them out of

51). 2 sq. GS iii. 1279b 6 ~q., iv. 12951 19.

112 Cp. iii. uSsb 6 114 Cp. iii. uss• 24

240 Politics [ Bx. V: Crr. 10

ts the city and dispers ing them. F rom democracy ty ra nts have borrowed the art of making war upon the notables and destroying them secretly or openly, or of exiling them because they arc ri vals and stand in the way of their power; and also because plots against them a re

20 contrived by men of thi s class, who either want to r ule or to escape s ubj ection. H ence Peria nd er advised Thra- sybulus 6~ by cutting off the tops of the tallest ears of corn, mea ning that he mus t always put out of the way the citizens who overtop the rest. And so, as I ha ve already intimated,66 the beginnings of change a rc the same in monarchies as in forms of constitutional gov-

zs e rnment; subjects a t tack the ir sovereigns out of fea r or contempt, or because they have been unjustly treated by them. And of injus tice, the most common fo rm is ~t, another is confiscation of Q!QJ2erty.

The ends sought by conspi racies aga inst mona rchies, whether tyrannies or royalties, are the sa me as the ends

JO sought by conspiracies against othe r forms of govern- ment. 1\Ionarchs have great wealth and honou r , which are objects of desire to all mankind. The attacks are made sometimes aga ins t their li ves, sometimes against the office; where the sense of ins ult is the motive, against their lives. Any sort of ins ult ( and there are many) may s tir up a nge r, and whe n men are angry, they com monly

JS act out of revenge, and not from ambition. For exa mple, the attempt made upo n the Pe isistratidae a rose out of the public dis honour offered to the sister of Harmodius and the insult to himself. He attacked the tyra nt fo r his s ister 's sake, and Aristogeiton joined in the attack fo r the sa ke of H a rmodius. A conspiracy was also formed

40 against P eriande r, the tyrant of Ambracia, because, 13 11)1 when drinking with a favo urite youth, he asked him

Ci8 IJ to" 40 sqq.

BK· V : Ca. 10] Politics 243

bs. as for example, Cyrus attacked Astyages, d e- ar~ ing th~ effeminacy of his life, and believing that his sp~:er was worn out. Thus again, Seuthes the Tbracian po aspi red against Amadocus, whose general he was. co And sometimes men are actuated by mo re tha n one 15 motive, like Mithridates, who conspired against Ariobar- zanes, partly out of contempt and partly from th e love

of gain. Bold natures, placed by their sove reigns in a high

milita ry position, are most likely to make the attempt in the expectation of success; for cou rage is em boldened 20 by power , and the u~ion of the two inspires them with the hope of an easy v1ctory.

Attemp ts of which the motive is ambition arise in a different way as well as in those a lready mentio ned. There are men who will not risk their lives in the hope of 25 1

gains and honours however great, but who nevertheless regard the killing of a tyrant simply as a n ext raord ina ry action which will make them famous a nd honourable in the world ; they wish to acquire, not a kingdom, but a JO name. It is rare, however, to find such men; he who would kill a tyrant must be prepared to lose hi s life i f he fail. He must have the resolution of Dio n, who, when be made war upon Dionysius, took with him very few JS troops

1 saying 'that whatever measure of s uccess be

migh t attain would be enough for him, even if he were to die the moment he landed; such a d eath would be welcome to him'. But this is a temper to which few can attain.

Once more, tyrannies, like a ll othe r gove rnments, are 40 destroyed from without by some opposite and more 13 12b powerful form of government. That such a gove rnm ent will have the will to attack them is clear; for the two are opposed in principle; and all men, if they can, do

244 Politics [ BK. V: CH . 10

what they will. Democracy is antagon istic to tyranny on the principle of.Hesiod, 'Potter hates P otter', becaus~

5 ~ey a re nearly akin, for the extreme form of democracy 1s tyranny; a nd royalty and aristocracy are both alike o~posed to tyranny, because they are constitutions of a different type. And therefore the Lacedaemonians put down most of the tyrannies, and so di d the Syracusans during the time when th ey were well governed.

.Ag~in, tyr~nnies are d estroyed from within, whe n the 10 re1gmng fam ily a re divided among themselves, as that

of Gelo was, and more rece ntly that of Dionysius; in the case of Gelo because T hrasybulus, the brother of Hiero flattered the son of Gelo and led him into excesses i~ ord~r that he might rul e in his name. Whereupon the fam1ly got together a pa rty to get rid of Thrasybulus and

15 s~ve the tyr~nny; but those of the people who conspired wtth them seized the opportunity and drove them all out.

In the case of Dionys ius, Dion, his own relative, at- tacked and expelled bim with the assistance of the peo- ple; be afterwards perished himself.

There arc two chief motives which induce men to

20 attac~ t~ra~nies-patrcd and c,gntempt. H atred of ty- rants IS mevJtable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their des truction. Thus we see that most of those who

have ~cqui:ed, ha ve retained their power, but those who ~ave t~ented,00 have lost it, almost at once; for, living m luxunous ease, they have become contemptible and

25 offer many opportunities to their assailants. Anger: too, mus t be included und er hatred, and produces the same effects. It is oftentimes even more ready to s trike-the a ngry are more impetuous in making an attack, fo r they

do ~ot follow rati?nal p~inciple. And men are very apt to g1ve way to th etr passiOns when they are ins ulted. To

08 Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 695.

BK. V: CH. 10] Politics 245

thb cause is to be attributed the fall of the Peis istratidae 30 and of many others. Hatred is more reasonable, for ange r is accompanied by pain, which is a n impediment to rea- son, whereas hatred is painless.0

0

In a word, all the causes which I have mentioned 61

as destroying the last and most unmixed form of oli- JS

garchy, an d the e:ll.ircme form of democracy, may be assumed to affect tyranny; indeed th e extreme forms of both are only tyrannies distributed among seve ral per- sons. Kingly rule is little affected by external causes, and is the refore lasting; it is generally destroyed from .w wi th in. And there are two ways in which the destruction may come about; ( 1) when the members of the royal 13 13• fa mily quarrel among themselves, and (2) when the kings attempt to administe r the s tate too much afte r the fashion of a tyranny, and to extend their authority con- trary to the Jaw. Royalties do not now come into exist- ence; where s uch forms of government arise, they are rather monarchies or tyrannies. For the rule of a king is s over voluntary s ubj ects, and he is s upreme in a ll im- portant matte rs; but in our own d ay men arc more upon an equality, and no one is so immeasurably superior to others as to represent adequa tely the greatness and dig- ni ty of the office. H ence mankind will not, if they can help, endure it, and a ny one who obtains power by for c11 10

or fraud is at once thought to be a tyrant. In hereditary monarchies a further cause of dest ru ction is the fact that kings often fall into contempt, and, although possessing not tyrann ical power, but only royal dignity, are apt to outrage others. Their overthrow is then readi ly effected ; for there is an end to the king when his s ubj ects do not 1s want to have him, but the tyrant lasts, whether they like

hi m or not.

246 Politics [BK. V : Cu . ll

The destruction of monarchies is to be attributed to these and the like causes.

11 ~nd they are p~eserved, to speak generally, by the oppos1t~ causes; or, 1f we consider them separately, ( 1 )

zo~yalty IS ~reserved by the limitation of i t§.Qower~. The more restncted the functions of kings, the longer their power will last unimpaired; for then they are more mod- erate a~d not so ?espo~ic in their ways; and they are le.ss env1ed by the1r subjects. This is the reason why the ki ngly office has lasted so long among the Molossia ns

zs And for a similar reason it has continued among th~ Lacedaemonians, because there it was always divided between t.wo, a~d afterwards further limited by T hr- opom~us m vanous respects, more particularly by the estab!Js~ment of the Ep~10ralty. He diminished the power o~ the k1ngs, bu~ estabhshed on a more lasting basis the kmgly office, wh1ch was thus made in a ce r tain sense not

JO less, but greater. There is a story that when his wife once asked him whether he was not ashamed to leave to his sons a royal power which was less than he had inherited fro~ his father, 'No indeed,' he replied, 'for the p ower wh1ch I leave to them will be more las ting.'

As to ( 2) tyrannies) they are preserved in two most JS opposite ways. One of them is the old traditional method

in which most tyrants administer their governmen t. Of such arts Periander of Corinth is said to have been the great master, and many similar devices may be gathe red from th e P e rs ians in the administration of their gove rn- ment. There are firstly the prescriptions mentioned some distance back,62 for the preser vation of a tyranny in

40 so far as this is possible; viz. that the tyrant should 1

!.2Q._ off those who are too high; he must put to death meo of

62 I JII. IS-22.

BK· V: CH. 11 ) Politics 247

spirit; he must not allow common meals, clubs, educa- 1313t. lion, and the like; be must be upon his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or con- fidence among his subjects; he must prohibit literary assemblies or othe r meetings for discussion, and he must take every means to prevent people from knowing one another (for acquaintance begets mutual confidence). s Further, he must compel all persons staying in the city to appear in public and live at his gates; then he will know what they are doing: if they are always kept unde r, they will learn to be bumble. In short, be should practise these and the like Persian and barbaric arts, which al l have

1 the same object. A tyranr5hould also endeavour to know 10 what each of his subjects says or does, and should employ spies, like the 'female detectives' at Syracuse, a nd the eavesdroppers whom Hiero was in the habit of sendi ng to a ny place of resort or meeting; fo r the fear of in formers IS prevents people from speaking their minds, and if they do, they are more easily found out. Another art of the tyrant is to sow quar rels among the citizens~ fr iends should be embroiled with friends, the people with the notables, and the rich with one another. Also he should impoverish his subjects; be thus provides against the maintenance of a guard by the citizens, and the people, za having to keep bard at work, are prevented from con- 5piring. The. Pyramids of Egypt afford an example of this policy; also the offerings of the family of Cypselus, and the buHding of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Peisistratidae, and the great Polycratean monuments at Samos; all these works were alike intended to occupy the people and keep them poor. Another practice of zs tyrants is to multiply taxes, after the manner of Diony- sius at Syracuse, who coutrived that within five years his su bjects sho uld bring into the treasury thei r whole

248 Politics [BK. V: Cu. 11

property. The tyrant is also fond of making war in order that his subjects may have something to do and be always

JO in want of a leade r. And whereas the power of a king is preser ved by his friends, the characteristic of a tyrant is to dist rust his friends, because he knows that all men want to overthrow him, and they above all have the power.

Again, the evil practices of the las t and worst form of democracy 63 are all found in tyrannies. Such a re the power given to women in their families in the hope that they will inform against their hu sba nds, and the licence which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray

JS their masters; for slaves a nd women do not conspire against tyrants; a nd they are of course friendly to tyran- nies and a lso to democracies, since under them they have a good time. F or the people too would fain be a monarch; ana there fore by them, as well as by the tyrant, the flat-

40 te rer is held in honou r ; in democracies he is the dema- gogue; a nd the tyrant also has those who associate with

13 14• biro in a humble spirit, which is a work of flattery. Hence ty rants are always fond of bad men, because

they love to be flatte red, but no man who has the spirit of a freeman in him will lower himself by flattery; good men love others, or at any rate do not flatter them. More- over , the bad a re useful for bad purposes; 'nail knocks

s out nail', as the proverb says. It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every one who has dignity or independ- ence; he wants to be alone in his glory, but any one who claims <;!,. like dignity or asserts his ind epende nce en- c roaches upon his pre rogative, and is bated by him as

11p a n enemy to hi s powe r. Another mark of a tyrant is that , be likes fo reigners better than citizens, and lives with

83 Cp. vi. 1319b 27.

BK· V: Ca. 11 ] Politics 249

them and invites them to his table; for the one are ene- mies but the others enter into no rivalry with him. s~ch are the notes of the tyrant and the a rts by which

be preserves his power; there is no wickedness too great for him. All that we have said may be summed up under tbree heads, which answer to the three aims of the tyrant. lS These a re , (I) thc;_humiliation oLhi.s.subjects; he knows tbat a mean-spirited man will not conspire against any- body: (2) the creation of mistrust amo ng them; for a tyrant is not. overthrown unt_il ~en begin lo have confi- dence in one another; a nd thts ts the reason why tyrants are at war with the good; they a re under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not only because 20 they will not be rul ed despotically, but also because they are Joyal to one a nother, and to other men, and do not inform against one another or against other men: (3) the tyra nt desires that his subjects shall be incapable of action, for no one attempts what is impossible, and they will not attempt to overthrow a tyranny , if they are powerless. Under these three heads the whole policy of 2s a tyrant may be summed up, and to one or other of them all his ideas may be ref erred: ( I ) he sows distrust among his subjects; (2) he takes away thei r power; (3) he I bumbles them. __.J

This then is one of the two methods by which tyran- 30 nies are preserved; and there is another which proceeds upon an almost opposite principle of action. The nature of this latter method may be gathered from a compari- son of the causes which destroy kingdoms, for as one mode of destroying kingly power is to make the office of king more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is lo make it more like the rule of a king. But of one thing JS the tyrant must be ca reful; he must keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like him o r not,

260 Politics (BK. VI: Ca. 2 try to bring together all the clements which accord with the ideas of the seve ra l constitutions; but this is a mis- take of theirs, as I have already remarked 10 when speak- ing of the destruction and preservation of states. We will now set forth the principles, characteristics, and aims of such s tates.

40 2 The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, 13 1 ib according to the common opinion of men, can only be

enjoyed in such a state;-this they affi rm to be the great end of every democracy .11 One principle of li berty is for all to rule and be rul ed in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical not proportionate

s equality; whence it follows that the majority must be supreme, and that whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just. Every citizen, it is said, must have equality, and therefore in a democracy the poor have more power than the rich , because there a re mo re of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. T his,

10 then , is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that a man should live as he likes.12 This, they say, is the privilege of a freema n, since, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second char- acteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of

IS men to be ruled by none, if possible, or, if this is im- possible, to rule and be ruled in turns; and so it con- tributes to the freedom based upon equality.

Such being our foundation and such the principle from which we start, the characteristics of democracy a re as

20 follows:-the election of officers by all out of all; a nd that all should rule over each, and each in his turn over

10 V. 1309b 18- IJio* J 6. 12Cp. v. tJtoA Jt.

11 Cp. Plato, Rep. vlli. 557 sqq.

3 J3K. VI: CH. 4] Politics 263

;>. classes out of which a state is composed-the poor and .y the rich- that is to be deemed law, on which both or te the greater part of both agree; and if they disagree, that y which is approved by the greater number, and by those tr who have the highe r qualification. For example, suppose U that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some meas-

ure is approved by six of the rich and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of the rich H

e join with the party of the poor, and the remaining five of e the poor with that of the rich ; in such a case the will of r1 those whose qualifications, when both sides are added e up, are the greatest, should prevail. If they turn out to r, be equal, there is no greater difficulty than at present, 1 when, if the assembly or the courts are divided, recourse 40 ~ is had to the lot, or to some sim ilar expedient. But, al- 13181'

though it may be difftcult in theory to know what is just and equal , the p ractical difficulty of inducing those to forbear who can, if they like, encroach, is far greater, for the weaker are always asking for equality and jus- tice, but the stronger care for none of these things. s

4 Of the fou r kinds of democracy, as was said in t he previous discussion/8 the bes t is that which comes first in order; it is also the oldest of them all. I am speaking of them according to the natural classification of their inhabitants. For the best material of democracy is a n agricultural population; 10 there is no difficulty in fo rm- 10 ing a democracy where the mass of the people live by agriculture or tending of cattle. Being poor, they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assem- bly, and not having the necessar ies of life they are always at work, and do not covet the prope r ty of others . Indeed , they find thei r employment pleasanter than the cares of

J3J<. VII : Cn. 3] Politics 285

rule, instead of giving up a~ything to his neighbour, ought rather to take away hts powe r ; and the father should make no accoun t of his son, nor the son of his father, no r friend of friend; th ey should not bestow a thought on one another in compariso n with this higher object, for the bes t is the mos t eligible and 'doi ng well' is 40 the best. There might be some truth in s uch a view if we 132Sb assu me that robbers and plunderers attain the chief good. But this can never be; their hypothesis is false. For the actions of a ruler cannot really be honourable, unless he is as much superior to other men as a hus band is to a wife, or a father to his children, or a master to his sl::tves. And s therefore he who violates the law can never recove r by any success, however great, what he h as already los t in departing from virtue. For equals the honourable and the just cons ist in sharing alike, as is just a nd equal. But that the unequ al should be given to equals, and th e unlike to those who are li ke, is contrary to natu re, and nothing whi ch is contra ry to nature is good. If therefore, there is 10 any one 8 superior in virtue and in the power of perform - ing the best actions, him we ought to follow and obey, but he must have the capacity for action as well as virtue.

If we are right in our view, and ha ppiness is assumed to be virtuous activity, the active life will be the best , ts both for every city collectively, and for indi viduals . Not th at a life of action must necessarily have relation to others, as some persons think, nor a re those ideas only to be regarded as practical which arc pursued for the sake of practical results, but much more the thoughts and con- templations which are indepe ndent and complete in 20 themselves; since virtuous activity, and therefore a cer- tain kind of action, is an end, and even in the case of ex- ternal actions the di recting mind js mos t truly said to act

8 Cp. iii. 1284b 3l nnd nssa l8