

tense, by people who are incapable of enjoying other pleasures. At any rate, these people induce some kinds of thirst in themselves, which is blameless whenever the thirsts are harmless, but base whenever they are harmful. And they do this because they enjoy nothing else, and many people's nature makes the neutral condition painful to them.

8.73 *They are intense because of our natural imperfections*

For an animal is always suffering, as the natural scientists also testify, since they maintain that seeing and hearing are painful. However, we are used [to seeing and hearing] by now, so they say, [and so feel no intense pain]. Indeed, the [process of] growth makes young people's condition similar to an intoxicated person's and hence youth is pleasant.

Naturally ardent people, by contrast, are always requiring a cure, since their constitution causes their body continual turmoil, and they are always having intense desires. A pain is driven out by its contrary pleasure, indeed by any pleasure at all that is strong enough; and this is why such people become intemperate and base.

Pleasures without pains, however, have no excess. These are pleasant by nature and not coincidentally. By coincidentally pleasant things I mean pleasant things that are curative; for the [process of] being cured coincides with some action of the part of us that remains healthy, and hence undergoing a cure seems to be pleasant. Things are pleasant by nature, however, when they produce action of a healthy nature.

8.74 *The same natural imperfections explain why pleasures need to be varied*

The reason why no one thing is always pleasant is that our nature is not simple, but has more than one constituent, in so far as we are perishable; hence the action of one part is contrary to nature for the other nature in us, and when they are equally balanced, the action seems neither pleasant nor

painful. For if something has a simple nature the same action will always be pleasantest.

That is why the god always enjoys one simple pleasure [without change]. For activity belongs not only to change but also to unchangingness, and indeed there is pleasure in rest more than in change. 'Variation in everything is sweet', as the poet says, because of some inferiority; for just as it is the inferior human being who is prone to variation, so also the nature that needs variation is inferior, since it is not simple or decent.

So much, then, for continence and incontinence and for pleasure and pain, what each of them is, and in what ways some [aspects] of them are good and others bad. It remains for us to discuss friendship as well.

9. *The Varieties of Friendship*

9.1 *The Problems*

9.11 *Common beliefs about friendship*

After that the next topic to discuss is friendship; for it is a virtue, or involves virtue, and besides is most necessary for our life.

It is necessary in all external conditions . . .

For no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods. For in fact rich people and holders of powerful positions, even more than other people, seem to need friends. For how would one benefit from such prosperity if one had no opportunity for beneficence, which is most often displayed, and most highly praised, in relation to friends? And how would one guard and protect prosperity without friends, when it is all the more precarious the greater it is? In poverty also, and in the other misfortunes, people think friends are the only refuge.

In all times of life . . .

Moreover, the young need it to keep them from error. The old need it to care for them and support the actions that fail because of weakness. And those in their prime need it, to do fine actions; for 'when two go together . . .', they are more capable of understanding and acting.

And throughout nature . . .

Further, a parent would seem to have a natural friendship for a child, and a child for a parent, not only among human beings but also among birds and most kinds of animals. Members of the same race, and human beings most of all, have a natural friendship for each other; that is why we praise friends of humanity. And in our travels we can see how every human being is akin and beloved to a human being.

For communities as well as for individuals

Moreover, friendship would seem to hold cities together, and legislators would seem to be more concerned about it than about justice. For concord would seem to be similar to friendship and they aim at concord above all, while they try above all to expel civil conflict, which is enmity.

Further, if people are friends, they have no need of justice, but if they are just they need friendship in addition; and the justice that is most just seems to belong to friendship.

It is both necessary and fine

However, friendship is not only necessary, but also fine. For we praise lovers of friends, and having many friends seems to be a fine thing. Moreover, people think that the same people are good and also friends.

9.12 *Puzzles about friendship*

Still, there are quite a few disputed points about friendship.

For some hold it is a sort of similarity and that similar

people are friends. Hence the saying 'Similar to similar', and 'Birds of a feather', and so on. On the other hand it is said that similar people are all like the proverbial potters, quarrelling with each other.

On these questions some people inquire at a higher level, more proper to natural science. Euripides says that when earth gets dry it longs passionately for rain, and the holy heaven when filled with rain longs passionately to fall into the earth; and Heracleitus says that the opponent cooperates, the finest harmony arises from discordant elements, and all things come to be in struggle. Others, e.g. Empedocles, oppose this view, and say that similar aims for similar.

Let us, then, leave aside the puzzles proper to natural science, since they are not proper to the present examination; and let us examine the puzzles that concern human [nature], and bear on characters and feelings.

For instance, does friendship arise among all sorts of people, or can people not be friends if they are vicious?

Is there one species of friendship, or are there more? Some people think there is only one species because friendship allows more and less. But here their confidence rests on an inadequate sign; for things of different species also allow more and less.

9.2 *General Account of Friendship*

9.21 *The object of friendship: What is lovable*

Perhaps these questions will become clear once we find out what it is that is lovable. For, it seems, not everything is loved, but [only] what is lovable, and this is either good or pleasant or useful. However, it seems that what is useful is the source of some good or some pleasure; hence what is good and what is pleasant are lovable as ends.

Do people love what is good, or what is good for them? For sometimes these conflict; and the same is true of what

25 is pleasant. Each one, it seems, loves what is good for him; and while what is good is lovable unconditionally, what is lovable for each one is what is good for him. In fact each one loves not what *is* good for him, but what *appears* good for him; but this will not matter, since [what appears good for him] will be what appears lovable.

Hence there are these three causes of love.

* 9.22 *Necessary conditions for friendship*

There is no friendship for soulless things

30 Love for a soulless thing is not called friendship, since there is no mutual loving, and you do not wish good to it. For it would presumably be ridiculous to wish good things to wine; the most you wish is its preservation so that you can have it. To a friend, however, it is said, you must wish goods for his own sake.

Friendship is not mere goodwill . . .

If you wish good things in this way, but the same wish is not returned by the other, you would be said to have [only] goodwill for the other. For friendship is said to be *reciprocated* goodwill.

And not mere reciprocated goodwill

35 But perhaps we should add that friends are aware of the reciprocated goodwill. For many a one has goodwill to people whom he has not seen but supposes to be decent or useful, and one of these might have the same goodwill towards him. These people, then, apparently have goodwill to each other, but how could we call them friends when they are unaware of their attitude to each other?

5 Hence, [to be friends] they must have goodwill to each other, wish goods and be aware of it, from one of the causes mentioned above.

9.3 *The Three Types of Friendship*

9.31 *Complete and incomplete species of friendship correspond to the different objects*

viii 3

Now since these causes differ in species, so do the types of loving and types of friendship. Hence friendship has three species, corresponding to the three objects of love. For each object of love has a corresponding type of mutual loving, combined with awareness of it, and those who love each other wish goods to each other in so far as they love each other.

10

9.32 *Friendships for utility and pleasure are incomplete*

Those who love each other for utility love the other not in himself, but in so far as they gain some good for themselves from him. The same is true of those who love for pleasure; for they like a witty person not because of his character, but because he is pleasant to themselves.

And so those who love for utility or pleasure are fond of a friend because of what is good or pleasant for themselves, not in so far as the beloved is who he is, but in so far as he is useful or pleasant.

15

Hence these friendships as well [as the friends] are coincidental, since the beloved is loved not in so far as he is who he is, but in so far as he provides some good or pleasure.

And so these sorts of friendships are easily dissolved, when the friends do not remain similar [to what they were]; for if someone is no longer pleasant or useful, the other stops loving him.

20

9.33 *Friendship for utility*

What is useful does not remain the same, but is different at different times. Hence, when the cause of their being

25 friends is removed, the friendship is dissolved too, on the assumption that the friendship aims at these [useful results]. This sort of friendship seems to arise especially among older people, since at that age they pursue what is advantageous, not what is pleasant, and also among those in their prime or youth who pursue what is expedient.

30 Nor do such people live together very much. For sometimes they do not even find each other pleasant. Hence they have no further need to meet in this way if they are not advantageous [to each other]; for each finds the other pleasant [only] to the extent that he expects some good from him. The friendship of hosts and guests is taken to be of this type too.

9.34 *Friendships for pleasure*

35 The cause of friendship between young people seems to be pleasure. For their lives are guided by their feelings, and they pursue above all what is pleasant for themselves and what is near at hand. But as they grow up [what they find] pleasant changes too. Hence they are quick to become friends, and quick to stop; for their friendship shifts with [what they find] pleasant, and the change in such pleasure is quick. 1156b Young people are prone to erotic passion, since this mostly follows feelings, and is caused by pleasure; that is why they love and quickly stop, often changing in a single day.

5 These people wish to spend their days together and to live together; for this is how they gain [the good things] corresponding to their friendship.

9.35 *Complete friendship is the friendship of good people*

But complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue; for they wish goods in the same way to each other in so far as they are good, and they are good in

10 themselves. [Hence they wish goods to each other for each other's own sake.] Now those who wish goods to their friend for the friend's own sake are friends most of all; for they have this attitude because of the friend himself, not coincidentally. Hence these people's friendship lasts as long as they are good; and virtue is enduring.

15 Each of them is both good unconditionally and good for his friend, since good people are both unconditionally good and advantageous for each other. They are pleasant in the same ways too, since good people are pleasant both unconditionally and for each other. [They are pleasant for each other] because each person finds his own actions and actions of that kind pleasant, and the actions of good people are the same or similar.

20 It is reasonable that this sort of friendship is enduring, since it embraces in itself all the features that friends must have. For the cause of every friendship is good or pleasure, either unconditional or for the lover; and every friendship reflects some similarity. And all the features we have mentioned are found in this friendship because of [the nature of] the friends themselves. For they are similar in this way [i.e. in being good]. Moreover, their friendship also has the other things—what is unconditionally good and what is unconditionally pleasant; and these are lovable most of all. Hence loving and friendship are found most of all and at their best in these friends.

25 These kinds of friendships are likely to be rare, since such people are few. Moreover, they need time to grow accustomed to each other; for, as the proverb says, they cannot know each other before they have shared the traditional [peck of] salt, and they cannot accept each other or be friends until each appears lovable to the other and gains the other's confidence. Those who are quick to treat each other in friendly ways wish to be friends, but are not friends, unless they are also lovable, and know this. For though the wish for friendship comes quickly, friendship does not. 30

9.4 *Differences and Similarities Between Complete and Incomplete Friendship*

9.41 *The incomplete friendships resemble the complete*

35 This sort of friendship, then, is complete both in time and
1157a in the other ways. In every way each friend gets the same
things and similar things from each, and this is what must
be true of friends. Friendship for pleasure bears some re-
semblance to this complete sort, since good people are also
pleasant to each other. And friendship for utility also re-
sembles it, since good people are also useful to each other.

Incomplete friendships endure to the extent that they resemble complete friendships

5 With these [incomplete friends] also, the friendships are
most enduring when they get the same thing—e.g. pleasure
—from each other, and, moreover, get it from the same
source, as witty people do. They must not be like the erotic
lover and the boy he loves. For these do not take pleasure
in the same things; the lover takes pleasure in seeing his
beloved, while the beloved takes pleasure in being courted
by his lover. When the beloved's bloom is fading, sometimes
the friendship fades too; for the lover no longer finds plea-
sure in seeing his beloved, while the beloved is no longer
10 courted by the lover.

Many, however, remain friends if they have similar char-
acters and come to be fond of each other's characters from
being accustomed to them. Those who exchange utility rather
than pleasure in their erotic relations are friends to a lesser
extent and less enduring friends.

15 Those who are friends for utility dissolve the friendship
as soon as the advantage is removed; for they were never
friends of each other, but of what was expedient for them.

viii 4

9.42 *But the character of the friends in complete friendship makes it more enduring*

Now it is possible for bad people as well [as good] to
be friends to each other for pleasure or utility, for decent
people to be friends to base people, and for someone with
neither character to be a friend to someone with any char-
acter. Clearly, however, only good people can be friends to
each other because of the other person himself; for bad peo-
ple find no enjoyment in one another if they get no benefit.

Moreover, it is only the friendship of good people that is
immune to slander. For it is hard to trust anyone speaking
against someone whom we ourselves have found reliable for
a long time; and among good people there is trust, the belief
that he would never do injustice [to a friend], and all the
other things expected in a true friendship. But in the other
types of friendship [distrust] may easily arise.

9.43 *Hence incomplete friendships are friendships only to a limited extent*

[These must be counted as types of friendship.] For peo-
ple include among friends [not only the best type, but] also
those who are friends for utility, as cities are—since alliances
between cities seem to aim at expediency—and those who
are fond of each other, as children are, for pleasure. Hence
we must presumably also say that such people are friends,
but say that there are more species of friendship than one.

On this view, the friendship of good people in so far as
they are good is friendship in the primary way, and to the
full extent; and the others are friendships by similarity. They
are friends in so far as there is something good, and [hence]
something similar to [what one finds in the best kind]; for
what is pleasant is good to lovers of pleasure. But these [in-
complete] types of friendship are not very regularly com-
bined, and the same people do not become friends for both
utility and pleasure. For things that [merely] coincide with
each other are not very regularly combined.

1157b Friendship has been assigned, then, to these species. Base people will be friends for pleasure or utility, since they are similar in that way. But good people will be friends because of themselves, since they are friends in so far as they are good. These, then, are friends unconditionally; the others
5 are friends coincidentally and by being similar to these.

9.44 Only complete friendship includes all the right states and activities

* *Friendship includes both states and activities*

Just as with the virtues some people are called good in their state of character, others good in their activity, the same is true of friendship. For some people find enjoyment in each other by living together, and provide each other with good things. Others, however, are asleep or separated by distance, and so are not active in these ways, but are in the state that
10 would result in the friendly activities; for distance does not dissolve the friendship unconditionally, but only its activity. But if the absence is long, it also seems to cause the friendship to be forgotten; hence the saying, 'Lack of conversation has dissolved many a friendship'.

The right activities require pleasure in living together

15 Older people and sour people do not appear to be prone to friendship. For there is little pleasure to be found in them, and no one can spend his days with what is painful or not pleasant, since nature appears to avoid above all what is painful and to aim at what is pleasant.

20 Those who welcome each other but do not live together would seem to have goodwill rather than friendship. For nothing is as proper to friends as living together; for while those who are in want desire benefit, blessedly happy people [who want for nothing], no less than the others, desire

to spend their days together, since a solitary life fits them least of all. But people cannot spend their time with each other if they are not pleasant and do not enjoy the same things, as they seem to in the friendship of companions.

And only the best kind of friendship includes the appropriate activities and attitudes

It is the friendship of good people that is friendship most of all, as we have often said. For what is lovable and choiceworthy seems to be what is unconditionally good or pleasant, and what is lovable and choiceworthy for each person seems to be what is good or pleasant for him; and both of these make one good person lovable and choiceworthy for another good person.

Loving would seem to be a feeling, but friendship a state. For loving occurs no less towards soulless things, but reciprocal loving requires decision, and decision comes from a state; and what makes [good people] wish good to the beloved for his own sake is their state, not their feeling.

Moreover, in loving their friend they love what is good for themselves; for when a good person becomes a friend he becomes a good for his friend. Each of them loves what is good for himself, and repays in equal measure the wish and the pleasantness of his friend; for friendship is said to be equality. And this is true above all in the friendship of good people.

9.45 The characteristics of friendship are found in friendships for pleasure more than in friendships for utility

Among sour people and older people friendship is found less often, since they are worse tempered and enjoy meeting people less, [and so lack] what seems to be most typical and most productive of friendship. That is why young people become friends quickly, but older people do not, since they

do not become friends with people in whom they find no enjoyment—nor do sour people. These people have goodwill to each other, since they wish goods and give help in time of need; but they scarcely count as friends, since they do not spend their days together or find enjoyment in each other, and these things seem to be above all typical of friendship.

9.46 *The number of friends distinguishes the best kind of friendship*

No one can have complete friendship for many people, just as no one can have an erotic passion for many at the same time; for [complete friendship, like erotic passion,] is like an excess, and an excess is naturally directed at a single individual. Moreover, just as it is hard for the same person to please many people intensely at the same time, it is also hard, presumably, to be good towards many people at the same time.

Besides, he must gain experience of the other too, and become accustomed to him, which is very difficult.

It is possible, however, to please many people when the friendship is for utility or pleasure, since many people can be pleased in these ways, and the services take little time.

9.47 *Friendship for pleasure contrasted with friendship for utility*

Of these other two types of friendship the friendship for pleasure is more like [real] friendship; for they get the same thing from each other, and they find enjoyment in each other or in the same things. This is what friendships are like among young people; for a generous [attitude] is found here more [than among older people], whereas it is mercenary people who form friendships for utility.

Moreover, blessedly happy people have no need of anything useful, but do need sources of pleasure. For they want

to spend their lives with companions, and though what is painful is borne for a short time, no one could continuously endure even The Good Itself if it were painful to him; hence they seek friends who are pleasant. But, presumably, they must also seek friends who are good as well [as pleasant], and good for them too; for then they will have everything that friends must have.

9.48 *Evidence of the difference between the two incomplete types of friendship*

Someone in a position of power appears to have separate groups of friends; for some are useful to him, others pleasant, but the same ones are not often both. For he does not seek friends who are both pleasant and virtuous, or useful for fine actions, but seeks one group to be witty, when he pursues pleasure, and the other group to be clever in carrying out instructions; and the same person rarely has both features.

Though admittedly, as we have said, an excellent person is both pleasant and useful, he does not become a friend to a superior [in power and position] unless the superior is also superior in virtue; otherwise he does not reach [proportionate] equality by having a proportionate superior. And this superiority both in power and in virtue is not often found.

9.49 *Summary: The extent to which incomplete friendships are friendships*

The friendships we have mentioned involve equality, since both friends get the same and wish the same to each other, or exchange one thing for another, e.g. pleasure for benefit. But, as we have said, they are friendships to a lesser extent, and less enduring. Because they are both similar and dissimilar to the same thing they seem both to be and not to be friendships. For in so far as they are similar to the friendship of virtue, they appear to be friendships; for that

10 type of friendship includes both utility and pleasure, and one of these types includes utility, the other pleasure. On the other hand, since the friendship of virtue is enduring and immune to slander, while these change quickly and differ from it in many other ways as well, they do not appear to be friendships, in so far as they are dissimilar to that [best] type.

9.5 *Friendship Between Unequals*

9.51 *Types of friendship between unequals*

A different species of friendship is the one that corresponds to superiority, e.g. of a father towards his son, and in general of an older person towards a younger, of a man towards a woman, and of any sort of ruler towards the one he rules.

15 These friendships also differ from each other. For friendship of parents to children is not the same as that of rulers to ruled; nor is friendship of father to son the same as that of son to father, or of man to woman as that of woman to man.

Explanation of the different types

20 For each of these friends has a different virtue and a different function, and there are different causes of love. Hence the ways of loving are different, and so are the friendships. Each does not get the same thing from the other, then, and must not seek it; but whenever children accord to their parents what they must accord to those who gave them birth, and parents accord what they must to their children, their friendship is enduring and decent.

9.52 *Proportion and equality in friendship and in justice*

25 In all the friendships corresponding to superiority, the loving must also be proportional, e.g. the better person, and

the more beneficial, and each of the others likewise, must be loved more than he loves; for when the loving reflects the comparative worth of the friends, equality is achieved in a way, and this seems to be proper to friendship.

Equality, however, does not appear to be the same in friendship as in justice. For in justice equality is equality primarily in worth and secondarily in quantity; but in friendship it is equality primarily in quantity and secondarily in worth.

This is clear if friends come to be separated by some wide gap in virtue, vice, wealth, or something else; for then they are friends no more, and do not even expect to be. This is most evident with gods, since they have the greatest superiority in all goods. But it is also clear with kings, since far inferior people do not expect to be their friends; nor do worthless people expect to be friends to the best or wisest.

When the right proportion and equality are lost, the friendship is lost

Now in these cases there is no exact definition of how long people are friends. For even if one of them loses a lot, the friendship still endures; but if one is widely separated [from the other], as a god is [from a human being], it no longer endures.

Hence there is this puzzle: do friends really wish their friend to have the greatest good, e.g. to be a god? For [if he becomes a god], *he* will no longer have friends, and hence no longer have goods, since friends are goods.

If, then, we have been right to say that one friend wishes good things to the other for the sake of the other *himself*, the other must remain whatever sort of being he is. Hence it is to the other as a human being that a friend will wish the greatest goods—though presumably not all of them, since each person wishes goods most of all to himself.

10 he lent to a decent person, whereas you have no hope of it from a bad person. If that is really so, then, the demand [for reciprocity] is not fair; and even if it is not so, but you think it is so, your refusal of the demand seems not at all absurd.

As we have often said, then, arguments about acting and being affected are no more definite than their subject matter.

10.54 *Different benefits are owed to different friends*

15 Clearly, then, we should not give the same thing to everyone, and we should not give our fathers everything, just as we should not make all our sacrifices to Zeus. And since different things should be given to parents, brothers, companions and benefactors, we should accord to each what is proper and suitable. This is what actually appears to be done; e.g. kinsfolk are the people invited to a wedding, since they
20 share the same family, and hence share in actions that concern it; and for the same reason it is thought that kinsfolk more than anyone must come to funerals.

It seems that we must supply means of support to parents more than anyone. For we suppose that we owe them this, and that it is finer to supply those who are the causes of our being than to supply ourselves in this way. And we should
25 accord honour to our parents, just as we should to the gods, but not every sort of honour; for we should not accord the same honour to father and to mother, nor accord them the honour due a wise person or a general. We should accord a father's honour to a father, and likewise a mother's to a mother.

30 We should accord to every older person the honour befitting his age, by standing up, giving up seats and so on. With companions and brothers we should speak freely, and have everything in common. To kinsfolk, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-citizens and all the rest we should always try to accord what is proper, and should compare what belongs to each, as be-

fits closeness of relation, virtue or usefulness. Comparison is easier with people of the same kind, and more difficult with people of different kinds, but the difficulty is no reason for giving up the comparison; rather, we should define as far as we can.

10.6 *When Should Friendships Be Dissolved?*

10.61 *It is easy with friendships for utility and pleasure*

ix 3 There is also a puzzle about dissolving or not dissolving friendships with friends who do not remain the same. With friends for utility or pleasure perhaps there is nothing absurd in dissolving the friendship whenever they are no longer pleasant or useful. For they were friends of pleasure or utility; and if these give out, it is reasonable not to love.

10.62 *Supposed friendships for virtue may also be dissolved*

However, we might accuse a friend if he really liked us for utility or pleasure, and pretended to like us for our character. For, as we said at the beginning, friends are most at odds when they are not friends in the way they think they are. And so, if we mistakenly suppose we are loved for our character, when our friend is doing nothing to suggest this, we must hold ourselves responsible. But if we are deceived
5 by his pretence, we are justified in accusing him—even more justified than in accusing debasers of the currency, to the extent that his evil-doing debases something more precious.

10.63 *A change of character creates special difficulties*

But if we accept a friend as a good person, and then he becomes vicious, and seems so, should we still love him? Surely we cannot, if not everything, but only what is good,

15 is lovable. What is bad is not lovable, and must not be loved; for we ought neither to love what is bad nor to become similar to a bad person, and we have said that similar is friend to similar.

Then should the friendship be dissolved at once [as soon as the friend becomes bad]? Surely not with everyone, but only with an incurably vicious person. If someone can be set right, we should try harder to rescue his character than his property, in so far as character is both better and more proper to friendship.

However, the friend who dissolves the friendship seems to be doing nothing absurd. For he was not the friend of a person of this sort; hence, if the friend has altered, and he cannot save him, he leaves him.

But if one friend stayed the same and the other became more decent and far excelled his friend in virtue, should the better person still treat the other as a friend? Surely he cannot. This becomes clear in a wide separation, such as we find in friendships beginning in childhood. For if one friend still thinks as a child, while the other becomes a most superior man, how could they still be friends, when they neither approve of the same things nor find the same things enjoyable or painful? For they do not even find it so in their life together and without that they cannot be friends, since they cannot live together—we have discussed this.

10.64 *But the dissolution of a friendship may not cancel all special relations*

Then should the better person regard the other as though he had never become his friend? Surely he must keep some memory of the familiarity they had; and just as we think we must do kindnesses for friends more than for strangers, so also we should accord something to past friends because of the former friendship, whenever excessive vice does not cause the dissolution.

11. *The Sources and Justification of Friendship*

11.1 *Friendship May Be Understood by Reference to Self-love*

11.11 *The features of friendship*

The defining features of friendship that are found in friendships to one's neighbours would seem to be derived from features of friendship towards oneself.

For a friend is taken to be (1) someone who wishes and does goods or apparent goods to his friend for the friend's own sake; or (2) one who wishes the friend to be and to live for the friend's own sake—this is how mothers feel towards their children, and how friends who have been in conflict feel [towards each other]. (3) Others take a friend to be one who spends his time with his friend, and (4) makes the same choices; or (5) one who shares his friend's distress and enjoyment—and this also is true especially of mothers. And people define friendship by one of these features.

11.12 *These Features of Friendship Reflect the Virtuous Person's Love of Himself*

Each of these features is found in the decent person's relation to himself, and it is found in other people in so far as they suppose they are decent. As we have said, virtue and the excellent person would seem to be the standard in each case.

(4) The excellent person is of one mind with himself, and desires the same things in his whole soul.

(1) Hence he wishes goods and apparent goods to himself, and does them in his actions, since it is proper to the good person to achieve the good. He wishes and does them for his own sake, since he does them for the sake of his thinking part, and that is what each person seems to be.

(2) He wishes himself to live and to be preserved. And

20 he wishes this for the part by which he has intelligence more than for any other part. For being is a good for the good person, and each person wishes for goods for himself. And no one chooses to become another person even if that other will have every good when he has come into being; for, as it is, the god has the good [but no one chooses to be replaced by a god]. Rather [each of us chooses goods] on condition that he remains whatever he is; and each person would seem to be the understanding part, or that most of all. [Hence the good person wishes for goods for the understanding part.]

25 (3) Further, such a person finds it pleasant to spend time with himself, and so wishes to do it. For his memories of what he has done are agreeable, and his expectations for the future are good, and hence both are pleasant. And besides, his thought is well supplied with topics for study.

(5) Moreover, he shares his own distresses and pleasures, more than other people share theirs. For it is always the same thing that is painful or pleasant, not different things at different times. This is because he practically never regrets [what he has done].

30 The decent person, then, has each of these features in relation to himself, and is related to his friend as he is to himself, since the friend is another himself. Hence friendship seems to be one of these features, and people with these features seem to be friends.

35 Is there friendship towards oneself, or is there not? Let us dismiss that question for the present. However, there seems to be friendship in so far as someone is two or more parts. This seems to be true from what we have said, and because an extreme degree of friendship resembles one's friendship to oneself.

11.13 *Vicious people are not capable of the same self-love*

The many, base though they are, also appear to have these features. But perhaps they share in them only in so far as

they approve of themselves and suppose they are decent. For no one who is utterly bad and unscrupulous either has these features or appears to have them. 5

Indeed, even base people hardly have them.

(4) For they are at odds with themselves, and, like incontinent people, have an appetite for one thing and a wish for another.

(1) For they do not choose things that seem to be good for them, but instead choose pleasant things that are actually harmful. And cowardice or laziness causes others to shrink from doing what they think best for themselves. 10

(2) Those who have done many terrible actions hate and shun life because of their vice, and destroy themselves.

(3) Besides, vicious people seek others to pass their days with, and shun themselves. For when they are by themselves they remember many disagreeable actions, and expect to do others in the future; but they manage to forget these in other people's company. These people have nothing lovable about them, and so have no friendly feelings for themselves. 15

(5) Hence such a person does not share his own enjoyments and distresses. For his soul is in conflict, and because he is vicious one part is distressed at being restrained, and another is pleased [by the intended action]; and so each part pulls in a different direction, as though they were tearing him apart. Even if he cannot be distressed and pleased at the same time, still he is soon distressed because he was pleased, and wishes these things had not become pleasant to him; for base people are full of regret. 20 25

11.14 *Both self-love and friendship require virtue*

Hence the base person appears not to have a friendly attitude even towards himself, because he has nothing lovable about him.

If this state is utterly miserable, everyone should earnestly

shun vice and try to be decent; for that is how someone will have a friendly relation to himself and will become a friend to another.

11.2 *Goodwill is a Component of Friendship*

11.21 *Goodwill is not the same as friendship*

30 Goodwill would seem to be a feature of friendship, but still it is not friendship. For it arises even towards people we do not know, and without their noticing it, whereas friendship does not. We have said this before also.

35 Nor is it loving, since it lacks intensity and desire, which are implied by loving. Moreover, while loving requires familiarity, goodwill can also arise in a moment, as it arises, 1167a e.g., [in a spectator] for contestants. For [the spectator] acquires goodwill for them, and wants what they want, but would not cooperate with them in any action; for, as we said, his good will arises in a moment and his fondness is superficial.

11.22 *It is the basis of friendship . . .*

5 In fact goodwill would seem to originate friendship in the way that pleasure coming through sight originates erotic passion. For no one has erotic passion for another without previous pleasure in his appearance. But still enjoyment of his appearance does not imply erotic passion for him; passion consists also in longing for him in his absence and an appetite for his presence. Similarly, though people cannot be friends without previous goodwill, goodwill does not imply friendship; for when they have goodwill people only wish goods to the other, and will not cooperate with him in any 10 action, or go to any trouble for him.

Hence we might transfer [the name 'friendship'], and say that goodwill is inactive friendship, and that when it lasts some time and they grow accustomed to each other, it becomes friendship.

11.23 . . . *But only of the best kind of friendship*

It does not, however, become friendship for utility or pleasure, since these aims do not produce goodwill either.

For a recipient of a benefit does what is just when he returns goodwill for what he has received. But those who wish for another's welfare because they hope to enrich themselves through him would seem to have goodwill to themselves, rather than to him. Likewise, they would seem to be friends to themselves rather than to him, if they attend to him because he is of some use to them.

But in general good will results from some sort of virtue and decency, whenever one person finds another to be apparently fine or brave or something similar. As we said, this also arises in the case of contestants.

11.3 *Concord is a Component of Friendship*

11.31 *It requires agreement in beliefs about goods . . .*

ix 6 Now concord also appears to be a feature of friendship. Hence it is not merely sharing a belief, since this might happen among people who do not know each other. Nor are people said to be in concord when they agree about just anything, e.g. on astronomical questions, since concord on these questions is not a feature of friendship. Rather, a city is said to be in concord when [its citizens] agree about what is advantageous, make the same decision, and act on their common resolution.

Hence concord concerns questions for action, and, more exactly, large questions where both or all can get what they want. A city, e.g., is in concord whenever all the citizens resolve to make offices elective, or to make an alliance with the Spartans, or to make Pittacus ruler, when he is willing too.

... *But especially about the distribution of goods*

Whenever each person wants the same thing all to himself, as the people in the *Phoenissae* do, they are in conflict. For it is not concord when each merely has the same thing in mind, whatever it is, but each must also have the same thing in mind for the same person; this is true, e.g., whenever both the common people and the decent party want the best people to rule, since when that is so both sides get what they seek.

Concord, then, is apparently political friendship, as indeed it is said to be; for it is concerned with advantage and with what affects life [as a whole].

11.32 Hence it is largely confined to virtuous people

This sort of concord is found in decent people. For they are in concord with themselves and with each other, since they are practically of the same mind; for their wishes are stable, not flowing back and forth like a tidal strait. They wish for what is just and advantageous, and also seek it in common.

Base people, however, cannot be in concord, except to a small extent, just as they can be friends only to a small extent; for they are greedy for more benefits, and shirk labours and public services. And since each wishes this for himself, he interrogates and obstructs his neighbour; for when people do not look out for the common good, it is ruined. The result is that they are in conflict, trying to compel each other to do what is just, but not wishing to do it themselves.

11.4 Active and Unselfish Benevolence is a Component of Friendship

11.41 Why do benefactors love more than they are loved?

Now benefactors seem to love their beneficiaries more than the beneficiaries love them [in return], and this is discussed as though it were an unreasonable thing to happen.

11.42 The common explanation assumes that the benefactor is purely selfish

Here is how it appears to most people. It is because the beneficiaries are debtors and the benefactors creditors: the debtor in a loan wishes the creditor did not exist, while the creditor even attends to the safety of the debtor. So also, then, a benefactor wants the beneficiary to exist because he expects gratitude in return, while the beneficiary is not attentive about making the return.

Now Epicharmus might say that most people say this because they 'take a bad person's point of view'. Still, it would seem to be a human point of view, since the many are indeed forgetful, and seek to receive benefits more than to give them.

But this explanation is refuted by the facts

However, it seems that the cause is more proper to [human] nature, and the case of creditors is not even similar. For they do not love their debtors, but in wishing for their safety simply seek repayment; whereas benefactors love and like their beneficiaries even if they are of no present or future use to them.

11.43 The correct explanation assumes that the benefactor is unselfish

The same is true with craftsmen; for each likes his own product more than it would like him if it acquired a soul. Perhaps this is true of poets most of all, since they dearly like their own poems, and are fond of them as though they were their children. This, then, is what the case of the benefactor resembles; here the beneficiary is his product, and hence he likes him more than the product likes its producer.

11.44 *This explanation is justified by facts about human nature*

Active benevolence realizes human capacities

The cause of this is as follows:

1. Being is choiceworthy and lovable for all.
2. We are in so far as we are actualized, since we are in so far as we live and act.
3. The product is, in a way, the producer in his actualization.
4. Hence the producer is fond of the product, because he loves his own being. And this is natural, since what he is potentially is what the product indicates in actualization.

It is finest and pleasantest

- 10 At the same time, the benefactor's action is fine for him, so that he finds enjoyment in the person he acts on; but the person acted on finds nothing fine in the agent, but only, at most, some advantage, which is less pleasant and lovable.

- 15 What is pleasant is actualization in the present, expectation for the future, and memory of the past; but what is pleasantest is the [action we do] in so far as we are actualized, and this is also most lovable. For the benefactor, then, his product endures, since what is fine is long-lasting; but for the person acted on, what is useful passes away.

Besides, memory of something fine is pleasant, while memory of [receiving] something useful is not altogether pleasant, or is less pleasant—though the reverse would seem to be true for expectation.

Benevolence is production

- 20 Moreover, loving is like production, while being loved is like being acted on; and [the benefactor's] love and friendliness is the result of his greater activity.

Benevolence reflects the benefactor's own effort

Besides, everyone is fond of what has needed effort to produce it; e.g. people who have made money themselves are fonder of it than people who have inherited it. And while receiving a benefit seems to take no effort, giving one is hard work.

This is also why mothers love their children more [than fathers do], since giving birth is more effort for them, and they know better that the children are theirs. And this also would seem to be proper to benefactors.

11.5 *Self-love is a Component of Friendship*

11.51 *The common view identifies self-love with selfishness*

- ix 8 There is also a puzzle about whether one ought to love oneself or someone else most of all; for those who like themselves most are criticized and denounced as self-lovers, as though this were something shameful.

Indeed, the base person does seem to go to every length for his own sake, and all the more the more vicious he is; hence he is accused, e.g., of doing nothing of his own accord. The decent person, on the contrary, acts for what is fine, all the more the better he is, and for his friend's sake, disregarding his own good.

11.52 *But facts about friendship justify self-love*

The facts, however, conflict with these claims, and that is not unreasonable.

For it is said that we must love most the friend who is most a friend; and one person is most a friend to another if he wishes goods to the other for the other's sake, even if no one will know about it. But these are features most of all of one's relation to oneself; and so too are all the other

1168b5 defining features of a friend, since we have said that all the features of friendship extend from oneself to others.

All the proverbs agree with this too, e.g. speaking of 'one soul', 'what friends have is common', 'equality is friendship' and 'the knee is closer than the shin'. For all these are true most of all in someone's relations with himself, since one is a friend to himself most of all. Hence he should also love himself most of all.

11.53 *Hence we must distinguish good and bad forms of self-love*

It is not surprising that there is a puzzle about which view we ought to follow, since both inspire some confidence; hence we must presumably divide these sorts of arguments, and distinguish how far and in what ways those on each side are true.

15 Perhaps, then, it will become clear, if we grasp how those on each side understand self-love.

11.54 *The bad form of self-love is selfish, resting on an incorrect view of the self*

Those who make self-love a matter for reproach ascribe it to those who award the biggest share in money, honours and bodily pleasures to themselves. For these are the goods desired and eagerly pursued by the many on the assumption that they are best; and hence they are also contested.

20 Those who are greedy for these goods gratify their appetites and in general their feelings and the non-rational part of the soul; and since this is the character of the many, the application of the term ['self-love'] is derived from the most frequent [kind of self-love], which is base. This type of self-lover, then, is justifiably reproached.

And plainly it is the person who awards himself these goods whom the many habitually call a self-lover. For if

someone is always eager to excel everyone in doing just or temperate actions or any others expressing the virtues, and in general always gains for himself what is fine, no one will call him a self-lover or blame him for it.

11.55 *But the good form of self-love rests on a correct view of the self*

However, it is this more than the other sort of person who seems to be a self-lover. At any rate he awards himself what is finest and best of all, and gratifies the most controlling part of himself, obeying it in everything. And just as a city and every other composite system seems to be above all its most controlling part, the same is true of a human being; hence someone loves himself most if he likes and gratifies this part.

Similarly, someone is called continent or incontinent because his understanding is or is not the master, on the assumption that this is what each person is. Moreover, his own voluntary actions seem above all to be those involving reason. Clearly, then, this, or this above all, is what each person is, and the decent person likes this most of all.

Hence he most of all is a self-lover, but a different kind from the self-lover who is reproached, differing from him as much as the life guided by reason differs from the life guided by feelings, and as much as the desire for what is fine differs from the desire for what seems advantageous.

11.56 *Hence it leads to virtuous action*

Those who are unusually eager to do fine actions are welcomed and praised by everyone. And when everyone competes to achieve what is fine and strains to do the finest actions, everything that is right will be done for the common good, and each person individually will receive the greatest of goods, since that is the character of virtue.

Hence the good person must be a self-lover, since he will both help himself and benefit others by doing fine actions. But the vicious person must not love himself, since he will harm both himself and his neighbours by following his base feelings.

15 For the vicious person, then, the right actions conflict with those he does. The decent person, however, does the right actions, since every understanding chooses what is best for itself and the decent person obeys his understanding.

11.57 *It even leads to costly sacrifices*

20 Besides, it is true that, as they say, the excellent person labours for his friends and for his native country, and will die for them if he must; he will sacrifice money, honours and contested goods in general, in achieving what is fine for himself. For he will choose intense pleasure for a short time over mild pleasure for a long time; a year of living finely over many years of undistinguished life; and a single fine and great action over many small actions.

25 This is presumably true of one who dies for others; he does indeed choose something great and fine for himself. He is ready to sacrifice money as long as his friends profit; for the friends gain money, while he gains what is fine, and so he awards himself the greater good. He treats honours and offices the same way; for he will sacrifice them all for his friends, since this is fine and praiseworthy for him. It is not surprising, then, that he seems to be excellent, when he chooses what is fine at the cost of everything. It is also possible, however, to sacrifice actions to his friend, since it may be finer to be responsible for his friend's doing the action than to do it himself. In everything praiseworthy, then, the excellent person awards himself what is fine.

1169b In this way, then, we must be self-lovers, as we have said. But in the way the many are, we ought not to be.

11.6 *The Justification of Friendship*

11.61 *Friends do not seem to be needed for happiness*

ix 9 There is also a dispute about whether the happy person will need friends or not.

For it is said that blessedly happy and self-sufficient people have no need of friends. For they already have [all] the goods, and hence, being self-sufficient, need nothing added. But your friend, since he is another yourself, supplies what your own efforts cannot supply. Hence it is said, 'When the god gives well, what need is there of friends?'

11.62 *But friends are the greatest external good*

However, in awarding the happy person all the goods it would seem absurd not to give him friends; for having friends seems to be the greatest external good.

11.63 *We need friends for us to benefit*

And it is more proper to a friend to confer benefits than to receive them, and proper to the good person and to virtue to do good; and it is finer to benefit friends than to benefit strangers. Hence the excellent person will need people for him to benefit. Indeed, that is why there is a question about whether friends are needed more in good fortune than in ill-fortune; for it is assumed that in ill-fortune we need people to benefit us, and in good fortune we need others for us to benefit.

11.64 *Solitude makes happiness impossible*

Surely it is also absurd to make the blessed person a solitary. For no one would choose to have all [other] goods and yet be alone, since a human being is political, tending by nature to live together with others. This will also be true,

20 then, of the happy person; for he has the natural goods, and clearly it is better to spend his days with decent friends than with strangers of just any character. Hence the happy person will need friends.

11.65 We can observe the actions of virtuous friends

Then what are the other side saying, and in what way is it true? Surely they say what they say because the many think that it is the useful people who are friends. Certainly
25 the blessedly happy person will have no need of these, since he has [all] goods. Similarly, he will have no need, or very little, of friends for pleasure; for since his life is pleasant, it has no need of imported pleasures. Since he does not need these sorts of friends, he does not seem to need friends at all.

However, this conclusion is presumably not true:

- 30 (1) For we said at the beginning that happiness is a kind of activity; and clearly activity comes into being, and does not belong [to someone all the time], as a possession does. Being happy, then, is found in living and being active.
(2) The activity of the good person is excellent, and [hence] pleasant in itself, as we said at the beginning.
(3) Moreover, what is our own is pleasant.
(4) We are able to observe our neighbours more than ourselves, and to observe their actions more than our own.
35 (5) Hence a good person finds pleasure in the actions of excellent people who are his friends, since these actions have
1170a both the naturally pleasant [features, i.e. they are good, and they are his own].
(6) The blessed person decides to observe virtuous actions that are his own; and the actions of a virtuous friend are of this sort.
(7) Hence he will need virtuous friends.

11.66 Friendship provides pleasure

Further, it is thought that the happy person must live pleasantly. But the solitary person's life is hard, since it is
5 not easy for him to be continuously active all by himself; but in relation to others and in their company it is easier, and hence his activity will be more continuous. It is also pleasant in itself, as it must be in the blessedly happy person's case. For the excellent person, in so far as he is excellent, enjoys actions expressing virtue, and objects to actions
10 caused by vice, just as the musician enjoys fine melodies and is pained by bad ones.

11.67 Friendship encourages virtue

Further, good people's life together allows the cultivation of virtue, as Theognis says.

11.68 Friendship realizes human capacities

If we examine the question more from the point of view of [human] nature, an excellent friend would seem to be
choiceworthy by nature for an excellent person.

- (1) For, as we have said, what is good by nature is good
15 and pleasant in itself for an excellent person.
(2) For animals life is defined by the capacity for perception; for human beings it is defined by the capacity for perception or understanding.
(3) Every capacity refers to an activity, and a thing is present to its full extent in its activity.
(4) Hence living to its full extent would seem to be perceiving or understanding.
(5) Life is good and pleasant in itself. For it has definite
20 order, which is proper to the nature of what is good.
(6) What is good by nature is also good for the decent person. That is why life would seem to be pleasant for everyone. Here, however, we must not consider a life that is vicious and corrupted, or filled with pains; for such a life